Part I. The first part will contain questions asking for brief descriptions of some of the key ideas we have discussed; these will be taken from the list I made available earlier on the web. Here they are again, for your convenience:

utilitarianism

consequentialism

act utilitarianism vs rule utilitarianism

deontology

absolutism

two-tiered versions of consequentialism

paradox of hedonism; paradox of consequentialism

subjective vs. objective hedonism; subjective vs. objective consequentialism

alienation

side constraints

agent-relative vs. agent-neutral reasons

agent-relative permissions (Nagel: "reasons of autonomy")

agent-relative restrictions (Nagel: "deontological reasons")

principle of double effect

morality vs ethics

Moral Saint

Rational Saint

practice

internal goods vs external goods

virtue

Part II. The second part of the examination will ask you to write an extended essay on one of two questions. Answers to the essay question will be graded on (1) the degree of familiarity with,and understanding of, the details of the readings exhibited by your answers; (2) quality of philosophical argument, and degree to which you consider and respond to views opposed to your own; (3) clarity of organization and expression. The outline of the material we have covered this semester on the web site may help you to organize your thought for the examination. Of course, you should also review the readings! The overview does *not* contain enough material to enable you to do well on the exam without also consulting the texts! Here are some candidates for the essay question:

1. The desert-island promise. You are marooned on a desert island with a very wealthy dying person. This person tells you where to find the millions she has hidden away, and asks you to promise that you will give the money to her nephew. You promise. Shortly afterward, she dies. There is no one else on the island, so there is no way that anyone else will ever find out about the promise. The next day, you are rescued. You return to the US and recover the hidden millions. However, you discover that the nephew, while a decent sort, is rather self-centered. He won't do anything evil with the money, but he is likely to squander it on expensive sports cars and perhaps a mansion or two. On the other hand, you could donate the money to a worthy charity, where it would do much more good. What should you do?

Discuss this example, bringing to bear as much of the material we have read as you can. Include discussion of the following: what would a simple consequentialist say about the example, and why? What differences are there between the way a simple consequentialist would approach this case, and the way a souped-up consequentialist along Scanlon's or Railton's lines would approach it? Construct and evaluate a deontological justification of keeping the promise, and compare this with the consequentialist approaches. Finally, consider what bearing MacIntyre's account of the virtues might have on this example. (Assume that the right thing to do, for MacIntyre, is what a virtuous person would do.)

2. Liver transplants. Each year, 4,000 livers must be distributed among 7,000 waiting patients. How should we decide who gets them? There is currently a debate between two policies. The policy currently in effect gives preference to patients close to the donor organ: a donated liver is offered to waiting local patients in order of medical need; if there is no match, the liver is offered to patients in the region. Most transplant centers are local, and these local centers obviously benefit from this policy.

On the other hand, there is a smaller number of large centers which care for the sickest patients and have the longest waiting lists. These centers, such as the University of Pittsburgh, have argued for an alternative policy according to which donated livers should go to the sickest patients first. They argue that this would alleviate the current situation, in which the waiting time for livers is five times as long in some parts of the country as it is in others.

Consider how the various views we have discussed would approach this issue. Consider simple consequentialist, souped-up consequentialist, deontological, and virtue-ethics approaches. Of particular interest are the nature of justice, the relation between justice and utility, and the extremely interesting issue of the contrast Nagel draws between agent-neutral and agent-relative reasons. (Local centers have agent-relative reasons to give livers to local patients. But could there be any agent-neutral reason to prefer local patients over sicker patients waiting elsewhere?)

3. Give a careful account of MacIntyre's account of the nature of virtue. Then discuss whether the account is adequate or not. Include discussion of: the nature of practices, the distinction between internal and external goods, the definition of virtue in terms of practices. Consider potential problems for MacIntyre's account and argue than they can or can't (depending on your view) be overcome.

4. Is morality on the whole a bad thing? Explain and compare the indictments of morality offered by Anscombe, Williams, and Wolf. How are they similar and different? Are they convincing as objections to the consequentialist and deontological ideas we have considered? With what do these writers think that morality should be replaced?

5. Explain what agent-relative permissions and agent-relative restrictions are, and why they seem to pose a problem for simple consequentialism. Then explain and evaluate the claim that a more sophisticated consequentialism, of the sort defended by Railton (or Scanlon, or both), can provide satisfying answers to these problems.

Curtis Brown
Last Update: March 1, 1998