|
Bankers bet with their bank's capital, not their own. If the bet goes right,
they get a huge bonus; if it misfires, that's the shareholders' problem.
Sebastian Mallaby. Council on Foreign Relations, as quoted by
Avital Louria Hahn, "Missing: How Poor Risk-Management Techniques
Contributed to the Subprime Mess," CFO Magazine, March 2008, Page 53 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10755469/c_10788146?f=magazine_featured
Now that the Fed is going to
bail out these crooks with taxpayer funds makes it all the worse.
The bourgeoisie can be termed as any group of people
who are discontented with what they have, but satisfied with what they are
Nicolás
Dávila
This
one on the report card business schools seemed too important to pass up.
I think it relates to the points Dr.
Brazil
made in the quotation that I placed
(with permission) in http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book05q1.htm#020805
(You have to scroll down some distance to find the
Brazil
quotation.)
Today's Bourgeoisie
Education molds not just individuals but also common assumptions and
conventional wisdom. And when it comes to the business world, our
universities - and especially their graduate business schools - are
powerful shapers of the culture.
History suggests it was
always this way. Even Isaac Newton, of gravity fame but who also held the
position of master of the mint, lost money in the South Sea Bubble. He got out,
thinking it was a bubble, then got back in when it kept going up. He lost a
small fortune in the process when it finally collapsed. Human greed, coupled
with hubris, hasn't changed in the four centuries for which we have some sense
of economic history.
Lawrence B. Lindsey, "Loosen Deposit
Insurance Rules To Prevent a Bank Run," The Wall Street Journal,
September 17, 2008 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122161066927045759.html?mod=djemEditorialPage
Jensen Comment
You can read about the South Sea Bubble in 1720 at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sea_bubble
The South Sea Company was selling shares in itself and calling it income.
Mortgage Backed Securities are like boxes
of chocolates. Criminals on Wall Street and one particular U.S. Congressional
Committee stole a few chocolates from the boxes and replaced them with turds.
Their criminal buddies at Standard & Poors rated these boxes AAA Investment Grade
chocolates. These boxes were then sold all over the world to investors.
Eventually somebody bites into a turd and discovers the crime. Suddenly nobody
trusts American chocolates anymore worldwide. Hank Paulson now wants the
American taxpayers to buy up and hold all these boxes of turd-infested
chocolates for $700 billion dollars until the market for turds returns to
normal. Meanwhile, Hank's buddies, the Wall Street criminals who stole all the
good chocolates are not being investigated, arrested, or indicted. Momma always
said: '"Sniff the chocolates first Forrest." Things generally don't pass the
smell test if they came from Wall Street or from Washington DC.
Forrest Gump as quoted at
http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive/Rec/rec.sport.tennis/2008-10/msg02206.html

Forrest Gump's Momma
The Sleazy Subprime Mortgage Lending Companies Have a New (actually
renewed old) Scheme to Make Billions at Taxpayer Expense
As if they haven't done enough damage. Thousands of
subprime mortgage lenders and brokers—many of them the very sorts of firms that
helped create the current financial crisis—are going strong. Their new strategy:
taking advantage of a long-standing federal program designed to encourage
homeownership by insuring mortgages for buyers of modest means. You read that
correctly. Some of the same people who propelled us toward the housing market
calamity are now seeking to profit by exploiting billions in federally insured
mortgages. Washington, meanwhile, has vastly expanded the availability of such
taxpayer-backed loans as part of the emergency campaign to rescue the country's
swooning economy.
Chad Terhune and Robert Berner,
"FHA-Backed Loans: The New Subprime The same people whose reckless practices
triggered the global financial crisis are onto a similar scheme that could cost
taxpayers tons more," Business Week, November 19, 2008 ---
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_48/b4110036448352.htm?link_position=link2
Jensen Comment
That's right. The greedy slime balls "Borne of Sleaze, Bribery, and Lies" are
resurfacing with Barney Frank's blessing ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Sleaze
"Financial Reversals: Everything bad is good
again," by Jacob Sullum, Reason Magazine, November 19,
2008 ---
http://www.reason.com/news/show/130142.html
"Proposed new Bailout Plan," by Andreas Hippin, Bloomberg,
November 20, 2008 ---
http://www.wallstreetoasis.com/forums/proposed-new-bailout-plan
The Somali pirates, renegade Somalis known for
hijacking ships for ransom in the Gulf of Aden, are negotiating a purchase
of Citigroup.
The pirates would buy Citigroup with new debt and
their existing cash stockpiles, earned most recently from hijacking numerous
ships, including most recently a $200 million Saudi Arabian oil tanker. The
Somali pirates are offering up to $0.10 per share for Citigroup, pirate
spokesman Sugule Ali said earlier today. The negotiations have entered the
final stage, Ali said. ``You may not like our price, but we are not in the
business of paying for things. Be happy we are in the mood to offer the
shareholders anything," said Ali.
The pirates will finance part of the purchase by
selling new Pirate Ransom Backed Securities. The PRBS's are backed by the
cash flows from future ransom payments from hijackings in the Gulf of Aden.
Moody's and S&P have already issued their top
investment grade ratings for the PRBS's.
Head pirate, Ubu Kalid Shandu, said "we need a bank
so that we have a place to keep all of our ransom money. Thankfully, the
dislocations in the capital markets has allowed us to purchase Citigroup at
an attractive valuation and to take advantage of TARP capital to grow the
business even faster." Shandu added, "We don't call ourselves pirates. We
are coastguards and this will just allow us to guard our coasts better."
I'm suspicious that Andreas Hippin, in the above tidbit, was inspired by "The
End" by Michael Lewis
"The End," by Michael Lewis December 2008 Issue The era that defined Wall Street
is finally, officially over. Michael Lewis, who chronicled its excess in Liar’s
Poker, returns to his old haunt to figure out what went wrong.
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom?tid=true
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#TheEnd
From the Financial Clippings Blog on October 22, 2008 ---
http://financeclippings.blogspot.com/
I
wrote earlier
that credit rating agencies seem to be run like protection rackets..
from
CNBC
In a hearing today before the House Oversight
Committee, the credit rating agencies are being portrayed as
profit-hungry institutions that would give any deal their blessing for
the right price.
Case in point: this instant message exchange between two unidentified
Standard & Poor's officials about a mortgage-backed security deal on
4/5/2007:
Official #1: Btw (by the way) that deal is ridiculous.
Official #2: I know right...model def (definitely) does not capture half
the risk.
Official #1: We should not be rating it.
Official #2: We rate every deal. It could be structured by cows and we
would rate it.
A former executive of Moody's says
conflicts of interest got in the way of rating agencies properly valuing
mortgage backed securities.
Former Managing Director Jerome Fons, who worked at Moody's until August
of 2007, says Moody's was focused on "maxmizing revenues," leading it to
make the firm more "issuer friendly."
Fraud and incompetence among credit rating
agencies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies
The New York Stock Exchange's report on the pay package given to its
former chairman, Dick Grasso, made clear the excessiveness of the
compensation and the ineffectiveness of the safety controls that
failed to stop it. What the report didn't provide, however, was an
answer to an obvious question: Why did nobody on the exchange's board
look at that astronomical sum and feel some personal responsibility to
find out what was happening? I can't read minds, but I think
it's fair to say that to some extent the players in this drama - as
well as those in the ones now being played out in courtrooms and
starring former executives of Tyco, WorldCom and HealthSouth - have
been shaped by the broader business culture they have worked in for so
long. And, as with any situation in which we are puzzled by how a
group of people can think in a seemingly odd way, it helps to look
back to how they were educated. Education
molds not just individuals but also common assumptions and
conventional wisdom. And when it comes to the business world, our
universities - and especially their graduate business schools - are
powerful shapers of the culture.
Robert J. Shiller, "How Wall Street Learns to Look the
Other Way," The New York Times, February 8, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/08/opinion/08shiller.html
Ending a bitter public
fight over whether former New York Stock Exchange Chief Executive Dick Grasso
was paid too much, a state appeals court ruled that Mr. Grasso can keep every
penny collected from his $187.5 million multiyear compensation package. The
3-to-1 ruling by the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court was
a vindication for the relentless Mr. Grasso, who was ousted after details of his
lucrative pay were revealed in 2003.
Aaron Lucchetti, "Grasso Wins Court Fight, Can Keep NYSE Pay," The Wall
Street Journal, July 2, 2008; Page A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121492781324819635.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
Clinton's famously crude remark
And I hope that comes through in the book (Infectious
Greed). I am very critical of the tax law
changes that created the incentives for companies to pay executives with stock
options, which were made at the beginning of the Clinton Administration to
appease populist anti-corporation forces among his supporters by appearing to do
something about what, even then, was alleged to be excessive pay for corporate
executives. Not to mention his Administration's hands-off approach to Wall
Street (when Arthur Levitt headed the SEC).
There's that great story --- perhaps apocoryphal --- that I recount in the book
about Clinton's famously crude remark when he discovered that voters cared much
more about whether the stocks were going up than his economic program.
Frank Partnoy, Partnoy's Solutions, welling@weeden, October 21, 2005
Symptoms include "excessive and sometimes fraudulent risks
Add to the growing number of recently diagnosed
diseases in America the Icarus Syndrome. This malady, discovered by a law
professor, is said to affect corporations in particular. The symptoms include
"excessive and sometimes fraudulent risks." The disease has attacked
corporate America not only in our own scandal-plagued times but, it seems, since
about 1873. Icarus in the Boardroom (Oxford University Press, 250
pages, $25) is an attempt to alert public-health officials, so to speak, to the
dangers of this contagion. David Skeel, a professor of law at the University of
Pennsylvania, labels all sorts of apparently admirable traits --
"self-confidence, visionary insight, the ability to think outside the
box" -- as potential Icaran qualities, full of danger. They "may spur
entrepreneurs to take misguided risks," he writes, "in the belief that
everything they touch will eventually turn to gold." Fortunately, he offers
a number of cures, ranging from small doses of regulation to massive doses of
regulation. And little wonder. What is most interesting about "Icarus
in the Boardroom" is the vast divide it reveals -- between American lawyers
who study corporations and, well, everybody else. Following common sense and
economic logic, most people view corporate risk-taking and corporate fraud as
different things: Fraud involves lying; risk-taking does not. As in the case of
Enron and WorldCom, fraudulent executives often misstate how much risk their
investors will assume. For academic lawyers such as Mr. Skeel, however, it
seems that risk-taking and fraud are points on a continuum. Risk-taking quickly
fades into "excessive" risk-taking, which then morphs into fraud. Mr.
Skeel never says just how we are to distinguish acceptable risks from the
excessive and fraudulent kind. Apparently, though, lawmakers and regulators will
figure out a formula, for it falls to them, in Mr. Skeel's view, "to
prevent risk-taking that edges toward market manipulation or fraud."
Jonathan R. Macey, "A Risky Proposition," The Wall Street Journal,
March 15, 2005; Page D8 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111083993718979142,00.html?mod=todays_us_personal_journal
That some bankers have ended
up in prison is not a matter of scandal, but what is outrageous is the
fact that all the others are free.
Honoré
de Balzac
Two months ago, shortly before Japan
ordered Citigroup to close its private banking unit there for, among
other things, failing to guard against money laundering, Charles O.
Prince, the chief executive, commissioned an independent examination
of his bank's lapses. When he received the assessment in mid-October,
he got an eyeful.
"It's Cleanup Time at Citi," by Timothy L. O'Brien and
Landon Thomas, Jr., The New York Times, November 7, 2004 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/business/yourmoney/07citi.html

The Sleazy Subprime Mortgage Lending Companies Have a New (actually
renewed old) Scheme to Make Billions at Taxpayer Expense
As if they haven't done enough damage. Thousands of
subprime mortgage lenders and brokers—many of them the very sorts of firms that
helped create the current financial crisis—are going strong. Their new strategy:
taking advantage of a long-standing federal program designed to encourage
homeownership by insuring mortgages for buyers of modest means. You read that
correctly. Some of the same people who propelled us toward the housing market
calamity are now seeking to profit by exploiting billions in federally insured
mortgages. Washington, meanwhile, has vastly expanded the availability of such
taxpayer-backed loans as part of the emergency campaign to rescue the country's
swooning economy.
Chad Terhune and Robert Berner,
"FHA-Backed Loans: The New Subprime The same people whose reckless practices
triggered the global financial crisis are onto a similar scheme that could cost
taxpayers tons more," Business Week, November 19, 2008 ---
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_48/b4110036448352.htm?link_position=link2
Jensen Comment
That's right. The greedy slime balls "Borne of Sleaze, Bribery, and Lies" are
resurfacing with Barney Frank's blessing ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Sleaze
"Financial Reversals: Everything bad is good
again," by Jacob Sullum, Reason Magazine, November 19,
2008 ---
http://www.reason.com/news/show/130142.html
"Proposed new Bailout Plan," by Andreas Hippin, Bloomberg,
November 20, 2008 ---
http://www.wallstreetoasis.com/forums/proposed-new-bailout-plan
The Somali pirates, renegade Somalis known for
hijacking ships for ransom in the Gulf of Aden, are negotiating a purchase
of Citigroup.
The pirates would buy Citigroup with new debt and
their existing cash stockpiles, earned most recently from hijacking numerous
ships, including most recently a $200 million Saudi Arabian oil tanker. The
Somali pirates are offering up to $0.10 per share for Citigroup, pirate
spokesman Sugule Ali said earlier today. The negotiations have entered the
final stage, Ali said. ``You may not like our price, but we are not in the
business of paying for things. Be happy we are in the mood to offer the
shareholders anything," said Ali.
The pirates will finance part of the purchase by
selling new Pirate Ransom Backed Securities. The PRBS's are backed by the
cash flows from future ransom payments from hijackings in the Gulf of Aden.
Moody's and S&P have already issued their top
investment grade ratings for the PRBS's.
Head pirate, Ubu Kalid Shandu, said "we need a bank
so that we have a place to keep all of our ransom money. Thankfully, the
dislocations in the capital markets has allowed us to purchase Citigroup at
an attractive valuation and to take advantage of TARP capital to grow the
business even faster." Shandu added, "We don't call ourselves pirates. We
are coastguards and this will just allow us to guard our coasts better."
I'm suspicious that Andreas Hippin, in the above tidbit, was inspired by "The
End" by Michael Lewis
"The End," by Michael Lewis December 2008 Issue The era that defined Wall Street
is finally, officially over. Michael Lewis, who chronicled its excess in Liar’s
Poker, returns to his old haunt to figure out what went wrong.
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom?tid=true
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#TheEnd
From the Financial Clippings Blog on October 22, 2008 ---
http://financeclippings.blogspot.com/
I
wrote earlier
that credit rating agencies seem to be run like protection rackets..
from
CNBC
In a hearing today before the House Oversight
Committee, the credit rating agencies are being portrayed as
profit-hungry institutions that would give any deal their blessing for
the right price.
Case in point: this instant message exchange between two unidentified
Standard & Poor's officials about a mortgage-backed security deal on
4/5/2007:
Official #1: Btw (by the way) that deal is ridiculous.
Official #2: I know right...model def (definitely) does not capture half
the risk.
Official #1: We should not be rating it.
Official #2: We rate every deal. It could be structured by cows and we
would rate it.
A former executive of Moody's says
conflicts of interest got in the way of rating agencies properly valuing
mortgage backed securities.
Former Managing Director Jerome Fons, who worked at Moody's until August
of 2007, says Moody's was focused on "maxmizing revenues," leading it to
make the firm more "issuer friendly."
Fraud and incompetence among credit rating
agencies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies
In the years after Enron, many chief
executives had been operating in a defensive crouch. Last year,
however, they switched to offense, yelping about the new securities
rules — way too strict and so time-consuming — and whining that
Eliot Spitzer and his meddlesome investigations could wreck the nation’s
economy. The United States Chamber of Commerce even sued the
Securities and Exchange Commission, hoping to overturn its new rule
requiring mutual fund chairmen to be independent. So as 2005
dawns, it is again time to grant the Augustus Melmotte Memorial
Prizes, named for the charlatan who parades through “The Way We Live
Now,” the novel by Anthony Trollope. Mr. Melmotte, who would fit
just fine into today’s business world, is a confidence man who takes
London by storm in the late 1800’s.
Gretchen Morgensen, "The Envelopes, Please," The New York
Times, January 1, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/01/business/yourmoney/02award.backup.html?oref=login
Bob Jensen's threads on corporate governance are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#Governance
Who's Preying on Your Grandparents?
Back in February, Jose and Gloria Aquino
received a flier in the mail inviting them to a free seminar on one
of their favorite topics: protecting their financial assets. As
retirees, they were always on the lookout for safe investment
strategies as well as tips on how to make sure they didn't outlive
their savings. Besides, the flier promised a free lunch for anyone
attending the workshop, so what did they have to lose? Potentially
plenty, they would soon discover.
Gretchen Morgenson, "Who's Preying on Your Grandparents?" The New
York Times, May 15, 2005 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/business/yourmoney/15vict.html?
How the Gatekeepers Failed in Their Responsibilities
to Protect the Public from Corporate and Banking Fraud
Brooksley Born, chair of the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission --- suggested that government should at
least study whether some regulation might make sense, a stampede of
lobbyists, members of Congress, and other regulators --- including
Alan Greenspan and Robert Rubin --- ran her over, admonishing her to
keep quiet. Derivatives tightened the connections among various
markets, creating enormous financial benefits and making global
transacting less costly --- no one denied that. But they also
raised the prospect of a system-wide breakdown. With each
crisis, a few more dominos fell, and regulators and market
participants increasingly expressed concerns about systematic risk ---
a term that described a financial-market epidemic. After
Long-Term Capital collapsed, even Alan Greenspan admitted that the
financial markets had been close to the brink.
Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed (Henry Holt and Company, 2004,
Page 229)
Throughout 1994 and 1995, Brickell (the
banking industry's pit bull in Washington) and Levitt (Head of the
SEC) worked to protect the finance industry from new
legislation. In early 1994, lobbyists waited for investors to
calm down from the shock of how much money-fund managers and corporate
treasures had lost gambling on interest rates. When legislation
was introduced, Brickell fought it and Levitt gave speeches saying the
financial industry should police itself. The issues were
complicated, and the public --- once angered by the various scandals
--- ultimately lost interest. Instead of new derivatives
regulation, Congress, various federal agencies, and even the Supreme
Court created new legal rules that insulated Wall Street from
liability and enabled financial firms to regulate
themselves. Under the influence of Levitt and Brickell,
regulators essentially left the abuses of the 1990s to what Justice
Cardozo had called the "morals of the market place."
Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed (Henry Holt and
Company, 2004, Page 143)
In God, but not our financial advisor, we
trust!
Declining trust has spurred some 25% of the affluent investors
surveyed to move a portion of their assets out of their
financial-services firms in the past two years, according to a study
by Spectrem Group, a Chicago research and consulting firm. A litany of
complaints, including poor investment performance, conflicts of
interest, hidden fees and financial scandals, prompted wealthy
investors to move their business elsewhere.
Rachel Emma Silverman, "Wealthy Lose Trust in
Advisers," The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2005, Page
D2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110730662305243216,00.html?mod=todays_us_personal_journal
One of the world's most widely known and
respected economists, Henry Kaufman is almost single-handedly
responsible for founding the spectator sport known as "Fed
watching." He began a 26-year career at Salomon Brothers in 1962,
when he was probably the only Wall Street employee with a doctorate.
There he built one of the most prestigious securities research
departments and became a senior partner and vice chairman. In the last
30 years, he has been one of the most vocal critics of insufficient
financial oversight and regulation, and his pronouncements and
prognostications have often moved markets. We interviewed Dr. Kaufman
in his New York office, where he heads his own international economic
consulting firm.
Wall Street Wisdom ---
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/feature/-/41979/102-2649781-5248131
Question
What is the SEC's new NMS?
In the best possible marketplace, all buyers see
the prices asked by all sellers and all sellers see the prices offered by all
buyers -- and little guys are treated the same as big ones. The result:
competition that insures the most efficient interplay of supply and demand. In
theory, it sounds great. And indeed, this is the idea behind the Security and
Exchange Commission's push for an integrated stock market called the National
Market System, or NMS. But could the best intentions backfire? Wharton finance
professor Marshall E. Blume answers that question in a new research paper
titled, "Competition and Fragmentation in the Equity Markets: The Effect of
Regulation NMS."
"Will the SEC's National Market System Stifle the Innovation It Hopes to
Promote?" Wharton Business School at the University of Pennsylvania,
Knowledge@Wharton, April 4, 2007 ---
Click Here
Question
"U.S. Securities Law: Does 'High Intensity' Enforcement Pay Off?"
Knowledge@Wharton, May 30, 2007 ---
Click Here
Strong enforcement is critical to
obtaining good governance and adding value to corporations, and investors
stand to gain from it.
. . .
In the U.K., the FSA budget for
enforcement is between 12.5% and 13% of its total budget, which Coffee said
is consistent with many other countries. The SEC spends around 40% of its
overall budget on enforcement, and Australia spends even more -- nearly 47%
in 2005. Coffee also noted that the SEC has 1,200 attorneys working full
time for the agency. The FSA, he said, maintains a "skeletal" legal staff
and outsources cases when necessary. In Britain and many other countries,
regulators place more emphasis on negotiating settlements to avoid formal
enforcement actions. "They don't like to keep a legal enforcement staff
because they see enforcement as a last-ditch effort."
. . .
In the wake of corporate scandals
in the U.S., criminal enforcement is the "ultimate deterrence," Coffee said.
Citing research from cases between 1978 and 2004, he noted that some 755
individuals and 40 firms were indicted for "financial misrepresentation,"
which he said is just a small subset of securities violations. In all,
1,230.7 years of incarceration and 397.5 years of probation were imposed,
with an average sentence of 4.2 years.
Continued in article
There's a shelf of financial bestsellers whose
titles now sound absurd: Ravi Batra's The Great Depression of 1990; James
Glassman's Dow 36,000; Harry Figgie's Bankruptcy 1995: The Coming Collapse of
America and How to Stop It. There’s BusinessWeek’s 1979 description of "the
death of equities as a near permanent condition,
Michael Lewis, "The Evolution of an
Investor," Blaine-Lourd Profile, December 2007 ---
http://www.portfolio.com/executives/features/2007/11/19/Blaine-Lourd-Profile#page3
As quoted by Jim Mahar in his Finance Professor Blog at
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
As a group, professional money managers control more
than 90 percent of the U.S. stock market. By definition, the money they invest
yields returns equal to those of the market as a whole, minus whatever fees
investors pay them for their services. This simple math, you might think, would
lead investors to pay professional money managers less and less. Instead, they
pay them more and more...Nobody knows which stock is going to go up. Nobody
knows what the market as a whole is going to do, not even Warren Buffett. A
handful of people with amazing track records isn’t evidence that people can game
the market. Nobody knows which company will prove a good long-term investment.
Even Buffett’s genius lies more in running businesses than in picking stocks.
But in the investing world, that is ignored. Wall Street, with its army of
brokers, analysts, and advisers funneling trillions of dollars into mutual
funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds, is an elaborate fraud.
Michael Lewis, "The Evolution of an
Investor," Blaine-Lourd Profile, December 2007 ---
http://www.portfolio.com/executives/features/2007/11/19/Blaine-Lourd-Profile#page3
As quoted by Jim Mahar in his Finance Professor Blog at
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
A second paper in this series will examine the
theoretical justifications for the importance of the stock market as perhaps the
central financial institution in the United States.
"Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I: The Empirical
Evidence," by Lawrence E. Mitchell George Washington University - Law School,
SSRN, October 30, 2008 ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292403
Data on historical
and current corporate finance trends drawn from a variety of sources present
a paradox. External equity has never played a significant role in financing
industrial enterprises in the United States. The only American industry that
has relied heavily upon external financing is the finance industry itself.
Yet it is commonly accepted among legal scholars and economists that the
stock market plays a valuable role in American economic life, and a recent,
large body of macroeconomic work on economic development links the growth of
financial institutions (including, in the U.S, the stock market) to growth
in real economic output. How can this be the case if external equity as
represented by the stock market plays an insignificant role in financing
productivity? This paradox has been largely ignored in the legal and
economic literature.
This paper surveys
the history of American corporate finance, presents original and secondary
data demonstrating the paradox, and raises questions regarding the structure
of American capital markets, the appropriate rights of stockholders, the
desirable regulatory structure (whether the stock market should be regulated
by the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodities Futures Trading
Commission, for example), and the overall relationship between finance and
growth.
The answers to
these questions are particularly pressing in light of a dramatic increase in
stock market volatility since the turn of the century creating distorted
incentives for long-term corporate management, especially trenchant in light
of the recent global financial collapse.
A second paper in
this series will examine the theoretical justifications for the importance
of the stock market as perhaps the central financial institution in the
United States.
Shocking 25 Minute Video
A Rigged Trading System: "The odds are better in Las Vegas than on Wall Street"
This is the same fraud as the one committed by Max in the Broadway show called
The Producers (watch the Bloomberg video of how the fraud works)
Max sold over 100% of the shares in his play.
A fraudulent market manipulation contributed to the Wall Street meltdown
Phantom Shares and Market Manipulation (Bloomberg News
video on naked short selling) ---
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4490541725797746038
Labor Unions Want Less Financial Disclosure and
accountability
From day one of the Obama era, union
leaders want the lights dimmed on how they spend their mandatory member dues.
The AFL-CIO's representative on the Obama transition team for Labor is Deborah
Greenfield, and we're told her first inspection stop was the Office of
Labor-Management Standards, or OLMS, which monitors union compliance with
federal law. Ms. Greenfield declined to comment, citing Obama transition rules,
but her mission is clear enough. The AFL-CIO's formal "recommendations" to the
Obama team call for the realignment of "the allocation of budgetary resources"
from OLMS to other Labor agencies. The Secretary should "temporarily stay all
financial reporting regulations that have not gone into effect," and "revise or
rescind the onerous and unreasonable new requirements," such as the LM-2 and T-1
reporting forms. The explicit goal is to "restore the Department of Labor to its
mission and role of advocating for, protecting and advancing the interests of
workers." In other words, while transparency is fine for business, unions are
demanding a pass for themselves.
"Quantum of Solis Big labor wants Obama to dilute union disclosure rules,"
The Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2008 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122990431323225179.html?mod=djemEditorialPage
The entire year 2006 ethics flap about climbers not rendering aid to a
supposedly dying climber on Mt. Everest was preceded by a great 1983 real world
case called the Parable of the Sadhu from the Harvard Business School ---
Click Here
The Parable of the Sadhu was and still is widely used in ethics
courses, especially regarding issues of situational ethics and group versus
individual ethics. The author Bowen H. McCoy was the managing director of the
investment banking firm Morgan Stanley & Co. After returning to New York, McCoy
was conscious stricken about leaving a dying religious man during an Everest climb. The
climbers at that time shed some clothes to keep the dying man warm. But climbers
from various nations (U.S., Switzerland, and Japan) actually moved on and did not help the man down to shelter
because they all felt that he was going to die in any case. Also, the weather
was such that the climbers could not complete their climbing goal if they delayed to
carry the dying man to shelter.
McCoy wrote the following after returning to New York:
We do not know if the sadhu lived or died. For many
of the following days and evenings Stephen and I discussed and debated our
behavior toward the sadhu. Stephen is a committed Quaker with deep moral
vision. He said, "I feel that what happened with the Sadhu is a good example
of the breakdown between the individual ethic and the corporate ethic. No
one person was willing to assume ultimate responsibility for the sadhu. Each
was willing to do his bit just so long as it was not too inconvenient. When
it got to be a bother everyone just passed the buck to someone else and took
off . . . "
. . .
Despite my arguments, I feel and continue to feel
guilt about the sadhu. I had literally walked through a classic moral
dilemma without fully thinking through the consequences. My excuses for my
actions include a high adrenaline flow, super-ordinate goal, and a
once-in-a-lifetime opportunity --- factors in the usual corporate situation,
especially when one is under stress.
Real moral dilemmas are ambiguous and many of us
hike right through them, unaware that they exist. When, usually after the
fact, someone makes an issue of them, we tend to resent his or her bringing
it up. Often, when the full import of what we have done (or not done) falls
on us, we dig into a defensive position from which it is very difficult to
emerge. In rare circumstances we may contemplate what we have done from
inside a prison.
Had we mountaineers have been free of physical and
mental stress caused by the effort and the high altitude, we might have
treated the sadhu differently. Yet isn't stress the real test of personal
and corporate values? The instant decisions executives make under pressure
reveal the most about personal and corporate character.
Among the many questions that occur to me when
pondering my experience are: What are the practical limits of moral
imagination and vision? Is there a collective or institutional ethic beyond
the ethics of the individual? At what level of effor or commitment can one
discharge one's ethical responsibilities?
Continued in this 1983 Harvard Business School Case.
Jensen Comment
I might add that this 1983 case was written before the breakdown in ethics
during the 1990s high tech bubble in which investment banking, executive
compensation, corporate governance, and corporate ethics in general sometimes
become Congress to the core ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm
********************
You can read more about the 2006 repeat of the dilemma at
"Everest pioneer appalled that climber was left to die," by Steve McMorran,
Seattle Times, May 25, 2006 ---
http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003017177_everest25.html
May 28, 2006 reply from Andrew Priest [a.priest@ECU.EDU.AU]
Hi Bob
And you can contrast this action and the 2006 with
the help given to Lincoln Hall again this year (events still going on).
Lincoln was left on the mountain, assumed dead. He was not and is lower down
the mountain and doing okay. Details at <
http://www.mounteverest.net/news.php?id=3315>
and more details at
<
http://www.mounteverest.net/news.php?id=3311> .
Compassion and caring wins out every time in my
view over selfishness.
Andrew
"Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan Before a conference
sponsored by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency,
Washington, D.C. October 14, 1999 --- http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19991014.htm
Measuring Financial Risk in the
Twenty-first Century
During a financial crisis, risk aversion
rises dramatically, and deliberate trading strategies are replaced
by rising fear-induced disengagement. Yield spreads on relatively
risky assets widen dramatically. In the more extreme manifestation,
the inability to differentiate among degrees of risk drives trading
strategies to ever-more-liquid instruments that permit investors to
immediately reverse decisions at minimum cost should that be
required. As a consequence, even among riskless assets, such as U.S.
Treasury securities, liquidity premiums rise sharply as investors
seek the heavily traded "on-the-run" issues--a behavior
that was so evident last fall.
As I have indicated on previous occasions,
history tells us that sharp reversals in confidence occur abruptly,
most often with little advance notice. These reversals can be
self-reinforcing processes that can compress sizable adjustments
into a very short period. Panic reactions in the market are
characterized by dramatic shifts in behavior that are intended to
minimize short-term losses. Claims on far-distant future values are
discounted to insignificance. What is so intriguing, as I noted
earlier, is that this type of behavior has characterized human
interaction with little appreciable change over the generations.
Whether Dutch tulip bulbs or Russian equities, the market price
patterns remain much the same.
We can readily describe this process, but,
to date, economists have been unable to anticipate sharp reversals
in confidence. Collapsing confidence is generally described as a
bursting bubble, an event incontrovertibly evident only in
retrospect. To anticipate a bubble about to burst requires the
forecast of a plunge in the prices of assets previously set by the
judgments of millions of investors, many of whom are highly
knowledgeable about the prospects for the specific investments that
make up our broad price indexes of stocks and other assets.
Nevertheless, if episodic recurrences of
ruptured confidence are integral to the way our economy and our
financial markets work now and in the future, the implications for
risk measurement and risk management are significant.
Probability distributions estimated
largely, or exclusively, over cycles that do not include periods of
panic will underestimate the likelihood of extreme price movements
because they fail to capture a secondary peak at the extreme
negative tail that reflects the probability of occurrence of a
panic. Furthermore, joint distributions estimated over periods that
do not include panics will underestimate correlations between asset
returns during panics. Under these circumstances, fear and
disengagement on the part of investors holding net long positions
often lead to simultaneous declines in the values of private
obligations, as investors no longer realistically differentiate
among degrees of risk and liquidity, and to increases in the values
of riskless government securities. Consequently, the benefits of
portfolio diversification will tend to be overestimated when the
rare panic periods are not taken into account.
The uncertainties inherent in valuations of
assets and the potential for abrupt changes in perceptions of those
uncertainties clearly must be adjudged by risk managers at banks and
other financial intermediaries. At a minimum, risk managers need to
stress test the assumptions underlying their models and set aside
somewhat higher contingency resources--reserves or capital--to cover
the losses that will inevitably emerge from time to time when
investors suffer a loss of confidence. These reserves will appear
almost all the time to be a suboptimal use of capital. So do fire
insurance premiums.
The above is only a quotation from the speech.
UNEQUAL
TREATMENT: Congress to the Core
"Playing
Favorites: Why Alan Greenspan's Fed lets banks off easy on
corporate fraud," by Ronald Fink, CFO Magazine, April
2004, pp. 46-54 --- http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,12866||M|886,00.html
The module below is not in
the above online version of the above article. However, it is on
Page 51 of the printed version.
UNEQUAL
TREATMENT
IF
THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AND THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
Commission
pursue the same agenda, why were Merrill Lynch & Co. and the
Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) treated so differently by
the Corporate Fraud Task Force--a team with representatives from the
SEC, the FBI, and the Department of Justice (DoJ) set up to
prosecute perpetrators of Enron's fraud--than were Citigroup and J.
P. Morgan Chase & Co.? After all, all four banks did much
the same thing.
