Lecture #16: Hume: "Essay on
Miracles"
OF MIRACLES
by David Hume
I
A wise man proportions his belief to the evidence. In
such conclusions as are founded on an infallible experience, he expects the
event with the last degree of assurance, and regards his past experience as a
full proof of the future existence of that event. In other cases, he proceeds
with more caution: he weighs the opposite experiments: he considers which side
is supported by the greater number of experiments: to that side he inclines,
with doubt and hesitation; and when at last he fixes his judgment, the evidence
exceeds not what we properly call probability. All probability, then, supposes
an opposition of experiments and observations, where the one side is found to
overbalance the other and to produce a degree of evidence, proportioned to the
superiority. A hundred instances or experiments on one side and fifty on
another afford a doubtful expectation of any event; though a hundred uniform
experiments with only one that is contradictory reasonably beget a pretty
strong degree of assurance. In all cases, we must balance the opposite
experiments, where they are opposite, and deduct the smaller number from the
greater, in order to know the exact force of the superior evidence.
To apply these principles to a particular instance; we
may observe that there is no species of reasoning more common, more useful, and
even necessary to human life than that which is derived from the testimony of
men and the reports of eye-witnesses and spectators. This species of reasoning,
perhaps, one may deny to be founded on the relation of cause and effect. I
shall not dispute about a word. It will be sufficient to observe that our
assurance in any argument of this kind is derived from no other principle than
our observation of the veracity of human testimony, and of the usual conformity
of facts to the reports of witnesses. It being a general maxim that no objects
have any discoverable connection together and that all the inferences which we
can draw from one to another are founded merely on our experience of their
constant and regular conjunction, it is evident that we ought not to make an
exception to this maxim in favor of human testimony, whose connection with any
event seems, in itself, as little necessary as any other. Were not the memory
tenacious to a certain degree, had no men commonly an inclination to truth and
a principle of probity, where they not sensible to shame when detected in a
falsehood -- where not these, I say, discovered by experience to be qualities
inherent in human nature, we should never repose the least confidence in human
testimony. A man delirious or noted for falsehood and villainy has no manner of
authority with us.
And, as the evidence derived from witnesses and human
testimony is founded on past experience, so it varies with the experience, and
is regarded either as a proof or a probability, according as the conjunction
between any particular kind of report and any kind of object has been found to
be constant or variable. There are a number of circumstances to be taken into
consideration in all judgments of this kind, and the ultimate standard by which
we determine all disputes that may arise concerning them is always derived from
experience and observation. Where this experience is not entirely uniform on
any side, it is attended with an unavoidable contrariety in our judgments, and
with the same opposition and mutual destruction of argument as in every other
kind of evidence. We frequently hesitate concerning the reports of others. We
balance the opposite circumstances which cause any doubt or uncertainty, and
when we discover a superiority on any side, we incline to it, but still with a
diminution of assurance in proportion to the force of its antagonist.
This contrariety of evidence in the present case may be
derived from the character or number of the witnesses, from the manner of their
delivering their testimony, or from the union of all these circumstances. We
entertain a suspicion concerning any matter of fact when the witnesses
contradict each other, when they are but few or of a doubtful character, when
they deliver their testimony with hesitation or, on the contrary, with too
violent asseverations. There are many other particulars of the same kind which
may diminish or destroy the force of any argument derived from human testimony.
Suppose, for instance, that the fact which the testimony
endeavors to establish partakes of the extraordinary and the marvelous; in that
case, the evidence resulting from the testimony admits of a diminution, greater
or less in proportion as the fact is more or less unusual. The reason why we
place any credit in witnesses and historians is not derived from any connection
which we perceive a priori between testimony and reality, but because we are
accustomed to find a conformity between them. But, when the fact attested is
such a one as has seldom fallen under our observation, here is a contest of two
opposite experiences, of which the one destroys the other, as far as its force
goes, and the superior can only operate on the mind by the force which remains.
The very same principle of experience which gives us a certain degree of
assurance in the testimony of witnesses gives us also, in this case, another
degree of assurance against the fact which they endeavor to establish; from
which contradiction there necessarily arises a counterpoise and mutual
destruction of belief and authority.
