Throughout 2001, the
Israeli-Palestinian peace process, punctuated by gestures of peace and acts of
violence, continued in its cycle of promise and disappointment. It was a year of changes in the Israeli and
American administrations, as well as a call for a change in the Palestinian
administration. It was a year which saw
American involvement wax and wane and wax again. Although to no avail, U.S. President Bill
Clinton strove to facilitate a lasting peace in the closing days of his
presidency. Incoming President George W.
Bush, stepping back in the initial months of his presidency from such intense
American involvement in the region, retracted Clinton’s
final peace plan. Soon, however, Bush realized the need to send a special
envoy, General Anthony Zinni to the region in an
attempt to support the diplomatic work of C.I.A. Director George Tenet to
implement the Mitchell recommendations for peace. Despite Israeli Prime
Minister Ehud Barak’s peace
efforts, he was defeated in the February Israeli elections. He lost to the hard-liner Ariel Sharon, whose
march across the contested Temple Mount
in Jerusalem in September of 2000, sparked the round of violence that continues until
today. The year saw the declaration and
breaking of cease-fires, leading to Israeli calls for the rejection of Yasir Arafat as a peace partner. Arafat’s popularity also
declined amongst his constituents while that of Palestinian militant groups
such as Hamas and Islamic Jihad rose
dramatically. Throughout 2001, these
groups engaged the Israeli military in a violent dance characterized by a
steady stream of military incursions into Palestinian
Territory and suicide bombers into
Israeli territory.
This essay focuses on the
manifestations of Trickster’s work in the media representation of these acts of
aggression which have made up this dance.
As Stockall (p. 1) reminds us, “Trickster is semiosis.” Therefore, one way to probe Trickster activity in the peace process is
to examine how acts of Israeli and Palestinian aggression are semiotically constructed in the media representation of
this reality. What language is used to
represent this contested reality of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict? Ng and Bradac offer
that “the availability of different linguistic forms for representing reality
provides language users with tools for deleting or stressing particular aspects
of reality” (144). For this essay, then,
the starting point is determining which verbal signs are used to represent the
reality of the conflict. In the
representation of aggressive actions by both parties, what is deleted or what
is stressed in the presentation of the conflict’s narrative? Are acts of aggression represented by the
same signs for each side? Is the killing
of a Palestinian by an Israeli signified by the same signs that the killing of
an Israeli by a Palestinian is, or are they represented by different
signs? In order to discern answers to
these questions, I have examined the construction of the Israeli-Palestinian
narrative within the 2001 editorials in the New
York Times which focus on the conflict.
(See Appendix A for a list of these editorials).
Methodology
Why choose
editorials to explore the representation of this conflict? I chose this genre because the editorial’s
purpose is to trick the sails of public opinion by changing the direction of
readers’ opinions. At least theoretically,
then, the editorial should be fruitful ground for Trickster activity. Also, Trickster, who can and often does
create chaos from order, also creates order from chaos, transforming the
“meaningless into the meaningful” (Jung p. 256). Editorials are often an attempt at sorting
the details of a complex situation into a meaningful framework in order to
persuade readers to support a particular view, actor, or policy. When covering a conflict situation, editors,
acting in their Trickster capacity, must determine how they are going to
represent the acts of aggression each party takes against the other. Because in
the Israeli-Palestinian conflict these acts seem to be a consistent roadblock
to peace, it is important to determine what patterns of representation the
editors are creating from the chaos to track how Trickster may be afoot in
these patterns.
To decipher these patterns, I read
a series of twenty-one editorials to track the signs signifying the aggressive
actions of both parties. After
identifying these signs, I examined them for linguistic activity, such as
mitigation or masking strategies, characteristic of Trickster. Masking proved to be at play throughout the
series. According to Ng and Bradac, “masking can be thought of as the rendering of reality
so as to make it appear different from the ‘actual’ way of the world. Masking does not withhold true information or
present false information as if true, rather it
presents true information in an incomplete or partial way under the cover of
one of more literary masks. The formation of a literary mask consists of,
first, the concoction of special phrases and expressions …The act of concoction
also involves the removal of cues that may otherwise encourage a more critical
reading of the masked reality … The third feature, which may be thought of as a
consequence of the second feature, is the reduced level of cognitive activity
in comprehending the presented reality” (Ng and Bradac
145). Because of this strategic maneuvering of information, masking is a prime
Trickster method, one by which s/he may tell the truth, yet still guide the
editorial readers in a direction s/he wishes them to go.
