Kevin Anderson

Dr. Brown

Classical Modern Philosophy

8 March 2001

Literature Review: Locke on Personal Identity

Literature Review: Locke on Personal Identity

Locke makes a very interesting addition to the second edition of An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (hereafter referred to as Essay). This addition is Chapter 27 of Book 2 entitled “Of Identity and Diversity.” The chapter has been the focus of the debate surrounding personal identity because of some of the central claims of the chapter. In this chapter Locke claims that sameness of substance is not necessary for sameness of person and also claims that two different substances can be the same person at different times. There are three main discussions surrounding Locke’s chapter “Of Identity and Diversity.” The first discussion surrounds the importance or significance of the chapter in relation to the rest of the Essay. The second discussion surrounds whether or not Locke’s claim that sameness of substance is not necessary for sameness of person is defendable. The third discussion surrounding this chapter is whether or not memory is sufficient for identity (included in this discussion is the debate around Locke’s claim that “x at time two can be the same person as y at time one if and only if x and y are both persons and x can remember at time two what y did at time one” (Flew 54-56)). These are the three debates that will be discussed in this literature review.

The first debate of interest is the debate surrounding the importance and significance of Chapter 27 in relation to the rest of the Essay. This discussion is relevant because Locke did not add this chapter concerning identity and diversity until the second edition of the Essay. Because Locke’s discussion of identity was not added until the second edition of the Essay, many scholars have thought it futile to try to make any relevant connections between his concepts of the person and the broader themes that run throughout the Essay. Eric Matthews is one of the scholars that believes it is futile to try to make these sorts of connections. Matthews states in his article “Descartes and Locke on the Concept of a Person”

Scattered remarks in the Essay on the concept of a person…are clearly incidental to a discussion of the Essay’s Main theme, ‘the original, certainty, and extent of human knowledge’ (pg. 9).

Even though many scholars over the years have sided with Matthews, Ruth Mattern in her article “Moral Science and the Concept of Persons in Locke” claims that the concept of the person is central to developing a demonstrative science of ethics. Mattern claims that Locke believed a demonstrative science of ethics could be developed and understood. For this to be done, we must have an understanding of the identity of a person. Mattern proposes that Locke believes that moral and ethical truths can be discovered in the same way that mathematical truths are discovered. Mattern concludes that Locke’s discussion of personal identity is relevant to the rest of the Essay because the concept of personal identity makes it possible for the knowledge of ethics.

The second debate surrounding Locke’s claims about personal identity deals with Locke’s claim that sameness of substance is not necessary for sameness of person. This debate has had both attacks of Locke’s claim and defenses of Locke’s claim. It seems that most of the literature though has been on the side of the attackers and their arguments are by far more advanced and convincing then those that try to defend Locke.

The perennial king of this debate, and the arguably of the personal identity debate as a whole, is Sydney Shoemaker. Shoemaker’s book Self Knowledge and Self Identity is cited in almost every article discussing personal identity that appears after its publication in 1963. Shoemaker makes three objections to the claim that Locke makes about sameness of substance being un-necessary for sameness of person. These three objections are responded to by Hugh Chandler in his article “Shoemaker’s Arguments Against Locke.”

Shoemaker’s first objection is that Locke contradicts himself when he claims that sameness of substance is not necessary for sameness of person. Shoemaker believes that this claim is equivalent to saying that the “identity of a person does not involve the identity of a substance” (pg. 46). The problem arises because Locke often implies that whenever a person thinks there is always a substance related to the thinking thing. So Shoemaker believes that Locke gets into trouble because

If persons are thinking things, and thinking things are substances, then persons are substances. And if it follows from the definition of ‘person’ that a person is a substance, it is surely self-contradictory to say that the identity of a person does not involve the identity of a substance. (pg. 46).

