Philosophy of Language |
We have looked at theories regarding two main (related) topics: reference and meaning. I have also listed Russell's logical atomism as a third topic, although it overlaps both of the other topics. Here is a summary of some of the highlights of the material we have discussed on these three topics. You should be familiar with, and able to write about, the issues, terminology, and arguments mentioned or briefly summarized below. Some of the items are sample questions; others are brief summaries of ideas you should be familiar with. I have longer notes on a number of these issues available online (but of course ultimately what you need to be familiar with are the texts themselves).
what does Russell mean by "analysis"?
what is logical atomism? What makes it "logical"? (Logical as opposed to what?) What makes it "atomism"? (Atomism as opposed to what?)
explain how Russell thinks that language and metaphysics are related. How can we use language as a guide to what there is? (Be able to give some examples.)
what does Russell mean by a "logical construction"? What are they good for? Be able to give an example.
1. Definite Descriptions
A. referential theory: the meaning of a definite description is simply its reference
problem 1: apparent reference to nonexistents (if the referential theory were true, a sentence with a nonreferring definite description would seem to be meaningless: if meaning = reference, then a definite description could only have a meaning if it had a reference. But in fact nonreferring definite descriptions like "the present king of France" seem perfectly meaningful.
problem 2: negative existentials. A special case of problem 1. If the referential theory were true, then a sentence like "the present king of France does not exist," if meaningful, would be self-contradictory (or at least necessarily false). But in fact it seems both meaningful and true.
problem 3: Frege's puzzle (how can identity statements be informative and contingent?) If meaning = reference, then "the morning star = the evening star" is just a fancy way of saying Venus = Venus, which seems to be both necessary and uninformative. However, "the morning star = the evening star" in fact seems to be informative and contingent.
problem 4: Substitutivity. If the referential theory were true, then we would expect that substitution of one definite description for another coreferential definite description would be guaranteed to preserve truth. But in some contexts, e.g. belief contexts, this does not seem to be the case.
B. Russell's theory of definite descriptions. (You should be able to describe the theory, and also to explain how it attempts to deal with the four objections above.)
2. Proper names (Kripke, Naming and Necessity)
A. referential theory: meaning of a proper name is simply its reference. Note that this faces exactly the same four objections as the referential theory of definite descriptions (although the examples of course need to change to involve names rather than descriptions).
B. the description theory of proper names (simple version): every proper name is synonymous with a particular definite description. So we can use Russell's theory of definite descriptions to explain the meaning of names as well.
problem 1: the same person may associate different definite descriptions with a name at different times. And even at a single time, there may be no single description that the person would associate with the name.
problem 2: different people associate different descriptions with the same names.
C. the cluster theory: the meaning of a name is a "cluster" of descriptions, not a single description
problem 1: (metaphysical objection) if a name is synonymous with a cluster of descriptions, then it must be a necessary truth that all or most of the descriptions are true of the bearer of the name. But in fact this doesn't seem to be necessary. Even if the descriptions are true, this fact seems contingent, not necessary.
problem 2: (epistemological objection) if a name is synonymous with a cluster of descriptions, then it must be a priori that the descriptions are true of the bearer of the name. But even if the descriptions are true, they seem to be a posteriori rather than a priori.
problem 3: (semantic objection 1) if a name is synonymous with a cluster of descriptions, then it must be true that all or most of the descriptions are true of the bearer of the name. But it seems that this could turn out to be false. (Thales, Gödel/Schmidt: maybe Thales and Gödel don't have any of the properties we associate with them.)
problem 4: (semantic objection 2) if a name is synonymous with a cluster of descriptions, then it must be true that whatever has all or most of the descriptions is the bearer of the name. (The converse of the previous point.) But examples like Gödel/Schmidt seem to show that this isn't correct. (Even if Schmidt had all the characteristics we associate with Gödel, we wouldn't be referring to Schmidt when we use the name 'Gödel'.)
My tabular overview of the description theory is here. I've also put up a more discursive summary of some of the main arguments here.
D. The causal-historical theory (or "picture") of how the reference of names is determined. (Note that this is not a theory of the "meaning" of names if meaning has to do with what a competent user understands. Kripke's view is that reference is determined in part by factors that the user may not know about: it's the chain of transmission from the original dubbing to my use that determines what I'm referring to, but referring to, say, Socrates when I use the name 'Socrates' does not require that I know much about the chain of transmission.)
My tabular summary of the causal-historical theory is here.
E. miscellaneous things to know about Kripke, causal-historical theory, and related matters:
rigid designator
1. Ideational Theories (Locke reading and Lycan's discussion)
(Lockean version: ideas are like images)
problem 1: images are too specific (as Berkeley pointed out, you can't have an image of a triangle in general: it will be isosceles or scalene or . . . )
problem 2: lots of words have no associated images
problem 3: images are too idiosyncratic (i.e. they vary from one speaker to another; thus, if meanings were images, words would all be multiply ambiguous)
My notes on this material are here.
2. "Use" theories (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, and Lycan's discussion)
Wittgensteinian ideas to be familiar with include:
Wittgenstein's criticisms, explicit or implicit, of the referential, ideational, and propositional views of meaning
language game
rules of language
family resemblances
language as abstraction vs. as concrete social practice
My notes on the Wittgenstein reading are here.
3. Psychological Theories (Grice)
Grice's definition of speaker meaning
roughly: S speaker-means P by uttering x if and only if:
(1) S uttered x intending that A (S's audience) form the belief that P;
(2) S intended that A recognize that (1);
(3) S intended that A form the belief that P because A recognizes that (1)
problem 1: soliloquizing (no audience; possible responses: you can be your own audience, or the audience can be hypothetical)
problem 2: speaker may not intend audience to acquire belief (preaching to the choir; the examinee)
Grice's account of sentence meaning. You don't need to know much about this, as it is only vaguely specified in Lycan, but very roughly the idea is that a sentence S means P if people usually, or under ideal circumstances, speaker-mean that P when they utter a sentence of the same type as S. (By "same type" I mean another instance of the same abstract sentence -- the same words in the same order.) We have a somewhat more developed version of a related account in Lewis's definition of what it is for a population to use a language.
My notes on (Lycan's chapter on) Grice are here.
5. Verificationism (Ayer, Language, Truth, and Logic, and Lycan's discussion)
verifiability criterion of cognitive significance
verificationist theory of meaning
strong vs. weak verifiability
verifiability in principle vs. in practice
relation between verificationism and classical empiricism (as in e.g. Locke)
Ayer's conception of the role of philosophy (not "metaphysics"! Rather, "analysis.")
analytic/synthetic distinction (related to "analysis" and "analytic philosophy")
what is Ayer's theory of truth? (Sometimes called the "redundancy theory")
what is Ayer's theory of ethics? (sometimes called "emotivism"; how does he distinguish it from other views?)
Objections to verificationism:
Some notes on Ayer that I've put online: chapter 3, chapter 5.
My general discussion of verificationism, with emphasis on its early modern origins: verificationism.
6. Truth-Condition Theories: Extensional and Intensional
how is verificationism similar to, and different from, a truth-conditions theory?
what is an extension (of a singular term; of a predicate)?
what is an extensional truth-conditions theory?
Davidson: T-sentences
what is a possible world?
what is an intension (of a singular term; of a predicate)?
what is an intensional truth-conditions theory? (what is the distinction between extension and intension?)
be able to explain how an intensional account avoids some of the problems of an extensional account.
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Last update: March 5, 2007. |