Under
settlements signed with the SEC last July, Citigroup and Chase were
fined a mere $101 million (including $19 million for its actions
relating to a similar fraud involving Dynegy) and $135 million,
respectively, which amounts to no more than a week of either's most
recent annual earnings. And they agreed, in effect, to cease
and desist from doing other structured-finance deals that mislead
investors. That contrasts sharply with the punishment meted
out by the DoJ to Merrill and CIBC, each of which not only paid $80
million in fines, but also agreed to have their activities monitored
by a supervising committee that reports to the DoJ. Even more
striking, CIBC agreed to exit not only the structured-finance
business but also the plain-vanilla commercial--paper conduit trade
for three years. No regulatory agency involved in the
settlements would comment on the cases, though the SEC's settlement
with Citigroup took note of the bank's cooperation in the
investigation.
But Brad S.
Karp, an attorney with the New York firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind,
Wharton & Garrison LLP, suggested recently that the terms of the
SEC settlement with its client, Citigroup, reflected a lack of
knowledge or intent on the bank's part. As Karp noted more
than once at a February conference on legal issues and compliance
facing bond-market participants, the SEC's settlement with Citigroup
was ex scienter, a Latin legal phrase meaning "without
knowledge."
However,
the SEC's administrative order to Citigroup cited at least 13
instances where the bank was anything but in the dark about its
involvement in Enron's fraud.
As Richard
H. Walker, former director of the SEC's enforcement division and now
general counsel of Deutsche Bank's Corporate and Investment Bank,
puts it, all the banks involved in Enron's fraud "had
knowledge" of it. Yet Walker isn't surprised by their
disparate treatment at the hands of regulators. "The SEC
does things its way," he says, "and the Fed does them
another." *Ronald Fink and Tim Reason
The just don't get it! Chartered Jets, a
Wedding At Versailles and Fast Cars To Help Forget Bad Times.
As financial companies start to pay out big
bonuses for 2003, lavish spending by Wall Streeters is showing signs
of a comeback. Chartered jets and hot wheels head a list of
indulgences sparked by the recent bull market.
Gregory Zuckerman and Cassell Bryan-Low, "With the
Market Up, Wall Street High Life Bounces Back, Too," The Wall
Street Journal, February 4, 2004 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107584886617919763,00.html?mod=home%5Fpage%5Fone%5Fus
Scandals Are a Hot Topic in College Courses --- http://www.smartpros.com/x42201.xml
Most of us enter the investment business for the
same sanity-destroying reasons a woman becomes a prostitute: It avoids the
menace of hard work, is a group activity that requires little in the way of
intellect, and is a practical means of manking money for those with no special
talent for anything else.
Richard New, The Wall Street Jungle (as quoted by Frank Partnoy in
FIASCO: The Inside Story of a Wall Street Trader.)
Behind every great fortune there lies a great crime.
Honore de Balzac (as quoted by Frank Partnoy in FIASCO: The Inside
Story of a Wall Street Trader.)
But for Freddie Mac, the other pillar of
the colossal U.S. mortgage market, Freddie Mac's restatement has only
caused headaches and has even raised new questions about the quality
of financial reporting.
Patrick Barta, "Restatement by Freddie Mac Puts Fannie on the
Spot," The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2004, Page C1.
The problem is the companies'
(Freddie
Mac versus Fannie Mae) business and financial
statements have become so complex that they are effectively "unanalyzable"
says James Bianco, president of Bianco Research,
a Chicago-based fixed-income research firm that has been critical of
Fannie and Freddie in the past. He says the same is becoming
true of other large financial institutions, particularly those that,
like Fannie and Freddie, use large volumes of derivatives, which are
investment contracts that can be used by companies to offset risk from
interest rate shifts.
Ibid
The Timeline of the Recent History of Fannie Mae Scandals
2002-2008 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae
"Fannie Mayhem: A History," The Wall Street Journal,
July 14, 2008
So what's a little business deal among
friends? It's trouble, if the friends are college or
college-foundation trustees who benefit personally from the decisions
they make on behalf of the institutions they serve.
Julianne Basinger, "Boars Crack Down on Members' Insider
Benefits," The Chronicle of Higher Education, February 6.
2004, Page A1.
Mutual-fund investors sent a record $14
billion in net assets to exchange-traded funds last month as they
sought escape from the recent share-trading scandal.
Aaron Lucchetti, The Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2004 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107482213730209735,00.html?mod=mkts_main_news_hs_h
S. Scott Voynich, Chair of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, has stated that further
changes were necessary to regain the confidence of American investors.
Voynich was the keynote speaker at the Institute’s 2003 AICPA
National Conference on Current SEC Developments .
http://accountingeducation.com/news/news4675.html
Nothing wrong with overcharging, so long
as everyone else is doing it, right?
Gretchen Morgenson"The Mutual Fund Scandal's Next
Chapter," The New York Times, December 7, 2003
(See below)
Are you
disgusted enough with mutual funds to raise a stink? So far,
savers don't seem nearly as outraged as they were about Enron--yet
deceptive funds and sneaky "financial advisers" have swiped
more money, from more people, than all the corporate scandals
combined. The House of
Representatives just passed a reform bill, but in the Senate, the
going looks tough. Your
legislators are scooping up money from the mutual-fund lobby, which
hopes to head off any major change.
To counter the lobby,
Congress needs angry protest calls from voters like you.
Jane Bryant Quinn (See Below)
One the one
hand, eliminating the middleman would result in lower costs, increased
sales, and greater consumer satisfaction; on the other hand,
we're the middleman.
New Yorker Cartoon, Page 29, The New Yorker Book of Business
Cartoons
In the context of the recent mutual fund scandals, financial advisors
have become those middlemen.
Boyer had also
asked Kmart's auditors at PricewaterhouseCoopers in several cases to
look into various accounting issues and was unsatisfied with the
firm's work, according to the lawsuit.
"Fired From Kmart, Ex-CFO Is Key Figure in
Lawsuits," SmartPros (See below)
"I believe
this (mutual fund rip-off) is the worst
scandal we've seen in 50 years, and I can't say I saw it coming,"
said Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission for nearly eight years under the Clinton administration.
"I probably worried about funds less than insider trading,
accounting issues and fair disclosure to investors" by public
companies.
Stephen Labaton --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland
Illegal
or unfair trading isn't hard for directors (or the SEC)
to spot, says New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, who brought the
first of these scandals to light. They just have to compare
their funds' total sales with total redemptions. When the two
are about the same, skimming might be going on. I asked Lipper,
a fund-tracking service, to list the larger funds where redemptions
reached 90 to 110 percent of sales. It found 229, some looking
obviously churned.
Jane Bryant Quinn --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland
One thing your
can count on: When you invest, a lot of the people you trust are
going to cheat. Billions of investor dollars whirl through the
system. It's all too easy for insiders to stick their hands into
that current and grab. We're not talking about a bad apple here
and there. Cheating runs through Wall Street's very seams ---
even in the sainted mutual funds.
Jane Bryant Quinn --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland
But Wall Street's Lobbyists Still Have a
Firm Grip Where it Counts
While Representative Baker pushes his bill in
the House, the Senate is not expected to take up a measure before next
year. Some lawmakers have filed bills, but Senator Richard Shelby, the
Alabama Republican who heads the Senate banking committee, has said he
is not convinced of the need for new laws.
Stephen Labaton, "S.E.C. Offers Plan for Tightening Grip on
Mutual Funds," The New York Times, November 19, 2003 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/19/business/19sec.html
You can read more about SEC Chairman
William H. Donaldson's defense of his quick and some say marshmallow
punishment of mutual fund cheaters at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland
What makes this such a
big scandal is that the savings of half the households in the U.S. are
at stake here. The tragedy is that now that the scandal is
surfacing in the media and in state courts, the SEC is only wrist
slapping mutual funds. This
is along with the continued wrist slapping of investment banking
(e.g., why is Merrill Lynch still in existence after frauds dating
back to
Orange
County
?) is the real evidence of industry power over regulators.
Sarbanes-Oxley won’t do it!
It’s still Congress to the core in
Washington
DC
as long as industries have regulators in their well-financed pockets
--- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland
New
York State Attorney General Eliott Spitzer's charges of improper
trading practices by several leading mutual fund families are another
blow to public trust in financial institutions. Mutual funds have been
the place you would advise the most unsophisticated investors to go:
Mutual funds were designed for grandpa and grandma, and repeatedly
recommended to them by all kinds of benevolent authorities. Thus
scandals in the mutual fund sector are potentially much more damaging
to public trust in our financial institutions than are scandals in
other sectors -- such as the one playing out in the New York Stock
Exchange right now.
See Robert Shiller's article below.
If
you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler.
Warren Buffett,
Lowly
investors who lost their retirement accounts following the advice of
Citigroup's Jack Grubman or followed the "research" of some
other firm that was bought and paid for by favored clients can only
burn with shame and disbelief. Restore investor confidence in Wall
Street? Not likely for baby boomers, who've already been publicly
fleeced in broad daylight. Wall Street will have to wait for another
generation of innocents to prey upon.
Richard Dooling, The New York Times, May 4, 2003
Mr. Quattrone's rise shows
how some who were on the inside during the tech boom piled up huge
fortunes in part through special access, unavailable to other
investors, to the machinery of that era's frenzied stock market. But
now he faces a crunch. The steep yearlong downturn in tech stocks has
hurt the profits of his technology group. And in recent weeks, the
group he heads has come under scrutiny in connection with a federal
probe into whether some investment-bank employees awarded shares of
hot IPOs in exchange for unusually high commissions, and whether those
commissions amounted to kickbacks.
Susan Pulliam and Randall Smith, The Wall Street Journal, May
3, 2003 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB988836228231147483,00.html?mod=2_1040_1
The Investment Banker Who Got Away to Start Another Day
The (Frank Quattrone)
deal marks the end of a sorry chapter in American business
history. While high-profile white-collar crime persists, the dramatic criminal
cases that were launched just after the dotcom economy fizzled are now mostly
completed. The icons of massive, turn-of-the-century corporate fraud--Ken Lay
and Jeff Skilling of Enron, Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom, Dennis Kozlowski and Mark
Swartz of Tyco--are convicted and, in Lay's case, dead. Even Martha Stewart has
served time. And many, if not most, of the cases the feds brought against
smaller fish--to help assuage a share-owning public that had been scammed by
phony accounting and overhyped stock--are resolved. The government claims that
since mid-2002 it has won more than 1,000 corporate-fraud convictions, including
those of more than 100 CEOs and presidents.
Barbara Kiviat, "The One Who Got Away: The decision to abandon a
high-profile case against a dotcom poster boy marks the end of a sorry era,"
Time Magazine, August 27, 2006 ---
Click Here
Cleaning Up Corporate Japan
Is Japan Inc. finally moving toward more
responsible corporate governance? After last week's arrest of Yoshiaki
Tsutsumi, owner of the country's major railway, hotel and resort
conglomerate Seibu group, there's at least reason to believe that the
government is finally demanding more accountability from its corporate
leaders. Mr. Tsutsumi, former chairman of Seibu railway and its
holding company, Kokudo, was arrested on Thursday on charges of
insider trading and falsification of documents. While his guilt of
these charges is still to be determined, the Japanese press has not
held back from criticizing the politically influential Mr. Tsutsumi
and his business empire, portraying them as powerful symbols of
corporate Japan's lack of transparency and disregard for shareholder
interests.
"Cleaning Up Corporate Japan," The Wall Street Journal,
March 10, 2005 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111040748350775119,00.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep
Hi Milt,
I think the problem in the investment banking industry that spilled
over into accounting, banking, mutual funds, securities dealers, and
large corporations is truly "infectious greed." When
deregulations came 8n 1995, executives watched as investment bankers
became filthy rich and many, certainly not all, decided to join in the
fun.
What is important in Parnoy's latest book is a greater explanation
of "how" it was done.
And yes, I think that many would do it again even if they knew they
would get caught. See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudconclusion.htm#CrimePays
Many of the perpetrators in the 1990s are now sitting in places like
London and Switzerland enjoying a very nice life with no longer having
to work. Many of them will gladly sacrifice pride for wealth, which is
something that I gather would never appeal to you.
As for Nixon, I think his years in public office drove him to
pathological paranoia. He was driven more by fear than greed. I think
he wanted to go down in history as a great statesman, and he feared
his enemies were out keep him from realizing his dream.
Bob Jensen
-----Original Message-----
From: MILT COHEN [mailto:uncmlt@juno.com]
Sent: Sunday, April 25, 2004 9:06 AM
To: Jensen, Robert
Subject: comment on your comments
Hi Bob
I read your comments on various books
written on securities fraud and related "fun & games"
with investors per Cheryl Dunn's request --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm#Quotations
Just a couple of comments from my view. I
read one of the books you wrote on - namely Liar's Poker and I also
read a book on Michael Milkens dealings during his days at Drexel,
his downfall along with Drexel's, and how others of that era that
were involved in those dealings.
It seems to me that most of these books get
muddled down into the same expose type of writing and/or reporting.
It's like, wow! Is that what really happened? Or, I guess I forgot
about that. Each book seems to be a primer for the next
"hero" who wlll take investors and accountants for another
fleecing. And make lawyers rich.
My question to you (and you may have the
same feeling I have) is why are there so many fraudulent happenings
in the security arena? One would think that with jail sentences and
monetary fines being given (even Martha Stewart), people's
reputations driven into a ditch - perhaps forever (notwithstanding
Michael Milken's good deeds in medicine and education) is the wealth
obtained so worthy of being convicted of being a thief? Does anyone
have that answer? Is it all worth it just to get out of jury duty?
Back in history when I was an under grad back in the 1950s the big
defalcation (as it was titled) was the McKesson Robbins inventory
cover-up of the 1930s. The next one that comes to my mind was the
Equity Funding matter of the 1960-1970 era that centered on the
fraud of writing nonexistent life insurance contracts that brought
attention to the firm of Seidman & Seidman (I had a friend
working for them during that era).
After Equity Funding, the fraud circuit was
quiet for awhile, but in the last fifteen or so years, it seems we
experience one hit after another (like airplanes in a flight plan at
LAX) - all centering on the oversight of audits that have gone on
for years or even decades. The latest being the B of A involvement
with the Italian dairy company. (how a bank account could be
overlooked or confirmed when it didn't exist is beyond me). My
conclusion after 45 years in this "game" is that it all
relates back to Richard Nixon. Nixon in his day depicted the worst
of fraud and lying in the matter of Watergate. (He also was depicted
as a less than ethical politician here in California. The name
"tricky Dick" didn't come from nowhere). Anyway, he showed
the populace that anyone can "get away with it". Fast
forward to Bill Clinton and we have another example of not telling
the truth. (only he has the definition of sex?) So what can our kids
and students think as they trudge through college. If ethics is not
emphasized in class (and I assume it is not a major topic these or
any other days) and ethical actions are not depicted in real life as
well as in movies and TV (look at Ormirosa's actions on the Donald
Trump show) how can we expect that these financial frauds will not
be a continual event? Perhaps the next reality show should be
centered on financial fraud. It might bring in bigger ratings than
Trump's show did. (And Trump is such an icon of ethical behavior in
business dealings too - (that's a joke)).
Anyway, I just thought I'd share my
feelings on your thoughts and comments on current readings and
topical events.
Sincerely,
Milt Cohen Chatsworth, Ca.
Hi Again Milt,
The entire body of agency theory that evolved in the past three
decades is built upon the underlying assumption that managers' utility
functions are also in the best interest of the prosperity of
corporations and shareholders. Agency theory falls apart when managers
like Fastow, Kozwalski, Waksal, etc. are willing to loot the company
and/or rob shareholders for personal gain even if they know they will
get caught and spend some relaxing time in Club Fed --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudconclusion.htm#CrimePays
We always hope that dastardly managers are few and far between such
that your assumptions and agency theory still hold water. What we saw
in the late 1990s, however, was that highly infectious greed that
commenced to sicken entire industries such as investment banking,
energy traders, stock brokers, and securities dealers after Federal
regulations were eliminated in 1995 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm
Sadly, the auditing profession was not immune to infectious greed
as consulting opportunities exploded in auditing clients. We would
hope that integrity is being restored in the auditing profession, but
the scandals in tax shelter marketing and client billing cheating
since the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation have further eroded the
credibility of auditing firms --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm#others
See "ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONALISM: THEY JUST DON'T GET IT"
--- http://aaahq.org/AM2003/WyattSpeech.pdf
Bob Jensen
-----Original Message-----
From: MILT COHEN [mailto:uncmlt@juno.com]
Sent: Sunday, April 25, 2004 2:31 PM To: Jensen, Robert
Subject: Re: comment on your comments
You may be precisely correct in your
conclusion, but one would like to think that the greedy bunch
wouldn't want to ruin the 'game" for everyone else. That old
story about killing the goose that lays the golden eggs is
happening. Another story about the bar owner watching a new
bartender steal every other drink that is sold. Finally when the
bartender pockets two in a row, the owners calls him over and asks,
"aren't we partners on that one?" I mean, in order for
investors to part with money the thieves have to let others make a
few bucks just to sweeten the pot, or the game is over, in my view.
The flip side is that with new laws and the emphasis on accountant's
trust, many students will opt out of accounting and just head for
the finance sign. I tutored a student last year who was trying to
understand Intermediate Accounting. He said he did well in the
Principle course. His last remark to me was that if he blows the
mid-term he'll drop the course and take up Finance just to keep his
grade average. So much for tenacity and commitment.
Sincerely Milt Cohen
March 13, 2009 message from Zafar Khan
Why was Sarbanes-Oxley enacted?
Zafar Khan, Ph.D.
Professor
Eastern Michigan University
March 14, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Zafar,
Sarbanes (SOX) was enacted to keep
investors from abandoning the U.S. stock market after enormous scandals
like Enron, WorldCom, and other huge scandals that revealed CPA audits
themselves were becoming both substandard and non-profitable ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm
To make money, auditing firms themselves
were profiting from irresponsible audit cost cutting and non-audit
consulting that compromised their auditing independence. Inside
corporations, internal controls for responsible financial reporting had
broken down or never existed in the first place.
Sarbanes forced auditors to become more
independent and also made it possible to double or triple audit fees,
thereby restoring auditing to profitable services rather than services
that lost money for auditing firms trying to be responsible auditors.
SOX also created the PCAOB that got
serious about reviewing auditor performance (including fining Deloitte a
million dollars). Many of the large and smaller CPA firms failed the
PCAOB tests early on and soon cleaned up their audit practices with the
PCAOB breathing down their backs.
Among other things SOX increased
government funding for the SEC and the FASB (which before SOX received
no taxpayer funding). This, in turn, made the FASB less dependent upon
sales of publications. The FASB then made many publications free
electronically, most notably free distribution of standards and
interpretations. The IASB, sadly, still depends upon publication revenue
such that IFRS are not free unless you play games like download the
equivalent Hong Kong accounting standards.
See
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarbanes_and_Oxley
A variety of complex factors
created the conditions and culture in which a series of large
corporate frauds occurred between 2000-2002. The spectacular,
highly-publicized frauds at Enron (see
Enron scandal), WorldCom, and Tyco exposed significant problems
with conflicts of interest and incentive compensation practices. The
analysis of their complex and contentious root causes contributed to
the passage of SOX in 2002. In a 2004 interview, Senator Paul
Sarbanes stated:
|
|
The Senate Banking Committee
undertook a series of hearings on the problems in the
markets that had led to a loss of hundreds and hundreds of
billions, indeed trillions of dollars in market value. The
hearings set out to lay the foundation for legislation. We
scheduled 10 hearings over a six-week period, during which
we brought in some of the best people in the country to
testify...The hearings produced remarkable consensus on the
nature of the problems: inadequate oversight of accountants,
lack of auditor independence, weak corporate governance
procedures, stock analysts' conflict of interests,
inadequate disclosure provisions, and grossly inadequate
funding of the Securities and Exchange Commission. |
|
-
Auditor conflicts of interest:
Prior to SOX, auditing firms, the primary financial "watchdogs"
for investors, were self-regulated. They also performed
significant non-audit or consulting work for the companies they
audited. Many of these consulting agreements were far more
lucrative than the auditing engagement. This presented at least
the appearance of a conflict of interest. For example,
challenging the company's accounting approach might damage a
client relationship, conceivably placing a significant
consulting arrangement at risk, damaging the auditing firm's
bottom line.
-
Boardroom failures: Boards of
Directors, specifically Audit Committees, are charged with
establishing oversight mechanisms for financial reporting in
U.S. corporations on the behalf of investors. These scandals
identified Board members who either did not exercise their
responsibilities or did not have the expertise to understand the
complexities of the businesses. In many cases, Audit Committee
members were not truly independent of management.
-
Securities analysts' conflicts of interest:
The roles of securities analysts, who make buy and sell
recommendations on company stocks and bonds, and investment
bankers, who help provide companies loans or handle mergers and
acquisitions, provide opportunities for conflicts. Similar to
the auditor conflict, issuing a buy or sell recommendation on a
stock while providing lucrative investment banking services
creates at least the appearance of a conflict of interest.
-
Inadequate funding of the SEC:
The SEC budget has steadily increased to nearly double the
pre-SOX level.
In the interview cited above, Sarbanes
indicated that enforcement and rule-making are more effective
post-SOX.
-
Banking practices: Lending to
a firm sends signals to investors regarding the firm's risk. In
the case of Enron, several major banks provided large loans to
the company without understanding, or while ignoring, the risks
of the company. Investors of these banks and their clients were
hurt by such bad loans, resulting in large settlement payments
by the banks. Others interpreted the willingness of banks to
lend money to the company as an indication of its health and
integrity, and were led to invest in Enron as a result. These
investors were hurt as well.
-
Internet bubble: Investors
had been stung in 2000 by the sharp declines in technology
stocks and to a lesser extent, by declines in the overall
market. Certain
mutual fund managers were alleged to have advocated the
purchasing of particular technology stocks, while quietly
selling them. The losses sustained also helped create a general
anger among investors.
-
Executive compensation: Stock
option and bonus practices, combined with volatility in stock
prices for even small earnings "misses," resulted in pressures
to manage earnings. Stock options were not treated as
compensation expense by companies, encouraging this form of
compensation. With a large stock-based bonus at risk, managers
were pressured to meet their targets.
Pay Me More and More and More
Sadly, SOX did not attack the root problems that led to the subsequent
subprime lending scandals. These root problems included
pay-for-performance compensation plans that motivated mortgage brokers,
real estate appraisers, banks, and investment banks to screw both
shareholders and home owners.
Pass the Trash
Added to this was Congressional pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mack
to buy hopeless mortgages that had almost no chance of being repaid.
Banks commenced a practice of passing the trash to Freddie, Fannie, and
Wall Street investment banks that, in turn, passed the trash to their
customers in CDOs that were intended to diversify the bad loan risks
(but failed to do so when the real estate bubble burst).
SOX has worked in countless ways, but
not all ways
There are countless success stories where SOX led to better internal
controls and better auditing with more substantive testing in place of
lousy analytical reviews. However, SOX did almost nothing to prevent
fraud in the mortgage brokering and banking sectors.
You can read more about subprime sleaze at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Sleaze
You can read more about auditing
professionalism at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#Professionalism
Fiduciaries turned into whores
One of the most sad things for me is the way that CPA auditing firms
failed to signal the public that banks were filling up on toxic loans.
Equally unprofessional were the credit rating agencies like Standard and
Poors and Moody’s that in essence became Wall Street’s whores.
Why regulations fail and
succeed in the turning of the carousel
The main problem with government
regulations on industry is that industry eventually runs the regulators
(e.g., the Federal Reserve, SEC, FDA, FAA, FCC, etc.) until some
enormous scandals force the regulators to use the powers entrusted to
them. Then we get new regulations that industry eventually figures out
how to circumvent. Then we wait for more huge scandals. And so the
carousel goes round and round.
Socialism bypasses the regulation
process by owning and running the industries. Then the abuses really
begin
The
inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of the blessings. The
inherent blessing of socialism is the equal sharing of misery.
Winston Churchill
May 14, 2009 reply from Zafar Khan
[zkhan@EMICH.EDU]
Hi Bob, one can always depend upon you to
set the record straight. Otherwise, some might continue to believe that this
(SOX) was another gratuitous government intervention to disrupt the smooth
functioning of our self correcting financial markets.
I also read in a recent post that the
government should not do anything about executive compensation despite the
obscene abuse of power by the executives of public companies who have
enriched themselves while running their companies into the ground because
the market will in the end sort it out. My humble response to that is dream
on.
Zafar Khan, Ph.D.
Professor
Eastern Michigan University
March 15, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi again Zafar,
After the fall of Andersen you would've
thought CPA auditors would've "self corrected" without having SOX since
their reputations had hit bottom.
In 2003 a former professor of accounting
at the University of Illinois and long-time executive partner with
Andersen told accounting professors that the CPA firm executives "still
didn't get it." This is probably why we needed SOX and the PCAOB to help
them "get it." Art Wyatt’s plenary session speech at the 2003 American
Accounting Association annual meetings is at
http://aaahq.org/AM2003/WyattSpeech.pdf
Art is also a former AAA President and a member of the Accounting Hall
of Fame. His opinions have a lot of clout in both the CPA profession and
academe.
From “Topics for Class Debate” at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
This might be a good topic of debate for an ethics and/or fraud course.
The topic is essentially the problem of regulating and/or punishing many
for the egregious actions of a few. The best example is the major
accounting firm of Andersen in which 84,000 mostly ethical and highly
professional employees lost their jobs when the firm's leadership
repeatedly failed to take action to prevent corrupt and/or incompetent
audits of a small number audit partners. Clearly the firm's management
failed and deserves to be fired and/or jailed for obstruction of justice
and failure to protect the public in general and 83,900 Andersen
employees. A former
Andersen executive partner,
Art Wyatt, contends that Andersen's leadership did not get the message
and that leadership in today's leading CPA firms is still not (just
before SOX) getting the message ---
http://aaahq.org/AM2003/WyattSpeech.pdf
Bob Jensen's threads on auditing professionalism are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#Professionalism
"8 Accused of Kickbacks, Fraud at Wall Street
Brokerage Firms," SmartPros, May 23, 2008 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x61954.xml
"Eliot Spitzer's Case Book," by Elizabeth Weinstein, The Wall
Street Journal, April 28, 2005
Eliot Spitzer is a man on the hunt. From mutual
funds to music, executive compensation to counterfeit drugs, the New York
attorney general has pursued investigations of alleged misdeeds in half a
dozen industries.
Though sometimes criticized for focusing too
closely on Wall Street -- and on his own bid for New York state governor in
2006 -- Mr. Spitzer's probes have led to stricter controls on Wall Street
research and spurred other attorneys general to action. His landmark
investigations have zeroed in on high-profile executives, most recently
Maurice Greenberg at insurer American International Group.
Last year alone, the New York attorney general's office recovered a record
$2.38 billion earmarked for restitution to individual shareholders and other
consumers. Mr. Spitzer's office, which has an annual budget of $214 million,
has added nearly 50 lawyers to its staff of more than 500 attorneys since
1999.
Here is an overview of key investigations:
Investment Banking Stock research
Probe launched: 2001
At issue: Misleading information in analysts' public research reports
An investigation into the stock research issued by Merrill Lynch & Co.'s
Internet group, whose star analyst was Henry Blodget, showed that some
analysts harbored different opinions privately from those they expressed in
their public research reports. The investigation spawned a wide-ranging
probe over nearly two years into the procedures at many firms. Ultimately,
10 of the largest securities firms
agreed to pay $1.4 billion to settle charges that
they routinely issued misleading stock research to curry favor with
corporate clients during the stock-market bubble of the late 1990s. The
firms consented to the charges without admitting or denying wrongdoing. The
$1.4 billion settlement was among the highest ever imposed by securities
regulators, and both Mr. Blodget and Jack Grubman of Salomon Smith Barney
were banned from the securities business.
Investment Banking - IPOs
Probe launched: 2001
At issue: Unfair allocations of shares in initial public offerings
Mr. Spitzer's office also charged that several big Wall Street firms
improperly doled out coveted shares in initial public offerings to corporate
executives in a bid to win banking business. Two companies, Citigroup Inc.'s
Citigroup Global Markets unit, formerly Salomon Smith Barney, and Credit
Suisse Group's Credit Suisse First Boston, settled these charges as part of
the $1.4 billion pact with securities firms and did so without admitting or
denying wrongdoing. In a related probe, former star CSFB banker Frank
Quattrone was
convicted of obstruction of justice for impeding
and investigation of CSFB's IPO allocations.
Insurance - Improper transactions
Probe launched: 2003
At issue: Whether several AIG business deals were designed to manipulate its
financial statements
In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Mr. Spitzer's office
looked into insurance transactions that American International Group Inc.
conducted with two firms, cellphone distributor Brightpoint Inc. and PNC
Financial Services Group Inc. AIG paid $126 million in a settlement without
admitting or denying guilt. Later, both the SEC and Mr. Spitzer's office
scrutinized a deal struck between AIG and Berkshire Hathaway's General
Reinsurance unit in 2000 to determine if the deal was aimed at making the
giant insurer's reserves look healthier than they were. Longtime Chairman
Maurice R. "Hank" Greenberg
retired from the company, and in late March, AIG
admitted to a broad range of improper accounting.
Other AIG executives were forced out, including chief financial officer
Howard Smith. Meanwhile, Berkshire chief Warren Buffett this week told
investigators that he
didn't know details about the contentious
transaction. Mr. Greenberg also was deposed and repeatedly invoked his
constitutional right against self incrimination.
Insurance - Broker fees
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Whether fees paid by insurance companies to insurance brokers and
consultants posed a conflict of interest
Mr. Spitzer and other state attorneys general as well as insurance
regulators in New York and Illinois alleged that insurance companies
routinely paid fees to brokers and consultants who advised employers on
where to buy policies for workers, a potential conflict of interest. Mr.
Spitzer accused several insurance brokers of accepting undisclosed
commissions and, in the case of Marsh & McLennan, of bid-rigging --
soliciting fake bids from insurers to help steer business to favored
providers. In February 2005, Marsh
agreed to pay $850 million in restitution to
clients of its Marsh Inc. insurance brokerage firm who allegedly were
cheated by Marsh brokers. Marsh neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing.
The investigations shook up an insurance dynasty. Marsh was run by Jeffrey
W. Greenberg, the eldest son of AIG's former head Maurice Greenberg, before
he was ousted as a result of the probe. Another insurance firm included in
the probe, Ace Ltd., is run by Evan Greenberg, Jeffrey's younger brother.
Meanwhile, Aon Corp.
reached a $190 million settlement without
admitting or denying wrongdoing, and earlier this month, insurance broker
Willis Group Holdings Ltd.
said it would pay $51 million and change its
business practices to end an investigation by attorneys general in New York
and Minnesota. Willis admitted no wrongdoing or liability.
NYSE - Executive Compensation
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Whether then-New York Stock Exchange Chairman Dick Grasso's
compensation was excessive
Mr. Spitzer sued Mr. Grasso, the NYSE and the Wall Street executive who
headed its compensation committee for what Mr. Spitzer claimed was a pay
package so huge that it violated the state law governing not-for-profit
groups. Mr. Spitzer said the compensation -- valued at nearly $200 million
-- came about as a result of Mr. Grasso's intimidation of the exchange's
board of directors. Mr. Grasso, who denied there was anything improper about
his pay, was
forced to resign from the Big Board in September
2003 following a public outcry over his compensation. The lawsuit, which is
still in progress, led to new governance oversight at the Big Board.
Retail
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Antitrust violations by retailers
Mr. Spitzer claimed that Federated Department Stores Inc. and May Department
Stores Co. conspired to pressure housewares makers Lenox Inc., a unit of
Brown-Forman Corp. and Waterford Wedgwood PLC's U.S. unit to pull out as
planned anchors of Bed Bath & Beyond Inc.'s new tableware department. The
case was settled in August when the four companies agreed to pay a total of
$2.9 million in civil penalties but admit no wrongdoing. Later, Mr. Spitzer
charged James M. Zimmerman, Federated's retired
chairman, with perjury, alleging that he lied under oath to conceal evidence
of possible antitrust violations. Mr. Zimmerman has pleaded not guilty.
Music
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Payments by music companies middlemen aimed at securing better
airplay for the labels' artists
Mr. Spitzer's
investigation, which is continuing, centers around independent promoters
-- middlemen between record companies and radio
stations -- whom music labels pay to help them secure better airplay for
their music releases. Broadcasters are prohibited from taking goods or cash
for playing songs on their stations. The independent-promotion system has
been viewed as a way around laws against payola -- undisclosed cash payments
to individuals in exchange for airplay. Last fall, Mr. Spitzer requested
information from Warner Music Group, EMI Group PLC, Vivendi Universal SA's
Universal Music Group, and Sony Corp. and Bertelsmann AG's Sony BMG Music
Entertainment. Warner Music received an additional subpoena
last week.
Marketing
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Software secretly installed on home computers to put ads on
screens
After a six-month investigation into Internet marketer Intermix Media Inc.,
Mr. Spitzer in April 2005
filed suit, claiming the company installed a wide
range of advertising software on home computers nationwide. The software,
known as "spyware" or "adware," prompts nuisance pop-up advertising on
computer screens, setting users up for PC slowdowns and crashes. The
programs sometimes don't come with "un-install" applications and can't be
removed by most computers' add/remove function. Mr. Spitzer said the suit is
designed to combat the practice of redirecting of home computer users to
unwanted Web sites, the adding of unnecessary toolbar items and the delivery
of unwanted ads that pop up on computer screens. The civil suit accuses
Intermix of violating state General Business Law provisions against false
advertising and deceptive business practices, and also of trespass under New
York common law. Intermix has said it doesn't "promote or condone spyware"
and has ceased distribution of the software at issue, which it says was
introduced under prior leadership.
