ON THE DESTINY OF CIVILIZED CULTURES
by
(Copyright: April 26, 1974, Reg. No. A531153)
PART I
ON THE ORIGIN OF THE PRINCIPLES
INTRODUCTION
"A human being is
a part of the whole, called by us 'Universe', a part limited in time and space.
He experiences himself, his thoughts and feelings as something separated from
the rest—a kind of optical delusion of his consciousness. This delusion is a
kind of prison for us, restricting us to our personal desires and to affection
for a few persons nearest to us. Our task must be to free ourselves from this
prison by widening our circle of compassion to embrace all living creatures and
the whole nature in its beauty. Nobody is able to achieve this completely, but
the striving for such achievement is in itself a part of the liberation and
foundation for inner security."
This rich counsel from
Einstein (1) was composed as a condolence for a friend who was lamenting the
remorseless nature of death. It would seem that its message might be
appropriate for mankind in the whole in the event the current concerns about
ozone depletion and global warming culminate in the environmental apocalypse
that has been debated for the past three decades. If the forecasters are
correct, then the challenge may not only be one of how we go about striving for
a compassion that would embrace "the whole nature", but indeed, it we
are going to be around to strive for anything for very much longer (2, 3). In
the interest of assessing the probability of such an ominous future, this essay
examines the predictability of human destiny.
The query on human
survival is not new: More than a century ago the erudite George Perkins Marsh,
in considering human degradation of the environment, expressed concern that
"the earth is fast becoming an unfit home for its noblest inhabitant, and
another era of equal crime...would reduce it to such a condition as to
threaten...perhaps even extinction of the species" (my
italics) (4). What is new is the growing number of contemporary scholars
who are now expressing concern over the prospect of human extinction (5, 6, 7,
8, 9, 10, 11, 12). Some have even declared that the
man-environment relationship has intrinsic characteristics that make
comprehensive solutions impossible, regardless of the design of any technical
or political attempt to ameliorate the problem (13, 14). Of course, if this is
true—if the environment of civilized society contains undesirable conditions
for which there are no solutions—then this fact in itself raises the question
of whether a problem (as defined in the usual terms of human reason) even
exists. (The concept of problems for which there are no solutions is not novel.
Recognition of predicaments that can only be analyzed, but not solved, occurred
at least as early as the stoic logic of Ancient Greece [15].)
In recent years I have
become curious as to whether there is any absolute evidence to justify such
grave conclusions about human destiny, and if so, why this evidence is not more
discernible to the academic community. Our scientific methodology has generated
a tremendous store of knowledge regarding the nature of man, his environment,
and the Universe as a whole. With all this knowledge, with the ability to
transplant hearts, construct atomic reactors, walk on the surface of the moon,
and have a window to the world through television and computers, why is it not
feasible for us to determine with reasonable accuracy the essence of our own
eventual fate? This is the question I shall examine in this discourse: Can we
predict, from the information at hand, the destiny of man as a civilized
species?
I have made a diligent
effort to conduct my reason and approach my conclusions through a progression
of coherent postulates. To those who presume my motive is to demonstrate the
method that everyone should follow in order to promote an understanding of his
relationship to the environment, you may be sure it is my intention here to
show only the manner in which I have endeavored to satisfy my own need to
know—to satiate that craving for "meaning" that lies within us all.
To those who do not understand the liberation of compassion and attack my
frankness as radical (without realizing that the original meaning of the term
radical is thorough), I request only the privilege of being cast as a
"humanistic radical," i.e., one who questions all idolatrous thinking
and is not afraid of arriving at insights that may sound absurd (16). To those
who are bent on demurring the credibility of the
premises set forth, I would suggest that you neither look for nor demand a more
rigorous logic, because any trifling inaccuracies are not material to the
principal conclusions—it is the omnium gatherum that matters. And to those who do not recognize
the pertinence of the diversified subject matter that is incorporated into this
endeavor, I would admonish you to pursue the reference material.
MENTAL
LIMITATIONS
In proceeding, you may
wonder why convictions that are founded on information that is readily
available to the educated majority are not more widely accepted, and why those
few individuals who actually comprehend the significance of the conclusions do
not use the concerted influence of their professions to elicit radical changes
in human behavior. Objectivity is difficult because the examination of rigorous
data on the sensitive topic of human destiny induces oscillations between
mental states of exhilarating disillusionment on the one hand and discouraging
apprehension on the other. But these natural reactions are not in themselves
the basic reasons why others do not confront the evidence: The natural insights
that follow are not common to all men because there is an intrinsic quality of
the human psyche that suppresses information that challenges the cultural
indoctrination of civilized society, particularly any knowledge that tends to
disturb the anthropocentric delusions of the human consciousness. In this
regard, despite the uniqueness of man's intelligence, there are limitations to his
mental faculties (17), limitations that prevent (or, perhaps, protect) him from
evaluating the calculable destiny of the human species. The inference is, in
essence, a Freudian denial of genuine human rationality.
Three examples of these
mental limitations are apropos to this discourse:
(1) The tendency of
men to believe exclusively what men want to believe
In any effort to
dispose of the environmental dilemma, the greatest obstacle confronting mankind
is the natural propensity for men to believe only what men want to believe
(just as you will do with the conclusions in this discourse in which I have
given my own preferential judgments). The simplicity of this proposal should
not be allowed to detract from its importance. What men believe generally determines
what men do, and since no two men think identically, it may be impossible to
attain the mutuality that is essential for meaningful action on environmental
issues.
Most pertinent to this
treatise is the image that man harbors regarding his own position in the
natural order of the cosmos. Diversity of opinion on this matter is the
consequence of variable measures of reason and faith, depending on individual
confidence in proofs, probabilities, and miracles (18). Although an exceptional
being (like Einstein) may consider man as a prosaic "part of the
whole," the multitude chose to believe that the human species has
extraordinary features that place him above the rest of creation.
The source of this
preeminence attitude is an "arrogant conception of man, and above all, of
the human consciousness, as wholly unique" (19). Man has become a creature
"so fascinating to himself" he has blessed himself with "special
creation" (20), believing that he has emerged in the image of God as a "master
species" (21, 22). Confident that he, exclusively, is divine (23),
man assumes his potential to be like a blank sheet of paper "on which
anything can be written" (24). He even goes so far as to believe that the
human consciousness is "an entity distinct from, and potentially independent
of, the rest of Nature" (19), and he supposes that "nature has no
reason for existence save to serve man" (25), alleging that nature can be
humanized to almost any extent, without jeopardizing his own existence (26, 27,
28).
Inversely, and more relevant
to this discourse, man does not believe any truths that he does not want to
believe (29). There is, seemingly, an instinctive predisposition "to
hesitate to believe facts which he finds unpleasant" (30). This
predilection to discredit any knowledge that might alter the egocentric image
of Homo sapiens is illustrated by at least three notable incidents in
scientific history:
(a) Nongeocentric cosmology.
In about 250 B.C. the Pythagorean cosmologist, Aristarchus of Samos, perceived
the daily rotation of the Earth and its annual circuit around the Sun, and
thereby disclosed that the Universe does not revolve around the Earth (31).
This revolutionary knowledge was ignored for almost 2000 years until Copernicus
and Galileo corroborated the evidence (32). But, today, despite Aristarchus,
Copernicus, and Galileo, man still seems to adhere to the beatae
memoriae that all the cosmos rotates around the
relatively incidental globe that man occupies (33). Although he occasionally
acknowledges that Homo sapiens does not reside at
the center of the Universe, this admission is obscured by the
self-proclamation that contemporary man is the natural heir of the Earth.
(b) Organic
evolution. In more recent times, Lyell,
Darwin, and Wallace accumulated substantial geological and biological data on
the evolutionary development of living systems (34). However, men have ignored,
ridiculed, and maligned their meticulous efforts in order to deter a candid
interpretation of the evidence that Homo sapiens is
"a cousin of the ape, the sea urchin, and [even] the oak" (35).
Despite this perceptible information, man still does not, in his
"heart," consider himself to be an ordinary
constituent of biological evolution. In fact, instead of dispelling the
illusion of human supremacy, as the theory of evolution first seemed to
discharge, man has compensated his emotions by positioning himself at the
pinnacle of the evolutionary process (36).
(c) Biogenesis. Within the present century, enlightening clues have
accumulated on the question of the origin of life (37, 38). In 1923, Oparin speculated, from his knowledge of the evolution of
stars, planets and atmospheric gases, that life originated from inert,
inorganic gases. His hypothesis was supported subsequently by laboratory
experiments conducted by Miller and Urey. And yet, despite this illustrious
discernment of biogenesis, man remains confident that life, and particularly
human life, is something more than the inorganic atoms of which it is composed.
He continues to believe that all life past and present is the creation of
nothing less than an instantaneous "divine function," i.e., a
miracle, requiring the bringing into existence of both matter and energy from
what was previously a void. Yet, this miraculous phenomenon, if it did occur,
is incongruous with the First Law of Thermodynamics.
Over the years, even
the professional cosmologists, geologists, and biologists have been dubious
about these novel concepts of non-geocentric cosmology, organic evolution, and
biogenesis. Their procrastination has been due, in part, to (i) the inertia of earlier scientific theory, (ii) the
vegetation of prevailing dogma on special creation (34), and (iii) the dread of
unveiling an onslaught of unwelcome truths that might insult man's
anthropocentric view.
The conclusion is that
"man in his egocentric way is interested in himself above all else"
(39). "No culture has been able to completely screen out the egocentric
tendencies of human beings" (40), and probably none ever will. It would be
encouraging to anticipate that man might at least strive to achieve freedom
from the delusions kindled by his personal desires, but the admission that
fanciful thinking is a basic part of human nature does not in itself insinuate
that the anthropocentric disposition will change significantly in the future.
Surely men will continue to experience delight from their efforts to captivate
nature's creatures in zoos and to humanize those creatures in circuses. And,
surely, men shall continue to develop nostalgia over their success in training
young people to believe that reindeer fly, rabbits lay eggs, and fairies buy
baby teeth. And so it is that men will continue to believe whatever men want to
believe(92).
(2) The tendency of
men to become superfluously preoccupied.
According to Marx (41),
"if most scientists and engineers seem not to be listening, much less
acting, it is because these highly skilled men are so busy doing what every
good American is supposed to do"—and that is, engrossing themselves in the
"astonishing dynamism" that has become a salient feature of
commercialized societies. Rousseau was cognizant of this compulsion when he
observed that "civilized man... is always moving, sweating, toiling, and
racking his brains to find still more laborious occupations" (42). It is
no wonder that the commotion oftentimes causes individual
frustrations—"not so much that the pace is fast, but that it is somebody
else's pace" (43).
Ostensibly,
"man alone always seeks to increase his contacts" (44), almost as if
deliberately to evade a quiescence that would allow him to foresee the destiny
of his social "treadmill".
As to be expected, the fervor entails frequent encounters with mental overload,
a turmoil to which man eventually adapts by learning to impulsively disregard
those events and individuals that cannot be instantly identified as
advantageous to his own immediate utilitarian interests (45). Consequently,
man's "future serious realities [become] lost in the noise of [these]
immediacies," and diversionary action seems unattainable without the
development of a full-blown crisis situation (46).
Meanwhile, the leaders
of contemporary pluralistic commonwealths remain preoccupied with an expanding
economy and with social justice, in anticipation of production increases and
social "progress" prior to the next election (47, 48). Consequently,
the potentially calamitous problems remain neglected, as the specialists in
problem-solving undertake less critical problems for which they can find facile
technical and political solutions (if monetary support is available) (49).