Findings
In
examining the series of editorials to explore Trickster’s role in the
representation of aggressive Palestinian and Israeli actions, a general pattern
emerged for each group. Overall, the
signs violence and terrorism were used to represent
Palestinian actions, while the signs military
and restrictions were used to
represent Israeli actions. The following
is a presentation of these findings succeeded by a discussion of the role of
Trickster’s masking activity in these representations.
Representations of Palestinian
Aggressive Actions
Overall, representation of
Palestinian aggression was generally performed by two signs, violence and terrorist (both in various nominal and adjectival forms). On initial review of the editorials, it
appeared that violence also might be
an Israeli representation, because both Israeli and Palestinian actors were
often present in the sentences in which violence
occurred. Of the fifty-two times violence occurred throughout the
editorials, it most often collocated – 38 percent of the time – with both
Israeli and Palestinian actors within the particular sentences in which it
occurred. For example,
“But if Yasir
Arafat, the Palestinian leader, is willing to end the violence, he may find Mr.
Sharon to be an unexpectedly pragmatic negotiating partner.” (March 10, 2001).
“Prime
Minister Ariel Sharon of Israel announced that if the Palestinian
leader, Yasir Arafat, could deliver seven
days without anti-Israeli violence,
the clock would start on a six-week cooling-off period.” (June 29, 2001).
Along with this Israeli-Palestinian
combination, violence also collocated
with the following combinations:
Palestinian-Israeli-American actors in 13 percent as well as Israeli
only actors, Israeli-American actors or Palestinian-American actors in 4
percent of occurrences. It collocated
with only Palestinian actors 23 percent of occurrences, while collocating with
only in 6 percent. In the final 8 percent of the occurrences, none of these
actors are present. (See Graphic One for samples).
These
examples give the appearance that on the surface, the distribution of the sign violence most often occurs with multiple
actors present, primarily Palestinian and Israeli ones. While that is accurate,
these patterns only provide ‘relational location’ information; they do not
reveal that in seventy-seven percent of the occurrences, the
Graphic One: Samples of Patterns of Actors
Palestinian-Israeli-American Actors: “It [the Mitchell
recommendations] outlined steps both needed to take, including stronger
Palestinian moves against violence and an end to all new Israeli settlement
activity” (November 20, 2001).
Israeli-American Actors: “Mr. Sharon’s actions have made it less
likely that a reduction in violence will be negotiated any time soon and
have strained relations between Israel and the United States.” (October 26, 2001).
Palestinian-American Actors: “[Arafat] must, as
Washington demands, break up the terrorist organizations led by Hamas and Islamic Jihad by arresting leaders involved
in planning violence and by seizing illegally held arms.” (December 3, 2001).
responsibility for the violence was
clearly designated as Palestinian. In an
additional twenty-one percent, responsibility was ambiguous with the
possibility of both Palestinian and Israelis being implicated. This raised the Palestinian responsibility,
at least potentially, to a total of ninety-eight percent, leaving clear Israeli
responsibility indicated two percent of the time. Thus, although on the surface, the sign violence collocates often with both
Palestinian and Israeli actors, responsibility for the violence being wrought
is clearly Palestinian. Violence is
therefore a sign that represents Palestinian aggressive actions and only rarely
Israeli ones.
Along with violence, the other sign that represents Palestinian aggressive
actions is that of terrorism. Terrorism
collocates with Palestinian actors/actions thirty-three times in the
editorials, but never with Israeli actors/actions; thus, in this pattern, it
represents only Palestinian aggressive actions, never Israeli ones. For instance, in the March 14, 2001 editorial, the writers employ the
sign three different times, in three different grammatical forms to categorize
Palestinian activity. (See Graphic Two for samples).
Graphic Two: Samples of Terrorism Signs in the March
14, 2001
“The
threat of a terrorist attack has
become an unsettling constant in Israeli life, one made all the more vexing
because Palestinian bomb makers and carriers can often move freely through
Israeli cities and towns.”
“Mr.
