Seminar on
Philosophy and Time

Possible Questions for the Final Exam

I will probably ask approximately eight short-answer questions (answers should be approximately a paragraph long) and two essay questions (I may give you three and let you choose two). All the essay questions primarily concern material we have covered since the midterm. For the short-answer questions, I will select mostly questions from the "Since the Midterm" list, but will include a couple from before the midterm.

short-answer questions
 

Topics Covered Prior to the Midterm:

  1. A-Series
  2. B-Series
  3. C-Series
  4. tensers, detensers
  5. modal vs. predicate-logic approaches to temporal logic
  6. token-reflexive
  7. indexical
  8. demonstrative
  9. absolute view of time
  10. relational view of time
  11. anisotropy

Topics Since the Midterm:

  1. fatalism
  2. Osmo
  3. Law of Excluded Middle
  4. logical vs. metaphysical versions of fatalism (Bernstein)
  5. fatalist fallacy (Vihvelin)
  6. counterfactual (Vihvelin)
  7. open vs. closed future
  8. divine omniscience
  9. sense/imagination/reason/intelligence (Boethius)
  10. simple vs. conditional necessity (Boethius)
  11. the Self-Interest Theory (Parfit)
  12. the Present-Aim Theory (Parfit)
  13. Morality (Parfit)
  14. "bias toward the future" vs. "bias toward the near"
essay questions
  1. "Time is the passage from possibility through actuality to necessity" (J. R. Lucas, "The Open Future"). Discuss. (What does this mean? How is it related to views we have discussed, including fatalism, open/closed future, possibility of time travel? Is this characterization of time correct? Why or why not?)
  2. How do fatalists get from the Law of Excluded Middle to the fatalist conclusion that there's nothing we can do to affect the future? Give the most plausible reconstruction you can of a fatalist argument, and then either criticize the argument or defend it against criticism. Make use of the discussions of at least two of: Taylor, Bernstein, Boethius, Vihvelin.
  3. Lucas distinguishes between a number of different kinds of arguments for the idea that the future is closed: "the logical argument from the nature of truth," the argument from divine omniscience, the argument from determinism, and the argument from relativity theory. He suggests that none of these arguments is ultimately successful. Which of these arguments do you think is the best? Explain and evaluate it with reference to other class materials.
  4. Parfit suggests that someone who thoroughly accepted the "block universe" conception of time, the idea that there is no genuine passage, should also not regard desires or events in the past or future as any less or more important than those in the present. He also suggests that on balance this attitude (the attitude of "Timeless") would be preferable to our ordinary attitudes, which regard past pain as no longer important and future pain as less important the more remote it is. Is he correct that someone who rejects passage should be committed to this view? Is he correct that it would be better for us than our actual views?
  5. Boethius considers and rejects the argument that divine omniscience is incompatible with free will. (More precisely, in the dialogue Boethius argues that they are incompatible, and Philosophy criticizes this argument.) Explain and evaluate the argument and Philosophy's criticism of it.
  6. Vihvelin rejects a naive argument that the time traveler cannot kill his or her grandparent. Her response to the naive version involves the idea that even though we can know that the time traveler *will not* kill the grandparent, nevertheless in a respectable sense the tt *can* kill the grandparent. However, Vihvelin then constructs a more sophisticated argument that the tt cannot, after all, kill the grandparent. Explain the sophisticated argument. Is Vihvelin correct in thinking that the "naive" argument doesn't work? Is the sophisticated argument better? Why or why not? 
  7. Discuss the idea of branching time (discussed in Jess's and Jeremy's presentations, and brilliantly illustrated in Borges's "The Garden of Forking Paths"). How is this idea related to the ideas of the open or closed future? Does it make the idea of a time traveler "changing the past" coherent, or is that idea problematic even if time does branch? 

Last update: December 8, 2003. 
Curtis Brown  |  Philosophy and Time   |  Philosophy Department  |   Trinity University
cbrown@trinity.edu