Rotten to the Core

Bob Jensen at Trinity University 

Aesop:  We hang the petty thieves and appoint the great ones to public office.
 

The Professions of Investment Banking and Security Analysis are Rotten to the Core  


Timeline of Financial Scandals, Auditing Failures, and the Evolution of International Accounting Standards ---- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm#DerivativesFrauds  (to view on a new page)
For a faster scroll down this same page --- Click Here


Introductory Quotations (including Eliot Spitzer's Case Book)

Securities Fraud History and Highlights

The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws 

Private Equity Crooks

The Vultures Feeding on Insolvency 

Insolvent Vultures Feeding on Creditors and Taxpayers

Mutual Fund, Index Fund, and Insurance Company Scandals  

Investment Banking, Banking, Brokerage, Banking, and Security Analysis Scandals
(Investors are still losing the war in spite of all the promises made.)

Peter, Paul, and Barney: An Essay on 2008 U.S. Government Bailouts of Private Companies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm

The Pension Fund Consulting Racket

Playing Favorites:  Why the Fed Lets Banks Off Easy on Corporate Fraud  

From Enron to Earnings Reports, How Reliable is the Media's Coverage?

Insurance Company Scandals  

Medicare and Medicaid Fraud  

The Crookest of them All:  Lawyers

Credit Rating Agencies

Bob Jensen's threads on how credit card companies are cheating you are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm#FICO

Accelerated share repurchase (ASR) Manipulation of Earnings-Per-Share (EPS)

Real Estate Fraud   

Many Companies Avoided Taxes Even as Profits Soared in Boom 

Billionaires & Accounting Scandals

Ponzi Schemes Where Bernie Madoff Was King

Exploiting the Poor

Fraud at the World Bank

Fraud Around the World  

A Topic for Class Debate 

Women of Wall Street Get Their Day in Court  

Derivative Financial Instruments and "Fairness Opinion" Frauds

LTCM:  The Trillion Dollar Bet

Government Subsidies and Pork Barrels 
U.S. Government Accountability (Governmental Accounting)

Video: Fora.Tv on Institutional Corruption & The Economy Of Influence ---
http://www.simoleonsense.com/video-foratv-on-institutional-corruption-the-economy-of-influence/

Global Corruption (in legal systems) Report 2007 --- http://www.transparency.org/content/download/19093/263155

Accounting Education Shares Some of the Blame --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm#AccountingEducation 

Charity Frauds --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm 

Bob Jensen documents on derivative financial instruments are linked at 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
 

Bob Jensen's glossary on derivative financial instruments is at 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm
 

Monthly Updates on the Above Fraud Categories --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm 

Fraud Detection and Reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm 

Bob Jensen's American History of Fraud ---  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm

Bob Jensen's Other Fraud Documents --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 

White Collar Fraud Site --- http://www.whitecollarfraud.com/
Note the column of links on the left.

Online Searching for Law, Accounting, and Finance --- http://securities.stanford.edu/

Stanford University Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse --- http://securities.stanford.edu/

Securities Law Archives --- http://www.bespacific.com/mt/archives/cat_securities_law.html

Securities and Exchange Commission --- http://www.sec.gov/
Division of Corporation Finance: Current Accounting and Disclosure Issues --- http://www.sec.gov/divisions/corpfin/acctdisc_old.htm

The Heroes of Financial Fraud, The Atlantic, April 2009 --- http://meganmcardle.theatlantic.com/archives/2009/04/the_heroes_of_financial_fraud.php

History of Fraud in America ---  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm

Rotten to the Core --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm

 

Some of the many, many lawsuits settled by auditing firms can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

Recent Financial Reporting and Disclosure Initiatives
  • Initiative to Address Improper Earnings Management
  • Rules Governing Independence of the Accounting Profession
  • New Rules for Audit Committees and Reviews of
    Interim Financial Statements
  • Materiality in the Preparation or Audit of Financial Statements
    (SAB 99)
  • Restructuring Charges, Impairments, and Related Issues (SAB 100)
  • Interpretive Guidance on Revenue Recognition (SAB 101)
  • Proposed Rule for Disclosure about Valuation and Loss Accruals, Long-Lived Assets
  • Proposed Rule for Guarantors and Related Issuers
  • Matters Involving Auditor Independence
  • Recent Enforcement Action -- America Online, Inc.

Other Commission Rules and Proposals Affecting Registration
and Reporting

  • Interpretive Release on the Use of Electronic Media
  • Regulation of Takeovers and Security Holder Communications
  • EDGAR

Current Accounting and Disclosure Issues

  • Segment Disclosure
  • Issues Associated With SFAS 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
  • Amortization Periods Selected for Goodwill
  • Accounting for Intangibles Relating to Customer Relationships
  • Purchase Adjustments to Acquired Company's Loss Accruals
  • Allowance for Loan Losses
  • Internal Costs Associated with an Acquisition
  • Redeemable Securities and "Deemed Liquidation Events"
  • Changes in Functional Currency
  • Effects of Changes to Financial Statements Filed with the Commission in an IPO
  • Market Risk Disclosures
  • Revenue and Cost Recognition in Co-Marketing Arrangements
  • Write-Offs of Prepayments for Services, Occupancy or Usage
  • Cost or Equity Method of Accounting
  • Accounting for Extended Warranty Plans
  • SFAS 45 Guidance Limited to Franchise Agreements
  • Disclosures about "Targeted Stock"
  • Gain on Sale or Securitization of Financial Assets
  • Combining Companies in a Pooling of Interests
  • Issues in the Extractive Industry

Internationalization of the Securities Markets

  • Foreign Issuers in the U.S. Market
  • International Accounting Standards
  • International Disclosure Standards – Amendments to Form 20-F

Other Information About the Division of Corporation Finance
and Other Commission Offices and Divisions

  • The SEC Website and Other Information Outlines
     
  • Corporation Finance Staffing and Phone Numbers
     
  • Division Employment Opportunities for Accountants

Business schools, eager to impart ethics, are paying white-collar felons to recite the error of their ways

"Using Ex-Cons to Scare MBAs Straight," by Porter, Business Week, April 24, 2008 --- Click Here

Bob Jensen's threads on white collar crime include the following links:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm


Question
Where were (are) the lawyers in the recent corporate governance and investment scandals?
Report of the Task Force on the Lawyer's Role in Corporate Governance, New York City Bar, November 2006 --- http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/WSJ-CORP-GOV-FINAL_REPORT.pdf
Bob Jensen's threads on corporate governance are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#Governance

January 29, 2008 message from Sikka, Prem N [prems@essex.ac.uk]

Dear Bob.

Here is an item for your website.

I have been writing regular blogs for The Guardian, a UK national newspaper. The articles are available at http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/prem_sikka/index.html and offer a critical commentary on business and accountancy matters. For three days after each article the website takes readers' comments and colleagues are welcome to add comments, critical or otherwise. The most recent article appeared on 29 January 2008.

There is now also an extensive database of corporate and accountancy misdemeanours on the AABA website ( http://www.aabaglobal.org <https://exchange5.essex.ac.uk/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.aabaglobal.org/> ) and may interest scholars, students, journalists and citizens concerned about the abuse of power.

Regards

Prem Sikka
Professor of Accounting
University of Essex
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ
UK
Office Tel: +44(0)1206 873773
Office Fax: +44 (01206) 873429

Jensen Comment
I added Professor Sikka's message to the following sites:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm

 

Introductory Quotations

Bankers bet with their bank's capital, not their own. If the bet goes right, they get a huge bonus; if it misfires, that's the shareholders' problem.
Sebastian Mallaby. Council on Foreign Relations, as quoted by Avital Louria Hahn, "Missing:  How Poor Risk-Management Techniques Contributed to the Subprime Mess," CFO Magazine, March 2008, Page 53 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10755469/c_10788146?f=magazine_featured
Now that the Fed is going to bail out these crooks with taxpayer funds makes it all the worse.

The bourgeoisie can be termed as any group of people who are discontented with what they have, but satisfied with what they are
Nicolás Dávila

This one on the report card business schools seemed too important to pass up.  I think it relates to the points Dr. Brazil made in the quotation that I placed (with permission) in http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book05q1.htm#020805
(You have to scroll down some distance to find the
Brazil quotation.)

Today's Bourgeoisie
Education molds not just individuals but also common assumptions and conventional wisdom. And when it comes to the business world, our universities - and especially their graduate business schools - are powerful shapers of the culture.

History suggests it was always this way. Even Isaac Newton, of gravity fame but who also held the position of master of the mint, lost money in the South Sea Bubble. He got out, thinking it was a bubble, then got back in when it kept going up. He lost a small fortune in the process when it finally collapsed. Human greed, coupled with hubris, hasn't changed in the four centuries for which we have some sense of economic history.
Lawrence B. Lindsey, "Loosen Deposit Insurance Rules To Prevent a Bank Run," The Wall Street Journal, September 17, 2008 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122161066927045759.html?mod=djemEditorialPage
Jensen Comment
You can read about the South Sea Bubble in 1720 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sea_bubble
The South Sea Company was selling shares in itself and calling it income.

Mortgage Backed Securities are like boxes of chocolates. Criminals on Wall Street and one particular U.S. Congressional Committee stole a few chocolates from the boxes and replaced them with turds. Their criminal buddies at Standard & Poors rated these boxes AAA Investment Grade chocolates. These boxes were then sold all over the world to investors. Eventually somebody bites into a turd and discovers the crime. Suddenly nobody trusts American chocolates anymore worldwide. Hank Paulson now wants the American taxpayers to buy up and hold all these boxes of turd-infested chocolates for $700 billion dollars until the market for turds returns to normal. Meanwhile, Hank's buddies, the Wall Street criminals who stole all the good chocolates are not being investigated, arrested, or indicted. Momma always said: '"Sniff the chocolates first Forrest." Things generally don't pass the smell test if they came from Wall Street or from Washington DC.
Forrest Gump as quoted at http://newsgroups.derkeiler.com/Archive/Rec/rec.sport.tennis/2008-10/msg02206.html


                           Forrest Gump's Momma

The Sleazy Subprime Mortgage Lending Companies Have a New (actually renewed old) Scheme to Make Billions at Taxpayer Expense
As if they haven't done enough damage. Thousands of subprime mortgage lenders and brokers—many of them the very sorts of firms that helped create the current financial crisis—are going strong. Their new strategy: taking advantage of a long-standing federal program designed to encourage homeownership by insuring mortgages for buyers of modest means. You read that correctly. Some of the same people who propelled us toward the housing market calamity are now seeking to profit by exploiting billions in federally insured mortgages. Washington, meanwhile, has vastly expanded the availability of such taxpayer-backed loans as part of the emergency campaign to rescue the country's swooning economy.
Chad Terhune and Robert Berner, "FHA-Backed Loans: The New Subprime The same people whose reckless practices triggered the global financial crisis are onto a similar scheme that could cost taxpayers tons more," Business Week, November 19, 2008 --- http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_48/b4110036448352.htm?link_position=link2
Jensen Comment
That's right. The greedy slime balls "Borne of Sleaze, Bribery, and Lies" are resurfacing with Barney Frank's blessing --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Sleaze

"Financial Reversals:  Everything bad is good again," by  Jacob Sullum, Reason Magazine, November 19, 2008 ---
http://www.reason.com/news/show/130142.html

"Proposed new Bailout Plan," by Andreas Hippin, Bloomberg, November 20, 2008 ---
http://www.wallstreetoasis.com/forums/proposed-new-bailout-plan

The Somali pirates, renegade Somalis known for hijacking ships for ransom in the Gulf of Aden, are negotiating a purchase of Citigroup.

The pirates would buy Citigroup with new debt and their existing cash stockpiles, earned most recently from hijacking numerous ships, including most recently a $200 million Saudi Arabian oil tanker. The Somali pirates are offering up to $0.10 per share for Citigroup, pirate spokesman Sugule Ali said earlier today. The negotiations have entered the final stage, Ali said. ``You may not like our price, but we are not in the business of paying for things. Be happy we are in the mood to offer the shareholders anything," said Ali.

The pirates will finance part of the purchase by selling new Pirate Ransom Backed Securities. The PRBS's are backed by the cash flows from future ransom payments from hijackings in the Gulf of Aden. Moody's and S&P have already issued their top investment grade ratings for the PRBS's.

Head pirate, Ubu Kalid Shandu, said "we need a bank so that we have a place to keep all of our ransom money. Thankfully, the dislocations in the capital markets has allowed us to purchase Citigroup at an attractive valuation and to take advantage of TARP capital to grow the business even faster." Shandu added, "We don't call ourselves pirates. We are coastguards and this will just allow us to guard our coasts better."

I'm suspicious that Andreas Hippin, in the above tidbit, was inspired by "The End" by Michael Lewis
"The End," by Michael Lewis December 2008 Issue The era that defined Wall Street is finally, officially over. Michael Lewis, who chronicled its excess in Liar’s Poker, returns to his old haunt to figure out what went wrong.
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom?tid=true
Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#TheEnd 

From the Financial Clippings Blog on October 22, 2008 --- http://financeclippings.blogspot.com/

I wrote earlier that credit rating agencies seem to be run like protection rackets..

from
CNBC
In a hearing today before the House Oversight Committee, the credit rating agencies are being portrayed as profit-hungry institutions that would give any deal their blessing for the right price.

Case in point: this instant message exchange between two unidentified Standard & Poor's officials about a mortgage-backed security deal on 4/5/2007:

Official #1: Btw (by the way) that deal is ridiculous.

Official #2: I know right...model def (definitely) does not capture half the risk.

Official #1: We should not be rating it.

Official #2: We rate every deal. It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.

A former executive of Moody's says conflicts of interest got in the way of rating agencies properly valuing mortgage backed securities.

Former Managing Director Jerome Fons, who worked at Moody's until August of 2007, says Moody's was focused on "maxmizing revenues," leading it to make the firm more "issuer friendly.
"

Fraud and incompetence among credit rating agencies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies

 


The New York Stock Exchange's report on the pay package given to its former chairman, Dick Grasso, made clear the excessiveness of the compensation and the ineffectiveness of the safety controls that failed to stop it. What the report didn't provide, however, was an answer to an obvious question: Why did nobody on the exchange's board look at that astronomical sum and feel some personal responsibility to find out what was happening?  I can't read minds, but I think it's fair to say that to some extent the players in this drama - as well as those in the ones now being played out in courtrooms and starring former executives of Tyco, WorldCom and HealthSouth - have been shaped by the broader business culture they have worked in for so long. And, as with any situation in which we are puzzled by how a group of people can think in a seemingly odd way, it helps to look back to how they were educated.
Education molds not just individuals but also common assumptions and conventional wisdom. And when it comes to the business world, our universities - and especially their graduate business schools - are powerful shapers of the culture.
Robert J. Shiller, "How Wall Street Learns to Look the Other Way," The New York Times, February 8, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/08/opinion/08shiller.html 

Ending a bitter public fight over whether former New York Stock Exchange Chief Executive Dick Grasso was paid too much, a state appeals court ruled that Mr. Grasso can keep every penny collected from his $187.5 million multiyear compensation package. The 3-to-1 ruling by the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court was a vindication for the relentless Mr. Grasso, who was ousted after details of his lucrative pay were revealed in 2003.
Aaron Lucchetti, "Grasso Wins Court Fight, Can Keep NYSE Pay," The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2008; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121492781324819635.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

Clinton's famously crude remark
And I hope that comes through in the book (Infectious Greed).  I am very critical of the tax law changes that created the incentives for companies to pay executives with stock options, which were made at the beginning of the Clinton Administration to appease populist anti-corporation forces among his supporters by appearing to do something about what, even then, was alleged to be excessive pay for corporate executives.  Not to mention his Administration's hands-off approach to Wall Street (when Arthur Levitt headed the SEC).  There's that great story --- perhaps apocoryphal --- that I recount in the book about Clinton's famously crude remark when he discovered that voters cared much more about whether the stocks were going up than his economic program.
Frank Partnoy, Partnoy's Solutions, welling@weeden, October 21, 2005

Symptoms include "excessive and sometimes fraudulent risks
Add to the growing number of recently diagnosed diseases in America the Icarus Syndrome. This malady, discovered by a law professor, is said to affect corporations in particular. The symptoms include "excessive and sometimes fraudulent risks." The disease has attacked corporate America not only in our own scandal-plagued times but, it seems, since about 1873.  Icarus in the Boardroom (Oxford University Press, 250 pages, $25) is an attempt to alert public-health officials, so to speak, to the dangers of this contagion. David Skeel, a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania, labels all sorts of apparently admirable traits -- "self-confidence, visionary insight, the ability to think outside the box" -- as potential Icaran qualities, full of danger. They "may spur entrepreneurs to take misguided risks," he writes, "in the belief that everything they touch will eventually turn to gold." Fortunately, he offers a number of cures, ranging from small doses of regulation to massive doses of regulation.  And little wonder. What is most interesting about "Icarus in the Boardroom" is the vast divide it reveals -- between American lawyers who study corporations and, well, everybody else. Following common sense and economic logic, most people view corporate risk-taking and corporate fraud as different things: Fraud involves lying; risk-taking does not. As in the case of Enron and WorldCom, fraudulent executives often misstate how much risk their investors will assume.  For academic lawyers such as Mr. Skeel, however, it seems that risk-taking and fraud are points on a continuum. Risk-taking quickly fades into "excessive" risk-taking, which then morphs into fraud. Mr. Skeel never says just how we are to distinguish acceptable risks from the excessive and fraudulent kind. Apparently, though, lawmakers and regulators will figure out a formula, for it falls to them, in Mr. Skeel's view, "to prevent risk-taking that edges toward market manipulation or fraud."
Jonathan R. Macey, "A Risky Proposition," The Wall Street Journal,  March 15, 2005; Page D8 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111083993718979142,00.html?mod=todays_us_personal_journal 

That some bankers have ended up in prison is not a matter of scandal, but what is outrageous is the fact that all the others are free.

Honoré de Balzac

Two months ago, shortly before Japan ordered Citigroup to close its private banking unit there for, among other things, failing to guard against money laundering, Charles O. Prince, the chief executive, commissioned an independent examination of his bank's lapses. When he received the assessment in mid-October, he got an eyeful.
"It's Cleanup Time at Citi," by Timothy L. O'Brien and Landon Thomas, Jr., The New York Times, November 7, 2004 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/07/business/yourmoney/07citi.html  

 

The Sleazy Subprime Mortgage Lending Companies Have a New (actually renewed old) Scheme to Make Billions at Taxpayer Expense
As if they haven't done enough damage. Thousands of subprime mortgage lenders and brokers—many of them the very sorts of firms that helped create the current financial crisis—are going strong. Their new strategy: taking advantage of a long-standing federal program designed to encourage homeownership by insuring mortgages for buyers of modest means. You read that correctly. Some of the same people who propelled us toward the housing market calamity are now seeking to profit by exploiting billions in federally insured mortgages. Washington, meanwhile, has vastly expanded the availability of such taxpayer-backed loans as part of the emergency campaign to rescue the country's swooning economy.
Chad Terhune and Robert Berner, "FHA-Backed Loans: The New Subprime The same people whose reckless practices triggered the global financial crisis are onto a similar scheme that could cost taxpayers tons more," Business Week, November 19, 2008 --- http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/08_48/b4110036448352.htm?link_position=link2
Jensen Comment
That's right. The greedy slime balls "Borne of Sleaze, Bribery, and Lies" are resurfacing with Barney Frank's blessing --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Sleaze

"Financial Reversals:  Everything bad is good again," by  Jacob Sullum, Reason Magazine, November 19, 2008 ---
http://www.reason.com/news/show/130142.html

"Proposed new Bailout Plan," by Andreas Hippin, Bloomberg, November 20, 2008 ---
http://www.wallstreetoasis.com/forums/proposed-new-bailout-plan

The Somali pirates, renegade Somalis known for hijacking ships for ransom in the Gulf of Aden, are negotiating a purchase of Citigroup.

The pirates would buy Citigroup with new debt and their existing cash stockpiles, earned most recently from hijacking numerous ships, including most recently a $200 million Saudi Arabian oil tanker. The Somali pirates are offering up to $0.10 per share for Citigroup, pirate spokesman Sugule Ali said earlier today. The negotiations have entered the final stage, Ali said. ``You may not like our price, but we are not in the business of paying for things. Be happy we are in the mood to offer the shareholders anything," said Ali.

The pirates will finance part of the purchase by selling new Pirate Ransom Backed Securities. The PRBS's are backed by the cash flows from future ransom payments from hijackings in the Gulf of Aden. Moody's and S&P have already issued their top investment grade ratings for the PRBS's.

Head pirate, Ubu Kalid Shandu, said "we need a bank so that we have a place to keep all of our ransom money. Thankfully, the dislocations in the capital markets has allowed us to purchase Citigroup at an attractive valuation and to take advantage of TARP capital to grow the business even faster." Shandu added, "We don't call ourselves pirates. We are coastguards and this will just allow us to guard our coasts better."

I'm suspicious that Andreas Hippin, in the above tidbit, was inspired by "The End" by Michael Lewis
"The End," by Michael Lewis December 2008 Issue The era that defined Wall Street is finally, officially over. Michael Lewis, who chronicled its excess in Liar’s Poker, returns to his old haunt to figure out what went wrong.
http://www.portfolio.com/news-markets/national-news/portfolio/2008/11/11/The-End-of-Wall-Streets-Boom?tid=true
Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#TheEnd 

From the Financial Clippings Blog on October 22, 2008 --- http://financeclippings.blogspot.com/

I wrote earlier that credit rating agencies seem to be run like protection rackets..

from
CNBC
In a hearing today before the House Oversight Committee, the credit rating agencies are being portrayed as profit-hungry institutions that would give any deal their blessing for the right price.

Case in point: this instant message exchange between two unidentified Standard & Poor's officials about a mortgage-backed security deal on 4/5/2007:

Official #1: Btw (by the way) that deal is ridiculous.

Official #2: I know right...model def (definitely) does not capture half the risk.

Official #1: We should not be rating it.

Official #2: We rate every deal. It could be structured by cows and we would rate it.

A former executive of Moody's says conflicts of interest got in the way of rating agencies properly valuing mortgage backed securities.

Former Managing Director Jerome Fons, who worked at Moody's until August of 2007, says Moody's was focused on "maxmizing revenues," leading it to make the firm more "issuer friendly.
"

Fraud and incompetence among credit rating agencies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies

In the years after Enron, many chief executives had been operating in a defensive crouch. Last year, however, they switched to offense, yelping about the new securities rules — way too strict and so time-consuming — and whining that Eliot Spitzer and his meddlesome investigations could wreck the nation’s economy. The United States Chamber of Commerce even sued the Securities and Exchange Commission, hoping to overturn its new rule requiring mutual fund chairmen to be independent.  So as 2005 dawns, it is again time to grant the Augustus Melmotte Memorial Prizes, named for the charlatan who parades through “The Way We Live Now,” the novel by Anthony Trollope. Mr. Melmotte, who would fit just fine into today’s business world, is a confidence man who takes London by storm in the late 1800’s.
Gretchen Morgensen, "The Envelopes, Please," The New York Times, January 1, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/01/01/business/yourmoney/02award.backup.html?oref=login 
Bob Jensen's threads on corporate governance are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#Governance 

Who's Preying on Your Grandparents?
Back in February, Jose and Gloria Aquino received a flier in the mail inviting them to a free seminar on one of their favorite topics: protecting their financial assets. As retirees, they were always on the lookout for safe investment strategies as well as tips on how to make sure they didn't outlive their savings. Besides, the flier promised a free lunch for anyone attending the workshop, so what did they have to lose? Potentially plenty, they would soon discover.
Gretchen Morgenson, "Who's Preying on Your Grandparents?" The New York Times, May 15, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/05/15/business/yourmoney/15vict.html?

How the Gatekeepers Failed in Their Responsibilities to Protect the Public from Corporate and Banking Fraud

Brooksley Born, chair of the Commodity Futures Trading Commission --- suggested that government should at least study whether some regulation might make sense, a stampede of lobbyists, members of Congress, and other regulators --- including Alan Greenspan and Robert Rubin --- ran her over, admonishing her to keep quiet.  Derivatives tightened the connections among various markets, creating enormous financial benefits and making global transacting less costly --- no one denied that.  But they also raised the prospect of a system-wide breakdown.  With each crisis, a few more dominos fell, and regulators and market participants increasingly expressed concerns about systematic risk --- a term that described a financial-market epidemic.  After Long-Term Capital collapsed, even Alan Greenspan admitted that the financial markets had been close to the brink.  
Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed (Henry Holt and Company, 2004, Page 229)

Throughout 1994 and 1995, Brickell (the banking industry's pit bull in Washington) and Levitt (Head of the SEC) worked to protect the finance industry from new legislation.  In early 1994, lobbyists waited for investors to calm down from the shock of how much money-fund managers and corporate treasures had lost gambling on interest rates.  When legislation was introduced, Brickell fought it and Levitt gave speeches saying the financial industry should police itself.  The issues were complicated, and the public --- once angered by the various scandals ---  ultimately lost interest.  Instead of new derivatives regulation, Congress, various federal agencies, and even the Supreme Court created new legal rules that insulated Wall Street from liability and enabled financial firms to regulate themselves.   Under the influence of Levitt and Brickell, regulators essentially left the abuses of the 1990s to what Justice Cardozo had called the "morals of the market place."
Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed (Henry Holt and Company, 2004, Page 143)

In God, but not our financial advisor, we trust!
Declining trust has spurred some 25% of the affluent investors surveyed to move a portion of their assets out of their financial-services firms in the past two years, according to a study by Spectrem Group, a Chicago research and consulting firm. A litany of complaints, including poor investment performance, conflicts of interest, hidden fees and financial scandals, prompted wealthy investors to move their business elsewhere.
Rachel Emma Silverman, "
Wealthy Lose Trust in Advisers," The Wall Street Journal, February 2, 2005, Page D2 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110730662305243216,00.html?mod=todays_us_personal_journal 

One of the world's most widely known and respected economists, Henry Kaufman is almost single-handedly responsible for founding the spectator sport known as "Fed watching." He began a 26-year career at Salomon Brothers in 1962, when he was probably the only Wall Street employee with a doctorate. There he built one of the most prestigious securities research departments and became a senior partner and vice chairman. In the last 30 years, he has been one of the most vocal critics of insufficient financial oversight and regulation, and his pronouncements and prognostications have often moved markets. We interviewed Dr. Kaufman in his New York office, where he heads his own international economic consulting firm.
Wall Street Wisdom ---
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/feature/-/41979/102-2649781-5248131 

Question
What is the SEC's new NMS?
In the best possible marketplace, all buyers see the prices asked by all sellers and all sellers see the prices offered by all buyers -- and little guys are treated the same as big ones. The result: competition that insures the most efficient interplay of supply and demand. In theory, it sounds great. And indeed, this is the idea behind the Security and Exchange Commission's push for an integrated stock market called the National Market System, or NMS. But could the best intentions backfire? Wharton finance professor Marshall E. Blume answers that question in a new research paper titled, "Competition and Fragmentation in the Equity Markets: The Effect of Regulation NMS."
"Will the SEC's National Market System Stifle the Innovation It Hopes to Promote?" Wharton Business School at the University of Pennsylvania, Knowledge@Wharton, April 4, 2007 --- Click Here

Question
"U.S. Securities Law: Does 'High Intensity' Enforcement Pay Off?
" Knowledge@Wharton, May 30, 2007 ---
Click Here

Strong enforcement is critical to obtaining good governance and adding value to corporations, and investors stand to gain from it.

. . .

In the U.K., the FSA budget for enforcement is between 12.5% and 13% of its total budget, which Coffee said is consistent with many other countries. The SEC spends around 40% of its overall budget on enforcement, and Australia spends even more -- nearly 47% in 2005. Coffee also noted that the SEC has 1,200 attorneys working full time for the agency. The FSA, he said, maintains a "skeletal" legal staff and outsources cases when necessary. In Britain and many other countries, regulators place more emphasis on negotiating settlements to avoid formal enforcement actions. "They don't like to keep a legal enforcement staff because they see enforcement as a last-ditch effort."

. . .

In the wake of corporate scandals in the U.S., criminal enforcement is the "ultimate deterrence," Coffee said. Citing research from cases between 1978 and 2004, he noted that some 755 individuals and 40 firms were indicted for "financial misrepresentation," which he said is just a small subset of securities violations. In all, 1,230.7 years of incarceration and 397.5 years of probation were imposed, with an average sentence of 4.2 years.

Continued in article


There's a shelf of financial bestsellers whose titles now sound absurd: Ravi Batra's The Great Depression of 1990; James Glassman's Dow 36,000; Harry Figgie's Bankruptcy 1995: The Coming Collapse of America and How to Stop It. There’s BusinessWeek’s 1979 description of "the death of equities as a near permanent condition,
Michael Lewis, "The Evolution of an Investor," Blaine-Lourd Profile, December 2007 ---
http://www.portfolio.com/executives/features/2007/11/19/Blaine-Lourd-Profile#page3
As quoted by Jim Mahar in his Finance Professor Blog at http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

As a group, professional money managers control more than 90 percent of the U.S. stock market. By definition, the money they invest yields returns equal to those of the market as a whole, minus whatever fees investors pay them for their services. This simple math, you might think, would lead investors to pay professional money managers less and less. Instead, they pay them more and more...Nobody knows which stock is going to go up. Nobody knows what the market as a whole is going to do, not even Warren Buffett. A handful of people with amazing track records isn’t evidence that people can game the market. Nobody knows which company will prove a good long-term investment. Even Buffett’s genius lies more in running businesses than in picking stocks. But in the investing world, that is ignored. Wall Street, with its army of brokers, analysts, and advisers funneling trillions of dollars into mutual funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds, is an elaborate fraud.
Michael Lewis, "The Evolution of an Investor," Blaine-Lourd Profile, December 2007 ---
http://www.portfolio.com/executives/features/2007/11/19/Blaine-Lourd-Profile#page3
As quoted by Jim Mahar in his Finance Professor Blog at http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/


A second paper in this series will examine the theoretical justifications for the importance of the stock market as perhaps the central financial institution in the United States.
"Who Needs the Stock Market? Part I: The Empirical Evidence," by Lawrence E. Mitchell George Washington University - Law School, SSRN, October 30, 2008 --- http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1292403

Data on historical and current corporate finance trends drawn from a variety of sources present a paradox. External equity has never played a significant role in financing industrial enterprises in the United States. The only American industry that has relied heavily upon external financing is the finance industry itself. Yet it is commonly accepted among legal scholars and economists that the stock market plays a valuable role in American economic life, and a recent, large body of macroeconomic work on economic development links the growth of financial institutions (including, in the U.S, the stock market) to growth in real economic output. How can this be the case if external equity as represented by the stock market plays an insignificant role in financing productivity? This paradox has been largely ignored in the legal and economic literature.

This paper surveys the history of American corporate finance, presents original and secondary data demonstrating the paradox, and raises questions regarding the structure of American capital markets, the appropriate rights of stockholders, the desirable regulatory structure (whether the stock market should be regulated by the Securities and Exchange Commission or the Commodities Futures Trading Commission, for example), and the overall relationship between finance and growth.

The answers to these questions are particularly pressing in light of a dramatic increase in stock market volatility since the turn of the century creating distorted incentives for long-term corporate management, especially trenchant in light of the recent global financial collapse.

A second paper in this series will examine the theoretical justifications for the importance of the stock market as perhaps the central financial institution in the United States.


Shocking 25 Minute Video
A Rigged Trading System: "The odds are better in Las Vegas than on Wall Street"
This is the same fraud as the one committed by Max in the Broadway show called The Producers (watch the Bloomberg video of how the fraud works)
Max sold over 100% of the shares in his play.
A fraudulent market manipulation contributed to the Wall Street meltdown
Phantom Shares and Market Manipulation (Bloomberg News video on naked short selling) --- http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4490541725797746038


Labor Unions Want Less Financial Disclosure and accountability

From day one of the Obama era, union leaders want the lights dimmed on how they spend their mandatory member dues. The AFL-CIO's representative on the Obama transition team for Labor is Deborah Greenfield, and we're told her first inspection stop was the Office of Labor-Management Standards, or OLMS, which monitors union compliance with federal law. Ms. Greenfield declined to comment, citing Obama transition rules, but her mission is clear enough. The AFL-CIO's formal "recommendations" to the Obama team call for the realignment of "the allocation of budgetary resources" from OLMS to other Labor agencies. The Secretary should "temporarily stay all financial reporting regulations that have not gone into effect," and "revise or rescind the onerous and unreasonable new requirements," such as the LM-2 and T-1 reporting forms. The explicit goal is to "restore the Department of Labor to its mission and role of advocating for, protecting and advancing the interests of workers." In other words, while transparency is fine for business, unions are demanding a pass for themselves.
"Quantum of Solis Big labor wants Obama to dilute union disclosure rules," The Wall Street Journal, December 21, 2008 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122990431323225179.html?mod=djemEditorialPage

 


The entire year 2006 ethics flap about climbers not rendering aid to a supposedly dying climber on Mt. Everest was preceded by a great 1983 real world case called the Parable of the Sadhu from the Harvard Business School --- Click Here

The Parable of the Sadhu was and still is widely used in ethics courses, especially regarding issues of situational ethics and group versus individual ethics. The author Bowen H. McCoy was the managing director of the investment banking firm Morgan Stanley & Co. After returning to New York, McCoy was conscious stricken about leaving a dying religious man during an Everest climb. The climbers at that time shed some clothes to keep the dying man warm. But climbers from various nations (U.S., Switzerland, and Japan) actually moved on and did not help the man down to shelter because they all felt that he was going to die in any case. Also, the weather was such that the climbers could not complete their climbing goal if they delayed to carry the dying man to shelter.