But this kind of
self-serving action does not solve anything—not in the long-run. Technical and
political decisions that provide instantaneous relief of cultural pressures
usually degrade the social system in the long-run (50). Although it is
imperative that contemporary man comes to understand this axiomatic disclosure,
it would be delusional to hope against hope that he might tergiversate
the customary preoccupations of civilized culture.
Surely, humans will
continue to applaud grown men who accomplish nothing while kicking a piece of
skin from a dead pig around an open field. As Thoreau poetized, "the
surface of the earth is soft and impressible by the feet of men; and so with
the paths which the mind travels. How worn and dusty, then
must be the highways of the world, how deep the ruts of tradition and
conformity!" (51). So, men can be expected
to continue to dissipate their energies on meaningless and ephemeral vestiges.
(3) The tendency of
men to contemplate only myopic views.
The gravity of the
environmental predicament is contingent upon the time perspective one considers
(52). Population excess, resource depletion, and waste accumulation are
inter-related conditions that have developed over an extensive period of time,
and perception of their true direction requires broadmindedness. However, the
human mind is not adapted to thinking in long-range terms. As Schweitzer once
deplored, "man has lost the capacity to foresee and forestall" (53).
Seemingly, "man has never seen very far ahead,
and perhaps he never will" (54).
In recognizing the
limitations of the human vista, I have become curious about the maximum
possible extension of the human psyche. Does man have the capacity to
comprehend the ultimate magnitude of time and space? What is the meaning of
eternity and infinity? How does a mortal being commensurate these vague
dimensions that have tantalized the human consciousness for millennia? Would
not their comprehension require an omniscient position in the Universe?
The subjects of
eternity and infinity are worthy of a digression, because man has arrived at a
pass in the evolution of civilization where it has become essential for him to
acquire an appreciation of the natural order of time and space (55). An
assessment of the extent of these qualities brings about a respect for the
vastness of the Universe, in its immeasurable greatness—a greatness that
possesses all men with silent wonder (56) during reflective moments (57). Two
thousand years ago Lucretius (58) epitomized this awesome sensation:
".... the universe is not bounded in any direction.
If it were, it would necessarily have a limit somewhere. But clearly a thing
cannot have a limit unless there is something outside to limit it, so that the
eye can follow it up to a certain point but not beyond. Since you must admit
that there is nothing outside the universe, it can have no limit and is
accordingly without end or measure".
This ancient concept of
a Universe, existing for eternity with no limits to its dimensions, is in
accord with the "new cosmology" of Hoyle, Bondi,
and Gold (59, 60, 61) in which they theorize an infinite Universe in a steady
state of continuous creation—a proposition that requires the perpetual bringing
into being of new primordial matter **. (FOOTNOTE: ** The theory of continuous creation would be more
palatable if it included a logical explanation of the source of the primordial
matter. For example, perhaps it could be established (and possibly it has been)
that the interstellar "stuff" from which new stars are being
continuously formed is not created from nothing, but instead arises de nova
via coalescence (i) of electromagnetic radiation
emitted from intense bodies elsewhere in the Universe, (ii) of debris from
supernova, and (iii) of randomly distributed gases in intergalactic space. This
possibility is supported by the suggestion that radiant energy in the Universe
accumulates in interstellar clouds of hydrogen gas that eventually fuse into protostars through the force of gravitational collapse (62).
The implication is a reciprocating transformation of mass and energy in the
Universe. That is to say, stellar masses might radiate energy that coalesces
into clouds of hydrogen gas that undergo gravitational collapse into protostars.) This
proposition is obviously contrary to the prevalent notions that the Universe
was created in one "big bang" at some finite interval of time in the
distant past and is now undergoing an evolutionary expansion.** (FOOTNOTE: ** The theory of an expanding
Universe is primarily based on the observation of the "red shift" by
Hubble. However, it is possible to contrive an interpretation of the red-shift
phenomenon that is manifestly different from the Doppler effect: Since
intergalactic space is not a perfect vacuum, the electromagnetic waves
traversing this "vacuity" should, seemingly, from a laymen's view,
lose energy (i.e., decrease in wavelength) because of very slight (but
significant) interspacial "friction." The
more distant the origin of the light source from the Earth, the greater would
be the red shift. In other words, the red shift may not be caused by the
recession velocity of the intense body from which the light originated, but,
instead, be due to an intrinsic loss of energy during transmission to the
Earth.) Undeniably, there is evidence that the cataclysmic event, which
initiated the course of evolution of the existent Universe, occurred in an
undetermined region of the cosmos approximately 17.7 billion years ago (63).
But, this information does not necessarily mean that the generative material
did not exist in an unqualified form prior to the "big bang.")
Cosmologists may never
resolve this controversy over whether the Universe endures in a steady state,
or whether it is evolving. Both explanations appear to violate the
thermodynamic laws that are so fundamental to the major scientific endeavors of
human society. The "big bang" theory breaks the First Law of
Thermodynamics, which promulgates that matter can be neither created nor
destroyed; whereas the "steady state" theory is inconsistent with the
increasing entropy aspect of the Second Law of Thermodynamics. Granted, some
progress has been made toward understanding the mechanics of the visible
Universe; nevertheless, knowledge on the true origin and extent of the cosmos
remains essentially as it was two thousand years ago in the Lucretian
era. As Einstein once expressed, "possibly we shall know a little more
than we do now. But, the real nature of things, that
we shall never know, never" (64).
I thus conclude that
the meaning of eternity and infinity are beyond the limited consciousness of
mortal beings. To uncover the extent of these dimensions would require the
discovery of God. Yet, who can honestly confess that he truly knows, or speaks
with, God? Men only assume these associations, because they are convinced there
must be some meaning to it all.
Personally, I am
inclined to believe that the cosmos is both eternal and infinite. This explicit
opinion is not a consequence of the eloquence with which Lucretius, Hoyle, and
colleagues have presented their reasoning. Nor is my position based on the
evidence that galaxies in the observable Universe can be arranged in a
chronological sequence, progressing from very young ones (formed from recently
"created" intergalactic matter) to vary old ones (65), but because of
one notable circumstance—the concept of infinity is a functional item in the
universal science of mathematics. This sole clue has influenced me to trust
that there is no limit to the cosmos, in all of its grandeur. To maintain, on
the contrary, that there is an edge to the Universe is only to confess that man
does not know what is beyond the range of his radio telescopes and mathematical
theorems. Furthermore, even if cosmologists should succeed in proving the
visible Universe to be finite, then they will, in that event, merely expose an
infinite number of Universes within an unlimited cosmos, or perhaps, "a
cycle of universes" (66), or some other phenomenon that may be
inconceivable to the human mind.
The digression on these
intangible abstractions is relevant, because it implicates man as a
relatively minuscule entity on an incidental globe in the vast Universe; and,
thereby, it bestows an appropriate humility from which to examine his
relationship to the Earth. The awe that one can experience from a vain attempt
to comprehend the ramifications of this deduction was most expressly presented
by Pascal (67):
"When I consider
the short duration of my life, swallowed up in the eternity before and after,
the little space which I fill, and even can see, engulfed in the infinite
immensity of spaces of which I am ignorant and which know me not, I am
frightened, and am astonished at being here rather than there; for there is no
reason why here rather than there, why now rather than then... the eternal
silence of these infinite spaces frightens me."
STELLAR
EVOLUTION
Regardless of whether
the Universe has existed forever, or whether it is the result of a cataclysmic
miracle that occurred under unique thermonuclear conditions, it is now apparent
that at least the solar system (in which human life developed) came into
existence during a finite epoch in the past. According to the accessible
information (of which there is considerable), about five billion years ago the Sun
first began to materialize as a relatively small cloud of interstellar gas on
the verge of gravitational collapse near the central plane of the Milky Way
(65). As this stellar gas began contracting, physical principles required it to
begin revolving faster and faster; and, in the process, the central portion
that was to become the Sun accumulated excessive energy in the form of angular
motion. Some of this rotational kinetic energy escaped (i.e., separated) from
the central cloud of gas to form the dusty shells that subsequently broke up
into the planets (65, 68).
In the limited duration
of individual human experience, the extant solar system appears to change very
little. However, at long range, the picture is quite different—stellar systems
are not only born, but once formed, they continuously evolve (65, 68, 69). The Sun itself has changed significantly since its
origin. In the beginning it consisted primarily of hydrogen, the element that
has served as its incessant source of atomic fuel (65, 68). Intensive proton
interaction in this hydrogen mass has resulted in a continuous emission of
nuclear energy in the form of sunlight to the rest of the solar system and
beyond (68).
These thermonuclear
reactions are gradually depleting the basic fuel, the hydrogen; and,
consequently, the Sun is losing mass. Eventually, as the core of hydrogen
approaches exhaustion, an accumulation of helium will initiate a different kind
of nuclear reaction, causing the solar material to expand (68). The radius of
the Sun will grow larger and larger, and its luminosity will be greater because
of the enormous increase in its surface area. At this stage of its evolution,
the Sun will become a "red giant," just like Betelgeuse, Scheat, Ras Algethi
(70) and other bright red stars among the "blessed candles of the
night" (71).
This spectacular change
in the Sun will transpire some five billion years from now. Scientific theory
predicts that it will grow to some 250 times its present diameter of 850,00 miles, engulfing Mercury, Venus, and probably the Earth
in the process (72, 73, 74). "Nothing that we or the
planets can do will rescue us from its ultimate fiery embrace" (75).
"The oceans of the earth will boil. Life as we know it will end on the
earth" (76).
After a short duration
in this bloated condition, the Sun will begin contracting back down toward its
original size. But, it will not stop here. The Sun will shrink more, to a mere
one-hundredth of its initial diameter, i.e., to roughly the present size of the
Earth (77). By this stage of its evolution, the Sun will have transformed into
what is referred to as a "white dwarf," and all that will remain is
for it to collapse into the final dead state of a "black dwarf" (77).
This ultimate fate of
the Sun is as certain as the sundown of the present day. Although the solar
terminus may seem remote, it is predictable, and there is no apparent recourse
for modifying the schedule. An "entropic doom" appears inevitable
(78)—an inevitability that is confirmed by the Second Law of Thermodynamics,
itself. As the solar core of hydrogen is steadily degraded by the intense
nuclear reactions in this central mass, and as its kinetic energy is
irreversibly radiated into the vast cosmos, entropy must increase; and,
therefore, the solar system must eventually run down. Thus, it appears
"entropy is time's arrow" (79), at least within the limits of solar
time, and thermodynamic principles do not permit any alterations in the
trajectory of that fateful missile.
