Brian Wade Garrison

12 March 2001

PHIL 3322

Dr. Brown

Hume and His Problem of Induction

David Hume remains most noted for his skepticism. Even on his deathbed denying his belief in God because he still doubted. Similarly after taking great lengths to understand the causal relationships between events that occur and our deductions about them through perception, Hume became skeptical of the nature of gaining knowledge through induction.

He had established that the majority of beliefs that people have derive from a cause and then a subsequent effect. And even if not every single cause and effect is seen between two relied upon causal relationships we infer that these instances always hold true. Then it occurred to Hume that nothing about the future could be determined through causal factors. Deduction was still plausible because it appeared obvious that the laws that have been true until the present should be consistent with the past. He felt that the causal factors used for deduction from cause to effect could not be applied in the same way for the future because nothing exists that makes things always proceed from one cause to a single effect. It seemed to Hume that the decision to rely on cause on effect for future events was not based in any logical reasoning. The example Hume gives is the sun rising. Just because the sun has always risen does not mean that one has any reason to believe that it will do the same thing the next day (in which case one might throw out the idea of day, but anyway you get the idea).

After reading Hume philosophers attempting to interpret his Enquiry are left with the question of whether or not anything can be counted on to occur in the future based on previous observed events. From here several arguments arise regarding Hume’s findings with no definitive lines being drawn on a specific side. Each philosopher applies Hume’s ideas in a different way with different problems. They all make some sort of attempt to prove that validity or invalidity of the use of induction, but they go about it in different ways and sometimes with minute clarifications regarding their specific interests. These arguments appear to arise in part because Hume never completely concludes his thoughts on the matter and instead ventures off to dissect beliefs that people create. These beliefs themselves a further solidification of inferences made in regards to the nature of the world. At best he revisits his problem with the idea of probability but this again seems to him to be engaging in a circular argument. After all, one is already relying on the probability of previous events when determining the possibility of the future. Hume’s conclusion according to most is that the only kind of reasoning of any merit is deductive. Only careful deduction regarding past events can be made with anything near certainty.

The notion of probability leads to the discussion on the matter of the validity of making inductive inferences. Many try to explore the idea of probability and determine that it can be used for inductive conclusions. For instance, it is argued that certain things are impossible and therefore can be ruled out of occurring in relation to a cause. However these arguments never seem to withstand much consideration, especially in relation to Hume given that he seems to account for the possibility of the impossible, because of the nature of the calculation of probability. The very act of calculation involves certain assumptions about the future. The calculation is such that regardless of what is being calculated the calculation promotes and inductive framework for coming to conclusions. Perhaps probability would be an appropriate way to solve the problem if all possibilities could be calculated as Empiricus believed (Weintraub 1995) , but given that this cannot be done calculation of probability seems to remain useless in regards to solving Hume’s problem. Even so, Reichenbach, a mathematician, still attempted to justify the act of induction with the idea that if predictions are made and that they do eventually come to pass, then the use of induction is valid (Reichenbach, 1940). Another quandary regards the scientific method which makes various deductive conclusions but relies upon an inductive statement for the basis of further information when an experiment occurs. The response to this by Carl Popper is the idea that once the experiment concludes deductive reason shall be used to acquire information regarding the experiment (Weintraub 1995). This method of course also depends on generalizations and as C. S. Pierce points out, if a broad enough generalization is made then the result of a hypothesis will eventually come true (Ayer 1980).

Some readers interpret Hume completely differently. Instead of regarding Hume’s attack on induction as a an argument that needs exploration, Beauchamp and Rosenberg maintained the idea that Hume is attacking the faculty of reason (Fogelin 1985). Given that Hume was an empiricist this seems a likely supposition. In which case it would explain Hume’s failure to address or come to some sort of conclusion about induction. In this case, Hume might have surmised that deduction was the only way to go about making conclusions through the faculty of perception. Inductive reason ultimately coming down to some sort of blind approximation of what might or might not happen. However the attitude toward Hume’s problem results in the opinion that the use of inductive inference is ineffectual, and that regardless of whether or not it leads to the truth, it is still a preferable way of approaching things that might or might not come to pass. Strawson argued that the act of induction was what making decisions was (Weintraub 1995). Finally many philosophers appear to be able to think through logically Hume’s problem but they cannot find any more concrete answer than Hume did as to what can be done regarding human understanding.

The variations of ideas regarding Hume’s problem are too broad to accurately list. However lines can be drawn regarding those that address probability while others engage in arguments regarding the semantics of words, such as justification. However neither of these sides ultimately clash because of the incongruity of their argument.

Bibliography

Ayer, A. J. Hume. New York: Hill and Wang, 1980. 55-74.

A thorough discussion of Hume’s ideas and that of other philosophers and a general dissatisfaction with Hume’s lack of a conclusion regarding even if beliefs are valid things.

Creed, Isabel P. “The Justification of the Habit of Induction.” The Journal of Philosophy 36

(1940): 85-97.

An indictment of conclusions made by Professor Reichenbach regarding the idea that there is a justification to making inductive inferences. Creed believes that Reichenbach makes addresses Hume in the wrong way because Hume was not a mathematician. Furthermore she believes that Reichenbach’s idea that induction is the most valid way to go about the future is flawed because there is no imperative basis for judgment and only that of the individual.

Dauer, Francis W. “Hume’s Skeptical Solution and the Causal Theory of Knowledge.” The Philosophical Review 89 (1980): 357-378.

A very complex look at the logic of Hume’s skepticism. Difficult to follow for an individual untrained in symbolic logic. No conclusion is given in the end. Dauer does not have any certainty regarding whether Hume’s problem should be left alone or not.

Fogelin, Robert J. Hume’s Skepticism in the Treatise of Human Nature. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985. 152-166.

A concise outline of the specific arguments that have revolved around Hume’s problem.

Reichenbach, Hans. “On the Justification of Induction.” The Journal of Philosophy 37 (1940): 97-103.

A reply to Creed’s indictment of his conclusions and further explanation of his thoughts regarding the practical use of induction. He takes an almost economic approach with a diagram of weighing cost versus benefit when making inductive inferences.

Stove, D. C. Probability and Hume’s Inductive Scepticism. London: Oxford University Press, 1973. 5-23.

Clearly all of this book gives a thorough treatment of Hume but the first chapter seems especially useful in regards to interpretation of probability and logic surrounding Hume’s problem.

Stroud, Barry. Hume. London: Routledge, 1977. 42-67.

A detailed dissection of Hume’s skepticism regarding cause and effect and finally ending with Hume’s questioning of induction without mention of any other outside interpretations.

Weintraub, Ruth. “What Was Hume’s Contribution to the Problem of Induction.” Philosophical Quarterly 45 (1995): 460-470.

Weintraub engages in a discussion regarding the misconception with which people approach Hume as the founder of the question of induction. Instead she sites the Greek skeptic Sextus Empericus and then states that Hume’s argument is no different. The distinction that Hume does make is that deduction is justified and induction is not. Weintraub then proceeds by stating the considerations of various philosophers regarding induction and deduction with the conclusion that perhaps the distinction Hume gives induction is invalid.