"I should not believe such a story were it told me
by Cato," was a proverbial saying in Rome, even during the lifetime of
that philosophical patriot. The incredibility of a fact, it was allowed, might
invalidate so great an authority . . . .
But, in order to increase the probability against the
testimony of witnesses, let us suppose that the fact which they affirm, instead
of being only marvelous, is really miraculous; and suppose also that the
testimony, considered apart and in itself, amounts to an entire proof. In that
case, there is proof against proof, of which the strongest must prevail, but
still with a diminution of its force, in proportion to that of its antagonist.
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature;
and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof
against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any
argument from experience can possibly be imagined. Why is it more than probable
that all men must die, that lead cannot, of itself, remain suspended in the
air, that fire consumes wood and is extinguished by water; unless it be that
these events are found agreeable to the laws of nature, and there is
required a violation of these laws, or in other words a miracle, to prevent
them? Nothing is esteemed a miracle if it ever happen in the common course of
nature. it is no miracle that a man, seemingly in good health, should die on a
sudden; because such a kind of death, though more unusual than any other; has
yet been frequently observed to happen. But, it is a miracle that a dead man
should come to life: because that has never been observed in any age or
country. There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous
event; otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And, as a uniform
experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the
nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle,; nor can such a proof
be destroyed, or the miracle rendered credible, but by an opposite proof which
is superior.
The plain consequence is (and, it is a general maxim
worthy of our attention), "That no testimony is sufficient to establish a
miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind that the falsehood would be
more miraculous than the fact which it endeavors to establish; and even in that
case there is a mutual destruction of arguments, and the superior only gives us
an assurance suitable to that degree of force which remains after deducting the
inferior." When anyone tells me that he saw a dead man restored to
life, I immediately consider with myself whether it is more probable that this
person should either deceive or be deceived, or that the fact which he relates
should really have happened. I weigh the one miracle against the other, and
according to the superiority which I discover, I always reject the greater
miracle. If the falsehood of his testimony would be more miraculous than
the event which he relates, then, and not till then, can he pretend to command
my belief or opinion.
II
In the foregoing reasoning, we have supposed that the
testimony upon which a miracle is founded may possibly amount to an entire
proof, and that the falsehood of that testimony would be a real prodigy. But,
it is easy to show that we have been a great deal too liberal in our
concession, and that there never was a miraculous event established on so full
an evidence.
For first, there is not to be found in all history any
miracle attested by a sufficient number of men of such unquestioned good sense,
education, and learning as to secure us against any delusion in themselves; of
such undoubted integrity as to place them beyond all suspicion of any design to
deceive others; of such credit and reputation in the eyes of mankind as to have
a great deal to lose in case of their being detected in any falsehood; and at
the same time attesting facts performed in such a public manner and in so
celebrated a part of the world as to render the detection unavoidable: all which
circumstances are requisite to give us a full assurance in the testimony of
men.
Secondly, we may observe in human nature a principle
which, if strictly examined, will be found to diminish extremely the assurance
which we might from human testimony have in any kind of prodigy. The maxim by
which we commonly conduct ourselves in our reasoning is that the objects of
which we have no experience resemble those of which we have, that what we have
found to be most usual is always most probable, and that where there is an
opposition of arguments, we ought to give the preference to such as are founded
on the greatest number of past observations. But though, in proceeding by this
rule, we readily reject any fact which is unusual and incredible in an ordinary
degree, yet in advancing farther, the mind observes not always the same rule;
but, when anything is affirmed utterly absurd and miraculous, it rather the
more readily admits of such a fact, upon account of that very circumstance
which ought to destroy all its authority. The passion of surprise and wonder
arising from miracles, being an agreeable emotion, gives a sensible tendency
toward the belief of those events from which it is derived. And, this goes
so far that even those who cannot enjoy this pleasure immediately, nor can
believe those miraculous events of which they are informed, yet love to partake
of the satisfaction at second-hand or by rebound, and place a pride and delight
in exciting the admiration of others.
With what greediness are the miraculous accounts of
travelers received, their descriptions of sea and land monsters, their
relations of wonderful adventures, strange men, and uncouth manners? But, if
the spirit of religion join itself to the love of wonder, there is an end of
common sense, and human testimony in these circumstances loses all pretensions
to authority. A religionist may be an enthusiast, and imagine he sees what has
no reality. He may know his narrative to be false, and yet persevere in it with
the best intentions in the world, for the sake of promoting so holy a cause.