Health Care
Probe launched: 2005
At issue: Covert sales of counterfeit drugs
Mr. Spitzer's office has
sent subpoenas to three big drug wholesalers
--
Cardinal Health Inc., Amerisource Bergen Corp. and McKesson Corp. -- related
to the companies' purchase of drugs on the secondary market. Although few
details about the probe have emerged, some industry analysts have said that
the subpoenas are likely connected to sales transactions involving
counterfeit products. Counterfeit drugs are those sold under a product name
without proper authorization -- they can include drugs without the active
ingredient, with an insufficient quantity of the active ingredient, with the
wrong active ingredient, or with fake packaging. The investigation focuses
on the secondary market, where the wholesalers buy drugs from each other,
often at lower prices, and counterfeit drugs are hard to track. It isn't
clear whether the wholesalers are the focus of a probe or just sources of
information.
How Grasso Got Greener: Grasso Took Fifth In SEC Testimony
An official in the office of New York state's attorney
general yesterday said former New York Stock Exchange Chief Executive Dick
Grasso last year declined to answer certain questions during a deposition by the
Securities and Exchange Commission regarding that regulator's probe of trading
firms at the Big Board. Avi Schick, a lawyer working for Attorney General Eliot
Spitzer, made that assertion during a pretrial hearing in New York state court
for a civil lawsuit claiming that Mr. Grasso's $187.5 million pay package as Big
Board chief was excessive under New York law covering not-for-profits. (The NYSE
has since become a public company, NYSE Group Inc.) The disclosure could be
useful to Mr. Spitzer in the compensation case if he can use it to suggest that
Mr. Grasso was an inadequate market regulator.
Chad Bray, "Grasso Took Fifth In SEC Testimony, Spitzer Aide Says," The Wall
Street Journal, March 17, 2006; Page C3 ---
Click Here
Ending a bitter public
fight over whether former New York Stock Exchange Chief Executive Dick Grasso
was paid too much, a state appeals court ruled that Mr. Grasso can keep every
penny collected from his $187.5 million multiyear compensation package. The
3-to-1 ruling by the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court was
a vindication for the relentless Mr. Grasso, who was ousted after details of his
lucrative pay were revealed in 2003.
Aaron Lucchetti, "Grasso Wins Court Fight, Can Keep NYSE Pay," The Wall
Street Journal, July 2, 2008; Page A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121492781324819635.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
American History of Fraud ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm
Federal securities class action
lawsuits increased 19 percent in 2008, with almost half involving firms in the
financial services sector according to the annual report prepared by the
Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse in cooperation with
Cornerstone Research ---
http://securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/20080106_YIR08_Press_Release.pdf
Especially note the 2008 Year in Review link at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2008_YIR/20080106.pdf
Simoleon Sense
Reviews Janet Tavakoli’s Dear Mr. Buffett ---
http://www.simoleonsense.com/simoleon-sense-reviews-janet-tavakolis-dear-mr-buffett/
What’s The Book (Dear Mr. Buffett) About
Dear Mr. Buffett,
chronicles the agency problems, poor regulations, and participants which led to
the current financial crisis. Janet accomplishes this herculean task by
capitalizing on her experiences with derivatives, Wall St, and her relationship
with Warren Buffett. One wonders how she managed to pack so much material in
such few pages!
Unlike many books which only analyze past events, Dear Mr.
Buffett, offers proactive advice for improving financial markets. Janet is
clearly very concerned about protecting individual rights, promoting honesty,
and enhancing financial integrity. This is exactly the kind of character we
should require of our financial leaders.
Business week once called Janet the Cassandra of Credit
Derivatives. Without a doubt Janet should have been listened to. I’m confident
that from now on she will be.
Closing thoughts
Rather than a complicated book on financial esoterica, Janet has
created a simple guide to understanding the current crisis. This book is a must
read for all students of finance, economics, and business. If you haven’t read
this book, please do so.
Warning –This book is likely to infuriate you, and that’s a good
thing!
Janet provides indicting evidence and citizens may be tempted to
initiate vigilante like witch trials. Please
consult with your doctor before taking this financial medication.
Continued in article
September 1, 2009 reply from Rick Lillie
[rlillie@CSUSB.EDU]
Hi Bob,
I am reading Dear Mr.
Buffett, What an Investor Learns 1,269 Miles from Wall Street, by Janet
Tavakoli. I am just about finished with the book. I am thinking about giving
a copy of the book to students who perform well in my upper-level financial
reporting classes.
I agree with the reviewer’s
comments about Tavakoli’s book. Her explanations are clear and concise and
do not require expertise in finance or financial derivatives in order to
understand what she (or Warren Buffet) says. She explains the underlying
problems of the financial meltdown with ease. Tavakoli does not blow you
over with “finance BS.” She does in print what Steve Kroft does in the 60
Minutes story.
Tavakoli delivers a unique
perspective throughout the book. She looks through the eyes of Warren
Buffett and explains issues as Buffett sees them, while peppering the
discussion with her experience and perspective.
The reviewer is correct.
Tavakoli lets the finance world, along with accountants, attorneys, bankers,
Congress, and regulators, have it with both barrels!
Tavakoli’s book is the
highlight of my summer reading.
Best wishes,
Rick Lillie
Rick Lillie, MAS, Ed.D., CPA
Assistant Professor of Accounting Coordinator - Master of Science in
Accountancy (MSA) Program Department of Accounting and Finance College of
Business and Public Administration CSU San Bernardino 5500 University Pkwy,
JB-547 San Bernardino, CA. 92407-2397
Telephone Numbers: San
Bernardino Campus: (909) 537-5726 Palm Desert Campus: (760) 341-2883, Ext.
78158
For technical details see the following book:
Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in
Cash and Synthetic Securitization (Wiley Finance) by Janet M. Tavakoli
(2008)
FBI Arrest in What Appears to Be the World's Largest Case Involving
Insider Information
More and more keeps coming out, including revelations of wiretapping
"8 trades the insiders allegedly made The government's case against the
Galleon crew includes transactions in companies like Google, AMD, Hilton and
Sun," by Michael Copeland, Fortune, October 19, 2009 ---
Click Here
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/19/markets/insider_trading_arrests.fortune/?postversion=2009101912
The government's case in what it is calling the
largest insider trading case involving a U.S. hedge fund contains a detailed
list of trades involving household-name companies.
Investigators have pieced together a case that
alleges more than $25 million in illegal gains based on trading in 2006-09
on companies including Advanced Micro Devices (AMD, Fortune 500), Akamai (AKAM),
Clearwire (CLWR), Google (GOOG, Fortune 500), Hilton, Polycom (PLCM) and Sun
Microsystems (JAVA, Fortune 500), among others.
The six people charged include hedge fund
billionaire Raj Rajaratnam, founder of Galleon Group; Robert Moffat, IBM's
(IBM, Fortune 500) top hardware executive and an oft-discussed CEO
candidate; Mark Curland and Danielle Chiesi, executives of the hedge fund
New Castle Partners; Anil Kumar, a director at consulting firm McKinsey &
Co.; and Rajiv Goel, an executive in Intel's treasury department.
Just what did they allegedly do? Using information
gleaned from wiretapped conversations between the accused and others, along
with the statements of an apparent informant, SEC investigators have pieced
together a series of episodes alleging to show how the defendants used
inside information and well-timed trades to turn million-dollar profits.
Those charged have yet to enter pleas in the case.
Jim Waldman, a lawyer for Rajaratman, told the Wall Street Journal that the
hedge fund chief "is innocent. We're going to fight the charges." Lawyers
for some of the other accused said their clients are shocked by the charges
and deny wrongdoing.
What follows is a condensed account of eight major
trades the suspects made and the inside information they capitalized on,
according to the the SEC investigation and complaint. At the center of some
of the trades is an unnamed "Tipper A," a person who gathered a great deal
of information on companies for Rajaratnam, and whose identity presumably
will be made public as the case unfolds in court.
Polycom beats the Street
On Jan. 10, 2006, the
unnamed source identified in the SEC's complaint as "Tipper A" told
Galleon's Rajaratnam that, based on information received from a Polycom
insider, revenues at the video-conferencing company for the fourth-quarter
of 2005 were about to beat Wall Street estimates. Polycom was set to
announce its earnings more than two weeks later.
Rajaratnam sent an
instant message to his trader instructing him to "buy 60 [thousand shares]
PLCM" for certain Galleon Tech funds. All told, from Jan. 10 through Jan.
25, the date of the Polycom earnings release, Rajaratnam and Galleon bought
245,000 shares of Polycom and 500 Polycom call-option contracts. Polycom did
beat the Street, and collectively, the Galleon Tech funds made over $570,000
in connection with their Polycom trades based on Tipper A's tip.
The same scenario was
repeated for Polycom's first-quarter 2006 earnings, the complaint says.
Galleon made $165,000 on the information. Tipper A made $22,000.
The Hilton takeover
Tipper A allegedly
obtained confidential information in advance of a July 3, 2007, announcement
that a private equity group would be buying Hilton for $47.50 per share, a
premium of $11.45 over the July 3 closing price. Tipper A obtained the
information from an analyst who, at the time, was working at Moody's, a
rating agency that was evaluating Hilton's debt in connection with the
planned buyout. Tipper A bought call option contracts based on the
information, and passed on the tip to Rajaratnam.
On July 3, Rajaratnam and
Galleon bought 400,000 shares of Hilton in the Galleon Tech funds. That
evening, the Hilton transaction was announced. Tipper A sold all of the
Hilton call option contracts for a profit of more than $630,000, the
complaint says. To compensate the source for the Hilton tip, Tipper A paid
the source $10,000. The Galleon Tech funds sold their Hilton shares after
the July 3 announcement for a profit of more than $4 million.
Google Misses
Around July 10, 2007, a
PR consultant to Google allegedly told Tipper A that Google's second-quarter
earnings per share would be down about 25 cents. The Street had estimated
yet another strong quarter for the search giant, which was scheduled to
report earnings July 19.
Two days later Tipper A
bought put options in Google and passed along details of the pending Google
miss to Rajaratnam. He and Galleon began buying Google put options for the
Galleon Tech funds, and continued buying them through July 19. In addition,
Galleon funds bought other options betting on a fall in Google shares and
sold short Google stock beginning July 17.
On July 19, Google
announced its earnings results, disclosing that its earnings-per-share was
indeed 25 cents lower than the prior quarter. Google's share price fell from
over $548 per share to almost $520 per share. The Galleon Tech funds'
profits from the Google tip were almost $8 million. Tipper A sold all of the
put options the day after the July 19 announcement for a profit of over
$500,000.
Trading in Intel
Rajaratnam allegedly tapped former Wharton classmate
and Intel executive Rajiv Goel just before Intel's (INTL)
scheduled fourth-quarter 2006 earnings announcement to get inside
information on the world's largest chipmaker. On Jan. 8, 2007, Rajaratnam
contacted Intel's Goel. The next day, Rajaratnam bought 1 million shares of
Intel at $21.08 per share. On Jan, 11, he bought 500,000 more at $21.65 per
share.
Goel and Rajaratnam
communicated again multiple times over the Martin Luther King Day weekend
that followed. On Tuesday, Jan. 16, the day the markets reopened, Rajaratnam
reversed course, selling the Galleon Tech funds' entire 1.5 million share
long position in Intel at $22.03 per share, and making a profit of a little
over $1 million
Later that day, after the
markets closed, Intel released its fourth-quarter 2006 earnings. Although
the company's earnings beat analysts' projections, its guidance was below
expectations. Intel's stock price fell nearly 5% on the news, but Rajaratnam
was already out of the stock.
According to Intel
officials, Goel has been placed on administrative leave pending the court
case.
Clearwire Gets a Partner
In early February 2008, Goel allegedly tipped
Rajaratnam that there was a pending joint venture between wireless broadband
company Clearwire and Sprint (S,
Fortune 500). Intel
was a huge shareholder in Clearwire. Over the next three months, Galleon
Tech funds bought and sold Clearwire shares on three occasions. Each time,
the Galleon Tech funds traded in advance of news reports relating to the
deal between Clearwire and Sprint, and shortly after calls between Goel and
Rajaratnam. Overall, the Galleon Tech funds realized gains of about $780,000
on their Clearwire trading between February and May 2008. On May 8, the
joint venture between Sprint and Clearwire was publicly announced.
As payback for Goel's
tips, Rajaratnam (or someone acting on his behalf) executed trades in Goel's
personal brokerage account based on inside information concerning Hilton and
PeopleSupport (the government notes that a Galleon director sits on the
PeopleSupport's board of directors though no charges of wrongdoing have been
brought against that person), which resulted in nearly $250,000 in profits
for Goel.
Shorting Akamai
Another hedge fund
executive, New Castle's Danielle Chiesi, is an acquaintance of Rajaratnam.
When an Akamai executive told her that the Internet infrastructure company
would trend lower in the company's second-quarter 2008 guidance to
investors, the government claims she passed along the information to
Rajaratnam. The consensus among Akamai's management was that Akamai's stock
price would decline in the wake of the lowered guidance scheduled for July
30.
Chiesi and the Akamai
source spoke multiple times between July 2 and July 24. Chiesi told what she
had learned from the Akamai source to her colleague at New Castle, Mark
Kurland. On July 25, several New Castle funds took short positions in Akamai
shares. The positions grew through July 30. Rajaratnam's Galleon funds also
built up a short position during the same period.
In its second-quarter
2008 earnings announcement on July 30, Akamai's results disappointed
investors. The stock fell nearly 20% following the announcement. New Castle
made $2.4 million. The Galleon Tech funds took home more than $3.2 million.
IBM knows Sun
In January 2009, IBM was conducting due diligence on Sun Microsystems in
preparation for an offer to buy it (Sun was ultimately bought by Oracle (ORCL,
Fortune 500)).
As part of that process, Sun opened its books to IBM, providing its
second-quarter 2009 results in advance of the scheduled Jan. 27
announcement.
Because much of Sun's
business is hardware, IBM's top hardware executive Robert Moffat was
involved in the evaluation of Sun. Moffat allegedly had access to Sun's
earnings results. He and Chiesi were also friends and contacted each other
repeatedly during January 2009. The frequency of contact between the two
increased just prior to the Sun earnings release, investigators say.
On Jan. 26, New Castle
began acquiring a substantial long position in Sun. On Jan. 27, after the
market close, Sun reported earnings that exceeded Wall Street's estimates,
posting a two-cent per-share profit when analysts had expected a loss. Sun
shares soared 21% on the news. New Castle made almost $1 million.
AMD gets out of manufacturing
On June 1, 2008, McKinsey
& Co. began advising Advanced Micro Devices over its negotiations with two
Abu Dhabi sovereign entities. One, a joint venture with the Abu Dhabi
government, Advanced Technology Investment Co., would take over AMD's chip
manufacturing. The other, an Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund, Mubadala
Investment Co., would provide a large investment in AMD (in the end, it
would total $314 million). According to the SEC, Anil Kumar was one of the
McKinsey team briefed on the negotiations. Kumar also knew Rajaratnam.
On Aug. 14, Kumar learned
that the two deals were finally getting done. The next day he told
Rajaratnam, investigators say. Almost immediately, Rajaratnam and Galleon
increased their long position in AMD by buying more than 2.5 million shares
in Galleon funds and continuing to build their long position until just
before the announcement of the AMD transactions. Rajaratnam and Galleon
bought 4 million AMD shares on Sept. 25 and 26, and 1.65 million more on
Oct. 3. On Oct. 8, the deals were announced publicly. AMD's stock price
increased by about 25%. All told, the value of Galleon's entire position in
AMD increased approximately $9.5 million in Oct. 6-7.
However, the allegedly ill-gotten gain was wiped out by the financial crisis
of the time. Because the Galleon Tech funds had accumulated much of their
AMD position beginning in August, before the crisis sent stock prices,
including AMD's, tumbling in September and October, the funds lost money on
the overall trade
The Deep Shah Insiders Leak at Moody's: What $10,000 Bought
Leaks such as this are probably impossible to stop
What disturbs me is that the Blackstone Group would exploit investors based up
such leaks
"Moody's Analysts Are Warned to Keep Secrets," by Serena Ing, The Wall
Street Journal, October 20, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125599951161895543.html?mod=article-outset-box
"Billionaire among 6 nabbed in inside trading
case Wall Street wake-up call: Hedge fund boss, 5 others charged in $25M-plus
insider trading case," by Larry Neumeister and Candice Choi, Yahoo
News, October 16, 2009 ---
Click Here
One of America's wealthiest
men was among six hedge fund managers and corporate executives arrested
Friday in a hedge fund insider trading case that authorities say generated
more than $25 million in illegal profits and was a wake-up call for Wall
Street.
Raj Rajaratnam, a portfolio
manager for Galleon Group, a hedge fund with up to $7 billion in assets
under management, was accused of conspiring with others to use insider
information to trade securities in several publicly traded companies,
including Google Inc.
U.S. Magistrate Judge
Douglas F. Eaton set bail at $100 million to be secured by $20 million in
collateral despite a request by prosecutors to deny bail. He also ordered
Rajaratnam, who has both U.S. and Sri Lankan citizenship, to stay within 110
miles of New York City.
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara
told a news conference it was the largest hedge fund case ever prosecuted
and marked the first use of court-authorized wiretaps to capture
conversations by suspects in an insider trading case.
He said the case should
cause financial professionals considering insider trades in the future to
wonder whether law enforcement is listening.
"Greed is not good," Bharara
said. "This case should be a wake-up call for Wall Street."
Joseph Demarest Jr., the
head of the New York FBI office, said it was clear that "the $20 million in
illicit profits come at the expense of the average public investor."
The Securities and Exchange
Commission, which brought separate civil charges, said the scheme generated
more than $25 million in illegal profits.
Robert Khuzami, director of
enforcement at the SEC, said the charges show Rajaratnam's "secret of
success was not genius trading strategies."
"He is not the master of the
universe. He is a master of the Rolodex," Khuzami said.
Galleon Group LLP said in a
statement it was shocked to learn of Rajaratnam's arrest at his apartment.
"We had no knowledge of the investigation before it was made public and we
intend to cooperate fully with the relevant authorities," the statement
said.
The firm added that Galleon
"continues to operate and is highly liquid."
Rajaratnam, 52, was ranked
No. 559 by Forbes magazine this year among the world's wealthiest
billionaires, with a $1.3 billion net worth.
According to the Federal
Election Commission, he is a generous contributor to Democratic candidates
and causes. The FEC said he made over $87,000 in contributions to President
Barack Obama's campaign, the Democratic National Committee and various
campaigns on behalf of Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer and
New Jersey U.S. Sen. Robert Menendez in the past five years. The Center for
Responsive Politics, a watchdog group, said he has given a total of $118,000
since 2004 -- all but one contribution, for $5,000, to Democrats.
The Associated Press has
learned that even before his arrest, Rajaratnam was under scrutiny for
helping bankroll Sri Lankan militants notorious for suicide bombings.
Papers filed in U.S.
District Court in Brooklyn allege that Rajaratnam worked closely with a
phony charity that channeled funds to the Tamil Tiger terrorist
organization. Those papers refer to him only as "Individual B." But U.S. law
enforcement and government officials familiar with the case have confirmed
that the individual is Rajaratnam.
At an initial court
appearance in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh
Klein sought detention for Rajaratnam, saying there was "a grave concern
about flight risk" given Rajaratnam's wealth and his frequent travels around
the world.
His lawyer, Jim Walden,
called his client a "citizen of the world," who has made more than $20
million in charitable donations in the last five years and had risen from
humble beginnings in the finance profession to oversee hedge funds
responsible for nearly $8 billion.
Walden promised "there's a
lot more to this case" and his client was ready to prepare for it from home.
Rajaratnam lives in a $10 million condominium with his wife of 20 years,
their three children and two elderly parents. Walden noted that many of his
employees were in court ready to sign a bail package on his behalf.
Rajaratnam -- born in Sri
Lanka and a graduate of University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of
Business -- has been described as a savvy manager of billions of dollars in
technology and health care hedge funds at Galleon, which he started in 1996.
The firm is based in New York City with offices in California, China, Taiwan
and India. He lives in New York.
According to a criminal
complaint filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, Rajaratnam obtained
insider information and then caused the Galleon Technology Funds to execute
trades that earned a profit of more than $12.7 million between January 2006
and July 2007. Other schemes garnered millions more and continued into this
year, authorities said.
Bharara said the defendants
benefited from tips about the earnings, earnings guidance and acquisition
plans of various companies. Sometimes, those who provided tips received
financial benefits and sometimes they just traded tips for more inside
information, he added.
The timing of the arrests
might be explained by a footnote in the complaint against Rajaratnam. In it,
an FBI agent said he had learned that Rajaratnam had been warned to be
careful and that Rajaratnam, in response, had said that a former employee of
the Galleon Group was likely to be wearing a "wire."
The agent said he learned
from federal authorities that Rajaratnam had a ticket to fly from Kennedy
International Airport to London on Friday and to return to New York from
Geneva, Switzerland next Thursday.
Also charged in the scheme
are Rajiv Goel, 51, of Los Altos, Calif., a director of strategic
investments at Intel Capital, the investment arm of Intel Corp., Anil Kumar,
51, of Santa Clara, Calif., a director at McKinsey & Co. Inc., a global
management consulting firm, and Robert Moffat, 53, of Ridgefield, Conn.,
senior vice president and group executive at International Business Machines
Corp.'s Systems and Technology Group.
The others charged in the
case were identified as Danielle Chiesi, 43, of New York City, and Mark
Kurland, 60, also of New York City.
According to court papers,
Chiesi worked for New Castle, the equity hedge fund group of Bear Stearns
Asset Management Inc. that had assets worth about $1 billion under
management. Kurland is a top executive at New Castle.
Kumar's lawyer, Isabelle
Kirshner, said of her client: "He's distraught." He was freed on $5 million
bail, secured in part by his $2.5 million California home.
Kerry Lawrence, an attorney
representing Moffat, said: "He's shocked by the charges."
Bail for Kurland was set at
$3 million while bail for Moffat and Chiesi was set at $2 million each.
Lawyers for Moffat and Chiesi said their clients will plead not guilty. The
law firm representing Kurland did not immediately return a phone call for
comment.
A message left at Goel's
residence was not immediately returned. He was released on bail after an
appearance in California.
A criminal complaint filed
in the case shows that an unidentified person involved in the insider
trading scheme began cooperating and authorities obtained wiretaps of
conversations between the defendants.
In one conversation about a
pending deal that was described in a criminal complaint, Chiesi is quoted as
saying: "I'm dead if this leaks. I really am. ... and my career is over.
I'll be like Martha (expletive) Stewart."
Stewart, the homemaking
maven, was convicted in 2004 of lying to the government about the sale of
her shares in a friend's company whose stock plummeted after a negative
public announcement. She served five months in prison and five months of
home confinement.
Prosecutors charged those
arrested Friday with conspiracy and securities fraud.
A separate criminal
complaint in the case said Chiesi and Moffat conspired to engage in insider
trading in the securities of International Business Machines Corp.
According to another
criminal complaint in the case, Chiesi and Rajaratnam were heard on a
government wiretap of a Sept. 26, 2008, phone conversation discussing
whether Chiesi's friend Moffat should move from IBM to a different
technology company to aid the scheme.
"Put him in some company
where we can trade well," Rajaratnam was quoted in the court papers as
saying.
The complaint said Chiesi
replied: "I know, I know. I'm thinking that too. Or just keep him at IBM,
you know, because this guy is giving me more information. ... I'd like to
keep him at IBM right now because that's a very powerful place for him. For
us, too."
According to the court
papers, Rajaratnam replied: "Only if he becomes CEO." And Chiesi was quoted
as replying: "Well, not really. I mean, come on. ... you know, we nailed
it."
Continued in article
"Arrest of Hedge Fund Chief Unsettles the
Industry," by Michael J. de la Merced and Zachery Kouwe, The New York Times,
October 18, 2009 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/business/19insider.html?_r=1
The firm made no secret that
its investors included technology executives. Among them was Anil Kumar, a
McKinsey director who did consulting work for Advanced Micro Devices and was
charged in the scheme. Another defendant, Rajiv Goel, is an Intel executive
who is accused of leaking information about the chip maker’s earnings and an
investment in Clearwire.
Prosecutors also say that a
Galleon executive on the board of PeopleSupport, an outsourcing company,
regularly tipped off Mr. Rajaratnam about merger negotiations with a
subsidiary of Essar Group of India. Regulatory filings by PeopleSupport last
year identified the director as Krish Panu, a former technology executive.
He was not charged on Friday.
Galleon has previously
been accused of wrongdoing by regulators. In 2005, it paid more than $2
million to settle an S.E.C. lawsuit claiming it had conducted an illegal
form of short-selling.
Bob Jensen's fraud updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Rotten to the Core ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Question
Do you ever get the feeling while we debate accounting theory and standards that
we're just fiddling while investors burn?
"Is stock market still a chump's game? Small
investors won't have a fair shot until a presumption of integrity is restored.
It's not clear that Obama's proposed remedy will resolve the conflicts," by
Eliot Spitzer, Microsoft News, August 19, 2009 ---
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/Extra/is-stock-market-still-a-chumps-game.aspx
Link forwarded by Steve Markoff
[smarkoff@KIMSTARR.ORG]
One of America's great
accomplishments in the last half-century was the so-called "democratization"
of the financial markets.
No longer just for the upper
crust, investing became a way for the burgeoning middle class to accumulate
wealth. Mutual funds exploded in size and number, 401k plans made savings
and investing easy, and the excitement of participating in the growth of our
economy gripped an ever larger percentage of the population.
Despite a backdrop of
doubters -- those who knowingly asserted that outperforming the average was
an impossibility for the small investor -- there was a growing consensus
that the rules were sufficient to protect the mom-and-pop investor from the
sharks that swam in the water.
That sense of fair play in
the market has been virtually destroyed by the bubble burstings and market
drops of the past few years.
Recent rebounds
notwithstanding, most people now are asking whether the system is
fundamentally rigged. It's not just that they have an understandable
aversion to losing their life savings when the market crashes; it's that
each of the scandals and crises has a common pattern: The small investor was
taken advantage of by the piranhas that hide in the rapidly moving currents.
And underlying this pattern is
a simple theme: conflicts of interest that violated the duty the market
players had to their supposed clients.
It is no wonder that
cynicism and anger have replaced what had been the joy of participation in
the capital markets.
Take a quick run through a
few of the scandals:
-
Analysts at major
investment banks promote stocks they know to be worthless, misleading
the investors who rely on their advice yet helping their
investment-banking colleagues generate fees and woo clients.
-
Ratings agencies slap AAA
ratings on debt they know to be dicey in order to appease the issuers --
who happen to pay the fees of the agencies, violating the rating
agency's duty to provide the marketplace with honest evaluations.
-
Executives receive outsized
and grotesque compensation packages -- the result of the perverted
recommendations of compensation consultants whose other business depends
upon the goodwill of the very CEOs whose pay they are opining upon, thus
violating the consultants' duty to the shareholders of the companies for
whom they are supposedly working.
-
Mutual funds charge
exorbitant fees that investors have to absorb -- fees that dramatically
reduce any possibility of outperforming the market and that are set by
captive boards of captive management companies, not one of which has
been replaced for inadequate performance, violating their duty to guard
the interests of the fund investors for whom they supposedly work.
-
"High-speed trading"
produces not only the reality of a two-tiered market but also the
probability of front-running -- that is, illegally trading on
information not yet widely known -- that eats into the possible profits
of the retail clients supposedly being served by these very same market
players, violating the obligation of the banks to get their clients
"best execution" without stepping between their customers and the best
available price.
-
AIG (AIG,
news,
msgs) is bailed out, costing taxpayers
tens of billions of dollars, even though (as we later learned) the big
guys knew that AIG was going down and were able to hedge and cover their
positions. Smaller investors are left holding the stock, and all of us
are left picking up the tab.
The unifying theme is
apparent: Access to information and advice, the very lifeblood of a level
playing field, is not where it needs to be. The small investor still doesn't
have a fair shot.
While there have been
case-specific remedies, the aggregate effect of all the scandals is still to
deny the market the most essential of ingredients: the presumption of
integrity.
The issue confronting those
who wish to solve this problem is that there really is no simple fix.
Bob Jensen's threads on the economic crisis
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm
Alpha Return on Investment ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_(investment)
What the professional investors don't tell
you ---
I downloaded this video ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/FinancialRounds.flv
From the Financial Rounds Blog on September 4,
2009 ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
When I teach
investments, there's always a section on market efficiency. A key point I
try to make is that any test of market efficiency suffers from the "joint
hypothesis" problem - that the test is not tests market efficiency, but also
assumes that you have the correct model for measuring the benchmark
risk-adjusted return.
In other words, you can't say that you have "alpha" (an abnormal return)
without correcting for risk.
Falkenblog makes exactly this point:
In my book
Finding Alpha I describe these strategies, as
they are built on the fact that alpha is a residual return, a
risk-adjusted return, and as 'risk' is not definable, this gives people
a lot of degrees of freedom. Further, it has long been the case that
successful people are good at doing one thing while saying they are
doing another.
Even better, he's got a pretty
good video on the topic (it also touches on other topics). Enjoy.
You can watch the video under September 4, 2009
at
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
I downloaded this video ---
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/FinancialRounds.flv
Bob Jensen's threads on Return on Investment
(ROI) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on market efficiency (EMH)
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH
Bob Jensen's investment helpers are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm#InvestmentHelpers
Instead of adding more regulating
agencies, I think we should simply make the FBI tougher on crime and the IRS
tougher on cheats
Our Main Financial Regulating Agency:
The SEC Screw Everybody Commission
One of the biggest regulation failures in history is the way the SEC failed to
seriously investigate Bernie Madoff's fund even after being warned by Wall
Street experts across six years before Bernie himself disclosed that he was
running a $65 billion Ponzi fund.
CBS Sixty Minutes on June 14, 2009 ran a
rerun that is devastatingly critical of the SEC. If you’ve not seen it, it may
still be available for free (for a short time only) at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5088137n&tag=contentMain;cbsCarousel
The title of the video is “The Man Who Would Be King.”
Between 2002 and 2008 Harry Markopolos
repeatedly told (with indisputable proof) the Securities and Exchange Commission
that Bernie Madoff's investment fund was a fraud. Markopolos was ignored and, as
a result, investors lost more and more billions of dollars. Steve Kroft reports.
Markoplos makes the SEC look truly
incompetent or outright conspiratorial in fraud.
I'm really surprised that the SEC
survived after Chris Cox messed it up so many things so badly.
As Far as Regulations Go
An annual
report issued by the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) shows that the U.S.
government imposed $1.17 trillion in new regulatory costs in 2008. That almost
equals the $1.2 trillion generated by individual income taxes, and amounts to
$3,849 for every American citizen. According the 2009 edition of Ten Thousand
Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State, the government
issued 3,830 new rules last year, and The Federal Register, where such rules are
listed, ballooned to a record 79,435 pages. “The costs of federal regulations
too often exceed the benefits, yet these regulations receive little official
scrutiny from Congress,” said CEI Vice President Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., who
wrote the report. “The U.S. economy lost value in 2008 for the first time since
1990,” Crews said. “Meanwhile, our federal government imposed a $1.17 trillion
‘hidden tax’ on Americans beyond the $3 trillion officially budgeted” through
the regulations.
Adam Brickley, "Government Implemented Thousands of New Regulations
Costing $1.17 Trillion in 2008," CNS News, June 12, 2009 ---
http://www.cnsnews.com/public/content/article.aspx?RsrcID=49487
Jensen Comment
I’m a long-time believer that industries being regulated end up controlling the
regulating agencies. The records of Alan Greenspan (FED) and the SEC from Arthur
Levitt to Chris Cox do absolutely nothing to change my belief ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
How do industries leverage the
regulatory agencies?
The primary control mechanism is to have high paying jobs waiting in industry
for regulators who play ball while they are still employed by the government. It
happens time and time again in the FPC, EPA, FDA, FAA, FTC, SEC, etc. Because so
many people work for the FBI and IRS, it's a little harder for industry to
manage those bureaucrats. Also the FBI and the IRS tend to focus on the worst of
the worst offenders whereas other agencies often deal with top management of the
largest companies in America.
Being Honest About Being
Dishonest
Democrats openly admit that most of the stimulus money is going to counties that
voted for Obama
A new study released by USA Today also finds that
counties that voted for Obama received about twice as much stimulus money per
capita as those that voted for McCain. "The stimulus bill is designed to help
those who have been hurt by the economic downturn.... Do you see disparity out
there in where the money is going? Certainly," a Democratic congressional
staffer knowledgeable about the process told FOXNews.com.
John Lott, "ANALYSIS: States Hit
Hardest by Recession Get Least Stimulus Money," Fox News, July 19,
2009---
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,533841,00.html
The Greatest Swindle in the History of the World
"The Greatest Swindle Ever Sold," by Andy Kroll,
The Nation, May 26, 2009 ---
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090608/kroll/print
The legislation's guidelines for crafting the
rescue plan were clear: the TARP should protect home values and consumer
savings, help citizens keep their homes and create jobs. Above all, with the
government poised to invest hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars in
various financial institutions, the legislation urged the bailout's
architects to maximize returns to the American people.
That $700 billion bailout has since
grown into a more than $12 trillion commitment by
the US government and the Federal Reserve. About
$1.1 trillion
of that is taxpayer money--the TARP money and an additional $400 billion
rescue of mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The TARP now
includes twelve separate programs, and recipients range from megabanks like
Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase to automakers Chrysler and General Motors.