Sharon argued that closing off Ramallah was
justified to speed the capture of several terrorists still at large after other members of their cell had
been caught plotting to blow up a
car in Jerusalem, eight miles to the South.”
“Emergency
security measures should be targeted as narrowly as possible against those
persisting in terrorism and
other armed violence.”
Representation of Israeli Aggressive
Actions
The most
common and dominant sign representing Israeli aggressive actions within the
series of editorials is that of military (functioning adjectivally and nominally). The pattern that emerges is one of a
continuum of specificity – from general to specific – in the usage of the
sign. It is used generally in phrases
such as military tactics, military response, military retaliation, military operations.
(See Graphic Three for samples).
Graphic Three: Samples of Military Signs
“Israel should also match any
moves by Mr. Arafat to end the violence by ordering its own military
to act with restraint” (March 10, 2001).
“This
[Israeli Defense and Foreign Ministry input] will be particularly important
on issues like military tactics against the Palestinians …” (February 27, 2001).
“Renewed
confrontations would only invite a strong Israeli military response and
create more suffering among Palestinian civilians” (March 10, 2001).
“But
he [Yasir Arafat] acted only after worldwide
revulsion at last Friday’s murderous suicide bombing and under the threat
of Israeli military retaliation” (June 5,
2001).
“Despite
a personal plea from President Bush to withdraw Israeli troops, Mr. Sharon
continues these military operations, the broadest in the West Bank in
nearly a decade” (October 26, 2001).
It is also used as a cover term to
designate specific military activities such as sealing off cities through the
use of trenches, roadblocks and tanks, the usage of missile strikes, or the
reoccupation of towns to accomplish Israeli goals. Other Israeli aggressive actions are
represented as restrictions
which also serves as a cover term for actions such as border restrictions, withholding tax payments, or economic blockades. (See Graphic Four
for samples of specific military actions as well as various restrictions).
Graphic
Four: Samples of Military Actions
Specific Military Actions
“Mr.
Sharon’s initial action in this regard, sealing off the Palestinian city of
Ramallah, seemed unnecessarily
severe. Israel moved abruptly Monday
to use trenches, roadblocks and tanks to cut off travel from Ramallah to neighboring West Bank villages (March 14,
2001).
“Israel retaliated with missile
strikes against Palestinian offices in Gaza City” (April 17, 2001).
“Israel
now cites that failure [to capture the Israeli Tourism Minister’s killer]
as justification for partially reoccupying a growing list of West Bank
towns that passed to Palestinian control under the Oslo agreements”
(October 26, 2001).
Various Restrictions
“Once
this happens [halt of violence against Israelis], Mr. Sharon is willing to
ease the pressures Israel has imposed on the Palestinian economy, from border
restrictions to the withholding of tax payments from Mr. Arafat’s
civil administration” (March 10, 2001).
“The
first steps should include efforts by the Palestinian Authority to collect
illegal guns and prevent terrorist attacks and moves by Israel to lift economic
blockades of Palestinian areas” (June
25, 2001).
The purpose offered within these
editorials for these military actions, general or specific, was consistently
security:
Mr. Sharon and his ministers must protect Israel’s
security
while looking for ways to renew the search for peace to which both Labor and Likud have made major contributions over the years (February 27, 2001).
Mr. Sharon must make sure that any
new military measures are designed to enhance security while leaving
open the possibility of eventually resuming peace talks (December 3, 2001).
Keeping this purpose in mind, it is
not surprising that another pattern which develops throughout these texts is
one of ‘defensive’ signs including but not limited to reaction, responding to
provocations, and defensive actions:
In the face of such hostility and a
series of terrorist attacks in recent days, Israel’s
reaction
has been restrained (March 29, 2001);
In both cases, Israel
was responding
to provocations (April 17,
2001);
Strong Israeli defensive actions are
justified (April 17, 2001).
Discussion
The degree of masking within these
texts is gauged by “showing which of the essential dimensions of communication
have been omitted from the presented reality” within these editorials (Ng and Bradac 151-2). These
essential dimensions include: the editorial writers or senders of the message,
the readers or receivers of the message, the content of the editorial message,
and the context of the editorial message.
