PHILOSOPHY OF MINDQUESTIONS FOR THE MID-TERM EXAMINATION |
The examination will have two parts. The first part will ask you to explain, carefully but briefly, a number of basic ideas covered in the readings. (Probably 6-8 questions.) The second part will ask you to write one more extended essay.
| Questions for Part I: short answer |
- Cartesian dualism
- materialism (physicalism)
- epiphenomenalism
- interactionism
- the "ghost in the machine"
- category mistake
- behaviorism
- Super-Spartans
- X-Worlders
- identity theory
- the "is" of definition and the "is" of composition (Place)
- logical independence of expressions vs. ontological independence of entities (Place)
- the phenomenological fallacy (Place)
- "species chauvinism"
- functionalism
- probabilistic automaton (Putnam)
- functionalism: Functionalism vs. Psychofunctionalism (Block)
- homunculi-headed robot (Block)
- the "knowledge argument"
- Turing machine
- inverted qualia
- absent qualia
- pseudonormal vision
- special sciences
- token physicalism vs. type physicalism
- multiple realization
- the causal exclusion problem
- supervenience
- determinate vs. determinable
- phenomenal consciousness
- access consciousness
- Chase & Sanborn
- super-blindsight (what would it be and what would it show?)
Questions for Part II: Essay
The general idea for the essay is to take a position on one of the theories we have discussed so far, and defend your position in relation to the issues and arguments discussed in the readings for the class. Essays will be graded on the accuracy, thoroughness, and clarity with which you discuss the relevant readings, as well as the cogency and clarity of your arguments.
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of dualism, focusing on Cartesian dualism. You should include discussion of the following issues: How did Descartes argue in favor of a dualist view? What objections have persuaded many that Cartesian dualism is not a tenable view? Can these objections be met? Does epiphenomenalism provide a more acceptable version of dualism? (Of course you may want to consider other issues as well.)
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of behaviorism. You should include discussion of the following issues: What motivations have made behaviorism attractive to some with a scientific mind-set? What are the chief difficulties the view faces? How might a behaviorist respond to these difficulties, and are these responses adequate? Conclude by discussing connections between behaviorism and other topics we have discussed. What are the similarities and differences between behaviorism and functionalism? (Of course you may want to consider other issues as well.)
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of functionalism. You should include discussion of the following issues: What exactly is functionalism, anyway? How is it similar to and different from behaviorism and the identity theory? To what extent does it overcome objections to those views, and to what extent is it still vulnerable to them? Does it face additional objections? (Of course you may want to consider other issues as well.)
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the identity theory. You should include discussion of the following issues: What is the identity theory? Why does it seem to take the existence and importance of internal mental states more seriously than behaviorism? Does it require contingent identity statements, and can there be such a thing? Why does it seem that its account of mental states may be insufficiently general? (Of course you may want to consider other issues as well.)
- Explain what is meant by nonreductive physicalism, using functionalism as an example and drawing on Fodor's discussion of "reductivism." Then explain why Kim thinks that there is an "exclusion problem" for nonreductive physicalism, and how Yablo responds to this problem. Defend one position or the other (or if you reject both, explain why).
- Is there a distinction between P-consciousness and A-consciousness? Explain, and defend or criticize, Dennett's attempt to (in effect) reject the distinction by arguing that qualia are a philosopher's fiction.
Last update: October 8, 2005. |