McCoy wrote the following after returning to New York:

We do not know if the sadhu lived or died. For many of the following days and evenings Stephen and I discussed and debated our behavior toward the sadhu. Stephen is a committed Quaker with deep moral vision. He said, "I feel that what happened with the Sadhu is a good example of the breakdown between the individual ethic and the corporate ethic. No one person was willing to assume ultimate responsibility for the sadhu. Each was willing to do his bit just so long as it was not too inconvenient. When it got to be a bother everyone just passed the buck to someone else and took off . . . "

. . .

Despite my arguments, I feel and continue to feel guilt about the sadhu. I had literally walked through a classic moral dilemma without fully thinking through the consequences. My excuses for my actions include a high adrenaline flow, super-ordinate goal, and a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity --- factors in the usual corporate situation, especially when one is under stress.

Real moral dilemmas are ambiguous and many of us hike right through them, unaware that they exist. When, usually after the fact, someone makes an issue of them, we tend to resent his or her bringing it up. Often, when the full import of what we have done (or not done) falls on us, we dig into a defensive position from which it is very difficult to emerge. In rare circumstances we may contemplate what we have done from inside a prison.

Had we mountaineers have been free of physical and mental stress caused by the effort and the high altitude, we might have treated the sadhu differently. Yet isn't stress the real test of personal and corporate values? The instant decisions executives make under pressure reveal the most about personal and corporate character.

Among the many questions that occur to me when pondering my experience are:  What are the practical limits of moral imagination and vision? Is there a collective or institutional ethic beyond the ethics of the individual? At what level of effor or commitment can one discharge one's ethical responsibilities?

Continued in this 1983 Harvard Business School Case.

Jensen Comment
I might add that this 1983 case was written before the breakdown in ethics during the 1990s high tech bubble in which investment banking, executive compensation, corporate governance, and corporate ethics in general sometimes become Congress to the core --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm

********************

You can read more about the 2006 repeat of the dilemma at
"Everest pioneer appalled that climber was left to die," by Steve McMorran, Seattle Times, May 25, 2006 --- http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/nationworld/2003017177_everest25.html

May 28, 2006 reply from Andrew Priest [a.priest@ECU.EDU.AU]

Hi Bob

And you can contrast this action and the 2006 with the help given to Lincoln Hall again this year (events still going on). Lincoln was left on the mountain, assumed dead. He was not and is lower down the mountain and doing okay. Details at < http://www.mounteverest.net/news.php?id=3315and more details at
< http://www.mounteverest.net/news.php?id=3311> .

Compassion and caring wins out every time in my view over selfishness.

Andrew


"Remarks by Chairman Alan Greenspan Before a conference sponsored by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Washington, D.C. October 14, 1999 --- http://federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/speeches/1999/19991014.htm 

Measuring Financial Risk in the Twenty-first Century

During a financial crisis, risk aversion rises dramatically, and deliberate trading strategies are replaced by rising fear-induced disengagement. Yield spreads on relatively risky assets widen dramatically. In the more extreme manifestation, the inability to differentiate among degrees of risk drives trading strategies to ever-more-liquid instruments that permit investors to immediately reverse decisions at minimum cost should that be required. As a consequence, even among riskless assets, such as U.S. Treasury securities, liquidity premiums rise sharply as investors seek the heavily traded "on-the-run" issues--a behavior that was so evident last fall.

As I have indicated on previous occasions, history tells us that sharp reversals in confidence occur abruptly, most often with little advance notice. These reversals can be self-reinforcing processes that can compress sizable adjustments into a very short period. Panic reactions in the market are characterized by dramatic shifts in behavior that are intended to minimize short-term losses. Claims on far-distant future values are discounted to insignificance. What is so intriguing, as I noted earlier, is that this type of behavior has characterized human interaction with little appreciable change over the generations. Whether Dutch tulip bulbs or Russian equities, the market price patterns remain much the same.

We can readily describe this process, but, to date, economists have been unable to anticipate sharp reversals in confidence. Collapsing confidence is generally described as a bursting bubble, an event incontrovertibly evident only in retrospect. To anticipate a bubble about to burst requires the forecast of a plunge in the prices of assets previously set by the judgments of millions of investors, many of whom are highly knowledgeable about the prospects for the specific investments that make up our broad price indexes of stocks and other assets.

Nevertheless, if episodic recurrences of ruptured confidence are integral to the way our economy and our financial markets work now and in the future, the implications for risk measurement and risk management are significant.

Probability distributions estimated largely, or exclusively, over cycles that do not include periods of panic will underestimate the likelihood of extreme price movements because they fail to capture a secondary peak at the extreme negative tail that reflects the probability of occurrence of a panic. Furthermore, joint distributions estimated over periods that do not include panics will underestimate correlations between asset returns during panics. Under these circumstances, fear and disengagement on the part of investors holding net long positions often lead to simultaneous declines in the values of private obligations, as investors no longer realistically differentiate among degrees of risk and liquidity, and to increases in the values of riskless government securities. Consequently, the benefits of portfolio diversification will tend to be overestimated when the rare panic periods are not taken into account.

The uncertainties inherent in valuations of assets and the potential for abrupt changes in perceptions of those uncertainties clearly must be adjudged by risk managers at banks and other financial intermediaries. At a minimum, risk managers need to stress test the assumptions underlying their models and set aside somewhat higher contingency resources--reserves or capital--to cover the losses that will inevitably emerge from time to time when investors suffer a loss of confidence. These reserves will appear almost all the time to be a suboptimal use of capital. So do fire insurance premiums.

The above is only a quotation from the speech.

UNEQUAL TREATMENT:  Congress to the Core

"Playing Favorites:  Why Alan Greenspan's Fed lets banks off easy on corporate fraud," by Ronald Fink, CFO Magazine, April 2004, pp. 46-54 --- http://www.cfo.com/article/1,5309,12866||M|886,00.html 

The module below is not in the above online version of the above article.  However, it is on Page 51 of the printed version.

UNEQUAL TREATMENT

IF THE FEDERAL RESERVE BOARD AND THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE Commission pursue the same agenda, why were Merrill Lynch & Co. and the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce (CIBC) treated so differently by the Corporate Fraud Task Force--a team with representatives from the SEC, the FBI, and the Department of Justice (DoJ) set up to prosecute perpetrators of Enron's fraud--than were Citigroup and J. P. Morgan Chase & Co.?  After all, all four banks did much the same thing.

Under settlements signed with the SEC last July, Citigroup and Chase were fined a mere $101 million (including $19 million for its actions relating to a similar fraud involving Dynegy) and $135 million, respectively, which amounts to no more than a week of either's most recent annual earnings.  And they agreed, in effect, to cease and desist from doing other structured-finance deals that mislead investors.  That contrasts sharply with the punishment meted out by the DoJ to Merrill and CIBC, each of which not only paid $80 million in fines, but also agreed to have their activities monitored by a supervising committee that reports to the DoJ.  Even more striking, CIBC agreed to exit not only the structured-finance business but also the plain-vanilla commercial--paper conduit trade for three years.  No regulatory agency involved in the settlements would comment on the cases, though the SEC's settlement with Citigroup took note of the bank's cooperation in the investigation.

But Brad S. Karp, an attorney with the New York firm Paul, Weiss, Rifkind, Wharton & Garrison LLP, suggested recently that the terms of the SEC settlement with its client, Citigroup, reflected a lack of knowledge or intent on the bank's part.  As Karp noted more than once at a February conference on legal issues and compliance facing bond-market participants, the SEC's settlement with Citigroup was ex scienter, a Latin legal phrase meaning "without knowledge."

However, the SEC's administrative order to Citigroup cited at least 13 instances where the bank was anything but in the dark about its involvement in Enron's fraud.

As Richard H. Walker, former director of the SEC's enforcement division and now general counsel of Deutsche Bank's Corporate and Investment Bank, puts it, all the banks involved in Enron's fraud "had knowledge" of it.  Yet Walker isn't surprised by their disparate treatment at the hands of regulators.  "The SEC does things its way," he says, "and the Fed does them another."  *Ronald Fink and Tim Reason



The just don't get it!  Chartered Jets, a Wedding At Versailles and Fast Cars To Help Forget Bad Times.

As financial companies start to pay out big bonuses for 2003, lavish spending by Wall Streeters is showing signs of a comeback. Chartered jets and hot wheels head a list of indulgences sparked by the recent bull market.
Gregory Zuckerman and Cassell Bryan-Low, "With the Market Up, Wall Street High Life Bounces Back, Too," The Wall Street Journal, February 4, 2004 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107584886617919763,00.html?mod=home%5Fpage%5Fone%5Fus 


Scandals Are a Hot Topic in College Courses --- http://www.smartpros.com/x42201.xml 

Most of us enter the investment business for the same sanity-destroying reasons a woman becomes a prostitute:  It avoids the menace of hard work, is a group activity that requires little in the way of intellect, and is a practical means of manking money for those with no special talent for anything else.
Richard New, The Wall Street Jungle (as quoted by Frank Partnoy in FIASCO:  The Inside Story of a Wall Street Trader.)

Behind every great fortune there lies a great crime.
Honore de Balzac (as quoted by Frank Partnoy in FIASCO:  The Inside Story of a Wall Street Trader.)

But for Freddie Mac, the other pillar of the colossal U.S. mortgage market, Freddie Mac's restatement has only caused headaches and has even raised new questions about the quality of financial reporting.
Patrick Barta, "Restatement by Freddie Mac Puts Fannie on the Spot," The Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2004, Page C1.

The problem is the companies' (Freddie Mac versus Fannie Mae) business and financial statements have become so complex that they are effectively "unanalyzable" says James Bianco, president of Bianco Research, a Chicago-based fixed-income research firm that has been critical of Fannie and Freddie in the past.  He says the same is becoming true of other large financial institutions, particularly those that, like Fannie and Freddie, use large volumes of derivatives, which are investment contracts that can be used by companies to offset risk from interest rate shifts.
Ibid

The Timeline of the Recent History of Fannie Mae Scandals 2002-2008 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FannieMae
"Fannie Mayhem: A History," The Wall Street Journal, July 14, 2008

So what's a little business deal among friends?  It's trouble, if the friends are college or college-foundation trustees who benefit personally from the decisions they make on behalf of the institutions they serve.  
Julianne Basinger, "Boars Crack Down on Members' Insider Benefits," The Chronicle of Higher Education, February 6. 2004, Page A1.

Mutual-fund investors sent a record $14 billion in net assets to exchange-traded funds last month as they sought escape from the recent share-trading scandal.
Aaron Lucchetti, The Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2004 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107482213730209735,00.html?mod=mkts_main_news_hs_h 

S. Scott Voynich, Chair of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, has stated that further changes were necessary to regain the confidence of American investors. Voynich was the keynote speaker at the Institute’s 2003 AICPA National Conference on Current SEC Developments  .
http://accountingeducation.com/news/news4675.html
 

Nothing wrong with overcharging, so long as everyone else is doing it, right?
Gretchen Morgenson"The Mutual Fund Scandal's Next Chapter," The New York Times, December 7, 2003
(See below)

Are you disgusted enough with mutual funds to raise a stink?  So far, savers don't seem nearly as outraged as they were about Enron--yet deceptive funds and sneaky "financial advisers" have swiped more money, from more people, than all the corporate scandals combined.  The House of Representatives just passed a reform bill, but in the Senate, the going looks tough.  Your legislators are scooping up money from the mutual-fund lobby, which hopes to head off any major change.  To counter the lobby, Congress needs angry protest calls from voters like you.
Jane Bryant Quinn (See Below)

One the one hand, eliminating the middleman would result in lower costs, increased sales, and greater consumer satisfaction;  on the other hand, we're the middleman.
New Yorker Cartoon, Page 29, The New Yorker Book of Business Cartoons
In the context of the recent mutual fund scandals, financial advisors have become those middlemen.

Boyer had also asked Kmart's auditors at PricewaterhouseCoopers in several cases to look into various accounting issues and was unsatisfied with the firm's work, according to the lawsuit.
"Fired From Kmart, Ex-CFO Is Key Figure in Lawsuits," SmartPros (See below)

"I believe this (mutual fund rip-off) is the worst scandal we've seen in 50 years, and I can't say I saw it coming," said Arthur Levitt, the former chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission for nearly eight years under the Clinton administration. "I probably worried about funds less than insider trading, accounting issues and fair disclosure to investors" by public companies.
Stephen Labaton --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland 

Illegal or unfair trading isn't hard for directors (or the SEC) to spot, says New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, who brought the first of these scandals to light.  They just have to compare their funds' total sales with total redemptions.  When the two are about the same, skimming might be going on.  I asked Lipper, a fund-tracking service, to list the larger funds where redemptions reached 90 to 110 percent of sales.  It found 229, some looking obviously churned.
Jane Bryant Quinn
--- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland 

One thing your can count on:  When you invest, a lot of the people you trust are going to cheat.  Billions of investor dollars whirl through the system.  It's all too easy for insiders to stick their hands into that current and grab.  We're not talking about a bad apple here and there.  Cheating runs through Wall Street's very seams --- even in the sainted mutual funds.
Jane Bryant Quinn --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland 

But Wall Street's Lobbyists Still Have a Firm Grip Where it Counts
While Representative Baker pushes his bill in the House, the Senate is not expected to take up a measure before next year. Some lawmakers have filed bills, but Senator Richard Shelby, the Alabama Republican who heads the Senate banking committee, has said he is not convinced of the need for new laws.
Stephen Labaton, "S.E.C. Offers Plan for Tightening Grip on Mutual Funds," The New York Times, November 19, 2003 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2003/11/19/business/19sec.html 

You can read more about SEC Chairman William H. Donaldson's defense of his quick and some say marshmallow punishment of mutual fund cheaters at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland  

What makes this such a big scandal is that the savings of half the households in the U.S. are at stake here.  The tragedy is that now that the scandal is surfacing in the media and in state courts, the SEC is only wrist slapping mutual funds.  This is along with the continued wrist slapping of investment banking (e.g., why is Merrill Lynch still in existence after frauds dating back to Orange County ?) is the real evidence of industry power over regulators.  Sarbanes-Oxley won’t do it!  It’s still Congress to the core in Washington DC as long as industries have regulators in their well-financed  pockets --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland 

New York State Attorney General Eliott Spitzer's charges of improper trading practices by several leading mutual fund families are another blow to public trust in financial institutions. Mutual funds have been the place you would advise the most unsophisticated investors to go: Mutual funds were designed for grandpa and grandma, and repeatedly recommended to them by all kinds of benevolent authorities. Thus scandals in the mutual fund sector are potentially much more damaging to public trust in our financial institutions than are scandals in other sectors -- such as the one playing out in the New York Stock Exchange right now.
See Robert Shiller's article below.


If you don't know jewelry, know your jeweler.
Warren Buffett,

Lowly investors who lost their retirement accounts following the advice of Citigroup's Jack Grubman or followed the "research" of some other firm that was bought and paid for by favored clients can only burn with shame and disbelief. Restore investor confidence in Wall Street? Not likely for baby boomers, who've already been publicly fleeced in broad daylight. Wall Street will have to wait for another generation of innocents to prey upon.
Richard Dooling, The New York Times, May 4, 2003


Mr. Quattrone's rise shows how some who were on the inside during the tech boom piled up huge fortunes in part through special access, unavailable to other investors, to the machinery of that era's frenzied stock market. But now he faces a crunch. The steep yearlong downturn in tech stocks has hurt the profits of his technology group. And in recent weeks, the group he heads has come under scrutiny in connection with a federal probe into whether some investment-bank employees awarded shares of hot IPOs in exchange for unusually high commissions, and whether those commissions amounted to kickbacks.

Susan Pulliam and Randall Smith, The Wall Street Journal, May 3, 2003 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB988836228231147483,00.html?mod=2_1040_1

The Investment Banker Who Got Away to Start Another Day
The (Frank Quattrone) deal marks the end of a sorry chapter in American business history. While high-profile white-collar crime persists, the dramatic criminal cases that were launched just after the dotcom economy fizzled are now mostly completed. The icons of massive, turn-of-the-century corporate fraud--Ken Lay and Jeff Skilling of Enron, Bernie Ebbers of WorldCom, Dennis Kozlowski and Mark Swartz of Tyco--are convicted and, in Lay's case, dead. Even Martha Stewart has served time. And many, if not most, of the cases the feds brought against smaller fish--to help assuage a share-owning public that had been scammed by phony accounting and overhyped stock--are resolved. The government claims that since mid-2002 it has won more than 1,000 corporate-fraud convictions, including those of more than 100 CEOs and presidents.
Barbara Kiviat, "The One Who Got Away:  The decision to abandon a high-profile case against a dotcom poster boy marks the end of a sorry era,"  Time Magazine, August 27, 2006 --- Click Here

Cleaning Up Corporate Japan
Is Japan Inc. finally moving toward more responsible corporate governance? After last week's arrest of Yoshiaki Tsutsumi, owner of the country's major railway, hotel and resort conglomerate Seibu group, there's at least reason to believe that the government is finally demanding more accountability from its corporate leaders.  Mr. Tsutsumi, former chairman of Seibu railway and its holding company, Kokudo, was arrested on Thursday on charges of insider trading and falsification of documents. While his guilt of these charges is still to be determined, the Japanese press has not held back from criticizing the politically influential Mr. Tsutsumi and his business empire, portraying them as powerful symbols of corporate Japan's lack of transparency and disregard for shareholder interests.
"Cleaning Up Corporate Japan," The Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2005 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB111040748350775119,00.html?mod=opinion&ojcontent=otep 


Hi Milt,

I think the problem in the investment banking industry that spilled over into accounting, banking, mutual funds, securities dealers, and large corporations is truly "infectious greed." When deregulations came 8n 1995, executives watched as investment bankers became filthy rich and many, certainly not all, decided to join in the fun.

What is important in Parnoy's latest book is a greater explanation of "how" it was done.

And yes, I think that many would do it again even if they knew they would get caught. See http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudconclusion.htm#CrimePays  
Many of the perpetrators in the 1990s are now sitting in places like London and Switzerland enjoying a very nice life with no longer having to work. Many of them will gladly sacrifice pride for wealth, which is something that I gather would never appeal to you.

As for Nixon, I think his years in public office drove him to pathological paranoia. He was driven more by fear than greed. I think he wanted to go down in history as a great statesman, and he feared his enemies were out keep him from realizing his dream.

Bob Jensen

-----Original Message----- 
From: MILT COHEN [mailto:uncmlt@juno.com]  
Sent: Sunday, April 25, 2004 9:06 AM 
To: Jensen, Robert 
Subject: comment on your comments

Hi Bob

I read your comments on various books written on securities fraud and related "fun & games" with investors per Cheryl Dunn's request --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm#Quotations 

Just a couple of comments from my view. I read one of the books you wrote on - namely Liar's Poker and I also read a book on Michael Milkens dealings during his days at Drexel, his downfall along with Drexel's, and how others of that era that were involved in those dealings.

It seems to me that most of these books get muddled down into the same expose type of writing and/or reporting. It's like, wow! Is that what really happened? Or, I guess I forgot about that. Each book seems to be a primer for the next "hero" who wlll take investors and accountants for another fleecing. And make lawyers rich.

My question to you (and you may have the same feeling I have) is why are there so many fraudulent happenings in the security arena? One would think that with jail sentences and monetary fines being given (even Martha Stewart), people's reputations driven into a ditch - perhaps forever (notwithstanding Michael Milken's good deeds in medicine and education) is the wealth obtained so worthy of being convicted of being a thief? Does anyone have that answer? Is it all worth it just to get out of jury duty? Back in history when I was an under grad back in the 1950s the big defalcation (as it was titled) was the McKesson Robbins inventory cover-up of the 1930s. The next one that comes to my mind was the Equity Funding matter of the 1960-1970 era that centered on the fraud of writing nonexistent life insurance contracts that brought attention to the firm of Seidman & Seidman (I had a friend working for them during that era). 

After Equity Funding, the fraud circuit was quiet for awhile, but in the last fifteen or so years, it seems we experience one hit after another (like airplanes in a flight plan at LAX) - all centering on the oversight of audits that have gone on for years or even decades. The latest being the B of A involvement with the Italian dairy company. (how a bank account could be overlooked or confirmed when it didn't exist is beyond me). My conclusion after 45 years in this "game" is that it all relates back to Richard Nixon. Nixon in his day depicted the worst of fraud and lying in the matter of Watergate. (He also was depicted as a less than ethical politician here in California. The name "tricky Dick" didn't come from nowhere). Anyway, he showed the populace that anyone can "get away with it". Fast forward to Bill Clinton and we have another example of not telling the truth. (only he has the definition of sex?) So what can our kids and students think as they trudge through college. If ethics is not emphasized in class (and I assume it is not a major topic these or any other days) and ethical actions are not depicted in real life as well as in movies and TV (look at Ormirosa's actions on the Donald Trump show) how can we expect that these financial frauds will not be a continual event? Perhaps the next reality show should be centered on financial fraud. It might bring in bigger ratings than Trump's show did. (And Trump is such an icon of ethical behavior in business dealings too - (that's a joke)).

Anyway, I just thought I'd share my feelings on your thoughts and comments on current readings and topical events.

Sincerely,
Milt Cohen Chatsworth, Ca.

 

Hi Again Milt,

The entire body of agency theory that evolved in the past three decades is built upon the underlying assumption that managers' utility functions are also in the best interest of the prosperity of corporations and shareholders. Agency theory falls apart when managers like Fastow, Kozwalski, Waksal, etc. are willing to loot the company and/or rob shareholders for personal gain even if they know they will get caught and spend some relaxing time in Club Fed --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudconclusion.htm#CrimePays 

We always hope that dastardly managers are few and far between such that your assumptions and agency theory still hold water. What we saw in the late 1990s, however, was that highly infectious greed that commenced to sicken entire industries such as investment banking, energy traders, stock brokers, and securities dealers after Federal regulations were eliminated in 1995 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm 

Sadly, the auditing profession was not immune to infectious greed as consulting opportunities exploded in auditing clients. We would hope that integrity is being restored in the auditing profession, but the scandals in tax shelter marketing and client billing cheating since the Sarbanes-Oxley legislation have further eroded the credibility of auditing firms --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm#others 

See "ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONALISM: THEY JUST DON'T GET IT" --- http://aaahq.org/AM2003/WyattSpeech.pdf 

Bob Jensen

-----Original Message----- 
From: MILT COHEN [mailto:uncmlt@juno.com]  
Sent: Sunday, April 25, 2004 2:31 PM To: Jensen, Robert 
Subject: Re: comment on your comments

You may be precisely correct in your conclusion, but one would like to think that the greedy bunch wouldn't want to ruin the 'game" for everyone else. That old story about killing the goose that lays the golden eggs is happening. Another story about the bar owner watching a new bartender steal every other drink that is sold. Finally when the bartender pockets two in a row, the owners calls him over and asks, "aren't we partners on that one?" I mean, in order for investors to part with money the thieves have to let others make a few bucks just to sweeten the pot, or the game is over, in my view. The flip side is that with new laws and the emphasis on accountant's trust, many students will opt out of accounting and just head for the finance sign. I tutored a student last year who was trying to understand Intermediate Accounting. He said he did well in the Principle course. His last remark to me was that if he blows the mid-term he'll drop the course and take up Finance just to keep his grade average. So much for tenacity and commitment.

Sincerely Milt Cohen

 


March 13, 2009 message from Zafar Khan

Why was Sarbanes-Oxley enacted?

Zafar Khan, Ph.D.
Professor
Eastern Michigan University

March 14, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi Zafar,

Sarbanes (SOX) was enacted to keep investors from abandoning the U.S. stock market after enormous scandals like Enron, WorldCom, and other huge scandals that revealed CPA audits themselves were becoming both substandard and non-profitable --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm

To make money, auditing firms themselves were profiting from irresponsible audit cost cutting and non-audit consulting that compromised their auditing independence. Inside corporations, internal controls for responsible financial reporting had broken down or never existed in the first place.

Sarbanes forced auditors to become more independent and also made it possible to double or triple audit fees, thereby restoring auditing to profitable services rather than services that lost money for auditing firms trying to be responsible auditors.

SOX also created the PCAOB that got serious about reviewing auditor performance (including fining Deloitte a million dollars). Many of the large and smaller CPA firms failed the PCAOB tests early on and soon cleaned up their audit practices with the PCAOB breathing down their backs.

Among other things SOX increased government funding for the SEC and the FASB (which before SOX received no taxpayer funding). This, in turn, made the FASB less dependent upon sales of publications. The FASB then made many publications free electronically, most notably free distribution of standards and interpretations. The IASB, sadly, still depends upon publication revenue such that IFRS are not free unless you play games like download the equivalent Hong Kong accounting standards.

See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sarbanes_and_Oxley

A variety of complex factors created the conditions and culture in which a series of large corporate frauds occurred between 2000-2002. The spectacular, highly-publicized frauds at Enron (see Enron scandal), WorldCom, and Tyco exposed significant problems with conflicts of interest and incentive compensation practices. The analysis of their complex and contentious root causes contributed to the passage of SOX in 2002. In a 2004 interview, Senator Paul Sarbanes stated:

 

The Senate Banking Committee undertook a series of hearings on the problems in the markets that had led to a loss of hundreds and hundreds of billions, indeed trillions of dollars in market value. The hearings set out to lay the foundation for legislation. We scheduled 10 hearings over a six-week period, during which we brought in some of the best people in the country to testify...The hearings produced remarkable consensus on the nature of the problems: inadequate oversight of accountants, lack of auditor independence, weak corporate governance procedures, stock analysts' conflict of interests, inadequate disclosure provisions, and grossly inadequate funding of the Securities and Exchange Commission.

 

  • Auditor conflicts of interest: Prior to SOX, auditing firms, the primary financial "watchdogs" for investors, were self-regulated. They also performed significant non-audit or consulting work for the companies they audited. Many of these consulting agreements were far more lucrative than the auditing engagement. This presented at least the appearance of a conflict of interest. For example, challenging the company's accounting approach might damage a client relationship, conceivably placing a significant consulting arrangement at risk, damaging the auditing firm's bottom line.
     
  • Boardroom failures: Boards of Directors, specifically Audit Committees, are charged with establishing oversight mechanisms for financial reporting in U.S. corporations on the behalf of investors. These scandals identified Board members who either did not exercise their responsibilities or did not have the expertise to understand the complexities of the businesses. In many cases, Audit Committee members were not truly independent of management.
     
  • Securities analysts' conflicts of interest: The roles of securities analysts, who make buy and sell recommendations on company stocks and bonds, and investment bankers, who help provide companies loans or handle mergers and acquisitions, provide opportunities for conflicts. Similar to the auditor conflict, issuing a buy or sell recommendation on a stock while providing lucrative investment banking services creates at least the appearance of a conflict of interest.
     
  • Inadequate funding of the SEC: The SEC budget has steadily increased to nearly double the pre-SOX level. In the interview cited above, Sarbanes indicated that enforcement and rule-making are more effective post-SOX.
     
  • Banking practices: Lending to a firm sends signals to investors regarding the firm's risk. In the case of Enron, several major banks provided large loans to the company without understanding, or while ignoring, the risks of the company. Investors of these banks and their clients were hurt by such bad loans, resulting in large settlement payments by the banks. Others interpreted the willingness of banks to lend money to the company as an indication of its health and integrity, and were led to invest in Enron as a result. These investors were hurt as well.
     
  • Internet bubble: Investors had been stung in 2000 by the sharp declines in technology stocks and to a lesser extent, by declines in the overall market. Certain mutual fund managers were alleged to have advocated the purchasing of particular technology stocks, while quietly selling them. The losses sustained also helped create a general anger among investors.
     
  • Executive compensation: Stock option and bonus practices, combined with volatility in stock prices for even small earnings "misses," resulted in pressures to manage earnings. Stock options were not treated as compensation expense by companies, encouraging this form of compensation. With a large stock-based bonus at risk, managers were pressured to meet their targets.

 

Pay Me More and More and More
Sadly, SOX did not attack the root problems that led to the subsequent subprime lending scandals. These root problems included pay-for-performance compensation plans that motivated mortgage brokers, real estate appraisers, banks, and investment banks to screw both shareholders and home owners.

Pass the Trash
Added to this was Congressional pressure on Fannie Mae and Freddie Mack to buy hopeless mortgages that had almost no chance of being repaid. Banks commenced a practice of passing the trash to Freddie, Fannie, and Wall Street investment banks that, in turn, passed the trash to their customers in CDOs that were intended to diversify the bad loan risks (but failed to do so when the real estate bubble burst).

SOX has worked in countless ways, but not all ways
There are countless success stories where SOX led to better internal controls and better auditing with more substantive testing in place of lousy analytical reviews. However, SOX did almost nothing to prevent fraud in the mortgage brokering and banking sectors.

You can read more about subprime sleaze at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Sleaze

You can read more about auditing professionalism at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#Professionalism

Fiduciaries turned into whores
One of the most sad things for me is the way that CPA auditing firms failed to signal the public that banks were filling up on toxic loans. Equally unprofessional were the credit rating agencies like Standard and Poors and Moody’s that in essence became Wall Street’s whores.

Why regulations fail and succeed in the turning of the carousel
The main problem with government regulations on industry is that industry eventually runs the regulators (e.g., the Federal Reserve, SEC, FDA, FAA, FCC, etc.) until some enormous scandals force the regulators to use the powers entrusted to them. Then we get new regulations that industry eventually figures out how to circumvent. Then we wait for more huge scandals. And so the carousel goes round and round.

Socialism bypasses the regulation process by owning and running the industries. Then the abuses really begin
The inherent vice of capitalism is the unequal sharing of the blessings. The inherent blessing of socialism is the equal sharing of misery.
Winston Churchill

May 14, 2009 reply from Zafar Khan [zkhan@EMICH.EDU]

Hi Bob, one can always depend upon you to set the record straight. Otherwise, some might continue to believe that this (SOX) was another gratuitous government intervention to disrupt the smooth functioning of our self correcting financial markets.

I also read in a recent post that the government should not do anything about executive compensation despite the obscene abuse of power by the executives of public companies who have enriched themselves while running their companies into the ground because the market will in the end sort it out. My humble response to that is dream on.

Zafar Khan, Ph.D.
Professor
Eastern Michigan University

March 15, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen

Hi again Zafar,

After the fall of Andersen you would've thought CPA auditors would've "self corrected" without having SOX since their reputations had hit bottom.

In 2003 a former professor of accounting at the University of Illinois and long-time executive partner with Andersen told accounting professors that the CPA firm executives "still didn't get it." This is probably why we needed SOX and the PCAOB to help them "get it." Art Wyatt’s plenary session speech at the 2003 American Accounting Association annual meetings is at http://aaahq.org/AM2003/WyattSpeech.pdf
Art is also a former AAA President and a member of the Accounting Hall of Fame. His opinions have a lot of clout in both the CPA profession and academe.

From “Topics for Class Debate” at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
This might be a good topic of debate for an ethics and/or fraud course.  The topic is essentially the problem of regulating and/or punishing many for the egregious actions of a few.  The best example is the major accounting firm of Andersen in which 84,000 mostly ethical and highly professional employees lost their jobs when the firm's leadership repeatedly failed to take action to prevent corrupt and/or incompetent audits of a small number audit partners.  Clearly the firm's management failed and deserves to be fired and/or jailed for obstruction of justice and failure to protect the public in general and 83,900 Andersen employees.  A former Andersen executive partner, Art Wyatt, contends that Andersen's leadership did not get the message and that leadership in today's leading CPA firms is still not (just before SOX) getting the message --- http://aaahq.org/AM2003/WyattSpeech.pdf 

Bob Jensen's threads on auditing professionalism are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm#Professionalism

 


"8 Accused of Kickbacks, Fraud at Wall Street Brokerage Firms," SmartPros, May 23, 2008 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x61954.xml


"Eliot Spitzer's Case Book," by Elizabeth Weinstein, The Wall Street Journal, April 28, 2005

Eliot Spitzer is a man on the hunt. From mutual funds to music, executive compensation to counterfeit drugs, the New York attorney general has pursued investigations of alleged misdeeds in half a dozen industries.

Though sometimes criticized for focusing too closely on Wall Street -- and on his own bid for New York state governor in 2006 -- Mr. Spitzer's probes have led to stricter controls on Wall Street research and spurred other attorneys general to action. His landmark investigations have zeroed in on high-profile executives, most recently Maurice Greenberg at insurer American International Group.

Last year alone, the New York attorney general's office recovered a record $2.38 billion earmarked for restitution to individual shareholders and other consumers. Mr. Spitzer's office, which has an annual budget of $214 million, has added nearly 50 lawyers to its staff of more than 500 attorneys since 1999.

Here is an overview of key investigations:

Investment Banking ­ Stock research
Probe launched: 2001
At issue: Misleading information in analysts' public research reports

An investigation into the stock research issued by Merrill Lynch & Co.'s Internet group, whose star analyst was Henry Blodget, showed that some analysts harbored different opinions privately from those they expressed in their public research reports. The investigation spawned a wide-ranging probe over nearly two years into the procedures at many firms. Ultimately, 10 of the largest securities firms
agreed to pay $1.4 billion to settle charges that they routinely issued misleading stock research to curry favor with corporate clients during the stock-market bubble of the late 1990s. The firms consented to the charges without admitting or denying wrongdoing. The $1.4 billion settlement was among the highest ever imposed by securities regulators, and both Mr. Blodget and Jack Grubman of Salomon Smith Barney were banned from the securities business.

Investment Banking - IPOs
Probe launched: 2001
At issue: Unfair allocations of shares in initial public offerings

Mr. Spitzer's office also charged that several big Wall Street firms improperly doled out coveted shares in initial public offerings to corporate executives in a bid to win banking business. Two companies, Citigroup Inc.'s Citigroup Global Markets unit, formerly Salomon Smith Barney, and Credit Suisse Group's Credit Suisse First Boston, settled these charges as part of the $1.4 billion pact with securities firms and did so without admitting or denying wrongdoing. In a related probe, former star CSFB banker Frank Quattrone was
convicted of obstruction of justice for impeding and investigation of CSFB's IPO allocations.