If this is true, if the
geophysical environment is indeed being modified by a natural process that will
not allow life to endure for more than "an instant in the ongoing
evolution of our solar system" (80), then the Earth should concomitantly
be changing—and, it is. Within the duration of an individual human life, this
change is negligible; but, nevertheless, it is occurring in a gradual, yet
detectable, form:
(a) Astronomical
evidence. Celestial mechanics has
revealed that the daily rotation of the Earth is in the process of slowing
down.** (FOOTNOTE: **As
pointed out by Kopal (81), "the reasons for this
gradual change in the length of the day...are connected with a tendency for the
Moon to slow down the axial rotation of our planet through tidal friction. The
momentum thus lost to the Earth is transferred to that of the lunar orbit
around the Earth." And, this lunar orbit is increasing by a distance of
ten centimeters with each new moon (82)). Each
new day is longer than the previous by two hundred millionths of a second (82).** (FOOTNOTE:
**By using the current rate of two hundred millionths of a second, if one
extrapolates back one million years it appears that each day then was no more
than four hours long; or by extrapolating forward, one finds it would take
slightly over fifty million years before the day will be forty-seven times its
present length of twenty-four hours. But, the Earth is much older than one
million years, and physicists estimate that it will take much longer than fifty
million years (approximately one thousand times longer) to reach a day length
that is forty-seven times the present 24-hour day (assuming the Earth were to
miraculously survive the "red giant"). These discrepancies can be
accounted for by recognizing that the Earth's crust expands, and the change in
mass distribution causes its rotation to periodically decelerate at a rate that
is greater than the average value. Furthermore, the changing day length is a
non-linear function that is influenced by variables such as ocean mass and by
the distance between the Earth and the Moon.)
It is estimated that, eventually, the
duration of a single day on the Earth will be about forty-seven times its
present length of twenty-four hours (83, 84, 85). How
different the Earth will be then!
(b) Geological
evidence. An accumulation of geophysical
data in recent years had disclosed that the morphology of the Earth is also
changing. Proof of this change is embedded in the massive process of
continental drift (86). The more discernible manifestations of this gradual
transfiguration of the Earth include earthquakes, volcanoes, mountain building,
glaciation, and regional extensions of land and
water.
(c) Biological
evidence. The phenomenon of life is
probably the most conspicuous form of evidence that the physical properties of
the Earth have changed over the millennia. This biogenic event did not (in
fact, could not) transpire during the epoch following the Earth's initial
separation form the Sun. At least three billion years had to elapse before a
sufficient amount of the primeval hydrogen in this solar satellite was
transformed into the more complex elements, that were
capable of bonding into the organic molecules essential for life. It was during
this phase of stellar evolution that the stage was set for the eventual
development of the more complex living systems, including man; and, therefore,
I shall elaborate on events that occurred during that vital era.
According to Oparin's hypothesis, the synthesis of organic matter should
have been a very natural phenomenon once terrestrial evolution produced certain
environmental conditions that could energize organic bonding (87). However, his
remarkable hypothesis lacked corroboration until 1953, when a graduate
student** deliberately placed the appropriate gases into a simple laboratory apparatus
that simulated the primitive atmospheric conditions that were thought to exist
on the Earth approximately two billion years ago. This rewarding experiment
yielded an abundance of complex organic molecules that are known to serve as
basic components in living systems (37, 38).** (FOOTNOTE: ** The student was Stanley Miller, who tested Oparin's hypothesis while working in the laboratory of
Nobel Laureate Harold Urey. Miller placed the estimated proportions of
hydrogen, methane, and ammonium into a reflux system, and added water, which
could be boiled and refluxed throughout the system in a manner that allowed all
the gases to flow past an electrical arc. The electric arc was a substitute for
the electrical storms that are considered to be the likely source of energy for
the synthesis of primordial organic molecules on primitive Earth. After
refluxing the sterilized system for about fifteen hours, Miller found a wide
variety of organic compounds in his experimental chamber. Most significant was
his discovery that one-quarter of this aggregated carbon was in the form of
either alanine or glycine.
Although these organic compounds represent the two simplest amino acids, they
are essential as building blocks for the proteins of life (37, 38).)
So, after this one
simple, but elegant, experiment, it appears that, if any region of the Universe
happens to possess these special environmental conditions, the synthesis of
organic molecules is inevitable, and "life must occur" (87). This
conjecture implies that life might be a common occurrence in the Universe, a
possibility that is supported by recent studies on the absorption spectra of
distant stars that have revealed at least thirty different biotic molecules,
ranging from ammonium to methanol (88).
For those who have
meditated on the details of this knowledge, and who are not inhibited by the
coercive doctrines of mythological religions, the origin of life on Earth is
now considered to have been the result of "a set of many, but natural and
inevitable, molecular reactions" (87). Lucretius was right! "The
races of mortal creatures were not let down into the fields from heaven by a
golden cord,...but [were] born of the same earth that
now provides their nurture" (89).
"As atoms combined
to form molecules, and as molecules combined to form still more complex
molecules, new properties [were] acquired at each step along the
way"—special properties—ones that did not exist before and that were
greater than the aggregate of properties of the individual elements (90). It is
not possible to pinpoint the stage in this progression when the more complex
molecules became integrated living systems: It has been proposed that within
these haphazard organic combinations there occurred certain molecular
arrangements that tended to facilitate sequential catalytic reactions (91). If
this actually was the case, it is tempting to conceive of "life" as
having first appeared at the instant when a group of organic molecules, by
random interaction, formed a unified system with the ability to sustain
a series of catalytic reactions for some indefinite, but significant, period of
time. In other words, the first living system was probably an open system
with the intrinsic ability to maintain an energy flux, i.e., the intrinsic
capacity to "metabolize".** (FOOTNOTE: ** It has been suggested that a living system is
unique because it consists of a microcosm of neg-entropy,
possessing higher order, greater complexity and less randomness than the
inanimate world from which it originated (92, 93). However, life originated as
an exothermic phenomenon, involving a series of catalytic reactions that must
have been associated with an increase in entropy, rather than a decrease.
Admittedly, living systems are characterized by a specific organization, but
this structure must be constantly maintained, at a high cost of energy. The
vital metabolism that maintains this integrity requires a continuous input of
high-grade energy from the environment and results in significant thermal
discharge from living organisms. Thus, if the heat that is released by the
metabolic processes is included in the thermodynamic considerations, the net
effect is an acceleration of entropy by these "organized warm
bodies"—or, "organized entropy".) Subsequently, the more stable systems acquired a unique
molecular configuration that allowed them to utilize a fraction of this energy
flux strictly for maintenance of their own "vital" organization (94).
(In the complex forms of life today this property includes the ability to
maintain a steady state within the internal environment of the organism.)
The appropriate
conditions for the origin of life apparently did not last very long during the
ongoing evolution of the physical Earth. And, as the generative capacity of the
environment decreased, most of the catalytic reactions began to subside. Death
was frequent as environmental pressures disrupted the flux of energy in the
individual systems. When the molecular configuration, which provided the
synergistic property of life, was disturbed to a critical threshold of
disorganization, then the "metabolic momentum" of the system was
lost, the flux stopped, there was no longer catabolic "friction,"
heat ceased to be radiated, and the vital molecules (which were active only a
moment earlier) became non-biotic.
Under the
circumstances, the primordial biosphere would not have persisted except for the
fact that a small fraction of the first living systems possessed the ability to
replicate themselves. Some forms of pre-cellular life
must have consisted of special nucleotide sequences that could rapidly
reproduce themselves within the massive organic "broth" that existed
on primitive Earth. This theory is supported by recent laboratory studies that
have shown that specific RNA molecules are capable of auto-catalytically
replicating one trillion copies in twenty minutes in a test tube (95). Similar
molecules were presumably abundant in the environment of the Earth two billion
years ago.
ORGANIC
EVOLUTION
As the Earth proceeded
along its prescribed evolutionary path, new environmental forces developed
which were more detrimental to the integrity of living systems than the initial
pressures under which primitive life first arose. Therefore, if the bios were
to persist under these conditions, it could not remain static in nature. Life
had to respond with motion and change because the physical environment in which
it existed was changing. This evolutionary requirement was met by the fact that
primordial nucleotides possessed the intrinsic capacity to mutate randomly during
replication, and this property allowed diversity to arise during the course of
the copying process, and eventually led to more complex nucleic acids that were
better qualified to cope with the changing environmental pressures.
The desultory manner in
which nucleotides transmute suggests that the continuance of life over the past
two billion years has been the result of a chain of rather incidental
circumstances. In the orderless process of mutations,
the newly evolved biotic systems happened to survive only if their mutant
quality allowed them to take advantage (albeit passively) of those
opportunities offered by the environment.** (FOOTNOTE:
** On this basis man exists today because the natural environment was
appropriate for his evolution, and for no other reason.) This means that life on Earth has not been
"self-generating and self-sufficient," but instead, "has been
totally shaped by, and is still largely dependent upon, the terrestrial
environment in which it has evolved" (80).
By integrating the above
information it is evident that organic evolution has been, from the beginning,
but a part of stellar evolution and therefore, is based on the evolution of the
cosmos, which represents "the time pattern of change of all matter and
energy" (96). Assuredly, "the whole evolutionary process, both cosmic
and organic, is one" (97, 98); and, if living systems are to endure as the
solar system ages, they must adapt by developing attributes which are more
congruous with the new environmental forces that arise as the physical
environment of the Earth changes. Any species of organism that does not
successfully conform to the physical evolution of the terrestrial environment
will disintegrate. Within this process of elimination, the unsuitable
"organisms are replaced sooner or later by better adapted, newly evolved
forms: (90). This is a basic condition within the familiar precept of natural
selection; the procedure whereby Nature ‘inanimates’
those species which no longer evolve, while permitting the survival of those
organisms that are more fit to cope with the stresses of the natural
environment (100).
So, men are now aware
that species have continually replaced one another, even though only a small
fraction of those that have been eliminated are actually recorded in fossil
remains. Yet, the process of fossilization itself is proof enough that
"species cannot be immortal, but must perish, one after the other, like
the individuals which compose them" (101). Although the length of
existence of a particular living species may be more difficult to predict than
the life span of the individual members of that species (a life span which is
written in the genetic code), still the very prospect of species extinction
begins with birth. "Although some species like the horseshoe crab have
remained relatively unchanged for hundreds of millions of years, the
[successful] extinct reptiles included a number of the most advanced, complex,
specialized creatures that the world has ever seen" (103).
From the available
evidence, it appears that "natural selection [operating throughout
starvation, disease, and death] so often leads to extinction rather than to
perfection" (104). The fossil remnants indicate that all the extinct
species, which inhabited the Earth at some time during its long geologic
history, vanished from the organic scene in either of two basic ways: (i) either by dying out altogether (upon arriving at an
evolutionary dead-end), or (ii) by gradually evolving into another species ( a
process called speciation) (105). In either circumstance, a species that
existed at one time disappears from the bios. It must therefore be concluded
that extinction is a natural episode within the continuous process of organic
evolution, an episode from which no species is immune (99). "Extinction—relatively
rapid in the time scale of evolution—is the rule" (106). Thus,
"evolution is not predestined to promote always the good and the
beautiful" in the eyes of man (107).
But,
what about man? Is the species Homo
sapiens in conformity with the dynamic pattern of organic evolution? A
number of respected evolutionists doubt that humans are evolving today (108,
109). They believe that natural selection is essentially at a standstill, or at
least is not operating in the normal way, so far as the adaptation of human
beings to the natural environment (110, 111, 112).
This stagnation, if it is veritable, may be crucial to
the long range durability of mankind, because there is reason to believe that any
species, if it is to survive to its maximum evolutionary potential, must be
recurrently subjected to the process of natural selection.
If there is indeed a
natural law that demands that all species evolve, or else be forced to
extinction, then the great question becomes one of whether man is a part of
material Nature, or above it (113). Certainly man is unique in his own way,
but this does not mean that he is any "more unique than any other species
that is a sole survivor of a genus and a family" (114). In fact, human
beings are no more highly evolved than most other groups of present day mammals
(115). Furthermore, mammals as a whole cannot justifiably be considered as more
advanced than cephalopods or insects, in terms of success in a natural
environment. Any notions to the contrary have resulted from the inescapable
fact that it is man who has arranged all organisms in an evolutionary
hierarchy. It is the human viewpoint that has placed mankind "at the
summit of all creation," and we make our comparisons on this basis (115).