Or, even where this delusion has no place, vanity, excited by so strong a
temptation, operates on him more powerfully than on the rest of mankind in any
other circumstances; and self-interest with equal force. His auditors may not
have, and commonly have not, sufficient judgment to canvass his evidence. What
judgment they have, the renounce by principle in these sublime and mysterious
subjects. Or, if they were ever so willing to employ it, passion and a heated
imagination disturb the regularity of its operations. This credulity increases
his impudence: and his impudence overpowers their credulity.
Eloquence, when at its highest pitch, leaves little room
for reason or reflection, but addressing itself entirely to the fancy or the
affections, captivates the willing hearer and subdues their understanding.
Happily, this pitch it seldom attains. But, what a Tully or a Demosthenes could
scarcely effect over a Roman or Athenian audience, every Capuchin, every
itinerant or stationary teacher can perform over the generality of mankind, and
in a higher degree, by touching such gross and vulgar passions.
The many instances of forged miracles, and prophecies,
and supernatural events, which in all ages have either been detected by
contrary evidence, or which detect themselves by their absurdity, prove
sufficiently the strong propensity of mankind to the extraordinary and the
marvelous, and ought reasonably to beget a suspicion against all relations of
this kind. This is our natural way of thinking, even with regard to the most
common and most credible events. For instance, there is no kind of report
which rises so easily and spreads so quickly, especially in country places and
provincial towns, as those concerning marriages; insomuch that two young
persons of equal condition never see each other twice but the whole
neighborhood immediately join them together. The pleasure of telling a piece of
news so interesting, of propagating it, and of being the first reporters of it,
spreads the intelligence. And, this is so well known that no man of sense gives
attention to these reports till he find them confirmed by some greater
evidence. Do not the same passions, and others still stronger, incline the
generality of mankind to believe and report with the greatest vehemence and
assurance all religious miracles?
Thirdly, it forms a strong presumption against all
supernatural and miraculous relations that they are observed chiefly to abound
among ignorant and barbarous nations; or if a civilized people has ever given
admission to any of them, that people will be found to have received them from
ignorant and barbarous ancestors, who transmitted them with that inviolable
sanction and authority which always attend received opinions. When we peruse the
first histories of all nations, we are apt to imagine ourselves transported
into some new world, where the whole frame of nature is disjointed and every
element performs its operations in a different manner from what it does at
present. Battles, revolutions, pestilence, famine, and death are never the
effect of those natural causes which we experience. Prodigies, omens, oracles,
judgments, quite obscure the few natural events that are intermingled with
them. but, as the former grow thinner every page, in proportion as we advance
nearer the enlightened ages, we soon learn that there is nothing mysterious or
supernatural in the case, but that all proceeds from the usual propensity of
mankind towards the marvelous, and that, though this inclination may at intervals
receive a check from sense and learning, it can never be thoroughly extirpated
from human nature.
It is strange, a judicious reader is apt to say upon the
perusal of these wonderful historians, that such prodigious events never happen
in our days. But, it is nothing strange, I hope, that men should lie in all
ages. You must surely have seen instances enow of that frailty. You have
yourself heard many such marvelous relations started, which being treated with
scorn by all the wise and judicious, have at last been abandoned even by the
vulgar. Be assured that those renowned lies, which have spread and flourished
to such a monstrous height, arose from like beginnings; but being sown in a
more proper soil, shot up at last into prodigies almost equal to those which
they related . . . .
