Literature Review – Kant on Freedom

In order to utilize my transcendental freedom I have chosen to not write my literature review. I have decided to not be caged by my moral laws and do what my will (“willkur”) is – to sit and watch TV instead. I decide to do that because I have experienced the pain of writing papers and the pleasure of watching TV. I also had a busy week previous to this one and I am tired and would rather not work on a paper. Wait! These are a sequence of events that led to this decision therefore, it is not transcendental freedom but causation. I will not be a controlled by causation, I will instead write my paper to prove that I have the freedom to choose. I should also write this paper because I respect my professor and want a good grade in this philosophy course. I do have a choice, but it is guided by constraints. I use my “wille” to do what is right and ignore my “willkur” whose will is to do nothing. I will write the literature review on Kant’s views of freedom.

The word freedom refers to having the power of choice. But how powerful is Kant’s argument on freedom? In debating freedom it is important to consider three topics of discussion. One, if freedom is controlled by moral law, which leads to a paradox argument of Kant’s antinomies. Two, the discussion of whether we have freedom through spontaneous actions, or if there is causation. And three, to distinguish between the many different types of “freedoms” Kant discusses.

Before reviewing these topics of discussion, it is important to understand the terms that the philosophers use in their arguments. “Willkur” is a term to describe the will of what you want to do (freedom) when it is not what you ought to do in terms of moral law. It is not deviation, your will just happens to be to do something that is not in code with moral law (your “duty”). “Wille” is the rational sense, when your will is to do as moral law would have you do. It is affected by sensuous motives and says that human will wills the law. This is the compilation of duty and acting freely as being compatible. Wille is when you freely choose to act within the duties moral laws place on you. An antinomy is a contradiction between two statements when they are both created by correct reasoning. In Kant’s antinomies he writes a thesis and an antithesis that are contradictions. In the third antinomies he writes his thesis as “causality in accordance with laws of nature is not the only one from which all the appearances of the world can be derived.” (Critique of Pure Reason, 484) Here, causality must be assumed through freedom to explain them. The antithesis states there “is no freedom, but everything in the world happens solely in accordance with the laws of nature.” (485) Kant attempts to solve the antinomy by saying there had to be an absolute beginning in order for causality (an initial start for all events to be caused by) and the only answer to that could be a divine assistance, an omnipotence of nature.

Kant believes we assume we are free so we may think of ourselves as subject to moral laws. Guyer, in Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness, questions that if the value of freedom has nothing to do with happiness as Kant describes, then what is its value? Guyer concludes that Kant would say that “we are entitled to our own happiness only if we exercise freedom, freely chosen actions.” (124) Guyer believes it is the idea of freedom that motivates us to follow moral law. We, as society, are more likely to follow moral law if we believe we have the choice. This is the “theory of respect” he writes about; to recognize that good will is the only absolute value and acts for the sake of duty alone, and that “a will that acts for the sake of duty alone must be one that acts on purely formal principle of the universal lawfulness of actions in general.” (138) He concludes that freedom is the fundamental end of human action that is preserved and promoted by following moral law. Similarly, Broad, in Kant: An Introduction, writes “freedom is shown to be possible in a certain sense . . . moral obligation compels us to hold that freedom in this sense is not merely possible but actual.” (Pg. 270) Because we morally think we must follow rules and laws to be good citizens, we want to believe that we choose to be good, that we use our freedom and will to be good.

Broad also discusses the third antinomy. He wrote “Kant believes there is no freedom and that everything takes place solely in accordance with the laws of nature.” (217) He writes that there are two types of causality, one according to nature, and one arising from freedom. In nature, there is a necessary sequence of causes and freedom cannot exist. Michalson and Zeldin write about the paradox found within the antinomies. Michalson, in Fallen Freedom, writes that Kant’s solution of the antinomies, asks the same question he poses in the second part of the antimony, “he concluded by emphasizing self-reliance above belief in outside aid, whereas the difficulty posed by the second part of the antinomy concerns the efficiency of self-reliance.” (100) Michalson continues his argument saying Kant’s problem is in his use of vocabulary of autonomy. That one hand the “moral drama concerning a fall and regeneration is a drama of the self against itself, while, on the other hand, Kant has not entirely jettisoned the traditional language of divine grace in the telling of this drama.” Michalson complains that “Kant creates an irony in his own vocabulary of autonomy that has itself gained full autonomy, due to a fall that autonomy has suffered through its own willing.” (102) Zeldin writes in Freedom and the Critical Undertaking, that the third antinomy describes freedom as an absolute spontaneity that begins itself. She questions how it is possible to not be completely presupposed. She writes that “it is only in his capacity for feeling, in his pleasure and pain, that man can find an instance of freedom as an intellectual determination effective in nature.”(211) Freedom in the transcendental sense is experienced, therefore cannot be spontaneous. It is a paradox. Hoffman, in Kant’s Theory of Freedom: A Metaphysical Inquiry agrees. He thinks the third antinomy is not sensible. Hoffman writes that Kant ought to find the antithesis true and his thesis false because the thesis says that the series of causes can exist as a whole while the antithesis states what Kant proved in the antinomies, that “every member of the series which is actually met within experience . . . must be taken to have an antecedent cause.” (29)

Allison’s arguments in Idealism & Freedom are centralized around the question of spontaneity versus autonomy. He describes two theories he named the incorporation thesis (spontaneity) and the reciprocity thesis (autonomy). The incorporation thesis is designed to allow us to accept the desire, grant it, and granting it “honorific status” as a sufficient reason to act. This is Kant’s belief-desire model. The reciprocity thesis is the idea of having all self imposed or self legislated laws, “being a law to itself.” However, Allison writes this would not work because it presupposes rather than establishes autonomy. Allison concludes that we are not free, we act from duty, “through the consciousness of our autonomy that we become aware of our absolute spontaneity and, therefore, of the imputablilty of our acts . . . connection between moral law and freedom is spontaneity appears to underline both “deduction” of freedom and the doctrine of the unity of reason.” (139) In other words having reason restricts our freedom and constitutes moral law.