Now I must ask (as Hume
[18] surely would have), which possibility is more extraordinary, that man
is truly special, or that man only thinks he is special? And, if you master
the "relative sense" in responding to this question, you will find
that man is "neither better nor worse than any other living thing"
(116). To think otherwise is to harbor an illusion of the human consciousness.
There is absolutely no tangible evidence to support the cherished sentiment
that man is above material Nature. "Man is wholly and ineluctably embedded
in the tissue of natural process" (117).
To comprehend the
extent to which Nature possesses him, man need only realize his implicit
dependence upon the simple chloroplast. In order for animal life to exist,
there was (and still is) the indubitable prerequisite of photosynthesis, the
phenomenon by which plants absorb carbon dioxide (the principal animal waste),
discharge oxygen (so vital to animal metabolism), and within the very same
operation utilize a fraction of the Sun's energy to transform light into
nutriment for all other forms of life, including man (118). McHarg
(119) has vividly expressed this dependency of the bios on the plant kingdom's
ability to capture fragments of the Sun's rays before they re-radiate from the
Earth into the vast Universe:
"All life now,
the residue of all life past, the transformations of all life in all time all
creatures and all men are based upon the chloroplast, turned to the sun,
arresting and ordering its energy as it passes to disorder....[And so,] at
least in thermodynamic terms, the world consist[s] of a working partnership
between the sun and the leaf as man look[s] on—irrelevant, smiling benignly
upon the scene, secure in the illusion of his primacy."
What else needs be said
to confirm that human life is no more or less than Nature itself, that man is
forever tied to "the physical processes and biological cycles from which
all life slowly emerged through millions of years of evolution" (120).
What more knowledge must flow from the Pierian Spring
to convince man that all life is a product of the evolution of inorganic
nature, and that he himself is a product of the evolution of life.
Homo sapiens is "nothing more or less than
the result of natural selection in nature" (121), a natural process which
ultimately demands natural extinction.
The very fact that
humans are mortal beings should be sufficient evidence that man is exposed to
the same basic laws of Nature as are the other members of the animal kingdom.
Furthermore, it may be intensely relevant that the archaeological records have
revealed at least four subspecies of Homo sapiens that have become
extinct in the recent past, i.e., Solo, Rhodesian, Neanderthal, and Cro-Magnon
man (122).
"The
same [general] principles that have governed natural processes in the past will
continue to affect man just as they always have" (39). At some time in the future even twentieth-century man
must be submitted once again to the miseries of natural selection--that
"system of checks and balances" by which organic evolution operates
(123). Technology cannot indefinitely prevent "the necessity of disease
and death" (124) and the "hard conditions of life"(125). How
much longer man will survive before he reaches a similar dead-end (or undergoes
speciation) is uncertain; however, based on the duration of other subspecies of
sapiens, present-day man may be discarded from the evolutionary scene within no
more than a few millennia.
CULTURAL
EVOLUTION
Yet, despite the
evidence, there are still those who believe that the human species has been
blessed with a status equivalent to "the lord of creation" (126),
that man is the most unique and most successful product of biological evolution
(127), and that this uniqueness will allow man to abide endlessly as a
biological success. This arrogant claim is primarily based on the highly
specialized development and function of the human brain (128), (129). (Even
Wallace ascribed supernatural powers to the brain—a conjuration that
But what is culture?
This vague concept has been defined in so many different ways (133, 134, 135, 136). In fact, there has even been an effort to describe
this societal phenomenon in terms of the Second Law of Thermodynamics (137).
However, more often the various definitions imply that culture is the body of
learned information that humans pass non-genetically from generation to
generation. Yet, in having been characterized so diversely, it would seem that
culture must be many things; or, perhaps, the inconsistencies in its definition
indicate that culture has never been properly explained. It is this latter
probability that I shall pursue in the following fascicle.
Although human culture,
with its brain-hand-eye correlation, germinated from a biological entity,** (FOOTNOTE: ** According to Ehrlich, Ehrlich, and Holdren (138), "During man's evolutionary history, the
possession of culture has been responsible for a great increase in human brain
size. Early men added to the store of cultural information, developing and
learning techniques of social organization and group and individual survival.
This gave an evolutionary advantage to individuals with the large brain
capacity necessary to take full advantage of the culture. Larger brains in turn
increased the potential store of cultural information, and a self-reinforcing
coupling of the growth of culture and brain size resulted.") it has gradually acquired independent characteristics of its own (139,
140). There is little doubt that, in man, cultural evolution (i.e., the
progression of knowledge) has displaced biological evolution and now represents
the leading edge of human development (108).
Mankind experienced
fateful advances towards modern culture approximately ten millennia ago when he
(i) learned a language that permitted him to
articulate the information he perceived with regard to the natural environment,
(ii) constructed tools that allowed him to manipulate the environment for his
own comfort, and (iii) developed agricultural techniques that provided him with
a surplus of food and the leisure to espy still more about the behavior of his
environment (139, 141). Since these earliest times, man has progressively
shaped the physical environment for his own purpose. As more and more knowledge
has accumulated, hunting and gathering have been sequentially replaced by
herding, agriculture, industrialization, and now by the intensified
technological complexity of the electronic age (142).
Humanity has gained
this "enhanced" position among the living creatures of the world through
the ability of a few of its more discerning minds to perceive a few of the
regularities of Nature. Little by little as fallow information began to
accumulate within human culture the more sagacious members of society
discovered how to cultivate this virgin knowledge for their own utilitarian
interests. Most significantly, social men learned to anticipate circumstances
within their immediate environs that might result in a painful experience; and,
therefore, quite innocently and intuitively the human animal began to escape
the discomforts of the evolutionary process. As each new generation has been
enlightened with additional utilitarian methodology, man has increased his
effort to adapt the environment to himself; and thus, it appears that culture has
served to reduce the necessity for humans to adapt to the natural environment
(140, 143, 144, 145).
Thus, with the
development and expansion of culture, people learned that the miseries of
natural selection were unnecessary, that men could reduce famine and disease,
and human mentality could forestall human mortality (108, 146, 147, 148). This
insight is extremely (if such a superlative is ever really applicable)
significant, because it reveals that as culture has progressively developed to
its present technological state man appears to have made natural selection
obsolete, or at least to have reduced it to a vestigial influence on a few
surviving savages (149, 150). Herein lies the
foundation for a more universal definition of culture. Why has it been so recondite?
Culture is that accumulation of educational information, that men transmit exosomatically from generation to generation, in their
effort to avoid the miseries of natural selection**. (FOOTNOTE: ** Although the physiological
and anatomical potential for the development of culture is hereditary,
according to the definition of culture herein postulated, culture itself could
never become inherent (instinctive) because it is diametrically opposed to the
essential process of natural selection (136, 151).)
This being the case, it
seems that mankind must now consider the question of whether to continue his
effort to perfect human civilization. In any future deliberations on this
matter, it is imperative to notice that the definition does not assert that culture
has succeeded in conquering Nature, or that Homo sapiens can evade
natural selection indefinitely. To the contrary, humanity is now confronted
with increasing evidence that each additional advancement
in cultural evolution has resulted in greater and greater disruptions of the
environment (142). Therefore, the declaration of human dominion over Nature is
apparently nothing more than a transitory illusion, engendered by man's
self-induced remoteness from the real world (152).
It is now obvious that
the very technology that man has utilized to insulate himself from the natural
evolutionary process has caused extensive deterioration, not only in the state
of Nature, but also within the micro-environment he has fabricated (152, 153).
Furthermore, in the impulsive efforts to secure himself from the pollution and
other hazards he has created, man is responding by mechanically isolating
himself still further from Nature. He does not seem to realize that with each
turn of this vicious cycle the human species becomes more removed from the
natural world (152, 154, 155). His automation is
progressively secluding him in an artificial micro-environment—one that is, in
many respects, comparable to the hospital incubator that allows a fragile,
premature infant to avoid natural selection. By constructing this unnatural
world, human culture has succeeded in reducing selection pressures to a
significant (albeit limited) extent. By this action, in the name of
"humanity," civilization protects and preserves the weaker and less
well-endowed members of society (110, 156), in an artificial environment where
defective genes, despite their negative phenotypic expression, fail to impede
reproduction (146, 157). Consequently, in the absence of the checks and
balances of natural selection, the population of civilized man has grown out of
proportion.
If mankind intends to
decipher its future it must first come to realize that cultural activity has
served to impair the physiological evolution of humans, and therefore has lead
the species one step further along the road to oblivion (148). As Rousseau
(158) recognized more than two hundred years ago, "[cultural] improvements
have been so many steps, in appearance towards the perfection of individuals,
but in fact towards the decrepitness of the
species." In effect, as Emerson (159) has stated, "civilized man has
built a coach, but has lost the use of his feet. He is supported on crutches,
but lacks so much support of muscle." Thus, the accumulative effect of
culture has been to enfeeble mankind.
To the present day man
has been effectual in obtaining the energy needed to create and maintain the
extraordinarily complex civilization he has manufactured on the Earth. However,
it now appears there may be limits to the carrying capacity of this man-made
environment—limits that cannot be transcended for any reasonable duration
(160). As man stresses the natural environment more and more he recruits every
technological stratagem available to expand his artificial environment still
further into life zones that cannot possibly be sustained adequately over an
extended period of time (161).
Acute problems must
eventually arise within any over-developed civilization as a consequence of the
persistent impact of natural evolutionary pressures that will ultimately render
the strained systems inoperative, regardless of how much additional manpower
might be utilized in an attempt to preserve the human interest. In fact, no
artificial (i.e., man-made) system has ever remained functional for very long
without considerable human maintenance. And, it is because of this requirement
that modern society is now consuming excessive amounts of energy in its effort
to sustain the existing systems, especially those systems that are now
beginning to evince symptoms of instability.
At this moment, the
increasing demand for energy is forcing mankind to venture to the generation of
nuclear power, unmindful of the fact that the Second Law of Thermodynamics
imposes a limit on the efficiency with which technological society can produce
additional power. Furthermore, the Second Law asserts that all power
pollutes, not only at the production site, but also at the consumption
terminal. In other words, this natural law condemns human culture if it
aggravates the situation by generating more and more pollution with machinery
that is devised to produce additional power to surmount the forces of Nature.
Nonetheless, with
absurd enthusiasm, society proceeds pell-mell into the
research and development of every conceivable source of energy, oblivious to
the salient fact that it budgets the cost, as well as the ensuing pollution, to
each future generation. As this investment becomes more and more expensive, the
law of diminishing returns must eventually come into operation, and inevitably
the descendants of man will arrive at a pass where a greater effort to shield
themselves from environmental perils will fail to provide the necessary
protection (162, and 163). At that juncture, agricultural and industrial
expansion will slow down and eventually cease. In effect, human culture will
have arrived at a limit to its capacity to avoid the pressures of natural
selection (164). Shortly thereafter prosperity will dwindle and civilization
will begin to decline. During the retrogression man "will be conditioned
to accept the fact that he is nothing in himself, and even the epi-phenomena associated with consciousness and the
delusions regarding choice and value will disappear" (165). There is no
discernible alternative to this human destiny.