Seven months in, the bailout's impact is
unclear. The Treasury Department has used the
recent "stress test" results it applied to
nineteen of the nation's largest banks to suggest that the worst might be
over; yet the
International Monetary Fund, as well as economists
like New York University professor and economist Nouriel Roubini and New
York Times columnist Paul Krugman
predict greater losses in US markets, rising unemployment and
generally tougher economic times ahead.
What cannot be disputed, however, is the
financial bailout's biggest loser: the American taxpayer. The US government,
led by the Treasury Department, has done little, if anything, to maximize
returns on its trillion-dollar, taxpayer-funded investment. So far, the
bailout has favored rescued financial institutions by
subsidizing their
losses to the tune of $356 billion,
shying away from much-needed management changes and--with the exception of
the automakers--letting companies take taxpayer money without a coherent
plan for how they might return to viability.
The bailout's perks have been no less
favorable for private investors who are now picking over the economy's
still-smoking rubble at the taxpayers' expense. The newer bailout programs
rolled out by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner give private equity firms,
hedge funds and other private investors significant leverage to buy "toxic"
or distressed assets, while leaving taxpayers stuck with the lion's share of
the risk and potential losses.
Given the lack of transparency and
accountability, don't expect taxpayers to be able to object too much. After
all, remarkably little is known about how TARP recipients have used the
government aid received. Nonetheless, recent government
reports,
Congressional testimony and
commentaries offer those patient enough to pore over hundreds of pages of
material glimpses of just how Wall Street friendly the bailout actually is.
Here, then, based on the most definitive data and analyses available, are
six of the most blatant and alarming ways taxpayers have been scammed by the
government's $1.1-trillion, publicly funded bailout.
1. By
overpaying for its TARP investments, the Treasury Department provided
bailout recipients with generous subsidies at the taxpayer's expense.
When the Treasury Department ditched its
initial plan to buy up "toxic" assets and instead invest directly in
financial institutions, then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr. assured
Americans that they'd get a fair deal. "This is an investment, not an
expenditure, and there is no reason to expect this program will cost
taxpayers anything," he
said in October 2008.
Yet the Congressional Oversight Panel
(COP), a five-person group tasked with ensuring that the Treasury Department
acts in the public's best interest, concluded in its
monthly report for February that
the department had significantly overpaid by tens of billions of dollars for
its investments. For the ten largest TARP investments made in 2008, totaling
$184.2 billion, Treasury received on average only $66 worth of assets for
every $100 invested. Based on that shortfall, the panel calculated that
Treasury had received only $176 billion in assets for its $254 billion
investment, leaving a $78 billion hole in taxpayer pockets.
Not all investors subsidized the
struggling banks so heavily while investing in them. The COP report notes
that private investors received much closer to fair market value in
investments made at the time of the early TARP transactions. When, for
instance,
Berkshire Hathaway invested $5 billion in Goldman Sachs
in September, the Omaha-based company received
securities worth $110 for each $100 invested. And when
Mitsubishi invested in Morgan Stanley
that same month, it received securities worth
$91 for every $100 invested.
As of May 15, according to the
Ethisphere TARP Index, which
tracks the government's bailout investments, its various investments had
depreciated in value by almost $147.7 billion. In other words, TARP's losses
come out to almost $1,300 per American taxpaying household.
2. As the
government has no real oversight over bailout funds, taxpayers remain in the
dark about how their money has been used and if it has made any difference.
While the Treasury Department can make
TARP recipients report on just how they spend their government bailout
funds, it has chosen not to do so. As a result, it's unclear whether
institutions receiving such funds are using that money to increase
lending--which would, in turn, boost the economy--or merely to fill in holes
in their balance sheets.
Neil M. Barofsky, the special inspector
general for TARP, summed the situation up this way in his office's April
quarterly report to Congress: "The American people have a right to know how
their tax dollars are being used, particularly as billions of dollars are
going to institutions for which banking is certainly not part of the
institution's core business and may be little more than a way to gain access
to the low-cost capital provided under TARP."
This lack of transparency makes the
bailout process highly susceptible to fraud and corruption.
Barofsky's report stated that twenty separate
criminal investigations were already underway involving corporate fraud,
insider trading and public corruption. He also
told the Financial Times
that his office was investigating whether banks manipulated their books to
secure bailout funds. "I hope we don't find a single bank that's cooked its
books to try to get money, but I don't think that's going to be the case."
Economist Dean Baker, co-director of the
Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, suggested to
TomDispatch in an interview that the opaque and complicated nature of the
bailout may not be entirely unintentional, given the difficulties it raises
for anyone wanting to follow the trail of taxpayer dollars from the
government to the banks. "[Government officials] see this all as a Three
Card Monte, moving everything around really quickly so the public won't
understand that this really is an elaborate way to subsidize the banks,"
Baker says, adding that the public "won't realize we gave money away to some
of the richest people."
3. The
bailout's newer programs heavily favor the private sector, giving investors
an opportunity to earn lucrative profits and leaving taxpayers with most of
the risk.
Under Treasury Secretary Geithner, the
Treasury Department has greatly expanded the financial bailout to troubling
new programs like the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) and the Term
Asset-Backed-Securities Loan Facility (TALF). The PPIP, for example,
encourages private investors to buy "toxic" or risky assets on the books of
struggling banks. Doing so, we're told, will get banks lending again because
the burdensome assets won't weigh them down. Unfortunately, the incentives
the Treasury Department is offering to get private investors to participate
are so generous that the government--and, by extension, American
taxpayers--are left with all the downside.
Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel-prize winning
economist,
described the PPIP program in a
New York Times op-ed this way:
Consider an asset that
has a 50-50 chance of being worth either zero or $200 in a year's time. The
average "value" of the asset is $100. Ignoring interest, this is what the
asset would sell for in a competitive market. It is what the asset is
'worth.' Under the plan by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, the
government would provide about 92 percent of the money to buy the asset but
would stand to receive only 50 percent of any gains, and would absorb almost
all of the losses. Some partnership!
Assume that one of the
public-private partnerships the Treasury has promised to create is willing
to pay $150 for the asset. That's 50 percent more than its true value, and
the bank is more than happy to sell. So the private partner puts up $12, and
the government supplies the rest--$12 in "equity" plus $126 in the form of a
guaranteed loan.
If, in a year's time,
it turns out that the true value of the asset is zero, the private partner
loses the $12, and the government loses $138. If the true value is $200, the
government and the private partner split the $74 that's left over after
paying back the $126 loan. In that rosy scenario, the private partner more
than triples his $12 investment. But the taxpayer, having risked $138, gains
a mere $37."
Worse still, the PPIP can be easily
manipulated for private gain. As economist
Jeffrey Sachs has described it, a
bank with worthless toxic assets on its books could actually set up its
own public-private fund to bid on those assets. Since no true bidder
would pay for a worthless asset, the bank's public-private fund would win
the bid, essentially using government money for the purchase. All the
public-private fund would then have to do is quietly declare bankruptcy and
disappear, leaving the bank to make off with the government money it
received. With the PPIP deals set to begin in the coming months, time will
tell whether private investors actually take advantage of the program's
flaws in this fashion.
The Treasury Department's TALF program
offers equally enticing possibilities for potential bailout profiteers,
providing investors with a chance to double, triple or even quadruple their
investments. And like the PPIP, if the deal goes bad, taxpayers absorb most
of the losses. "It beats any financing that the private sector could ever
come up with," a
Wall Street trader commented
in a recent Fortune magazine story. "I almost want to say it is
irresponsible."
4. The
government has no coherent plan for returning failing financial institutions
to profitability and maximizing returns on taxpayers' investments.
Compare the treatment of the auto industry
and the financial sector, and a troubling double standard emerges. As a
condition for taking bailout aid, the government required Chrysler and
General Motors to present
detailed plans on how the
companies would return to profitability. Yet the Treasury Department
attached minimal conditions to the billions injected into the largest
bailed-out financial institutions. Moreover, neither Geithner nor Lawrence
Summers, one of President Barack Obama's top economic advisors, nor the
president himself has articulated any substantive plan or vision for how the
bailout will help these institutions recover and, hopefully, maximize
taxpayers' investment returns.
The Congressional Oversight Panel
highlighted the absence of such a comprehensive plan in its
January report. Three months into
the bailout, the Treasury Department "has not yet explained its strategy,"
the report stated. "Treasury has identified its goals and announced its
programs, but it has not yet explained how the programs chosen constitute a
coherent plan to achieve those goals."
Today, the department's endgame for the
bailout still remains vague. Thomas Hoenig, president of the Federal Reserve
Bank of Kansas City,
wrote in the Financial Times
in May that the government's response to the financial meltdown has been "ad
hoc, resulting in inequitable outcomes among firms, creditors, and
investors." Rather than perpetually prop up banks with endless taxpayer
funds, Hoenig suggests, the government should allow banks to fail. Only
then, he believes, can crippled financial institutions and systems be fixed.
"Because we still have far to go in this crisis, there remains time to
define a clear process for resolving large institutional failure. Without
one, the consequences will involve a series of short-term events and far
more uncertainty for the global economy in the long run."
The healthier and more profitable bailout
recipients are once financial markets rebound, the more taxpayers will earn
on their investments. Without a plan, however, banks may limp back to
viability while taxpayers lose their investments or even absorb further
losses.
5. The
bailout's focus on Wall Street mega-banks ignores smaller banks serving
millions of American taxpayers that face an equally uncertain future.
The government may not have a long-term
strategy for its trillion-dollar bailout, but its guiding principle, however
misguided, is clear: what's good for Wall Street will be best for the rest
of the country.
On the day the mega-bank stress tests were
officially released, another set of stress-test results came out to much
less fanfare. In its
quarterly report on the health of individual banks and the banking industry
as a whole, Institutional Risk
Analytics (IRA), a respected financial services organization, found that the
stress levels among more than 7,500 FDIC-reporting banks nationwide had
risen dramatically. For 1,575 of the banks, net incomes had turned negative
due to decreased lending and less risk-taking.
The conclusion IRA drew was telling: "Our
overall observation is that US policy makers may very well have been
distracted by focusing on 19 large stress test banks designed to save Wall
Street and the world's central bank bondholders, this while a trend is
emerging of a going concern viability crash taking shape under the radar."
The report concluded with a question: "Has the time come to shift the policy
focus away from the things that we love, namely big zombie banks, to tackle
things that are truly hurting us?"
6. The bailout
encourages the very behaviors that created the economic crisis in the first
place instead of overhauling our broken financial system and helping the
individuals most affected by the crisis.
As Joseph Stiglitz explained in the New
York Times, one major cause of the economic crisis was bank
overleveraging. "Using relatively little capital of their own," he wrote,
banks "borrowed heavily to buy extremely risky real estate assets. In the
process, they used overly complex instruments like collateralized debt
obligations." Financial institutions engaged in overleveraging in pursuit of
the lucrative profits such deals promised--even if those profits came with
staggering levels of risk.
Sound familiar? It should, because in the
PPIP and TALF bailout programs the Treasury Department has essentially
replicated the very over-leveraged, risky, complex system that got us into
this mess in the first place: in other words, the government hopes to repair
our financial system by using the flawed practices that caused this crisis.
Then there are the institutions deemed
"too big to fail." These financial giants--among them AIG, Citigroup and
Bank of America-- have been kept afloat by billions of dollars in bottomless
bailout aid. Yet reinforcing the notion that any institution is "too big to
fail" is dangerous to the economy. When a company like AIG grows so large
that it becomes "too big to fail," the risk it carries is systemic, meaning
failure could drag down the entire economy. The government should force "too
big to fail" institutions to slim down to a safer, more modest size;
instead, the Treasury Department continues to subsidize these financial
giants, reinforcing their place in our economy.
Of even greater concern is the message the
bailout sends to banks and lenders--namely, that the risky investments that
crippled the economy are fair game in the future. After all, if banks fail
and teeter at the edge of collapse, the government promises to be there with
a taxpayer-funded, potentially profitable safety net.
The handling of the bailout makes at least
one thing clear, however. It's not your health that the government is
focused on, it's theirs-- the very banks and lenders whose convoluted
financial systems provided the underpinnings for staggering salaries and
bonuses, while bringing our economy to the brink of another Great
Depression.
Bob Jensen's threads how your money was put to word
(fraudulently) to pay for the mistakes of the so-called professionals of finance
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Bailout
Bob Jensen's threads on why the infamous "Bailout" won't
work ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#BailoutStupidity
"SEC Charges Four With Fraud," by
Kathy Shwiff, The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124751046687234157.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing
The Securities and Exchange
Commission charged Seattle securities lawyer David Otto, three other
individuals and two companies with conducting a fraudulent "pump-and-dump"
scheme in which they secretly unloaded more than $1 million in "penny
stocks" of a company touting a nonexistent antiaging product.
The complaint says the
defendants violated antifraud and other provisions of federal securities
laws. The SEC is seeking disgorgement and financial penalties.
The agency said misleading
news releases and Web profiles touting beverages and nutritional supplements
pushed the stock price of Seattle-based MitoPharm up more than four times to
above $2.30 although MitoPharm's products were in the developmental stage.
Two key products didn't exist, according to the complaint.
The SEC said Mr. Otto sold
his shares for more than $1 million while Houston-based stock promoter
Charles Bingham generated proceeds of $300,000 before heavy selling caused
the price to fall to a nickel by November 2007.
The SEC's complaint, filed
in federal court in Seattle, charges Mr. Otto, associate Todd Van Siclen of
Seattle, Mr. Bingham and his company, Wall Street PR Inc., along with
MitoPharm and its chief executive, Pak Peter Cheung of Vancouver.
Mr. Otto's attorney,
Jeff Coopersmith said Mr. Otto committed no intentional violation of
securities law. Mr. Bingham's attorney, Ronald Kaufman, said his client is
as much a victim as any other shareholder. Mr. Bingham said his firm lost
money on the work it did for MitoPharm, adding he had no way of knowing the
products, which were being manufactured in China, weren't as described. The
other defendants couldn't be reached for comment.
Bob Jensen's threads on securities frauds are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#SecuritiesFraud
"Insider Trading Inside the SEC," by Joe
Weisenthal, Business Insider, May 15, 2009 ---
http://www.businessinsider.com/insider-trading-at-the-sec-2009-5
Kotz, who told Congress last year he was examining
whether frequent trades by the pair broke agency
rules, referred the case to the U.S. Attorney’s
Office in Washington after finding evidence the bets
might amount to insider trading, he wrote in the
March 3 report released by Senator
Charles Grassley.
Both lawyers still work for the agency and denied
improper conduct.
The report faults the agency for inadequately
monitoring trades by employees and relying on an
“honor system.” The lawyers frequently discussed
stocks at work, traded in at least one company under
investigation and didn’t properly disclose some
transactions, it says. One lawyer made 247 trades in
the two years ending January 2008, and the other
made 14.
ead the whole thing >
Question
What are hedge funds, especially after Bernie Madoff made them so famous?
When people ask me this question, my initial
response is that a hedge fund no longer necessarily has anything to do with
financial risk hedging. Rather a hedge fund is merely a "private" investment
"club" that does not offer shares to the general public largely because it would
then subject itself to more SEC, stock exchange, and other regulators. Having
said this, it's pretty darn easy for anybody with sufficient funds to get into
such a "private" club. Minimum investments range from $10,000 to $1,000,000 or
higher.
Since Bernie Madoff made hedge funds so famous,
the public tends to think that a hedge fund is dangerous, fraudulent, and a back
street operation that does not play be the rules. Certainly hedge funds emerged
in part to avoid being regulated. Sometimes they are risky due to high leverage,
but some funds skillfully hedge to manage risk and are
much safer than mutual funds. For example, some hedge funds have shrewd
hedging strategies to control risk in interest rate and/or foreign currency
trading.
Most hedge funds are not fraudulent. In general,
however, it's "buyer beware" for hedge fund investors.
I would never invest in a hedge fund that is not
audited by a very reliable CPA auditing firm. Not all CPA auditing firms are
reliable (Bernie Madoff proved you can engage a fraudulent auditor operating out
of a one-room office). Hence, the first step in evaluating a hedge fund is to
investigate its auditor. The first step in evaluating an auditor is to determine
if the auditing firm is wealthy enough to be a serious third party in law suits
if the hedge fund goes belly up.
But the recent multimillion losses of Carnegie
Mellon, the University of Pittsburgh, and other university endowment funds that
invested in a verry fraudulent hedge fund purportedly audited by Deloitte
suggests that the size and reputation of the auditing firm is not, by itself,
sufficient protection against a criminal hedge fund (that was supposedly given a
clean opinion by Deloitte in financial reports circulated to the victims of the
fraud).
When learning about hedge funds, you may want to
begin at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_Fund
"What is a hedge fund and how is it different
from a mutual fund?" by Andy Samuels, Business and Finance 101
Examiner, June 10, 2009 ---
Click Here
Jim Mahar pointed out this link.
Having migrated away from
their namesake, hedge funds no longer focus primarily on “hedging”
(attempting to reduce risk) because hedge funds are now focused almost
blindly on one thing: returns.
Having been referred
to as “mutual funds for the super rich” by
investopedia.com, hedge funds are very similar to
mutual funds in that they pool money together from many investors. Hedge
funds, like
mutual funds, are also managed by a financial
professionals, but differ because they are geared toward wealthier
individuals.
Hedge funds, unlike
mutual funds, employ a wider array of ivesting techniques, which are
considered more aggresive. For example, hedge funds often use
leverage to amplify their returns (or losses if
things go wrong).
The other key
difference between hedge funds and mutual funds is the amount of regulation
involved. Hedge funds are relatively unregulated because investors in hedge
funds are assumed to be more sophisticated investors, who can both afford
and understand the potential losses. In fact, U.S. laws require that the
majority of investors in the fund are
accredited.
Most hedge funds draw in investors because of
the trustworthy reputations of the executives of the fund. Word-of-mouth praise
and affiliations are often the key to success. Bernie Madoff succeed in luring
customers based on two leading factors: (1) His esteemed reputation on
Wall Street and (2) His highly regarded connections in the Jewish community
where he drew in most of his victims.
A Bit of History
German Chancellor's Call for Global Regulations to Curb Hedge Funds
Germany and the United States are parting company
again, this time over Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's call for international
regulations to govern hedge funds. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow, speaking
here Thursday at the end of a five-country European tour, said the United
States opposed "heavy-handed" curbs on markets. He said that he was not
familiar with the German proposals, but left little doubt about how
Washington would react. "I think we ought to be very careful about
heavy-handed regulation of markets because it stymies financial innovation,"
Mr. Snow said after a news conference here to sum up his visit. Noting that
the Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed that hedge funds be
required to register themselves, he said he preferred the "light touch
rather than the heavy regulatory burden."
Mark Landler, "U.S. Balks at German Chancellor's Call for Global Regulations
to Curb Hedge Funds," The New York Times, June 17, 2005 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/17/business/worldbusiness/17hedge.html?
An investing balloon that will one day burst
The numbers are mind-boggling: 15 years ago,
hedge funds managed less than $40 billion. Today, the figure is
approaching $1 trillion. By contrast, assets in mutual funds grew at an
impressive but much slower rate, to $8.1 trillion from $1 trillion, during
the same period. The number of hedge fund firms has also grown - to 3,307
last year, up 74 percent from 1,903 in 1999. During the same period, the
number of funds created - a manager can start more than one fund at a time
- has surged 209 percent, with 1,406 funds introduced in 2004, according
to Hedge Fund Research, based in Chicago.
Jenny Anderson and Riva D. Atlas, "If I Only Had a Hedge Fund,"
The New York Times, The New York Times, March 27, 2005 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/business/yourmoney/27hedge.html
Jensen Comment: The name "hedge fund" seems to imply that
risk is hedged. Nothing could be further from the case. Hedge
funds do not have to hedge risks, Hedge funds should instead be
called private investment clubs. If structured in a certain way they
can avoid SEC oversight.
Remember how the Russian
space program worked in the 1960s? The only flights that got publicized
were the successful ones. Hedge funds are like that. The ones asking
for your money have terrific records. You don't hear about the ones that
blew up. That fact should strongly color your view of hedge funds with
terrific records.
Forbes, January 13, 2005 ---
http://snipurl.com/ForbesJan_13
US hedge funds prior to 2005 were exempted from
Securities and Exchange Commission reporting requirements, as well as from
regulatory restrictions concerning leverage or trading strategies. They
now must register with the SEC except under an enormous loophole for funds
that cannot liquidate in less than two years.
The Loophole: Locked-up
funds don't require oversight. That means more risk for investors.
"Hedge Funds Find an Escape Hatch," Business Week,
December 27, 2004, Page 51 ---
Securities
& Exchange Commission Chairman William H. Donaldson recently
accomplished a major feat when he got the agency to pass a controversial
rule forcing hedge fund advisers to register by 2006. Unfortunately,
just weeks after the SEC announced the new rule on Dec. 2, many hedge
fund managers have already figured out a simple way to bypass it.
The easy out is
right on page 23 of the new SEC rule: Any fund that requires investors
to commit their money for more than two years does not have to register
with the SEC. The SEC created that escape hatch to benefit
private-equity firms and venture capitalists, which typically make
long-term investments and have been involved in few SEC enforcement
actions. By contrast, hedge funds, some of which have recently been
charged with defrauding investors, typically have allowed investors to
remove their money at the end of every quarter. Now many are considering
taking advantage of the loophole by locking up customers' money for
years.
Bob Jensen's threads on frauds are linked at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
In particular see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Video 1: "Nobelist Daniel Kahneman On Behavioral Economics (Awesome)!"
Simoleon Sense, June 5, 2009 ---
http://www.simoleonsense.com/video-nobelist-daniel-kahneman-on-behavioral-economics-awesome/
Introduction (Via Fora.Tv)
Nobel
Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman addresses the
Georgetown class of 2009 about the merits of behavioral
economics.
He deconstructs the assumption that people always act
rationally, and explains how to promote rational
decisions in an irrational world.
Topics Covered:
1. The
Economic Definition Of Rationality
2.
Emphasis on Rationality in Modern Economic Theory
3. Examples of Irrational Behavior (watch this part)
4. How
to encourage rational decisions
Speaker Background (Via Fora.Tv)
Daniel
Kahneman - Daniel Kahneman is Eugene Higgins Professor
of Psychology and Professor of Public Affairs Emeritus
at Princeton University. He was educated at The Hebrew
University in Jerusalem and obtained his PhD in
Berkeley. He taught at The Hebrew University, at the
University of British Columbia and at Berkeley, and
joined the Princeton faculty in 1994, retiring in 2007.
He is best known for his contributions, with his late
colleague Amos Tversky, to the psychology of judgment
and decision making, which inspired the development of
behavioral economics in general, and of behavioral
finance in particular. This work earned Kahneman the
Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 and many other honors
Video 2: Nancy Etcoff is part of a new
vanguard of cognitive researchers asking: What makes us happy? Why do we like
beautiful things? And how on earth did we evolve that way?
Simoleon Sense, June 10, 2009
http://www.simoleonsense.com/science-of-happiness/
"Must Read: Why People Fall Victim To Scams,"
Simoleon Sense, March 18, 2009 ---
http://www.simoleonsense.com/must-read-why-people-fall-victim-to-scams/
The paper is at
http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/oft1070.pdf
A fraudulent market manipulation contributed to
the Wall Street meltdown
Phantom Shares and Market Manipulation (Bloomberg News
video on naked short selling) ---
http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4490541725797746038
Securities Fraud ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Securities_fraud
Securities fraud, also
known as investment fraud, is a practice in which
investors are deceived and manipulated, resulting in losses.[1]
Generally speaking, securities fraud consists of deceptive
practices in the stock and commodity markets, and occurs
when investors are enticed to part with their money based on
untrue statements.
Securities fraud frequently includes theft of
capital from investors and misstatements on a public
company's financial reports. The term also encompasses a
wide range of other actions, including insider trading.
Sometimes the losses caused
by securities fraud are difficult to quantify, but real. For
example, insider trading is believed to raise the cost of
capital for securities issuers, thus decreasing overall
economic growth.
This
white collar crime has become increasingly frequent as
the
Internet and
World Wide Web are giving criminals greater access to
prey. The trading volume in the
United States
securities and commodities markets, having grown
dramatically in the 1990s, has led to an increase in
fraud and misconduct by
investors,
executives,
shareholders, and other market participants.
Securities regulators and other prominent groups
estimate civil securities fraud totals approximately $40
billion per year. Fraudulent schemes perpetrated in the
securities and commodities markets can ultimately have a
devastating impact on the viability and operation of these
markets.
According to the
FBI, securities fraud includes false information on a
company's financial statement and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings; lying
to corporate auditors; insider trading; stock manipulation
schemes, and embezzlement by stockbrokers.
Overview ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Securities_fraud
-
1
Types of securities fraud
-
1.1
Internet fraud
-
1.2
Insider trading
-
1.3
Microcap fraud
-
1.4
Accountant fraud
-
1.5
Boiler rooms
-
2
Pervasiveness of
securities fraud
-
3
Characteristics of victims
and perpetrators
-
4
Other effects of
securities fraud
-
5
Related subjects
-
6
See also
-
7
References
|
The Way Financial
Media Fraud Works
Video from YouTube
(not sure how long it will be online)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dwUXx4DR0wo
From Jim Mahar's Blog on March 152, 2009 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
While
there was much hype in the days leading
up to the show, the actual interview was
pretty good. Jon Stewart vs Jim Cramer.
Here is the
link from The DailyShow
for the entire
episode.
It is also available (at least
temporarily) on
YouTube
Jon Stewart vs Jim
Cramer Interview Fight on Daily Show
---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LceizefhP4k
Some talking
points:
* Stewart's main point seems to be that
while Cramer and CNBC claim to be
looking out for investors, in actuality
they are are nothing more than
entertainment at best and accomplices at
worst.
* It is interesting to see the
discussion on Short Selling and the way
that Cramer (and by inference other
hedge fund managers) essentially lied to
drive the price down. I would have to
think the SEC might be interested in
this.
* Stewart maintains that the financial
media plays a role in governance. They
dropped the ball.
* Cramer was good in admitting that
success (year after year of 30% returns)
changes our view and we forget that
things go wrong.
* Line of the day from Stewart: "We are
both snake oil salesmen, but I let
people know I sell snake oil.:
* Line of the day from Cramer: "No one
should be spared in this environment."
The whole interview (unedited) is also
available. Here is the 3rd part:
Video
from YouTube (not sure how long it will
be online)
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dwUXx4DR0wo
Bernard Madoff, former Nasdaq Stock Market chairman and
founder of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, was arrested and charged
with securities fraud Thursday in what federal prosecutors called a Ponzi scheme
that could involve losses of more than $50 billion.
It is bigger than Enron, bigger than Boesky and bigger than
Tyco
"Madoff Scandal: 'Biggest Story of the Year'," Seeking
Alpha, December 12, 2008 ---
http://seekingalpha.com/article/110402-madoff-scandal-biggest-story-of-the-year?source=wildcard
According to
RealMoney.com columnist Doug Kass,
general partner and investment manager of hedge fund Seabreeze Partners
Short LP and Seabreeze Partners Short Offshore Fund, Ltd., today's
late-breaking report of an alleged massive fraud at a well known investment
firm could be "the biggest story of the year." In his view,
it is bigger than
Enron, bigger than Boesky and bigger than Tyco.
It attacks at the core of investor confidence -- because, if true,
and this could happen ... investors might think that almost anything
imaginable could happen to the money they have entrusted to their fiduciaries.
Here are some excerpts
from the Bloomberg report, entitled
"Madoff Charged in $50 Billion Fraud at Advisory Firm":
Bernard Madoff,
founder and president of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, a
market-maker for hedge funds and banks, was charged by federal
prosecutors in a $50 billion fraud at his advisory business.
Madoff, 70, was
arrested today at 8:30 a.m. by the FBI and appeared before U.S.
Magistrate Judge Douglas Eaton in Manhattan federal court. Charged
in a criminal complaint with a single count of securities fraud, he
was granted release on a $10 million bond guaranteed by his wife and
secured by his apartment. Madoff’s wife was present in the
courtroom.
"It’s all just
one big lie," Madoff told his employees on Dec. 10, according to a
statement by prosecutors. The firm, Madoff allegedly said, is
"basically, a giant Ponzi scheme." He was also sued by the
Securities and Exchange Commission.
Madoff’s New
York-based firm was the 23rd largest market maker on Nasdaq in
October, handling a daily average of about 50 million shares a day,
exchange data show. The firm specialized in handling orders from
online brokers in some of the largest U.S. companies, including
General Electric Co (GE). and Citigroup Inc. (C).
...
SEC Complaint
The SEC in its
complaint, also filed today in Manhattan federal court, accused
Madoff of a "multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme that he perpetrated
on advisory clients of his firm."
The SEC said it’s
seeking emergency relief for investors, including an asset freeze
and the appointment of a receiver for the firm. Ira Sorkin, another
defense lawyer for Madoff, couldn’t be immediately reached for
comment.
...
Madoff, who owned
more than 75 percent of his firm, and his brother Peter are the only
two individuals listed on regulatory records as "direct owners and
executive officers."
Peter Madoff was
a board member of the St. Louis brokerage firm A.G. Edwards Inc.
from 2001 through last year, when it was sold to Wachovia Corp (WB).
$17.1 Billion
The Madoff firm
had about $17.1 billion in assets under management as of Nov. 17,
according to NASD records. At least 50 percent of its clients were
hedge funds, and others included banks and wealthy individuals,
according to the records.
...
Madoff’s Web site
advertises the "high ethical standards" of the firm.
"In an era of
faceless organizations owned by other equally faceless
organizations, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC harks
back to an earlier era in the financial world: The owner’s name is
on the door," according to the Web site. "Clients know that Bernard
Madoff has a personal interest in maintaining the unblemished record
of value, fair-dealing, and high ethical standards that has always
been the firm’s hallmark."
...
"These guys were
one of the original, if not the original, third market makers," said
Joseph Saluzzi, the co-head of equity trading at Themis Trading LLC
in Chatham, New Jersey. "They had a great business and they were
good with their clients. They were around for a long time. He’s a
well-respected guy in the industry."
The case is U.S.
v. Madoff, 08-MAG-02735, U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of New York (Manhattan)
Continued in article
And here is the
SEC press release
Also see
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/
What was the auditing firm of Bernard Madoff
Investment Securities, the auditor who gave a clean opinion, that's been
insolvent for years?
Apparently, Mr Madoff said the business had been
insolvent for years and, from having $17 billion of assets under management at
the beginning of 2008, the SEC said: “It appears that virtually all assets of
the advisory business are gone”. It has now emerged that Friehling & Horowitz,
the auditor that signed off the annual financial statement for the investment
advisory business for 2006, is under investigation by the district attorney in
New York’s Rockland County, a northern suburb of New York City.
"The $50bn scam: How Bernard Madoff allegedly cheated investors," London
Times, December 15, 2008 ---
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article5345751.ece
It was at the Manhattan
apartment that Mr Madoff apparently confessed that the business was in fact
a “giant Ponzi scheme” and that the firm had been insolvent for years.
To cap it all, Mr Madoff
told his sons he was going to give himself up, but only after giving out the
$200 - $300 million money he had left to “employees, family and friends”.
All the company’s remaining
assets have now been frozen in the hope of repaying some of the companies,
individuals and charities that have been unfortunate enough to invest in the
business.
However, with the fraud
believed to exceed $50 billion, whatever recompense investors could receive
will be a drop in the ocean.
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Where were the auditors?
What surprised me is the size of this alleged fraud
"This is huge," said David Rosenfeld,
associate regional director of the SEC's New York Regional Office.
"This is a truly egregious fraud of immense proportions."
"Carnegie Mellon and Pitt Accuse 2 Investment Managers of
$114-Million Fraud," by Scott Carlson, Chronicle of Higher Education,
February 26, 2009 ---
Click Here
|
The University of Pittsburgh and
Carnegie Mellon University are suing two investment managers who
allegedly took $114-million from the institutions and spent it on
cars, horses, houses for their wives, and even teddy bears.
The two managers, Paul Greenwood and
Stephen Walsh, are said to have taken a total of more than
$500-million from the universities and other investors through their
company, Westridge Capital Management, and they have also been
charged with fraud by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The
universities named several associates of Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh
in the lawsuit.
According to the complaint, the
universities became alarmed after the National Futures Association,
a nonprofit organization that investigates member firms, tried to
audit Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh’s company. The association
determined that that Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh had taken hundreds
of millions in loans from the investment funds. On February 12 the
association suspended their membership after repeatedly trying, and
failing, to contact them.
That step spurred the universities
to try to locate their money. On February 18 they contacted the
Securities and Exchange Commission and sought an investigation.
According to their lawsuit, Carnegie Mellon had invested $49-million
and the University of Pittsburgh had invested $65-million.
Today’s
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette
listed some of the things that Mr.
Greenwood and Mr. Walsh had purchased with their investors’ money:
rare books, Steiff teddy bears at up to $80,000 each, a horse farm,
cars, and a $3-million residence for Mr. Walsh’s ex-wife.
Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh were
also handling money for retirement funds for teachers and public
employees in Iowa, North Dakota, and Sacramento County, California.
In the Post-Gazette, David Rosenfeld, an associate regional
director of the SEC’s New York Regional
Office, said the case represented “a truly egregious fraud of
immense proportions.”