Insurance - Improper transactions
Probe launched: 2003
At issue: Whether several AIG business deals were designed to manipulate its financial statements

In 2003, the Securities and Exchange Commission and Mr. Spitzer's office looked into insurance transactions that American International Group Inc. conducted with two firms, cellphone distributor Brightpoint Inc. and PNC Financial Services Group Inc. AIG paid $126 million in a settlement without admitting or denying guilt. Later, both the SEC and Mr. Spitzer's office scrutinized a deal struck between AIG and Berkshire Hathaway's General Reinsurance unit in 2000 to determine if the deal was aimed at making the giant insurer's reserves look healthier than they were. Longtime Chairman Maurice R. "Hank" Greenberg
retired from the company, and in late March, AIG admitted to a broad range of improper accounting. Other AIG executives were forced out, including chief financial officer Howard Smith. Meanwhile, Berkshire chief Warren Buffett this week told investigators that he didn't know details about the contentious transaction. Mr. Greenberg also was deposed and repeatedly invoked his constitutional right against self incrimination.

Insurance - Broker fees
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Whether fees paid by insurance companies to insurance brokers and consultants posed a conflict of interest

Mr. Spitzer and other state attorneys general as well as insurance regulators in New York and Illinois alleged that insurance companies routinely paid fees to brokers and consultants who advised employers on where to buy policies for workers, a potential conflict of interest. Mr. Spitzer accused several insurance brokers of accepting undisclosed commissions and, in the case of Marsh & McLennan, of bid-rigging -- soliciting fake bids from insurers to help steer business to favored providers. In February 2005, Marsh
agreed to pay $850 million in restitution to clients of its Marsh Inc. insurance brokerage firm who allegedly were cheated by Marsh brokers. Marsh neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing.

The investigations shook up an insurance dynasty. Marsh was run by Jeffrey W. Greenberg, the eldest son of AIG's former head Maurice Greenberg, before he was ousted as a result of the probe. Another insurance firm included in the probe, Ace Ltd., is run by Evan Greenberg, Jeffrey's younger brother. Meanwhile, Aon Corp.
reached a $190 million settlement without admitting or denying wrongdoing, and earlier this month, insurance broker Willis Group Holdings Ltd. said it would pay $51 million and change its business practices to end an investigation by attorneys general in New York and Minnesota. Willis admitted no wrongdoing or liability.

NYSE - Executive Compensation
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Whether then-New York Stock Exchange Chairman Dick Grasso's compensation was excessive

Mr. Spitzer sued Mr. Grasso, the NYSE and the Wall Street executive who headed its compensation committee for what Mr. Spitzer claimed was a pay package so huge that it violated the state law governing not-for-profit groups. Mr. Spitzer said the compensation -- valued at nearly $200 million -- came about as a result of Mr. Grasso's intimidation of the exchange's board of directors. Mr. Grasso, who denied there was anything improper about his pay, was
forced to resign from the Big Board in September 2003 following a public outcry over his compensation. The lawsuit, which is still in progress, led to new governance oversight at the Big Board.

Retail
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Antitrust violations by retailers

Mr. Spitzer claimed that Federated Department Stores Inc. and May Department Stores Co. conspired to pressure housewares makers Lenox Inc., a unit of Brown-Forman Corp. and Waterford Wedgwood PLC's U.S. unit to pull out as planned anchors of Bed Bath & Beyond Inc.'s new tableware department. The case was settled in August when the four companies agreed to pay a total of $2.9 million in civil penalties but admit no wrongdoing. Later, Mr. Spitzer
charged James M. Zimmerman, Federated's retired chairman, with perjury, alleging that he lied under oath to conceal evidence of possible antitrust violations. Mr. Zimmerman has pleaded not guilty.

Music
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Payments by music companies middlemen aimed at securing better airplay for the labels' artists

Mr. Spitzer's
investigation, which is continuing, centers around independent promoters -- middlemen between record companies and radio stations -- whom music labels pay to help them secure better airplay for their music releases. Broadcasters are prohibited from taking goods or cash for playing songs on their stations. The independent-promotion system has been viewed as a way around laws against payola -- undisclosed cash payments to individuals in exchange for airplay. Last fall, Mr. Spitzer requested information from Warner Music Group, EMI Group PLC, Vivendi Universal SA's Universal Music Group, and Sony Corp. and Bertelsmann AG's Sony BMG Music Entertainment. Warner Music received an additional subpoena last week.

Marketing
Probe launched: 2004
At issue: Software secretly installed on home computers to put ads on screens

After a six-month investigation into Internet marketer Intermix Media Inc., Mr. Spitzer in April 2005
filed suit, claiming the company installed a wide range of advertising software on home computers nationwide. The software, known as "spyware" or "adware," prompts nuisance pop-up advertising on computer screens, setting users up for PC slowdowns and crashes. The programs sometimes don't come with "un-install" applications and can't be removed by most computers' add/remove function. Mr. Spitzer said the suit is designed to combat the practice of redirecting of home computer users to unwanted Web sites, the adding of unnecessary toolbar items and the delivery of unwanted ads that pop up on computer screens. The civil suit accuses Intermix of violating state General Business Law provisions against false advertising and deceptive business practices, and also of trespass under New York common law. Intermix has said it doesn't "promote or condone spyware" and has ceased distribution of the software at issue, which it says was introduced under prior leadership.

Health Care
Probe launched: 2005
At issue: Covert sales of counterfeit drugs

Mr. Spitzer's office has
sent subpoenas to three big drug wholesalers
-- Cardinal Health Inc., Amerisource Bergen Corp. and McKesson Corp. -- related to the companies' purchase of drugs on the secondary market. Although few details about the probe have emerged, some industry analysts have said that the subpoenas are likely connected to sales transactions involving counterfeit products. Counterfeit drugs are those sold under a product name without proper authorization -- they can include drugs without the active ingredient, with an insufficient quantity of the active ingredient, with the wrong active ingredient, or with fake packaging. The investigation focuses on the secondary market, where the wholesalers buy drugs from each other, often at lower prices, and counterfeit drugs are hard to track. It isn't clear whether the wholesalers are the focus of a probe or just sources of information.


How Grasso Got Greener:  Grasso Took Fifth In SEC Testimony
An official in the office of New York state's attorney general yesterday said former New York Stock Exchange Chief Executive Dick Grasso last year declined to answer certain questions during a deposition by the Securities and Exchange Commission regarding that regulator's probe of trading firms at the Big Board. Avi Schick, a lawyer working for Attorney General Eliot Spitzer, made that assertion during a pretrial hearing in New York state court for a civil lawsuit claiming that Mr. Grasso's $187.5 million pay package as Big Board chief was excessive under New York law covering not-for-profits. (The NYSE has since become a public company, NYSE Group Inc.) The disclosure could be useful to Mr. Spitzer in the compensation case if he can use it to suggest that Mr. Grasso was an inadequate market regulator.
Chad Bray, "Grasso Took Fifth In SEC Testimony, Spitzer Aide Says," The Wall Street Journal, March 17, 2006; Page C3 --- Click Here


Ending a bitter public fight over whether former New York Stock Exchange Chief Executive Dick Grasso was paid too much, a state appeals court ruled that Mr. Grasso can keep every penny collected from his $187.5 million multiyear compensation package. The 3-to-1 ruling by the Appellate Division of the New York State Supreme Court was a vindication for the relentless Mr. Grasso, who was ousted after details of his lucrative pay were revealed in 2003.
Aaron Lucchetti, "Grasso Wins Court Fight, Can Keep NYSE Pay," The Wall Street Journal, July 2, 2008; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121492781324819635.html?mod=todays_us_page_one


American History of Fraud --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm


Federal securities class action lawsuits increased 19 percent in 2008, with almost half involving firms in the financial services sector according to the annual report prepared by the Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse in cooperation with Cornerstone Research --- http://securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/20080106_YIR08_Press_Release.pdf

Especially note the 2008 Year in Review link at http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2008_YIR/20080106.pdf


Simoleon Sense Reviews Janet Tavakoli’s Dear Mr. Buffett ---
http://www.simoleonsense.com/simoleon-sense-reviews-janet-tavakolis-dear-mr-buffett/

What’s The Book (Dear Mr. Buffett) About

Dear Mr. Buffett, chronicles the agency problems, poor regulations, and participants which led to the current financial crisis. Janet accomplishes this herculean task by capitalizing on her experiences with derivatives, Wall St, and her relationship with Warren Buffett. One wonders how she managed to pack so much material in such few pages!

Unlike many books which only analyze past events, Dear Mr. Buffett, offers proactive advice for improving financial markets. Janet is clearly very concerned about protecting individual rights, promoting honesty, and enhancing financial integrity. This is exactly the kind of character we should require of our financial leaders.

Business week once called Janet the Cassandra of Credit Derivatives. Without a doubt Janet should have been listened to. I’m confident that from now on she will be.

Closing thoughts

Rather than a complicated book on financial esoterica, Janet has created a simple guide to understanding the current crisis. This book is a must read for all students of finance, economics, and business. If you haven’t read this book, please do so.

Warning –This book is likely to infuriate you, and that’s a good thing! Janet provides indicting evidence and citizens may be tempted to initiate vigilante like witch trials. Please consult with your doctor before taking this financial medication.

Continued in article

September 1, 2009 reply from Rick Lillie [rlillie@CSUSB.EDU]

Hi Bob,

I am reading Dear Mr. Buffett, What an Investor Learns 1,269 Miles from Wall Street, by Janet Tavakoli. I am just about finished with the book. I am thinking about giving a copy of the book to students who perform well in my upper-level financial reporting classes.

I agree with the reviewer’s comments about Tavakoli’s book. Her explanations are clear and concise and do not require expertise in finance or financial derivatives in order to understand what she (or Warren Buffet) says. She explains the underlying problems of the financial meltdown with ease. Tavakoli does not blow you over with “finance BS.” She does in print what Steve Kroft does in the 60 Minutes story.

Tavakoli delivers a unique perspective throughout the book. She looks through the eyes of Warren Buffett and explains issues as Buffett sees them, while peppering the discussion with her experience and perspective.

The reviewer is correct. Tavakoli lets the finance world, along with accountants, attorneys, bankers, Congress, and regulators, have it with both barrels!

Tavakoli’s book is the highlight of my summer reading.

Best wishes,

Rick Lillie

Rick Lillie, MAS, Ed.D., CPA Assistant Professor of Accounting Coordinator - Master of Science in Accountancy (MSA) Program Department of Accounting and Finance College of Business and Public Administration CSU San Bernardino 5500 University Pkwy, JB-547 San Bernardino, CA. 92407-2397

Telephone Numbers: San Bernardino Campus: (909) 537-5726 Palm Desert Campus: (760) 341-2883, Ext. 78158

For technical details see the following book:
Structured Finance and Collateralized Debt Obligations: New Developments in Cash and Synthetic Securitization (Wiley Finance) by Janet M. Tavakoli (2008)


FBI Arrest in What Appears to Be the World's Largest Case Involving Insider Information
More and more keeps coming out, including revelations of wiretapping

"8 trades the insiders allegedly made The government's case against the Galleon crew includes transactions in companies like Google, AMD, Hilton and Sun," by Michael Copeland, Fortune, October 19, 2009 --- Click Here
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/19/markets/insider_trading_arrests.fortune/?postversion=2009101912

The government's case in what it is calling the largest insider trading case involving a U.S. hedge fund contains a detailed list of trades involving household-name companies.

Investigators have pieced together a case that alleges more than $25 million in illegal gains based on trading in 2006-09 on companies including Advanced Micro Devices (AMD, Fortune 500), Akamai (AKAM), Clearwire (CLWR), Google (GOOG, Fortune 500), Hilton, Polycom (PLCM) and Sun Microsystems (JAVA, Fortune 500), among others.

The six people charged include hedge fund billionaire Raj Rajaratnam, founder of Galleon Group; Robert Moffat, IBM's (IBM, Fortune 500) top hardware executive and an oft-discussed CEO candidate; Mark Curland and Danielle Chiesi, executives of the hedge fund New Castle Partners; Anil Kumar, a director at consulting firm McKinsey & Co.; and Rajiv Goel, an executive in Intel's treasury department.

Just what did they allegedly do? Using information gleaned from wiretapped conversations between the accused and others, along with the statements of an apparent informant, SEC investigators have pieced together a series of episodes alleging to show how the defendants used inside information and well-timed trades to turn million-dollar profits.

Those charged have yet to enter pleas in the case. Jim Waldman, a lawyer for Rajaratman, told the Wall Street Journal that the hedge fund chief "is innocent. We're going to fight the charges." Lawyers for some of the other accused said their clients are shocked by the charges and deny wrongdoing.

What follows is a condensed account of eight major trades the suspects made and the inside information they capitalized on, according to the the SEC investigation and complaint. At the center of some of the trades is an unnamed "Tipper A," a person who gathered a great deal of information on companies for Rajaratnam, and whose identity presumably will be made public as the case unfolds in court.

Polycom beats the Street

On Jan. 10, 2006, the unnamed source identified in the SEC's complaint as "Tipper A" told Galleon's Rajaratnam that, based on information received from a Polycom insider, revenues at the video-conferencing company for the fourth-quarter of 2005 were about to beat Wall Street estimates. Polycom was set to announce its earnings more than two weeks later.

Rajaratnam sent an instant message to his trader instructing him to "buy 60 [thousand shares] PLCM" for certain Galleon Tech funds. All told, from Jan. 10 through Jan. 25, the date of the Polycom earnings release, Rajaratnam and Galleon bought 245,000 shares of Polycom and 500 Polycom call-option contracts. Polycom did beat the Street, and collectively, the Galleon Tech funds made over $570,000 in connection with their Polycom trades based on Tipper A's tip.

The same scenario was repeated for Polycom's first-quarter 2006 earnings, the complaint says. Galleon made $165,000 on the information. Tipper A made $22,000.

The Hilton takeover

Tipper A allegedly obtained confidential information in advance of a July 3, 2007, announcement that a private equity group would be buying Hilton for $47.50 per share, a premium of $11.45 over the July 3 closing price. Tipper A obtained the information from an analyst who, at the time, was working at Moody's, a rating agency that was evaluating Hilton's debt in connection with the planned buyout. Tipper A bought call option contracts based on the information, and passed on the tip to Rajaratnam.

On July 3, Rajaratnam and Galleon bought 400,000 shares of Hilton in the Galleon Tech funds. That evening, the Hilton transaction was announced. Tipper A sold all of the Hilton call option contracts for a profit of more than $630,000, the complaint says. To compensate the source for the Hilton tip, Tipper A paid the source $10,000. The Galleon Tech funds sold their Hilton shares after the July 3 announcement for a profit of more than $4 million.

Google Misses

Around July 10, 2007, a PR consultant to Google allegedly told Tipper A that Google's second-quarter earnings per share would be down about 25 cents. The Street had estimated yet another strong quarter for the search giant, which was scheduled to report earnings July 19.

Two days later Tipper A bought put options in Google and passed along details of the pending Google miss to Rajaratnam. He and Galleon began buying Google put options for the Galleon Tech funds, and continued buying them through July 19. In addition, Galleon funds bought other options betting on a fall in Google shares and sold short Google stock beginning July 17.

On July 19, Google announced its earnings results, disclosing that its earnings-per-share was indeed 25 cents lower than the prior quarter. Google's share price fell from over $548 per share to almost $520 per share. The Galleon Tech funds' profits from the Google tip were almost $8 million. Tipper A sold all of the put options the day after the July 19 announcement for a profit of over $500,000.

Trading in Intel

Rajaratnam allegedly tapped former Wharton classmate and Intel executive Rajiv Goel just before Intel's (INTL) scheduled fourth-quarter 2006 earnings announcement to get inside information on the world's largest chipmaker. On Jan. 8, 2007, Rajaratnam contacted Intel's Goel. The next day, Rajaratnam bought 1 million shares of Intel at $21.08 per share. On Jan, 11, he bought 500,000 more at $21.65 per share.

Goel and Rajaratnam communicated again multiple times over the Martin Luther King Day weekend that followed. On Tuesday, Jan. 16, the day the markets reopened, Rajaratnam reversed course, selling the Galleon Tech funds' entire 1.5 million share long position in Intel at $22.03 per share, and making a profit of a little over $1 million

Later that day, after the markets closed, Intel released its fourth-quarter 2006 earnings. Although the company's earnings beat analysts' projections, its guidance was below expectations. Intel's stock price fell nearly 5% on the news, but Rajaratnam was already out of the stock.

According to Intel officials, Goel has been placed on administrative leave pending the court case.

Clearwire Gets a Partner

In early February 2008, Goel allegedly tipped Rajaratnam that there was a pending joint venture between wireless broadband company Clearwire and Sprint (S, Fortune 500). Intel was a huge shareholder in Clearwire. Over the next three months, Galleon Tech funds bought and sold Clearwire shares on three occasions. Each time, the Galleon Tech funds traded in advance of news reports relating to the deal between Clearwire and Sprint, and shortly after calls between Goel and Rajaratnam. Overall, the Galleon Tech funds realized gains of about $780,000 on their Clearwire trading between February and May 2008. On May 8, the joint venture between Sprint and Clearwire was publicly announced.

As payback for Goel's tips, Rajaratnam (or someone acting on his behalf) executed trades in Goel's personal brokerage account based on inside information concerning Hilton and PeopleSupport (the government notes that a Galleon director sits on the PeopleSupport's board of directors though no charges of wrongdoing have been brought against that person), which resulted in nearly $250,000 in profits for Goel.

Shorting Akamai

Another hedge fund executive, New Castle's Danielle Chiesi, is an acquaintance of Rajaratnam. When an Akamai executive told her that the Internet infrastructure company would trend lower in the company's second-quarter 2008 guidance to investors, the government claims she passed along the information to Rajaratnam. The consensus among Akamai's management was that Akamai's stock price would decline in the wake of the lowered guidance scheduled for July 30.

Chiesi and the Akamai source spoke multiple times between July 2 and July 24. Chiesi told what she had learned from the Akamai source to her colleague at New Castle, Mark Kurland. On July 25, several New Castle funds took short positions in Akamai shares. The positions grew through July 30. Rajaratnam's Galleon funds also built up a short position during the same period.

In its second-quarter 2008 earnings announcement on July 30, Akamai's results disappointed investors. The stock fell nearly 20% following the announcement. New Castle made $2.4 million. The Galleon Tech funds took home more than $3.2 million.

IBM knows Sun

In January 2009, IBM was conducting due diligence on Sun Microsystems in preparation for an offer to buy it (Sun was ultimately bought by Oracle (ORCL, Fortune 500)). As part of that process, Sun opened its books to IBM, providing its second-quarter 2009 results in advance of the scheduled Jan. 27 announcement.

Because much of Sun's business is hardware, IBM's top hardware executive Robert Moffat was involved in the evaluation of Sun. Moffat allegedly had access to Sun's earnings results. He and Chiesi were also friends and contacted each other repeatedly during January 2009. The frequency of contact between the two increased just prior to the Sun earnings release, investigators say.

On Jan. 26, New Castle began acquiring a substantial long position in Sun. On Jan. 27, after the market close, Sun reported earnings that exceeded Wall Street's estimates, posting a two-cent per-share profit when analysts had expected a loss. Sun shares soared 21% on the news. New Castle made almost $1 million.

AMD gets out of manufacturing

On June 1, 2008, McKinsey & Co. began advising Advanced Micro Devices over its negotiations with two Abu Dhabi sovereign entities. One, a joint venture with the Abu Dhabi government, Advanced Technology Investment Co., would take over AMD's chip manufacturing. The other, an Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund, Mubadala Investment Co., would provide a large investment in AMD (in the end, it would total $314 million). According to the SEC, Anil Kumar was one of the McKinsey team briefed on the negotiations. Kumar also knew Rajaratnam.

On Aug. 14, Kumar learned that the two deals were finally getting done. The next day he told Rajaratnam, investigators say. Almost immediately, Rajaratnam and Galleon increased their long position in AMD by buying more than 2.5 million shares in Galleon funds and continuing to build their long position until just before the announcement of the AMD transactions. Rajaratnam and Galleon bought 4 million AMD shares on Sept. 25 and 26, and 1.65 million more on Oct. 3. On Oct. 8, the deals were announced publicly. AMD's stock price increased by about 25%. All told, the value of Galleon's entire position in AMD increased approximately $9.5 million in Oct. 6-7.

However, the allegedly ill-gotten gain was wiped out by the financial crisis of the time. Because the Galleon Tech funds had accumulated much of their AMD position beginning in August, before the crisis sent stock prices, including AMD's, tumbling in September and October, the funds lost money on the overall trade

The Deep Shah Insiders Leak at Moody's:  What $10,000 Bought
Leaks such as this are probably impossible to stop
What disturbs me is that the Blackstone Group would exploit investors based up such leaks
"Moody's Analysts Are Warned to Keep Secrets," by Serena Ing, The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125599951161895543.html?mod=article-outset-box

"Billionaire among 6 nabbed in inside trading case Wall Street wake-up call: Hedge fund boss, 5 others charged in $25M-plus insider trading case," by Larry Neumeister and Candice Choi,  Yahoo News, October 16, 2009 --- Click Here

One of America's wealthiest men was among six hedge fund managers and corporate executives arrested Friday in a hedge fund insider trading case that authorities say generated more than $25 million in illegal profits and was a wake-up call for Wall Street.

Raj Rajaratnam, a portfolio manager for Galleon Group, a hedge fund with up to $7 billion in assets under management, was accused of conspiring with others to use insider information to trade securities in several publicly traded companies, including Google Inc.

U.S. Magistrate Judge Douglas F. Eaton set bail at $100 million to be secured by $20 million in collateral despite a request by prosecutors to deny bail. He also ordered Rajaratnam, who has both U.S. and Sri Lankan citizenship, to stay within 110 miles of New York City.

U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara told a news conference it was the largest hedge fund case ever prosecuted and marked the first use of court-authorized wiretaps to capture conversations by suspects in an insider trading case.

He said the case should cause financial professionals considering insider trades in the future to wonder whether law enforcement is listening.

"Greed is not good," Bharara said. "This case should be a wake-up call for Wall Street."

Joseph Demarest Jr., the head of the New York FBI office, said it was clear that "the $20 million in illicit profits come at the expense of the average public investor."

The Securities and Exchange Commission, which brought separate civil charges, said the scheme generated more than $25 million in illegal profits.

Robert Khuzami, director of enforcement at the SEC, said the charges show Rajaratnam's "secret of success was not genius trading strategies."

"He is not the master of the universe. He is a master of the Rolodex," Khuzami said.

Galleon Group LLP said in a statement it was shocked to learn of Rajaratnam's arrest at his apartment. "We had no knowledge of the investigation before it was made public and we intend to cooperate fully with the relevant authorities," the statement said.

The firm added that Galleon "continues to operate and is highly liquid."

Rajaratnam, 52, was ranked No. 559 by Forbes magazine this year among the world's wealthiest billionaires, with a $1.3 billion net worth.

According to the Federal Election Commission, he is a generous contributor to Democratic candidates and causes. The FEC said he made over $87,000 in contributions to President Barack Obama's campaign, the Democratic National Committee and various campaigns on behalf of Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer and New Jersey U.S. Sen. Robert Menendez in the past five years. The Center for Responsive Politics, a watchdog group, said he has given a total of $118,000 since 2004 -- all but one contribution, for $5,000, to Democrats.

The Associated Press has learned that even before his arrest, Rajaratnam was under scrutiny for helping bankroll Sri Lankan militants notorious for suicide bombings.

Papers filed in U.S. District Court in Brooklyn allege that Rajaratnam worked closely with a phony charity that channeled funds to the Tamil Tiger terrorist organization. Those papers refer to him only as "Individual B." But U.S. law enforcement and government officials familiar with the case have confirmed that the individual is Rajaratnam.

At an initial court appearance in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh Klein sought detention for Rajaratnam, saying there was "a grave concern about flight risk" given Rajaratnam's wealth and his frequent travels around the world.

His lawyer, Jim Walden, called his client a "citizen of the world," who has made more than $20 million in charitable donations in the last five years and had risen from humble beginnings in the finance profession to oversee hedge funds responsible for nearly $8 billion.

Walden promised "there's a lot more to this case" and his client was ready to prepare for it from home. Rajaratnam lives in a $10 million condominium with his wife of 20 years, their three children and two elderly parents. Walden noted that many of his employees were in court ready to sign a bail package on his behalf.

Rajaratnam -- born in Sri Lanka and a graduate of University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business -- has been described as a savvy manager of billions of dollars in technology and health care hedge funds at Galleon, which he started in 1996. The firm is based in New York City with offices in California, China, Taiwan and India. He lives in New York.

According to a criminal complaint filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, Rajaratnam obtained insider information and then caused the Galleon Technology Funds to execute trades that earned a profit of more than $12.7 million between January 2006 and July 2007. Other schemes garnered millions more and continued into this year, authorities said.

Bharara said the defendants benefited from tips about the earnings, earnings guidance and acquisition plans of various companies. Sometimes, those who provided tips received financial benefits and sometimes they just traded tips for more inside information, he added.

The timing of the arrests might be explained by a footnote in the complaint against Rajaratnam. In it, an FBI agent said he had learned that Rajaratnam had been warned to be careful and that Rajaratnam, in response, had said that a former employee of the Galleon Group was likely to be wearing a "wire."

The agent said he learned from federal authorities that Rajaratnam had a ticket to fly from Kennedy International Airport to London on Friday and to return to New York from Geneva, Switzerland next Thursday.

Also charged in the scheme are Rajiv Goel, 51, of Los Altos, Calif., a director of strategic investments at Intel Capital, the investment arm of Intel Corp., Anil Kumar, 51, of Santa Clara, Calif., a director at McKinsey & Co. Inc., a global management consulting firm, and Robert Moffat, 53, of Ridgefield, Conn., senior vice president and group executive at International Business Machines Corp.'s Systems and Technology Group.

The others charged in the case were identified as Danielle Chiesi, 43, of New York City, and Mark Kurland, 60, also of New York City.

According to court papers, Chiesi worked for New Castle, the equity hedge fund group of Bear Stearns Asset Management Inc. that had assets worth about $1 billion under management. Kurland is a top executive at New Castle.

Kumar's lawyer, Isabelle Kirshner, said of her client: "He's distraught." He was freed on $5 million bail, secured in part by his $2.5 million California home.

Kerry Lawrence, an attorney representing Moffat, said: "He's shocked by the charges."

Bail for Kurland was set at $3 million while bail for Moffat and Chiesi was set at $2 million each. Lawyers for Moffat and Chiesi said their clients will plead not guilty. The law firm representing Kurland did not immediately return a phone call for comment.

A message left at Goel's residence was not immediately returned. He was released on bail after an appearance in California.

A criminal complaint filed in the case shows that an unidentified person involved in the insider trading scheme began cooperating and authorities obtained wiretaps of conversations between the defendants.

In one conversation about a pending deal that was described in a criminal complaint, Chiesi is quoted as saying: "I'm dead if this leaks. I really am. ... and my career is over. I'll be like Martha (expletive) Stewart."

Stewart, the homemaking maven, was convicted in 2004 of lying to the government about the sale of her shares in a friend's company whose stock plummeted after a negative public announcement. She served five months in prison and five months of home confinement.

Prosecutors charged those arrested Friday with conspiracy and securities fraud.

A separate criminal complaint in the case said Chiesi and Moffat conspired to engage in insider trading in the securities of International Business Machines Corp.

According to another criminal complaint in the case, Chiesi and Rajaratnam were heard on a government wiretap of a Sept. 26, 2008, phone conversation discussing whether Chiesi's friend Moffat should move from IBM to a different technology company to aid the scheme.

"Put him in some company where we can trade well," Rajaratnam was quoted in the court papers as saying.

The complaint said Chiesi replied: "I know, I know. I'm thinking that too. Or just keep him at IBM, you know, because this guy is giving me more information. ... I'd like to keep him at IBM right now because that's a very powerful place for him. For us, too."

According to the court papers, Rajaratnam replied: "Only if he becomes CEO." And Chiesi was quoted as replying: "Well, not really. I mean, come on. ... you know, we nailed it."

Continued in article

"Arrest of Hedge Fund Chief Unsettles the Industry," by Michael J. de la Merced and Zachery Kouwe, The New York Times, October 18, 2009 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/business/19insider.html?_r=1

The firm made no secret that its investors included technology executives. Among them was Anil Kumar, a McKinsey director who did consulting work for Advanced Micro Devices and was charged in the scheme. Another defendant, Rajiv Goel, is an Intel executive who is accused of leaking information about the chip maker’s earnings and an investment in Clearwire.

Prosecutors also say that a Galleon executive on the board of PeopleSupport, an outsourcing company, regularly tipped off Mr. Rajaratnam about merger negotiations with a subsidiary of Essar Group of India. Regulatory filings by PeopleSupport last year identified the director as Krish Panu, a former technology executive. He was not charged on Friday.

Galleon has previously been accused of wrongdoing by regulators. In 2005, it paid more than $2 million to settle an S.E.C. lawsuit claiming it had conducted an illegal form of short-selling.

 

Bob Jensen's fraud updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm 

Rotten to the Core ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm


Question
Do you ever get the feeling while we debate accounting theory and standards that we're just fiddling while investors burn?

"Is stock market still a chump's game? Small investors won't have a fair shot until a presumption of integrity is restored. It's not clear that Obama's proposed remedy will resolve the conflicts," by Eliot Spitzer, Microsoft News, August 19, 2009 ---
http://articles.moneycentral.msn.com/Investing/Extra/is-stock-market-still-a-chumps-game.aspx
Link forwarded by Steve Markoff [smarkoff@KIMSTARR.ORG]

One of America's great accomplishments in the last half-century was the so-called "democratization" of the financial markets.

No longer just for the upper crust, investing became a way for the burgeoning middle class to accumulate wealth. Mutual funds exploded in size and number, 401k plans made savings and investing easy, and the excitement of participating in the growth of our economy gripped an ever larger percentage of the population.

Despite a backdrop of doubters -- those who knowingly asserted that outperforming the average was an impossibility for the small investor -- there was a growing consensus that the rules were sufficient to protect the mom-and-pop investor from the sharks that swam in the water.

That sense of fair play in the market has been virtually destroyed by the bubble burstings and market drops of the past few years.

Recent rebounds notwithstanding, most people now are asking whether the system is fundamentally rigged. It's not just that they have an understandable aversion to losing their life savings when the market crashes; it's that each of the scandals and crises has a common pattern: The small investor was taken advantage of by the piranhas that hide in the rapidly moving currents.

And underlying this pattern is a simple theme: conflicts of interest that violated the duty the market players had to their supposed clients.

It is no wonder that cynicism and anger have replaced what had been the joy of participation in the capital markets.

Take a quick run through a few of the scandals:

  • Analysts at major investment banks promote stocks they know to be worthless, misleading the investors who rely on their advice yet helping their investment-banking colleagues generate fees and woo clients.
  • Ratings agencies slap AAA ratings on debt they know to be dicey in order to appease the issuers -- who happen to pay the fees of the agencies, violating the rating agency's duty to provide the marketplace with honest evaluations.
  • Executives receive outsized and grotesque compensation packages -- the result of the perverted recommendations of compensation consultants whose other business depends upon the goodwill of the very CEOs whose pay they are opining upon, thus violating the consultants' duty to the shareholders of the companies for whom they are supposedly working.
  • Mutual funds charge exorbitant fees that investors have to absorb -- fees that dramatically reduce any possibility of outperforming the market and that are set by captive boards of captive management companies, not one of which has been replaced for inadequate performance, violating their duty to guard the interests of the fund investors for whom they supposedly work.
  • "High-speed trading" produces not only the reality of a two-tiered market but also the probability of front-running -- that is, illegally trading on information not yet widely known -- that eats into the possible profits of the retail clients supposedly being served by these very same market players, violating the obligation of the banks to get their clients "best execution" without stepping between their customers and the best available price.
  • AIG (AIG, news, msgs) is bailed out, costing taxpayers tens of billions of dollars, even though (as we later learned) the big guys knew that AIG was going down and were able to hedge and cover their positions. Smaller investors are left holding the stock, and all of us are left picking up the tab.

The unifying theme is apparent: Access to information and advice, the very lifeblood of a level playing field, is not where it needs to be. The small investor still doesn't have a fair shot.

While there have been case-specific remedies, the aggregate effect of all the scandals is still to deny the market the most essential of ingredients: the presumption of integrity.

The issue confronting those who wish to solve this problem is that there really is no simple fix.

Bob Jensen's threads on the economic crisis are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm


Alpha Return on Investment --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_(investment)

What the professional investors don't tell you ---
I downloaded this video --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/FinancialRounds.flv

From the Financial Rounds Blog on September 4, 2009 ---
http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

When I teach investments, there's always a section on market efficiency. A key point I try to make is that any test of market efficiency suffers from the "joint hypothesis" problem - that the test is not tests market efficiency, but also assumes that you have the correct model for measuring the benchmark risk-adjusted return.

In other words, you can't say that you have "alpha" (an abnormal return) without correcting for risk.


Falkenblog makes exactly this point:
 

In my book Finding Alpha I describe these strategies, as they are built on the fact that alpha is a residual return, a risk-adjusted return, and as 'risk' is not definable, this gives people a lot of degrees of freedom. Further, it has long been the case that successful people are good at doing one thing while saying they are doing another.
 
Even better, he's got a pretty good video on the topic (it also touches on other topics). Enjoy.