Why should this tragedy
befall mankind? What conceivable transition could have occurred during the
natural evolution of the human species that would now threaten the termination
of civilized culture and possibly even the extinction of man himself? Some
enlightenment on this question can be gained by examining the fossil records of
earlier species that have flourished for short periods on the Earth and then
perished. One discovers from this information that extinction has frequently
been accompanied by over-specialization of some particular anatomical feature
that temporarily provided the species with a distinct (but excessive) advantage
in the constant struggle for survival. Usually, such "specialization is
one of the first steps towards exploitation of [the] environment, but it is
also a first step toward eventual extinction" (166), because "a
highly specialized animal loses its ability to adapt to changing
conditions" (103). Therefore, it now appears that as a species becomes
overly dependent upon some highly specialized part of its anatomy, this
excessive dependency is in itself evidence that an evolutionary dead-end may be
imminent (131).
But, what component of
the human animal is so overspecialized? Distinctly, it is the human brain (with
its unique intellectual ability) that is the most specialized physiological
system in the human body. It is the human brain that has provided man with the
initiative to develop culture (128). It is also the human brain that has
yielded the power to invent technology, which can disrupt the natural
environment in catastrophic proportions. It is therefore the human brain that
has created the potential for global self-destruction as a consequence of
nuclear devastation, oceanic deterioration, irreversible atmospheric
disturbance, or some other insurmountable environmental alteration that cannot
be tolerated (167, 168). To be sure, it is human intelligence that has led to a
world that is "triggered to wipe out hundreds of millions of people in a
3-hour duel!" (169). This fact by itself is substantial
evidence to support the idea that the human brain may indeed be "far along
on its road to...destructive specialization" (170).
Thus it seems that
Nature, in evolving the human intellect, may have unintentionally created a
kind of "juggernaut" (171), who is laboring under the false
impression that the physical evolution of the Earth can be overpowered.
However, this is an intellect that allows "reason without wisdom"
(172). Perhaps even "primitive man was characterized by
a genetic structure incorporating somewhat more wisdom and prudence than our
own" (173). Be that as it may, I am inclined to somberly conclude
that the excessive specialization of the human brain is already limiting the
evolutionary potential of man, and that human intelligence, not human
ignorance, will condemn mankind (174). Therefore, if there should be a next
time, then, "next time, no brains" (175)
THE
PRINCIPLES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DYNAMICS
The principal
conclusions of this discourse can be summarized by formulating three aphorisms,
namely, the Principles of Environmental Dynamics—as I have fallen into the
habit of calling them:
PRINCIPAL I: Cosmic evolution, the evolution of the physical
Universe, is based on entropy increase and is the time pattern of change of all
matter and energy. Organic evolution is but a part of cosmic evolution, and if
living species are to survive, they must continuously adapt to the physical
evolution of the Earth.
PRINCIPAL II: Natural selection is the essential process by which
organic life conforms to the evolution of the Earth. Any species which does not
adapt to the changing environment is selected against and is eventually
eliminated by extinction.
PRINCIPAL III: Culture is the phenomenon by which the species Homo
sapiens avoids the miseries of natural selection. Therefore, culture prevents
the human species from complying with the physical evolution of the Earth, and
consequently culture will be the ultimate cause of human extinction. Thus,
culture, with all of its utilitarian advantages, is nothing more than a
self-eliminating aberration of organic evolution.
These Principles of
Environmental Dynamics make it evident that the evolution of modern culture has
not been a venerable progression toward the alleged "perfection"
of the human species. Culture is not a divinely endowed crusade that is leading
the way to a utopian society. Culture is not progress, but process—the
process by which civilized man has temporarily evaded the afflictions of
natural selection. But, eventually, in the ongoing evolution of the solar
system, civilizations must be confronted with abysmal pressures that culture
cannot commensurate. As Lucretius (58) said many years ago, "there is laid
down for each thing a specific limit to its growth and its tenure of life, and
the laws of nature ordain what each can do and what it cannot," and
culture is no exception to this axiom. To believe otherwise is to foster a
delusion of the human consciousness.
If this analysis of the
destiny of culture is accurate (as the future will surely determine) then the
fate of mankind is strange indeed, because it appears that no matter how
deliberately human society might strive to avoid an apocalypse in the decades
ahead, any such endeavor would merely represent still another expression of human
culture and therefore would, in all probability, accelerate the process of
self-elimination. Thus, although The Principles in no way resemble an
"environmental monitoring system," they might nevertheless suffice as
those "symbols of dis-assurance" that Crowe
(176) has urged from the scientific community.
PART II
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLES
INSIGHTS
Despite all the
evidence, there has been a lingering hesitancy within me to accept the
implications of The Principles of Environmental Dynamics. It is a reluctance
which Hume (177) would have understood: the passions of distress and anxiety
arising from the evidence of man's inevitable extinction, being a disagreeable
emotion, evokes a sensible tendency to disbelieve those events from which the
evidence is derived. Yet, rather than neglect The Principles, I have
commenced to test their application, and have found them to be consistently
helpful in understanding the current state of affairs of human civilization. It
is this capability that has persuaded me to reconsider their axiomatic
potential in an analysis of the destiny of human culture. In the following
lines I have endeavored to impart some examples of the insights that I believe
a consciousness of The Principles can render.
(1) Civilization
extinction
No civilization has
survived indefinitely (12, 178). All past cultures have either arrived at an
evolutionary dead-end (somewhat like species extinction), or undergone such
gross evolutionary transformations (somewhat like speciation) that they could
no longer be identified with their past. Regardless of which of these two fates
have ultimately occurred, every past civilization has perished after some
finite interval of accomplishment and prosperity.
Thus, as with stellar
systems and biological species, cultures are "born, mature, and die"
(178). But, why must this be? Why has man been unable to perfect the social
systems that he has created? The reason may be partly explained by the fact
that, as a civilization matures, the human element becomes more and more
essential for the endurance of the artificial systems that have been created;
and although a generous number of the participating members may be salubrious
to the society, human compassion simultaneously allows the lethargic members of
civilized cultures to persist as interdependent components of the social
systems to which they do not contribute. In fact, by its very definition, the
more successful a culture is, the greater will be the survival rate of its
weaker members. This being so, as the social systems of a particular culture
become more and more complex (and more demanding) there is concomitantly an
increase in disability, incompetence, and lassitude in the poorly endowed
members, while frustration, disillusionment and indifference develop among the
sustaining contributors of the society. Consequently, as The Principles
predict, after a period of time, "energy flags, diversity of customs
bewilders the common mind, arts and crafts grow feeble and careless, the people
give up and the civilization 'dies'" (178).
Occasionally a
faltering civilization may experience re-stabilization as a result of a
political revolution that refines the culture in a manner that reduces (albeit
temporarily) the disorganization of the society. But regardless of whether the
new regime is based on capitalism, socialism, fascism, dialectical materialism,
or some other socio-political structure, the revolutionary gains cannot last
because each new form of government, in its own characteristic way, acts
primarily to satisfy the utilitarian interests of mankind. Quite predictably,
the populace accepts those leaders who profer the
most attractive pledges for social reforms that might forestall the imminence
of natural selection within the society. In time, the administration finds itself less and less able to fulfill its commitments and can
no longer cope with the growing instability of the civilization. Inevitably, a
situation is reached where there is "decreased individual responsibility
for the design and function of the overall system....The expanding needs
eventually exceed the competence and control, [complacency] sets in, collapse
occurs, and the Golden Age is ended" (179). This has occurred repeatedly
in the past because all previous human societies have lacked the mentality to
estimate their evolutionary needs in relation to their future
environments; and, as a result, after a period of time, each culture has become
extinct (180).
(2) Quality of life
"The desire for a
better life is universal"; that is, the desire for higher status and the
attainment of 'culturally defined' desirable goals is common to all
societies" (181). But what is really meant by "quality living"?
Like culture, this vague concept has been ill-defined to the present. In the
past, "quality of life" has been considered as (i)
"the kind and number of choices that individuals may make" (182),
(ii) "having the maximum range of choices for a way of life" (183),
(iii) "the variety and flexibility of options available" (184), (iv)
"the availability of services and personal options" (185), (v)
"convenient access to ample and varied material goods and amenities"
(184), (vi) "having as much money as possible left over after taking care
of the basic necessities, and having the necessary time and opportunities for
spending it in a pleasant way" (183), or (viii) "releasing stress and
pressures, and reduced crowding, reducing pollution, alleviating hunger, and
treating ill health" (186).
Being aware of this
inexactness in definition, various institutions (including the federal
government) are now sponsoring national and international symposia in an
intentional effort to formulate a workable description of this illusive goal of
every past civilization (187, 188, 189). It has even been suggested that
contemporary society should develop an Index for Quality of Life (IQL or
QOL) (190, 191), or a Mean Amenity Level (MAL) (192), and then strive to
maximize these social indicators. But before any such index could possibly be
established, it would be necessary to have a better understanding of what
values should be emphasized in any endeavor to achieve an elevated
"quality of life."
The list of historical
values which contribute to "quality living" is long, and includes, at
the very least, health, knowledge, liberty, self-expression, freedom, justice,
dignity, and happiness (193, 194, 195, 196). It would probably be most
profitable to equate "quality of life" with the latter value—that is,
with "happiness"—for surely if an individual could not proclaim
himself to be happy, then he could hardly be considered as having a pleasant
and gratifying life. Whereas, if a person attained a position in life from
which he could perpetually affirm to the whole wide world that he was free and
happy, then no man could rightfully deny that this self-same person had
succeeded in achieving the quality of life that is so universally desired.
But, what man can
honestly stand before his idolatrous god and avow that he can enjoy incessant
peace of mind? Surely, "all men seek to be happy [i.e., tranquil]; this is
without exception. Whatever different means they may employ, they all tend to
this end....And yet, after the lapse of so many years, no one has ever
reached...this point upon which all keep their eyes continually fixed"
(197).
It appears that
"perpetual happiness is psychologically impossible" (198). Even in
composing the Declaration of Independence,
It is remotely possible
that all men might mutually agree that individual "happiness is very much
owing to the good opinion of mankind" (201); however, this extraction is
objectionable as a reliable criterion because already, as a result of his
pursuit of social approval, civilized man "only knows how to live in the
opinion of others" (202) and this condition has in itself made it difficult
to achieve lasting tranquility. Perhaps social men would find it more rewarding
if they could rediscover, as Candide did at the end
of his adventures, that the most effective ritual for experiencing happiness is
simply to cultivate one's own garden (203).
Forrester has pointed
out that "to try to raise quality of life without intentionally creating
compensating pressures...will be self-defeating" (186). As the nominal
standard of living rises, population density also increases, social pressures
develop, and "the satisfaction of living declines" (204). I therefore
conclude that the prevalent efforts to alleviate world hunger, to eradicate
pestilence, and to bring about a universal improvement in the amenities of life
are in the long-run merely self-defeating obsessions of well-meaning (but
uninformed) social utopianists. But, I need
not have taken so long to arrive at such a conclusion: The Principles
themselves impart the notion that it would be impossible to achieve a utopian
world because success would require the elimination of all misery—a task that
would call for an alteration of natural laws and, particularly, of the
inescapable law of natural selection and the wretchedness with which it asserts
itself. Therefore, those ignoramuses (and I use this term in the sense that
George Ruggle used it in 1615 to depict the
uninformed lawyer in his play, "Ignoramus" [205]) within and
without the federal bureaucracy who unwittingly assume that a specific
"quality of life" should be deliberately pursued as a national goal,
only serve to squander the taxpayer's wherewithal on political fantasy. The
very policies that are now being enacted "to manage the environment in
such a manner that it contributes to the physical and mental health of man and
to the flowering of civilization" (206) are the consequence of a deceptive
utopian rhetoric that will lead to more widespread misery in the long-run by
inflating the carrying capacity of the human environment to such a grotesque
state that it will be impossible to avoid collapse and chaos.