Mr. Walsh, it appears, had ties to
another university as well. He is a member of the foundation board
at the State University of New York at Buffalo, from which he
graduated in 1966 with a political-science degree. In a written
statement, officials at Buffalo said that he had not been an active
board member for the past two years and that foundation policy
forbade investing university money with any member of the board. |
"Pitt, CMU money managers arrested in fraud FBI says they
misappropriated $500 million for lavish lifestyles," by Jonathon Silver,
Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 26, 2009 ---
http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09057/951834-85.stm
Two East Coast investment managers sued
for fraud by the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University
misappropriated more than $500 million of investors' money to hide losses
and fund a lavish lifestyle that included purchases of $80,000 collectible
teddy bears, horses and rare books, federal authorities said yesterday.
As Pitt and Carnegie Mellon were busy
trying to learn whether they will be able to recover any of their combined
$114 million in investments through Westridge Capital Management, the FBI
yesterday arrested the corporations' managers.
Paul Greenwood, 61, of North Salem, N.Y.,
and Stephen Walsh, 64, of Sands Point, N.Y., were charged in Manhattan -- by
the same office prosecuting the Bernard L. Madoff fraud case -- with
securities fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy.
Both men also were sued in civil court by
the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, which alleged that the partners misappropriated more
than $553 million and "fraudulently solicited" $1.3 billion from investors
since 1996.
The Accused
Paul Greenwood and Stephen Walsh are
accused of misappropriating millions from investors. Here is a look at some
of their biggest personal purchases:
• HOME: Mr. Greenwood, a horse
breeder, owned a horse farm in North Salem, N.Y., an affluent community
that counts David Letterman as a resident.
• BEARS: Mr. Greenwood owns as many as
1,350 Steiff toys, including teddy bears costing as much as $80,000.
• DIVORCE: Mr. Walsh bought his
ex-wife a $3 million condominium as part of their divorce settlement.
"This is huge," said David Rosenfeld,
associate regional director of the SEC's New York Regional Office. "This is
a truly egregious fraud of immense proportions."
Lawyers for the defendants either could
not be reached or had no comment.
Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh, longtime
associates and former co-owners of the New York Islanders hockey team, ran
Westridge Capital Management and a number of affiliated funds and entities.
As late as this month, the partners
appeared to be doing well. Mr. Greenwood told Pitt's assistant treasurer
Jan. 21 that they had $2.8 billion under management -- though that number is
now in question. And on Feb. 2, Pitt sent $5 million to be invested.
But in the course of less than three
weeks, Westridge's mammoth portfolio imploded in what federal authorities
called an investment scam meant to cover up trading losses and fund
extravagant purchases by the partners.
An audit launched Feb. 5 by the National
Futures Association proved key to uncovering the alleged deceit and
apparently became the linchpin of the case federal prosecutors are building.
That audit came about in an indirect way.
The association, a self-policing membership body, had taken action against a
New York financier. That led to a man named Jack Reynolds, a manager of the
Westridge Capital Management Fund in which CMU invested $49 million; and Mr.
Reynolds led to Westridge.
"We just said we better take a look at
Jack Reynolds and see what's happening, and that led us to Westridge and WCM,
so it was a domino effect," said Larry Dyekman, an association spokesman.
"We're just not sure we have the full picture yet."
Mr. Reynolds has not been charged by
federal authorities, but he is named as a defendant in the lawsuit that was
filed last week by Pitt and CMU.
"Greenwood and Walsh refused to answer any
of our questions about where the money was or how much there was," Mr.
Dyekman continued.
"This is still an ongoing investigation,
and we can't really say at this point with any finality how much has been
lost."
The federal criminal complaint traces the
alleged illegal activity to at least 1996.
FBI Special Agent James C. Barnacle Jr.
said Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh used "manipulative and deceptive devices,"
lied and withheld information as part of a scheme to defraud investors and
enrich themselves.
The complaint refers to a public
state-sponsored university called "Investor 1" whose details match those
given by Pitt in its lawsuit.
The SEC's Mr. Rosenfeld said the fraud
hinged not so much on the partners' investment strategy but on the fact that
they are believed to have simply spent other people's money on themselves.
"They took it. They promised the investors
it would be invested. And instead of doing that they misappropriated it for
their own use," Mr. Rosenfeld said.
Not only do federal authorities believe
Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh used new investors' funds to cover up prior
losses in a classic Ponzi scheme, they used more than $160 million for
personal expenses including:
• Rare books bought at auction;
• Steiff teddy bears purchased for up to
$80,000 at auction houses including Sotheby's;
• A horse farm;
• Cars;
• A residence for Mr. Walsh's ex-wife,
Janet Walsh, 53, of Florida, for at least $3 million;
• Money for Ms. Walsh and Mr. Greenwood's
wife, Robin Greenwood, 57, both of whom are defendants in the SEC suit. More
than $2 million was allegedly wired to their personal accounts by an unnamed
employee of the partners.
"Defendants treated investor money -- some
of which came from a public pension fund -- as their own piggy bank to
lavish themselves with expensive gifts," said Stephen J. Obie, the Commodity
Futures Trading Commission's acting director of enforcement.
It is not clear how Pitt and CMU got
involved with Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh. But there is at least one
connection involving academia. The commission suit said Mr. Walsh
represented to potential investors that he was a member of the University at
Buffalo Foundation board and served on its investment committee.
Mr. Walsh is a 1966 graduate of the State
University of New York at Buffalo where he majored in political science.
He was a trustee of the University at
Buffalo Foundation, but the foundation did not have any investments in
Westridge or related firms.
Universities, charitable organizations,
retirement and pension funds are among the investors who have done business
with Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh.
Among those investors are the Sacramento
County Employees' Retirement System, the Iowa Public Employees' Retirement
System and the North Dakota Retirement and Investment Office, which handles
$4 billion in investments for teachers and public employees.
The North Dakota fund received about $20
million back from Westridge Capital Management, but has an undetermined
amount still out in the market, said Steve Cochrane, executive director.
Mr. Cochrane said Westridge Capital was
cooperative in returning what money it could by closing out their position
and sending them the money.
"I dealt with them exclusively all these
years," Mr. Cochrane said.
"They always seemed to be upfront and
honest. I think they're as stunned and as victimized as we are, is my
guess."
He said Westridge Capital had done an
excellent job over the years.
The November financial statement indicated
that the one-year return from Westridge Capital was a negative 11.87
percent, but the five-year annualized rate of return was a positive 8.36
percent.
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Bernard Madoff's Gangster Family Seems to Have Been Overlooked by
Investors
"Pretty v. Ugly at the University," University Diaries Blog, Inside Higher
Ed, February 24, 2009 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/university_diaries
Bernard Madoff is a
classic Mafia-style gangster. He comes from gangsters - his mother was a
crook. Investigators are looking into his
father-in-law. A lot of his friends and investors
are crooks. He was born a crook, has always been a crook.
"The FBI believes
Madoff may never have properly invested any of the money entrusted to him,"
writes Stephen Foley in
The Independent. That's <em>never</em>. Madoff is
in his seventies.
Psychopathically evil,
Madoff makes an exception - again, Mafia-style - for his closest family and
friends. His last act before turning himself in was writing big checks to
the inner circle.
Tomorrow,
Harry Markopolos will tell Congress how easy it
was, ten years ago, for him to prove that Madoff was a crook, and how
difficult it was for him to convince the SEC, or anyone else, of this
obvious truth.
An ugly story, isn't
it.... Ugh. Let us turn to the verdant paths of Brandeis University, and
walk to the door of
its art museum, where
pretty canvases hang on the walls and rekindle our sense of the beauty of
the world and the goodness of mankind.
Yet all of this beauty will
soon be shuttered, because that ugly world is all over Brandeis. It's all
over a number of other universities, too -- Yeshiva, Bard, NYU, all the
schools who loved charitable Bernie Madoff and his charitable friends.
Madoff, after all, was a
philanthropist.
Not that he, as the word
suggests, loves people. He hates people.
But he (and
benefactors like
Carl Shapiro, his closest business associate) gave
lots of money to pretty places like universities, places that stand for
love, not hate, and beauty, not ugliness. Why did he do that?
For the same reason many
other crooks do it. To get their names on buildings, and, much more
importantly, to launder their images. Madoff's been cleaning himself up for
public consumption all his life, and there's nothing like gifts to
universities to do oneself up <em>real</em> good.
University Diaries has
covered, over the years, many amusing stories of universities using the
latest in stone-blasting technology to get the names of crooks off of
buildings the crooks endowed. At any given time, some university in this
country is using power tools on its walls in a desperate effort to
dissociate itself from scum. Here's
the latest case. One of the most amusing was
Dennis Kozlowski at Seton Hall.
Even if it doesn't
call for power tools, the problem of taking crooks' money can be just as
troublesome, as with the University of Missouri-Columbia's
Kenneth L. Lay Chair in International Economics.
Sometimes things call for
quick-action internet prowess. Recall how, deep in the pre-exposure night,
Yeshiva University deleted from its webpages the once-sainted names of
Bernard Madoff and his partner, Ezra Merkin.
Our wretched economy will
continue to reveal the reputation-laundering enterprise some of our
universities have been running.
Just as every Madoff
associate or victim claims to be a deceived innocent, so these campuses will
tell us they never suspected a thing.
The farce would be fun to
watch if it weren't so incredibly destructive.
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on security frauds are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
"Argentina Has a Bond It Wants to Sell You:
Deadbeat nations should be kept out of U.S. capital markets," by Mark Shapiro
and Nancy Soderberg, The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123569777717089081.html?mod=djemEditorialPage
In 2001, Argentina defaulted on $81
billion in sovereign bonds. Four years later it presented a unilateral,
nonnegotiable restructuring plan worth about 25 cents on the dollar. When
half of its foreign lenders said "no thanks," Buenos Aires repudiated their
claims.
Since Argentina had earlier agreed to
waive sovereign immunity and accept the jurisdiction and judgments of New
York courts, more than 160 lawsuits were filed. But the governments of
Nestor Kirchner and of his wife and successor, Christina Fernandez, have
ignored numerous court judgments. Judge Thomas Griesa has repeatedly
condemned their conduct, noting in 2005 that "I have not heard one single
word from the [Argentine] Republic except ways to avoid paying those
judgments." Nothing has changed since then.
If Argentina gets away with its misdeeds
-- offering terrible terms for restructuring its debt and then repudiating
its obligations to those who object -- the likelihood of additional defaults
could increase substantially. If that occurs, it would inflict another
serious blow to a global financial system in crisis.
Already, Buenos Aires's scofflaw behavior
is being imitated. Citing Argentina's example, Ecuador recently defaulted on
sovereign debts issued in the U.S., though it has the means to meet its
obligations. The default drove down the market price of the bonds. The
Correa government then entered the American secondary market with a massive
repurchase program, scooping up much of its own debt at a very steep
discount.
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Question
Is the history of Arthur Levitt Jr. at the SEC so pure?
He does charge out at $900 per hour ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Levitt
When he was Director of the SEC, Arthur Levitt
and his Chief SEC Accountant gave the large auditing firms considerable trouble
(unlike SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt). But to my knowledge Levitt was pretty much
hands off on free-wheeling Wall Street financial institutions and is now
probably given too much credence in terms of cleaning up the mess after Chris
Cox was the disastrous head of the SEC ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#SEC
Leavitt was easily duped by his close friend
Bernie Madoff, probably not separating church and state when Levitt was head of
the SEC and Madoff was committing fraud (for over 28 years of phony stock trades
in his investment fund that Levitt, Pitt, and Cox left unregulated to the point
of not even requiring audits by registered auditing firms).
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting
Weekly Review on January 23, 2009
Good and Bad Ideas on How to Thwart
Another Madoff
by Kevin Rosenberg, Paul L
Comstock, Eunice Bet-Mansour, Ph.D., and Porter Landreth
The Wall Street Journal
Jan 10, 2009
Click here to view the full article
on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Auditing, Fraudulent Financial Reporting, SEC,
Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: These letters to the editor express a range of
opinions on another op-ed piece by Arthur Levitt Jr., former
Chairman of the SEC. In Levitt's January 5 Op-Ed piece, he
stated that he "never saw an instance where credible information
about misconduct was not followed up by the agency."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Understanding the role of the SEC and
the skill set needed to fulfill its mission are the primary uses
of this article.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) Who is Arthur Levitt? Summarize his
recent opinion-page piece that led to these letters in response.
2. (Introductory) What concerns the CPA, Kevin
Rosenberg, who describes the types of audit and accounting firms
associated with recent financial reporting frauds and failures?
3. (Advanced) One op-ed writer, Paul L. Comstock,
argues that "the SEC can only do so much to protect without
paralyzing our capital markets." But does Eunice Bet-Mansour,
Ph.D., necessarily call for a greater quantity of regulatory
steps to avoid another Ponzi scheme or fraud such as that
committed by Mr. Madoff?
4. (Advanced) What level of skill set does Dr. Bet-Mansour
say is needed among SEC staffers? What level of education
provides this analytical skill set? In your answer, consider the
level of education held by Harry Markopoulos.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED ARTICLES:
How the SEC Can Prevent More
Madoffs
by Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Jan 05, 2009
Online Exclusive
|
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Madoff Chasers Dug for Years, to No Avail
by Kara
Scannell
Jan 05, 2009
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Auditing,
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, SEC, Securities and Exchange
Commission
SUMMARY: "I
think the reality is the [SEC] enforcement program needs some
systematic review at this point, and it is not a review which
should start with judgments," said, Joel Seligman, president of
the University of Rochester, in the related article. "You want
to know what went wrong." The main article describes a series of
detailed investigations into Madoff investment management
practices that failed to uncover the biggest Ponzi scheme in
history.
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Auditing classes can use the article to discuss
fraud investigations versus overall financial statement audits,
evidential matter, and the importance of overall financial
statement analysis to assess reasonability of reported results.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What auditing expertise is needed by
Securities and Exchange Commission staff members to properly
perform their functions related to the matter of Bernard L.
Madoff Securities Investment LLC?
2. (Introductory) Author of the lead article Kara
Scannell writes that "regulatory gaps abound in the paper trail
generated by the SEC's scrutiny of Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities." What were the regulatory gaps?
3. (Introductory) What reasonableness test was used by
Harry Markopolous to make the assessment that "Madoff Securities
is the world's largest Ponzi Scheme," as he wrote in a letter to
the SEC. Did the SEC follow up on this accusation?
4. (Advanced) One accusation by an outsider that the
SEC did specifically pursue, according to the article, was to
determine whether Mr. Madoff was "front-running" for favored
clients. Design an audit test to assess that question, including
in your answer a definition of the term.
5. (Advanced) Review the audit test drafted in answer
to question 4. Is it likely that your test would uncover the
type of fraud Madoff committed? Why or why not?
6. (Advanced) What audit steps did the SEC undertake in
its review of January 2005 customer accounts, according to the
article? What audit steps did they possibly overlook? How might
these steps have uncovered fraud?
7. (Introductory) In 1992, the SEC's enforcement
division sued two Florida accountants for selling unregistered
investment securities managed by Madoff. "With no investors
found to be harmed, the SEC concluded there was no fraud." Why
were the investors not shown to be harmed?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
SEC Nominee to Face Tough Questions at Confirmation Hearing
by Sarah N. Lynch
Jan 07, 2009
Online Exclusive
|
"Madoff Chasers Dug for Years, to No Avail: Regulators
Probed at Least 8 Times Over 16 Years; Congress Starts Review of SEC Today," by
Kara Scannell, The Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2008 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123111743915052731.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities
LLC was examined at least eight times in 16 years by the Securities and
Exchange Commission and other regulators, who often came armed with
suspicions.
SEC officials followed up on emails from a
New York hedge fund that described Bernard Madoff's business practices as
"highly unusual." The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the
industry-run watchdog for brokerage firms, reported in 2007 that parts of
the firm appeared to have no customers.
Mr. Madoff was interviewed at least twice
by the SEC. But regulators never came close to uncovering the alleged $50
billion Ponzi scheme that investigators now believe began in the 1970s.
The serial regulatory failures will be on
display Monday when Congress holds a hearing to probe why the alleged fraud
went undetected. Among the key witnesses is SEC Inspector General David Kotz,
who was asked last month by the agency's chairman, Christopher Cox, to
investigate the mess.
The situation is even more awkward because
SEC examiners seemed to be looking in the right places, yet still were
unable to unmask the alleged scheme. For example, investigators were led
astray by concerns that Mr. Madoff, now under house arrest, was placing
orders for favored clients ahead of others to get a better price, a practice
known as "front running." Front running isn't thought to have played a role
in the firm's collapse.
Concern that the SEC lacks the expertise
to keep up with fraudsters is the latest criticism of the agency, which saw
the Wall Street investment banks it oversees get pummeled or vanish
altogether in 2008. With Congress likely to take a hard look at how to
structure oversight of financial markets, the SEC is struggling to maintain
its clout.
The failure to stop Mr. Madoff also is an
embarrassment for Mary Schapiro, the Finra chief who has been nominated by
President-elect Barack Obama as the next SEC chairman. Finra was involved in
several investigations of Mr. Madoff's firm, concluding in 2007 that it
violated technical rules and failed to report certain transactions in a
timely way.
Ms. Schapiro declined to comment. Mr. Cox
has previously acknowledged mistakes by the SEC. The agency declined to
comment.
Regulatory gaps abound in the paper trail
generated by the SEC's scrutiny of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities,
according to a review of the documents. Many of the details haven't been
reported previously.
For years, Mr. Madoff told regulators he
wasn't running an investment-advisory business. By saying he instead managed
accounts for hedge funds, Mr. Madoff was able to avoid regular reviews of
his advisory business.
In 1992, Mr. Madoff had a brush with the
SEC's enforcement division, which had sued two Florida accountants for
selling unregistered securities that paid returns of 13.5% to 20%. The SEC
believed at the time it had uncovered a $440 million fraud.
"We went into this thinking it could be a
major catastrophe," Richard Walker, then-chief of the SEC's New York office,
told The Wall Street Journal at the time.
The SEC probe turned up money that had
been managed by Mr. Madoff. He said he didn't know the money had been raised
illegally.
With no investors found to be harmed, the
SEC concluded there was no fraud. But the scheme indicated Mr. Madoff was
managing money on behalf of other people.
In 1999 and 2000, the SEC sent examiners
into Mr. Madoff's firm to review its trading practices. SEC officials
worried the firm wasn't properly displaying orders to others in the market,
violating a trading rule. In response, Mr. Madoff outlined new procedures to
address the findings.
Continued in article
A Tale of Four Investors
Forwarded by Dennis Beresford
Four investors made different
investment decisions 10 years ago. Investor one was extremely risk
averse so he put $1 million in a safe deposit box. Today he still
has $1 million. Investor two was a bit less risk averse so she
bought $1 million of 6% Fanny Mae Preferred. She put the $15,000
she received in dividends each quarter in a safe deposit box. After
receiving 40 dividends, she recently sold her investment for $20,000
so she now has $620,000 in her safe deposit box. Investor three was
less risk averse so he bought and held a $1 million well diversified
U.S. stock portfolio which he recently sold for $1 million, putting
the $1 million in his safe deposit box. Investor four had a friend
who knew someone who was able to invest her $1 million with Bernie
Madoff. Like clockwork, she received a $10,000 check each and every
month for 120 months. She cashed all the checks, putting the money
in her safe deposit box. She was outraged to learn that she will no
longer receive her monthly checks. Even worse, she lost all her
principal. She only has $1,200,000 in her safe deposit box. She
hopes the government will bail her out.
Lawrence D. Brown J. Mack Robinson Distinguished Professor of Accounting Georgia State University December 18, 2008
Robert Edward Rubin (born August 29, 1938)
is Director and Senior Counselor of Citigroup where he was the architect of
Citigroup's strategy of taking on more risk in debt markets, which by the end of
2008 led the firm to the brink of collapse and an eventual government rescue
[1]. From November to December 2007, he served temporarily as Chairman of
Citigroup.[2][3] From 1999 to present, he earned $115 million in pay at
Citigroup[4]. He served as the 70th United States Secretary of the Treasury
during both the first and second Clinton administrations.
Wikipedia ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Rubin
A new Citigroup scandal is engulfing
Robert Rubin and his former disciple Chuck Prince for their roles in an alleged
Ponzi-style scheme that's now choking world banking. Director Rubin and ousted
CEO Prince - and their lieutenants over the past five years - are named in a
federal lawsuit for an alleged complex cover-up of toxic securities that spread
across the globe, wiping out trillions of dollars in their destructive paths.
Paul Tharp, "'PONZI SCHEME' AT CITI SUIT SLAMS RUBIN," The New York Post,
December 5, 2008 ---
http://www.nypost.com/seven/12042008/business/ponzi_scheme_at_citi_142511.htm
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Why Madoff's Hedge Fund Could Be Audited by Non-registered
Auditors
We all know that Bernie Madoff's brokerage firm was
audited by an obscure 3-person accounting firm that is not registered with the
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board. This was permitted because the SEC
exempted privately owned brokerage firms from the SOX requirement that firms are
audited by registered accountants. Floyd Norris reports, in today's NY Times,
that the SEC has now quietly rescinded that exemption. As a result, firms that
audit broker-dealers for fiscal years that end December 2008 or later will have
to be registered. However, under another SOX provision, PCAOB is allowed to
inspect only audits of publicly held companies. NYTimes,
Oversight for Auditor of Madoff.
"Why an Obscure Accounting Firm Could Audit Madoff's Records," Securities Law
Professor Blog, January 9, 2008 ---
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/
"SEC Goes After Another
Ponzi Scheme," Securities Law Professor Blog,
January 8, 2009 ---
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/
Another Ponzi scheme -- is the SEC seeking
atonement for failure to uncover the Madoff fraud?
The SEC announced today that it has filed
an emergency civil enforcement action to
halt an ongoing affinity fraud and Ponzi scheme orchestrated by
Buffalo-based Gen-See Capital
Corporation a/k/a Gen Unlimited ("Gen-See") and its owner and president,
Richard S. Piccoli. According to the Commission's complaint, the defendants
have raised millions of dollars from investors by promising steady,
"guaranteed" returns, ranging from 7.1% to 8.3% per annum, and no fees or
commissions. In November 2008 alone, the defendants raised over $500,000
from investors. The defendants have relied heavily on advertisements in
newsletters published by churches and dioceses. The complaint further
alleges that the defendants told investors that their money was invested in
"high quality" residential mortgages that the defendants were able to
purchase at a discount. The defendants did not invest the funds as promised,
but instead used new investor funds to make payments to earlier investors.
In addition, the complaint alleges that Gen-See's offering and sale of
securities to the public was not registered with the Commission.
The Commission seeks, among other
emergency relief, a temporary restraining order (i) enjoining the defendants
from future violations of the federal securities laws; (ii) freezing the
defendants' assets; (iii) directing the defendants to provide verified
accountings; and (iv) prohibiting the destruction, concealment or alteration
of documents. In addition to this emergency relief, the Commission seeks
preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and civil money penalties
against the defendants as well as disgorgement by the defendants of their
ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest.
"SEC Takes Action to Halt
Ponzi Scheme,"
Securities Law Professor Blog, January 7, 2009 ---
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/
The SEC filed an emergency action to halt
an estimated $50 million Ponzi scheme conducted by Joseph S.
Forte (“Forte”) and Joseph Forte,
L.P. (“Forte LP”), of Broomall, Pennsylvania. According to the Commission’s
complaint, from at least February 1995 to the present, Forte has been
operating a Ponzi scheme in which he fraudulently obtained approximately $50
million from as many as 80 investors through the sale of securities in the
form of limited partnership interests. The federal district court for the
Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an order granting a preliminary
injunction, freezing assets, compelling an accounting, and imposing other
emergency relief. Without admitting or denying the allegations in the
Commission’s complaint, Forte and Forte LP consented to the entry of the
order.
The Commission’s complaint alleges that in
late December 2008, Forte admitted to federal authorities that from at least
1995 through December 2008, he had been conducting a Ponzi scheme. Forte,
who has never been registered with the Commission in any capacity, told
investors that he would invest the limited partnership funds in a securities
futures trading account in the name of Forte LP that would trade in futures
contracts, including S&P 500 stock index futures (“trading program”). Forte
has admitted that he misrepresented and falsified Forte LP’s trading
performance from the very first quarter. From 1995 through September 30,
2008, the defendants reported to investors annual returns ranging from
18.52% to as high as 37.96%. However, from January 1998 through October
2008, the Forte LP trading account had net trading losses of approximately
$3.3 million.
Greenspan's Disastrous Agency Problem
In political science and economics, the principal-agent problem or agency
dilemma treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and
asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent. Various mechanisms may
be used to try to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal,
such as piece rates/commissions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, performance
measurement (including financial statements), the agent posting a bond, or fear
of firing. The principal-agent problem is found in most employer/employee
relationships, for example, when stockholders hire top executives of
corporations. Numerous studies in political science have noted the problems
inherent in the delegation of legislative authority to bureaucratic agencies.
The implementation of legislation (such as laws and executive directives) is
open to bureaucratic interpretation, creating opportunities and incentives for
the bureaucrat-as-agent to deviate from the intentions or preferences of the
legislators. Variance in the intensity of legislative oversight also serves to
increase principal-agent problems in implementing legislative preferences.
Wikipedia ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_theory
Not only have individual
financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk
factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient.
Alan Greenspan in 2004 as quoted by Peter S.
Goodman, Taking a Good Look at the Greenspan Legacy," The New York Times,
October 8, 2008 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/economy/09greenspan.html?em
The problem is not that the
contracts failed, he says. Rather, the people using them got greedy. A lack
of integrity spawned the crisis, he argued in a speech a week ago at
Georgetown University, intimating that those peddling derivatives were not
as reliable as “the pharmacist who fills the prescription ordered by our
physician.”
But others hold a starkly
different view of how global markets unwound, and the role that Mr.
Greenspan played in setting up this unrest.
“Clearly, derivatives are a
centerpiece of the crisis, and he was the leading proponent of the
deregulation of derivatives,” said Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the
University of San Diego and an expert on financial regulation.
The derivatives market is
$531 trillion, up from $106 trillion in 2002 and a relative pittance just
two decades ago. Theoretically intended to limit risk and ward off financial
problems, the contracts instead have stoked uncertainty and actually spread
risk amid doubts about how companies value them.
If Mr. Greenspan had acted
differently during his tenure as Federal Reserve chairman from 1987 to 2006,
many economists say, the current crisis might have been averted or muted.
Over the years, Mr. Greenspan
helped enable an ambitious American experiment in letting market forces run
free. Now, the nation is confronting the consequences.
Derivatives were created to
soften — or in the argot of Wall Street, “hedge” — investment losses. For
example, some of the contracts protect debt holders against losses on
mortgage securities. (Their name comes from the fact that their value
“derives” from underlying assets like stocks, bonds and commodities.) Many
individuals own a common derivative: the insurance contract on their homes.
On a grander scale, such
contracts allow financial services firms and corporations to take more
complex risks that they might otherwise avoid — for example, issuing more
mortgages or corporate debt. And the contracts can be traded, further
limiting risk but also increasing the number of parties exposed if problems
occur.
Throughout the 1990s, some
argued that derivatives had become so vast, intertwined and inscrutable that
they required federal oversight to protect the financial system. In meetings
with federal officials, celebrated appearances on Capitol Hill and heavily
attended speeches, Mr. Greenspan banked on the good will of Wall Street to
self-regulate as he fended off restrictions.
Ever since housing began to
collapse, Mr. Greenspan’s record has been up for revision. Economists from
across the ideological spectrum have criticized his decision to let the
nation’s real estate market continue to boom with cheap credit, courtesy of
low interest rates, rather than snuffing out price increases with higher
rates. Others have criticized Mr. Greenspan for not disciplining
institutions that lent indiscriminately.
But whatever history ends up
saying about those decisions, Mr. Greenspan’s legacy may ultimately rest on
a more deeply embedded and much less scrutinized phenomenon: the spectacular
boom and calamitous bust in derivatives trading.
Bob Jensen's timeline of derivatives
scandals and the evolution of accounting standards for accounting for
derivatives financial instruments can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm#DerivativesFrauds
"‘I made a mistake,’ admits
Greenspan," by Alan Beattie and James Politi, Financial Times, October
23, 2008 ---
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aee9e3a2-a11f-11dd-82fd-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1
“I made a
mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organisations, specifically
banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protecting their
own shareholders,” he said.
In the second of two days of
tense hearings on Capitol Hill, Henry Waxman, chairman of the House of
Representatives, clashed with current and former regulators and with
Republicans on his own committee over blame for the financial crisis.
Mr Waxman said Mr Greenspan’s
Federal Reserve – along with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the
US Treasury – had propagated “the prevailing attitude in Washington... that
the market always knows best.”
Mr Waxman blamed the Fed for
failing to curb aggressive lending practices, the SEC for allowing credit
rating agencies to operate under lax standards and the Treasury for opposing
“responsible oversight” of financial derivatives.
Christopher Cox, chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Commission, defended himself, saying that
virtually no one had foreseen the meltdown of the mortgage market, or the
inadequacy of banking capital standards in preventing the collapse of
institutions such as Bear Stearns.
Mr Waxman accused the SEC
chairman of being wise after the event. “Mr Cox has come in with a long list
of regulations he wants... But the reality is, Mr Cox, you weren’t doing
that beforehand.”
Mr Cox blamed the fact that
congressional responsibility was divided between the banking and financial
services committees, which regulate banking, insurance and securities, and
the agriculture committees, which regulate futures.
“This jurisdictional split
threatens to for ever stand in the way of rationalising the regulation of
these products and markets,” he said.
Mr Greenspan accepted that
the crisis had “found a flaw” in his thinking but said that the kind of
heavy regulation that could have prevented the crisis would have damaged US
economic growth. He described the past two decades as a “period of euphoria”
that encouraged participants in the financial markets to misprice
securities.
He had wrongly assumed that
lending institutions would carry out proper surveillance of their
counterparties, he said. “I had been going for 40 years with considerable
evidence that it was working very well”.
Continued in the article
Jensen Comment
In other words, he assumed the agency theory model that corporate employees, as
agents of their owners and creditors, would act hand and hand in the best
interest for themselves and their investors. But agency theory has a flaw in
that it does not understand Peter Pan.
Peter Pan, the manager of Countrywide Financial on Main Street, thought he had
little to lose by selling a fraudulent mortgage to Wall Street. Foreclosures
would be Wall Street’s problems and not his local bank’s problems. And he got
his nice little commission on the sale of the Emma Nobody’s mortgage for
$180,000 on a house worth less than $100,000 in foreclosure. And foreclosure was
almost certain in Emma’s case, because she only makes $12,000 waitressing at the
Country Café. So what if Peter Pan fudged her income a mite in the loan
application along with the fudged home appraisal value? Let Wall Street or Fat
Fannie or Foolish Freddie worry about Emma after closing the pre-approved
mortgage sale deal. The ultimate loss, so thinks Peter Pan, will be spread over
millions of wealthy shareholders of Wall Street investment banks. Peter Pan is
more concerned with his own conventional mortgage on his precious house just two
blocks south of Main Street. This is what happens when risk is
spread even farther than Tinkerbell can fly!
Also see how corporate executives cooked the books ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation
The Saturday Night Live Skit on the Bailout ---
http://patdollard.com/2008/10/it-is-here-the-banned-snl-skit-cannot-hide-from-louie/
|
Bankers (Men in Black)
bet with their
bank's capital, not their own. If the bet goes right, they get a
huge bonus; if it misfires, that's the shareholders' problem.
Sebastian Mallaby.
Council on Foreign Relations, as quoted by Avital Louria Hahn,
"Missing: How Poor Risk-Management Techniques Contributed to
the Subprime Mess," CFO
Magazine, March 2008, Page 53 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10755469/c_10788146?f=magazine_featured
Jensen Comment
Now that the Government is going to bail out these speculators with
taxpayer funds makes it all the worse. I received an email
message claiming that if you had purchased $1,000 of AIG
stock one year ago, you would have $42 left; with Lehman, you
would have $6.60 left; with Fannie or Freddie, you would have
less than $5 left. But if you had purchased $1,000 worth of beer
one year ago, drank all of the beer, then turned in the cans for
the aluminum recycling REFUND, you would have had $214. Based on
the above, the best current investment advice is to drink
heavily and recycle. It's called the 401-Keg. Why let others
gamble your money away when you can piss it away on your own? |
Selling New
Equity to Pay Dividends: Reminds Me About the South Sea Bubble of
1720 ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sea_bubble
"Fooling Some
People All the Time"
"Melting into
Air: Before the financial system went bust, it went postmodern," by
John Lanchester, The New Yorker, November 10, 2008 ---
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2008/11/10/081110crat_atlarge_lanchester
This is also why the
financial masters of the universe tend not to write books. If you have been
proved—proved—right, why bother? If you need to tell it, you can’t truly
know it. The story of David Einhorn and Allied Capital is an example of a
moneyman who believed, with absolute certainty, that he was in the right,
who said so, and who then watched the world fail to react to his irrefutable
demonstration of his own rightness. This drove him so crazy that he did what
was, for a hedge-fund manager, a bizarre thing: he wrote a book about it.
The story began on May
15, 2002, when Einhorn, who runs a hedge fund called Greenlight Capital,
made a speech for a children’s-cancer charity in Hackensack, New Jersey. The
charity holds an annual fund-raiser at which investment luminaries give
advice on specific shares. Einhorn was one of eleven speakers that day, but
his speech had a twist: he recommended shorting—betting against—a firm
called Allied Capital. Allied is a “business development company,” which
invests in companies in their early stages. Einhorn found things not to like
in Allied’s accounting practices—in particular, its way of assessing the
value of its investments. The mark-to-market
accounting that Einhorn favored is based on the
price an asset would fetch if it were sold today, but many of Allied’s
investments were in small startups that had, in effect, no market to which
they could be marked. In Einhorn’s view, Allied’s way of pricing its
holdings amounted to “the you-have-got-to-be-kidding-me method of
accounting.” At the same time, Allied was
issuing new equity, and, according to Einhorn,
the revenue from this could be used to fund the dividend payments that were
keeping Allied’s investors happy. To Einhorn,
this looked like a potential Ponzi scheme.