You can watch the video under September 4, 2009 at http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
I downloaded this video --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/FinancialRounds.flv

Bob Jensen's threads on Return on Investment (ROI) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on market efficiency (EMH) are at 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH

Bob Jensen's investment helpers are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm#InvestmentHelpers

 


Instead of adding more regulating agencies, I think we should simply make the FBI tougher on crime and the IRS tougher on cheats

Our Main Financial Regulating Agency:  The SEC Screw Everybody Commission
One of the biggest regulation failures in history is the way the SEC failed to seriously investigate Bernie Madoff's fund even after being warned by Wall Street experts across six years before Bernie himself disclosed that he was running a $65 billion Ponzi fund.

CBS Sixty Minutes on June 14, 2009 ran a rerun that is devastatingly critical of the SEC. If you’ve not seen it, it may still be available for free (for a short time only) at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5088137n&tag=contentMain;cbsCarousel
The title of the video is “The Man Who Would Be King.”

Between 2002 and 2008 Harry Markopolos repeatedly told (with indisputable proof) the Securities and Exchange Commission that Bernie Madoff's investment fund was a fraud. Markopolos was ignored and, as a result, investors lost more and more billions of dollars. Steve Kroft reports.

Markoplos makes the SEC look truly incompetent or outright conspiratorial in fraud.

I'm really surprised that the SEC survived after Chris Cox messed it up so many things so badly.

As Far as Regulations Go

An annual report issued by the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) shows that the U.S. government imposed $1.17 trillion in new regulatory costs in 2008. That almost equals the $1.2 trillion generated by individual income taxes, and amounts to $3,849 for every American citizen. According the 2009 edition of Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State, the government issued 3,830 new rules last year, and The Federal Register, where such rules are listed, ballooned to a record 79,435 pages. “The costs of federal regulations too often exceed the benefits, yet these regulations receive little official scrutiny from Congress,” said CEI Vice President Clyde Wayne Crews, Jr., who wrote the report. “The U.S. economy lost value in 2008 for the first time since 1990,” Crews said. “Meanwhile, our federal government imposed a $1.17 trillion ‘hidden tax’ on Americans beyond the $3 trillion officially budgeted” through the regulations.
 Adam Brickley, "Government Implemented Thousands of New Regulations Costing $1.17 Trillion in 2008," CNS News, June 12, 2009 ---
http://www.cnsnews.com/public/content/article.aspx?RsrcID=49487

Jensen Comment
I’m a long-time believer that industries being regulated end up controlling the regulating agencies. The records of Alan Greenspan (FED) and the SEC from Arthur Levitt to Chris Cox do absolutely nothing to change my belief ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

How do industries leverage the regulatory agencies?
The primary control mechanism is to have high paying jobs waiting in industry for regulators who play ball while they are still employed by the government. It happens time and time again in the FPC, EPA, FDA, FAA, FTC, SEC, etc. Because so many people work for the FBI and IRS, it's a little harder for industry to manage those bureaucrats. Also the FBI and the IRS tend to focus on the worst of the worst offenders whereas other agencies often deal with top management of the largest companies in America.

 


Being Honest About Being Dishonest
Democrats openly admit that most of the stimulus money is going to counties that voted for Obama

A new study released by USA Today also finds that counties that voted for Obama received about twice as much stimulus money per capita as those that voted for McCain. "The stimulus bill is designed to help those who have been hurt by the economic downturn.... Do you see disparity out there in where the money is going? Certainly," a Democratic congressional staffer knowledgeable about the process told FOXNews.com.
John Lott, "ANALYSIS: States Hit Hardest by Recession Get Least Stimulus Money," Fox News, July 19, 2009--- http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,533841,00.html

 

The Greatest Swindle in the History of the World
"The Greatest Swindle Ever Sold," by Andy Kroll, The Nation, May 26, 2009 ---
http://www.thenation.com/doc/20090608/kroll/print

The legislation's guidelines for crafting the rescue plan were clear: the TARP should protect home values and consumer savings, help citizens keep their homes and create jobs. Above all, with the government poised to invest hundreds of billions of taxpayer dollars in various financial institutions, the legislation urged the bailout's architects to maximize returns to the American people.

That $700 billion bailout has since grown into a more than $12 trillion commitment by the US government and the Federal Reserve. About $1.1 trillion of that is taxpayer money--the TARP money and an additional $400 billion rescue of mortgage companies Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. The TARP now includes twelve separate programs, and recipients range from megabanks like Citigroup and JPMorgan Chase to automakers Chrysler and General Motors.

Seven months in, the bailout's impact is unclear. The Treasury Department has used the recent "stress test" results it applied to nineteen of the nation's largest banks to suggest that the worst might be over; yet the International Monetary Fund, as well as economists like New York University professor and economist Nouriel Roubini and New York Times columnist Paul Krugman predict greater losses in US markets, rising unemployment and generally tougher economic times ahead.

What cannot be disputed, however, is the financial bailout's biggest loser: the American taxpayer. The US government, led by the Treasury Department, has done little, if anything, to maximize returns on its trillion-dollar, taxpayer-funded investment. So far, the bailout has favored rescued financial institutions by subsidizing their losses to the tune of $356 billion, shying away from much-needed management changes and--with the exception of the automakers--letting companies take taxpayer money without a coherent plan for how they might return to viability.

The bailout's perks have been no less favorable for private investors who are now picking over the economy's still-smoking rubble at the taxpayers' expense. The newer bailout programs rolled out by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner give private equity firms, hedge funds and other private investors significant leverage to buy "toxic" or distressed assets, while leaving taxpayers stuck with the lion's share of the risk and potential losses.

Given the lack of transparency and accountability, don't expect taxpayers to be able to object too much. After all, remarkably little is known about how TARP recipients have used the government aid received. Nonetheless, recent government reports, Congressional testimony and commentaries offer those patient enough to pore over hundreds of pages of material glimpses of just how Wall Street friendly the bailout actually is. Here, then, based on the most definitive data and analyses available, are six of the most blatant and alarming ways taxpayers have been scammed by the government's $1.1-trillion, publicly funded bailout.

1. By overpaying for its TARP investments, the Treasury Department provided bailout recipients with generous subsidies at the taxpayer's expense.

When the Treasury Department ditched its initial plan to buy up "toxic" assets and instead invest directly in financial institutions, then-Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson Jr. assured Americans that they'd get a fair deal. "This is an investment, not an expenditure, and there is no reason to expect this program will cost taxpayers anything," he said in October 2008.

Yet the Congressional Oversight Panel (COP), a five-person group tasked with ensuring that the Treasury Department acts in the public's best interest, concluded in its monthly report for February that the department had significantly overpaid by tens of billions of dollars for its investments. For the ten largest TARP investments made in 2008, totaling $184.2 billion, Treasury received on average only $66 worth of assets for every $100 invested. Based on that shortfall, the panel calculated that Treasury had received only $176 billion in assets for its $254 billion investment, leaving a $78 billion hole in taxpayer pockets.

Not all investors subsidized the struggling banks so heavily while investing in them. The COP report notes that private investors received much closer to fair market value in investments made at the time of the early TARP transactions. When, for instance, Berkshire Hathaway invested $5 billion in Goldman Sachs in September, the Omaha-based company received securities worth $110 for each $100 invested. And when Mitsubishi invested in Morgan Stanley that same month, it received securities worth $91 for every $100 invested.

As of May 15, according to the Ethisphere TARP Index, which tracks the government's bailout investments, its various investments had depreciated in value by almost $147.7 billion. In other words, TARP's losses come out to almost $1,300 per American taxpaying household.

2. As the government has no real oversight over bailout funds, taxpayers remain in the dark about how their money has been used and if it has made any difference.

While the Treasury Department can make TARP recipients report on just how they spend their government bailout funds, it has chosen not to do so. As a result, it's unclear whether institutions receiving such funds are using that money to increase lending--which would, in turn, boost the economy--or merely to fill in holes in their balance sheets.

Neil M. Barofsky, the special inspector general for TARP, summed the situation up this way in his office's April quarterly report to Congress: "The American people have a right to know how their tax dollars are being used, particularly as billions of dollars are going to institutions for which banking is certainly not part of the institution's core business and may be little more than a way to gain access to the low-cost capital provided under TARP."

This lack of transparency makes the bailout process highly susceptible to fraud and corruption. Barofsky's report stated that twenty separate criminal investigations were already underway involving corporate fraud, insider trading and public corruption. He also told the Financial Times that his office was investigating whether banks manipulated their books to secure bailout funds. "I hope we don't find a single bank that's cooked its books to try to get money, but I don't think that's going to be the case."

Economist Dean Baker, co-director of the Center for Economic and Policy Research in Washington, suggested to TomDispatch in an interview that the opaque and complicated nature of the bailout may not be entirely unintentional, given the difficulties it raises for anyone wanting to follow the trail of taxpayer dollars from the government to the banks. "[Government officials] see this all as a Three Card Monte, moving everything around really quickly so the public won't understand that this really is an elaborate way to subsidize the banks," Baker says, adding that the public "won't realize we gave money away to some of the richest people."

3. The bailout's newer programs heavily favor the private sector, giving investors an opportunity to earn lucrative profits and leaving taxpayers with most of the risk.

Under Treasury Secretary Geithner, the Treasury Department has greatly expanded the financial bailout to troubling new programs like the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP) and the Term Asset-Backed-Securities Loan Facility (TALF). The PPIP, for example, encourages private investors to buy "toxic" or risky assets on the books of struggling banks. Doing so, we're told, will get banks lending again because the burdensome assets won't weigh them down. Unfortunately, the incentives the Treasury Department is offering to get private investors to participate are so generous that the government--and, by extension, American taxpayers--are left with all the downside.

Joseph Stiglitz, the Nobel-prize winning economist, described the PPIP program in a New York Times op-ed this way:

Consider an asset that has a 50-50 chance of being worth either zero or $200 in a year's time. The average "value" of the asset is $100. Ignoring interest, this is what the asset would sell for in a competitive market. It is what the asset is 'worth.' Under the plan by Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, the government would provide about 92 percent of the money to buy the asset but would stand to receive only 50 percent of any gains, and would absorb almost all of the losses. Some partnership!

Assume that one of the public-private partnerships the Treasury has promised to create is willing to pay $150 for the asset. That's 50 percent more than its true value, and the bank is more than happy to sell. So the private partner puts up $12, and the government supplies the rest--$12 in "equity" plus $126 in the form of a guaranteed loan.

If, in a year's time, it turns out that the true value of the asset is zero, the private partner loses the $12, and the government loses $138. If the true value is $200, the government and the private partner split the $74 that's left over after paying back the $126 loan. In that rosy scenario, the private partner more than triples his $12 investment. But the taxpayer, having risked $138, gains a mere $37."

Worse still, the PPIP can be easily manipulated for private gain. As economist Jeffrey Sachs has described it, a bank with worthless toxic assets on its books could actually set up its own public-private fund to bid on those assets. Since no true bidder would pay for a worthless asset, the bank's public-private fund would win the bid, essentially using government money for the purchase. All the public-private fund would then have to do is quietly declare bankruptcy and disappear, leaving the bank to make off with the government money it received. With the PPIP deals set to begin in the coming months, time will tell whether private investors actually take advantage of the program's flaws in this fashion.

The Treasury Department's TALF program offers equally enticing possibilities for potential bailout profiteers, providing investors with a chance to double, triple or even quadruple their investments. And like the PPIP, if the deal goes bad, taxpayers absorb most of the losses. "It beats any financing that the private sector could ever come up with," a Wall Street trader commented in a recent Fortune magazine story. "I almost want to say it is irresponsible."

4. The government has no coherent plan for returning failing financial institutions to profitability and maximizing returns on taxpayers' investments.

Compare the treatment of the auto industry and the financial sector, and a troubling double standard emerges. As a condition for taking bailout aid, the government required Chrysler and General Motors to present detailed plans on how the companies would return to profitability. Yet the Treasury Department attached minimal conditions to the billions injected into the largest bailed-out financial institutions. Moreover, neither Geithner nor Lawrence Summers, one of President Barack Obama's top economic advisors, nor the president himself has articulated any substantive plan or vision for how the bailout will help these institutions recover and, hopefully, maximize taxpayers' investment returns.

The Congressional Oversight Panel highlighted the absence of such a comprehensive plan in its January report. Three months into the bailout, the Treasury Department "has not yet explained its strategy," the report stated. "Treasury has identified its goals and announced its programs, but it has not yet explained how the programs chosen constitute a coherent plan to achieve those goals."

Today, the department's endgame for the bailout still remains vague. Thomas Hoenig, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, wrote in the Financial Times in May that the government's response to the financial meltdown has been "ad hoc, resulting in inequitable outcomes among firms, creditors, and investors." Rather than perpetually prop up banks with endless taxpayer funds, Hoenig suggests, the government should allow banks to fail. Only then, he believes, can crippled financial institutions and systems be fixed. "Because we still have far to go in this crisis, there remains time to define a clear process for resolving large institutional failure. Without one, the consequences will involve a series of short-term events and far more uncertainty for the global economy in the long run."

The healthier and more profitable bailout recipients are once financial markets rebound, the more taxpayers will earn on their investments. Without a plan, however, banks may limp back to viability while taxpayers lose their investments or even absorb further losses.

5. The bailout's focus on Wall Street mega-banks ignores smaller banks serving millions of American taxpayers that face an equally uncertain future.

The government may not have a long-term strategy for its trillion-dollar bailout, but its guiding principle, however misguided, is clear: what's good for Wall Street will be best for the rest of the country.

On the day the mega-bank stress tests were officially released, another set of stress-test results came out to much less fanfare. In its quarterly report on the health of individual banks and the banking industry as a whole, Institutional Risk Analytics (IRA), a respected financial services organization, found that the stress levels among more than 7,500 FDIC-reporting banks nationwide had risen dramatically. For 1,575 of the banks, net incomes had turned negative due to decreased lending and less risk-taking.

The conclusion IRA drew was telling: "Our overall observation is that US policy makers may very well have been distracted by focusing on 19 large stress test banks designed to save Wall Street and the world's central bank bondholders, this while a trend is emerging of a going concern viability crash taking shape under the radar." The report concluded with a question: "Has the time come to shift the policy focus away from the things that we love, namely big zombie banks, to tackle things that are truly hurting us?"

6. The bailout encourages the very behaviors that created the economic crisis in the first place instead of overhauling our broken financial system and helping the individuals most affected by the crisis.

As Joseph Stiglitz explained in the New York Times, one major cause of the economic crisis was bank overleveraging. "Using relatively little capital of their own," he wrote, banks "borrowed heavily to buy extremely risky real estate assets. In the process, they used overly complex instruments like collateralized debt obligations." Financial institutions engaged in overleveraging in pursuit of the lucrative profits such deals promised--even if those profits came with staggering levels of risk.

Sound familiar? It should, because in the PPIP and TALF bailout programs the Treasury Department has essentially replicated the very over-leveraged, risky, complex system that got us into this mess in the first place: in other words, the government hopes to repair our financial system by using the flawed practices that caused this crisis.

Then there are the institutions deemed "too big to fail." These financial giants--among them AIG, Citigroup and Bank of America-- have been kept afloat by billions of dollars in bottomless bailout aid. Yet reinforcing the notion that any institution is "too big to fail" is dangerous to the economy. When a company like AIG grows so large that it becomes "too big to fail," the risk it carries is systemic, meaning failure could drag down the entire economy. The government should force "too big to fail" institutions to slim down to a safer, more modest size; instead, the Treasury Department continues to subsidize these financial giants, reinforcing their place in our economy.

Of even greater concern is the message the bailout sends to banks and lenders--namely, that the risky investments that crippled the economy are fair game in the future. After all, if banks fail and teeter at the edge of collapse, the government promises to be there with a taxpayer-funded, potentially profitable safety net.

The handling of the bailout makes at least one thing clear, however. It's not your health that the government is focused on, it's theirs-- the very banks and lenders whose convoluted financial systems provided the underpinnings for staggering salaries and bonuses, while bringing our economy to the brink of another Great Depression.

Bob Jensen's threads how your money was put to word (fraudulently) to pay for the mistakes of the so-called professionals of finance --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Bailout

Bob Jensen's threads on why the infamous "Bailout" won't work --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#BailoutStupidity


"SEC Charges Four With Fraud," by Kathy Shwiff, The Wall Street Journal, July 15, 2009 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124751046687234157.html#mod=todays_us_money_and_investing

The Securities and Exchange Commission charged Seattle securities lawyer David Otto, three other individuals and two companies with conducting a fraudulent "pump-and-dump" scheme in which they secretly unloaded more than $1 million in "penny stocks" of a company touting a nonexistent antiaging product.

The complaint says the defendants violated antifraud and other provisions of federal securities laws. The SEC is seeking disgorgement and financial penalties.

The agency said misleading news releases and Web profiles touting beverages and nutritional supplements pushed the stock price of Seattle-based MitoPharm up more than four times to above $2.30 although MitoPharm's products were in the developmental stage. Two key products didn't exist, according to the complaint.

The SEC said Mr. Otto sold his shares for more than $1 million while Houston-based stock promoter Charles Bingham generated proceeds of $300,000 before heavy selling caused the price to fall to a nickel by November 2007.

The SEC's complaint, filed in federal court in Seattle, charges Mr. Otto, associate Todd Van Siclen of Seattle, Mr. Bingham and his company, Wall Street PR Inc., along with MitoPharm and its chief executive, Pak Peter Cheung of Vancouver.

Mr. Otto's attorney, Jeff Coopersmith said Mr. Otto committed no intentional violation of securities law. Mr. Bingham's attorney, Ronald Kaufman, said his client is as much a victim as any other shareholder. Mr. Bingham said his firm lost money on the work it did for MitoPharm, adding he had no way of knowing the products, which were being manufactured in China, weren't as described. The other defendants couldn't be reached for comment.

Bob Jensen's threads on securities frauds are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#SecuritiesFraud

 


"Insider Trading Inside the SEC," by Joe Weisenthal, Business Insider, May 15, 2009 --- http://www.businessinsider.com/insider-trading-at-the-sec-2009-5

Kotz, who told Congress last year he was examining whether frequent trades by the pair broke agency rules, referred the case to the U.S. Attorney’s Office in Washington after finding evidence the bets might amount to insider trading, he wrote in the March 3 report released by Senator Charles Grassley. Both lawyers still work for the agency and denied improper conduct.

The report faults the agency for inadequately monitoring trades by employees and relying on an “honor system.” The lawyers frequently discussed stocks at work, traded in at least one company under investigation and didn’t properly disclose some transactions, it says. One lawyer made 247 trades in the two years ending January 2008, and the other made 14.
ead the whole thing >


Question
What are hedge funds, especially after Bernie Madoff made them so famous?

When people ask me this question, my initial response is that a hedge fund no longer necessarily has anything to do with financial risk hedging. Rather a hedge fund is merely a "private" investment "club" that does not offer shares to the general public largely because it would then subject itself to more SEC, stock exchange, and other regulators. Having said this, it's pretty darn easy for anybody with sufficient funds to get into such a "private" club. Minimum investments range from $10,000 to $1,000,000 or higher.

Since Bernie Madoff made hedge funds so famous, the public tends to think that a hedge fund is dangerous, fraudulent, and a back street operation that does not play be the rules. Certainly hedge funds emerged in part to avoid being regulated. Sometimes they are risky due to high leverage, but some funds skillfully hedge to manage risk and are much safer than mutual funds. For example, some hedge funds have shrewd hedging strategies to control risk in interest rate and/or foreign currency trading.

Most hedge funds are not fraudulent. In general, however, it's "buyer beware" for hedge fund investors.

I would never invest in a hedge fund that is not audited by a very reliable CPA auditing firm. Not all CPA auditing firms are reliable (Bernie Madoff proved you can engage a fraudulent auditor operating out of a one-room office). Hence, the first step in evaluating a hedge fund is to investigate its auditor. The first step in evaluating an auditor is to determine if the auditing firm is wealthy enough to be a serious third party in law suits if the hedge fund goes belly up.

But the recent multimillion losses of Carnegie Mellon, the University of Pittsburgh, and other university endowment funds that invested in a verry fraudulent hedge fund purportedly audited by Deloitte suggests that the size and reputation of the auditing firm is not, by itself, sufficient protection against a criminal hedge fund (that was supposedly given a clean opinion by Deloitte in financial reports circulated to the victims of the fraud).

When learning about hedge funds, you may want to begin at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hedge_Fund

"What is a hedge fund and how is it different from a mutual fund?" by Andy Samuels, Business and Finance 101 Examiner, June 10, 2009 --- Click Here
Jim Mahar pointed out this link.

Having migrated away from their namesake, hedge funds no longer  focus primarily on “hedging” (attempting to reduce risk) because hedge funds are now focused almost blindly on one thing: returns.

Having been referred to as “mutual funds for the super rich” by investopedia.com, hedge funds are very similar to mutual funds in that they pool money together from many investors. Hedge funds, like mutual funds, are also managed by a financial professionals, but differ because they are geared toward wealthier individuals.

Hedge funds, unlike mutual funds, employ a wider array of ivesting techniques, which are considered more aggresive. For example, hedge funds often use leverage to amplify their returns (or losses if things go wrong).

The other key difference between hedge funds and mutual funds is the amount of regulation involved. Hedge funds are relatively unregulated because investors in hedge funds are assumed to be more sophisticated investors, who can both afford and understand the potential losses. In fact, U.S. laws require that the majority of investors in the fund are accredited.

Most hedge funds draw in investors because of the trustworthy reputations of the executives of the fund. Word-of-mouth praise and affiliations are often the key to success. Bernie Madoff succeed in luring customers based on two leading factors:  (1) His esteemed reputation on Wall Street and (2) His highly regarded connections in the Jewish community where he drew in most of his victims.

A Bit of History
German Chancellor's Call for Global Regulations to Curb Hedge Funds
Germany and the United States are parting company again, this time over Chancellor Gerhard Schröder's call for international regulations to govern hedge funds. Treasury Secretary John W. Snow, speaking here Thursday at the end of a five-country European tour, said the United States opposed "heavy-handed" curbs on markets. He said that he was not familiar with the German proposals, but left little doubt about how Washington would react. "I think we ought to be very careful about heavy-handed regulation of markets because it stymies financial innovation," Mr. Snow said after a news conference here to sum up his visit. Noting that the Securities and Exchange Commission has proposed that hedge funds be required to register themselves, he said he preferred the "light touch rather than the heavy regulatory burden."
Mark Landler, "U.S. Balks at German Chancellor's Call for Global Regulations to Curb Hedge Funds," The New York Times, June 17, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/06/17/business/worldbusiness/17hedge.html?

An investing balloon that will one day burst
The numbers are mind-boggling: 15 years ago, hedge funds managed less than $40 billion. Today, the figure is approaching $1 trillion. By contrast, assets in mutual funds grew at an impressive but much slower rate, to $8.1 trillion from $1 trillion, during the same period. The number of hedge fund firms has also grown - to 3,307 last year, up 74 percent from 1,903 in 1999. During the same period, the number of funds created - a manager can start more than one fund at a time - has surged 209 percent, with 1,406 funds introduced in 2004, according to Hedge Fund Research, based in Chicago.
Jenny Anderson and Riva D. Atlas, "If I Only Had a Hedge Fund," The New York Times, The New York Times, March 27, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/03/27/business/yourmoney/27hedge.html 
Jensen Comment:  The name "hedge fund" seems to imply that risk is hedged.  Nothing could be further from the case.  Hedge funds do not have to hedge risks,  Hedge funds should instead be called private investment clubs.  If structured in a certain way they can avoid SEC oversight.  

Remember how the Russian space program worked in the 1960s? The only flights that got publicized were the successful ones.  Hedge funds are like that. The ones asking for your money have terrific records. You don't hear about the ones that blew up. That fact should strongly color your view of hedge funds with terrific records.
Forbes, January 13, 2005 --- http://snipurl.com/ForbesJan_13 

US hedge funds prior to 2005 were exempted from Securities and Exchange Commission reporting requirements, as well as from regulatory restrictions concerning leverage or trading strategies. They now must register with the SEC except under an enormous loophole for funds that cannot liquidate in less than two years.

The Loophole:  Locked-up funds don't require oversight.  That means more risk for investors.
"Hedge Funds Find an Escape Hatch," Business Week, December 27, 2004, Page 51 --- 

Securities & Exchange Commission Chairman William H. Donaldson recently accomplished a major feat when he got the agency to pass a controversial rule forcing hedge fund advisers to register by 2006. Unfortunately, just weeks after the SEC announced the new rule on Dec. 2, many hedge fund managers have already figured out a simple way to bypass it.

The easy out is right on page 23 of the new SEC rule: Any fund that requires investors to commit their money for more than two years does not have to register with the SEC. The SEC created that escape hatch to benefit private-equity firms and venture capitalists, which typically make long-term investments and have been involved in few SEC enforcement actions. By contrast, hedge funds, some of which have recently been charged with defrauding investors, typically have allowed investors to remove their money at the end of every quarter. Now many are considering taking advantage of the loophole by locking up customers' money for years.

 

Bob Jensen's threads on frauds are linked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
In particular see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm

 


Video 1: "Nobelist Daniel Kahneman On Behavioral Economics (Awesome)!" Simoleon Sense, June 5, 2009 ---
http://www.simoleonsense.com/video-nobelist-daniel-kahneman-on-behavioral-economics-awesome/

Introduction (Via Fora.Tv)

Nobel Prize-winning psychologist Daniel Kahneman addresses the Georgetown class of 2009 about the merits of behavioral economics.

He deconstructs the assumption that people always act rationally, and explains how to promote rational decisions in an irrational world.

Topics Covered:

1. The Economic Definition Of Rationality

2. Emphasis on Rationality in Modern Economic Theory

3. Examples of Irrational Behavior (watch this part)

4. How to encourage rational decisions

Speaker Background (Via Fora.Tv)

Daniel Kahneman - Daniel Kahneman is Eugene Higgins Professor of Psychology and Professor of Public Affairs Emeritus at Princeton University. He was educated at The Hebrew University in Jerusalem and obtained his PhD in Berkeley. He taught at The Hebrew University, at the University of British Columbia and at Berkeley, and joined the Princeton faculty in 1994, retiring in 2007. He is best known for his contributions, with his late colleague Amos Tversky, to the psychology of judgment and decision making, which inspired the development of behavioral economics in general, and of behavioral finance in particular. This work earned Kahneman the Nobel Prize in Economics in 2002 and many other honors

Video 2:  Nancy Etcoff is part of a new vanguard of cognitive researchers asking: What makes us happy? Why do we like beautiful things? And how on earth did we evolve that way?
Simoleon Sense, June 10, 2009
http://www.simoleonsense.com/science-of-happiness/ 

"Must Read: Why People Fall Victim To Scams," Simoleon Sense, March 18, 2009 ---
http://www.simoleonsense.com/must-read-why-people-fall-victim-to-scams/
The paper is at http://www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/reports/consumer_protection/oft1070.pdf

 


A fraudulent market manipulation contributed to the Wall Street meltdown
Phantom Shares and Market Manipulation (Bloomberg News video on naked short selling) --- http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=4490541725797746038

Securities Fraud --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Securities_fraud

Securities fraud, also known as investment fraud, is a practice in which investors are deceived and manipulated, resulting in losses.[1] Generally speaking, securities fraud consists of deceptive practices in the stock and commodity markets, and occurs when investors are enticed to part with their money based on untrue statements.

Securities fraud frequently includes theft of capital from investors and misstatements on a public company's financial reports. The term also encompasses a wide range of other actions, including insider trading.

Sometimes the losses caused by securities fraud are difficult to quantify, but real. For example, insider trading is believed to raise the cost of capital for securities issuers, thus decreasing overall economic growth.

This white collar crime has become increasingly frequent as the Internet and World Wide Web are giving criminals greater access to prey. The trading volume in the United States securities and commodities markets, having grown dramatically in the 1990s, has led to an increase in fraud and misconduct by investors, executives, shareholders, and other market participants. Securities regulators and other prominent groups estimate civil securities fraud totals approximately $40 billion per year. Fraudulent schemes perpetrated in the securities and commodities markets can ultimately have a devastating impact on the viability and operation of these markets.

According to the FBI, securities fraud includes false information on a company's financial statement and Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings; lying to corporate auditors; insider trading; stock manipulation schemes, and embezzlement by stockbrokers.

Overview --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Securities_fraud
  • 1 Types of securities fraud
    • 1.1 Internet fraud
    • 1.2 Insider trading
    • 1.3 Microcap fraud
    • 1.4 Accountant fraud
    • 1.5 Boiler rooms
  • 2 Pervasiveness of securities fraud
  • 3 Characteristics of victims and perpetrators
  • 4 Other effects of securities fraud
  • 5 Related subjects
  • 6 See also
  • 7 References

The Way Financial Media Fraud Works
Video from YouTube (not sure how long it will be online)
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dwUXx4DR0wo

From Jim Mahar's Blog on March 152, 2009 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

YouTube - Jon Stewart vs Jim Cramer Interview Fight on Daily Show ---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LceizefhP4k

While there was much hype in the days leading up to the show, the actual interview was pretty good. Jon Stewart vs Jim Cramer. Here is the link from The DailyShow for the entire episode.

It is also available (at least temporarily) on
YouTube

Jon Stewart vs Jim Cramer Interview Fight on Daily Show ---
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LceizefhP4k

Some talking points:

* Stewart's main point seems to be that while Cramer and CNBC claim to be looking out for investors, in actuality they are are nothing more than entertainment at best and accomplices at worst.

* It is interesting to see the discussion on Short Selling and the way that Cramer (and by inference other hedge fund managers) essentially lied to drive the price down. I would have to think the SEC might be interested in this.

* Stewart maintains that the financial media plays a role in governance. They dropped the ball.

* Cramer was good in admitting that success (year after year of 30% returns) changes our view and we forget that things go wrong.

* Line of the day from Stewart: "We are both snake oil salesmen, but I let people know I sell snake oil.:

* Line of the day from Cramer: "No one should be spared in this environment."



The whole interview (unedited) is also available. Here is the 3rd part:
 
Video from YouTube (not sure how long it will be online)
 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dwUXx4DR0wo
 

Bernard Madoff, former Nasdaq Stock Market chairman and founder of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, was arrested and charged with securities fraud Thursday in what federal prosecutors called a Ponzi scheme that could involve losses of more than $50 billion.

It is bigger than Enron, bigger than Boesky and bigger than Tyco

"Madoff Scandal: 'Biggest Story of the Year'," Seeking Alpha, December 12, 2008 ---
http://seekingalpha.com/article/110402-madoff-scandal-biggest-story-of-the-year?source=wildcard

According to RealMoney.com columnist Doug Kass, general partner and investment manager of hedge fund Seabreeze Partners Short LP and Seabreeze Partners Short Offshore Fund, Ltd., today's late-breaking report of an alleged massive fraud at a well known investment firm could be "the biggest story of the year." In his view,

it is bigger than Enron, bigger than Boesky and bigger than Tyco.
It attacks at the core of investor confidence -- because, if true, and this could happen ... investors might think that almost anything imaginable could happen to the money they have entrusted to their fiduciaries.

Here are some excerpts from the Bloomberg report, entitled "Madoff Charged in $50 Billion Fraud at Advisory Firm":

Bernard Madoff, founder and president of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, a market-maker for hedge funds and banks, was charged by federal prosecutors in a $50 billion fraud at his advisory business.

Madoff, 70, was arrested today at 8:30 a.m. by the FBI and appeared before U.S. Magistrate Judge Douglas Eaton in Manhattan federal court. Charged in a criminal complaint with a single count of securities fraud, he was granted release on a $10 million bond guaranteed by his wife and secured by his apartment. Madoff’s wife was present in the courtroom.

"It’s all just one big lie," Madoff told his employees on Dec. 10, according to a statement by prosecutors. The firm, Madoff allegedly said, is "basically, a giant Ponzi scheme." He was also sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Madoff’s New York-based firm was the 23rd largest market maker on Nasdaq in October, handling a daily average of about 50 million shares a day, exchange data show. The firm specialized in handling orders from online brokers in some of the largest U.S. companies, including General Electric Co (GE). and Citigroup Inc. (C).

...

SEC Complaint

The SEC in its complaint, also filed today in Manhattan federal court, accused Madoff of a "multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme that he perpetrated on advisory clients of his firm."

The SEC said it’s seeking emergency relief for investors, including an asset freeze and the appointment of a receiver for the firm. Ira Sorkin, another defense lawyer for Madoff, couldn’t be immediately reached for comment.

...

Madoff, who owned more than 75 percent of his firm, and his brother Peter are the only two individuals listed on regulatory records as "direct owners and executive officers."

Peter Madoff was a board member of the St. Louis brokerage firm A.G. Edwards Inc. from 2001 through last year, when it was sold to Wachovia Corp (WB).

$17.1 Billion

The Madoff firm had about $17.1 billion in assets under management as of Nov. 17, according to NASD records. At least 50 percent of its clients were hedge funds, and others included banks and wealthy individuals, according to the records.

...

Madoff’s Web site advertises the "high ethical standards" of the firm.

"In an era of faceless organizations owned by other equally faceless organizations, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC harks back to an earlier era in the financial world: The owner’s name is on the door," according to the Web site. "Clients know that Bernard Madoff has a personal interest in maintaining the unblemished record of value, fair-dealing, and high ethical standards that has always been the firm’s hallmark."

...

"These guys were one of the original, if not the original, third market makers," said Joseph Saluzzi, the co-head of equity trading at Themis Trading LLC in Chatham, New Jersey. "They had a great business and they were good with their clients. They were around for a long time. He’s a well-respected guy in the industry."