I may add as a fourth reason which diminishes the
authority of prodigies that there is no testimony for any, even those which
have not been expressly detected, that is not opposed by an infinite number of
witnesses; so that not only the miracle destroys the credit of testimony, but
the testimony destroys itself. To make this the better understood, let us
consider that, in matters of religion, whatever is different is contrary, and
that it is impossible the religions of ancient Rome, of Turkey, of Siam, and of
China should all of them be established on any solid foundation. Every miracle,
therefore, pretended to have been wrought in any of these religions (and all of
them abound in miracles), as its direct scope is to establish the particular
system to which it is attributed, so has it the same force, though more
indirectly, to overthrow every other system. In destroying a rival system, it
likewise destroys the credit of those miracles on which that system was
established; so that all the prodigies of different religions are to be
regarded as contrary facts, and the evidences of these prodigies, whether weak
or strong, as opposite to each other. According to this method of reasoning,
when we believe any miracle of Mahomet or his successors, we have for our
warrant the testimony of a few barbarous Arabians: And, on the other hand, we
are to regard the authority of Titus Livius, Plutarch, Tacitus, and, in short,
of all the authors and witnesses, Grecian, Chinese, and Roman Catholic, who
have related any miracle in their particular religion; I say, we are to regard
their testimony in the same light as if they had mentioned that Mahometan
miracle, and had in express terms contradicted it, with the same certainty as
they have for the miracle they relate. This argument may appear over subtle and
refined, but it is not in reality different from the reasoning of a judge who
supposes that the credit of two witnesses maintaining a crime against anyone is
destroyed by the testimony of two others who affirm him to have been two
hundred leagues distant at the same insstant when the crime is said to have
been committed.
One of the best attested miracles in all profane history
is that which Tacitus reports of Vespasian, who cured a blind man in Alexandria
by means of his spittle, and a lame man by the mere touch of his foot, in
obedience to a vision of the god Serapis, who had enjoined them to have
recourse to the Emperor for these miraculous cures. The story may be seen in
that fine historian, where every circumstance seems to add weight to the
testimony and might be displayed at large with all the force of argument and
eloquence, if anyone were now concerned to enforce the evidence of that
exploded and idolatrous superstition. The gravity, solidity, age, and probity
of so great an emperor, who through the whole course of his life, conversed in
a familiar manner with his friends and courtiers and never affected those
extraordinary airs of divinity assumed by Alexander and Demetrius. The historian,
a contemporary writer noted for candor and veracity, and withal, the greatest
and most penetrating genius, perhaps, of all antiquity, and so free from any
tendency to credulity that he even lies under the contrary imputation of
atheism and profaneness: The persons from whose authority he related the
miracle, of established character for judgment and veracity, as we may well
presume; eye-witnesses of the fact, and confirming their testimony after the
Flavian family was despoiled of the empire and could no longer give any reward
as the price of a lie, Ultrumque, qui interfuere,nunc quoque memorant,
postquam nullum mendacio pretium. To which if we add the public nature of
the facts as related, it will appear that no evidence can well be supposed
stronger for so gross and so palpable a falsehood.
There is also a memorable story related by Cardinal de
Retz, which may well deserve our consideration. When that intriguing politician
fled into Spain to avoid the persecution of his enemies, he passed through
Saragossa, the capital of Arragon, where he was shewn in the cathedral a man
who had served seven years as a door-keeper and was well known to everybody in
town that had ever paid his devotions at that church. He had been seen for so
long a time wanting a leg, but recovered that limb by the rubbing of holy oil
upon the stump; and the cardinal assures us that he saw him with two legs. This
miracle was vouched by all the canons of the church, and the whole company in
town were appealed to for a confirmation of the fact, whom the cardinal found,
by their zealous devotion, to be thorough believers of the miracle. Here, the
relater was also contemporary to the supposed prodigy, of an incredulous and
libertine character, as well as of great genius; the miracle of so singular a
nature as could scarcely admit of a counterfeit, and the witnesses very
numerous and all of them, in a manner, spectators of the fact to which they
gave their testimony. And, what adds mightily to the force of the evidence, and
may double our surprise on this occasion, is that the Cardinal himself, who
relates the story, seems not to give any credit to it, and consequently cannot
be suspected of any concurrence in the holy fraud. He considered justly that it
was not requisite, in order to reject a fact of this nature, to be able
accurately to disprove the testimony, and to trace its falsehood through all
the circumstances of knavery and credulity which produced it. He knew that, as
this was commonly altogether impossible at any small distance of time and
place, so was it extremely difficult, even where one was immediately present,
by reason of the bigotry, ignorance, cunning, and roguery of a great part of
mankind. He therefore concluded, like a just reasoner, that such an evidence
carried falsehood upon the very face of it, and that a miracle supported by any
human testimony was more properly a subject of derision than of argument.