The next day, Allied’s stock
dipped more than twenty per cent, and a storm of controversy and
counter-accusations began to rage. “Those engaging in the current
misinformation campaign against Allied Capital are cynically trying to take
advantage of the current post-Enron environment by tarring a great and
honest company like Allied Capital with the broad brush of a Big Lie,”
Allied’s C.E.O. said. Einhorn would be the first to admit that he wanted
Allied’s stock to drop, which might make his motives seem impure to the
general reader, but not to him. The function of hedge funds is, by his
account, to expose faulty companies and make money in the process. Joseph
Schumpeter described capitalism as “creative destruction”: hedge funds are
destructive agents, predators targeting the weak and infirm. As Einhorn
might see it, people like him are especially necessary because so many
others have been asleep at the wheel. His book about his five-year battle
with Allied, “Fooling Some of the People All of the Time” (Wiley;
$29.95), depicts analysts, financial journalists, and the S.E.C. as being
culpably complacent. The S.E.C. spent three years investigating Allied. It
found that Allied violated accounting guidelines, but noted that the company
had since made improvements. There were no penalties. Einhorn calls the
S.E.C. judgment “the lightest of taps on the wrist with the softest of
feathers.” He deeply minds this, not least because the complacency of the
watchdogs prevents him from being proved right on a reasonable schedule: if
they had seen things his way, Allied’s stock price would have promptly
collapsed and his short selling would be hugely profitable. As it was,
Greenlight shorted Allied at $26.25, only to spend the next years watching
the stock drift sideways and upward; eventually, in January of 2007, it hit
thirty-three dollars.
All this has a great
deal of resonance now, because, on May 21st of this year, at the same
charity event, Einhorn announced that Greenlight had shorted another stock,
on the ground of the company’s exposure to financial derivatives based on
dangerous subprime loans. The company was Lehman Brothers. There was little
delay in Einhorn’s being proved right about that one: the toppling company
shook the entire financial system. A global
cascade of bank implosions ensued—Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and the
Icelandic banking system being merely some of the highlights to date—and a
global bailout of the entire system had to be put in train.
The short sellers were proved right, and also came to
be seen as culprits; so was mark-to-market accounting, since it caused
sudden, cataclysmic drops in the book value of companies whose holdings had
become illiquid. It is therefore the perfect moment for a short-selling
advocate of marking to market to publish his account. One can only speculate
whether Einhorn would have written his book if he had known what was going
to happen next. (One of the things that have happened is that, on September
30th, Ciena Capital, an Allied portfolio company to whose fraudulent lending
Einhorn dedicates many pages, went into bankruptcy; this coincided with a
collapse in the value of Allied stock—finally!—to a price of around six
dollars a share.) Given the esteem with which Einhorn’s profession is
regarded these days, it’s a little as if the assassin of Archduke Franz
Ferdinand had taken the outbreak of the First World War as the timely moment
to publish a book advocating bomb-throwing—and the book had turned out to be
unexpectedly persuasive.
SEC = Suckers Endup Cheated
David Albrecht, Bowling Green University"
The Performance of the
SEC is shameful: In 2005 the SEC was warned that Madoff was
running a Ponzi scheme
Due-diligence firms use the fees collected from their clients to
hire professionals to meticulously review hedge firms for signs of
deceit. One such firm is Aksia LLC. After painstakingly
investigating the operations of Madoff's operation, they found
several red flags. A brief summary of some of the red flags
uncovered by Aksia can be found here. Shockingly,
Aksia even
uncovered a letter to the SEC dating from 2005 which claimed that
Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme.
As a result of
its investigation, Aksia advised all of its clients not to invest
their money in Madoff's hedge fund. This is a perfect case study
showing that the SEC is incapable of protecting investors as well as
free-market institutions can. The SEC is becoming increasingly
irrelevant and people are beginning to take notice. It failed to
save investors from the house of cards made up of mortgage-backed
securities, credit default swaps, and collateralized debt
obligations that resulted from the housing bubble. Now it has failed
to protect thousands more individuals and charities from something
as simple and old as a Ponzi scheme!
Briggs Armstrong, "Madoff
and the Failure of the SEC," Ludwig Von Mises Institutue, December
18, 2008 ---
http://mises.org/story/3260
The chairman
of the Securities and Exchange Commission, a longtime proponent of deregulation,
acknowledged on Friday that failures in a voluntary supervision program for Wall
Street’s largest investment banks had contributed to the global financial
crisis, and he abruptly shut the program down. The S.E.C.’s oversight
responsibilities will largely shift to the Federal Reserve, though the
commission will continue to oversee the brokerage units of investment banks.
Also Friday, the S.E.C.’s inspector general released a report strongly
criticizing the agency’s performance in monitoring Bear Stearns before it
collapsed in March. Christopher Cox, the commission chairman, said he agreed
that the oversight program was “fundamentally flawed from the beginning.” “The
last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not
work,” he said in a statement. The program “was fundamentally flawed from the
beginning, because investment banks could opt in or out of supervision
voluntarily. The fact that investment bank holding companies could withdraw from
this voluntary supervision at their discretion diminished the perceived mandate”
of the program, and “weakened its effectiveness,” he added.
"S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse," by Stephen Labaton, The
New York Times, September 26, 2008 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/business/27sec.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin
Bernard Madoff, former Nasdaq Stock Market chairman and
founder of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, was arrested and charged
with securities fraud Thursday in what federal prosecutors called a Ponzi scheme
that could involve losses of more than $50 billion.
It is bigger than Enron, bigger than Boesky and bigger than
Tyco
"Madoff Scandal: 'Biggest Story of the Year'," Seeking Alpha,
December 12, 2008 ---
http://seekingalpha.com/article/110402-madoff-scandal-biggest-story-of-the-year?source=wildcard
According to
RealMoney.com columnist Doug Kass,
general partner and investment manager of hedge fund Seabreeze
Partners Short LP and Seabreeze Partners Short Offshore Fund,
Ltd., today's late-breaking report of an alleged massive fraud
at a well known investment firm could be "the biggest story of
the year." In his view,
it is bigger
than Enron, bigger than Boesky and bigger than Tyco.
It attacks at the core of investor confidence --
because, if true, and this could happen ... investors
might think that almost anything imaginable could happen
to the money they have entrusted to their fiduciaries.
Here are some excerpts
from the Bloomberg report, entitled
"Madoff Charged in $50 Billion Fraud at Advisory Firm":
Bernard Madoff,
founder and president of Bernard Madoff Investment
Securities, a market-maker for hedge funds and banks,
was charged by federal prosecutors in a $50 billion
fraud at his advisory business.
Madoff, 70,
was arrested today at 8:30 a.m. by the FBI and appeared
before U.S. Magistrate Judge Douglas Eaton in Manhattan
federal court. Charged in a criminal complaint with a
single count of securities fraud, he was granted release
on a $10 million bond guaranteed by his wife and secured
by his apartment. Madoff’s wife was present in the
courtroom.
"It’s all just
one big lie," Madoff told his employees on Dec. 10,
according to a statement by prosecutors. The firm,
Madoff allegedly said, is "basically, a giant Ponzi
scheme." He was also sued by the Securities and Exchange
Commission.
Madoff’s New
York-based firm was the 23rd largest market maker on
Nasdaq in October, handling a daily average of about 50
million shares a day, exchange data show. The firm
specialized in handling orders from online brokers in
some of the largest U.S. companies, including General
Electric Co (GE). and Citigroup Inc. (C).
...
SEC Complaint
The SEC in its
complaint, also filed today in Manhattan federal court,
accused Madoff of a "multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme
that he perpetrated on advisory clients of his firm."
The SEC said
it’s seeking emergency relief for investors, including
an asset freeze and the appointment of a receiver for
the firm. Ira Sorkin, another defense lawyer for Madoff,
couldn’t be immediately reached for comment.
...
Madoff, who
owned more than 75 percent of his firm, and his brother
Peter are the only two individuals listed on regulatory
records as "direct owners and executive officers."
Peter Madoff
was a board member of the St. Louis brokerage firm A.G.
Edwards Inc. from 2001 through last year, when it was
sold to Wachovia Corp (WB).
$17.1 Billion
The Madoff
firm had about $17.1 billion in assets under management
as of Nov. 17, according to NASD records. At least 50
percent of its clients were hedge funds, and others
included banks and wealthy individuals, according to the
records.
...
Madoff’s Web
site advertises the "high ethical standards" of the
firm.
"In an era of
faceless organizations owned by other equally faceless
organizations, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities
LLC harks back to an earlier era in the financial world:
The owner’s name is on the door," according to the Web
site. "Clients know that Bernard Madoff has a personal
interest in maintaining the unblemished record of value,
fair-dealing, and high ethical standards that has always
been the firm’s hallmark."
...
"These guys
were one of the original, if not the original, third
market makers," said Joseph Saluzzi, the co-head of
equity trading at Themis Trading LLC in Chatham, New
Jersey. "They had a great business and they were good
with their clients. They were around for a long time.
He’s a well-respected guy in the industry."
The case is
U.S. v. Madoff, 08-MAG-02735, U.S. District Court for
the Southern District of New York (Manhattan)
Continued in article
And here is the
SEC press release:
What was the auditing firm of Bernard Madoff Investment
Securities, the auditor who gave a clean opinion, that's been
insolvent for years?
Apparently, Mr Madoff said the business had
been insolvent for years and, from having $17 billion of assets
under management at the beginning of 2008, the SEC said: “It appears
that virtually all assets of the advisory business are gone”. It has
now emerged that Friehling & Horowitz,
the auditor that signed off the annual financial statement for the
investment advisory business for 2006, is under investigation by the
district attorney in New York’s Rockland County, a northern suburb
of New York City.
"The $50bn scam: How Bernard Madoff allegedly cheated investors," London
Times, December 15, 2008 ---
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article5345751.ece
It was at the Manhattan apartment that
Mr Madoff apparently confessed that the business was in fact a
“giant Ponzi scheme” and that the firm had been insolvent for
years.
To cap it all, Mr Madoff told his sons
he was going to give himself up, but only after giving out the
$200 - $300 million money he had left to “employees, family and
friends”.
All the company’s remaining assets have
now been frozen in the hope of repaying some of the companies,
individuals and charities that have been unfortunate enough to
invest in the business.
However, with the fraud believed to
exceed $50 billion, whatever recompense investors could receive
will be a drop in the ocean.
"Bernie Madoff's Victims: The List (as known thus far) ,"
by Henry Blodget, Clusterstock, December 14, 2008 ---
http://clusterstock.alleyinsider.com/2008/12/bernie-madoff-hosed-client-list
Jensen Question
How could such sophisticated investors be so naive? At a minimum,
investors should consider whether the auditing firm has deep
pockets. Bernie's auditors,
Friehling & Horowitz,
probably do not have any pockets at all in order to streamline for
speed while fleeing the scene.
"Madoff's auditor... doesn't audit? The three-person firm that
apparently certified Madoff's books has been telling a key
accounting industry group for years that it doesn't conduct audits,"
by Alyssa Abkowitz, CNN, December 18, 2008 ---
http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/17/news/companies/madoff.auditor.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2008121808
The three-person auditing firm that
apparently certified the books of Bernard Madoff Investment
Securities, the shuttered home of an alleged multibillion-dollar
Ponzi scheme, is drawing new scrutiny.
Already under investigation by local
prosecutors for its potential role in the scandal, the firm,
Friehling & Horowitz, is now also being investigated by the
American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the
prestigious body that sets U.S. auditing standards for private
companies.
The problem: The auditing firm has been
telling the AICPA for 15 years that it doesn't conduct audits.
The AICPA, which has more than 350,000
individual members, monitors most firms that audit private
companies. (Public-company auditors are overseen, as the name
suggests, by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board,
which was created in 2003 in response to accounting scandals
involving WorldCom and Enron.)
Some 33,000 firms enroll in the AICPA's
peer review program, in which experienced auditors assess each
firm's audit quality every year. Forty-four states require
accountants to undergo reviews to maintain their licenses to
practice.
Friehling & Horowitz is enrolled in the
program but hasn't submitted to a review since 1993, says AICPA
spokesman Bill Roberts. That's because the firm has been
informing the AICPA -- every year, in writing -- for 15 years
that it doesn't perform audits.
Meanwhile, Friehling & Horowitz has
reportedly done just that for Madoff. For example, the firm's
name and signature appears on the "statement of financial
condition" for Madoff Securities dated Oct. 31, 2006. "The plain
fact is that this group hasn't submitted for peer review and
appears to have done an audit," Roberts says. AICPA has now
launched an "ethics investigation," he says.
As it happens, New York is one of only
six states that does not require accounting firms to be
peer-reviewed. But on the heels of the Madoff revelations, on
Tuesday, the New York State senate passed legislation that
requires such a process. (The bill now awaits Gov. David
Paterson's signature.) "We've not been regulated in the fashion
we should've inside the state," says David Moynihan,
president-elect of the New York State Society of Certified
Public Accountants.
David Friehling, the only active
accountant at Friehling & Horowitz, according to the AICPA,
might seem like an odd person to flout the institute's rules. He
has been active in affiliated groups: Friehling is the immediate
past president of the Rockland County chapter of the New York
State Society of Certified Public Accountants and sits on the
chapter's executive board.
Friehling, who didn't return calls
seeking comment, is rarely seen at his office, according to
press reports. The 49-year-old, whose firm is based 30 miles
north of Manhattan in New City, N.Y., operates out of a
13-by-18-foot office in a small plaza.
A woman who works nearby told Bloomberg
News that a man who dresses casually and drives a Lexus appears
periodically at Friehling & Horowitz's office for about 10 to 15
minutes at a stretch and then leaves. (State automobile records
indicate that Friehling owns a Lexus RX.) The Rockland County
District Attorney's Office has opened an investigation to see if
the firm committed any state crimes.
People who know Friehling, through the
state accounting chapter and through the Jewish Community Center
in Rockland County (where he's a board member) were reluctant to
discuss him. Most members of both boards wouldn't comment except
to say they were surprised by Friehling's connection to Madoff.
"He's nothing but the nicest guy in the
world," says David Kirschtel, chief executive of JCC Rockland.
"I've never had any negative dealings with him."
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on
December 19, 2008
SEC to Probe Its Ties to Madoffs
by Aaron
Lucchetti, Kara Scannell and Amir Efrati
The Wall Street Journal
Dec 17, 2008
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Accounting,
Auditing, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: "Bernard
Madoff was trying to raise funds for his investment empire as
recently as early this month, as redemptions were about to
prompt an unraveling of an apparent $50 billion investment
scam....According to a criminal complaint [filed] Dec.
11,...clients during the first week of December had requested
about $7 billion of assets from their accounts...[and] Mr.
Madoff...was struggling to meet those obligations....The sharp
downturn in stocks this year may have sealed the firm's demise,
since it hurt the ability for Mr. Madoff to keep recruiting new
clients." Madoff's sons, Andrew and Mark Madoff, contacted the
FBI through their attorney to after allegedly being told by
their father that the family business "was a giant Ponzi scheme"
totaling $50 billion. The SEC has made "an extraordinary
admission that [it] was aware of numerous red flags raised about
Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC but failed to take
them seriously enough."
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: Financial reporting and auditing classes may
use this case for discussing ethics and audit procedures.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What is a Ponzi scheme? Why would
recent market losses lead to the collapse of such a fraud?
2. (Introductory) How did Bernard L. Madoff attract
investors to his scheme?
3. (Advanced) What "red flags" did the SEC and others
miss that would have brought down the fraud earlier? You may use
related articles to help answer this question.
4. (Advanced) What should records of a legitimate
investment advisory firm show? How would you envision "a phony
set of records used to cover up [the] alleged $50 billion fraud"
would appear?
5. (Advanced) What audit steps are designed to identify
frauds, such as the one Mr. Madoff has allegedly perpetrated?
Why might such audit procedures fail to uncover fraud?
6. (Introductory) What is the role of the U.S. SEC? How
does this fraud reflect on the SEC's performance of its role in
the U.S. financial system?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
RELATED
ARTICLES:
Fairfield Group forced to Confront Its Madoff Ties
by Carrick Mollenkamp, Cassell Bryan-Low and Thomas Catan
Dec 17, 2008
Page: A10
Impact on Jewish Charities is Catastrophic
by Eleanor Laise and Dennis K. Berman
Dec 16, 2008
Online Exclusive
|
"SEC to Probe Its Ties to Madoffs ," by Aaron Lucchetti, Kara Scannell and
Amir Efrati, The Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2008 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122947343148212337.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
The Securities and Exchange Commission will examine
the relationship between a former official at the agency and a niece of
financier Bernard L. Madoff, after the SEC's chief admitted "apparent
multiple failures" to oversee the firm at the center of an alleged $50
billion Ponzi scheme.
In an extraordinary admission that the SEC was
aware of numerous red flags raised about Bernard L. Madoff Investment
Securities LLC, but failed to take them seriously enough, SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox ordered a review of the agency's oversight of the New York
securities-trading and investment-management firm.
The review will include whether relationships between SEC officials and Mr.
Madoff or his family members had any impact on the agency's oversight.
"I am gravely concerned" by the agency's regulation
of the firm, Mr. Cox said.
Mr. Madoff's niece, Shana Madoff, married a former
SEC attorney named Eric Swanson last year. Mr. Swanson worked at the SEC for
10 years, including as a senior inspections and examination official, before
leaving in 2006. Ms. Madoff is a compliance lawyer at the securities firm.
Among Mr. Swanson's duties was supervising the
SEC's inspection program in charge of trading oversight at stock exchanges
and electronic-trading platforms, according to a press release from Bats
Trading Inc., an electronic stock exchange that hired Mr. Swanson as general
counsel earlier this year.
Neither person is named in the SEC statement as a
target of the probe, which is being led by the agency's inspector general,
David Kotz. But Mr. Kotz said in an interview that he intended to examine
the relationship between Mr. Madoff's niece and Mr. Swanson.
In a statement Tuesday night, a spokesman for Mr.
Swanson acknowledged that "the compliance team he helped supervise made an
inquiry about Bernard Madoff's securities operation," without being more
specific. He said the couple began dating in 2006, and were married in 2007.
A second representative of Mr. Swanson said the
romantic relationship with Ms. Madoff began "years after" the regulatory
scrutiny in which Mr. Swanson was involved. Mr. Swanson will "fully
cooperate" with the SEC investigation, the representative said.
Ms. Madoff couldn't be reached for comment.
Mr. Cox's statements represent a strong rebuke of
an agency already facing criticism of its response to the credit crisis. Mr.
Cox said an initial review of SEC oversight of Mr. Madoff's firm found that
"credible and specific allegations" made as far back as 1999 "were
repeatedly brought to the attention of SEC staff, but were never recommended
to the Commission for action."
Mr. Cox wasn't specific about the past claims that
were inadequately investigated. But around 2000, Harry Markopolos, at the
time an executive at a rival firm to Mr. Madoff's, contacted the SEC with
suspicions about Mr. Madoff's business. "Madoff Securities is the world's
largest Ponzi scheme," Mr. Markopolos wrote in a letter to the agency. Mr.
Markopolos pursued his accusations for years, dealing with the SEC's
regional offices in New York and Boston, according to documents reviewed by
The Wall Street Journal.
In 2005, the SEC's inspections division in New York
examined Mr. Madoff's business operations, concluding there was a violation
of technical trading rules, according to the SEC. The agency's enforcement
staff in New York completed an investigation in 2007 without recommending
action.
Late Tuesday, Lori Richards, director of the SEC's
inspection and examinations division, detailed Mr. Swanson's role in
oversight of Mr. Madoff's firm, saying he was a member of a team that looked
at the securities-trading business in 1999 and 2004. "He did not participate
in the 2005 exam," she said.
Ms. Richards added that the SEC "has very strict
rules prohibiting SEC staff from participating in matters involving firms
where they have a personal interest. Subsequently, Mr. Swanson did not work
on any other examination matters involving the Madoff firm before leaving
the agency."
Mr. Cox's criticisms of the agency came as
investigators searching the offices of Mr. Madoff's firm in New York City
discovered what they described as phony sets of records used to cover up its
alleged $50 billion fraud, even as it became clear that Mr. Madoff was
trying to attract new investors as recently as early December.
Those potential investors included the Pritzkers,
one of America's wealthiest families, people familiar with the matter say.
Mr. Madoff's efforts didn't result in an investment from the family.
Meantime, a financial firm with ties to Mr. Madoff
is being drawn into the probe by regulators. The Massachusetts Secretary of
State has subpoenaed Cohmad Securities Corp., which was closely affiliated
with Mr. Madoff and advisers who helped bring investors to his business.
No one answered calls placed to two phone numbers
for Cohmad in New York on Tuesday.
Investigators, hunkered down in the 17th-floor
office where they believe Mr. Madoff carried out what he allegedly described
to his sons as a $50 billion fraud, have found what appear to be "falsified
records," according to Stephen Harbeck of Securities Investor Protection
Corp., the securities-industry nonprofit group helping to oversee the firm's
liquidation. These include a set of books that doesn't accurately reflect
the assets held by the firm, he said.
"Some customer statements do not reflect securities
in the firm's possession," Mr. Harbeck said.
The firm's records are in disarray, and the company
has officially ceased operations, Mr. Harbeck said. According to Mr. Cox,
Mr. Madoff "kept several sets of books and false documents, and provided
false information involving his advisory activities to investors and to
regulators."
The alleged scam is widely expected to cause
billions of dollars in losses for banks, hedge funds, well-known investors
and charities around the world, some of whom have been wiped out. Investors
and other affected parties have disclosed combined exposure of more than $25
billion.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Heavy Insider
Trading ---
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/ownership/ownership.asp?symbol=ALD
Allied's
independent auditor is KPMG
KPMG has a lot of problems
with litigation ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's
threads on the collapse of the Banking System are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm
Bob Jensen's
threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Also see Fraud Rotten at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Bob Jensen's
threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm
Also see the theory of fair value accounting at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue
History of Fraud in America ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on earnings management and creative
accounting to cook the books ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation
Keeping Score on the SEC in 2008
"The SEC in 2008: A Very Good Year? A terrific one, the
commission says, tallying a fiscal-year record in insider-trading cases, and the
second-highest number of enforcement cases overall. But what would John McCain
say?" by Stephen Taub and Roy Harris, CFO.com, October 22, 2008 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12465408/c_12469997
It was a great year for Securities and
Exchange Commission enforcement, according to the SEC. In a fiscal-year-end
summary, it notes, for example, that it brought the highest number ever of
insider trading cases.
And altogether, it took the second-highest
number of enforcement actions in agency history.
"The SEC's role in policing the markets
and protecting investors has never been more critical," said Linda Chatman
Thomsen, director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "The dedicated
enforcement staff has been working around the clock to investigate and
punish wrongdoing."
The celebration of these records and
near-records, however, comes during a time of widespread charges of what
critics call lax policing by the regulator. They question its performance
before the powderkeg of subprime mortgage lending, amid loose standards
within major financial institutions, exploded into the worst global
financial crisis since the Great Depression. Just a month ago, Republican
presidential candidate John McCain promoted the replacement of SEC Chairman
Christopher Cox, while many legislators have supported folding the SEC and
other agencies into one larger, more encompassing financial regulator.
But this day, at least, was one for the
SEC proudly to recount the 671 enforcement actions it took during the most
recent fiscal year. And it made special note of how insider trading cases
jumped more than 25 percent over the previous year.
Among those trading cases, the SEC seemed
to prize most highly the charges against former Dow Jones board member David
Li, and three other Hong Kong residents, in a $24-million insider-trading
enforcement action, along with the charging of the former chairman and CEO
of a division of Enron Corp. with illegally selling hundreds of thousands of
shares of Enron stock based on nonpublic information.
Market manipulation cases surged more than
45 percent. They included charges against a Wall Street short seller for
spreading false rumors, and charging 10 insiders or promoters of publicly
traded companies who made stock sales in exchange for illegal kickbacks.
Among the major fraud cases, the SEC sued
two Bear Stearns hedge fund managers for fraudulently misleading investors
about the financial state of the firm's two largest hedge funds. The
regulator also charged five former employees of the City of San Diego for
failing to disclose to the investing public buying the city's municipal
bonds that there were funding problems with its pension and retiree health
care obligations and those liabilities had placed the city in serious
financial jeopardy.
Illegal stock-option backdating was also a
big focus of the agency in 2008. The SEC charged eight public companies and
27 executives with providing false information to investors based on
improper accounting for backdated stock option grants.
The SEC said that another growth area
involved cases against U.S. companies that use corporate funds to bribe
foreign officials, an activity precluded by the Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act. In 2008, the SEC filed 15 FCPA cases. Since January 2006, the SEC has
brought 38 FCPA enforcement actions — more than were brought in all prior
years combined since FCPA became law in 1977.
Bob Jensen's threads on creative
accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/AccountingTricks.htm
Peter, Paul, and Barney: An Essay on 2008 U.S. Government Bailouts of Private
Companies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm
Timeline of Financial Scandals, Auditing
Failures, and the Evolution of International Accounting Standards ----
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm#DerivativesFrauds
White Collar Fraud Site ---
http://www.whitecollarfraud.com/
Note the column of links on the left.
Online Searching for Law, Accounting, and Finance ---
http://securities.stanford.edu/
Stanford University Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse
---
http://securities.stanford.edu/
Securities Law Archives ---
http://www.bespacific.com/mt/archives/cat_securities_law.html
Securities and Exchange Commission ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Securities_and_Exchange_Commission
Accounting Fraud ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Question
Why are so many Ivy League alumni behind bars?
From Bloomberg.com July 3, 2008 ---
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=awkNQpGwkfkU&refer=us
No matter which prison former Refco Inc.
Chief Executive Officer Phillip Bennett serves the 16-year sentence he
received today in Manhattan federal court, chances are he will be the only
one there with a master's degree from Cambridge University in England.
The head of what was once the biggest
independent U.S. futures broker, Bennett also was ordered to forfeit $2.4
billion in assets for what prosecutors said was ``among the very worst''
white-collar crimes. He faced a possible life sentence after pleading guilty
to bank fraud and money laundering.
Bennett, 60, joins at least a dozen other
wealthy corporate executives with degrees from elite institutions such as
Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School
who've been incarcerated for white-collar crimes this decade. Exceptional
intelligence, self-confidence and feeling special, common among those
educated at such schools, can turn into deviousness, arrogance and
entitlement, said Tom Donaldson, a professor of ethics and law at Wharton in
Philadelphia.
``If the devil exists, he no doubt has a
high IQ and an Ivy League degree,'' Donaldson said. ``It's clear that having
an educational pedigree is no prophylactic against greed and bad behavior.''
Imprisoned executives with Ivy League
degrees include Jeffrey Skilling, 54, former CEO of Enron Corp. (Harvard
Business School); Timothy Rigas, 52, former chief financial officer of
Adelphia Communications Corp. (Wharton); and William Sorin, 59, former
general counsel of New York-based Comverse Technology Inc. (Harvard Law
School).
Elite Schools
Some of these convicted executives have
multiple degrees. Conrad Black, the former CEO of Chicago-based Hollinger
International Inc., now serving a 6 1/2-year sentence for stealing $6.1
million from the company, has two bachelor's degrees from Carleton
University, a master's degree from McGill University and a law degree from
Laval University, all in Canada.
``There is a correlation between going to
an elite school and ending up as a CEO,'' said Edwin Hartman, a professor of
business ethics at New York University's Stern School of Business. ``Look at
the list of the heads of the 400 elite companies. They certainly didn't go
to no-name state schools.''
A top-level education may also cultivate
arrogance, said Maurice Schweitzer, who teaches information management at
Wharton.
`They Feel Special'
``We tell our students at premier
institutions that they are special, and they certainly feel special,''
Schweitzer said. ``We have famous faculty and great resources. They are
surrounded by accomplished peers, and recruiters flock to them.''
Massachusetts-based Harvard University
spokeswoman Rebecca Rollins said the school didn't have an immediate
comment.
Wrongdoing in the executive suite is more
about character flaws than alma maters, said Andrew Weissmann, a former
federal prosecutor who led the U.S. Justice Department task force that
investigated the collapse of Enron.
``Just because you went to a good school
doesn't mean you have a good moral compass,'' Weissmann said.
Moreover, some of the executives convicted
since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 in response to corporate
corruption didn't attend elite schools. HealthSouth Corp. founder Richard
Scrushy, 55, sentenced to almost 7 years in prison for bribery, has a
bachelor's degree from the University of Alabama in Birmingham. Former Tyco
International Ltd. CEO L. Dennis Kozlowski, convicted of stealing $137
million from the company and in prison for 8 1/3 to 25 years, has a
bachelor's degree from Seton Hall University.
Risk Takers
Executives with top educations may end up
trading their pin stripes for prison jumpsuits because they're driven to
excel.
``People who succeed in corporate America
are risk-takers,'' said Anthony Barkow, a former federal prosecutor and
Harvard Law School graduate who is now a New York University Law School
professor. ``They're smart, confident and sometimes even arrogant. That's
what it takes to succeed. Risk-takers get closer to the line and sometimes
cross it.''
Graduates from top-tier universities may
feel so special, they think law doesn't apply to them, Wharton's Schweitzer
said.
``We encourage our students to explore and
think outside the box,'' Schweitzer said. ``In general, this approach is
very constructive, but it may prompt people to be less likely to recognize
an ethical dilemma.''
Morgenthau's Warning
Current and former prosecutors who've
handled white-collar cases said the defendants' most common trait was
avarice.
``It doesn't matter if you graduated from
the best schools in the world and had every privilege accorded to you or
not,'' said Campbell, a member of the Enron Task Force with degrees from
Yale University and the University of Chicago School of Law. ``Greed is a
strong motivation, and it can cause you to make mistakes.''
Robert Morgenthau, the Manhattan District
Attorney who is a graduate of Amherst College and Yale Law School, issued
this warning:
``No matter what your position is in life
or where you went to school, if you commit a crime in our jurisdiction,
we'll be happy to prosecute you.''
Question
What are do so many executives cheat in recent years?
Answer
See Question 1 and Answer 1 at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's "Congress to the Core" threads are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm
"Merrill Lynch Settlement With SEC Worth Up
to $7B," SmartPros, August 25, 2008 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x62971.xml
Federal regulators said
Friday that investors who bought risky auction-rate securities from Merrill
Lynch & Co. before the market for those bonds collapsed will be able to
recover up to $7 billion under a new agreement.
The largest U.S. brokerage
will buy back the securities from thousands of investors under a settlement
with the Securities and Exchange Commission, New York Attorney General
Andrew Cuomo and other state regulators over its role in selling the
high-risk bonds to retail investors. Under that deal, announced Thursday,
Merrill agreed to hasten its voluntary buyback plan by repurchasing $10
billion to $12 billion of the securities from investors by Jan. 2.
Merrill also agreed to pay a
$125 million fine in a separate accord with state regulators.
The $330 billion market for
auction-rate securities collapsed in mid-February.
The SEC's estimate of a $7
billion recovery is based on its projection of the eventual amount of the
bonds that will be cashed in by the affected investors, who bought them
before Feb. 13. The $10 billion to $12 billion is the total amount that
Merrill is committing to buy back. The firm has to offer redemptions to all
investors, though not all may cash in the securities.
The SEC said the new
agreement will enable retail investors, small businesses and charities who
purchased the securities from Merrill "to restore their losses and
liquidity."
New York-based Merrill
neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing in agreeing to the federal
settlement, which is subject to approval by SEC commissioners.
The firm wasn't fined under
the accord, but the SEC said Merrill "faces the prospect" of a penalty after
completing its obligations under the agreement. The amount of the penalty,
if any, would take into account the extent of Merrill's misconduct in
marketing and selling auction-rate securities, and an assessment of whether
it fulfilled its obligations, the SEC said.
"Merrill Lynch's conduct
harmed tens of thousands of investors who will have the opportunity to get
their money back through this agreement," Linda Thomsen, the agency's
enforcement director, said in a statement. "We will continue to aggressively
investigate wrongdoing in the marketing and sale of auction-rate
securities."
Merrill, Goldman Sachs Group
Inc. and Deutsche Bank on Thursday brought to eight the number of global
banks that have settled a five-month investigation into claims they misled
customers into believing the securities were safe.
The auction-rate securities
market involved investors buying and selling instruments that resembled
regular corporate debt, except the interest rates were reset at regular
auctions - some as frequently as once a week. A number of companies and
retail clients invested in the securities because, thanks to the regular
auctions, they could treat their holdings as liquid, almost like cash.
Major issuers included
companies that financed student loans and municipal agencies like the Port
Authority of New York and New Jersey. When big banks ceased backstopping the
auctions with supporting bids because of concerns about credit exposure, the
bustling market collapsed. That left some issuers paying double-digit
interest rates because of the terms under which they issued the securities.
Regulators have been
investigating the collapse in the market to determine who was responsible
for its demise and whether banks knowingly misrepresented the safety of the
securities when selling them to investors.
Jensen Comment
It's unbelievable how many huge frauds there are in which Merrill Lynch has been
an active participant. For example, do a word search for "Merrill" in this
document that you are reading now.
"Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting
Scandals," by Ray Ball at the University of Chicago, SSRN, September 17,
2008 --- (free download) ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1272804
Not surprisingly, the recent accounting
scandals look different when viewed from the perspectives of the
political/regulatory process and of the market for corporate governance and
financial reporting. We do not have the opportunity to observe a world in
which either market or political/regulatory processes operate independently,
and the events are recent and not well-researched, so untangling their
separate effects is somewhat conjectural. This paper offers conjectures on
issues such as: What caused the scandalous behavior? Why was there such a
rash of accounting scandals at one time? Who killed Arthur Andersen – the
SEC, or the market? Did fraudulent accounting kill Enron, or just keep it
alive for too long? What is the social cost of financial reporting fraud?
Does the US in fact operate a “principles-based” or a “rules-based”
accounting system? Was there market failure? Or was there regulatory
failure? Or both? Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act a political and regulatory
over-reaction?
Jensen Comment
Although Professor Ball is best known for empirical research of capital markets
data, the above article is best described as a commentary of his personal
opinion. On many issues I agree with him, but on some issues I disagree.
Would market forces have killed Enron even if there was no criminal case
for document destruction?
Ray Ball (opinion with no supporting
evidence)
I conclude that market forces, left to their
own devices, would have closed Andersen.
Bob Jensen (agrees completely with
supporting evidence)
I don't think there's any doubt that Andersen would've folded due
to market forces of a succession of failed audits for which it did not
change its fundamental behavior and questions of auditor independence after
losing a succession of failed audit lawsuits prior to Enron. For example, it
continued to hire hire the in-charge auditor of Waste Management even after
his felony conviction.
When the Securities and Exchange Commission
found evidence in e-mail messages that a senior partner at Andersen had
participated in the fraud at Waste Management, Andersen did not fire him.
Instead, it put him to work revising the firm's document-retention policy.
Unsurprisingly, the new policy emphasized the need to destroy documents and
did not specify that should stop if an S.E.C. investigation was threatened.
It was that policy David Duncan, the Andersen partner in charge of Enron
audits, claimed to be following when he shredded Andersen's reputation.
Floyd Norris, "Will Big Four Audit Firms Survive in a World of Unlimited
Liability?," The New York Times, September 10, 2004
Although Ray Ball does not cite the empirical evidence, there is empirical
evidence that ultimately, due to a succession of incompetent or fraudulent
audits, having Andersen as an auditor raised a client's cost of capital.
"The Demise of Arthur Andersen," by Clifford F. Thies, Ludwig Von Mises
Institute, April 12, 2002 ---
http://www.mises.org/fullstory.asp?control=932&FS=The+Demise+of+Arthur+Andersen
From Yahoo.com, Andrew and I downloaded
the daily adjusted closing prices of the stocks of these companies (the
adjustment taking into account splits and dividends). I then constructed
portfolios based on an equal dollar investment in the stocks of each of
the companies and tracked the performance of the two portfolios from
August 1, 2001, to March 1, 2002. Indexes of the values of these
portfolios are juxtaposed in Figure 1.
From August 1, 2001, to November 30,
2001, the values of the two portfolios are very highly correlated. In
particular, the values of the two portfolios fell following the
September 11 terrorist attack on our country and then quickly recovered.
You would expect a very high correlation in the values of truly matched
portfolios. Then, two deviations stand out.
In early December 2001, a wedge
temporarily opened up between the values of the two portfolios. This
followed the SEC subpoena. Then, in early February, a second and
persistent wedge opened. This followed the news of the coming DOJ
indictment. It appears that an
Andersen signature (relative to a "Final Four" signature) costs a
company 6 percent of its market capitalization.
No wonder corporate clients--including several of the companies that
were in the Andersen-audited portfolio Andrew and I constructed--are
leaving Andersen.
Prior to the demise of Arthur Andersen,
the Big 5 firms seemed to have a "lock" on reputation. It is possible
that these firms may have felt free to trade on their names in search of
additional sources of revenue. If that is what happened at Andersen, it
was a big mistake. In a free market, nobody has a lock on anything.
Every day that you don’t earn your reputation afresh by serving your
customers well is a day you risk losing your reputation. And, in a
service-oriented economy, losing your reputation is the kiss of death.
Did (undetected) fraudulent accounting keep Enron alive too long?
Ray Ball
It is difficult to escape the conclusion
that market forces caused Enron’s bankruptcy, for the simple reason that it
had invested enormous sums and by 2000 was not generating profits.
Conversely, its accounting transgressions kept the company alive for some
period (perhaps one or two years) longer than would have occurred if it had
reported its true profitability. The welfare loss arose from keeping an
unprofitable company alive longer than optimal, and wasting capital and
labor that were better used elsewhere.
Bob Jensen (disagrees with the power
of GAAP in the case of Enron)
I think Ray Ball is attributing too much to financial reports of
past transactions. Even if Enron's financial reports were "true" in terms of
conformance with GAAP, the market may well have kept Enron alive because of
profit potential of some of the huge, albeit presently losing, ventures. The
counter example here is the more legitimate reporting losses in Amazon.com
for almost its entire history and the willingness of investors to "bet on
the come" of Amazon's ventures in spite of the reported losses in
conformance with GAAP. Furthermore, Enron's executives were so skilled at
sales pitches, I think Enron might've actually kept going much, much longer
if it conformed to GAAP and simply pitched its sweet-sounding ventures and
political connections in Washington DC. Enron was primarily brought down by
fraud that commenced to appear in the media and the pending lawsuits that
formed overhead due to the fraud.
Who killed Enron – the SEC or the market?
Ray Ball
It is difficult to escape the conclusion that
market forces caused Enron’s bankruptcy, for the simple reason that it had
invested enormous sums and by 2000 was not generating profits. Conversely,
its accounting transgressions kept the company alive for some period
(perhaps one or two years) longer than would have occurred if it had
reported its true profitability. The welfare loss arose from keeping an
unprofitable company alive longer than optimal, and wasting capital and
labor that were better used elsewhere.
Bob Jensen (disagrees because losing
divisions could've been dropped in favor of continued operations of highly
profitable divisions)
What Ray does not seek out is the first tip of the demise of Enron.
The single event that commenced Enron's dominos to fall has to be the
reporting of illegal related party transactions by a Wall Street Journal
Reporter. Once these became known, the SEC had to act and commenced a
chain of events from which Enron could not possibly survive in terms of
lawsuits and market reactions with lawsuit risks that bore down on the
market prices of Enron shares.
After John Emshwiller's WSJ report, determining whether the market or
the SEC brought down Enron is a chicken versus egg question!
Eichenwald states the following on pp. 490-492 in Conspiracy of Fools ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm#22
|
It was section
eight, called "Related Party Transactions," that got John
Emshwiller's juices flowing.
After being
assigned to follow the Skilling resignation, Emshwiller had put in a
request for an interview, then scrounged up a copy of Enron's most
recent SEC filing in search of any nuggets.
What he found
startled him. Words about some partnerships run by an unidentified
"senior officer." Arcane stuff, maybe, but the numbers were huge.
Enron reported more than $240 million in revenues in the first six
months of the year from its dealings with them.
One fact struck
Emshwiller in particular. This anonymous senior officer, the filing
said, had just sold his financial interest in the partnerships.
Now, it said, the partnerships were no longer related to Enron.
The senior
officer had just sold his interest, Skilling had just resigned. The
connection seemed obvious.
Could Enron have
actually allowed Jeff Skilling to run partnerships that were doing
massive business with the company? Now that, Emshwiller
thought, would be a great story.
Emshwiller was
back on the phone with Mark Palmer. With no better explanation for
Skilling's resignation, he said, the Journal was going to dig
through everything it could find. Right now he was focusing on
these partnerships. Were those run by Skilling?
"No, that's not
Skilling," Palmer replied, almost nonchalantly. "That's Andy
Fastow."
A pause. "Who's
Andy Fastow?" Emshwiller asked.
The message was
slipped to Skilling later that day. A Journal reporter was
pushing for an explanation of his departure and now was rooting
around, looking for anything he could find. Probably best just to
give the paper a call.
Emshwiller was
at his desk when the phone rang.
"Hi," a soft
voice said. "It's Jeff Skilling."
It was a
startling moment. Emshwiller had been on the hunt, and suddenly the
quarry just walked in and lay down on the floor, waiting for him to
fire. So he did: why was Skilling quitting his job?
"It's all pretty
mundane," Skilling replied. He'd worked hard and accomplished a lot
but now had the freedom to move on. His voice was distant, almost
depressed.
He and been
ruminating about it for a while, Skilling went on, but had wanted to
stay on at the company until the California situation eased up.
Then, he took the conversation in a new direction.
"The stock price
has been very disappointing to me," Skilling said. "The stock is
less than half of what it was six months ago. I put a lot of
pressure on myself. I felt I must not be communicating well
enough."
Skilling rambled
as Emshwiller took it down. India. California. Expense cuts. The
good shape of Enron.
"Had the stock
price not done what it did..." He paused. "I don't think I would
have felt the pressure to leave if the stock price had stayed up."
What?
Had Emshwiller heard that right? Was all this stuff about "personal
reasons" out the window? Had Skilling thrown in the towel because
of the stock price?
"What was that,
Mr. Skilling?" Emshwiller asked.
The employees at
Enron owned lots of shares, Skilling said. They were worried,
always asking him about the direction of the price. He found it
very frustrating.
"Are you saying
that you don't think you would have quit if the stock price had
stayed up?"
Skilling was
silent for several seconds.
"I guess so," he
finally mumbled.
Minutes later,
Emshwiller burst into his boss's office. "You're not gong to
believe what Skilling just told me!"
|
What are the incentives to commit fraud?
Ray Ball
My view, based on mainly anecdotal experience,
is that non-financial motives are more powerful than is commonly believed,
and sometimes are the dominant reason for committing accounting fraud. An
important motivator seems to be maintaining the esteem of one’s
peers,ranging from co-workers to the public at large. Enron executives
reportedly were celebrities in Houston, and in important places like the
White House.
Bob Jensen (disagrees as to level of
importance of non-financial motives except in isolated instances such as
possibly Ken Lay)
Although there are instances where non-financial motives may have
been powerful, I believe that they generally pale when compared to the
financial reasons for committing all types of financial fraud, including
accounting fraud ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm
Was Sarbanes-Oxley Necessary?
Ray Ball (who is generally critical of the
need for Sarbanes-Oxley relative to market forces without such regulation
and fraud penalties)
Markets need rules, and rely on trust. U.S.
financial markets historically had very effective rules by world standards,
the rules were broken, and there were immense consequences for the
transgressors.
Bob Jensen (strongly disagrees)
One need only look how the market-based system worldwide moved in
cycles of being Congress to the core among the major corporations, investment
banks, insurance companies, and credit rating companies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm
After getting caught these firms simply moved on to new schemes
without fear of market forces.
Nowhere is the wild west of market-based fraud more evident than in the
timeline history of derivative financial instruments frauds ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm#DerivativesFrauds
|
Frank Partnoy,
Page 283 of a Postscript entitled "The Return"
F.I.A.S.C.O. : The Inside Story of a Wall Street Trader by Frank
Partnoy - 283 pages (February 1999) Penguin USA (Paper); ISBN:
0140278796
Perhaps we don'
think we deserve a better chance. We play the lottery in record
numbers, despite the 50 percent cut (taken by the government). We
flock to riverboat casinos, despite substantial odds against
winning. Legal and illegal gambling are growing just as fast as the
financial markets, Las Vegas is our top tourist destination in the
U.S., narrowly edging out Atlantic City. Are the financial markets
any different? In sum, has our culture become so infused with the
gambling instinct that we would afford investors only that bill of
rights given a slot machine player: the right to pull the handle,
their right to pick a different machine, the right to leave the
casino, abut not the right to a fair game.
|
|
Infectious
Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets
(Henry Holt and Company, 2003, Page 17, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)
In February 1985, the
United States Financial Accounting Standards Board
(FASB)
--- the private group that established
most accounting standards (in the U.S.) --- asked whether banks
should begin including swaps on their balance sheets, the financial
statements that recorded their assets and liabilities . . .since the
early 1980s banks had not included swaps as assets or liabilities .
. . the banks' argument was deeply flawed. The right to receive
money on a swap was a valuable asset, and the obligation to pay
money on a swap was a costly liability.
But bankers knew that
the fluctuations in their swaps (swap value volatility) would worry
their shareholders, and they were determined to keep swaps off their
balance sheets (including mere disclosures as footnotes), FASB's
inquiry about banks' treating swaps as off-balance-sheet --- a term
that would become widespread during the 1991s --- mobilized and
unified the banks, which until that point had been competing
aggressively and not cooperating much on regulatory issues. All
banks strongly opposed disclosing more information about their
swaps, and so they threw down their swords and banded together a
serveral high-level meetings. |
|
Infectious
Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets
(Henry Holt and Company, 2003, Page 77, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)
The process of
transferring receivables to a new company and issuing new bonds
became known as
securitization,
which became a major part of the
structured finance industry . . . One of the most significant
innovations in structured finance was a deal called the
Collateralized Bond Obligation,
or CBO. CBOs are one of the threads that
run through the past fifteen years of financial markets, ranging
from Michael Milken to First Boston to Enron and WorldCom. CBOs
would mutate into various types of
credit derivatives ---
financial instruments tied to the creditworthiness of companies ---
which would play and important role in the aftermath of the collapse
of numerous companies in 2001and 2002.
. . .
In simple terms, here
is how a CBO works. A bank transfers a portfolio of junk bonds to a
Special Purpose Entity,
typically a newly created company, partnership, or trust domiciled
in a balmy tax haven, such as the Cayman Islands. This entity then
issues several securities, backed by bonds, effectively splitting
the junk bonds into pieces. Investors (hopefully) buy the pieces.
. . .
The first CBO was
TriCapital Ltc., a $420 million deal sold in July 1988. There were
about $900 million CBOs in 1988, and almost $ $3 billion in 1989.
Notwithstanding the bad press junk bonds had been getting, analysts
from all three of the credit-rating agencies began pushing CBOs.
Ther were very profitable for the rating agencies, which received
fees for rating the various pieces.
. . .
With the various
types of structured-finance deals, a trend began of companies using
Special Purpose Entities
(SPEs)
to hide risks. From an accounting perspective, the key question was
whether a company that owned particular financial assets needed to
disclose those assets in its financial statements even after it
transferred them to an SPE. Just as derivatives dealers had argued
that swaps should not be included in their balance sheets,
financial companies began arguing that their
interest in SPEs did not need to be disclosed
. . . In 1991. the acting chief accountant of the SEC, concerned
that companies might abuse this accounting standard, wrote a letter
saying the outside investment had to be at least three percent
(a requirement that helped implode Enron and its auditor
Andersen because the three percent investments were phony): |
|
Infectious
Greed: How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets
(Henry Holt and Company, 2003, Page 229, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)
Third, financial
derivatives were now everywhere --- and largely unregulated.
Increasingly, parties were using financial engineering to take
advantage of the differences in legal rules among jurisdictions, or
to take new risks in new markets. In 1994, The Economist
magazine noted, "Some financial innovation is driven by wealthy
firms and individuals seeking ways of escaping from the regulatory
machinery that governs established financial markets." With such
innovation, the regulators' grip on financial markets loosened
during the mid-to-late 1990s . . . After Long-Term Capital
(Management) collapsed, even Alan Greenspan admitted that financial
markets had been close to the brink.
The decade was
peppered with financial debacles, but these faded quickly from
memory even as they increased in size and complexity. The billion
dollar-plus scandals included some colorful characters (Robert
Citron of Orange County, Nick Leeson of Barings, and John Meriwether
of Long-Term Capital Management), but even as each new scandal
outdid the others in previously unimaginable ways, the markets
merely hic-coughed and then started going up again. It didn't seem
that anything serious was wrong, and their ability to shake off a
scandal made markets seem even more under control.
Frank Portnoy, Infectious Greed (Henry Holt and Company,
2003, Page 2, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0). |
|
"Does the use
of Financial Derivatives Affect Earnings Management Decisions?"
by Jan Barton, The Accounting Review, January 2001, pp. 1-26.
I present evidence
consistent with managers using derivatives and discretionary
accruals as partial substitutes for smoothing earnings. Using
1994-1996 data for a sample of Fortune 500 firms, I estimate a set
of simultaneous equations that captures managers' incentives to
maintain a desired level of earnings volatility through hedging and
accrual management. These incentives include increasing managerial
compensation and wealth, reducing corporate taxes and debt financing
costs, avoiding underinvestment and earnings surprises, and
mitigating volatility caused by low diversification. After
controlling for such incentives, I find significant negative
association between derivatives' notional amounts and proxies for
the magnitude of discretionary accruals.
|
|
Frank Partnoy introduces Chapter 7 of Infectious
Greed as follows:
Pages
187-188
The
regulatory changes of 1994-95 sent three messages to
corporate CEOs. First, you are not likely to be
punished for "massaging" your firm's accounting
numbers. Prosecutors rarely go after financial fraud
and, even when they do, the typical punishment is a
small fine; almost no one goes to prison. Moreover,
even a fraudulent scheme could be recast as mere
earnings management--the practice of smoothing a
company's earnings--which most executives did, and
regarded as perfectly legal.
Second, you
should use new financial instruments--including options,
swaps, and other derivatives--to increase your own pay
and to avoid costly regulation. If complex derivatives
are too much for you to handle--as they were for many
CEOs during the years immediately following the 1994
losses--you should at least pay yourself in stock
options, which don't need to be disclosed as an expense
and have a greater upside than cash bonuses or stock.
Third, you
don't need to worry about whether accountants or
securities analysts will tell investors about any hidden
losses or excessive options pay. Now that Congress and
the Supreme Court have insulated accounting firms and
investment banks from liability--with the Central Bank
decision and the Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act--they will be much more willing to look the other
way. If you pay them enough in fees, they might even be
willing to help.
Of course,
not every corporate executive heeded these messages.
For example, Warren Buffett argued that managers should
ensure that their companies' share prices were accurate,
not try to inflate prices artificially, and he
criticized the use of stock options as compensation.
Having been a major shareholder of Salomon Brothers,
Buffett also criticized accounting and securities firms
for conflicts of interest.
But for
every Warren Buffett, there were many less scrupulous
CEOs. This chapter considers four of them: Walter
Forbes of CUC International, Dean Buntrock of Waste
Management, Al Dunlap of Sunbeam, and Martin Grass of
Rite Aid. They are not all well-known among investors,
but their stories capture the changes in CEO behavior
during the mid-1990s. Unlike the "rocket scientists" at
Bankers Trust, First Boston, and Salomon Brothers, these
four had undistinguished backgrounds and little training
in mathematics or finance. Instead, they were
hardworking, hard-driving men who ran companies that met
basic consumer needs: they sold clothes, barbecue
grills, and prescription medicine, and cleaned up
garbage. They certainly didn't buy swaps linked to
LIBOR-squared.
|
|
I do agree with Ray Ball that regulation in and of itself is not panacea
when either preventing or detecting fraud.
|
"Greater
Regulation of Financial Markets?" by Richard Posner, The
Becker-Posner Blog, April 28, 2008 ---
http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/
Re-Regulate Financial Markets?--Posner's Comment I no longer believe
that deregulation has been a complete, an unqualified, success. As I
indicated in my posting of last week, deregulation of the airline
industry appears to be a factor in the serious deterioration of
service, which I believe has imposed substantial costs on travelers,
particularly but not only business travelers; and the partial
deregulation of electricity supply may have been a factor in the
western energy crisis of 2000 to 2001 and the ensuing Enron debacle.
The deregulation of trucking, natural gas, and pipelines has, in
contrast, probably been an unqualified success, and likewise the
deregulation of the long-distance telecommunications and
telecommunications terminal equipment markets, achieved by a
combination of deregulatory moves by the Federal Communications
Commission beginning in 1968 and the government antitrust suit that
culminated in the breakup of AT&T in 1983.
Although
one must be tentative in evaluating current events, I suspect that
the deregulation (though again partial) of banking has been a factor
in the current credit crisis. The reason is related to Becker's very
sensible suggestion that, given the moral hazard created by
government bailouts of failing financial institutions, a tighter
ceiling should be placed on the risks that banks are permitted to
take. Because of federal deposit insurance, banks are able to borrow
at low rates and depositors (the lenders) have no incentive to
monitor what the banks do with their money. This encourages risk
taking that is excessive from an overall social standpoint and was
the major factor in the savings and loan collapse of the 1980s.
Deregulation, by removing a variety of restrictions on permitted
banking activities, has allowed commercial banks to engage in
riskier activities than they previously had been allowed to engage
in, such as investing in derivatives and in subprime mortgages, and
thus deregulation helped to bring on the current credit crunch. At
the same time, investment banks such as Bear Sterns have been
allowed to engage in what is functionally commercial banking; their
lenders do not have deposit insurance--but their lenders are banks
that for the reason stated above are happy to make risky loans.
The
Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 required the FDIC to
base deposit insurance premiums on an assessment of the riskiness of
each banking institution, and last year the Commission issued
regulations implementing the statutory directive. But, as far as I
can judge, the risk-assessed premiums vary within a very narrow band
and are not based on an in-depth assessment of the individual bank’s
riskiness.
Now it
is tempting to think that deregulation has nothing to do with this,
that the problem is that the banks mistakenly believed that their
lending was not risky. I am skeptical. I do not think that bubbles
are primarily due to avoidable error. I think they are due to
inherent uncertainty about when the bubble will burst. You don't
want to sell (or lend, in the case of banks) when the bubble is
still growing, because then you may be leaving a lot of money on the
table. There were warnings about an impending collapse of housing
prices years ago, but anyone who heeded them lost a great deal of
money before his ship came in. (Remember how Warren Buffett was
criticized in the late 1990s for missing out on the high-tech stock
boom.) I suspect that the commercial and investment banks and hedge
funds were engaged in rational risk taking, but that (except in the
case of the smaller hedge funds--the largest, judging from the
bailout of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, are also considered
by federal regulators too large to be permitted to go broke) they
took excessive risks because of the moral hazard created by deposit
insurance and bailout prospects.
Perhaps
what the savings and loan and now the broader financial-industry
crises reveal is the danger of partial deregulation. Full
deregulation would entail eliminating both government deposit
insurance (especially insurance that is not experience-rated or
otherwise proportioned to risk) and bailouts. Partial deregulation
can create the worst of all possible worlds, as the western energy
crisis may also illustrate, by encouraging firms to take risks
secure in the knowledge that the downside risk is truncated.
There has I
think been a tendency of recent Administrations, both Republican and
Democratic but especially the former, not to take regulation very
seriously.
This tendency expresses itself in deep cuts in staff and in the
appointment of regulatory administrators who are either political
hacks or are ideologically opposed to regulation. (I have long
thought it troublesome that Alan Greenspan was a follower of Ayn
Rand.) This would be fine if zero regulation were the social
desideratum, but it is not. The correct approach is to carve down
regulation to the optimal level but then finance and staff and
enforce the remaining regulatory duties competently and in good
faith. Judging by the number of scandals in recent years involving
the regulation of health, safety, and the environment, this is not
being done. And to these examples should probably be added the weak
regulation of questionable mortgage practices and of rating
agencies' conflicts of interest and, more basically, a failure to
appreciate the gravity of the moral hazard problem in the financial
industry. |
If auditors and their clients do not take there professional and ethical
responsibilities more seriously then neither market forces nor regulators will
prevent frauds from increasingly undermining our prized capital markets.
Bob Jensen's Congress to the Core threads are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm
Bob Jensen's Fraud Conclusions are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws
Video: Fora.Tv on Institutional Corruption & The Economy Of Influence
---
http://www.simoleonsense.com/video-foratv-on-institutional-corruption-the-economy-of-influence/
Why single out capitalism for immorality and ethics misbehavior?
Making capitalism ethical is a tough task – and
possibly a hopeless one.
Prem Sikka (see below)
The
global code of conduct of Ernst & Young, another
global accountancy firm, claims that "no client or external relationship is
more important than the ethics, integrity and reputation of Ernst & Young".
Partners and former partners of the firm have also been found
guilty of promoting tax evasion.
Prem Sikka (see below)
Jensen Comment
Yeah right Prem, as if making the public sector and socialism ethical is an
easier task. The least ethical nations where bribery, crime, and immorality are
the worst are likely to be the more government (dictator) controlled and lower
on the capitalism scale. And in the so-called capitalist nations, the lowest
ethics are more apt to be found in the public sector that works hand in hand
with bribes from large and small businesses.
Rotten Fraud in General ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Rotten Fraud in the Public Sector (The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers
We hang the petty thieves and appoint the great ones to public office.
Aesop
Congress is our only native criminal class.
Mark Twain ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Twain
Why should
members of Congress be allowed to profit from insider trading?
Amid broad congressional concern about ethics scandals, some lawmakers are
poised to expand the battle for reform: They want to enact legislation that
would prohibit members of Congress and their aides from trading stocks based on
nonpublic information gathered on Capitol Hill. Two Democrat lawmakers plan to
introduce today a bill that would block trading on such inside information.
Current securities law and congressional ethics rules don't prohibit lawmakers
or their staff members from buying and selling securities based on information
learned in the halls of Congress.
Brody Mullins, "Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading By Lawmakers and Their Aides,"
The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006; Page A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114351554851509761.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
The
Culture of Corruption Runs Deep and Wide in Both U.S. Political Parties: Few if
any are uncorrupted
Committee members have shown no appetite for
taking up all those cases and are considering an amnesty for reporting
violations, although not for serious matters such as accepting a trip from a
lobbyist, which House rules forbid. The data firm PoliticalMoneyLine calculates
that members of Congress have received more than $18 million in travel from
private organizations in the past five years, with Democrats taking 3,458 trips
and Republicans taking 2,666. . . But of course, there are those who deem the
American People dumb as stones and will approach this bi-partisan scandal
accordingly. Enter Democrat Leader Nancy Pelosi, complete with talking points
for her minion, that are sure to come back and bite her .... “House Minority
Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) filed delinquent reports Friday for three trips
she accepted from outside sponsors that were worth $8,580 and occurred as long
as seven years ago, according to copies of the documents.
Bob Parks, "Will Nancy Pelosi's Words Come Back to Bite Her?" The National
Ledger, January 6, 2006 ---
http://www.nationalledger.com/artman/publish/article_27262498.shtml
And when
they aren't stealing directly, lawmakers are caving in to lobbying crooks
Drivers can send their thank-you notes to Capitol
Hill, which created the conditions for this mess last summer with its latest
energy bill. That legislation contained a sop to Midwest corn farmers in the
form of a huge new ethanol mandate that began this year and requires drivers to
consume 7.5 billion gallons a year by 2012. At the same time, Congress refused
to include liability protection for producers of MTBE, a rival oxygen
fuel-additive that has become a tort lawyer target. So MTBE makers are pulling
out, ethanol makers can't make up the difference quickly enough, and gas
supplies are getting squeezed.
"The Gasoline Follies," The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006; Page
A20 ---
Click Here
Once again, the power of pork to sustain incumbents gets its best demonstration
in the person of John Murtha (D-PA). The acknowledged king of earmarks in the
House gains the attention of the New York Times editorial board today, which
notes the cozy and lucrative relationship between more than two dozen
contractors in Murtha's district and the hundreds of millions of dollars in pork
he provided them. It also highlights what roughly amounts to a commission on the
sale of Murtha's power as an appropriator: Mr. Murtha led all House members this
year, securing $162 million in district favors, according to the watchdog group
Taxpayers for Common Sense. ... In 1991, Mr. Murtha used a $5 million earmark to
create the National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence in Johnstown to
develop anti-pollution technology for the military. Since then, it has garnered
more than $670 million in contracts and earmarks. Meanwhile it is managed by
another contractor Mr. Murtha helped create, Concurrent Technologies, a research
operation that somehow was allowed to be set up as a tax-exempt charity,
according to The Washington Post. Thanks to Mr. Murtha, Concurrent has boomed;
the annual salary for its top three executives averages $462,000.
Edward Morrissey, Captain's Quarters, January 14, 2008 ---
http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/archives/016617.php
"Several Democrats, including some closed allied to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, are
the subject of ethics complaints," by Holly Bailey, Newsweek Magazine,
October 3, 2009 ---
http://www.newsweek.com/id/216687
Nancy Pelosi likes to brag that she's
"drained the swamp" when it comes to corruption in the House, but ethics
problems could come back to haunt Democrats in 2010. Democrats are currently
the subject of 12 of the 16 complaints pending before the House ethics
committee. Two of the lawmakers under scrutiny—Reps. Jack Murtha and Charlie
Rangel—have close ties to Pelosi, who has come under criticism for not
asking them to resign their committee posts. Murtha, chairman of a key
defense-appropriations subcommittee, is is not formally under investigation
but the ethics committee is reviewing political contributions he and other
House lawmakers received from lobbying firm whose clients received millions
of dollars in Defense earmarks. Rangel, chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, is facing scrutiny for not fully disclosing assets. The ethics
committee is also looking into ties between Rangel and a developer who
leased rent-controlled apartments to the congressman, and whether Rangel
improperly used his House office to raise funds for a public policy
institute in his name. Rangel and Murtha deny any wrongdoing. (Another
lawmaker under investigation: Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr., who, according to the
committee, "may have offered to raise funds" for then–Illinois governor Rod
Blagojevich in exchange for the president's Senate seat—a charge Jackson
denies. The panel deferred its probe at the request of the Justice
Department, which is conducting its own inquiry.)
Pelosi has said little about Rangel's
ethics problems, or those involving other Democrats; a Pelosi spokesman,
Brendan Daly, e-mails NEWSWEEK, "The speaker has said that [Rangel] should
not step aside while the independent, bipartisan ethics committee is
investigating."
But watchdog groups, not to mention
Republicans, are calling Pelosi hypocritical (as if
they weren't equally hypocritical)
since Democrats won back control of the House by, in part, trashing the
GOP's ethics lapses. Republicans already plan to use the ethics issue
against Democrats in 2010. Though Rangel and Murtha aren't as known as Tom
DeLay, the GOP poster boy for scandal in 2006, the party aims to change
that: this week the House GOP plans to introduce a resolution calling on
Rangel to resign his committee post.
Pelosi "promised to run the most ethical
Congress in history," says Ken Spain, a spokesman for the National
Republican Congressional Committee,
"and instead of cracking down on corruption, she
promotes it (to garner votes in Congress)."
Daly responds, "Since Democrats
took control of Congress, we have strengthened the ethics process." (Daly
has some magnificent ocean front property for sale in Arizona.)
"Can morality be brought to market?" by Prem Sikka, The Guardian,
October 7, 2009 ---
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/07/bae-business-ethics-morality-markets
The
BAE bribery scandal has once again brought
discussions of business ethics to the fore. Politicians also claim to be
interested in promoting
morality in markets, but have not explained how
this can be achieved.
There is no shortage of
companies wrapping themselves in claims of ethical conduct to disarm
critics. BAE boasts a global
code of conduct, which claims that "its leaders
will act ethically, promote ethical conduct both within the company and in
the markets in which we operate". In the light of the revelations about the
way the company secured its business contracts, such claims must be doubted.
BAE is not alone. There is
a huge gap between corporate talk and action, and a few illustrations would
help to highlight this gap. KPMG is one of the world's biggest accountancy
firms. Its
global code of conduct states that the firm is
committed to "acting lawfully and ethically, and encouraging this behaviour
in the marketplace … maintaining independence and objectivity, and avoiding
conflicts of interest". Yet the firm created an extensive organisational
structure to devise
tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes. Former
managers have been
found guilty of tax evasion and the firm was fined
$456m for "criminal
wrongdoing".
The
global code of conduct of Ernst & Young, another
global accountancy firm, claims that "no client or external relationship is
more important than the ethics, integrity and reputation of Ernst & Young".
Partners and former partners of the firm have also been found
guilty of promoting tax evasion.
UBS, a leading bank, has
been fined $780m by the US authorities for
facilitating tax evasion, but it told the world
that "UBS upholds the law, respects regulations and behaves in a principled
way. UBS is self-aware and has the courage to face the truth. UBS maintains
the highest ethical standards."
British Airways paid a
fine of £270m after admitting
price fixing on fuel surcharges on its long-haul
flights while its
code of conduct promised that it would behave
responsibly and ethically towards its customers.
These are just a tiny sample that shows that
corporations say one thing but do something completely different. This
hypocrisy is manufactured by corporate culture, and unless that process is
changed there is no prospect of securing moral corporations or markets.
The key issue is that companies cannot buck the
systemic pressures to produce ever higher profits. Capitalism is not
accompanied by any moral guidance on how high these profits have to be, but
shareholders always demand more. Markets do not ask any questions about the
quality of profits or the human consequences of ever-rising returns. Behind
a wall of secrecy, company directors devise plans to fleece taxpayers and
customers to increase profits, and are rewarded through profit-related
remuneration schemes. The social system provides incentives for unethical
behaviour.
Within companies, daily routines encourage
employees to prioritise profit-making even if that is unethical. For
example, tax departments within major accountancy firms operate as profit
centres. The performance of their employees is assessed at regular
intervals, and those generating profits are rewarded with salary increases
and career advancements. In time, the routines of devising tax avoidance
schemes and other financial dodges become firmly established norms, and
employees are desensitised to the consequences.
With increasing public scepticism, and pressure
from consumer groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), companies
manage their image by publishing high-sounding statements. Ethics itself has
become big business, and armies of consultants and advisers are available
for hire to enable companies to manage their image. No questions are raised
about the internal culture or the economic incentives for misbehaviour. It
is far cheaper for companies to publish glossy brochures than to pay taxes
or improve customer and public welfare. The payment of fines has become just
another business cost.
Making capitalism ethical is a tough task – and
possibly a hopeless one. Any policy for
encouraging ethical corporate conduct has to change the nature of capitalism
and corporations so that companies are run for the benefit of all
stakeholders, rather than just shareholders. Pressures to change corporate
culture could be facilitated by closing down persistently offending
companies, imposing personal penalties on offending executives and offering
bounties to whistleblowers.