The case is U.S. v. Madoff, 08-MAG-02735, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Manhattan)

Continued in article

And here is the SEC press release

Also see http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/

What was the auditing firm of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, the auditor who gave a clean opinion, that's been insolvent for years?
Apparently, Mr Madoff said the business had been insolvent for years and, from having $17 billion of assets under management at the beginning of 2008, the SEC said: “It appears that virtually all assets of the advisory business are gone”. It has now emerged that Friehling & Horowitz, the auditor that signed off the annual financial statement for the investment advisory business for 2006, is under investigation by the district attorney in New York’s Rockland County, a northern suburb of New York City.
"The $50bn scam: How Bernard Madoff allegedly cheated investors," London Times, December 15, 2008 ---
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article5345751.ece

It was at the Manhattan apartment that Mr Madoff apparently confessed that the business was in fact a “giant Ponzi scheme” and that the firm had been insolvent for years.

To cap it all, Mr Madoff told his sons he was going to give himself up, but only after giving out the $200 - $300 million money he had left to “employees, family and friends”.

All the company’s remaining assets have now been frozen in the hope of repaying some of the companies, individuals and charities that have been unfortunate enough to invest in the business.

However, with the fraud believed to exceed $50 billion, whatever recompense investors could receive will be a drop in the ocean.

Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm


Where were the auditors?
What surprised me is the size of this alleged fraud
"This is huge," said David Rosenfeld, associate regional director of the SEC's New York Regional Office.
"This is a truly egregious fraud of immense proportions."

"Carnegie Mellon and Pitt Accuse 2 Investment Managers of $114-Million Fraud," by Scott Carlson, Chronicle of Higher Education, February 26, 2009 --- Click Here

The University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University are suing two investment managers who allegedly took $114-million from the institutions and spent it on cars, horses, houses for their wives, and even teddy bears.

The two managers, Paul Greenwood and Stephen Walsh, are said to have taken a total of more than $500-million from the universities and other investors through their company, Westridge Capital Management, and they have also been charged with fraud by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The universities named several associates of Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh in the lawsuit.

According to the complaint, the universities became alarmed after the National Futures Association, a nonprofit organization that investigates member firms, tried to audit Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh’s company. The association determined that that Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh had taken hundreds of millions in loans from the investment funds. On February 12 the association suspended their membership after repeatedly trying, and failing, to contact them.

That step spurred the universities to try to locate their money. On February 18 they contacted the Securities and Exchange Commission and sought an investigation. According to their lawsuit, Carnegie Mellon had invested $49-million and the University of Pittsburgh had invested $65-million.

Today’s Pittsburgh Post-Gazette listed some of the things that Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh had purchased with their investors’ money: rare books, Steiff teddy bears at up to $80,000 each, a horse farm, cars, and a $3-million residence for Mr. Walsh’s ex-wife.

Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh were also handling money for retirement funds for teachers and public employees in Iowa, North Dakota, and Sacramento County, California. In the Post-Gazette, David Rosenfeld, an associate regional director of the SEC’s New York Regional Office, said the case represented “a truly egregious fraud of immense proportions.”

Mr. Walsh, it appears, had ties to another university as well. He is a member of the foundation board at the State University of New York at Buffalo, from which he graduated in 1966 with a political-science degree. In a written statement, officials at Buffalo said that he had not been an active board member for the past two years and that foundation policy forbade investing university money with any member of the board.

"Pitt, CMU money managers arrested in fraud FBI says they misappropriated $500 million for lavish lifestyles," by Jonathon Silver, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, February 26, 2009 --- http://www.post-gazette.com/pg/09057/951834-85.stm

Two East Coast investment managers sued for fraud by the University of Pittsburgh and Carnegie Mellon University misappropriated more than $500 million of investors' money to hide losses and fund a lavish lifestyle that included purchases of $80,000 collectible teddy bears, horses and rare books, federal authorities said yesterday.

As Pitt and Carnegie Mellon were busy trying to learn whether they will be able to recover any of their combined $114 million in investments through Westridge Capital Management, the FBI yesterday arrested the corporations' managers.

Paul Greenwood, 61, of North Salem, N.Y., and Stephen Walsh, 64, of Sands Point, N.Y., were charged in Manhattan -- by the same office prosecuting the Bernard L. Madoff fraud case -- with securities fraud, wire fraud and conspiracy.

Both men also were sued in civil court by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission, which alleged that the partners misappropriated more than $553 million and "fraudulently solicited" $1.3 billion from investors since 1996.

The Accused

Paul Greenwood and Stephen Walsh are accused of misappropriating millions from investors. Here is a look at some of their biggest personal purchases:

• HOME: Mr. Greenwood, a horse breeder, owned a horse farm in North Salem, N.Y., an affluent community that counts David Letterman as a resident.

• BEARS: Mr. Greenwood owns as many as 1,350 Steiff toys, including teddy bears costing as much as $80,000.

• DIVORCE: Mr. Walsh bought his ex-wife a $3 million condominium as part of their divorce settlement.

"This is huge," said David Rosenfeld, associate regional director of the SEC's New York Regional Office. "This is a truly egregious fraud of immense proportions."

Lawyers for the defendants either could not be reached or had no comment.

Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh, longtime associates and former co-owners of the New York Islanders hockey team, ran Westridge Capital Management and a number of affiliated funds and entities.

As late as this month, the partners appeared to be doing well. Mr. Greenwood told Pitt's assistant treasurer Jan. 21 that they had $2.8 billion under management -- though that number is now in question. And on Feb. 2, Pitt sent $5 million to be invested.

But in the course of less than three weeks, Westridge's mammoth portfolio imploded in what federal authorities called an investment scam meant to cover up trading losses and fund extravagant purchases by the partners.

An audit launched Feb. 5 by the National Futures Association proved key to uncovering the alleged deceit and apparently became the linchpin of the case federal prosecutors are building.

That audit came about in an indirect way. The association, a self-policing membership body, had taken action against a New York financier. That led to a man named Jack Reynolds, a manager of the Westridge Capital Management Fund in which CMU invested $49 million; and Mr. Reynolds led to Westridge.

"We just said we better take a look at Jack Reynolds and see what's happening, and that led us to Westridge and WCM, so it was a domino effect," said Larry Dyekman, an association spokesman. "We're just not sure we have the full picture yet."

Mr. Reynolds has not been charged by federal authorities, but he is named as a defendant in the lawsuit that was filed last week by Pitt and CMU.

"Greenwood and Walsh refused to answer any of our questions about where the money was or how much there was," Mr. Dyekman continued.

"This is still an ongoing investigation, and we can't really say at this point with any finality how much has been lost."

The federal criminal complaint traces the alleged illegal activity to at least 1996.

FBI Special Agent James C. Barnacle Jr. said Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh used "manipulative and deceptive devices," lied and withheld information as part of a scheme to defraud investors and enrich themselves.

The complaint refers to a public state-sponsored university called "Investor 1" whose details match those given by Pitt in its lawsuit.

The SEC's Mr. Rosenfeld said the fraud hinged not so much on the partners' investment strategy but on the fact that they are believed to have simply spent other people's money on themselves.

"They took it. They promised the investors it would be invested. And instead of doing that they misappropriated it for their own use," Mr. Rosenfeld said.

Not only do federal authorities believe Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh used new investors' funds to cover up prior losses in a classic Ponzi scheme, they used more than $160 million for personal expenses including:

• Rare books bought at auction;

• Steiff teddy bears purchased for up to $80,000 at auction houses including Sotheby's;

• A horse farm;

• Cars;

• A residence for Mr. Walsh's ex-wife, Janet Walsh, 53, of Florida, for at least $3 million;

• Money for Ms. Walsh and Mr. Greenwood's wife, Robin Greenwood, 57, both of whom are defendants in the SEC suit. More than $2 million was allegedly wired to their personal accounts by an unnamed employee of the partners.

"Defendants treated investor money -- some of which came from a public pension fund -- as their own piggy bank to lavish themselves with expensive gifts," said Stephen J. Obie, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission's acting director of enforcement.

It is not clear how Pitt and CMU got involved with Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh. But there is at least one connection involving academia. The commission suit said Mr. Walsh represented to potential investors that he was a member of the University at Buffalo Foundation board and served on its investment committee.

Mr. Walsh is a 1966 graduate of the State University of New York at Buffalo where he majored in political science.

He was a trustee of the University at Buffalo Foundation, but the foundation did not have any investments in Westridge or related firms.

Universities, charitable organizations, retirement and pension funds are among the investors who have done business with Mr. Greenwood and Mr. Walsh.

Among those investors are the Sacramento County Employees' Retirement System, the Iowa Public Employees' Retirement System and the North Dakota Retirement and Investment Office, which handles $4 billion in investments for teachers and public employees.

The North Dakota fund received about $20 million back from Westridge Capital Management, but has an undetermined amount still out in the market, said Steve Cochrane, executive director.

Mr. Cochrane said Westridge Capital was cooperative in returning what money it could by closing out their position and sending them the money.

"I dealt with them exclusively all these years," Mr. Cochrane said.

"They always seemed to be upfront and honest. I think they're as stunned and as victimized as we are, is my guess."

He said Westridge Capital had done an excellent job over the years.

The November financial statement indicated that the one-year return from Westridge Capital was a negative 11.87 percent, but the five-year annualized rate of return was a positive 8.36 percent.

Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm


Bernard Madoff's Gangster Family Seems to Have Been Overlooked by Investors

"Pretty v. Ugly at the University," University Diaries Blog, Inside Higher Ed, February 24, 2009 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/blogs/university_diaries

Bernard Madoff is a classic Mafia-style gangster. He comes from gangsters - his mother was a crook. Investigators are looking into his father-in-law. A lot of his friends and investors are crooks. He was born a crook, has always been a crook.

"The FBI believes Madoff may never have properly invested any of the money entrusted to him," writes Stephen Foley in The Independent. That's <em>never</em>. Madoff is in his seventies.

Psychopathically evil, Madoff makes an exception - again, Mafia-style - for his closest family and friends. His last act before turning himself in was writing big checks to the inner circle.

Tomorrow, Harry Markopolos will tell Congress how easy it was, ten years ago, for him to prove that Madoff was a crook, and how difficult it was for him to convince the SEC, or anyone else, of this obvious truth.

An ugly story, isn't it.... Ugh. Let us turn to the verdant paths of Brandeis University, and walk to the door of its art museum, where pretty canvases hang on the walls and rekindle our sense of the beauty of the world and the goodness of mankind.

Yet all of this beauty will soon be shuttered, because that ugly world is all over Brandeis. It's all over a number of other universities, too -- Yeshiva, Bard, NYU, all the schools who loved charitable Bernie Madoff and his charitable friends.

Madoff, after all, was a philanthropist.

Not that he, as the word suggests, loves people. He hates people.

But he (and benefactors like Carl Shapiro, his closest business associate) gave lots of money to pretty places like universities, places that stand for love, not hate, and beauty, not ugliness. Why did he do that?

For the same reason many other crooks do it. To get their names on buildings, and, much more importantly, to launder their images. Madoff's been cleaning himself up for public consumption all his life, and there's nothing like gifts to universities to do oneself up <em>real</em> good.

University Diaries has covered, over the years, many amusing stories of universities using the latest in stone-blasting technology to get the names of crooks off of buildings the crooks endowed. At any given time, some university in this country is using power tools on its walls in a desperate effort to dissociate itself from scum. Here's the latest case. One of the most amusing was Dennis Kozlowski at Seton Hall.

Even if it doesn't call for power tools, the problem of taking crooks' money can be just as troublesome, as with the University of Missouri-Columbia's Kenneth L. Lay Chair in International Economics.

Sometimes things call for quick-action internet prowess. Recall how, deep in the pre-exposure night, Yeshiva University deleted from its webpages the once-sainted names of Bernard Madoff and his partner, Ezra Merkin.

Our wretched economy will continue to reveal the reputation-laundering enterprise some of our universities have been running.

Just as every Madoff associate or victim claims to be a deceived innocent, so these campuses will tell us they never suspected a thing.

The farce would be fun to watch if it weren't so incredibly destructive.

Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on security frauds are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

 


"Argentina Has a Bond It Wants to Sell You:  Deadbeat nations should be kept out of U.S. capital markets," by Mark Shapiro and Nancy Soderberg, The Wall Street Journal, February 27, 2009 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123569777717089081.html?mod=djemEditorialPage

In 2001, Argentina defaulted on $81 billion in sovereign bonds. Four years later it presented a unilateral, nonnegotiable restructuring plan worth about 25 cents on the dollar. When half of its foreign lenders said "no thanks," Buenos Aires repudiated their claims.

Since Argentina had earlier agreed to waive sovereign immunity and accept the jurisdiction and judgments of New York courts, more than 160 lawsuits were filed. But the governments of Nestor Kirchner and of his wife and successor, Christina Fernandez, have ignored numerous court judgments. Judge Thomas Griesa has repeatedly condemned their conduct, noting in 2005 that "I have not heard one single word from the [Argentine] Republic except ways to avoid paying those judgments." Nothing has changed since then.

If Argentina gets away with its misdeeds -- offering terrible terms for restructuring its debt and then repudiating its obligations to those who object -- the likelihood of additional defaults could increase substantially. If that occurs, it would inflict another serious blow to a global financial system in crisis.

Already, Buenos Aires's scofflaw behavior is being imitated. Citing Argentina's example, Ecuador recently defaulted on sovereign debts issued in the U.S., though it has the means to meet its obligations. The default drove down the market price of the bonds. The Correa government then entered the American secondary market with a massive repurchase program, scooping up much of its own debt at a very steep discount.

Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

 


Question
Is the history of Arthur Levitt Jr. at the SEC so pure?
He does charge out at $900 per hour --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Levitt

When he was Director of the SEC, Arthur Levitt and his Chief SEC Accountant gave the large auditing firms considerable trouble (unlike SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt). But to my knowledge Levitt was pretty much hands off on free-wheeling Wall Street financial institutions and is now probably given too much credence in terms of cleaning up the mess after Chris Cox was the disastrous head of the SEC --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#SEC 

Leavitt was easily duped by his close friend Bernie Madoff, probably not separating church and state when Levitt was head of the SEC and Madoff was committing fraud (for over 28 years of phony stock trades in his investment fund that Levitt, Pitt, and Cox left unregulated to the point of not even requiring audits by registered auditing firms).

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on January 23, 2009

Good and Bad Ideas on How to Thwart Another Madoff
by Kevin Rosenberg, Paul L Comstock, Eunice Bet-Mansour, Ph.D., and Porter Landreth
The Wall Street Journal

Jan 10, 2009
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
 

TOPICS: Auditing, Fraudulent Financial Reporting, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission

SUMMARY: These letters to the editor express a range of opinions on another op-ed piece by Arthur Levitt Jr., former Chairman of the SEC. In Levitt's January 5 Op-Ed piece, he stated that he "never saw an instance where credible information about misconduct was not followed up by the agency."

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Understanding the role of the SEC and the skill set needed to fulfill its mission are the primary uses of this article.

QUESTIONS: 
1. (Introductory) Who is Arthur Levitt? Summarize his recent opinion-page piece that led to these letters in response.

2. (Introductory) What concerns the CPA, Kevin Rosenberg, who describes the types of audit and accounting firms associated with recent financial reporting frauds and failures?

3. (Advanced) One op-ed writer, Paul L. Comstock, argues that "the SEC can only do so much to protect without paralyzing our capital markets." But does Eunice Bet-Mansour, Ph.D., necessarily call for a greater quantity of regulatory steps to avoid another Ponzi scheme or fraud such as that committed by Mr. Madoff?

4. (Advanced) What level of skill set does Dr. Bet-Mansour say is needed among SEC staffers? What level of education provides this analytical skill set? In your answer, consider the level of education held by Harry Markopoulos.
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

RELATED ARTICLES: 
How the SEC Can Prevent More Madoffs
by Arthur Levitt, Jr.
Jan 05, 2009
Online Exclusive
 

Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm

Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

 


Madoff Chasers Dug for Years, to No Avail
by Kara Scannell
Jan 05, 2009
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
 

TOPICS: Auditing, Fraudulent Financial Reporting, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission

SUMMARY: "I think the reality is the [SEC] enforcement program needs some systematic review at this point, and it is not a review which should start with judgments," said, Joel Seligman, president of the University of Rochester, in the related article. "You want to know what went wrong." The main article describes a series of detailed investigations into Madoff investment management practices that failed to uncover the biggest Ponzi scheme in history.

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Auditing classes can use the article to discuss fraud investigations versus overall financial statement audits, evidential matter, and the importance of overall financial statement analysis to assess reasonability of reported results.

QUESTIONS: 
1. (Introductory) What auditing expertise is needed by Securities and Exchange Commission staff members to properly perform their functions related to the matter of Bernard L. Madoff Securities Investment LLC?

2. (Introductory) Author of the lead article Kara Scannell writes that "regulatory gaps abound in the paper trail generated by the SEC's scrutiny of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities." What were the regulatory gaps?

3. (Introductory) What reasonableness test was used by Harry Markopolous to make the assessment that "Madoff Securities is the world's largest Ponzi Scheme," as he wrote in a letter to the SEC. Did the SEC follow up on this accusation?

4. (Advanced) One accusation by an outsider that the SEC did specifically pursue, according to the article, was to determine whether Mr. Madoff was "front-running" for favored clients. Design an audit test to assess that question, including in your answer a definition of the term.

5. (Advanced) Review the audit test drafted in answer to question 4. Is it likely that your test would uncover the type of fraud Madoff committed? Why or why not?

6. (Advanced) What audit steps did the SEC undertake in its review of January 2005 customer accounts, according to the article? What audit steps did they possibly overlook? How might these steps have uncovered fraud?

7. (Introductory) In 1992, the SEC's enforcement division sued two Florida accountants for selling unregistered investment securities managed by Madoff. "With no investors found to be harmed, the SEC concluded there was no fraud." Why were the investors not shown to be harmed?
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

RELATED ARTICLES: 
SEC Nominee to Face Tough Questions at Confirmation Hearing
by Sarah N. Lynch
Jan 07, 2009
Online Exclusive
 

"Madoff Chasers Dug for Years, to No Avail:  Regulators Probed at Least 8 Times Over 16 Years; Congress Starts Review of SEC Today," by Kara Scannell, The Wall Street Journal, January 5, 2008 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123111743915052731.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC was examined at least eight times in 16 years by the Securities and Exchange Commission and other regulators, who often came armed with suspicions.

SEC officials followed up on emails from a New York hedge fund that described Bernard Madoff's business practices as "highly unusual." The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority, the industry-run watchdog for brokerage firms, reported in 2007 that parts of the firm appeared to have no customers.

Mr. Madoff was interviewed at least twice by the SEC. But regulators never came close to uncovering the alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme that investigators now believe began in the 1970s.

The serial regulatory failures will be on display Monday when Congress holds a hearing to probe why the alleged fraud went undetected. Among the key witnesses is SEC Inspector General David Kotz, who was asked last month by the agency's chairman, Christopher Cox, to investigate the mess.

The situation is even more awkward because SEC examiners seemed to be looking in the right places, yet still were unable to unmask the alleged scheme. For example, investigators were led astray by concerns that Mr. Madoff, now under house arrest, was placing orders for favored clients ahead of others to get a better price, a practice known as "front running." Front running isn't thought to have played a role in the firm's collapse.

Concern that the SEC lacks the expertise to keep up with fraudsters is the latest criticism of the agency, which saw the Wall Street investment banks it oversees get pummeled or vanish altogether in 2008. With Congress likely to take a hard look at how to structure oversight of financial markets, the SEC is struggling to maintain its clout.

The failure to stop Mr. Madoff also is an embarrassment for Mary Schapiro, the Finra chief who has been nominated by President-elect Barack Obama as the next SEC chairman. Finra was involved in several investigations of Mr. Madoff's firm, concluding in 2007 that it violated technical rules and failed to report certain transactions in a timely way.

Ms. Schapiro declined to comment. Mr. Cox has previously acknowledged mistakes by the SEC. The agency declined to comment.

Regulatory gaps abound in the paper trail generated by the SEC's scrutiny of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities, according to a review of the documents. Many of the details haven't been reported previously.

For years, Mr. Madoff told regulators he wasn't running an investment-advisory business. By saying he instead managed accounts for hedge funds, Mr. Madoff was able to avoid regular reviews of his advisory business.

In 1992, Mr. Madoff had a brush with the SEC's enforcement division, which had sued two Florida accountants for selling unregistered securities that paid returns of 13.5% to 20%. The SEC believed at the time it had uncovered a $440 million fraud.

"We went into this thinking it could be a major catastrophe," Richard Walker, then-chief of the SEC's New York office, told The Wall Street Journal at the time.

The SEC probe turned up money that had been managed by Mr. Madoff. He said he didn't know the money had been raised illegally.

With no investors found to be harmed, the SEC concluded there was no fraud. But the scheme indicated Mr. Madoff was managing money on behalf of other people.

In 1999 and 2000, the SEC sent examiners into Mr. Madoff's firm to review its trading practices. SEC officials worried the firm wasn't properly displaying orders to others in the market, violating a trading rule. In response, Mr. Madoff outlined new procedures to address the findings.

Continued in article

A Tale of Four Investors
Forwarded by Dennis Beresford

Four investors made different investment decisions 10 years ago.  Investor one was extremely risk averse so he put $1 million in a safe deposit box.  Today he still has $1 million.  Investor two was a bit less risk averse so she bought $1 million of 6% Fanny Mae Preferred.  She put the $15,000 she received in dividends each quarter in a safe deposit box.  After receiving 40 dividends, she recently sold her investment for $20,000 so she now has $620,000 in her safe deposit box.  Investor three was less risk averse so he bought and held a $1 million well diversified U.S. stock portfolio which he recently sold for $1 million, putting the $1 million in his safe deposit box.  Investor four had a friend who knew someone who was able to invest her $1 million with Bernie Madoff.  Like clockwork, she received a $10,000 check each and every month for 120 months.  She cashed all the checks, putting the money in her safe deposit box.  She was outraged to learn that she will no longer receive her monthly checks.  Even worse, she lost all her principal.  She only has $1,200,000 in her safe deposit box. She hopes the government will bail her out.

 Lawrence D. Brown
J. Mack Robinson Distinguished Professor of Accounting
Georgia State University
December 18, 2008

 


Robert Edward Rubin (born August 29, 1938) is Director and Senior Counselor of Citigroup where he was the architect of Citigroup's strategy of taking on more risk in debt markets, which by the end of 2008 led the firm to the brink of collapse and an eventual government rescue [1]. From November to December 2007, he served temporarily as Chairman of Citigroup.[2][3] From 1999 to present, he earned $115 million in pay at Citigroup[4]. He served as the 70th United States Secretary of the Treasury during both the first and second Clinton administrations.
Wikipedia --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Robert_Rubin

A new Citigroup scandal is engulfing Robert Rubin and his former disciple Chuck Prince for their roles in an alleged Ponzi-style scheme that's now choking world banking. Director Rubin and ousted CEO Prince - and their lieutenants over the past five years - are named in a federal lawsuit for an alleged complex cover-up of toxic securities that spread across the globe, wiping out trillions of dollars in their destructive paths.
Paul Tharp, "'PONZI SCHEME' AT CITI SUIT SLAMS RUBIN," The New York Post, December 5, 2008 --- http://www.nypost.com/seven/12042008/business/ponzi_scheme_at_citi_142511.htm

Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm


Why Madoff's Hedge Fund Could Be Audited by Non-registered Auditors
We all know that Bernie Madoff's brokerage firm was audited by an obscure 3-person accounting firm that is not registered with the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board.  This was permitted because the SEC exempted privately owned brokerage firms from the SOX requirement that firms are audited by registered accountants.  Floyd Norris reports, in today's NY Times, that the SEC has now quietly rescinded that exemption.  As a result, firms that audit broker-dealers for fiscal years that end December 2008 or later will have to be registered.  However, under another SOX provision, PCAOB is allowed to inspect only audits of publicly held companies.  NYTimes, Oversight for Auditor of Madoff.
"Why an Obscure Accounting Firm Could Audit Madoff's Records," Securities Law Professor Blog, January 9, 2008 ---
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/


"SEC Goes After Another Ponzi Scheme," Securities Law Professor Blog, January 8, 2009 --- http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/

Another Ponzi scheme -- is the SEC seeking atonement for failure to uncover the Madoff fraud?

The SEC announced today that it has filed an emergency civil enforcement action to halt an ongoing affinity fraud and Ponzi scheme orchestrated by Buffalo-based Gen-See Capital Corporation a/k/a Gen Unlimited ("Gen-See") and its owner and president, Richard S. Piccoli.  According to the Commission's complaint, the defendants have raised millions of dollars from investors by promising steady, "guaranteed" returns, ranging from 7.1% to 8.3% per annum, and no fees or commissions. In November 2008 alone, the defendants raised over $500,000 from investors. The defendants have relied heavily on advertisements in newsletters published by churches and dioceses. The complaint further alleges that the defendants told investors that their money was invested in "high quality" residential mortgages that the defendants were able to purchase at a discount. The defendants did not invest the funds as promised, but instead used new investor funds to make payments to earlier investors. In addition, the complaint alleges that Gen-See's offering and sale of securities to the public was not registered with the Commission.

The Commission seeks, among other emergency relief, a temporary restraining order (i) enjoining the defendants from future violations of the federal securities laws; (ii) freezing the defendants' assets; (iii) directing the defendants to provide verified accountings; and (iv) prohibiting the destruction, concealment or alteration of documents. In addition to this emergency relief, the Commission seeks preliminary and permanent injunctive relief and civil money penalties against the defendants as well as disgorgement by the defendants of their ill-gotten gains plus prejudgment interest.

"SEC Takes Action to Halt Ponzi Scheme," Securities Law Professor Blog, January 7, 2009 --- http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/

The SEC filed an emergency action to halt an estimated $50 million Ponzi scheme conducted by Joseph S. Forte (“Forte”) and Joseph Forte, L.P. (“Forte LP”), of Broomall, Pennsylvania. According to the Commission’s complaint, from at least February 1995 to the present, Forte has been operating a Ponzi scheme in which he fraudulently obtained approximately $50 million from as many as 80 investors through the sale of securities in the form of limited partnership interests.  The federal district court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania issued an order granting a preliminary injunction, freezing assets, compelling an accounting, and imposing other emergency relief. Without admitting or denying the allegations in the Commission’s complaint, Forte and Forte LP consented to the entry of the order.

The Commission’s complaint alleges that in late December 2008, Forte admitted to federal authorities that from at least 1995 through December 2008, he had been conducting a Ponzi scheme. Forte, who has never been registered with the Commission in any capacity, told investors that he would invest the limited partnership funds in a securities futures trading account in the name of Forte LP that would trade in futures contracts, including S&P 500 stock index futures (“trading program”).  Forte has admitted that he misrepresented and falsified Forte LP’s trading performance from the very first quarter. From 1995 through September 30, 2008, the defendants reported to investors annual returns ranging from 18.52% to as high as 37.96%. However, from January 1998 through October 2008, the Forte LP trading account had net trading losses of approximately $3.3 million.

 


Greenspan's Disastrous Agency Problem
In political science and economics, the principal-agent problem or agency dilemma treats the difficulties that arise under conditions of incomplete and asymmetric information when a principal hires an agent. Various mechanisms may be used to try to align the interests of the agent with those of the principal, such as piece rates/commissions, profit sharing, efficiency wages, performance measurement (including financial statements), the agent posting a bond, or fear of firing. The principal-agent problem is found in most employer/employee relationships, for example, when stockholders hire top executives of corporations. Numerous studies in political science have noted the problems inherent in the delegation of legislative authority to bureaucratic agencies. The implementation of legislation (such as laws and executive directives) is open to bureaucratic interpretation, creating opportunities and incentives for the bureaucrat-as-agent to deviate from the intentions or preferences of the legislators. Variance in the intensity of legislative oversight also serves to increase principal-agent problems in implementing legislative preferences.

Wikipedia --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Agency_theory

 

Not only have individual financial institutions become less vulnerable to shocks from underlying risk factors, but also the financial system as a whole has become more resilient.
Alan Greenspan in 2004 as quoted by Peter S. Goodman, Taking a Good Look at the Greenspan Legacy," The New York Times, October 8, 2008 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/09/business/economy/09greenspan.html?em

The problem is not that the contracts failed, he says. Rather, the people using them got greedy. A lack of integrity spawned the crisis, he argued in a speech a week ago at Georgetown University, intimating that those peddling derivatives were not as reliable as “the pharmacist who fills the prescription ordered by our physician.”

But others hold a starkly different view of how global markets unwound, and the role that Mr. Greenspan played in setting up this unrest.

“Clearly, derivatives are a centerpiece of the crisis, and he was the leading proponent of the deregulation of derivatives,” said Frank Partnoy, a law professor at the University of San Diego and an expert on financial regulation.

The derivatives market is $531 trillion, up from $106 trillion in 2002 and a relative pittance just two decades ago. Theoretically intended to limit risk and ward off financial problems, the contracts instead have stoked uncertainty and actually spread risk amid doubts about how companies value them.

If Mr. Greenspan had acted differently during his tenure as Federal Reserve chairman from 1987 to 2006, many economists say, the current crisis might have been averted or muted.

Over the years, Mr. Greenspan helped enable an ambitious American experiment in letting market forces run free. Now, the nation is confronting the consequences.

Derivatives were created to soften — or in the argot of Wall Street, “hedge” — investment losses. For example, some of the contracts protect debt holders against losses on mortgage securities. (Their name comes from the fact that their value “derives” from underlying assets like stocks, bonds and commodities.) Many individuals own a common derivative: the insurance contract on their homes.

On a grander scale, such contracts allow financial services firms and corporations to take more complex risks that they might otherwise avoid — for example, issuing more mortgages or corporate debt. And the contracts can be traded, further limiting risk but also increasing the number of parties exposed if problems occur.

Throughout the 1990s, some argued that derivatives had become so vast, intertwined and inscrutable that they required federal oversight to protect the financial system. In meetings with federal officials, celebrated appearances on Capitol Hill and heavily attended speeches, Mr. Greenspan banked on the good will of Wall Street to self-regulate as he fended off restrictions.

Ever since housing began to collapse, Mr. Greenspan’s record has been up for revision. Economists from across the ideological spectrum have criticized his decision to let the nation’s real estate market continue to boom with cheap credit, courtesy of low interest rates, rather than snuffing out price increases with higher rates. Others have criticized Mr. Greenspan for not disciplining institutions that lent indiscriminately.

But whatever history ends up saying about those decisions, Mr. Greenspan’s legacy may ultimately rest on a more deeply embedded and much less scrutinized phenomenon: the spectacular boom and calamitous bust in derivatives trading.

Bob Jensen's timeline of derivatives scandals and the evolution of accounting standards for accounting for derivatives financial instruments can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm#DerivativesFrauds

"‘I made a mistake,’ admits Greenspan," by Alan Beattie and James Politi, Financial Times, October 23, 2008 ---
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/aee9e3a2-a11f-11dd-82fd-000077b07658.html?nclick_check=1

“I made a mistake in presuming that the self-interest of organisations, specifically banks and others, was such that they were best capable of protecting their own shareholders,” he said.

In the second of two days of tense hearings on Capitol Hill, Henry Waxman, chairman of the House of Representatives, clashed with current and former regulators and with Republicans on his own committee over blame for the financial crisis.

Mr Waxman said Mr Greenspan’s Federal Reserve – along with the Securities and Exchange Commission and the US Treasury – had propagated “the prevailing attitude in Washington... that the market always knows best.”

Mr Waxman blamed the Fed for failing to curb aggressive lending practices, the SEC for allowing credit rating agencies to operate under lax standards and the Treasury for opposing “responsible oversight” of financial derivatives.

Christopher Cox, chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, defended himself, saying that virtually no one had foreseen the meltdown of the mortgage market, or the inadequacy of banking capital standards in preventing the collapse of institutions such as Bear Stearns.

Mr Waxman accused the SEC chairman of being wise after the event. “Mr Cox has come in with a long list of regulations he wants... But the reality is, Mr Cox, you weren’t doing that beforehand.”

Mr Cox blamed the fact that congressional responsibility was divided between the banking and financial services committees, which regulate banking, insurance and securities, and the agriculture committees, which regulate futures.

“This jurisdictional split threatens to for ever stand in the way of rationalising the regulation of these products and markets,” he said.

Mr Greenspan accepted that the crisis had “found a flaw” in his thinking but said that the kind of heavy regulation that could have prevented the crisis would have damaged US economic growth. He described the past two decades as a “period of euphoria” that encouraged participants in the financial markets to misprice securities.

He had wrongly assumed that lending institutions would carry out proper surveillance of their counterparties, he said. “I had been going for 40 years with considerable evidence that it was working very well”.

Continued in the article

Jensen Comment
In other words, he assumed the agency theory model that corporate employees, as agents of their owners and creditors, would act hand and hand in the best interest for themselves and their investors. But agency theory has a flaw in that it does not understand Peter Pan.