There surely never was
a greater number of miracles ascribed to one person than those which were
lately said to have been wrought in France upon the tomb of Abbe Paris, the
famous Jansenist, with whose sanctity the people were so long deluded. The
curing of the sick, giving hearing to the deaf, and sight to the blind, were
everywhere talked of as the usual effects of that holy sepulchre. But, what is
more extraordinary, many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot
before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and
distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent theatre that is now in
the world. Nor is this all: A relation of them was published and dispersed
everywhere; nor were the Jesuits, though a learned body, supported by the civil
magistrate, and determined enemies to those opinions in whose favor the
miracles were said to have been wrought, ever able distinctly to refute or
detect them. where shall we find such a number of circumstances agreeing to the
corroboration of one fact? And, what have we to oppose to such a cloud of
witnesses but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events
which they relate? And, this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will
alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation . . . .
The wise lend a very academic faith to every report which
favors the passion of the reporter, whether it magnifies his country, his
family, or himself, or in any other way strikes in with his natural
inclinations and propensities. But, what greater temptation than to appear a
missionary, a prophet, an ambassador from heaven? Who would not encounter many
dangers and difficulties in order to attain so sublime a character? Or if, by
the help of vanity and a heated imagination, a man has first made a convert of
himself and entered seriously into the delusion, who ever scruples to make use
of pious frauds in support of so holy and meritorious a cause?
The smallest spark may here kindle into the greatest
flame, because the materials are always prepared for it. The avidum genus
auricularum, the gazing populace, receive greedily, without examination, whatever
sooths superstition and promotes wonder.
How many stories of this nature have in all ages been
detected and exploded in their infancy? How many more have been celebrated for
a time and have afterward sunk into neglect and oblivion? Where such reports,
therefore, fly about, the solution of the phenomenon is obvious, and we judge
in conformity to regular experience and observation when we account for it by
the known and natural principles of credulity and delusion. And, shall we,
rather than have a recourse to so natural a solution, allow of a miraculous
violation of the most established laws of nature?
I need not mention the difficulty of detecting a
falsehood in any private or even public history at the place where it is said
to happen; much more when the scene is removed to ever so small a distance.
Even a court of judicature, with all the authority, accuracy, and judgment
which they can employ, find themselves often at a loss to distinguish between
truth and falsehood in the most recent actions. But, the matter never comes to
an issue, if trusted to the common method of altercation and debate and flying
rumors, especially when men's passions have taken part on either side.
In the infancy of new religions, the wise and learned
commonly esteem the matter too inconsiderable to deserve their attention or
regard. And, when afterwards they would willingly detect the cheat in order to
undeceive the deluded multitude, the season is now past, and the records and
witnesses which might clear up the matter have perished beyond recovery.
No means of detection remain but those which must be
drawn from the very testimony itself of the reporters; and these, though always
sufficient with the judicious and knowing, are commonly too fine to fall under
the comprehension of the vulgar.
Upon the whole, then, it appears that no testimony for
any kind of miracle has ever amounted too a probability, much less to a proof,
and that, even supposing it amounted to a proof, it would be opposed by another
proof, derived from the very nature of the fact which it would endeavor to
establish. It is experience only which gives authority to human testimony, and
it is the same experience which assures us of the laws of nature. When,
therefore, these two kinds of experience are contrary, we have nothing to do
but subtract the one from the other, and embrace an opinion, either on one side
or the other, with that assurance which arises from the remainder. But,
according to the principle here explained, this subtraction, with regard to all
popular religions, amounts to an entire annihilation; and, therefore, we may
establish it as a maxim that no human testimony can have such force as to prove
a miracle and make it a just foundation for any such system of religion.
I beg the limitations here made may be remarked, when I
say that a miracle can never be proved so as to be the foundation of a system
of religion. For I own that otherwise there may possibly be miracles, or
violations of the usual course of nature, of such a kind as to admit of proof
from human testimony; though perhaps it will be impossible to find any such in
all the records of history. Thus, suppose all authors in all languages agree
that from the first of January 1600, there was a total darkness over the whole
earth for eight days: Suppose that the tradition of this extraordinary event is
still strong and lively among the people: that all travelers who return from
foreign countries bring us accounts of the same tradition without the least
variation or contradiction. It is evident that our present philosophers,
instead of doubting the fact, ought to receive it as certain and ought to
search for the causes whence it might be derived. The decay, corruption, and
dissolution of nature is an event rendered probably by so many analogies that
any phenomenon which seems to have a tendency toward that catastrophe comes
within the reach of human testimony, if that testimony be very extensive and
uniform.