Broad writes about Kant’s difference in the law of nature, causation. The idea is that it is inevitable that when an action occurs, other actions follow or are caused. Broad believes the law is “the principle of sufficient reason.”(271) This principle reasons that for every occurrence there must be an explanation of why the event happened just then and there at that time. Broad argues that Kant does not provide a transcendental proof as to why the reader should accept this principle. He questions if an explanation of a spontaneous initiation would better satisfy us than an explanation in terms of causation. But a believable explanation would contradict the principle of reason and would not be satisfactory. Norman, in Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason, agrees. He writes that every cause has a character that without one an action could not exist. Actions are derived from other actions, which form a series of events, which concludes that causation exists and there is not spontaneity but only causation.

In discussing freedom, there are two types of will, the wille and the willkur. There are also different types of freedom. Carnois in his book The Coherence of Kant’s Doctrine of Freedom compares the “wille” with the “willkur.” As mentioned above, Carnois describes “wille” as the rational sense that is affected by sensuous motives. Wille is when your will is the purpose of moral law. With this concept he explains that humans are destined, but not determined, to be good. We have the ability to deviate from moral law but create law to what rational wills are, therefore moral laws are our rational will. Conversely willkur is when there is a passion to do an action and the passion is not within accordance to moral law; it is not what we “ought” to do. Willkur is not deviation. According to Carnois it is man’s task to make his will will moral laws. Zeldin discusses freedom as a problem of rational self-determination and the sense of effective autonomy. She also discusses wille and willkur. Within these types of wills, Zeldin discusses three types of freedom: practical, transcendental, and moral (autonomy). She claims our actions are determined by the practical and moral freedoms we have. Zeldin describes practical freedom as being freedom from immediate sensuous determination (experience). Moral freedom is the ability of pure reason to be practical (to determine willkur according to moral law). Norman, Kemp, and Smith also discuss the different approaches to freedom. However, the authors believe there is no freedom that can exist along with universality of the natural law of causality. They write about the transcendental and practical freedoms. Transcendental freedom is freedom that contains nothing borrowed from experience. It is not required by the law of nature as described by Broad, is an object that cannot be determined, but this is to conclude that there may not be causal relationships. Practical freedom presupposes that although something has not happened, it ought to happen and that is the cause of our will, which causes a series of events thereafter, but is itself spontaneous.

The main discussions in review Kant’s freedom is the problem of whether actions are caused from nature or freedom, if freedom even exists, and how to work with the antinomies that create a confusing discussion that lends back to its own questions asked.

Annotated Bibliography

1. Guyer, Paul, Critique of Pure Reason. Cambridge University Press, 1997.

Text from class, used to formulate ideas and definitions, not used in discussion throughout paper.

2. Broad, C.B., Kant: An Introduction. Cambridge University Press, 1978.

Argues there must be another kind of causality to prove that an action initiated spontaneously occurs. Discusses and describes the third antinomy and the antithesis.

3. Guyer, Paul, Kant on Freedom, Law, and Happiness. Cambridge University Press, 2000.

Key point: we are entitled to our own happiness only if we exercise our own freedom, freely chosen actions. Discusses theory of respect, morality of law, and morality of freedom.

4. Allison, Henry E., Idealism and Freedom. Cambridge University Press, 1996.

Compares and contrasts spontaneity (Incorporation Thesis) and autonomy (Reciprocity Thesis). Allison questions if we are truly free. He believes we only act from duty.

5. Hoffman, W. Michael, Kant’s Theory of Freedom: A Metaphysical Inquiry. University Press of America, Inc., 1979.

Hoffman believes that Kant should have found the antithesis true and the thesis false. Disagrees that the third antinomy is sensible.

6. Carnois, Bernard, The Coherence of Kant’s Doctrine of Freedom. University of Chicago Press, 1973.

Discusses “wille” versus “willkur” and in response to discussions of Kant’s paradox believes that we must “consider the Kantian domain in its entirety rather than one or another particular work.”

7. Michalson Jr, Gordan E., Fallen Freedom. Cambridge University Press, 1990.

Argues that the conclusion of the antinomies is the same question posed in the second antinomy. Discusses the paradox created.

8. Zeldin, Mary-Barbara, Freedom and the Critical Undertaking. University Microfilms International, 1980.

Discusses the three types of freedom (practical, transcendental, and moral). Like Gordan poses a theory of the paradox found in the antimonies.

9. Norman, Kemp, Smith, Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason. The Macmillan Press LTD, 1929.

Describes how spontaneity and causation to occur simultaneously. Discusses nature versus freedom. Compares transcendental and practical freedoms.