Speech for 31^st Annual Meeting Southwest Conference on Asian Studies

Via videoconference between Taipei and Sam Houston State University

October 19,2002

“Taiwan’s democratization and external policy”

Distinguished scholars and academics:

Greetings from Taipei! First I would like to thank Dr. Hans Stockton for his kind introduction, and the Southwest Conference on Asian Studies for arranging the opportunity to engage in this dialogue on the political situation in Taiwan. I was asked to speak on Taiwan’s democratization and the ruling party’s policy vision, but I would not be doing justice to the multiple facets of Taiwan’s democratization process, of which we are very proud, in this short 20-minute presentation. So I would like to focus on how Taiwan’s democratization and fledging multi-party politics have impacted our country’s policy on external relations.

1. The character of Taiwan’s multi-party politics: a brief overview

Taiwan does not have a long history of multi-party politics. Under decades of Martial Law, the opposition movement was not able to organize itself into a political party until 1986, but even then, when the Democratic Progressive Party was founded, it was deemed illegal and its founders risked the possibility of imprisonment and exile. But soon after, during the final months of President Chiang Ching-kuo’s rule, in 1987 Martial Law was lifted, thus initiating a period of rapid change.

In the early years of democratic change, party politics consisted of confrontation between the main opposition, the DPP, and the ruling KMT. As in all other democratizing countries, the demand for democracy, freedom and human rights was the chief agenda of the opposition party. However, given Taiwan’s complicated history of colonialism and conflict with mainland China, there was also an entirely different dimension of confrontation between parties. The key political issues appeared in dichotomies such as: “native Taiwanese” vs. “mainland Chinese”; “native rule” vs. “outside regime”; and “independence” vs. “unification.” The salience of such dichotomies overshadowed all other domestic issues like the environment, social welfare, and the economy.

Even after Taiwan started to democratize and the original agenda of freedom and human rights was attained, and even after the parties have been through fundamental transformations, these dichotomies that meant initial divisions between parties have remained as significant political issues. Mainly, the party that was previously branded an “outside regime” representing “mainland Chinese interests,” the KMT, went through a process we call 本土化nativization, or 台灣化 “Taiwanization” under the leadership of President Lee Teng-hui. At the same time, the party that had been initially labeled “pro-independence” and attempted to represent “native Taiwanese” interests has significantly moderated its position. In the year 2000, Taiwan’s first ever democratic transfer of power from one party to another took place, bringing about even more profound changes. However, while these changes have not diluted the salience of identity politics in Taiwan and parties remain very vocal about a diverse range of views regarding cross-strait relations, there are indications that parties are moving toward more consensus through the democratic mechanism our system provides.

2. Ideology and national identity: Dealing with differences and building consensus

The democratization of domestic politics in Taiwan also coincided with the further opening up of China and greater interaction between the people on both sides across the Taiwan Strait. Domestically, democratization has meant that the people have enjoyed freedom to openly express their views about identity and cross-strait relations, thus producing a colorful spectrum of opinions often vocally expressed on the political stage. Yet while strong views are expressed, at the same time democracy itself provides a mechanism for channeling differences, dampening the confrontational character of internal debate and enabling consensus-building opportunities. Therefore we have seen the various political parties attempting to move toward a centrist view on issues: Indicating a general preference for the status quo instead of either reunification or a de jure declaration of independence, asserting a willingness to defend the sovereignty of the Republic of China, expressing hope that Taiwan can play a greater international role, and commonly opposing the “one country, two systems” formula China constantly presses on us.

In other words, what was formerly an ideological debate about identity has today evolved into very practical matters regarding cross-strait interaction. For example, two decades ago people debated the fundamental question of whether or not to interact with China, but today people talk about how to conduct trade and which specific types of industrial investment in China would benefit or hurt Taiwan’s interests. Instead of refusing to interact with China, people are debating the practical ways of reducing the security risks of economic engagement.

Thus democracy within Taiwan has enabled the parties to gradually soften differences and move toward a consensus on the economic relationship with mainland China, but across the Strait, Taiwan’s democracy contrasts with the highly authoritarian regime of China. In other words, on an internal level, democracy resolves differences, but on the external level, we are witnessing economic integration that is accompanied by heightened political differences.