Chandler offers a rebuttal to this objection of Shoemaker’s. He believes that Locke would “admit that if x and y are the same person, they must be the same particular substance” (pg. 263). But, according to Chandler, Locke would not admit that x and y are the same final substance. And since “Locke does not claim that every thinking this is, by definition, a final substance” he escapes the first attack of Shoemaker (pg. 264). According to Chandler, Locke would only be subject to Shoemaker’s objection if Shoemaker concluded that “if x and y are the same person, they must be the same final substance” (pg. 263).

Harold Noonan also offers a rebuttal to Shoemaker’s first attack. In defense of Locke, Noonan claims that Shoemaker’s attack rests on the idea that Shoemaker believes Locke is saying “if all F’s are G’s then the same F is always the same G” (pg 346). But Noonan readily points out that Locke avoids saying this in the Essay. Because of Locke’s avoidance of this principle, Noonan concludes that Locke realized the problem of accepting this principle and for that reason avoided accepting this principle.

Shoemaker’s second objection comes from his interpretation of Locke claiming that 1) immaterial substances are the things that are said to think and experience 2) persons cannot be identified with immaterial substances and 3) persons think (pp. 47-48). If this is the case then Locke has an inconsistency in his argument because both immaterial substances (i.e. spirits) and persons think. So Shoemaker concludes that if Locke does indeed admit these three claims that Locke is contradicting himself.

Chandler believes that Locke would accept the three above claims but does not think that these three claims pose any inconsistency for Locke’s claim. To show this Chandler gives the example of a telephone and the bells that make it ring. From this come the claims 1) it is bells that ring 2) telephones cannot be identified with bells and 3) telephones ring (pg. 264). This shows that Shoemaker’s above objection is not convincing because “it is possible for x and y to be the same telephone, at different times, even though x and y have different bells” (pg. 264). So these three claims do not create a discrepancy just as the three claims that Shoemaker makes do not pose inconsistency with Locke’s view.

Shoemaker’s final objection to Locke’s stance on same substances being necessary for same selves comes from Shoemaker’s belief that two subjects hold every thought. He believes this can be seen because every thought is thought by a sprit, we think, but we are not spirits, so each thought must be held by both a spirit and a person (material substance) (pg. 54). Because of this we are led to hold a belief that no one would want to hold; that being, that two different subjects hold each thought.

Chandler’s rebuttal to this objection of Shoemaker’s rests once again in his example of the telephone and its bells. If Shoemaker’s interpretation is correct, then we would be forced to hold the belief that when a telephone rings there are actually two things ringing, the telephone and the bells inside of it, but this is obviously not true. “When a telephone rings, only one thing rings. It is the telephone, or, more specifically, the telephone’s bell” (pg. 265). So just as Chandler dismissed Shoemaker’s second objection with the telephone example, Shoemaker’s third objection can also be dismissed.

There is one more major article that deals with the problem of Locke’s claims about the person and substance. The article, “Locke on People and Substances” by Alston and Bennett, tries to answer the following problem:

Locke’s handling of substance and of person seems clearly to imply that a person is a substance of a certain kind, and he often says as much, outright; this implies that to continue to be the same person is to continue to be the same substance; yet Locke flatly denies this. What is going on? (pg. 26).

Alston and Bennett try to answer this problem by qualifying Locke’s use of the term “person” as “a forensic term” when used in this chapter. Alston and Bennett seem to agree with Mattern that Locke is developing the idea of the person at this point for use in a moral and ethical science. If this is true, then “when Locke says that ‘person’ is ‘a forensic term,’ he means that we have the idea of person that we do because it answers best to our moral and legal interests” (pg. 45). This can be understood by the fact that when we as a society, or eventually God, punishes someone, we, or God, do not care about punishing the physical substance but rather we are worried about punishing the spirit or thinking thing of a person. From this it can be seen that substance is not needed for personal identity because Locke is using it in as a purely “forensic term.” This interpretation, they believe, answers the problem surrounding Locke’s claim that sameness of substance is not necessary for sameness of person.