Peter Pan, the manager of Countrywide Financial on Main Street, thought he had little to lose by selling a fraudulent mortgage to Wall Street. Foreclosures would be Wall Street’s problems and not his local bank’s problems. And he got his nice little commission on the sale of the Emma Nobody’s mortgage for $180,000 on a house worth less than $100,000 in foreclosure. And foreclosure was almost certain in Emma’s case, because she only makes $12,000 waitressing at the Country Café. So what if Peter Pan fudged her income a mite in the loan application along with the fudged home appraisal value? Let Wall Street or Fat Fannie or Foolish Freddie worry about Emma after closing the pre-approved mortgage sale deal. The ultimate loss, so thinks Peter Pan, will be spread over millions of wealthy shareholders of Wall Street investment banks. Peter Pan is more concerned with his own conventional mortgage on his precious house just two blocks south of Main Street. This is what happens when risk is spread even farther than Tinkerbell can fly!
Also see how corporate executives cooked the books --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation

The Saturday Night Live Skit on the Bailout --- http://patdollard.com/2008/10/it-is-here-the-banned-snl-skit-cannot-hide-from-louie/ 

 

Bankers (Men in Black) bet with their bank's capital, not their own. If the bet goes right, they get a huge bonus; if it misfires, that's the shareholders' problem.
Sebastian Mallaby. Council on Foreign Relations, as quoted by Avital Louria Hahn, "Missing:  How Poor Risk-Management Techniques Contributed to the Subprime Mess," CFO Magazine, March 2008, Page 53 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/10755469/c_10788146?f=magazine_featured
Jensen Comment
Now that the Government is going to bail out these speculators with taxpayer funds makes it all the worse. I received an email message claiming that i
f you had purchased $1,000 of AIG stock one year ago, you would have $42 left;  with Lehman, you would have $6.60 left; with Fannie or Freddie, you would have less than $5 left. But if you had purchased $1,000 worth of beer one year ago, drank all of the beer, then turned in the cans for the aluminum recycling REFUND, you would have had $214. Based on the above, the best current investment advice is to drink heavily and recycle. It's called the 401-Keg. Why let others gamble your money away when you can piss it away on your own?

 

Selling New Equity to Pay Dividends:  Reminds Me About the South Sea Bubble of 1720 ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sea_bubble

"Fooling Some People All the Time"

"Melting into Air:  Before the financial system went bust, it went postmodern," by John Lanchester, The New Yorker, November 10, 2008 --- http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2008/11/10/081110crat_atlarge_lanchester

This is also why the financial masters of the universe tend not to write books. If you have been proved—proved—right, why bother? If you need to tell it, you can’t truly know it. The story of David Einhorn and Allied Capital is an example of a moneyman who believed, with absolute certainty, that he was in the right, who said so, and who then watched the world fail to react to his irrefutable demonstration of his own rightness. This drove him so crazy that he did what was, for a hedge-fund manager, a bizarre thing: he wrote a book about it.

The story began on May 15, 2002, when Einhorn, who runs a hedge fund called Greenlight Capital, made a speech for a children’s-cancer charity in Hackensack, New Jersey. The charity holds an annual fund-raiser at which investment luminaries give advice on specific shares. Einhorn was one of eleven speakers that day, but his speech had a twist: he recommended shorting—betting against—a firm called Allied Capital. Allied is a “business development company,” which invests in companies in their early stages. Einhorn found things not to like in Allied’s accounting practices—in particular, its way of assessing the value of its investments. The mark-to-market accounting that Einhorn favored is based on the price an asset would fetch if it were sold today, but many of Allied’s investments were in small startups that had, in effect, no market to which they could be marked. In Einhorn’s view, Allied’s way of pricing its holdings amounted to “the you-have-got-to-be-kidding-me method of accounting.” At the same time, Allied was issuing new equity, and, according to Einhorn, the revenue from this could be used to fund the dividend payments that were keeping Allied’s investors happy. To Einhorn, this looked like a potential Ponzi scheme.

The next day, Allied’s stock dipped more than twenty per cent, and a storm of controversy and counter-accusations began to rage. “Those engaging in the current misinformation campaign against Allied Capital are cynically trying to take advantage of the current post-Enron environment by tarring a great and honest company like Allied Capital with the broad brush of a Big Lie,” Allied’s C.E.O. said. Einhorn would be the first to admit that he wanted Allied’s stock to drop, which might make his motives seem impure to the general reader, but not to him. The function of hedge funds is, by his account, to expose faulty companies and make money in the process. Joseph Schumpeter described capitalism as “creative destruction”: hedge funds are destructive agents, predators targeting the weak and infirm. As Einhorn might see it, people like him are especially necessary because so many others have been asleep at the wheel. His book about his five-year battle with Allied, “Fooling Some of the People All of the Time” (Wiley; $29.95), depicts analysts, financial journalists, and the S.E.C. as being culpably complacent. The S.E.C. spent three years investigating Allied. It found that Allied violated accounting guidelines, but noted that the company had since made improvements. There were no penalties. Einhorn calls the S.E.C. judgment “the lightest of taps on the wrist with the softest of feathers.” He deeply minds this, not least because the complacency of the watchdogs prevents him from being proved right on a reasonable schedule: if they had seen things his way, Allied’s stock price would have promptly collapsed and his short selling would be hugely profitable. As it was, Greenlight shorted Allied at $26.25, only to spend the next years watching the stock drift sideways and upward; eventually, in January of 2007, it hit thirty-three dollars.

All this has a great deal of resonance now, because, on May 21st of this year, at the same charity event, Einhorn announced that Greenlight had shorted another stock, on the ground of the company’s exposure to financial derivatives based on dangerous subprime loans. The company was Lehman Brothers. There was little delay in Einhorn’s being proved right about that one: the toppling company shook the entire financial system. A global cascade of bank implosions ensued—Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and the Icelandic banking system being merely some of the highlights to date—and a global bailout of the entire system had to be put in train. The short sellers were proved right, and also came to be seen as culprits; so was mark-to-market accounting, since it caused sudden, cataclysmic drops in the book value of companies whose holdings had become illiquid. It is therefore the perfect moment for a short-selling advocate of marking to market to publish his account. One can only speculate whether Einhorn would have written his book if he had known what was going to happen next. (One of the things that have happened is that, on September 30th, Ciena Capital, an Allied portfolio company to whose fraudulent lending Einhorn dedicates many pages, went into bankruptcy; this coincided with a collapse in the value of Allied stock—finally!—to a price of around six dollars a share.) Given the esteem with which Einhorn’s profession is regarded these days, it’s a little as if the assassin of Archduke Franz Ferdinand had taken the outbreak of the First World War as the timely moment to publish a book advocating bomb-throwing—and the book had turned out to be unexpectedly persuasive.


SEC = Suckers Endup Cheated
David Albrecht, Bowling Green University"

The Performance of the SEC is shameful:  In 2005 the SEC was warned that Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme
Due-diligence firms use the fees collected from their clients to hire professionals to meticulously review hedge firms for signs of deceit. One such firm is Aksia LLC. After painstakingly investigating the operations of Madoff's operation, they found several red flags. A brief summary of some of the red flags uncovered by Aksia can be found here. Shockingly,
Aksia even uncovered a letter to the SEC dating from 2005 which claimed that Madoff was running a Ponzi scheme. As a result of its investigation, Aksia advised all of its clients not to invest their money in Madoff's hedge fund. This is a perfect case study showing that the SEC is incapable of protecting investors as well as free-market institutions can. The SEC is becoming increasingly irrelevant and people are beginning to take notice. It failed to save investors from the house of cards made up of mortgage-backed securities, credit default swaps, and collateralized debt obligations that resulted from the housing bubble. Now it has failed to protect thousands more individuals and charities from something as simple and old as a Ponzi scheme!
Briggs Armstrong, "Madoff and the Failure of the SEC," Ludwig Von Mises Institutue, December 18, 2008 --- http://mises.org/story/3260

The chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission, a longtime proponent of deregulation, acknowledged on Friday that failures in a voluntary supervision program for Wall Street’s largest investment banks had contributed to the global financial crisis, and he abruptly shut the program down. The S.E.C.’s oversight responsibilities will largely shift to the Federal Reserve, though the commission will continue to oversee the brokerage units of investment banks. Also Friday, the S.E.C.’s inspector general released a report strongly criticizing the agency’s performance in monitoring Bear Stearns before it collapsed in March. Christopher Cox, the commission chairman, said he agreed that the oversight program was “fundamentally flawed from the beginning.” “The last six months have made it abundantly clear that voluntary regulation does not work,” he said in a statement. The program “was fundamentally flawed from the beginning, because investment banks could opt in or out of supervision voluntarily. The fact that investment bank holding companies could withdraw from this voluntary supervision at their discretion diminished the perceived mandate” of the program, and “weakened its effectiveness,” he added.
"S.E.C. Concedes Oversight Flaws Fueled Collapse," by Stephen Labaton, The New York Times, September 26, 2008 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/09/27/business/27sec.html?_r=1&hp&oref=slogin

Bernard Madoff, former Nasdaq Stock Market chairman and founder of Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, was arrested and charged with securities fraud Thursday in what federal prosecutors called a Ponzi scheme that could involve losses of more than $50 billion.

It is bigger than Enron, bigger than Boesky and bigger than Tyco

"Madoff Scandal: 'Biggest Story of the Year'," Seeking Alpha, December 12, 2008 ---
http://seekingalpha.com/article/110402-madoff-scandal-biggest-story-of-the-year?source=wildcard

According to RealMoney.com columnist Doug Kass, general partner and investment manager of hedge fund Seabreeze Partners Short LP and Seabreeze Partners Short Offshore Fund, Ltd., today's late-breaking report of an alleged massive fraud at a well known investment firm could be "the biggest story of the year." In his view,

it is bigger than Enron, bigger than Boesky and bigger than Tyco.
It attacks at the core of investor confidence -- because, if true, and this could happen ... investors might think that almost anything imaginable could happen to the money they have entrusted to their f
iduciaries.

Here are some excerpts from the Bloomberg report, entitled "Madoff Charged in $50 Billion Fraud at Advisory Firm":

Bernard Madoff, founder and president of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, a market-maker for hedge funds and banks, was charged by federal prosecutors in a $50 billion fraud at his advisory business.

Madoff, 70, was arrested today at 8:30 a.m. by the FBI and appeared before U.S. Magistrate Judge Douglas Eaton in Manhattan federal court. Charged in a criminal complaint with a single count of securities fraud, he was granted release on a $10 million bond guaranteed by his wife and secured by his apartment. Madoff’s wife was present in the courtroom.

"It’s all just one big lie," Madoff told his employees on Dec. 10, according to a statement by prosecutors. The firm, Madoff allegedly said, is "basically, a giant Ponzi scheme." He was also sued by the Securities and Exchange Commission.

Madoff’s New York-based firm was the 23rd largest market maker on Nasdaq in October, handling a daily average of about 50 million shares a day, exchange data show. The firm specialized in handling orders from online brokers in some of the largest U.S. companies, including General Electric Co (GE). and Citigroup Inc. (C).

...

SEC Complaint

The SEC in its complaint, also filed today in Manhattan federal court, accused Madoff of a "multi-billion dollar Ponzi scheme that he perpetrated on advisory clients of his firm."

The SEC said it’s seeking emergency relief for investors, including an asset freeze and the appointment of a receiver for the firm. Ira Sorkin, another defense lawyer for Madoff, couldn’t be immediately reached for comment.

...

Madoff, who owned more than 75 percent of his firm, and his brother Peter are the only two individuals listed on regulatory records as "direct owners and executive officers."

Peter Madoff was a board member of the St. Louis brokerage firm A.G. Edwards Inc. from 2001 through last year, when it was sold to Wachovia Corp (WB).

$17.1 Billion

The Madoff firm had about $17.1 billion in assets under management as of Nov. 17, according to NASD records. At least 50 percent of its clients were hedge funds, and others included banks and wealthy individuals, according to the records.

...

Madoff’s Web site advertises the "high ethical standards" of the firm.

"In an era of faceless organizations owned by other equally faceless organizations, Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC harks back to an earlier era in the financial world: The owner’s name is on the door," according to the Web site. "Clients know that Bernard Madoff has a personal interest in maintaining the unblemished record of value, fair-dealing, and high ethical standards that has always been the firm’s hallmark."

...

"These guys were one of the original, if not the original, third market makers," said Joseph Saluzzi, the co-head of equity trading at Themis Trading LLC in Chatham, New Jersey. "They had a great business and they were good with their clients. They were around for a long time. He’s a well-respected guy in the industry."

The case is U.S. v. Madoff, 08-MAG-02735, U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York (Manhattan)

Continued in article

And here is the SEC press release:

What was the auditing firm of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, the auditor who gave a clean opinion, that's been insolvent for years?
Apparently, Mr Madoff said the business had been insolvent for years and, from having $17 billion of assets under management at the beginning of 2008, the SEC said: “It appears that virtually all assets of the advisory business are gone”. It has now emerged that Friehling & Horowitz, the auditor that signed off the annual financial statement for the investment advisory business for 2006, is under investigation by the district attorney in New York’s Rockland County, a northern suburb of New York City.
"The $50bn scam: How Bernard Madoff allegedly cheated investors," London Times, December 15, 2008 ---
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/banking_and_finance/article5345751.ece

It was at the Manhattan apartment that Mr Madoff apparently confessed that the business was in fact a “giant Ponzi scheme” and that the firm had been insolvent for years.

To cap it all, Mr Madoff told his sons he was going to give himself up, but only after giving out the $200 - $300 million money he had left to “employees, family and friends”.

All the company’s remaining assets have now been frozen in the hope of repaying some of the companies, individuals and charities that have been unfortunate enough to invest in the business.

However, with the fraud believed to exceed $50 billion, whatever recompense investors could receive will be a drop in the ocean.

"Bernie Madoff's Victims: The List (as known thus far) ," by Henry Blodget, Clusterstock, December 14, 2008 --- http://clusterstock.alleyinsider.com/2008/12/bernie-madoff-hosed-client-list
Jensen Question
How could such sophisticated investors be so naive? At a minimum, investors should consider whether the auditing firm has deep pockets. Bernie's auditors, Friehling & Horowitz, probably do not have any pockets at all in order to streamline for speed while fleeing the scene.

"Madoff's auditor... doesn't audit? The three-person firm that apparently certified Madoff's books has been telling a key accounting industry group for years that it doesn't conduct audits," by Alyssa Abkowitz, CNN, December 18, 2008 --- http://money.cnn.com/2008/12/17/news/companies/madoff.auditor.fortune/index.htm?postversion=2008121808

The three-person auditing firm that apparently certified the books of Bernard Madoff Investment Securities, the shuttered home of an alleged multibillion-dollar Ponzi scheme, is drawing new scrutiny.

Already under investigation by local prosecutors for its potential role in the scandal, the firm, Friehling & Horowitz, is now also being investigated by the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, the prestigious body that sets U.S. auditing standards for private companies.

The problem: The auditing firm has been telling the AICPA for 15 years that it doesn't conduct audits.

The AICPA, which has more than 350,000 individual members, monitors most firms that audit private companies. (Public-company auditors are overseen, as the name suggests, by the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, which was created in 2003 in response to accounting scandals involving WorldCom and Enron.)

Some 33,000 firms enroll in the AICPA's peer review program, in which experienced auditors assess each firm's audit quality every year. Forty-four states require accountants to undergo reviews to maintain their licenses to practice.

Friehling & Horowitz is enrolled in the program but hasn't submitted to a review since 1993, says AICPA spokesman Bill Roberts. That's because the firm has been informing the AICPA -- every year, in writing -- for 15 years that it doesn't perform audits.

Meanwhile, Friehling & Horowitz has reportedly done just that for Madoff. For example, the firm's name and signature appears on the "statement of financial condition" for Madoff Securities dated Oct. 31, 2006. "The plain fact is that this group hasn't submitted for peer review and appears to have done an audit," Roberts says. AICPA has now launched an "ethics investigation," he says.

As it happens, New York is one of only six states that does not require accounting firms to be peer-reviewed. But on the heels of the Madoff revelations, on Tuesday, the New York State senate passed legislation that requires such a process. (The bill now awaits Gov. David Paterson's signature.) "We've not been regulated in the fashion we should've inside the state," says David Moynihan, president-elect of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants.

David Friehling, the only active accountant at Friehling & Horowitz, according to the AICPA, might seem like an odd person to flout the institute's rules. He has been active in affiliated groups: Friehling is the immediate past president of the Rockland County chapter of the New York State Society of Certified Public Accountants and sits on the chapter's executive board.

Friehling, who didn't return calls seeking comment, is rarely seen at his office, according to press reports. The 49-year-old, whose firm is based 30 miles north of Manhattan in New City, N.Y., operates out of a 13-by-18-foot office in a small plaza.

A woman who works nearby told Bloomberg News that a man who dresses casually and drives a Lexus appears periodically at Friehling & Horowitz's office for about 10 to 15 minutes at a stretch and then leaves. (State automobile records indicate that Friehling owns a Lexus RX.) The Rockland County District Attorney's Office has opened an investigation to see if the firm committed any state crimes.

People who know Friehling, through the state accounting chapter and through the Jewish Community Center in Rockland County (where he's a board member) were reluctant to discuss him. Most members of both boards wouldn't comment except to say they were surprised by Friehling's connection to Madoff.

"He's nothing but the nicest guy in the world," says David Kirschtel, chief executive of JCC Rockland. "I've never had any negative dealings with him."

From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on December 19, 2008

SEC to Probe Its Ties to Madoffs
by Aaron Lucchetti, Kara Scannell and Amir Efrati
The Wall Street Journal

Dec 17, 2008
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
 

TOPICS: Accounting, Auditing, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission

SUMMARY: "Bernard Madoff was trying to raise funds for his investment empire as recently as early this month, as redemptions were about to prompt an unraveling of an apparent $50 billion investment scam....According to a criminal complaint [filed] Dec. 11,...clients during the first week of December had requested about $7 billion of assets from their accounts...[and] Mr. Madoff...was struggling to meet those obligations....The sharp downturn in stocks this year may have sealed the firm's demise, since it hurt the ability for Mr. Madoff to keep recruiting new clients." Madoff's sons, Andrew and Mark Madoff, contacted the FBI through their attorney to after allegedly being told by their father that the family business "was a giant Ponzi scheme" totaling $50 billion. The SEC has made "an extraordinary admission that [it] was aware of numerous red flags raised about Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC but failed to take them seriously enough."

CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Financial reporting and auditing classes may use this case for discussing ethics and audit procedures.

QUESTIONS: 
1. (Introductory) What is a Ponzi scheme? Why would recent market losses lead to the collapse of such a fraud?

2. (Introductory) How did Bernard L. Madoff attract investors to his scheme?

3. (Advanced) What "red flags" did the SEC and others miss that would have brought down the fraud earlier? You may use related articles to help answer this question.

4. (Advanced) What should records of a legitimate investment advisory firm show? How would you envision "a phony set of records used to cover up [the] alleged $50 billion fraud" would appear?

5. (Advanced) What audit steps are designed to identify frauds, such as the one Mr. Madoff has allegedly perpetrated? Why might such audit procedures fail to uncover fraud?

6. (Introductory) What is the role of the U.S. SEC? How does this fraud reflect on the SEC's performance of its role in the U.S. financial system?
 

Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
 

RELATED ARTICLES: 
Fairfield Group forced to Confront Its Madoff Ties
by Carrick Mollenkamp, Cassell Bryan-Low and Thomas Catan
Dec 17, 2008
Page: A10

Impact on Jewish Charities is Catastrophic
by Eleanor Laise and Dennis K. Berman
Dec 16, 2008
Online Exclusive
 

"SEC to Probe Its Ties to Madoffs ," by Aaron Lucchetti, Kara Scannell and Amir Efrati, The Wall Street Journal, December 17, 2008 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB122947343148212337.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

The Securities and Exchange Commission will examine the relationship between a former official at the agency and a niece of financier Bernard L. Madoff, after the SEC's chief admitted "apparent multiple failures" to oversee the firm at the center of an alleged $50 billion Ponzi scheme.

In an extraordinary admission that the SEC was aware of numerous red flags raised about Bernard L. Madoff Investment Securities LLC, but failed to take them seriously enough, SEC Chairman Christopher Cox ordered a review of the agency's oversight of the New York securities-trading and investment-management firm. The review will include whether relationships between SEC officials and Mr. Madoff or his family members had any impact on the agency's oversight.

"I am gravely concerned" by the agency's regulation of the firm, Mr. Cox said.

Mr. Madoff's niece, Shana Madoff, married a former SEC attorney named Eric Swanson last year. Mr. Swanson worked at the SEC for 10 years, including as a senior inspections and examination official, before leaving in 2006. Ms. Madoff is a compliance lawyer at the securities firm.

Among Mr. Swanson's duties was supervising the SEC's inspection program in charge of trading oversight at stock exchanges and electronic-trading platforms, according to a press release from Bats Trading Inc., an electronic stock exchange that hired Mr. Swanson as general counsel earlier this year.

Neither person is named in the SEC statement as a target of the probe, which is being led by the agency's inspector general, David Kotz. But Mr. Kotz said in an interview that he intended to examine the relationship between Mr. Madoff's niece and Mr. Swanson.

In a statement Tuesday night, a spokesman for Mr. Swanson acknowledged that "the compliance team he helped supervise made an inquiry about Bernard Madoff's securities operation," without being more specific. He said the couple began dating in 2006, and were married in 2007.

A second representative of Mr. Swanson said the romantic relationship with Ms. Madoff began "years after" the regulatory scrutiny in which Mr. Swanson was involved. Mr. Swanson will "fully cooperate" with the SEC investigation, the representative said.

Ms. Madoff couldn't be reached for comment.

Mr. Cox's statements represent a strong rebuke of an agency already facing criticism of its response to the credit crisis. Mr. Cox said an initial review of SEC oversight of Mr. Madoff's firm found that "credible and specific allegations" made as far back as 1999 "were repeatedly brought to the attention of SEC staff, but were never recommended to the Commission for action."

Mr. Cox wasn't specific about the past claims that were inadequately investigated. But around 2000, Harry Markopolos, at the time an executive at a rival firm to Mr. Madoff's, contacted the SEC with suspicions about Mr. Madoff's business. "Madoff Securities is the world's largest Ponzi scheme," Mr. Markopolos wrote in a letter to the agency. Mr. Markopolos pursued his accusations for years, dealing with the SEC's regional offices in New York and Boston, according to documents reviewed by The Wall Street Journal.

In 2005, the SEC's inspections division in New York examined Mr. Madoff's business operations, concluding there was a violation of technical trading rules, according to the SEC. The agency's enforcement staff in New York completed an investigation in 2007 without recommending action.

Late Tuesday, Lori Richards, director of the SEC's inspection and examinations division, detailed Mr. Swanson's role in oversight of Mr. Madoff's firm, saying he was a member of a team that looked at the securities-trading business in 1999 and 2004. "He did not participate in the 2005 exam," she said.

Ms. Richards added that the SEC "has very strict rules prohibiting SEC staff from participating in matters involving firms where they have a personal interest. Subsequently, Mr. Swanson did not work on any other examination matters involving the Madoff firm before leaving the agency."

Mr. Cox's criticisms of the agency came as investigators searching the offices of Mr. Madoff's firm in New York City discovered what they described as phony sets of records used to cover up its alleged $50 billion fraud, even as it became clear that Mr. Madoff was trying to attract new investors as recently as early December.

Those potential investors included the Pritzkers, one of America's wealthiest families, people familiar with the matter say. Mr. Madoff's efforts didn't result in an investment from the family.

Meantime, a financial firm with ties to Mr. Madoff is being drawn into the probe by regulators. The Massachusetts Secretary of State has subpoenaed Cohmad Securities Corp., which was closely affiliated with Mr. Madoff and advisers who helped bring investors to his business.

No one answered calls placed to two phone numbers for Cohmad in New York on Tuesday.

Investigators, hunkered down in the 17th-floor office where they believe Mr. Madoff carried out what he allegedly described to his sons as a $50 billion fraud, have found what appear to be "falsified records," according to Stephen Harbeck of Securities Investor Protection Corp., the securities-industry nonprofit group helping to oversee the firm's liquidation. These include a set of books that doesn't accurately reflect the assets held by the firm, he said.

"Some customer statements do not reflect securities in the firm's possession," Mr. Harbeck said.

The firm's records are in disarray, and the company has officially ceased operations, Mr. Harbeck said. According to Mr. Cox, Mr. Madoff "kept several sets of books and false documents, and provided false information involving his advisory activities to investors and to regulators."

The alleged scam is widely expected to cause billions of dollars in losses for banks, hedge funds, well-known investors and charities around the world, some of whom have been wiped out. Investors and other affected parties have disclosed combined exposure of more than $25 billion.

Continued in article

Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

 

 


Heavy Insider Trading --- http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/ownership/ownership.asp?symbol=ALD

Allied's independent auditor is KPMG
KPMG has a lot of problems with litigation --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on the collapse of the Banking System are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Also see Fraud Rotten at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm
Also see the theory of fair value accounting at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue

History of Fraud in America ---  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm

 

Bob Jensen's threads on earnings management and creative accounting to cook the books ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation

 


Keeping Score on the SEC in 2008

"The SEC in 2008: A Very Good Year? A terrific one, the commission says, tallying a fiscal-year record in insider-trading cases, and the second-highest number of enforcement cases overall. But what would John McCain say?" by Stephen Taub and Roy Harris, CFO.com, October 22, 2008 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/12465408/c_12469997

  • It was a great year for Securities and Exchange Commission enforcement, according to the SEC. In a fiscal-year-end summary, it notes, for example, that it brought the highest number ever of insider trading cases.

    And altogether, it took the second-highest number of enforcement actions in agency history.

    "The SEC's role in policing the markets and protecting investors has never been more critical," said Linda Chatman Thomsen, director of the SEC's Division of Enforcement. "The dedicated enforcement staff has been working around the clock to investigate and punish wrongdoing."

    The celebration of these records and near-records, however, comes during a time of widespread charges of what critics call lax policing by the regulator. They question its performance before the powderkeg of subprime mortgage lending, amid loose standards within major financial institutions, exploded into the worst global financial crisis since the Great Depression. Just a month ago, Republican presidential candidate John McCain promoted the replacement of SEC Chairman Christopher Cox, while many legislators have supported folding the SEC and other agencies into one larger, more encompassing financial regulator.

    But this day, at least, was one for the SEC proudly to recount the 671 enforcement actions it took during the most recent fiscal year. And it made special note of how insider trading cases jumped more than 25 percent over the previous year.

    Among those trading cases, the SEC seemed to prize most highly the charges against former Dow Jones board member David Li, and three other Hong Kong residents, in a $24-million insider-trading enforcement action, along with the charging of the former chairman and CEO of a division of Enron Corp. with illegally selling hundreds of thousands of shares of Enron stock based on nonpublic information.

    Market manipulation cases surged more than 45 percent. They included charges against a Wall Street short seller for spreading false rumors, and charging 10 insiders or promoters of publicly traded companies who made stock sales in exchange for illegal kickbacks.

    Among the major fraud cases, the SEC sued two Bear Stearns hedge fund managers for fraudulently misleading investors about the financial state of the firm's two largest hedge funds. The regulator also charged five former employees of the City of San Diego for failing to disclose to the investing public buying the city's municipal bonds that there were funding problems with its pension and retiree health care obligations and those liabilities had placed the city in serious financial jeopardy.

    Illegal stock-option backdating was also a big focus of the agency in 2008. The SEC charged eight public companies and 27 executives with providing false information to investors based on improper accounting for backdated stock option grants.

    The SEC said that another growth area involved cases against U.S. companies that use corporate funds to bribe foreign officials, an activity precluded by the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act. In 2008, the SEC filed 15 FCPA cases. Since January 2006, the SEC has brought 38 FCPA enforcement actions — more than were brought in all prior years combined since FCPA became law in 1977.

     

    Bob Jensen's threads on creative accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation
    Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/AccountingTricks.htm

    Peter, Paul, and Barney: An Essay on 2008 U.S. Government Bailouts of Private Companies ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm

  •  


    Timeline of Financial Scandals, Auditing Failures, and the Evolution of International Accounting Standards ---- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm#DerivativesFrauds


    White Collar Fraud Site --- http://www.whitecollarfraud.com/
    Note the column of links on the left.

    Online Searching for Law, Accounting, and Finance --- http://securities.stanford.edu/

    Stanford University Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse --- http://securities.stanford.edu/

    Securities Law Archives --- http://www.bespacific.com/mt/archives/cat_securities_law.html

    Securities and Exchange Commission --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/U.S._Securities_and_Exchange_Commission

    Accounting Fraud --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm


    Question
    Why are so many Ivy League alumni behind bars?

    From Bloomberg.com July 3, 2008 --- http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601103&sid=awkNQpGwkfkU&refer=us

    No matter which prison former Refco Inc. Chief Executive Officer Phillip Bennett serves the 16-year sentence he received today in Manhattan federal court, chances are he will be the only one there with a master's degree from Cambridge University in England.

    The head of what was once the biggest independent U.S. futures broker, Bennett also was ordered to forfeit $2.4 billion in assets for what prosecutors said was ``among the very worst'' white-collar crimes. He faced a possible life sentence after pleading guilty to bank fraud and money laundering.

    Bennett, 60, joins at least a dozen other wealthy corporate executives with degrees from elite institutions such as Harvard University and the University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School who've been incarcerated for white-collar crimes this decade. Exceptional intelligence, self-confidence and feeling special, common among those educated at such schools, can turn into deviousness, arrogance and entitlement, said Tom Donaldson, a professor of ethics and law at Wharton in Philadelphia.

    ``If the devil exists, he no doubt has a high IQ and an Ivy League degree,'' Donaldson said. ``It's clear that having an educational pedigree is no prophylactic against greed and bad behavior.''

    Imprisoned executives with Ivy League degrees include Jeffrey Skilling, 54, former CEO of Enron Corp. (Harvard Business School); Timothy Rigas, 52, former chief financial officer of Adelphia Communications Corp. (Wharton); and William Sorin, 59, former general counsel of New York-based Comverse Technology Inc. (Harvard Law School).

    Elite Schools

    Some of these convicted executives have multiple degrees. Conrad Black, the former CEO of Chicago-based Hollinger International Inc., now serving a 6 1/2-year sentence for stealing $6.1 million from the company, has two bachelor's degrees from Carleton University, a master's degree from McGill University and a law degree from Laval University, all in Canada.

    ``There is a correlation between going to an elite school and ending up as a CEO,'' said Edwin Hartman, a professor of business ethics at New York University's Stern School of Business. ``Look at the list of the heads of the 400 elite companies. They certainly didn't go to no-name state schools.''

    A top-level education may also cultivate arrogance, said Maurice Schweitzer, who teaches information management at Wharton.

    `They Feel Special'

    ``We tell our students at premier institutions that they are special, and they certainly feel special,'' Schweitzer said. ``We have famous faculty and great resources. They are surrounded by accomplished peers, and recruiters flock to them.''

    Massachusetts-based Harvard University spokeswoman Rebecca Rollins said the school didn't have an immediate comment.

    Wrongdoing in the executive suite is more about character flaws than alma maters, said Andrew Weissmann, a former federal prosecutor who led the U.S. Justice Department task force that investigated the collapse of Enron.

    ``Just because you went to a good school doesn't mean you have a good moral compass,'' Weissmann said.

    Moreover, some of the executives convicted since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was passed in 2002 in response to corporate corruption didn't attend elite schools. HealthSouth Corp. founder Richard Scrushy, 55, sentenced to almost 7 years in prison for bribery, has a bachelor's degree from the University of Alabama in Birmingham. Former Tyco International Ltd. CEO L. Dennis Kozlowski, convicted of stealing $137 million from the company and in prison for 8 1/3 to 25 years, has a bachelor's degree from Seton Hall University.

    Risk Takers

    Executives with top educations may end up trading their pin stripes for prison jumpsuits because they're driven to excel.

    ``People who succeed in corporate America are risk-takers,'' said Anthony Barkow, a former federal prosecutor and Harvard Law School graduate who is now a New York University Law School professor. ``They're smart, confident and sometimes even arrogant. That's what it takes to succeed. Risk-takers get closer to the line and sometimes cross it.''

    Graduates from top-tier universities may feel so special, they think law doesn't apply to them, Wharton's Schweitzer said.

    ``We encourage our students to explore and think outside the box,'' Schweitzer said. ``In general, this approach is very constructive, but it may prompt people to be less likely to recognize an ethical dilemma.''

    Morgenthau's Warning

    Current and former prosecutors who've handled white-collar cases said the defendants' most common trait was avarice.

    ``It doesn't matter if you graduated from the best schools in the world and had every privilege accorded to you or not,'' said Campbell, a member of the Enron Task Force with degrees from Yale University and the University of Chicago School of Law. ``Greed is a strong motivation, and it can cause you to make mistakes.''

    Robert Morgenthau, the Manhattan District Attorney who is a graduate of Amherst College and Yale Law School, issued this warning:

    ``No matter what your position is in life or where you went to school, if you commit a crime in our jurisdiction, we'll be happy to prosecute you.''

    Question
    What are do so many executives cheat in recent years?

    Answer
    See Question 1 and Answer 1 at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm

    Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

    Bob Jensen's "Congress to the Core" threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm

     


    "Merrill Lynch Settlement With SEC Worth Up to $7B," SmartPros, August 25, 2008 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x62971.xml

    Federal regulators said Friday that investors who bought risky auction-rate securities from Merrill Lynch & Co. before the market for those bonds collapsed will be able to recover up to $7 billion under a new agreement.

    The largest U.S. brokerage will buy back the securities from thousands of investors under a settlement with the Securities and Exchange Commission, New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo and other state regulators over its role in selling the high-risk bonds to retail investors. Under that deal, announced Thursday, Merrill agreed to hasten its voluntary buyback plan by repurchasing $10 billion to $12 billion of the securities from investors by Jan. 2.

    Merrill also agreed to pay a $125 million fine in a separate accord with state regulators.

    The $330 billion market for auction-rate securities collapsed in mid-February.

    The SEC's estimate of a $7 billion recovery is based on its projection of the eventual amount of the bonds that will be cashed in by the affected investors, who bought them before Feb. 13. The $10 billion to $12 billion is the total amount that Merrill is committing to buy back. The firm has to offer redemptions to all investors, though not all may cash in the securities.

    The SEC said the new agreement will enable retail investors, small businesses and charities who purchased the securities from Merrill "to restore their losses and liquidity."

    New York-based Merrill neither admitted nor denied wrongdoing in agreeing to the federal settlement, which is subject to approval by SEC commissioners.