Within the presented data, the essential dimensions most involved with
masking are the content and context of the editorials. With regard to content, masking is at work in
the form of generalizations which “are nonfocused
formulations of reality brought about when writers (and speakers) use
nonspecific words without supplying definite referential indices” (Ng and Bradac 159). With
regard to context, masking is at work through the absence of contextual material.
Content
The editorial staff’s usage of
generalized signs/cover terms such as violence
and military present a nonspecific
picture of reality through which a predominantly negative view of one group,
the Palestinians, is created via negative connotations of the signs associated
with it, while a predominantly positive view of the other group, the Israelis,
is created via positive connotations of the signs associated with it. Thus, on the one hand, the Palestinians are
cast as the aggressors in the conflict due to their association with the signs violence and terrorist; while on the other hand, the Israelis are cast as the
victims of Palestinian aggression due to their association with signs such as military, retaliation, and security. These generalizations serve as the special
phrases through which cues are removed that might lead to a more critical
reading of the masked reality (Ng and Bradac
145). The writers usually do not offer
cues which may contradict or jeopardize the consistent casting pattern created
throughout a series of editorials. This
consistent repetition is worthy of note because of the cumulative effect media
coverage has on readers. As Fairclough reminds us,
[a] single text on its own is quite insignificant:
the effects of media power are cumulative, working through the repetition of
particular ways of handling causality and agency, particular ways of
positioning the reader, and so forth (p. 74).
Readers of these editorials have grown to expect the
Palestinians and Israelis to be cast in particular ways; and the editorial
staff does not abuse these expectations.
Nevertheless within these
generalized masking activities of the editorial staff in their Trickster-esque role of persuading readers, Trickster, himself, often
engages in some semantic play through an unexpected collocation or through some
latent semantic content. As stated
previously, violence appeared
fifty-two total times in this series of editorials. In fifty-one of these occurrences, it
collocated predominantly with Palestinian actors or combinations of
actors. However, upon examination, we
notice that in one of these occurrences, Israeli action is not designated as military or even as defensive but, surprisingly, as violence:
Mr. Sharon, who cut short a visit to the United
States to respond to the bombings, will be under considerable pressure to
escalate the violence (December 3, 2001).
The violence to be escalated is Israeli violence, not Palestinian, even though this is inconsistent
with the casting of Israelis as victims. Thus, despite the editorial staff’s
consistent vigilance over the sign violence,
Trickster subtly managed to complicate the Israeli image.
This also happens through the
occasional appearance of signs such as revolt,
or uprising. For example,
Yasir
Arafat unwisely spurned Mr. Barak’s proposals and
then encouraged a Palestinian uprising against Israel. That revolt doomed Mr. Barak’s peace policy and assured Mr. Sharon’s
electoral triumph” (February 7, 2001).
The appearance of such signs within
these editorials in which the Palestinians are cast as the aggressors begs the
questions: what are they rising up against? what are
they revolting against? Latent within
the semantic content of each of these signs, uprising and revolt,
is the idea that in order to revolt or to rise up, one must do so AGAINST
something or someone. Someone
or something such as an occupying army, for instance. Thus, even though the Palestinians are cast
as the aggressors via the signs violence
and terrorist, the signs uprising and revolt indicate that they are responding to a situation, not
initiating one. They indicate that the Palestinians are victims of something so
difficult that they find it necessary to engage in an uprising or a
revolt. So, despite the editorial care with
which the writers cast the opposing parties, sometimes Trickster still manages
to deconstruct the binary opposition to reveal a more complex situation. This splintering of the binary prompts a
rather peculiar Trickster-esque question: Can an
occupying force be a victim or hostage to those whom it occupies? Ironically, the answer appears to be yes and
no. Yes, in that the activities of the
occupied, of those who live in the refugee camps, dominate Israeli governmental
and military activity to the extent that other state needs may not be addressed
or addressed fully. But, certainly, no, in that the Palestinians do not have
the fire power or personnel that the Israeli government and military has at its
disposal to occupy Palestinian Territory.
Another Trickster-esque question which emerges from the splintering of this
casting pattern is: If Israel is indeed
a victim, who only responds militarily to defend its national security, then
why is the death toll so much higher for Palestinians than Israelis throughout
this period of the conflict? According
to Human Rights Watch,
[m]any civilians were among the over seven hundred
Palestinians and over two hundred Israelis who, by November 2001, had been killed in the
violence that followed the eruption of clashes between Israelis and
Palestinians in September 2000. In
addition, some 16,000 Palestinians and some 1,700 Israelis were injured in the
violence (2002).