Therefore it has been our view that in terms of strategy in cross-strait relations, unless there are fundamental changes in the political system of China, for the time being, efforts to resolve economic issues across the Strait should take precedence over attempts to deal with the political problems. It is also our belief that in the same way that democracy enables the people of Taiwan to begin to reconcile identity politics and ideological differences, the democratization of mainland China would help bring about a framework to resolve existing cross-strait political differences.

3. Democracy and Taiwan’s foreign policy

Taiwan’s democratization has been meaningful in our foreign policy in at least three different ways. First of all, like in our handling cross-strait relations, democracy provides us with the internal mechanism to achieve consensus in our foreign policy. In short, democracy provides Taiwan with an international identity distinct from that of mainland China’s, and the Taiwanese people are willing and able to make greater contributions to the world community. Despite ongoing Chinese attempts to limit Taiwan’s international activity space, within Taiwan and across party lines, there widespread hope that Taiwan can take part in international organizations so as to exercise responsibilities as citizens of the global village. Individuals across the domestic political spectrum have actively taken part in campaigns for Taiwan’s membership in international organizations such as the World Health Organization and United Nations. At the same time, there has also been widespread support for contributing to international aid and development. For example, Taiwan has contributed to the humanitarian relief of Afghani refugees, and we are particularly proud of the agricultural and medical missions Taiwan has established in Africa and other parts of the world.

Secondly, democracy has impacted our foreign policy by making Taiwan more appealing to the international community. Democracy is helping Taiwan out of the sense of international isolation we experienced in the 70’s and 80’s as countries started to break off diplomatic ties. Even though due to Chinese pressure most countries today do not recognize Taiwan diplomatically, but as a democratic country, Taiwan is widely supported by people around the world. The American Congress, the European Parliament and elected bodies around the world have passed resolutions recognizing Taiwan’s democratic achievements and offering their friendship and support. US Secretary of State Colin Powell recently stated that Taiwan is not a problem but a success story. Indeed, Taiwan’s democratization has not only brought about greater international goodwill, at the same time, Taiwan has also become an inspiration to those societies still struggling to overcome authoritarianism. Mainly, Taiwan has defied the notion that “Asian values” are not compatible with democracy. Other societies in Asia, including people in mainland China, look to Taiwan for support, and in turn, Taiwan has also pledged greater support for the democratization of the region. We are currently making preparations to establish a “Taiwan Democracy Foundation” which will serve to not only highlight Taiwan’s democratic achievements but to link Taiwan to the efforts of other international institutions of democracy-building.

Thirdly, Taiwan’s democratization has brought about greater involvement of our civil society in conducting international relations. Diplomacy is no longer seen only through the lenses of Foreign Ministry officials. Instead, we seek to promote the concept of multi-track diplomacy, in which we can link our parliaments, cities, political parties, academic institutions, businesses and NGO’s to their corresponding partners in other countries. Ultimately, the goal of diplomacy is to get our citizens connected to the world, and thus we attach great value to the vitality of Taiwan’s civil society. While our access to international governmental organizations is constrained by China, our NGO’s today are more active than ever in trying to obtain access to international conferences and events, not only making Taiwan’s presence known but also bringing back to Taiwan the most progressive trends and values of the world.

4. Evolution of Taiwan’s multi-party democracy: Moving beyond national identity

Taiwan’s democratization has provided multiple parties to voice differences but to also move toward consensus on important external policy matters. This process has involved emotional debate over national identity and ideology, but the peaceful way in which the Taiwanese people have dealt with burdens of our history gives us optimism in the democratic system for achieving at least two goals in the future: One, moving beyond ideology and national identity politics in Taiwan and shifting the political agenda toward constructive debate over economic and social issues. In other words, there is an expectation that in the future Taiwan’s political parties can be characterized not only by their national identity or view on relations with mainland China, but more importantly, by where they stand on important fiscal, social, economic, and environmental policy.

The second goal is to extend the democratic mechanism of resolving domestic differences to mainland China, so as to create a framework that would lead to an eventual peaceful resolution of cross-strait differences. In other words, in the same way that parties of different ideological origin can argue but not fight violently over differences in Taiwan, we hope that the leaders and people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait can engage in dialogue free of military threats.

I will stop there, with this brief overview of democracy’s impact on resolving differences in Taiwan, building consensus on external policy, and our expectation that democracy will also lead to greater acts of reconciliation across the Strait. Thank you for your interest and attention, and I look forward to further discussion with all of you.