It thus seems that the
cultural pursuance of a prescribed "quality of life" is nothing more
than a vain attempt to create a utopian society. However,
"so far as the real world is concerned, the word utopian means
unworkable" (207). "There are no utopias in our social
systems" (208). History substantiates this contention: "Various
utopian designs have been proposed for nearly twenty-five hundred years, and
most attempts to set them up have been ignominious failures" (207). In
spite of all of these Sisyphean labors, no civilization has ever achieved an
"Etzlerian paradise" (209). And, even
though time may show that twentieth-century man came nearest to this visionary
goal, it will also reveal that, within this failing effort, affluent societies
(i.e., consumptive societies) did not experience fulfilling happiness (210).
Thus, as Rousseau (172) realized some time ago, after all of the investments
men have made into civilization, "we have nothing to show for ourselves
but a frivolous and deceitful appearance, honor without virtue, reason without
wisdom, and pleasure without happiness" (my italics).
(3) Formal education
Early man was able to
learn essentially everything that was necessary to achieve success in his
society by spontaneously observing the customs of his parents and a few
dexterous members of his community. However, as culture evolved and knowledge
accumulated, man utilized each new bit of information to reduce the pressures
of natural selection and reinforce the utilitarian enterprises of mankind. In
the course of this process, education gradually became more organized and
deliberate. As knowledge expanded and as the artificial systems of structured
societies became more complicated, there arose a need for specialists with the
expertise to maintain the steady state of the unnatural systems of which
civilizations are composed. In order to convey the amount of information that
was necessary, education became still more organized, and more technical.
Today, the methodical
scientific disciplines (as biology, chemistry, engineering, geology, physics,
and the agricultural sciences), which have dominated most of the academic
institutions during the past century, are intentionally designed to instruct
the younger generation on the techniques needed to skillfully manipulates some
portion of the natural environment. The other major disciplines (as sociology,
psychology, economics, urbanology, political science,
and the administrative sciences), while not directly involved in restructuring
the natural environment, nonetheless exert an indirect influence by
establishing the social institutions that serve to coordinate the overall human
determination to dominate Nature. Because of this fundamental purpose, "a
large proportion of our university curricula are based on the archaic
presumption that it is man's God-given prerogative to conquer and destroy
Nature solely for his use" (211).
Thus, I have come to
realize that an underlying function of traditional education is to qualify
technicians who know how to use natural science to exploit the environment in a
manner that will aid civilization in its evasion of the miseries of natural
selection. However, according to The Principles (and this is a critical point),
this educational incentive gives further impetus to the divergence of Homo
sapiens from normal evolutionary processes, and thereby accelerates the
pace of modern civilization toward extinction. Therefore, there is a serious
discrepancy between the objectives of traditional education and those of an
innovative "science for survival." As a result of this difference, it
may eventuate that environmental education is too incompatible to coexist with
traditional education, because the former, if it is to be meaningful, must
become an academic discipline that explicitly reveals why mankind cannot reside
in an artificial world and expect to survive for very long.
For the most part even
the current flurry of self-proclaimed "environmental
scientists" have not recognized the disparity between traditional
and environmental education. Because of this nescience, there is considerable
diversity in the composition of the environmental curricula that are now being
created. As might be expected, two distinct kinds of programs are taking shape;
(i) one, which is only a slight modification of the
traditional sciences, attempts to devise new methods of environmental
technology in order to facilitate the expansion of civilization, and (ii) the
other, which appears more revolutionary, emphasizes that the
"progress" theme of the tradition-oriented program is so contrary to
the non-growth ethic of essential environmental education that the
latter could conceivably be rejected as a curricular objective of the modern
university structure.
(4) Environmental
management
Humans have modified
substantially the natural environment since the beginning of agriculture (212).
Furthermore, every additional advancement in culture
has artificially expanded the human carrying capacity of the Earth. Yet, during
each incremental rise in population, concomitantly there has been an unforeseen
increase in human dependency upon many of the technological advances that were
initially dispensable at the time of their invention. For instance, electric
generators, internal combustion engines, and computers were no more than
fascinating gadgets at first, yet they are now essential to the well-being of
every industrial nation that has taken advantage of their performance
capabilities. "The trouble [i.e., tragedy] is, however, we do not seem to
learn very much from these sad happenings" (213). Seemingly oblivious to
this addictive characteristic of technology, society proceeds to intensify its
efforts to develop more control devices, even though it has lost sight of any
ultimate goal (except possibly the search for a utopian world).
However, the historical
records make it dubious that man's helter-skelter and hazardous attacks on the
present world will yield an optimum environment (214). "In fact we are in
the mess that we are in because our economic, political, and value systems,
operating very well, are producing mess as part of their normal output"
(215). And, there is no reason to anticipate any change in this situation as
man now struggles to control evolutionary forces with still more technology.
With the praises of society, technologists are proceeding
pell-mell into the next stage of modification and management of Nature. This is
being carried out under the pretext that their "custodial" action is
vital to the preservation of the natural environment, when, in fact, the real
concern is conservation of the precarious human habitat (216, 217, 218, 219). Plans are being drawn up to reduce, not only the
pressing problems of air and water pollution, but also to modify the weather in
a manner that will supposedly eliminate damaging storms and hurricanes. In
addition, engineers are looking towards enormous projects of water management,
including the direction of rainfall into areas where it will be used to satiate
a growing population in the decades ahead (216).
Mankind attempts all of this without even stopping to consider the possibility
that it has been these same kinds of labors in the past that have brought about
the current problems.
Interestingly, the
premises upon which The Principles are based indicate that man's so-called
"struggle for existence" is unnecessary (220). The thermodynamic
forces responsible for the evolutionary momentum of the physical environment
far exceed the human potential to resist the insurmountable elements of Nature.
In fact, "technological improvements merely hasten the day of ruin"
(221) because they divert the human species still further from the mainstream
of evolution, and the longer man remains isolated, the less chance he has of
readapting to the natural environment in the event of a fateful re-exposure to
its stresses. Thus, in his preoccupation with technological progress, man has
ignored the fact that, regardless of what course human culture follows, natural selection must eventually reassert itself.
I therefore conclude that each and every novel institution, which mankind now
creates to provide new technologies to protect the human species from the
environmental hazards it has unleashed upon itself, is a cultural fixture that
will serve merely to remove man still further from the process of natural
selection.
(5) Counterintuitive
responses of social systems
In his enlightening
essay on the counterintuitive behavior of social systems, Forrester (222)
emphasized that industrial nations are exhibiting a growing sense of futility
as they repeatedly set up new social institutions to deal with the stresses of
modern society; while, in the long-run, the problems only appear to worsen.
After an initial sequence of successful responses there is an unanticipated
deepening of difficulties in the very systems that the social programs were
designed to improve.
The implication is that
there may be something inherently wrong with the social systems that mankind
has created. On the other hand, it is also possibly that natural
"evolutionary processes have not given us the mental skill needed to
properly interpret the dynamic behavior of the [artificial] systems of which we
have now become a part" (17). If this is true, then as man proceeds to
design new cultural techniques to deal with the environmental dilemma, he may
be harshly awakened to the probability that "...the web of man's
environment is not only more complex than we think, but more complex than we can
think. What this means is that we may never learn to manipulate the environment
for the sake of our precious technology, that we may never fully understand the
intricacies of the biosphere" (223), and that the short-sighted
"solutions" to the problems of population growth, resource depletion,
and waste accumulation are erroneously "posed by persons who fail to see
(for some, the blindness is self-imposed) more than a part, rather than the
entire problem" (224).
If man were to widen
his perspective, he would realize that his social systems respond contrary to human
intuition mainly because the short-range social programs of modern civilization
are aimed at increasing health, education, and welfare, and therefore, in
essence, they are designed to minimize the stresses of natural processes, and
consequently, according to The Principles, initial success can only be
ephemeral.
(6) Population
growth
The population of early
man remained at a rather constant size--that is to say, the death rate equaled
the birth rate. However, with the experience of culture, the human species has
managed to diminish its mortality rate and thereby lessen the demise through
which evolution normally operates. As a result of this impairment of natural
controls, the human population has grown at an ever-accelerating rate (225).
The important insight to be gained from this information is that the excessive
growth of the human population has not been due to an increase in the birth
rate, but instead, is the consequence of those cultural advances that have
reduced the death rate. In particular, medical science (coupled with
engineering) has contributed substantially to the world population problem by
deferring mortality in humans of all ages (226, 227, 228, 229, 230).
As difficult as it has
been to accept these truths, I now realize that over-population is an
unavoidable sequel to the humanitarian process of culture. It is through
culture that mankind has developed agriculture, engineering, and medicine with
which to minimize the morbidity of natural selection. Therefore, I must
conclude that man cannot possibly resolve the population problem unless he
either relinquishes the cherished comforts of civilized culture, or else alters
society in some drastic manner that would assure an equalization of the birth
rate and death rate of the human species.
REALITIES
OF POPULATION CONTROL
An underlying theme of
this discourse has been that human culture cannot protect a growing population
indefinitely. Malthusian and Darwinian principles will eventually reassert
themselves and compel mankind to resume a lifestyle that will be analogous to
primitive times (225, 231, 232). As natural
evolutionary stresses reappear, there will be little prospect of avoiding a
relapse into an arduous kind of existence.
Confronted with this
unpleasant (but realistic) outlook, man might want to consider using his
intelligence to estimate the date at which the human species will naturally
disappear, and then attempt to program the life remaining so as to forestall
chaos or collective suicide (233). Whether he acts or not, man still makes a
decision (234); because, if he takes no action, then by abstention he will have
chosen to continue the present expansion of civilized cultures toward the
limits that will be imposed by famines, pandemics, climactic disruptions,
nuclear holocausts, or some other environmental calamities. And, undoubtedly,
these dreadful means of terminating exponential growth would be painfully
devastating (235).
But what action could
man take to revise the present course of civilization? Should society
concentrate on the problem of resource depletion, or waste accumulation, or
social injustice, or economic deprivation, or international conflict, or what?
Since all of these conditions are merely symptoms of an overcrowded planet, it
seems that overpopulation may indeed be the paramount threat to human society
(225, 227, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239).
Most
certainly, "the unchecked growth of a species will eventually lead to its
extinction" (41). Therefore,
above all else, it seems the human consciousness should deal with the
prevailing illusion that the human population can continue to grow
indefinitely.
But how can the human
population possibly restrain its expansion? What conceivable measures could be
implemented to effectively limit reproduction? Personally, the least confining
mode of action would be to encourage family planning, as guided by individual
conscience. By this method, childbirth could continue as an inalienable
prerogative of the individual.