Despite the disparity in the number
of casualties, the editorials mention Israeli deaths three times more often
than they do Palestinian ones. Oddly,
when they do mention Palestinian casualties, the writers fail to indicate
Israeli responsibility for these deaths.
In the texts, Palestinian-caused Israeli casualties are explicitly
mentioned at least six times. Generally, they are presented as having resulted
from a terrorist action such as a suicide bomber or sniper fire. For example,
“Even for a country that has
suffered as many suicide bomb attacks as Israel,
the horror that unfolded outside a Tel Aviv discotheque last Friday night was
shocking. A powerful explosive device
packed with nails and bullets tore through a crowd of innocent young people,
fatally injuring 20, most of them teenagers whose families had immigrated from
the former Soviet Union” (June 5, 2001).
“Yesterday an Israeli settler was killed by gunfire
in the West Bank” (June 29, 2001).
This is accurate information. However, it is not enough information. As mentioned earlier in this essay, one of
the characteristics of masking is the offering of “true information in an
incomplete or partial way” (Ng and Bradac 145). The editorial does not offer any information
as to why someone would commit suicide and murder by blowing themselves up
outside an Israeli nightclub, why a settler was killed – or, for that matter,
what an ‘Israeli settler’ is.
While the editorial writers do not
offer reasons as to why a Palestinian might want to be a suicide bomber, they
do offer two commentaries on Palestinian casualties in the 2001 series of
editorials. In the first instance,
ironically, Palestinian leaders – not Israeli leaders – are blamed for
Palestinian deaths:
“Some Palestinians are beginning to question the
confrontational strategy pursued by their leaders, which has so far led to the
loss of nearly 400 Palestinian lives and drained some $2 billion from the
Palestinian economy” (March 14, 2001).
Palestinian leaders, due to their confrontational strategy,
are responsible for the deaths of their own people, not the Israelis who killed
them! In the second instance, the usage
of the passive voice in the sentence masks responsibility for the killing of a
militant leader in Nablus:
“But the fragility of the cease-fire was
underscored yesterday when a Palestinian militant leader in Nablus was killed in an explosion”
(June 25, 2001).
By using the passive voice
structure, the writers can include the accurate information
that a Palestinian leader was killed while not mentioning by whom he was killed
or what type of explosion killed him.
The failure to provide an active subject or the specific cause of death
in this sentence serves as an example of the removal of cues that might
encourage a more critical reading of the text (Ng and Bradac
145). For instance if the sentence had
read “…when the Israeli military killed a Palestinian militant leader in Nablus by a missile attack” agency
would no longer be masked in the sentence.
However, such a sentence would not be consistent with the casting of
Israelis as acting only defensively.
Also, the writers include the adjective militant to describe the Palestinian leader, but not his name. As a
sign functioning within this semiotic system of editorials, militant is consistent with the
characterization of Palestinians as violent terrorists. By including this adjective, the writers
justify the leader’s death for readers who might be quizzical enough to ask
about who killed this Palestinian. By not including his name, he remains an
undifferentiated violent terrorist, and not an individual human being.
Context
Within the
course of these editorials, the writers tend to offer only surface reasons as
to why a Palestinian might become a militant leader involved in violent
terrorist activities. Unlike the consistent presentation of Israeli security as
reason for Israeli military action, the editorials do not consistently offer
reasons as to why Palestinians would engage in violence or terrorism. In two of the year’s early editorials, the
three main points of contention in the conflict – Palestinian refugees in the diaspora, Jewish settlements in Palestinian
Territory, and the status of Jerusalem
– are mentioned with
regard to President Clinton’s final attempt at attaining peace (January 4 and March 10, 2001). However, an explanation as to why these three
issues are contentious is not offered in any of the editorials. There is no
supporting information as to why there are refugees and refugee camps or why
there are Jewish settlers living in Palestinian
Territory.
Early in the year, after the
election of Ariel Sharon, the writers do indicate that an action of his
initiated Palestinian violence:
[Sharon’s]
staged walk across Jerusalem’s
bitterly contested Temple Mount
lighted the spark for more than four months of Palestinian violence” (February 7, 2001).