    The firm wasn't fined under the accord, but the SEC said Merrill "faces the prospect" of a penalty after completing its obligations under the agreement. The amount of the penalty, if any, would take into account the extent of Merrill's misconduct in marketing and selling auction-rate securities, and an assessment of whether it fulfilled its obligations, the SEC said.

    "Merrill Lynch's conduct harmed tens of thousands of investors who will have the opportunity to get their money back through this agreement," Linda Thomsen, the agency's enforcement director, said in a statement. "We will continue to aggressively investigate wrongdoing in the marketing and sale of auction-rate securities."

    Merrill, Goldman Sachs Group Inc. and Deutsche Bank on Thursday brought to eight the number of global banks that have settled a five-month investigation into claims they misled customers into believing the securities were safe.

    The auction-rate securities market involved investors buying and selling instruments that resembled regular corporate debt, except the interest rates were reset at regular auctions - some as frequently as once a week. A number of companies and retail clients invested in the securities because, thanks to the regular auctions, they could treat their holdings as liquid, almost like cash.

    Major issuers included companies that financed student loans and municipal agencies like the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. When big banks ceased backstopping the auctions with supporting bids because of concerns about credit exposure, the bustling market collapsed. That left some issuers paying double-digit interest rates because of the terms under which they issued the securities.

    Regulators have been investigating the collapse in the market to determine who was responsible for its demise and whether banks knowingly misrepresented the safety of the securities when selling them to investors.

    Jensen Comment
    It's unbelievable how many huge frauds there are in which Merrill Lynch has been an active participant. For example, do a word search for "Merrill" in this document that you are reading now.


    "Market and Political/Regulatory Perspectives on the Recent Accounting Scandals," by Ray Ball at the University of Chicago, SSRN, September 17, 2008 --- (free download) --- http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1272804

    Not surprisingly, the recent accounting scandals look different when viewed from the perspectives of the political/regulatory process and of the market for corporate governance and financial reporting. We do not have the opportunity to observe a world in which either market or political/regulatory processes operate independently, and the events are recent and not well-researched, so untangling their separate effects is somewhat conjectural. This paper offers conjectures on issues such as: What caused the scandalous behavior? Why was there such a rash of accounting scandals at one time? Who killed Arthur Andersen – the SEC, or the market? Did fraudulent accounting kill Enron, or just keep it alive for too long? What is the social cost of financial reporting fraud? Does the US in fact operate a “principles-based” or a “rules-based” accounting system? Was there market failure? Or was there regulatory failure? Or both? Was the Sarbanes-Oxley Act a political and regulatory over-reaction?

    Jensen Comment
    Although Professor Ball is best known for empirical research of capital markets data, the above article is best described as a commentary of his personal opinion. On many issues I agree with him, but on some issues I disagree.

     

    Would market forces have killed Enron even if there was no criminal case for document destruction?

    Ray Ball (opinion with no supporting evidence)
    I conclude that market forces, left to their own devices, would have closed Andersen.

    Bob Jensen (agrees completely with supporting evidence)
    I don't think there's any doubt that Andersen would've folded due to market forces of a succession of failed audits for which it did not change its fundamental behavior and questions of auditor independence after losing a succession of failed audit lawsuits prior to Enron. For example, it continued to hire hire the in-charge auditor of Waste Management even after his felony conviction.

    When the Securities and Exchange Commission found evidence in e-mail messages that a senior partner at Andersen had participated in the fraud at Waste Management, Andersen did not fire him. Instead, it put him to work revising the firm's document-retention policy. Unsurprisingly, the new policy emphasized the need to destroy documents and did not specify that should stop if an S.E.C. investigation was threatened. It was that policy David Duncan, the Andersen partner in charge of Enron audits, claimed to be following when he shredded Andersen's reputation.
    Floyd Norris, "Will Big Four Audit Firms Survive in a World of Unlimited Liability?," The New York Times, September 10, 2004


    Although Ray Ball does not cite the empirical evidence, there is empirical evidence that ultimately, due to a succession of incompetent or fraudulent audits, having Andersen as an auditor raised a client's cost of capital.

    "The Demise of Arthur Andersen," by Clifford F. Thies, Ludwig Von Mises Institute, April 12, 2002 --- http://www.mises.org/fullstory.asp?control=932&FS=The+Demise+of+Arthur+Andersen

    From Yahoo.com, Andrew and I downloaded the daily adjusted closing prices of the stocks of these companies (the adjustment taking into account splits and dividends). I then constructed portfolios based on an equal dollar investment in the stocks of each of the companies and tracked the performance of the two portfolios from August 1, 2001, to March 1, 2002. Indexes of the values of these portfolios are juxtaposed in Figure 1.

    From August 1, 2001, to November 30, 2001, the values of the two portfolios are very highly correlated. In particular, the values of the two portfolios fell following the September 11 terrorist attack on our country and then quickly recovered. You would expect a very high correlation in the values of truly matched portfolios. Then, two deviations stand out.

     

    In early December 2001, a wedge temporarily opened up between the values of the two portfolios. This followed the SEC subpoena. Then, in early February, a second and persistent wedge opened. This followed the news of the coming DOJ indictment. It appears that an Andersen signature (relative to a "Final Four" signature) costs a company 6 percent of its market capitalization. No wonder corporate clients--including several of the companies that were in the Andersen-audited portfolio Andrew and I constructed--are leaving Andersen.

    Prior to the demise of Arthur Andersen, the Big 5 firms seemed to have a "lock" on reputation. It is possible that these firms may have felt free to trade on their names in search of additional sources of revenue. If that is what happened at Andersen, it was a big mistake. In a free market, nobody has a lock on anything. Every day that you don’t earn your reputation afresh by serving your customers well is a day you risk losing your reputation. And, in a service-oriented economy, losing your reputation is the kiss of death.

     

    Did (undetected) fraudulent accounting keep Enron alive too long?

    Ray Ball
    It is difficult to escape the conclusion that market forces caused Enron’s bankruptcy, for the simple reason that it had invested enormous sums and by 2000 was not generating profits. Conversely, its accounting transgressions kept the company alive for some period (perhaps one or two years) longer than would have occurred if it had reported its true profitability. The welfare loss arose from keeping an unprofitable company alive longer than optimal, and wasting capital and labor that were better used elsewhere.

    Bob Jensen (disagrees with the power of GAAP in the case of Enron)
    I think Ray Ball is attributing too much to financial reports of past transactions. Even if Enron's financial reports were "true" in terms of conformance with GAAP, the market may well have kept Enron alive because of profit potential of some of the huge, albeit presently losing, ventures. The counter example here is the more legitimate reporting losses in Amazon.com  for almost its entire history and the willingness of investors to "bet on the come" of Amazon's ventures in spite of the reported losses in conformance with GAAP. Furthermore, Enron's executives were so skilled at sales pitches, I think Enron might've actually kept going much, much longer if it conformed to GAAP and simply pitched its sweet-sounding ventures and political connections in Washington DC. Enron was primarily brought down by fraud that commenced to appear in the media and the pending lawsuits that formed overhead due to the fraud.

     

    Who killed Enron – the SEC or the market?

    Ray Ball
    It is difficult to escape the conclusion that market forces caused Enron’s bankruptcy, for the simple reason that it had invested enormous sums and by 2000 was not generating profits. Conversely, its accounting transgressions kept the company alive for some period (perhaps one or two years) longer than would have occurred if it had reported its true profitability. The welfare loss arose from keeping an unprofitable company alive longer than optimal, and wasting capital and labor that were better used elsewhere.

    Bob Jensen (disagrees because losing divisions could've been dropped in favor of continued operations of highly profitable divisions)
    What Ray does not seek out is the first tip of the demise of Enron. The single event that commenced Enron's dominos to fall has to be the reporting of illegal related party transactions by a Wall Street Journal Reporter. Once these became known, the SEC had to act and commenced a chain of events from which Enron could not possibly survive in terms of lawsuits and market reactions with lawsuit risks that bore down on the market prices of Enron shares.

    After John Emshwiller's WSJ report, determining whether the market or the SEC brought down Enron is a chicken versus egg question!

    Eichenwald states the following on pp. 490-492 in Conspiracy of Fools --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm#22

    It was section eight, called "Related Party Transactions," that got John Emshwiller's juices flowing.

    After being assigned to follow the Skilling resignation, Emshwiller had put in a request for an interview, then scrounged up a copy of Enron's most recent SEC filing in search of any nuggets.

    What he found startled him.  Words about some partnerships run by an unidentified "senior officer."  Arcane stuff, maybe, but the numbers were huge.  Enron reported more than $240 million in revenues in the first six months of the year from its dealings with them.

    One fact struck Emshwiller in particular.  This anonymous senior officer, the filing said, had just sold his financial interest in the partnerships.  Now, it said, the partnerships were no longer related to Enron.

    The senior officer had just sold his interest, Skilling had just resigned.  The connection seemed obvious.

    Could Enron have actually allowed Jeff Skilling to run partnerships that were doing massive business with the company?  Now that, Emshwiller thought, would be a great story.

    Emshwiller was back on the phone with Mark Palmer.  With no better explanation for Skilling's resignation, he said, the Journal was going to dig through everything it could find.  Right now he was focusing on these partnerships.  Were those run by Skilling?

    "No, that's not Skilling," Palmer replied, almost nonchalantly.  "That's Andy Fastow."

    A pause.  "Who's Andy Fastow?" Emshwiller asked.

    The message was slipped to Skilling later that day.  A Journal reporter was pushing for an explanation of his departure and now was rooting around, looking for anything he could find.  Probably best just to give the paper a call.

    Emshwiller was at his desk when the phone rang.

    "Hi," a soft voice said.  "It's Jeff Skilling."

    It was a startling moment.  Emshwiller had been on the hunt, and suddenly the quarry just walked in and lay down on the floor, waiting for him to fire.  So he did: why was Skilling quitting his job?

    "It's all pretty mundane," Skilling replied.  He'd worked hard and accomplished a lot but now had the freedom to move on.  His voice was distant, almost depressed.

    He and been ruminating about it for a while, Skilling went on, but had wanted to stay on at the company until the California situation eased up.  Then, he took the conversation in a new direction.

    "The stock price has been very disappointing to me," Skilling said.  "The stock is less than half of what it was six months ago.  I put a lot of pressure on myself.  I felt I must not be communicating well enough."

    Skilling rambled as Emshwiller took it down.  India.  California.  Expense cuts.  The good shape of Enron.

    "Had the stock price not done what it did..."  He paused.  "I don't think I would have felt the pressure to leave if the stock price had stayed up."

    What?  Had Emshwiller heard that right?  Was all this stuff about "personal reasons" out the window?  Had Skilling thrown in the towel because of the stock price?

    "What was that, Mr. Skilling?" Emshwiller asked.

    The employees at Enron owned lots of shares, Skilling said.  They were worried, always asking him about the direction of the price.  He found it very frustrating.

    "Are you saying that you don't think you would have quit if the stock price had stayed up?"

    Skilling was silent for several seconds.

    "I guess so," he finally mumbled.

    Minutes later, Emshwiller burst into his boss's office.  "You're not gong to believe what Skilling just told me!"
     

     

    What are the incentives to commit fraud?

    Ray Ball
    My view, based on mainly anecdotal experience, is that non-financial motives are more powerful than is commonly believed, and sometimes are the dominant reason for committing accounting fraud. An important motivator seems to be maintaining the esteem of one’s peers,ranging from co-workers to the public at large. Enron executives reportedly were celebrities in Houston, and in important places like the White House.

    Bob Jensen (disagrees as to level of importance of non-financial motives except in isolated instances such as possibly Ken Lay)
    Although there are instances where non-financial motives may have been powerful, I believe that they generally pale when compared to the financial reasons for committing all types of financial fraud, including accounting fraud --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm


     

    Was Sarbanes-Oxley Necessary?

    Ray Ball (who is generally critical of the need for Sarbanes-Oxley relative to market forces without such regulation and fraud penalties)
    Markets need rules, and rely on trust. U.S. financial markets historically had very effective rules by world standards, the rules were broken, and there were immense consequences for the transgressors.

    Bob Jensen (strongly disagrees)
    One need only look how the market-based system worldwide moved in cycles of being Congress to the core among the major corporations, investment banks, insurance companies, and credit rating companies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm
    After getting caught these firms simply moved on to new schemes without fear of market forces.

    Nowhere is the wild west of market-based fraud more evident than in the timeline history of derivative financial instruments frauds --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm#DerivativesFrauds

    Frank Partnoy, Page 283 of a Postscript entitled "The Return"
    F.I.A.S.C.O. : The Inside Story of a Wall Street Trader
    by Frank Partnoy - 283 pages (February 1999) Penguin USA (Paper); ISBN: 0140278796 

    Perhaps we don' think we deserve a better chance. We play the lottery in record numbers, despite the 50 percent cut (taken by the government). We flock to riverboat casinos, despite substantial odds against winning. Legal and illegal gambling are growing just as fast as the financial markets, Las Vegas is our top tourist destination in the U.S., narrowly edging out Atlantic City. Are the financial markets any different? In sum, has our culture become so infused with the gambling instinct that we would afford investors only that bill of rights given a slot machine player:  the right to pull the handle, their right to pick a different machine, the right to leave the casino, abut not the right to a fair game.

     

     

    Infectious Greed:  How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets  (Henry Holt and Company, 2003, Page 17, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)

    In February 1985, the United States Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) --- the private group that established most accounting standards (in the U.S.) --- asked whether banks should begin including swaps on their balance sheets, the financial statements that recorded their assets and liabilities . . .since the early 1980s banks had not included swaps as assets or liabilities . . . the banks' argument was deeply flawed. The right to receive money on a swap was a valuable asset, and the obligation to pay money on a swap was a costly liability.

    But bankers knew that the fluctuations in their swaps (swap value volatility) would worry their shareholders, and they were determined to keep swaps off their balance sheets (including mere disclosures as footnotes), FASB's inquiry about banks' treating swaps as off-balance-sheet --- a term that would become widespread during the 1991s --- mobilized and unified the banks, which until that point had been competing aggressively and not cooperating much on regulatory issues. All banks strongly opposed disclosing more information about their swaps, and so they threw down their swords and banded together a serveral high-level meetings.

     

    Infectious Greed:  How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets  (Henry Holt and Company, 2003, Page 77, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)

    The process of transferring receivables to a new company and issuing new bonds became known as securitization, which became a major part of the structured finance industry . . . One of the most significant innovations in structured finance was a deal called the Collateralized Bond Obligation, or CBO. CBOs are one of the threads that run through the past fifteen years of financial markets, ranging from Michael Milken to First Boston to Enron and WorldCom. CBOs would mutate into various types of credit derivatives --- financial instruments tied to the creditworthiness of companies --- which would play and important role in the aftermath of the collapse of numerous companies in 2001and 2002.

    . . .

    In simple terms, here is how a CBO works. A bank transfers a portfolio of junk bonds to a Special Purpose Entity, typically a newly created company, partnership, or trust domiciled in a balmy tax haven, such as the Cayman Islands. This entity then issues several securities, backed by bonds, effectively splitting the junk bonds into pieces. Investors (hopefully) buy the pieces.

    . . .

    The first CBO was TriCapital Ltc., a $420 million deal sold in July 1988. There were about $900 million CBOs in 1988, and almost $ $3 billion in 1989. Notwithstanding the bad press junk bonds had been getting, analysts from all three of the credit-rating agencies began pushing CBOs. Ther were very profitable for the rating agencies, which received fees for rating the various pieces.

    . . .

    With the various types of structured-finance deals, a trend began of companies using Special Purpose Entities (SPEs) to hide risks. From an accounting perspective, the key question was whether a company that owned particular financial assets needed to disclose those assets in its financial statements even after it transferred them to an SPE. Just as derivatives dealers had argued that swaps should not be included in their balance sheets, financial companies began arguing that their interest in SPEs did not need to be disclosed . . . In 1991. the acting chief accountant of the SEC, concerned that companies might abuse this accounting standard, wrote a letter saying the outside investment had to be at least three percent (a requirement that helped implode Enron and its auditor Andersen because the three percent investments were phony):

     

    Infectious Greed:  How Deceit and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets  (Henry Holt and Company, 2003, Page 229, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0)

    Third, financial derivatives were now everywhere --- and largely unregulated. Increasingly, parties were using financial engineering to take advantage of the differences in legal rules among jurisdictions, or to take new risks in new markets. In 1994, The Economist magazine noted, "Some financial innovation is driven by wealthy firms and individuals seeking ways of escaping from the regulatory machinery that governs established financial markets." With such innovation, the regulators' grip on financial markets loosened during the mid-to-late 1990s . . . After Long-Term Capital (Management) collapsed, even Alan Greenspan admitted that financial markets had been close to the brink.

    The decade was peppered with financial debacles, but these faded quickly from memory even as they increased in size and complexity. The billion dollar-plus scandals included some colorful characters (Robert Citron of Orange County, Nick Leeson of Barings, and John Meriwether of Long-Term Capital Management), but even as each new scandal outdid the others in previously unimaginable ways, the markets merely hic-coughed and then started going up again. It didn't seem that anything serious was wrong, and their ability to shake off a scandal made markets seem even more under control.
    Frank Portnoy, Infectious Greed (Henry Holt and Company, 2003, Page 2, ISBN 0-8050-7510-0).

     

    "Does the use of Financial Derivatives Affect Earnings Management Decisions?" by Jan Barton, The Accounting Review, January 2001, pp. 1-26.

    I present evidence consistent with managers using derivatives and discretionary accruals as partial substitutes for smoothing earnings. Using 1994-1996 data for a sample of Fortune 500 firms, I estimate a set of simultaneous equations that captures managers' incentives to maintain a desired level of earnings volatility through hedging and accrual management. These incentives include increasing managerial compensation and wealth, reducing corporate taxes and debt financing costs, avoiding underinvestment and earnings surprises, and mitigating volatility caused by low diversification. After controlling for such incentives, I find significant negative association between derivatives' notional amounts and proxies for the magnitude of discretionary accruals.

     
     

     

    Frank Partnoy introduces Chapter 7 of Infectious Greed as follows:

    Pages 187-188

    The regulatory changes of 1994-95 sent three messages to corporate CEOs.  First, you are not likely to be punished for "massaging" your firm's accounting numbers.  Prosecutors rarely go after financial fraud and, even when they do, the typical punishment is a small fine; almost no one goes to prison.  Moreover, even a fraudulent scheme could be recast as mere earnings management--the practice of smoothing a company's earnings--which most executives did, and regarded as perfectly legal.

    Second, you should use new financial instruments--including options, swaps, and other derivatives--to increase your own pay and to avoid costly regulation.  If complex derivatives are too much for you to handle--as they were for many CEOs during the years immediately following the 1994 losses--you should at least pay yourself in stock options, which don't need to be disclosed as an expense and have a greater upside than cash bonuses or stock.

    Third, you don't need to worry about whether accountants or securities analysts will tell investors about any hidden losses or excessive options pay.  Now that Congress and the Supreme Court have insulated accounting firms and investment banks from liability--with the Central Bank decision and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act--they will be much more willing to look the other way.  If you pay them enough in fees, they might even be willing to help.

    Of course, not every corporate executive heeded these messages.  For example, Warren Buffett argued that managers should ensure that their companies' share prices were accurate, not try to inflate prices artificially, and he criticized the use of stock options as compensation.  Having been a major shareholder of Salomon Brothers, Buffett also criticized accounting and securities firms for conflicts of interest.

    But for every Warren Buffett, there were many less scrupulous CEOs.  This chapter considers four of them: Walter Forbes of CUC International, Dean Buntrock of Waste Management, Al Dunlap of Sunbeam, and Martin Grass of Rite Aid.  They are not all well-known among investors, but their stories capture the changes in CEO behavior during the mid-1990s.  Unlike the "rocket scientists" at Bankers Trust, First Boston, and Salomon Brothers, these four had undistinguished backgrounds and little training in mathematics or finance.  Instead, they were hardworking, hard-driving men who ran companies that met basic consumer needs: they sold clothes, barbecue grills, and prescription medicine, and cleaned up garbage.  They certainly didn't buy swaps linked to LIBOR-squared.
     

     

     

    I do agree with Ray Ball that regulation in and of itself is not panacea when either preventing or detecting fraud.

    "Greater Regulation of Financial Markets?" by Richard Posner, The Becker-Posner Blog, April 28, 2008 ---
    http://www.becker-posner-blog.com/

    Re-Regulate Financial Markets?--Posner's Comment I no longer believe that deregulation has been a complete, an unqualified, success. As I indicated in my posting of last week, deregulation of the airline industry appears to be a factor in the serious deterioration of service, which I believe has imposed substantial costs on travelers, particularly but not only business travelers; and the partial deregulation of electricity supply may have been a factor in the western energy crisis of 2000 to 2001 and the ensuing Enron debacle. The deregulation of trucking, natural gas, and pipelines has, in contrast, probably been an unqualified success, and likewise the deregulation of the long-distance telecommunications and telecommunications terminal equipment markets, achieved by a combination of deregulatory moves by the Federal Communications Commission beginning in 1968 and the government antitrust suit that culminated in the breakup of AT&T in 1983.

    Although one must be tentative in evaluating current events, I suspect that the deregulation (though again partial) of banking has been a factor in the current credit crisis. The reason is related to Becker's very sensible suggestion that, given the moral hazard created by government bailouts of failing financial institutions, a tighter ceiling should be placed on the risks that banks are permitted to take. Because of federal deposit insurance, banks are able to borrow at low rates and depositors (the lenders) have no incentive to monitor what the banks do with their money. This encourages risk taking that is excessive from an overall social standpoint and was the major factor in the savings and loan collapse of the 1980s. Deregulation, by removing a variety of restrictions on permitted banking activities, has allowed commercial banks to engage in riskier activities than they previously had been allowed to engage in, such as investing in derivatives and in subprime mortgages, and thus deregulation helped to bring on the current credit crunch. At the same time, investment banks such as Bear Sterns have been allowed to engage in what is functionally commercial banking; their lenders do not have deposit insurance--but their lenders are banks that for the reason stated above are happy to make risky loans.

    The Federal Deposit Insurance Reform Act of 2005 required the FDIC to base deposit insurance premiums on an assessment of the riskiness of each banking institution, and last year the Commission issued regulations implementing the statutory directive. But, as far as I can judge, the risk-assessed premiums vary within a very narrow band and are not based on an in-depth assessment of the individual bank’s riskiness.

    Now it is tempting to think that deregulation has nothing to do with this, that the problem is that the banks mistakenly believed that their lending was not risky. I am skeptical. I do not think that bubbles are primarily due to avoidable error. I think they are due to inherent uncertainty about when the bubble will burst. You don't want to sell (or lend, in the case of banks) when the bubble is still growing, because then you may be leaving a lot of money on the table. There were warnings about an impending collapse of housing prices years ago, but anyone who heeded them lost a great deal of money before his ship came in. (Remember how Warren Buffett was criticized in the late 1990s for missing out on the high-tech stock boom.) I suspect that the commercial and investment banks and hedge funds were engaged in rational risk taking, but that (except in the case of the smaller hedge funds--the largest, judging from the bailout of Long-Term Capital Management in 1998, are also considered by federal regulators too large to be permitted to go broke) they took excessive risks because of the moral hazard created by deposit insurance and bailout prospects.

    Perhaps what the savings and loan and now the broader financial-industry crises reveal is the danger of partial deregulation. Full deregulation would entail eliminating both government deposit insurance (especially insurance that is not experience-rated or otherwise proportioned to risk) and bailouts. Partial deregulation can create the worst of all possible worlds, as the western energy crisis may also illustrate, by encouraging firms to take risks secure in the knowledge that the downside risk is truncated.

    There has I think been a tendency of recent Administrations, both Republican and Democratic but especially the former, not to take regulation very seriously. This tendency expresses itself in deep cuts in staff and in the appointment of regulatory administrators who are either political hacks or are ideologically opposed to regulation. (I have long thought it troublesome that Alan Greenspan was a follower of Ayn Rand.) This would be fine if zero regulation were the social desideratum, but it is not. The correct approach is to carve down regulation to the optimal level but then finance and staff and enforce the remaining regulatory duties competently and in good faith. Judging by the number of scandals in recent years involving the regulation of health, safety, and the environment, this is not being done. And to these examples should probably be added the weak regulation of questionable mortgage practices and of rating agencies' conflicts of interest and, more basically, a failure to appreciate the gravity of the moral hazard problem in the financial industry.

     

    If auditors and their clients do not take there professional and ethical responsibilities more seriously then neither market forces nor regulators will prevent frauds from increasingly undermining our prized capital markets.

    Bob Jensen's Congress to the Core threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudCongress.htm

    Bob Jensen's Fraud Conclusions are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm

     


     

    The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws

    Video: Fora.Tv on Institutional Corruption & The Economy Of Influence ---
    http://www.simoleonsense.com/video-foratv-on-institutional-corruption-the-economy-of-influence/

    Why single out capitalism for immorality and ethics misbehavior?
    Making capitalism ethical is a tough task – and possibly a hopeless one.
    Prem Sikka (see below)

    The global code of conduct of Ernst & Young, another global accountancy firm, claims that "no client or external relationship is more important than the ethics, integrity and reputation of Ernst & Young". Partners and former partners of the firm have also been found guilty of promoting tax evasion.
    Prem Sikka (see below)

    Jensen Comment
    Yeah right Prem, as if making the public sector and socialism ethical is an easier task. The least ethical nations where bribery, crime, and immorality are the worst are likely to be the more government (dictator) controlled and lower on the capitalism scale. And in the so-called capitalist nations, the lowest ethics are more apt to be found in the public sector that works hand in hand with bribes from large and small businesses.

    Rotten Fraud in General --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
    Rotten Fraud in the Public Sector (The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws) --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers

    We hang the petty thieves and appoint the great ones to public office.
    Aesop

    Congress is our only native criminal class.
    Mark Twain --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Twain

    Why should members of Congress be allowed to profit from insider trading?
    Amid broad congressional concern about ethics scandals, some lawmakers are poised to expand the battle for reform: They want to enact legislation that would prohibit members of Congress and their aides from trading stocks based on nonpublic information gathered on Capitol Hill. Two Democrat lawmakers plan to introduce today a bill that would block trading on such inside information. Current securities law and congressional ethics rules don't prohibit lawmakers or their staff members from buying and selling securities based on information learned in the halls of Congress.
    Brody Mullins, "Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading By Lawmakers and Their Aides," The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114351554851509761.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

    The Culture of Corruption Runs Deep and Wide in Both U.S. Political Parties:  Few if any are uncorrupted
    Committee members have shown no appetite for taking up all those cases and are considering an amnesty for reporting violations, although not for serious matters such as accepting a trip from a lobbyist, which House rules forbid. The data firm PoliticalMoneyLine calculates that members of Congress have received more than $18 million in travel from private organizations in the past five years, with Democrats taking 3,458 trips and Republicans taking 2,666. . . But of course, there are those who deem the American People dumb as stones and will approach this bi-partisan scandal accordingly. Enter Democrat Leader Nancy Pelosi, complete with talking points for her minion, that are sure to come back and bite her .... “House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) filed delinquent reports Friday for three trips she accepted from outside sponsors that were worth $8,580 and occurred as long as seven years ago, according to copies of the documents.
    Bob Parks, "Will Nancy Pelosi's Words Come Back to Bite Her?" The National Ledger, January 6, 2006 --- http://www.nationalledger.com/artman/publish/article_27262498.shtml 

    And when they aren't stealing directly, lawmakers are caving in to lobbying crooks
    Drivers can send their thank-you notes to Capitol Hill, which created the conditions for this mess last summer with its latest energy bill. That legislation contained a sop to Midwest corn farmers in the form of a huge new ethanol mandate that began this year and requires drivers to consume 7.5 billion gallons a year by 2012. At the same time, Congress refused to include liability protection for producers of MTBE, a rival oxygen fuel-additive that has become a tort lawyer target. So MTBE makers are pulling out, ethanol makers can't make up the difference quickly enough, and gas supplies are getting squeezed.
    "The Gasoline Follies," The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006; Page A20  --- Click Here

    Once again, the power of pork to sustain incumbents gets its best demonstration in the person of John Murtha (D-PA). The acknowledged king of earmarks in the House gains the attention of the New York Times editorial board today, which notes the cozy and lucrative relationship between more than two dozen contractors in Murtha's district and the hundreds of millions of dollars in pork he provided them. It also highlights what roughly amounts to a commission on the sale of Murtha's power as an appropriator: Mr. Murtha led all House members this year, securing $162 million in district favors, according to the watchdog group Taxpayers for Common Sense. ... In 1991, Mr. Murtha used a $5 million earmark to create the National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence in Johnstown to develop anti-pollution technology for the military. Since then, it has garnered more than $670 million in contracts and earmarks. Meanwhile it is managed by another contractor Mr. Murtha helped create, Concurrent Technologies, a research operation that somehow was allowed to be set up as a tax-exempt charity, according to The Washington Post. Thanks to Mr. Murtha, Concurrent has boomed; the annual salary for its top three executives averages $462,000.
    Edward Morrissey, Captain's Quarters, January 14, 2008 --- http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/archives/016617.php

    "Several Democrats, including some closed allied to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, are the subject of ethics complaints," by Holly Bailey, Newsweek Magazine, October 3, 2009 --- http://www.newsweek.com/id/216687

    Nancy Pelosi likes to brag that she's "drained the swamp" when it comes to corruption in the House, but ethics problems could come back to haunt Democrats in 2010. Democrats are currently the subject of 12 of the 16 complaints pending before the House ethics committee. Two of the lawmakers under scrutiny—Reps. Jack Murtha and Charlie Rangel—have close ties to Pelosi, who has come under criticism for not asking them to resign their committee posts. Murtha, chairman of a key defense-appropriations subcommittee, is is not formally under investigation but the ethics committee is reviewing political contributions he and other House lawmakers received from lobbying firm whose clients received millions of dollars in Defense earmarks. Rangel, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, is facing scrutiny for not fully disclosing assets. The ethics committee is also looking into ties between Rangel and a developer who leased rent-controlled apartments to the congressman, and whether Rangel improperly used his House office to raise funds for a public policy institute in his name. Rangel and Murtha deny any wrongdoing. (Another lawmaker under investigation: Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr., who, according to the committee, "may have offered to raise funds" for then–Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich in exchange for the president's Senate seat—a charge Jackson denies. The panel deferred its probe at the request of the Justice Department, which is conducting its own inquiry.)

    Pelosi has said little about Rangel's ethics problems, or those involving other Democrats; a Pelosi spokesman, Brendan Daly, e-mails NEWSWEEK, "The speaker has said that [Rangel] should not step aside while the independent, bipartisan ethics committee is investigating."

    But watchdog groups, not to mention Republicans, are calling Pelosi hypocritical (as if they weren't equally hypocritical) since Democrats won back control of the House by, in part, trashing the GOP's ethics lapses. Republicans already plan to use the ethics issue against Democrats in 2010. Though Rangel and Murtha aren't as known as Tom DeLay, the GOP poster boy for scandal in 2006, the party aims to change that: this week the House GOP plans to introduce a resolution calling on Rangel to resign his committee post.

    Pelosi "promised to run the most ethical Congress in history," says Ken Spain, a spokesman for the National Republican Congressional Committee, "and instead of cracking down on corruption, she promotes it (to garner votes in Congress)." Daly responds, "Since Democrats took control of Congress, we have strengthened the ethics process." (Daly has some magnificent ocean front property for sale in Arizona.)

    "Can morality be brought to market?" by Prem Sikka, The Guardian, October 7, 2009 ---
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/07/bae-business-ethics-morality-markets

    The BAE bribery scandal has once again brought discussions of business ethics to the fore. Politicians also claim to be interested in promoting morality in markets, but have not explained how this can be achieved.

    There is no shortage of companies wrapping themselves in claims of ethical conduct to disarm critics. BAE boasts a global code of conduct, which claims that "its leaders will act ethically, promote ethical conduct both within the company and in the markets in which we operate". In the light of the revelations about the way the company secured its business contracts, such claims must be doubted.

    BAE is not alone. There is a huge gap between corporate talk and action, and a few illustrations would help to highlight this gap. KPMG is one of the world's biggest accountancy firms. Its global code of conduct states that the firm is committed to "acting lawfully and ethically, and encouraging this behaviour in the marketplace … maintaining independence and objectivity, and avoiding conflicts of interest". Yet the firm created an extensive organisational structure to devise tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes. Former managers have been found guilty of tax evasion and the firm was fined $456m for "criminal wrongdoing".

    The global code of conduct of Ernst & Young, another global accountancy firm, claims that "no client or external relationship is more important than the ethics, integrity and reputation of Ernst & Young". Partners and former partners of the firm have also been found guilty of promoting tax evasion.

    UBS, a leading bank, has been fined $780m by the US authorities for facilitating tax evasion, but it told the world that "UBS upholds the law, respects regulations and behaves in a principled way. UBS is self-aware and has the courage to face the truth. UBS maintains the highest ethical standards."

    British Airways paid a fine of £270m after admitting price fixing on fuel surcharges on its long-haul flights while its code of conduct promised that it would behave responsibly and ethically towards its customers.

    These are just a tiny sample that shows that corporations say one thing but do something completely different. This hypocrisy is manufactured by corporate culture, and unless that process is changed there is no prospect of securing moral corporations or markets.

    The key issue is that companies cannot buck the systemic pressures to produce ever higher profits. Capitalism is not accompanied by any moral guidance on how high these profits have to be, but shareholders always demand more. Markets do not ask any questions about the quality of profits or the human consequences of ever-rising returns. Behind a wall of secrecy, company directors devise plans to fleece taxpayers and customers to increase profits, and are rewarded through profit-related remuneration schemes. The social system provides incentives for unethical behaviour.