But, suppose that all the historians who treat of England
should agree that on the first of January 1600, Queen Elizabeth died; that both
before and after her death she was seen by her physicians and the whole court,
as is usual with persons of her rank; that her successor was acknowledged and
proclaimed by the parliament; and that, after being interred a month, she again
appeared, resumed the throne, and governed England for three years. I must
confess that I should be surprised at the occurrence of so many odd
circumstances, but should not have the least inclination to believe so miraculous
an event. I should not doubt of her pretended death, and of those other public
circumstances that followed it. I should only assert it to have been pretended,
and that it neither was nor possible could be real. You would in vain object to
me the difficulty, and almost impossibility, of deceiving the world in an
affair of such consequence, the wisdom and solid judgment of that renowned
queen, with the little or no advantage that she could reap from so poor an
artifice. All this might astonish me, but I would still reply that the knavery
and folly of men are such common phenomena that I should rather believe the
most extraordinary events to arise from their concurrence than admit of so
signal a violation of the laws of nature.
But, should this miracle be ascribed to any new system of
religion, men in all ages have been so much imposed on by ridiculous stories of
that kind that this very circumstance would be a full proof of a cheat, and
sufficient with all men of sense, not only to make them reject the fact, but
reject it without further examination. Though the Being to whom the miracle is
ascribed be, in this case, Almighty, it does not, upon that account, become a
whit more probable, since it is impossible for us to know the attributes or
actions of such a Being otherwise than from the experience which we have of his
productions in the usual course of nature. This still reduces us to past
observations, and obliges us to compare the instances of the violation of truth
in the testimony of men with those of the violation of the laws of nature
by miracles, in order to judge which of them is most likely and probable. As
the violations of truth are more common in the testimony concerning religious
miracles than in that concerning any other matter of fact, this must diminish
very much the authority of the former testimony, and make us form a general
resolution never to lend any attention to it, with whatever specious pretense
it may be covered …
I am the better pleased with the method of reasoning here
delivered, as I think it may serve to confound those dangerous friends or
disguised enemies to the Christian Religion who have undertaken to defend it by
the principles of human reason. Our most holy religion is founded on Faith, not
on reason, and it is a sure method of exposing it to put it to such a trial as
it is by no means fitted to endure. To make this more evident, let us examine
those miracles related in scripture; and not to lose ourselves in too wide a
field, let us confine ourselves to such as we find in the Pentateuch, which we
shall examine, according to the principles of those pretended Christians, not
as the word or testimony of God himself, but as the production of a mere human
writer and historian. Here then, we are first to consider a book, presented to
us by a barbarous and ignorant people, written in an age when they were still
more barbarous and in all probability long after the facts which it relates,
corroborated by no concurring testimony, and resembling those fabulous accounts
which every nation gives of its origin. Upon reading this book, we find it full
of prodigies and miracles. It gives an account of the state of the world and of
human nature entirely different from the present: Of our fall from that state:
Of the age of man, extended by near a thousand years: Of the destruction of the
world by a deluge: Of the arbitrary choice of one people as the favorites of
heaven, and that people of the countrymen of the author: Of their deliverance
from bondage by prodigies the most astonishing imaginable. I desire anyone to
lay his hand upon his heart and, after a serious consideration, declare whether
he thinks that the falsehood of such a book, supported by such a testimony,
would be more extraordinary and miraculous than all the miracles it relates; which
is, however necessary to make it be received according to the measures of
probability above established.
What we have said of miracles may be applied without any
variation to prophecies; and indeed all prophecies are real miracles, and as
such only can be admitted as proofs of any revelation. If it did not exceed the
capacity of human nature to foretell future events, it would be absurd to
employ any prophecy as an argument for a divine mission or authority from
heaven. So that, upon the whole, we may conclude that the Christian Religion
not only at first was attended with miracles, but even at this day cannot be
believed by any reasonable person without one. Mere reason is insufficient to
convince us of its veracity; And, whoever is moved by faith to assent to it is
conscious of a continued miracle in his own person, which subverts all the
principles of his understanding and gives him a determination to believe what
is most contrary to custom and experience.
The End