Finally we can address the third debate that surrounds Locke’s chapter on identity and diversity in his Essay. This debate concerns Locke’s claim that memory is sufficient for identity and that “x is the same person as y at time one if and only if x and y are both persons and x can remember at time two what y did, or felt, or what have you, at time one” (Flew 54-55). The literature surrounding this debate is much more one sided than the literature surrounding the other two debates. It seems that everyone wants to criticize and object to Locke’s claim about memory and identity and very few are willing to defend Locke’s claim.

Thomas Reid makes one of the clearest and most convincing arguments against Locke’s chapter on identity in the realm of this debate. In Essay 3 Chapter 6 of his book Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man, Reid develops the paradox of the gallant general. Reid’s example is as follows; suppose that there is an officer who was flogged as a boy and in mid life he is promoted to general for his services in war during his middle age. Now suppose that when we was promoted to general he remembered the flogging that he underwent as a child and when he was in his advanced age he remembered being promoted to general for his services in war, but in his advanced age he no longer remembers being flogged as a young boy. Reid claims that this story implies that “it follows, if there be any truth in logic, that the general is the same person as who was flogged at school” (pg. 358). This is easy to accept, and it seems that almost everyone would accept this statement. But the problem is that according to Locke “the general’s consciousness does not reach so far back as his flogging, therefore, he is not the person who was flogged. Therefore the general is, and at the same time is not, the same person with him who was flogged at school” (pg. 358). This presents an obvious problem for Locke’s account of memory and identity.

Reid also points out another problem to Locke’s view of memory and identity. Reid claims, “it is strange that the sameness or identity of a person consists in a thing which is continually changing” (pg. 360). Reid equates our consciousness, or our memory, to the flowing water of a river. If our consciousness and our memory are ever-changing then we could never punish nor reward people for their wrongs or rights because the basis of their identity is always changing so then they must continually be different persons.

Antony Flew also raises two objections to Locke’s account of memory and identity in his article “Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity.” Flew believes that Locke’s account can be attacked on two fronts. The first front that Locke’s argument can be attacked on is that he believes that “it is self-evident, that consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity” (pg. 55). Unfortunately Flew does not elaborate much more on this argument so you are left with deciphering the argument from a single sentence. Luckily though this seems to be the same argument that Intisar-Ul-Haque makes in his article, which will be addressed next. The second argument that Flew makes against Locke’s account of memory and identity is that “Locke is at the same time both too strict in blackballing and too lenient in electing candidates” (pp. 55-56). Flew believes that this can be seen easily in Reid’s paradox of the gallant officer.

Intisar-Ul-Haque seems to object to Locke on the same grounds as Flew’s first objection. Intisar-Ul-Haque concludes that “memory cannot be used as a criterion of one’s own identity” because “the notion of personal identity is logically prior to that of memory” (pg. 64). Intisar-Ul-Haque seems to make this argument clearer by pointing out that personal identity exists prior to that of memory, so it does not follow that one could come to know their personal identity by something that exists after their personal identity exists. Even though he does not believe memory can be used as a criterion for personal identity, he does believes that memory is an essential function of a person because who has ever known a person who cannot remember. Even though memory is an essential function of a person, it is not sufficient for explaining identity (pg. 65).

Even though some philosophers have attempted to defend Locke’s position on memory and identity, none of the literature that I found was compelling enough or relevant to the texts already introduced here, so these texts were not included in this literature review.

Annotated Bibliography

Alston, William P. and Jonathan Bennett. “Locke on People and Substances.” The Philosophical Review, Volume 97, Issue 1 (Jan., 1988), pp. 25-46.

The essay addresses the following problem: “Locke’s handling of substance and of person seems clearly to imply that a person is a substance of a certain kind, and he often says as much, outright; this implies that to continue to be the same person is to continue to be the same substance; yet Locke flatly denies this. What is going on?”

Chandler, Hugh. “Shoemaker’s Arguments Against Locke.” Philosophical Quarterly, Volume 19, Issue 76 (Jul., 1969), pp. 263-265.