Some Great Role Models --- Ha! Ha!
"Dozens in Congress under ethics inquiry:
AN ACCIDENTAL DISCLOSURE Document was found on file-sharing network," by
Ellen Nakashima and Paul Kane, The Washington Post, October 30, 2009 ---
Click Here
The report appears
to have been inadvertently placed on a publicly accessible computer network,
and it was provided to The Washington Post by a source not connected to the
congressional investigations. The committee said Thursday night that the
document was released by a low-level staffer.
The ethics
committee is one of the most secretive panels in Congress, and its members
and staff members sign oaths not to disclose any activities related to its
past or present investigations. Watchdog groups have accused the committee
of not actively pursuing inquiries; the newly disclosed document indicates
the panel is conducting far more investigations than it had revealed.
Shortly after 6
p.m. Thursday, the committee chairman, Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), interrupted a
series of House votes to alert lawmakers about the breach. She cautioned
that some of the panel's activities are preliminary and not a conclusive
sign of inappropriate behavior.
"No inference
should be made as to any member," she said.
Rep. Jo Bonner
(Ala.), the committee's ranking Republican, said the breach was an isolated
incident.
The 22-page
"Committee on Standards Weekly Summary Report" gives brief summaries of
ethics panel investigations of the conduct of 19 lawmakers and a few staff
members. It also outlines the work of the new Office of Congressional
Ethics, a quasi-independent body that initiates investigations and provides
recommendations to the ethics committee. The document indicated that the
office was reviewing the activities of 14 other lawmakers. Some were under
review by both ethics bodies.
A broader inquiry
Ethics committee
investigations are not uncommon. Most result in private letters that either
exonerate or reprimand a member. In some rare instances, the censure is more
severe.
Many of the broad
outlines of the cases cited in the July document are known -- the committee
announced over the summer that it was reviewing lawmakers with connections
to the now-closed PMA Group, a lobbying firm. But the document indicates
that the inquiry was broader than initially believed. It included a review
of seven lawmakers on the House Appropriations defense subcommittee who have
steered federal money to the firm's clients and have also received large
campaign contributions.
The document also
disclosed that:
-- Ethics committee
staff members have interviewed House Ways and Means Chairman Charles B.
Rangel (D-N.Y.) about one element of the complex investigation of his
personal finances, as well as the lawmaker's top aide and his son. Rangel
said he spoke with ethics committee staff members regarding a conference
that he and four other members of the Congressional Black Caucus attended
last November in St. Martin. The trip initially was said to be sponsored by
a nonprofit foundation run by a newspaper. But the three-day event, at a
luxury resort, was underwritten by major corporations such as Citigroup,
Pfizer and AT&T. Rules passed in 2007, shortly after Democrats reclaimed the
majority following a wave of corruption cases against Republicans, bar
private companies from paying for congressional travel.
Rangel said he has
not discussed other parts of the investigation of his finances with the
committee. "I'm waiting for that, anxiously," he said.
The Justice
Department has told the ethics panel to suspend a probe of Rep. Alan B.
Mollohan (D-W.Va.), whose personal finances federal investigators began
reviewing in early 2006 after complaints from a conservative group that he
was not fully revealing his real estate holdings. There has been no public
action on that inquiry for several years. But the department's request in
early July to the committee suggests that the case continues to draw the
attention of federal investigators, who often ask that the House and Senate
ethics panels refrain from taking action against members whom the department
is already investigating.
Mollohan said that
he was not aware of any ongoing interest by the Justice Department in his
case and that he and his attorneys have not heard from federal
investigators. "The answer is no," he said.
-- The committee on
June 9 authorized issuance of subpoenas to the Justice Department, the
National Security Agency and the FBI for "certain intercepted
communications" regarding Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.). As was reported
earlier this year, Harman was heard in a 2005 conversation agreeing to an
Israeli operative's request to try to obtain leniency for two pro-Israel
lobbyists in exchange for the agent's help in lobbying House Speaker Nancy
Pelosi (D-Calif.) to name her chairman of the intelligence committee. The
department, a former U.S. official said, declined to respond to the
subpoena.
Harman said that
the ethics committee has not contacted her and that she has no knowledge
that the subpoena was ever issued. "I don't believe that's true," she said.
"As far as I'm concerned, this smear has been over for three years."
In June 2009, a
Justice Department official wrote in a letter to an attorney for Harman that
she was "neither a subject nor a target" of a criminal investigation.
Because of the
secretive nature of the ethics committee, it was difficult to assess the
current status of the investigations cited in the July document. The panel
said Thursday, however, that it is ending a probe of Rep. Sam Graves (R-Mo.)
after finding no ethical violations, and that it is investigating the
financial connections of two California Democrats.
The committee did
not detail the two newly disclosed investigations. However, according to the
July document, Rep. Maxine Waters, a high-ranking member of the House
Financial Services Committee, came under scrutiny because of activities
involving OneUnited Bank of Massachusetts, in which her husband owns at
least $250,000 in stock.
Waters arranged a
September 2008 meeting at the Treasury Department where OneUnited executives
asked for government money. In December, Treasury selected OneUnited as an
early participant in the bank bailout program, injecting $12.1 million.
The other, Rep.
Laura Richardson, may have failed to mention property, income and
liabilities on financial disclosure forms.
File-sharing
The committee's
review of investigations became available on file-sharing networks because
of a junior staff member's use of the software while working from home,
Lofgren and Bonner said in a statement issued Thursday night. The staffer
was fired, a congressional aide said.
The committee "is
taking all appropriate steps to deal with this issue," they said, noting
that neither the committee nor the House's information systems were breached
in any way.
"Peer-to-peer"
technology has previously caused inadvertent breaches of sensitive
financial, defense-related and personal data from government and commercial
networks, and it is prohibited on House networks.
House
administration rules require that if a lawmaker or staff member takes work
home, "all users of House sensitive information must protect the
confidentiality of sensitive information" from unauthorized disclosure.
Leo Wise, chief
counsel for the Office of Congressional Ethics, declined to comment, citing
office policy against confirming or denying the existence of investigations.
A Justice Department spokeswoman also declined to comment, citing a similar
policy.
The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
"Pay-to-Play Torts Pension middlemen get
investigated; lawyers get a pass," The Wall Street Journal, October
31, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704107204574473310387443816.html?mod=djemEditorialPage
Pay-to-play schemes
involving public officials and the pension funds they oversee are finally
getting the hard look they deserve. Some 36 states are investigating how
financial brokers and other middlemen have used kickbacks and campaign
contributions to gain access to retirement funds. Now if only plaintiffs law
firms would get the same scrutiny.
Like investment funds,
class-action law firms hire intermediaries to help win state business. But
the more common practice is for plaintiffs lawyers to make campaign
contributions to public officials with the goal of being selected by those
same officials to represent the pension fund in securities litigation.
These enormous state funds
are among the world's largest institutional investors, and they frequently
sue companies on behalf of shareholders. The role of pension funds in such
suits became all the more important after the securities-law reform of 1995
that limited the ability of some plaintiffs to file shareholder lawsuits. So
plaintiffs law firms have worked especially hard to turn these pension funds
into business partners in their pursuit of class action riches.
The law firms typically
agree to take the cases on a contingency basis that means no fees up front
but a huge share (30% or more) of any settlement or jury verdict. However,
attorneys suing on the government's behalf are supposed to be neutral actors
whose goal is justice, not lining their own pockets. When for-profit lawyers
are involved with a contingency fee at the end of the lawsuit rainbow, the
incentives shift toward settling to get a big payday.
This month, the New York
Daily News reported that the lawyers representing New York state's $116.5
billion pension fund have received more than a half-billion dollars in
contingency fees over the past decade. Meanwhile, state Comptroller Thomas
DiNapoli, the fund's sole trustee, "has raked in more than $200,000 in
campaign cash from law firms looking to represent the state's pension fund
in big-money suits," the paper reported. Attorneys from one Manhattan firm,
Labaton Sucharow, gave Mr. DiNapoli $47,500 in December 2008, only months
after he chose the firm as lead counsel in a class action suit against
Countrywide Financial. Mr. DiNapoli's office says firms that give money
don't get preferential treatment.
The Empire State is hardly
unusual. Labaton Sucharow has given more than $58,000 to Massachusetts State
Treasurer Timothy Cahill, who recently announced his gubernatorial bid. The
Labaton firm is representing state and county pension funds in more than a
dozen security class action lawsuits.
The Louisiana State
Employees' Retirement System is among the most litigious in the nation. John
Kennedy, the state treasurer who helps decide when Louisiana's major pension
funds should bring a law suit, has received tens of thousands of dollars in
political donations from Bernstein Litowitz, which has offices in New York,
New Orleans and San Diego and was the country's top-grossing securities
class-action firm in 2008. The law firm has represented Louisiana's public
pension funds at least 13 times since 2004, and its partners donated nearly
$30,000 to Mr. Kennedy's two most recent campaigns, even though he ran
unopposed both times.
In Mississippi, the state
attorney general determines when the public employees retirement fund should
bring a securities class action and which outside firms will represent the
fund. Would you be shocked to learn that AG Jim Hood has frequently chosen
law firms that have donated to his campaigns?
Mr. Hood is also partial to
Bernstein Litowitz. On February 21, 2006, he chose the firm to represent the
Mississippi Public Employees Retirement Fund in a securities class action
against Delphi Corporation—just days after receiving $25,000 in donations
from Bernstein Litowitz attorneys. The suit was eventually settled, and the
lawyers on the case received $40.5 million in fees. Mr. Hood's campaign
would appear to deserve a raise.
Back in New York, Attorney
General Andrew Cuomo has garnered banner headlines and much praise for his
pay-to-play pension fund probe that has already led to four guilty pleas by
investors and politicians. Good for him. Yet when asked about pursuing the
trial bar for similar behavior, his office says it has no jurisdiction to go
after law firms in class action suits. He could at least turn down their
campaign money, however.
Mr. Cuomo's campaign happens
to have received $200,000 from securities law firms. Perhaps it's merely a
coincidence that the expected candidate for governor in 2010 doesn't want to
investigate his funders. Mr. Cuomo recently proposed legislation that puts
restrictions on campaign donations from investment firms seeking pension
business. His proposal does not seek the same restrictions on securities law
firms. Perhaps that's another coincidence.
If Mr. Cuomo won't
investigate pay-to-play torts on his own, then someone else should
investigate Mr. Cuomo's relationship with these pay-to-play law firms.
Once again, the power of pork to sustain incumbents
gets its best demonstration in the person of John Murtha (D-PA). The
acknowledged king of earmarks in the House gains the attention of the New York
Times editorial board today, which notes the cozy and lucrative relationship
between more than two dozen contractors in Murtha's district and the hundreds of
millions of dollars in pork he provided them. It also highlights what roughly
amounts to a commission on the sale of Murtha's power as an appropriator: Mr.
Murtha led all House members this year, securing $162 million in district
favors, according to the watchdog group Taxpayers for Common Sense. ... In 1991,
Mr. Murtha used a $5 million earmark to create the National Defense Center for
Environmental Excellence in Johnstown to develop anti-pollution technology for
the military. Since then, it has garnered more than $670 million in contracts
and earmarks. Meanwhile it is managed by another contractor Mr. Murtha helped
create, Concurrent Technologies, a research operation that somehow was allowed
to be set up as a tax-exempt charity, according to The Washington Post. Thanks
to Mr. Murtha, Concurrent has boomed; the annual salary for its top three
executives averages $462,000.
Edward Morrissey, Captain's Quarters, January 14, 2008 ---
http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/archives/016617.php
Many Colleges Turn
Their Ears Toward Congress
Higher education leaders
have long had a love-hate
relationship with earmarks.
On the one hand, they’re
regularly derided by critics
as fostering the waste of
tax dollars and encouraging
a sometimes secretive
circumvention of peer review
in ways that do not
necessarily produce the best
science. But the fact
remains that colleges and
the research initiatives
they house have been among
the key recipients of the
dollars, which some argue
level the research playing
field for less-prestigious
institutions. Public
university presidents
regularly pass through
Washington to lobby their
members of Congress for the
grants; on Monday alone, two
who met with Inside Higher
Ed’s editors boasted that
that was a primary reason
for their visits to town.
Although many members of
Congress defend the grants
as a way for them to reward
constituents who do good
work but are disadvantaged
for a variety of reasons in
traditional competitions for
funds, the grants have come
under increasing scrutiny
from budget hawks and “good
government” types who see
the earmarks as wasteful.
Congress has made several
changes in law and policy
aimed at improving
disclosure of the grants,
with the goal of
embarrassing lawmakers into
providing fewer of them. But
that strategy appears to
have failed miserably so
far; in its 2008 spending
bills, Congress funded
11,000 noncompetitive
projects worth $14 billion —
half the amount delivered in
2007, but about 1,000 more
grants than awarded that
year.
Doug Lederman, 'Bush on
Earmarks: Tough Words,
Little Meaning," Inside
Higher Ed, January 29,
2008 ---
http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/01/29/bush
A company owned by a nephew of Rep. John Murtha
received $4 million from the Defense Department last year for engineering and
warehouse services, The Washington Post reported Tuesday. Murtha, D-Pa., is
chairman of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee. Murtech Inc., based
on Glen Burnie, Md., is owned by the congressman's nephew Robert C. Murtha Jr.,
who told the Post the company provides "necessary logistical support" to
Pentagon testing programs, "and that's about as far as I feel comfortable
going." The Post reported that the Pentagon rewarded contracts to Murtech
without competition.
"Murtha's Nephew Got Millions in Gov't Contracts," Fox News,
May 5, 2009 ---
http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/05/murthas-nephew-got-millions-defense-contracts/
"The Myth of Regulation," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, October
2009 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x67705.xml
Mark Twain remarked that
"There is no distinctively native American criminal class except Congress." He
was wrong. He should have included presidents and the SEC.
On August 4 the SEC
accused General Electric of accounting fraud (Litigation
Release No. 21166), but it chose not to disclose
who committed the frauds and it did not punish the criminals. Instead, the SEC
fined the victims—the shareholders—$50 million. Worse, the SEC protracted the
so-called investigation so long that even if the felons were indicted, the case
likely would get tossed out of court because of the statute of limitations.
This is just one example of many injustices by the SEC during the last decade
that reveals how this agency has supported the efforts of some managers and
directors to defraud the investing public.
I infer that Congress and
recent presidents have approved these activities, for Congress, Bush, and Obama
have done nothing to improve matters. They have given the appearance of caring,
but thwarted any real, effective measures.
Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley and President Bush signed the legislation. But
Sarbanes-Oxley did little to dampen the activities of criminally-minded managers
and directors. This was because it did so little to improve enforcement
activities. Sarbanes-Oxley merely required a variety of studies and increased
penalties and required auditors to report on the firm’s internal controls. But
these actions have not lessened securities fraud or accounting shenanigans.
More recently President
Obama claims to fight the problems that caused the financial crisis by
advocating a new agency. “The Consumer Financial Protection Agency will have
the power to ensure that consumers get information that is clear and concise,
and to prevent the worst kinds of abuses.” Many business writers have critiqued
this proposal for a variety of reasons. I agree with them, but I think there is
a deeper problem and that is the myth of regulation.
What Obama is really
trying to do is give American voters the impression that he is in charge, that
he cares about them, and that he is improving matters so that the chances of
another financial meltdown is infinitesimal. It is political legerdemain.
As long as managers have
perverse incentives to cheat investors and as long as the SEC goes after only
the little guys and ignores managers at Enron, WorldCom, Madoff Investments
Securities, and GE, nothing is going to change. If the Congress and if the
President want to improve matters—and I have no idea if they really do—then they
must change the set of incentives and disincentives. To effect real change, the
system must punish managers and directors who lie and steal and cover it up with
scandalous financial reporting.
More regulation might
make society feel better, but that just is an indication that most Americans
have little understanding of economics. They will continue to lose in the stock
markets until they insist elected officials do something substantive.
My fear is that Democrats
will rally around Obama while Republicans vilify him, similar to the previous
administration when Republicans rallied around Bush and Democrats denigrated
him. There is too much partisanship in this country and not enough rational
analysis. Americans need to understand that both presidents have failed us by
supporting new legislation and by crippling better enforcement. (For whatever
it is worth, this is one of the reasons I am an Independent.)
Jensen Comment
The problem of regulation is that the industries being regulated end up owning
the regulators until the next big scandal makes headlines. Bob Jensen's threads
on the need for better regulation and enforcement are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
The Sorry State of Democratic Party Leadership in
Combating Earmark Fraud and Pork
Democratic Earmark Fraud Nancy Pelosi Does Not Want Investigated
"Pelosi's Pork Problem: The PMA scandal could make
Abramoff look like a piker," The Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2009
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124416236598887387.html
Picture a freight train roaring down the
tracks. Picture House Speaker Nancy Pelosi positioning her party on the
rails. Picture a growing stream of nervous souls diving for the weeds.
Picture all this, and you've got a sense of the Democrats'
earmark-corruption problem.
This particular choo-choo has the name
John Murtha emblazoned on the side, and with each chug is proving that those
who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. Republicans got tossed in 2006
in part for failing to police the earmarks at the center of the Jack
Abramoff and other corruption scandals. Mrs. Pelosi is today leaving her
members exposed to an earmark mess that might make Abramoff look junior
varsity.
Federal investigators are deep into a
criminal investigation of PMA Group, a now-defunct lobby shop founded by a
former aide to Mr. Murtha, Pennsylvania's 18-term star appropriator. The
suspicion is that some members of Congress may have peddled lucrative
earmarks to PMA clients in exchange for campaign contributions. To get a
sense of this probe's scope, consider that last year alone more than 100
members secured earmarks for PMA clients.
Mr. Murtha, who in the past two years
alone directed $78 million to PMA companies, has so far not been accused of
wrongdoing and has proclaimed his innocence. The feds, for their part, are
picking up speed. Federal agents have raided PMA, as well as a defense
contractor to which Mr. Murtha had directed earmarks, Kuchera Defense
Systems. By last week, Mr. Murtha's fellow defense appropriator and
PMA-earmarker, Indiana Rep. Peter Visclosky, had disclosed he'd received
subpoenas in connection with PMA, while the Navy said it had suspended
Kuchera from doing business with it because of "alleged fraud."
The result is growing dissent among
Democrats, on full display this week. On one side is Mrs. Pelosi, who has
demanded her party protect Mr. Murtha, a man hugely responsible for her
ascent. One the other side are younger, first- and second-term Democrats who
won their seats off GOP scandals and who have no interest in sacrificing
them at the back-scratching altar.
Republican Rep. Jeff Flake this week gave
notice he was introducing his ninth resolution calling for an ethics
committee investigation into PMA. This scourge of earmarks worries that,
since the 1990s, some lawmakers have been "refining" earmarking, moving
beyond "bring home the bacon" pork for districts and instead viewing
earmarks as "fund-raising tools" -- a way to deliver money to companies that
produce campaign cash. "We've crossed a line," he tells me. "And we in
Congress need to understand that this is why Justice is interested."
His resolutions are forcing members to
take sides, and with each vote he's peeled off a few more of Mrs. Pelosi's
caucus. His first resolution, in February, got support from 17 Democrats.
These were folks like California's Jerry McNerney, who spent his 2006
campaign lashing his GOP rival to Abramoff. And New Hampshire's Paul Hodes,
who in the same year criticized his opponent for failing to return campaign
donations from former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay.
By last month's Flake resolution, 29
Democrats had jumped on board. Welcome Mike Quigley, newly elected in
Illinois after a campaign focused on Rod Blagojevich. Welcome, too, New
York's Scott Murphy, who in March squeaked out a special-election victory
after attacking his opponent on ethics. Some Democrats have fretted that
even lining up with Mr. Flake won't provide adequate cover from a possible
Murtha train wreck. In April, Mr. Hodes and Arizona Rep. Gabrielle Giffords
debuted a bill to ban lawmakers from taking contributions from companies on
whose behalf they've requested earmarks.
Mrs. Pelosi has relentlessly fought to
tamp down this uprising. In April, she recruited the former top Democrat on
the ethics committee, Howard Berman, to lecture members in a closed-door
meeting as to why they should continue to oppose Mr. Flake. In May, as the
House prepared for another vote, Mrs. Pelosi's assistant, Rep. Chris Van
Hollen, sent an email to staffers warning "Don't Be a Flake" and making
clear defections would not be viewed charitably.
But the news of the Visclosky subpoena,
and the possibility of another Flake vote, this week threatened a mass
revolt. Majority Leader Steny Hoyer pre-empted Mr. Flake with his own
resolution calling on the ethics committee merely to disclose whether it is
already looking at PMA. Democrats then watered this down further by
referring the resolution to committee, where it can be buried. Many of the
GOP's biggest earmarkers, in particular Alaska's Don Young and Florida's
Bill Young, went along with this charade, proving Republicans have yet to
exorcise their own earmark demons.
As political cover goes this is pretty
scant, and Democrats are in control. If and when this train derails, the
exposure could be huge. For Mr. Flake, it's all a bit mindboggling. "This is
a well-trodden path of denial that we Republicans already walked down.
Democrats are now walking down that path. Philosophically, it's nuts."
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 10, 2009
Public Pensions Cook the Books
by Andrew G.
Biggs
The Wall Street Journal
Jul 06, 2009
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Advanced
Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Governmental
Accounting, Market-Value Approach, Pension Accounting
SUMMARY: As
Mr. Biggs, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, puts it,
"public employee pension plans are plagued by overgenerous benefits, chronic
underfunding, and now trillion dollar stock-market losses. Based on their
preferred accounting methods...these plans are underfunded nationally by
around $310 billion. [But] the numbers are worse using market valuation
methods...which discount benefit liabilities at lower interest rates...."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Introducing
the importance of interest rate assumptions, and the accounting itself, for
pension plans can be accomplished with this article.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory)
Summarize the accounting for pension plans, including the process for
determining pension liabilities, the funded status of a pension plan,
pension expense, the use of a discount rate, the use of an expected rate of
return. You may base your answer on the process used by corporations rather
than governmental entities.
2. (Advanced)
Based on the discussion in the article, what is the difference between
accounting for pension plans by U.S. corporations following FASB
requirements and governmental entities following GASB guidance?
3. (Introductory)
What did the administrators of the Montana Public Employees' Retirement
Board and the Montana Teachers' Retirement System include in their
advertisements to hire new actuaries?
4. (Advanced)
What is the concern with using the "expected return" on plan assets as the
rate to discount future benefits rather than using a low, risk free rate of
return for this calculation? In your answer, comment on the author's
statement that "future benefits are considered to be riskless" and the
impact that assessment should have on the choice of a discount rate.
5. (Advanced)
What is the response by public pension officers regarding differences
between their plans and those of corporate entities? How do they argue this
leads to differences in required accounting? Do you agree or disagree with
this position? Support your assessment.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Public Pensions Cook the Books: Some plans want to hide the truth
from taxpayers," by Andrew Biggs, The Wall Street Journal, July 6,
2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124683573382697889.html
Here's a dilemma: You manage a public employee
pension plan and your actuary tells you it is significantly underfunded. You
don't want to raise contributions. Cutting benefits is out of the question.
To be honest, you'd really rather not even admit there's a problem, lest
taxpayers get upset.
What to do? For the administrators of two Montana
pension plans, the answer is obvious: Get a new actuary. Or at least that's
the essence of the managers' recent solicitations for actuarial services,
which warn that actuaries who favor reporting the full market value of
pension liabilities probably shouldn't bother applying.
Public employee pension plans are plagued by
overgenerous benefits, chronic underfunding, and now trillion dollar
stock-market losses. Based on their preferred accounting methods -- which
discount future liabilities based on high but uncertain returns projected
for investments -- these plans are underfunded nationally by around $310
billion.
The numbers are worse using market valuation
methods (the methods private-sector plans must use), which discount benefit
liabilities at lower interest rates to reflect the chance that the expected
returns won't be realized. Using that method, University of Chicago
economists Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh calculate that, even prior to
the market collapse, public pensions were actually short by nearly $2
trillion. That's nearly $87,000 per plan participant. With employee benefits
guaranteed by law and sometimes even by state constitutions, it's likely
these gargantuan shortfalls will have to be borne by unsuspecting taxpayers.
Some public pension administrators have a strategy,
though: Keep taxpayers unsuspecting. The Montana Public Employees'
Retirement Board and the Montana Teachers' Retirement System declare in a
recent solicitation for actuarial services that "If the Primary Actuary or
the Actuarial Firm supports [market valuation] for public pension plans,
their proposal may be disqualified from further consideration."
Scott Miller, legal counsel of the Montana Public
Employees Board, was more straightforward: "The point is we aren't
interested in bringing in an actuary to pressure the board to adopt market
value of liabilities theory."
While corporate pension funds are required by law
to use low, risk-adjusted discount rates to calculate the market value of
their liabilities, public employee pensions are not. However, financial
economists are united in believing that market-based techniques for valuing
private sector investments should also be applied to public pensions.
Because the power of compound interest is so
strong, discounting future benefit costs using a pension plan's high
expected return rather than a low riskless return can significantly reduce
the plan's measured funding shortfall. But it does so only by ignoring risk.
The expected return implies only the "expectation" -- meaning, at least a
50% chance, not a guarantee -- that the plan's assets will be sufficient to
meet its liabilities. But when future benefits are considered to be riskless
by plan participants and have been ruled to be so by state courts, a 51%
chance that the returns will actually be there when they are needed hardly
constitutes full funding.
Public pension administrators argue that government
plans fundamentally differ from private sector pensions, since the
government cannot go out of business. Even so, the only true advantage
public pensions have over private plans is the ability to raise taxes. But
as the Congressional Budget Office has pointed out in 2004, "The government
does not have a capacity to bear risk on its own" -- rather, government
merely redistributes risk between taxpayers and beneficiaries, present and
future.
Market valuation makes the costs of these potential
tax increases explicit, while the public pension administrators' approach,
which obscures the possibility that the investment returns won't achieve
their goals, leaves taxpayers in the dark.
For these reasons, the Public Interest Committee of
the American Academy of Actuaries recently stated, "it is in the public
interest for retirement plans to disclose consistent measures of the
economic value of plan assets and liabilities in order to provide the
benefits promised by plan sponsors."
Nevertheless, the National Association of State
Retirement Administrators, an umbrella group representing government
employee pension funds, effectively wants other public plans to take the
same low road that the two Montana plans want to take. It argues against
reporting the market valuation of pension shortfalls. But the association's
objections seem less against market valuation itself than against the fact
that higher reported underfunding "could encourage public sector plan
sponsors to abandon their traditional pension plans in lieu of defined
contribution plans."
The Government Accounting Standards Board, which
sets guidelines for public pension reporting, does not currently call for
reporting the market value of public pension liabilities. The board
announced last year a review of its position regarding market valuation but
says the review may not be completed until 2013.
This is too long for state taxpayers to wait to
find out how many trillions they owe.
A Sickening Lobbying Effort for Off-Balance-Sheet Financing in IFRS
The International Accounting Standards Board is working
quickly to produce some updated and clarified guidance on how to account for
financial assets and liabilities. The financial meltdown renewed attention on
this matter, as well as the use of special-purpose entities to hold financial
assets, a device that generally gets them off balance sheets. There is still
disagreement on how big of a role off-balance-sheet accounting played in
starting the financial crisis, but banks appear to be against changes that would
bring about greater disclosure of assets and liabilities.
Peter Williams, "Peter Williams Accounting: Off balance – the future of
off-balance sheet transactions," Personal Computer World, July 3, 2009
---
http://www.pcw.co.uk/financial-director/comment/2245360/balance-4729409
A working paper on fair value accounting from Columbia University ---
http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/publicoffering/post/731291/Behind+the+Mark-to-Market+Change#
Bob Jensen's threads on the never-ending OBSF wars ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#OBSF2
"Controlled by the corporations: Before we can deal with a financial
crisis manufactured in boardrooms, we must curb corporate power over our
legislators," by Prem Sikka, The Guardian, January 8, 2008 ---
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/08/financial-crisis-regulation
As we enter the second year of the financial crisis
manufactured in corporate boardrooms, there is hardly any sign of major
reforms. Short-selling of securities was considered to be a major blot on
the financial landscape, but is apparently OK now. The blinkered Financial
Services Authority (FSA) is still wielding its blunt regulatory instruments.
The corporate-controlled Financial Reporting Council (FRC), which did not
monitor the accounts of any bank and had no idea of their off balance sheet
accounting games, is still in place.
The real problem is the nature of neoliberal
democracy. Corporate interests have become central to domestic and foreign
policymaking. With minimum public scrutiny, legislation demanded by
corporate interests is enacted. Legislators are available for hire through
consultancies and are only too willing to do their bidding. Little attention
is paid to the long-term issues, or even consequences for the people, or the
economy.
Continued in article
"Why Congress Won't Investigate Wall Street: Republicans and
Democrats would find themselves in the hot seat," by Thomas Frank, The
Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124096712823366501.html
The famous Pecora Commission of 1933 and 1934 was
one of the most successful congressional investigations of all time, an
instance when oversight worked exactly as it should. The subject was the
massively corrupt investment practices of the 1920s. In the course of its
investigation, the Senate Banking Committee, which brought on as its counsel
a former New York assistant district attorney named Ferdinand Pecora, heard
testimony from the lords of finance that cemented public suspicion of Wall
Street. Along the way, the investigations formed the rationale for the
Glass-Steagall Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and other financial
regulations of the Roosevelt era.
A new round of regulation is clearly in order these
days, and a Pecora-style investigation seems like a good way to jolt the
Obama administration into action. After all, the financial revelations of
today bear a striking resemblance to those of 1933. In his own account of
his investigation, Pecora described bond issues that were almost certainly
worthless, but which 1920s bankers sold to uncomprehending investors anyway.
He told of the bonuses which the bankers thereby won for themselves. He also
told of the lucrative gifts banks gave to lawmakers from both political
parties. And then he told of the banking industry's indignation at being
made to account for itself. It regarded the outraged public, in Pecora's
shorthand, as a "howling mob."
The idea of a new Pecora investigation is catching
on, particularly, but not exclusively, on the left.
It's probably not going to happen, though, in the
comprehensive way that it should. The reason is that understanding our
problems, this time around, would require our political leaders to examine
themselves.
The crisis today is not solely one of bank
misbehavior. This is also about the failure of the regulators -- the Wall
Street policemen who dozed peacefully as the crime of the century went off
beneath the window.
We have all heard the official explanation for this
failure, that "the structure of our regulatory system is unnecessarily
complex and fragmented," in the soothing words of Treasury Secretary Tim
Geithner. But no proper Pecora would be satisfied with such piffle. The
system was not only complex, it was compromised and corrupted and thoroughly
rotten even in the spots where its mandate was simple.
After all, we have for decades been on a national
crusade to slash red tape and stifle regulators. Over the years, federal
agencies have been defunded, their workers have grown dispirited, their
managers, drawn in many cases from antiregulatory organizations, have seemed
to care far more about industry than the public.
Consider in this connection the 2003 photograph,
rapidly becoming an icon of the Bush years, in which James Gilleran, then
the director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (it regulates savings and
loan associations) can be seen in the company of several jolly bank industry
lobbyists, holding a chainsaw to a pile of rule books. The picture not only
tells us more about our current fix than would a thousand pages about
overlapping jurisdictions; it also reminds us why we may never solve the
problem of regulatory failure. To do so, we would have to examine the
apparent subversion of the regulatory system by the last administration. And
that topic is supposedly off limits, since going there would open the door
to endless partisan feuding.
But it's not only Republicans who would feel the
sting of embarrassment. Launching Pecora II would automatically raise this
question: Whatever happened to the reforms put in place after the first
go-round?
Now a different picture comes to mind. It's Bill
Clinton in November of 1999, surrounded by legislators of both parties,
giving a shout-out to his brilliant Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, and
signing the measure that overturned Glass-Steagall's separation of
investment from commercial banking. Mr. Clinton is confident about what he
is doing. He knows the lessons of history, he talks glibly about "the new
information-age global economy" that was the idol of deep thinkers
everywhere in those days. "[T]he Glass-Steagall law is no longer appropriate
to the economy in which we live," he says. "It worked pretty well for the
industrial economy, which was highly organized, much more centralized, and
much more nationalized than the one in which we operate today. But the world
is very different."
It turns out the world hadn't changed much after
all. But the Democratic Party sure had. And while today's chastened
Democrats might be ready to reregulate the banks, they are no more willing
to scrutinize the bad ideas of the Clinton years than Republicans are the
bad ideas of the Bush years.
"We may now need to be reminded what Wall Street
was like before Uncle Sam stationed a policeman at its corner," Pecora wrote
in 1939, "lest, in time to come, some attempt be made to abolish that post."
Well, the time did come. The attempt was made. And
we could use that reminder today.
Broken Promises and
Pork Binges
The Democratic majority came
to power in January
promising to do a better job
on earmarks. They appeared
to preserve our reforms and
even take them a bit
further. I commended
Democrats publicly for this
action. Unfortunately, the
leadership reversed course.
Desperate to advance their
agenda, they began trading
earmarks for votes, dangling
taxpayer-funded goodies in
front of wavering members to
win their support for
leadership priorities.
John
Boehner,
"Pork Barrel Stonewall,"
The Wall Street Journal,
September 27, 2007 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119085546436140827.html
"Earmarks Again Eat
Into the Amount Available
for Merit-Based Research,
Analysis Finds," by
Jeffrey Brainard,
Chronicle of Higher
Education, January 9,
2008 ---
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