    Within companies, daily routines encourage employees to prioritise profit-making even if that is unethical. For example, tax departments within major accountancy firms operate as profit centres. The performance of their employees is assessed at regular intervals, and those generating profits are rewarded with salary increases and career advancements. In time, the routines of devising tax avoidance schemes and other financial dodges become firmly established norms, and employees are desensitised to the consequences.

    With increasing public scepticism, and pressure from consumer groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), companies manage their image by publishing high-sounding statements. Ethics itself has become big business, and armies of consultants and advisers are available for hire to enable companies to manage their image. No questions are raised about the internal culture or the economic incentives for misbehaviour. It is far cheaper for companies to publish glossy brochures than to pay taxes or improve customer and public welfare. The payment of fines has become just another business cost.

    Making capitalism ethical is a tough task – and possibly a hopeless one. Any policy for encouraging ethical corporate conduct has to change the nature of capitalism and corporations so that companies are run for the benefit of all stakeholders, rather than just shareholders. Pressures to change corporate culture could be facilitated by closing down persistently offending companies, imposing personal penalties on offending executives and offering bounties to whistleblowers.

    Some Great Role Models --- Ha! Ha!
    "Dozens in Congress under ethics inquiry:
    AN ACCIDENTAL DISCLOSURE Document was found on file-sharing network
    ," by Ellen Nakashima and Paul Kane, The Washington Post, October 30, 2009 --- Click Here

    The report appears to have been inadvertently placed on a publicly accessible computer network, and it was provided to The Washington Post by a source not connected to the congressional investigations. The committee said Thursday night that the document was released by a low-level staffer.

    The ethics committee is one of the most secretive panels in Congress, and its members and staff members sign oaths not to disclose any activities related to its past or present investigations. Watchdog groups have accused the committee of not actively pursuing inquiries; the newly disclosed document indicates the panel is conducting far more investigations than it had revealed.

    Shortly after 6 p.m. Thursday, the committee chairman, Zoe Lofgren (D-Calif.), interrupted a series of House votes to alert lawmakers about the breach. She cautioned that some of the panel's activities are preliminary and not a conclusive sign of inappropriate behavior.

    "No inference should be made as to any member," she said.

    Rep. Jo Bonner (Ala.), the committee's ranking Republican, said the breach was an isolated incident.

    The 22-page "Committee on Standards Weekly Summary Report" gives brief summaries of ethics panel investigations of the conduct of 19 lawmakers and a few staff members. It also outlines the work of the new Office of Congressional Ethics, a quasi-independent body that initiates investigations and provides recommendations to the ethics committee. The document indicated that the office was reviewing the activities of 14 other lawmakers. Some were under review by both ethics bodies.

    A broader inquiry

    Ethics committee investigations are not uncommon. Most result in private letters that either exonerate or reprimand a member. In some rare instances, the censure is more severe.

    Many of the broad outlines of the cases cited in the July document are known -- the committee announced over the summer that it was reviewing lawmakers with connections to the now-closed PMA Group, a lobbying firm. But the document indicates that the inquiry was broader than initially believed. It included a review of seven lawmakers on the House Appropriations defense subcommittee who have steered federal money to the firm's clients and have also received large campaign contributions.

    The document also disclosed that:

    -- Ethics committee staff members have interviewed House Ways and Means Chairman Charles B. Rangel (D-N.Y.) about one element of the complex investigation of his personal finances, as well as the lawmaker's top aide and his son. Rangel said he spoke with ethics committee staff members regarding a conference that he and four other members of the Congressional Black Caucus attended last November in St. Martin. The trip initially was said to be sponsored by a nonprofit foundation run by a newspaper. But the three-day event, at a luxury resort, was underwritten by major corporations such as Citigroup, Pfizer and AT&T. Rules passed in 2007, shortly after Democrats reclaimed the majority following a wave of corruption cases against Republicans, bar private companies from paying for congressional travel.

    Rangel said he has not discussed other parts of the investigation of his finances with the committee. "I'm waiting for that, anxiously," he said.

    The Justice Department has told the ethics panel to suspend a probe of Rep. Alan B. Mollohan (D-W.Va.), whose personal finances federal investigators began reviewing in early 2006 after complaints from a conservative group that he was not fully revealing his real estate holdings. There has been no public action on that inquiry for several years. But the department's request in early July to the committee suggests that the case continues to draw the attention of federal investigators, who often ask that the House and Senate ethics panels refrain from taking action against members whom the department is already investigating.

    Mollohan said that he was not aware of any ongoing interest by the Justice Department in his case and that he and his attorneys have not heard from federal investigators. "The answer is no," he said.

    -- The committee on June 9 authorized issuance of subpoenas to the Justice Department, the National Security Agency and the FBI for "certain intercepted communications" regarding Rep. Jane Harman (D-Calif.). As was reported earlier this year, Harman was heard in a 2005 conversation agreeing to an Israeli operative's request to try to obtain leniency for two pro-Israel lobbyists in exchange for the agent's help in lobbying House Speaker Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) to name her chairman of the intelligence committee. The department, a former U.S. official said, declined to respond to the subpoena.

    Harman said that the ethics committee has not contacted her and that she has no knowledge that the subpoena was ever issued. "I don't believe that's true," she said. "As far as I'm concerned, this smear has been over for three years."

    In June 2009, a Justice Department official wrote in a letter to an attorney for Harman that she was "neither a subject nor a target" of a criminal investigation.

    Because of the secretive nature of the ethics committee, it was difficult to assess the current status of the investigations cited in the July document. The panel said Thursday, however, that it is ending a probe of Rep. Sam Graves (R-Mo.) after finding no ethical violations, and that it is investigating the financial connections of two California Democrats.

    The committee did not detail the two newly disclosed investigations. However, according to the July document, Rep. Maxine Waters, a high-ranking member of the House Financial Services Committee, came under scrutiny because of activities involving OneUnited Bank of Massachusetts, in which her husband owns at least $250,000 in stock.

    Waters arranged a September 2008 meeting at the Treasury Department where OneUnited executives asked for government money. In December, Treasury selected OneUnited as an early participant in the bank bailout program, injecting $12.1 million.

    The other, Rep. Laura Richardson, may have failed to mention property, income and liabilities on financial disclosure forms.

    File-sharing

    The committee's review of investigations became available on file-sharing networks because of a junior staff member's use of the software while working from home, Lofgren and Bonner said in a statement issued Thursday night. The staffer was fired, a congressional aide said.

    The committee "is taking all appropriate steps to deal with this issue," they said, noting that neither the committee nor the House's information systems were breached in any way.

    "Peer-to-peer" technology has previously caused inadvertent breaches of sensitive financial, defense-related and personal data from government and commercial networks, and it is prohibited on House networks.

    House administration rules require that if a lawmaker or staff member takes work home, "all users of House sensitive information must protect the confidentiality of sensitive information" from unauthorized disclosure.

    Leo Wise, chief counsel for the Office of Congressional Ethics, declined to comment, citing office policy against confirming or denying the existence of investigations. A Justice Department spokeswoman also declined to comment, citing a similar policy.

    The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers

    Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm


    "Pay-to-Play Torts Pension middlemen get investigated; lawyers get a pass," The Wall Street Journal, October 31, 2009 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704107204574473310387443816.html?mod=djemEditorialPage

    Pay-to-play schemes involving public officials and the pension funds they oversee are finally getting the hard look they deserve. Some 36 states are investigating how financial brokers and other middlemen have used kickbacks and campaign contributions to gain access to retirement funds. Now if only plaintiffs law firms would get the same scrutiny.

    Like investment funds, class-action law firms hire intermediaries to help win state business. But the more common practice is for plaintiffs lawyers to make campaign contributions to public officials with the goal of being selected by those same officials to represent the pension fund in securities litigation.

    These enormous state funds are among the world's largest institutional investors, and they frequently sue companies on behalf of shareholders. The role of pension funds in such suits became all the more important after the securities-law reform of 1995 that limited the ability of some plaintiffs to file shareholder lawsuits. So plaintiffs law firms have worked especially hard to turn these pension funds into business partners in their pursuit of class action riches.

    The law firms typically agree to take the cases on a contingency basis that means no fees up front but a huge share (30% or more) of any settlement or jury verdict. However, attorneys suing on the government's behalf are supposed to be neutral actors whose goal is justice, not lining their own pockets. When for-profit lawyers are involved with a contingency fee at the end of the lawsuit rainbow, the incentives shift toward settling to get a big payday.

    This month, the New York Daily News reported that the lawyers representing New York state's $116.5 billion pension fund have received more than a half-billion dollars in contingency fees over the past decade. Meanwhile, state Comptroller Thomas DiNapoli, the fund's sole trustee, "has raked in more than $200,000 in campaign cash from law firms looking to represent the state's pension fund in big-money suits," the paper reported. Attorneys from one Manhattan firm, Labaton Sucharow, gave Mr. DiNapoli $47,500 in December 2008, only months after he chose the firm as lead counsel in a class action suit against Countrywide Financial. Mr. DiNapoli's office says firms that give money don't get preferential treatment.

    The Empire State is hardly unusual. Labaton Sucharow has given more than $58,000 to Massachusetts State Treasurer Timothy Cahill, who recently announced his gubernatorial bid. The Labaton firm is representing state and county pension funds in more than a dozen security class action lawsuits.

    The Louisiana State Employees' Retirement System is among the most litigious in the nation. John Kennedy, the state treasurer who helps decide when Louisiana's major pension funds should bring a law suit, has received tens of thousands of dollars in political donations from Bernstein Litowitz, which has offices in New York, New Orleans and San Diego and was the country's top-grossing securities class-action firm in 2008. The law firm has represented Louisiana's public pension funds at least 13 times since 2004, and its partners donated nearly $30,000 to Mr. Kennedy's two most recent campaigns, even though he ran unopposed both times.

    In Mississippi, the state attorney general determines when the public employees retirement fund should bring a securities class action and which outside firms will represent the fund. Would you be shocked to learn that AG Jim Hood has frequently chosen law firms that have donated to his campaigns?

    Mr. Hood is also partial to Bernstein Litowitz. On February 21, 2006, he chose the firm to represent the Mississippi Public Employees Retirement Fund in a securities class action against Delphi Corporation—just days after receiving $25,000 in donations from Bernstein Litowitz attorneys. The suit was eventually settled, and the lawyers on the case received $40.5 million in fees. Mr. Hood's campaign would appear to deserve a raise.

    Back in New York, Attorney General Andrew Cuomo has garnered banner headlines and much praise for his pay-to-play pension fund probe that has already led to four guilty pleas by investors and politicians. Good for him. Yet when asked about pursuing the trial bar for similar behavior, his office says it has no jurisdiction to go after law firms in class action suits. He could at least turn down their campaign money, however.

    Mr. Cuomo's campaign happens to have received $200,000 from securities law firms. Perhaps it's merely a coincidence that the expected candidate for governor in 2010 doesn't want to investigate his funders. Mr. Cuomo recently proposed legislation that puts restrictions on campaign donations from investment firms seeking pension business. His proposal does not seek the same restrictions on securities law firms. Perhaps that's another coincidence.

    If Mr. Cuomo won't investigate pay-to-play torts on his own, then someone else should investigate Mr. Cuomo's relationship with these pay-to-play law firms.


    Once again, the power of pork to sustain incumbents gets its best demonstration in the person of John Murtha (D-PA). The acknowledged king of earmarks in the House gains the attention of the New York Times editorial board today, which notes the cozy and lucrative relationship between more than two dozen contractors in Murtha's district and the hundreds of millions of dollars in pork he provided them. It also highlights what roughly amounts to a commission on the sale of Murtha's power as an appropriator: Mr. Murtha led all House members this year, securing $162 million in district favors, according to the watchdog group Taxpayers for Common Sense. ... In 1991, Mr. Murtha used a $5 million earmark to create the National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence in Johnstown to develop anti-pollution technology for the military. Since then, it has garnered more than $670 million in contracts and earmarks. Meanwhile it is managed by another contractor Mr. Murtha helped create, Concurrent Technologies, a research operation that somehow was allowed to be set up as a tax-exempt charity, according to The Washington Post. Thanks to Mr. Murtha, Concurrent has boomed; the annual salary for its top three executives averages $462,000.
    Edward Morrissey, Captain's Quarters, January 14, 2008 --- http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/archives/016617.php


    Many Colleges Turn Their Ears Toward Congress
    Higher education leaders have long had a love-hate relationship with earmarks. On the one hand, they’re regularly derided by critics as fostering the waste of tax dollars and encouraging a sometimes secretive circumvention of peer review in ways that do not necessarily produce the best science. But the fact remains that colleges and the research initiatives they house have been among the key recipients of the dollars, which some argue level the research playing field for less-prestigious institutions. Public university presidents regularly pass through Washington to lobby their members of Congress for the grants; on Monday alone, two who met with Inside Higher Ed’s editors boasted that that was a primary reason for their visits to town. Although many members of Congress defend the grants as a way for them to reward constituents who do good work but are disadvantaged for a variety of reasons in traditional competitions for funds, the grants have come under increasing scrutiny from budget hawks and “good government” types who see the earmarks as wasteful. Congress has made several changes in law and policy aimed at improving disclosure of the grants, with the goal of embarrassing lawmakers into providing fewer of them. But that strategy appears to have failed miserably so far; in its 2008 spending bills, Congress funded 11,000 noncompetitive projects worth $14 billion — half the amount delivered in 2007, but about 1,000 more grants than awarded that year.
    Doug Lederman, 'Bush on Earmarks: Tough Words, Little Meaning," Inside Higher Ed, January 29, 2008 --- http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/01/29/bush


    A company owned by a nephew of Rep. John Murtha received $4 million from the Defense Department last year for engineering and warehouse services, The Washington Post reported Tuesday. Murtha, D-Pa., is chairman of the House Appropriations defense subcommittee. Murtech Inc., based on Glen Burnie, Md., is owned by the congressman's nephew Robert C. Murtha Jr., who told the Post the company provides "necessary logistical support" to Pentagon testing programs, "and that's about as far as I feel comfortable going." The Post reported that the Pentagon rewarded contracts to Murtech without competition.
    "Murtha's Nephew Got Millions in Gov't Contracts," Fox News, May 5, 2009 ---
    http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2009/05/05/murthas-nephew-got-millions-defense-contracts/


    "The Myth of Regulation," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, October 2009 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x67705.xml

    Mark Twain remarked that "There is no distinctively native American criminal class except Congress." He was wrong. He should have included presidents and the SEC.

    On August 4 the SEC accused General Electric of accounting fraud (Litigation Release No. 21166), but it chose not to disclose who committed the frauds and it did not punish the criminals.  Instead, the SEC fined the victims—the shareholders—$50 million.  Worse, the SEC protracted the so-called investigation so long that even if the felons were indicted, the case likely would get tossed out of court because of the statute of limitations.  This is just one example of many injustices by the SEC during the last decade that reveals how this agency has supported the efforts of some managers and directors to defraud the investing public.

    I infer that Congress and recent presidents have approved these activities, for Congress, Bush, and Obama have done nothing to improve matters.  They have given the appearance of caring, but thwarted any real, effective measures.
    Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley and President Bush signed the legislation.  But Sarbanes-Oxley did little to dampen the activities of criminally-minded managers and directors.  This was because it did so little to improve enforcement activities.  Sarbanes-Oxley merely required a variety of studies and increased penalties and required auditors to report on the firm’s internal controls.  But these actions have not lessened securities fraud or accounting shenanigans.

    More recently President Obama claims to fight the problems that caused the financial crisis by advocating a new agency.  “The Consumer Financial Protection Agency will have the power to ensure that consumers get information that is clear and concise, and to prevent the worst kinds of abuses.”  Many business writers have critiqued this proposal for a variety of reasons.  I agree with them, but I think there is a deeper problem and that is the myth of regulation.

    What Obama is really trying to do is give American voters the impression that he is in charge, that he cares about them, and that he is improving matters so that the chances of another financial meltdown is infinitesimal.  It is political legerdemain.

    As long as managers have perverse incentives to cheat investors and as long as the SEC goes after only the little guys and ignores managers at Enron, WorldCom, Madoff Investments Securities, and GE, nothing is going to change.  If the Congress and if the President want to improve matters—and I have no idea if they really do—then they must change the set of incentives and disincentives.  To effect real change, the system must punish managers and directors who lie and steal and cover it up with scandalous financial reporting.

    More regulation might make society feel better, but that just is an indication that most Americans have little understanding of economics.  They will continue to lose in the stock markets until they insist elected officials do something substantive.

    My fear is that Democrats will rally around Obama while Republicans vilify him, similar to the previous administration when Republicans rallied around Bush and Democrats denigrated him.  There is too much partisanship in this country and not enough rational analysis.  Americans need to understand that both presidents have failed us by supporting new legislation and by crippling better enforcement.  (For whatever it is worth, this is one of the reasons I am an Independent.)

     

    Jensen Comment
    The problem of regulation is that the industries being regulated end up owning the regulators until the next big scandal makes headlines. Bob Jensen's threads on the need for better regulation and enforcement are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

     


    The Sorry State of Democratic Party Leadership in Combating Earmark Fraud and Pork
    Democratic Earmark Fraud Nancy Pelosi Does Not Want Investigated

    "Pelosi's Pork Problem:  The PMA scandal could make Abramoff look like a piker," The Wall Street Journal, June 5, 2009 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124416236598887387.html

    Picture a freight train roaring down the tracks. Picture House Speaker Nancy Pelosi positioning her party on the rails. Picture a growing stream of nervous souls diving for the weeds. Picture all this, and you've got a sense of the Democrats' earmark-corruption problem.

    This particular choo-choo has the name John Murtha emblazoned on the side, and with each chug is proving that those who ignore history are doomed to repeat it. Republicans got tossed in 2006 in part for failing to police the earmarks at the center of the Jack Abramoff and other corruption scandals. Mrs. Pelosi is today leaving her members exposed to an earmark mess that might make Abramoff look junior varsity.

    Federal investigators are deep into a criminal investigation of PMA Group, a now-defunct lobby shop founded by a former aide to Mr. Murtha, Pennsylvania's 18-term star appropriator. The suspicion is that some members of Congress may have peddled lucrative earmarks to PMA clients in exchange for campaign contributions. To get a sense of this probe's scope, consider that last year alone more than 100 members secured earmarks for PMA clients.

    Mr. Murtha, who in the past two years alone directed $78 million to PMA companies, has so far not been accused of wrongdoing and has proclaimed his innocence. The feds, for their part, are picking up speed. Federal agents have raided PMA, as well as a defense contractor to which Mr. Murtha had directed earmarks, Kuchera Defense Systems. By last week, Mr. Murtha's fellow defense appropriator and PMA-earmarker, Indiana Rep. Peter Visclosky, had disclosed he'd received subpoenas in connection with PMA, while the Navy said it had suspended Kuchera from doing business with it because of "alleged fraud."

    The result is growing dissent among Democrats, on full display this week. On one side is Mrs. Pelosi, who has demanded her party protect Mr. Murtha, a man hugely responsible for her ascent. One the other side are younger, first- and second-term Democrats who won their seats off GOP scandals and who have no interest in sacrificing them at the back-scratching altar.

    Republican Rep. Jeff Flake this week gave notice he was introducing his ninth resolution calling for an ethics committee investigation into PMA. This scourge of earmarks worries that, since the 1990s, some lawmakers have been "refining" earmarking, moving beyond "bring home the bacon" pork for districts and instead viewing earmarks as "fund-raising tools" -- a way to deliver money to companies that produce campaign cash. "We've crossed a line," he tells me. "And we in Congress need to understand that this is why Justice is interested."

    His resolutions are forcing members to take sides, and with each vote he's peeled off a few more of Mrs. Pelosi's caucus. His first resolution, in February, got support from 17 Democrats. These were folks like California's Jerry McNerney, who spent his 2006 campaign lashing his GOP rival to Abramoff. And New Hampshire's Paul Hodes, who in the same year criticized his opponent for failing to return campaign donations from former House Majority Leader Tom DeLay.

    By last month's Flake resolution, 29 Democrats had jumped on board. Welcome Mike Quigley, newly elected in Illinois after a campaign focused on Rod Blagojevich. Welcome, too, New York's Scott Murphy, who in March squeaked out a special-election victory after attacking his opponent on ethics. Some Democrats have fretted that even lining up with Mr. Flake won't provide adequate cover from a possible Murtha train wreck. In April, Mr. Hodes and Arizona Rep. Gabrielle Giffords debuted a bill to ban lawmakers from taking contributions from companies on whose behalf they've requested earmarks.

    Mrs. Pelosi has relentlessly fought to tamp down this uprising. In April, she recruited the former top Democrat on the ethics committee, Howard Berman, to lecture members in a closed-door meeting as to why they should continue to oppose Mr. Flake. In May, as the House prepared for another vote, Mrs. Pelosi's assistant, Rep. Chris Van Hollen, sent an email to staffers warning "Don't Be a Flake" and making clear defections would not be viewed charitably.

    But the news of the Visclosky subpoena, and the possibility of another Flake vote, this week threatened a mass revolt. Majority Leader Steny Hoyer pre-empted Mr. Flake with his own resolution calling on the ethics committee merely to disclose whether it is already looking at PMA. Democrats then watered this down further by referring the resolution to committee, where it can be buried. Many of the GOP's biggest earmarkers, in particular Alaska's Don Young and Florida's Bill Young, went along with this charade, proving Republicans have yet to exorcise their own earmark demons.

    As political cover goes this is pretty scant, and Democrats are in control. If and when this train derails, the exposure could be huge. For Mr. Flake, it's all a bit mindboggling. "This is a well-trodden path of denial that we Republicans already walked down. Democrats are now walking down that path. Philosophically, it's nuts."


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on July 10, 2009

    Public Pensions Cook the Books
    by Andrew G. Biggs
    The Wall Street Journal

    Jul 06, 2009
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Governmental Accounting, Market-Value Approach, Pension Accounting

    SUMMARY: As Mr. Biggs, a resident scholar at the American Enterprise Institute, puts it, "public employee pension plans are plagued by overgenerous benefits, chronic underfunding, and now trillion dollar stock-market losses. Based on their preferred accounting methods...these plans are underfunded nationally by around $310 billion. [But] the numbers are worse using market valuation methods...which discount benefit liabilities at lower interest rates...."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Introducing the importance of interest rate assumptions, and the accounting itself, for pension plans can be accomplished with this article.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) Summarize the accounting for pension plans, including the process for determining pension liabilities, the funded status of a pension plan, pension expense, the use of a discount rate, the use of an expected rate of return. You may base your answer on the process used by corporations rather than governmental entities.

    2. (Advanced) Based on the discussion in the article, what is the difference between accounting for pension plans by U.S. corporations following FASB requirements and governmental entities following GASB guidance?

    3. (Introductory) What did the administrators of the Montana Public Employees' Retirement Board and the Montana Teachers' Retirement System include in their advertisements to hire new actuaries?

    4. (Advanced) What is the concern with using the "expected return" on plan assets as the rate to discount future benefits rather than using a low, risk free rate of return for this calculation? In your answer, comment on the author's statement that "future benefits are considered to be riskless" and the impact that assessment should have on the choice of a discount rate.

    5. (Advanced) What is the response by public pension officers regarding differences between their plans and those of corporate entities? How do they argue this leads to differences in required accounting? Do you agree or disagree with this position? Support your assessment.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Public Pensions Cook the Books:  Some plans want to hide the truth from taxpayers," by Andrew Biggs, The Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2009 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124683573382697889.html

    Here's a dilemma: You manage a public employee pension plan and your actuary tells you it is significantly underfunded. You don't want to raise contributions. Cutting benefits is out of the question. To be honest, you'd really rather not even admit there's a problem, lest taxpayers get upset.

    What to do? For the administrators of two Montana pension plans, the answer is obvious: Get a new actuary. Or at least that's the essence of the managers' recent solicitations for actuarial services, which warn that actuaries who favor reporting the full market value of pension liabilities probably shouldn't bother applying.

    Public employee pension plans are plagued by overgenerous benefits, chronic underfunding, and now trillion dollar stock-market losses. Based on their preferred accounting methods -- which discount future liabilities based on high but uncertain returns projected for investments -- these plans are underfunded nationally by around $310 billion.

    The numbers are worse using market valuation methods (the methods private-sector plans must use), which discount benefit liabilities at lower interest rates to reflect the chance that the expected returns won't be realized. Using that method, University of Chicago economists Robert Novy-Marx and Joshua Rauh calculate that, even prior to the market collapse, public pensions were actually short by nearly $2 trillion. That's nearly $87,000 per plan participant. With employee benefits guaranteed by law and sometimes even by state constitutions, it's likely these gargantuan shortfalls will have to be borne by unsuspecting taxpayers.

    Some public pension administrators have a strategy, though: Keep taxpayers unsuspecting. The Montana Public Employees' Retirement Board and the Montana Teachers' Retirement System declare in a recent solicitation for actuarial services that "If the Primary Actuary or the Actuarial Firm supports [market valuation] for public pension plans, their proposal may be disqualified from further consideration."

    Scott Miller, legal counsel of the Montana Public Employees Board, was more straightforward: "The point is we aren't interested in bringing in an actuary to pressure the board to adopt market value of liabilities theory."

    While corporate pension funds are required by law to use low, risk-adjusted discount rates to calculate the market value of their liabilities, public employee pensions are not. However, financial economists are united in believing that market-based techniques for valuing private sector investments should also be applied to public pensions.

    Because the power of compound interest is so strong, discounting future benefit costs using a pension plan's high expected return rather than a low riskless return can significantly reduce the plan's measured funding shortfall. But it does so only by ignoring risk. The expected return implies only the "expectation" -- meaning, at least a 50% chance, not a guarantee -- that the plan's assets will be sufficient to meet its liabilities. But when future benefits are considered to be riskless by plan participants and have been ruled to be so by state courts, a 51% chance that the returns will actually be there when they are needed hardly constitutes full funding.

    Public pension administrators argue that government plans fundamentally differ from private sector pensions, since the government cannot go out of business. Even so, the only true advantage public pensions have over private plans is the ability to raise taxes. But as the Congressional Budget Office has pointed out in 2004, "The government does not have a capacity to bear risk on its own" -- rather, government merely redistributes risk between taxpayers and beneficiaries, present and future.

    Market valuation makes the costs of these potential tax increases explicit, while the public pension administrators' approach, which obscures the possibility that the investment returns won't achieve their goals, leaves taxpayers in the dark.

    For these reasons, the Public Interest Committee of the American Academy of Actuaries recently stated, "it is in the public interest for retirement plans to disclose consistent measures of the economic value of plan assets and liabilities in order to provide the benefits promised by plan sponsors."

    Nevertheless, the National Association of State Retirement Administrators, an umbrella group representing government employee pension funds, effectively wants other public plans to take the same low road that the two Montana plans want to take. It argues against reporting the market valuation of pension shortfalls. But the association's objections seem less against market valuation itself than against the fact that higher reported underfunding "could encourage public sector plan sponsors to abandon their traditional pension plans in lieu of defined contribution plans."

    The Government Accounting Standards Board, which sets guidelines for public pension reporting, does not currently call for reporting the market value of public pension liabilities. The board announced last year a review of its position regarding market valuation but says the review may not be completed until 2013.

    This is too long for state taxpayers to wait to find out how many trillions they owe.

    A Sickening Lobbying Effort for Off-Balance-Sheet Financing in IFRS
    The International Accounting Standards Board is working quickly to produce some updated and clarified guidance on how to account for financial assets and liabilities. The financial meltdown renewed attention on this matter, as well as the use of special-purpose entities to hold financial assets, a device that generally gets them off balance sheets. There is still disagreement on how big of a role off-balance-sheet accounting played in starting the financial crisis, but banks appear to be against changes that would bring about greater disclosure of assets and liabilities.
    Peter Williams, "Peter Williams Accounting: Off balance – the future of off-balance sheet transactions," Personal Computer World, July 3, 2009 --- http://www.pcw.co.uk/financial-director/comment/2245360/balance-4729409

    A working paper on fair value accounting from Columbia University --- http://www4.gsb.columbia.edu/publicoffering/post/731291/Behind+the+Mark-to-Market+Change#

    Bob Jensen's threads on the never-ending OBSF wars ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#OBSF2


    "Controlled by the corporations:  Before we can deal with a financial crisis manufactured in boardrooms, we must curb corporate power over our legislators," by Prem Sikka, The Guardian, January 8, 2008 --- http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jan/08/financial-crisis-regulation

    As we enter the second year of the financial crisis manufactured in corporate boardrooms, there is hardly any sign of major reforms. Short-selling of securities was considered to be a major blot on the financial landscape, but is apparently OK now. The blinkered Financial Services Authority (FSA) is still wielding its blunt regulatory instruments. The corporate-controlled Financial Reporting Council (FRC), which did not monitor the accounts of any bank and had no idea of their off balance sheet accounting games, is still in place.

    The real problem is the nature of neoliberal democracy. Corporate interests have become central to domestic and foreign policymaking. With minimum public scrutiny, legislation demanded by corporate interests is enacted. Legislators are available for hire through consultancies and are only too willing to do their bidding. Little attention is paid to the long-term issues, or even consequences for the people, or the economy.

    Continued in article


    "Why Congress Won't Investigate Wall Street:  Republicans and Democrats would find themselves in the hot seat," by Thomas Frank, The Wall Street Journal, April 29, 2009 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124096712823366501.html

    The famous Pecora Commission of 1933 and 1934 was one of the most successful congressional investigations of all time, an instance when oversight worked exactly as it should. The subject was the massively corrupt investment practices of the 1920s. In the course of its investigation, the Senate Banking Committee, which brought on as its counsel a former New York assistant district attorney named Ferdinand Pecora, heard testimony from the lords of finance that cemented public suspicion of Wall Street. Along the way, the investigations formed the rationale for the Glass-Steagall Act, the Securities Exchange Act, and other financial regulations of the Roosevelt era.

    A new round of regulation is clearly in order these days, and a Pecora-style investigation seems like a good way to jolt the Obama administration into action. After all, the financial revelations of today bear a striking resemblance to those of 1933. In his own account of his investigation, Pecora described bond issues that were almost certainly worthless, but which 1920s bankers sold to uncomprehending investors anyway. He told of the bonuses which the bankers thereby won for themselves. He also told of the lucrative gifts banks gave to lawmakers from both political parties. And then he told of the banking industry's indignation at being made to account for itself. It regarded the outraged public, in Pecora's shorthand, as a "howling mob."

    The idea of a new Pecora investigation is catching on, particularly, but not exclusively, on the left.

    It's probably not going to happen, though, in the comprehensive way that it should. The reason is that understanding our problems, this time around, would require our political leaders to examine themselves.

    The crisis today is not solely one of bank misbehavior. This is also about the failure of the regulators -- the Wall Street policemen who dozed peacefully as the crime of the century went off beneath the window.

    We have all heard the official explanation for this failure, that "the structure of our regulatory system is unnecessarily complex and fragmented," in the soothing words of Treasury Secretary Tim Geithner. But no proper Pecora would be satisfied with such piffle. The system was not only complex, it was compromised and corrupted and thoroughly rotten even in the spots where its mandate was simple.

    After all, we have for decades been on a national crusade to slash red tape and stifle regulators. Over the years, federal agencies have been defunded, their workers have grown dispirited, their managers, drawn in many cases from antiregulatory organizations, have seemed to care far more about industry than the public.

    Consider in this connection the 2003 photograph, rapidly becoming an icon of the Bush years, in which James Gilleran, then the director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (it regulates savings and loan associations) can be seen in the company of several jolly bank industry lobbyists, holding a chainsaw to a pile of rule books. The picture not only tells us more about our current fix than would a thousand pages about overlapping jurisdictions; it also reminds us why we may never solve the problem of regulatory failure. To do so, we would have to examine the apparent subversion of the regulatory system by the last administration. And that topic is supposedly off limits, since going there would open the door to endless partisan feuding.

    But it's not only Republicans who would feel the sting of embarrassment. Launching Pecora II would automatically raise this question: Whatever happened to the reforms put in place after the first go-round?

    Now a different picture comes to mind. It's Bill Clinton in November of 1999, surrounded by legislators of both parties, giving a shout-out to his brilliant Treasury Secretary Larry Summers, and signing the measure that overturned Glass-Steagall's separation of investment from commercial banking. Mr. Clinton is confident about what he is doing. He knows the lessons of history, he talks glibly about "the new information-age global economy" that was the idol of deep thinkers everywhere in those days. "[T]he Glass-Steagall law is no longer appropriate to the economy in which we live," he says. "It worked pretty well for the industrial economy, which was highly organized, much more centralized, and much more nationalized than the one in which we operate today. But the world is very different."

    It turns out the world hadn't changed much after all. But the Democratic Party sure had. And while today's chastened Democrats might be ready to reregulate the banks, they are no more willing to scrutinize the bad ideas of the Clinton years than Republicans are the bad ideas of the Bush years.

    "We may now need to be reminded what Wall Street was like before Uncle Sam stationed a policeman at its corner," Pecora wrote in 1939, "lest, in time to come, some attempt be made to abolish that post."

    Well, the time did come. The attempt was made. And we could use that reminder today.

     


    Broken Promises and Pork Binges
    The Democratic majority came to power in January promising to do a better job on earmarks. They appeared to preserve our reforms and even take them a bit further. I commended Democrats publicly for this action. Unfortunately, the leadership reversed course. Desperate to advance their agenda, they began trading earmarks for votes, dangling taxpayer-funded goodies in front of wavering members to win their support for leadership priorities.

    John Boehner, "Pork Barrel Stonewall," The Wall Street Journal, September 27, 2007 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB119085546436140827.html

    "Earmarks Again Eat Into the Amount Available for Merit-Based Research, Analysis Finds," by Jeffrey Brainard, Chronicle of Higher Education, January 9, 2008 ---