Chandler provides rebuttals to the three objections Shoemaker makes against Locke in his chapter on “Are Selves Substances?” from his book Self Knowledge and Self Identity. Chandler’s rebuttals are short, sometimes too short. It would have been more beneficial if Chandler would have elaborated on his objections and made his explanations for his rebuttals clearer.

Flew, Antony. “Locke and the Problem of Personal Identity.” Philosophy, Volume 26 (1951), pp. 53-68.

Flew attacks Locke’s thesis that “x at time two is the same person as Y at time one if and only is x and y are both persons and x can remember at time two what y did, or felt, or what have you, at time one.” He attacks this view in two ways. First, he says, “Consciousness of personal identity presupposes, and therefore cannot constitute, personal identity. Secondly, “Locke is at the same time both too strict in blackballing and too lenient in electing candidates.” Flew does an excellent job of proving the second of these arguments but only spends two sentences explaining the first argument. He says that the first argument is “self-evident” and leaves it at that. For the essay to have been contained a more compelling argument it would have been helpful to have elaborated more on his first objection to Locke’s claim.

Intisar-Ul-Haque. “The Person and Personal Identity.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Volume 31, Issue 1 (Sep. 1970), pp. 60-72.

This essay deals with Locke, Hume and other philosophers. In the section relating to Locke, Intisar-Ul-Haque concludes that memory cannot be used as a criterion of one’s own identity because the notion of personal identity is logically prior to that of memory. It seems that his argument is an extension of Flew’s first argument, which is helpful after Flew leaves you hanging on the reasons for this argument.

Mattern, Ruth. “Moral Science and the Concept of Persons in Locke.” The philosophical Review, Volume 89, Issue 1 (Jan., 1980), pp. 24-45.

Mattern refutes Eric Matthews claim that Locke’s remarks on personal identity in the Essay Concerning Human Understanding are incidental and secondary to our understanding of human knowledge. Mattern argues that personal identity is a key concept to understanding a “demonstrative science of ethics” which Locke views as a “centrally important kind of knowledge.” Mattern’s argument is a beneficial addition because it provides a compelling argument for the importance of the concept of personal identity in Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding, especially considering that Chapter 27, “Identity and Diversity,” was not added until the second edition.

Noonan, Harold. “Locke on Personal Identity.” Philosophy, Volume 54 (1978), pp. 343-351.

Noonan defends “Locke’s account of personal identity against three well known objections.” Two of these objections are ones made by Shoemaker and the other one is made by Flew in a different article from the one cited above.

Reid, Thomas. “Of Mr. Locke’s Account of Personal Identity.” Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man. MIT Press, Cambridge, Mass 1969.

Reid creates the paradox of the gallant officer (or general) in this essay. The paradox of the gallant officer points out that under Locke’s account of identity it is possible that “a man may be, and at the same time, not be, the person that did a particular action.” He also claims that it is odd that a person’s identity is based on something that is continually changing. The paradox of the gallant officer was the clearest and most convincing argument against Locke’s account of identity that I found.

Shoemaker, Sydney. “Are Selves Substances?” Self Knowledge and Self Identity. Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York 1963.

This chapter is taken from Shoemaker’s book Self Knowledge and Self Identity, which seems to be hands down the leading work in this area. Practically all articles that I examined, which were written after 1963, had references to this work. In this chapter Shoemaker argues that Locke is wrong in believing that x and y can be the same person at different times even if x and y are not the same substance. Shoemaker offers three separate but interconnected arguments to attack this view of Locke’s.

Williams, Eric. “Descartes and Locke on the Concept of a Person.” The Locke Newsletter, No. 8 (Summer, 1977), p. 9.

Williams argues that attempts to derive any relevant connections between Locke’s concept of personal identity and the main themes of Locke’s Essay Concerning Human Understanding. He believes this because Chapter 27, which deals with identity, was not added until the second edition. This article was impossible to find. In fact I never did find it (our library does not carry the Locke Newsletter and they did not have archives of older issues on the internet). The thesis of this article is stated in Mattern’s article “Moral Science and the Concept of Persons in Locke.”