Philosophy of Mind
Questions for the Midterm Examination
[Complete and Final Version, as of 1:40 PM,
October 12]
The examination will have two parts. The first part will ask you to explain,
carefully but briefly, a number of basic ideas covered in the readings. The second part will ask you to write
two more extended essays. Each part will count for half of the overall grade.
Questions for Part I: Short Answer
I will ask
questions about approximately eight of the
following terms or concepts. Answers should be approximately a paragraph. You
should be able to define technical terms, give examples where appropriate, and
explain what issues or arguments the concept figures in.
- phenomenal states vs. intentional states
- Cartesian dualism (= substance dualism)
- property dualism
- supervenience
- physicalism
- indiscernibility of identicals
- epiphenomenalism
- dualist interactionism
- behaviorism
- verificationism
- behaviorism: linguistic thesis (Kim: Logical Behaviorism)
- behaviorism: methodological thesis (Kim: Scientific Behaviorism)
- behaviorism: metaphysical thesis (Kim: Ontological Behaviorism)
- identity theory
- Ockham's Razor
- "species chauvinism"
- functionalism
- multiple realizability
- Turing machine
- probabilistic automaton
- Turing Test
- Chinese room argument
- inverted qualia
- absent qualia
- zombie
- token physicalism vs. type physicalism
- nomological model of causation
- anomalous monism
- causal closure of the physical
- the causal exclusion problem
- consciousness vs. awareness
- HOP and HOT analyses of consciousness
- explanatory gap
- hard problem of consciousness
- interpretation theory of mental content ("interpretivism")
- causal-correlational account of mental content
- teleological account of mental content
- narrow vs. wide (or broad) content
- intrinsic property
- identity reduction
- functional reduction
Questions for Part II: Essays
The general idea for the essays is to take a position on one of the theories
we have discussed so far, and defend your position in relation to the issues and
arguments discussed in the readings for the class. Essays will be graded on the
accuracy, thoroughness, and clarity with which you discuss the relevant
readings, as well as the cogency and clarity of your arguments. I will give you
three of the following questions, and ask you to write on any two of the three I
choose.
- Analyze
the strengths and weaknesses of dualism, focusing on Cartesian dualism.
You should include discussion of the following issues: What arguments can be
offered in favor of a dualist view? What objections have
persuaded many that Cartesian dualism is not a tenable view? Can
these objections be met? Does epiphenomenalism provide a more
acceptable version of dualism? (Of course you may want to consider
other issues as well.)
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of behaviorism. You should include
discussion of the following issues: What arguments have made behaviorism
attractive to some with a scientific mind-set? What are the chief
difficulties the view faces? How might a behaviorist respond to these
difficulties, and are these responses adequate? Conclude by discussing
connections between behaviorism and other topics we have discussed. What are
the similarities and differences between behaviorism and functionalism? (Of course you may
want to consider other issues as well.)
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of the identity theory. You should
include discussion of the following issues: What is the identity theory?
How does it fare against the problems with behaviorism? Is it compatible
with the existence of nonhuman sentience or intelligence? (Of course you may want to consider
other issues as well.)
- Analyze the strengths and weaknesses of functionalism. You should
include discussion of the following issues: What
exactly is functionalism,
anyway? How is it similar to and different from behaviorism and the identity
theory? To what extent does it overcome objections to those views, and to what
extent is it still vulnerable to them? Does it face additional objections?
(Of course you may want to consider other issues as well.)
- Kim discusses two main problems of mental causation. Both arguments lead
to the conclusion that, although mental events may be able to cause physical
events, they cannot do so by virtue of their mental properties. The first is
an argument that Davidson's anomalous monism leads to this conclusion; the
second is an argument that functionalism, plus the causal closure of the
physical, leads to this conclusion. Write an essay in which you discuss one
of these two arguments in detail. Include an explanation of the distinction
between token physicalism and type physicalism, and a precise explanation of
how there can still be a problem of mental causation even if token
physicalism is true. Conclude with your own assessment of the correct
conclusions to draw about mental causation.
- The main problems for a physicalist account of consciousness concern
phenomenal consciousness, or qualia. Explain what phenomenal consciousness
is by contrasting it with what Chalmers calls "awareness." Then explain why
this aspect of consciousness seems so difficult to account for (that is,
explain why there seems to be a "hard problem" about consciousness, or an
"explanatory gap" that is difficult to fill). Conclude by explaining whether
you think there is in fact a "hard problem," and if so, what this shows
about physicalistic theories of consciousness. (For example, you might think
that some versions of physicalism can solve the problem while others can't;
or you might think that it shows that no version of physicalism can be
correct.)
- Explain the interpretivist, causal-correlational, and teleological
approaches to mental content, including the advantages and problems of each.
Conclude by discussing which view you think is closest to the truth, and
why. (Alternatively, if you have a rival view, you could explain and defend
that.)
- Explain what is meant by the distinction between reductive and
nonreductive physicalism. Note that Kim treats both the identity theory and
functionalism as offering "reductions" of mental to physical properties. He
contrasts both with emergentism as a form of nonreductive physicalism.
Explain what identity reductions and functional reductions are, and how they
deal with the "explanatory gap."
Last update: October 12, 2009.
Curtis Brown |
Philosophy of Mind |
Philosophy Department |
Trinity University
cbrown@trinity.edu