A common argument that
is used to support population control measures based on voluntary action
is the allegation that parenthood is a God-given "right" (240). This seems
reasonable, for I cannot think of any biological process that is more natural
(or more vital) than the reproductive process: Absolutely no living system
would exist today if it were not for the phenomenon of reproduction. However,
the advocates of voluntary contraception expound their course of action under
the illusion that all men everywhere, regardless of race, nationality, or
religion, would conscientiously limit their progeny. Surely, if everyone would,
by their own volition, adhere to international guidelines with regard to family
size, then such a proposal would represent an ideal solution to the
world population problem. But, such presumption is strictly idealistic.
Mutual constraint of this magnitude is inconceivable; because, in the
inevitable struggle to survive, any "refusal to limit numbers gives a
positive advantage" (241). "Those individuals or groups who refused
to restrain themselves would increase their numbers in relation to the rest,
with the result that these individuals or groups with their cultural and/or
biological supports for high fertility would constitute a larger and larger
proportion of the population of future generations" (242, 243, 244). The
residual effect would be that the conscientious members of society who
willingly limit their breeding would gradually decrease in number and
eventually be eliminated. Therefore, "freedom of parenthood cannot exist in an
overpopulated [technological] world" (245).
If civilized man should
decide to strive for population stabilization and then expect to maintain it
throughout the world, there does not appear to be any alternative to compulsory
regulation of birth rates (246). The existing aversion towards this kind of
involuntary action is understandable; however, in practice, governmental
control over individual fertility might not be much more confining than the
legal coercion that presently governs other personal interests such as marriage,
child care, medical care, education, income taxation, and so on (247).
Furthermore, the "miracle of birth" is no more natural than the
"stroke of death"; and if men can legitimate actions which prevent
death by using the argument that God has given the human species the
intelligence to develop medical technology, then one can likewise contend that
God has blessed modern society with the knowledge to control births.
(1) The two-child
family
If enforced population
control is the only course of action that will yield lasting results, then the
critical decision is to determine what type of compulsory program to adopt.
Collective opinion appears to favor a program whereby no more than two children
would be permitted within each family. This type of restriction should
effectively alleviate the current exponential growth rate of the human
population; however, in the long-run (and the long-run is what counts if
long-range survival becomes the goal of the species), according to Ornstein
(248), even if a policy of two children per family could be implemented, and
even if such a program were "successful in maintaining a stable population
and avoiding racial, class, and individual biases in the rates of
reproduction,...the human species may eliminate selection and thus be on the
road to ultimate biological degradation and probable extinction!" (his italics). This latent complication would arise because
two children per family could not generate the excessive number of individuals
that Nature must have to accomplish natural selection (249). Nor would the
counter-evolutionary influence of modern culture be significantly altered.
Furthermore, in any population that mutually agreed to limit its numbers, there
would be definite selection for under-breeding. Although the genomic change
would be negligible in the short-run, in the long-run there would probably be a
significant decline in fecundity, and at sometime in the future, when the
inhabitants of civilized cultures are re-exposed to the stresses of the natural
environment, man would find himself poorly endowed for survival. The
consequence of the sudden genetic load would be a high mortality rate. And, if
the high reproductive potential which man now possesses should be lost by that
time, then such a genetic deficiency would in itself lead to extinction.
(2) Polyandry
As an alternative to
the two-child family, Hardin (250) has recently advocated a social revolution
that would establish a modified form of polyandry as the matrimonial custom. In
essence, this eccentric method of population control would permit every woman
to have as many male children as she desired, but no more than one female child
among her progeny. By this restriction, the population of females would remain
at (or slightly below) replacement level. And, although the number of males
would also be expected to stabilize, their number would be proportionately
higher than the females. Therefore, it would be necessary for several men to
share the same wife, assuming that all members of the society were to be allowed
the opportunity for marital pleasure. However, in the competitive world of
civilized cultures, it is doubtful that the male ego could ever adapt to the
custom of freely sharing one's inamorata with others. For this reason alone the
polyandry idea would appear to be unworkable. Furthermore, the overburdened
female population would probably voice a number of objections to the connubial
arrangements of polyandry.
The implementation of
this proposal is further complicated by the absence of the technology that
would be needed to prevent the development of a female embryo after the first
girl-child was born. Even if the existing techniques for detecting a female
fetus should happen to be adequately improved in the near future, the universal
acceptance of abortion would still be a prerequisite to the successful
establishment of a polyandry society. And, even then, if polyandry were
adopted, it would not be any more effective than the "two-child
family" in restoring the normal evolution of man. There might be selection
in favor of women who could accommodate many husbands (and possibly for men who
produce fewer sperm with X chromosomes), but Nature would still not be
operating in its ordinary way.
(3) Eugenics
For some time now,
eugenics has been seriously considered as a method of directing human evolution
and controlling population (251, 252). The eugenics concept is based on the
assumption that the present "knowledge of genetics provides the human race
with the possibility of consciously guiding its own evolution in preferred
directions" (110), and that such "directional selection: would bring
about a significant "improvement of the present genetic endowment of
humanity" (112).
Accordingly, the
eugenicist assumes that mankind can "restore the principles—but not all
the methods—of natural selection as it operated for 500,000 years of pre-human
and human evolution" (253). However, considering the cultural predilection
of the civilized world (i.e., a world that is intent on evading famine,
annihilating pestilence and minimizing individual competition for the basic
necessities of survival) it is unlikely that any eugenic direction agreed upon
would actually lead to the normalization of human evolution. The problem is, as
Predictably, the
eugenic interests of modern men usually call for selection in favor of those
individuals who would be the most qualified to develop civilized cultures even
further. This attitude was clearly expressed in the so-called "Eugenic
Hypothesis," which was first advocated by Frederick Osborn in the late
1930's. He believed that "if societies were organized in such a way that
the most successful individuals had the most children, then the genes
underlying the traits held desirable by society would increase each
generation" (255). Osborn (255) outlined three basic steps that he
considered to be necessary for the development of such a society:
(a) "General
improvement of the [social] environment....
(b) Completion of the
change now taking place to freedom of parenthood....
(c) Finally, the
introduction of eugenic measures of a psychological and cultural sort which
will tend to encourage births among parents most responsive to the possibilities
of their [social] environment, and to diminish births among those least
responsive, thus bringing about a process of eugenic selection through
variations in size of family."
Following these
original suggestions by Osborn, modern eugenicists have recommended a variety
of human qualities that should be "perfected," including: (i) "intelligence...by merely arranging the system of
taxation so that...people earning large salaries...should be induced to have
more children than the rest" (256) (an approach that might actually serve
to encourage the proliferation of the most greedy members of society), (ii)
"intelligence and motivation [toward the enterprises of]...science and its
technologies" (257), (iii) "abilities for making use of the
environment more effectively" (258), (iv) "high intelligence,
creativity, cooperative personality, good physique, and physical health"
(259), and (v) "success in the various social environments men live in
today" (260). (Methods have also been proposed for implementing these
eugenic objectives [261].)
In view of these
ludicrous intentions, I must conclude that any ‘hereditarian’
who states that "environmentalists" should also encourage "a
return to the principle of selection for an environment" (262), when he
is speaking of selection for success in the social environment of civilized man,
is merely revealing a gross deficiency in his knowledge of the principles of
natural selection. The eugenicist does not seem to understand that the natural
environment is indeed evolving, but not in the same direction as the
increasingly complex social environment of civilized man. Nor does man have the
mental faculty to predict the direction that the terrestrial evolution of the
Earth will take in the future. And, without this knowledge, the eugenic
proposals for artificial selection will not (in fact, cannot) facilitate a
return to the normal evolutionary pathway.
Thus, it appears that
normalizing selection, being a natural process, can only take place in a
natural environment, free of the positive feedback loops that are common to
civilized cultures. Therefore, any attempt to direct human evolution (if it is
going to have even a remote chance of success) must somehow favor those
individuals who are most fit for survival in a natural environment--the only
environment that is in phase with the physical evolution of the Earth.
ONE
MORE THEORETICAL SOLUTION
If the destiny of
mankind can be programmed, it appears that it "can only be planned on
evolutionary platforms" (263). In addition, such principles can only be
based on the natural environment, rather than on the artificial conditions of
human civilization. Anyone who asserts that this distinction "between
contrived and natural conditions is not a serious one" (264) only
professes his ignorance of the dynamic evolutionary forces that move the
cosmos, because the artificial systems of civilization cannot substitute for
the evolutionary matrix of the natural environment.
In the final analysis,
it would be "impossible to achieve a harmonization of man and nature
without creating a human community that lives in lasting balance with its
natural environment" (265). Therefore, if man aims to strive for a lasting
position in the natural world, he must establish (from the very beginning of
his efforts) a value system that would "set up as a minimal requirement
the survival of the human species under conditions that would permit further
evolution and delay extinction" (266). However, even if human proprieties
could be appropriately modified, it is questionable whether the human mind has
the capacity to commensurate the natural evolutionary direction of Homo
sapiens, or the mentality to restructure civilization in a manner that
would mimic the stresses of natural selection and allow evolution to proceed on
its normal course. Such an endeavor would demand decisions for which men are
neither innately, nor temperamentally, nor intellectually conditioned (267).
Certainly, the existing eugenic criteria do not meet these evolutionary requirements.
Therefore, if man wishes to delay his extinction, there may be no alternative
but to permit Nature to do the selecting.
But what nation would
willingly relinquish the technological comforts and social dynamism of modern
civilization? What nation would voluntarily submit itself once again to the
miseries of natural selection? It is unlikely that any society would accept
such action as a reasonable solution.
Because of the intimacy
between man and his modern culture, it seems that the only type of proposal
that might engage attention would be one that did not require the human animal
to completely abandon the many "advantages" of civilization, yet
would allow a significant portion of the population still to experience maximum
contact with the natural environment in which man originally evolved and for
which he is still somewhat genetically programmed (268. However, in order to
achieve maximum contact with an "evolutionary" environment,
people would have to voluntarily expose themselves to the probabilities of
famine, disease, and other natural hazards that frequently result in misery and
death. But, who is eager to make such a sacrifice? If there are any such
psychologically spirited mortals who would willingly cast themselves once again
naked upon the natural Earth as Nature cast them at the moment of their birth
(269), they should step forward, because the future of the human species may
depend upon their gene pool.
What I am suggesting is
that mankind might be able to return to a normal evolutionary pattern (without
totally sacrificing the present opportunity to live in a technological society)
by dividing the human ecosystem into two completely separate environments—one
being artificial and the other natural—one composed of civilization and the other
consisting of the wilderness. For each member of society who chose to remain in
the comforts of technology, the number of children would necessarily be
regulated by the State—with an absolute maximum of two children permitted in a
family. Whereas, those individuals who chose to live in the wilderness would
have no restriction on family size. In effect, this "theoretical"
solution would require every person to make a choice between the advantages of
culture (but with limitations on birth rights) on the one hand,
and the disadvantages of an uncivilized environment where natural selection
would impose its controlling force on population growth (but with unrestricted
parenthood). As absurd as this suggestion may seem, I find that it has no less
merit than any existing proposal for a long-range solution.
Individuals might be
allowed to migrate from the social environment to the wilderness, but once a
person lived any portion of his life in a civilized culture he could not be
permitted to bear more than two children. And, any individual who inhabited the
wilderness during all of his pre-puberty years could have an unlimited number
of children so long as he remained in the natural community, but he could not
be allowed to have additional children if he migrated to civilization. The net
effect would be to reduce the growth of the civilized population to slightly
below replacement level. As a consequence, at some time in the future (possibly
within several millennia), civilization would dwindle out of existence. Ironically,
if modern man were successful at such an endeavor he would never know what he
had achieved, because the process of speciation should lead to a
"post-historic" man who would not sense from whence he came any more
than Homo erectus was able to predict the development of civilization.