However, the writers do not offer a reason as to why Ariel
Sharon would stage a walk across this site and why it would have the power to
light a spark of violence. Perhaps, if the writers did provide this
information, the occasional appearance of those signs uprising and revolt would
seem more consistent with the overall narrative. Nevertheless, because so little context of
the violence – in progress since the 1948 founding of Israel – is provided, it
appears that Palestinian actions are disjointed and irrational acts as opposed
to ongoing responses to that founding fifty-four years ago.
Conclusions
In this
essay, I have attempted to decipher, in a series of editorials, intentional
Trickster activity in the representation of Israeli and Palestinian aggressive
actions. The editorial writers performed this intentional tricking primarily
through the masking device of generalization.
Through the deployment of generalizations such as violence and military,
the writers crafted a narrative of the peace process – or lack thereof – in
which the Palestinians are consistently cast as the aggressors, while the
Israelis are consistently cast as the victims.
The use of this casting process via generalization facilitated the
omission of context and content cues – such as the reporting of Palestinian
casualties or the offering of reasons why Palestinians might engage in
terrorist activities – which would have encouraged a more critical reading of
the series.
However, even though overall the
narrative is consistently sustained throughout the series, Trickster
occasionally sneaks into play within these texts, resulting in unintentional
tricking. This unintentional tricking is manifested in the direct connection of
Israel to
violence, despite its predominant connection with Palestinians. It is also manifested in the subtle reminder
of the latent semantic content in uprising
and revolt.
An awareness of unintentional as
well as intentional Trickster activity has the potential to aid us in becoming
more critical readers and participants in processes of peace. Clearly this is a
necessary goal for those concerned with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
particularly after the horror of the siege of Bethlehem
in the spring of 2002. Such a tragedy as
that siege seems to be the type of calamity Jung alludes to when he contends
that
If, at the end of the trickster
myth, the savior is hinted at, this comforting premonition or hope means that
some calamity or other has happened and been consciously understood. Only out
of disaster can the longing for the savior arise – in other words, the
recognition and unavoidable integration of the shadow creates such a harrowing
situation that nobody but a savior can undo the tangled web of fate (p. 271).
Let us hope that Jung is correct and that the siege of Bethlehem
is a harbinger of the end of the Trickster myth in this conflict – and that the Israeli
and Palestinian people, themselves, emerge as saviors.
Appendix A
Editorials from the New York
Times
Palestinian-Israeli Conflict 2001
January 4 “Negotiating
Against the Clock
February 7 “A New Leader for Israel”
February 10 “Starting
Fresh in the Middle East”
February 27 “Israel’s
Unity Government”
February 28 “General
Powell in the Middle East”
March 10 “Mr.
Sharon’s New Course”
March 14 “Barricading
Ramallah”
March 29 “Arab
League Belligerence”
April 17 “Israeli
Airstrikes in Lebanon”
May 5 “Revolt
at the U.N.”
May 22 “The
American Mideast Initiative”
June 5 “Fragile
Cease-Fire in the Mideast”
June 14 “The
Mideast Negotiations”
June 25 “The
White House and the Mideast”
June 29 “Restarting
the Mideast Peace Clock”
August 8 “Mr.
Arafat’s Role”
October 26 “New
Battles on the West Bank”
November 20 “Pressing
for a Mideast Cease-Fire”
December 3 “Rising
Violence in the Mideast”
December 4 “Yasir Arafat’s Last Chance”
December 7 “Striking
Back at Hamas”
References
Fairclough, Norman. (1989). Language and Power. New York.
Longman.
Human Rights Watch. (2002). World Report 2002. Israel, the Occupied West Bank and Gaza Strip, and Palestinian Authority Territories. http://www.hrw.org.
Jung, Carl Gustav. (1980).
The Archetypes and the Collective Unconscious. Princeton. Princeton University
Press.
Ng, Sik Hung and James J. Bradac. (1993). Power
in Language: Verbal Communication and Social Influence. London.
Sage.
Stockall, Nancy. (April 1, 2002) “The Dark Side of Trickster: Collaboration
or Collusion.” The Trickster’s Way. http://www.trickster’s.org.
1(2).