In order to accomplish
its purpose, the natural community would need to subsist in the absence of
essentially all the conveniences of modern culture, and especially in the
absence of those circumstances that now allow an extraordinary survival rate in
civilization. For example, as a minimum, the wilderness society would need to
be devoid of the following opportunities:
(a) Medical
technology. Medicine, with all of its modern treatments, including antibiotics,
vaccines, and surgery, could not be practiced, except possibly for euthanasia.
("in the process of natural selection, death is a
necessity" [207].)
(b) Welfare
payments. Although there might be some form of bartering for the mutual
exchange of goods, there could be no form of organized social welfare. ("All efforts to promote human welfare should bear in mind
that too much support will make the recipient weaker instead of stronger"
[271].)
(c) Wealth
inheritance. To ensure initial equality of opportunity to compete in the
natural environment, there could be no inequality of initial wealth. ("Very great individual wealth, whether inherited or acquired,
is beneficial neither to the individual nor to society" [272].)
In essence, this
proposal would require every individual in human society to choose between the
cultural advantages of medicine, welfare, and wealth inheritance on the one
hand, or an unlimited opportunity to reproduce on the other.
To give further detail
on this scheme would imply that I am naive enough to believe that such a world
society, split into two so distinctly opposing factions could ever be
organized, implemented, and enforced. It is far more likely that the human
determination to avoid the miseries of natural selection will continue to
exceed any interest in the long-range survival of the species.
THE NECESSITY OF A
COMMONS
The improbability of
activating this theoretical solution becomes more definite when one considers
the difficulties that would be encountered in preserving the inner sanctum of
the "wilderness." In addition, although the natural environment would
not necessarily be identical to the environment of primitive societies, it
would in any case have to provide the inhabitants with conditions similar to
the commons in which man initially lived as a relatively independent
enterpriser, free to compete for the sustenance of the wilderness. Every other
animal except civilized man thrives in such an environment where the commons
flourishes, and so it must be for man if he is to return to a normal
evolutionary course.
This idea of
re-establishing the commons is contrary to Hardin's (273) reasonable notion
that "ruin is the destination towards which all men rush, each pursuing
his own best interest in a society that believes in the freedom of the
commons...[because] freedom in a commons brings ruin to all." But,
Rousseau (274) said, "you are lost, if you forget that the fruits of the
earth belong equally to us all, and the earth itself to nobody!" And Locke
(275) reemphasized that "....we must consider what estate all men are
naturally in, and that is a state of perfect freedom to order their actions,
and dispose of their possessions and persons as they think fit, within the
bounds of the law of Nature, without asking leave or depending upon the will of
any other man". These timeless insights have helped me to realize that it
is not the freedom of the commons that brings ruin; but instead, it is the
coupling of the commons with the technological advances of civilization that have
led to the population stresses that now threaten human existence. In other
words, freedom requires the recognition of no necessities in a natural
environment, as compared to the limitations it demands in an artificial
environment. Herein lies a hidden component of the
tragedy of the commons.
I therefore conclude
that species evolve via the process of natural selection in an environment
where the vital resources are available as a commons, and only as a commons.
When individuals leave this natural state of freedom to form a commonwealth in
order to exploit the commons as a unified group (even though the group may have
mutually agreed upon mutual coercion) they reduce their vulnerability (not just
as individuals, but also as a population) to the impact of natural selection.
Consequently, when natural selection reasserts itself (as it inevitably must
during the course of solar evolution) it will act, for the most part, on the
existing culture as a unified whole, rather than on the individual members of
that culture, and this conglomerate selection can, in itself, lead to the
extinction of an entire civilization. That is to say, in the environment of
primitive man, natural selection acted upon the individual primarily
because each person was intrinsically responsible for his own
interaction with the commons; whereas, in a commonwealth, where a group of men
mutually agree to give up some individual freedoms in order to maximize their
common interests, every person unwittingly casts his evolutionary lot with the
entire society.
A
NATURAL ETHIC
An understanding of
evolutionary processes reveals that all civilizations (and eventually all forms
of life) on Earth are destined to extinction. In view of the evidence that
"man's central position of control in nature's scheme is deteriorating
badly, and that in the expanding cosmology, man is already being bypassed"
(267), it appears there has indeed been an exaggeration of the dominion of Homo
sapiens. In fact, five billion years from now, as the "red giant"
of our solar system casts its final glare upon the planet that it generously
vitalized during its course of evolution in the vast Universe, there will not
be a single intelligent earthling to proclaim to the heavens that the brief
moment of human existence was any more or any less significant than the
duration of any other organism that inhabited the Earth.
Under the solemn
disillusionment of this destiny, it becomes imperative to find some objective
that will produce an incentive to endure the struggle ahead. But what is there
to work toward? What is there to value? Goring (276) believes that,
"lacking the power to alter his fate, man's noblest attitude must be one
of dignity, comprehension, and defiance." And possibly he is right.
Perhaps this is the goal that all of mankind should take into consideration. It
is an attitude that is somewhat analogous to a sentiment once composed by
Pascal (277):
"Man is but a
reed, the weakest in nature, but he is a thinking reed. It is not necessary
that the entire universe arm itself to crush him. A breath of air, a drop of
water, suffices to kill him. But were the universe to crush him, man would
still be more noble than that which kills him, because
he knows that he dies; and the universe knows nothing of the advantage it has
over him. Our whole dignity consists, then, in thought. Our elevation must be
derived from this, not from space and duration, which we cannot fill. Let us
endeavor, then to think well: this is the principle of ethics."
Thus, Pascal has
implied that man could find dignity within an endeavor to formulate an ethic
that is more appropriate to the present circumstances. This idea seems
credible, for after all, "the greatest value has at all times been placed
upon systems of ethics" (278). (Ironically, if man does have the brain
capacity to think more wisely, then the rudiment of his extinction might also
become the source of his dignity.)
More recently, there
has been an increase in emphasis on the need for a modification of existing
human ethics (279, 280, 281, 282, 283, 284, 285).
However, the drastic changes that are now being called for would require
nothing less than revolutionary alterations in present attitudes and values.
Such changes would presumably lead to an environmental perspective not too
unlike the naturalism of Thoreau (286). In essence, such a "religion"
would require men to accept the fact that they are an inseparable part of the
natural world. In addition, men would have to acknowledge their dependency upon
Nature in order to survive as human beings (287, 288, 289, 290).
If this type of transformation in human attitude did come about, men would find
themselves once again experiencing the awe, and even the fear, with which
primitive man observed the world around him (291, 292, 293, 294).
Frankly, such a change in viewpoint does not seem plausible, not simply because
the "ruts of tradition" are too deep, but also because mortals would
find the mental shock to be too overwhelming. As Fromm (295) pointed out, such
a consciousness would lead to a "growing doubt concerning one's own role
in the universe, the meaning of one's life, and with all that a growing feeling
of one's own powerlessness and insignificance as an individual." However,
this point of view may not be entirely correct; because, as Einstein (1) said,
the very act of striving to understand one's place in Nature, can, in
itself, be a "liberation and a foundation for inner security."
Of course, ultimately
it will not matter whether an individual's religion was oriental, or
occidental, whether he worshipped an idol or a myth, whether he cherished
Nature or culture. This being so, it seems that each man should be free to
adhere to whatever tenets he chooses, so long as they help the individual to
relate himself to the Universe which has borne his existence. Having made this
consolation, I shall briefly take the liberty to divulge my own thoughts on the
matter.
Foremost, I am inclined
to believe that in the difficult millennia ahead, if men are to have any chance
of living in peace, with dignity, there is no alternative but to seek a
universal system of moral values—a common code of ethics—that can unite all of
mankind. But what is the foundation of such a universal ethic? What is the
source of a true religion? What is the purpose of human existence? What is the
real meaning of God? Ah, yes, what is the meaning of God? I have come to
realize that the definition of this vague impression suffers from the very same
deficiencies as the concepts of "culture" and "quality of
life," which were dealt with earlier in this discourse. That is to say,
there are so many interpretations of God that He(?)
must also be many things, or else the concept of an eternal deity has also been
inadequately defined to the present. Be that as it may, I for one shall not
pretend to know the explanation to this divine question. If there is any
imposter who claims he does have an absolute understanding of God, then
let him promptly declare himself—and then let him prove beyond doubt that the
particular religion that he has arbitrarily chosen is any more sanctimonious
than anyone else's articles of faith.
As for those
individuals who have invented a God who supposedly blesses only His
disciples with everlasting life (i.e., that incomprehensible existence after death),
who among them can prove that there is indeed such a prejudiced God, who would
promise some men eternal paradise, yet deny the very same opportunity to their
brothers simply because of the random variations in the ethical illusions that
are impressed into the psyche of each individual during his lifetime. Who among
them can so boldly declare such gross inequality in individual human destiny?
It is only within the delusion of a man-made "God" that men can be
considered as equal at birth, but unequal at death. By the laws of Nature—that
is to say, by a natural God—all men are unequal at birth, but become equal
at death. Not only is this latter sentiment more reasonable, it is also
more compassionate. Furthermore, what mortal can prove that an eternal life
after death is any different from the inconceivable oblivion before birth?
Actually, it may be only the experience of life on Earth that matters. It may
be that what goes on before and after is not only greater than men can think,
but greater than men will ever think.
In the interim, I shall
content myself with the hope (or illusion) that there is a natural ethic that
mankind might decipher at some time in the future. Regretfully, I do not know
how to formulate such an ethic. I only know that it cannot be based on the
assumption that human beings should become the "custodians of
Nature." Men would achieve nothing together if everyone were to adopt the
belief that "I can save the Earth" (296). When men take this
attitude, it is principally for themselves that they
are concerned, rather than for Nature. And, this is the very kind of
anthropocentric disposition that concerned White (33). It merely represents
another example of man's effort to place himself above non-human Nature,
instead of facing the more difficult task of determining his place within the
natural environment.
SOME
FINAL REMARKS
In conclusion, it
appears that mankind can never be free from the forces of Nature (297). As Lucretius (298) pointed out, only "Nature is free and
uncontrolled by proud masters, and runs the universe by herself without the
aid of gods." In essence, the Universe runs according to
verifiable, inexorable, unalterable, irrevocable and eternal laws (299, 300,
301, 302, 303). They are natural laws--laws that have
not been created by men, but simply discovered by them.
Possibly mankind will
someday come to realize that "any attempt to break natural law is doomed
to failure" (304). In any event, it seems that if man is to "think
well" he must first acknowledge the simple truth that "Nature knows
best" (305). Pope (306) understood this maxim when he wrote his Essay
on Criticism:
"First follow Nature, and your judgment frame
By her just standard which is still the same:
Unerring Nature, still
divinely bright,
One clear, unchanged,
and universal light,
Life, force, and
beauty, must to all impart,
At
once the source, and end and test of Art."
Ah, yes, and the
"test of Art". Could it be that Pope had a premonition of the
principles of natural selection?
And, finally realizing
that "it is much more custom and example that persuade us than any certain
knowledge" (307), I know that the conclusions of this discourse will be
accepted only when their "constellation" is right, and not before
(308). Nevertheless, in accordance with an ancient Chinese sage (309), these
concepts are laid before the gods without question or fear, to wait a hundred
generations if necessary to be confirmed without a doubt by posterity.
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