But 250 years later, it's clearly
worked out well. The brewery at St. James's Gate has helped make Guinness
stout one of the most successful beer brands worldwide.
To celebrate what the company has
dubbed "Arthur's Day," stout-lovers around the world lifted a glass of the
foamy black brew to Arthur Thursday at 17:59 Greenwich Mean Time, or 1:59
ET. (See correction, below.)
Guinness parent Diageo PLC expects
thousands to attend an invitation-only party tonight at the Dublin brewery,
where musical acts Tom Jones, Kasabian and Estelle will play. Additionally,
other artists will perform at events being held at four major music venues
and 28 smaller pubs across the city.
Guinness may be distinctly Irish,
but the celebration of its birth is happening all over the world; parties
are being hosted in more than 150 different countries, according to the
beermaker's website.
To mark the occasion, Diageo PLC
has pledged to give €2.5 million this year from the Arthur Guinness Fund to
entrepreneurs.
The company says its founder was
one of the first employers in Ireland to provide pensions and health care
for workers, and the foundation aims to preserve that legacy.
Why single out capitalism for immorality and ethics misbehavior?
Making capitalism ethical is a tough task – and
possibly a hopeless one.
Prem Sikka (see below)
The
global code of conduct of Ernst & Young, another
global accountancy firm, claims that "no client or external relationship is
more important than the ethics, integrity and reputation of Ernst & Young".
Partners and former partners of the firm have also been found
guilty of promoting tax evasion.
Prem Sikka (see below)
Jensen Comment
Yeah right Prem, as if making the public sector and socialism ethical is an
easier task. The least ethical nations where bribery, crime, and immorality are
the worst are likely to be the more government (dictator) controlled and lower
on the capitalism scale. And in the so-called capitalist nations, the lowest
ethics are more apt to be found in the public sector that works hand in hand
with bribes from large and small businesses.
Rotten Fraud in General ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Rotten Fraud in the Public Sector (The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers
We hang the petty thieves and appoint the great ones to public office.
Aesop
Congress is our only native criminal class.
Mark Twain ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Twain
Why should
members of Congress be allowed to profit from insider trading?
Amid broad congressional concern about ethics scandals, some lawmakers are
poised to expand the battle for reform: They want to enact legislation that
would prohibit members of Congress and their aides from trading stocks based on
nonpublic information gathered on Capitol Hill. Two Democrat lawmakers plan to
introduce today a bill that would block trading on such inside information.
Current securities law and congressional ethics rules don't prohibit lawmakers
or their staff members from buying and selling securities based on information
learned in the halls of Congress.
Brody Mullins, "Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading By Lawmakers and Their Aides,"
The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006; Page A1 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114351554851509761.html?mod=todays_us_page_one
The
Culture of Corruption Runs Deep and Wide in Both U.S. Political Parties: Few if
any are uncorrupted
Committee members have shown no appetite for
taking up all those cases and are considering an amnesty for reporting
violations, although not for serious matters such as accepting a trip from a
lobbyist, which House rules forbid. The data firm PoliticalMoneyLine calculates
that members of Congress have received more than $18 million in travel from
private organizations in the past five years, with Democrats taking 3,458 trips
and Republicans taking 2,666. . . But of course, there are those who deem the
American People dumb as stones and will approach this bi-partisan scandal
accordingly. Enter Democrat Leader Nancy Pelosi, complete with talking points
for her minion, that are sure to come back and bite her .... “House Minority
Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) filed delinquent reports Friday for three trips
she accepted from outside sponsors that were worth $8,580 and occurred as long
as seven years ago, according to copies of the documents.
Bob Parks, "Will Nancy Pelosi's Words Come Back to Bite Her?" The National
Ledger, January 6, 2006 ---
http://www.nationalledger.com/artman/publish/article_27262498.shtml
And when
they aren't stealing directly, lawmakers are caving in to lobbying crooks
Drivers can send their thank-you notes to Capitol
Hill, which created the conditions for this mess last summer with its latest
energy bill. That legislation contained a sop to Midwest corn farmers in the
form of a huge new ethanol mandate that began this year and requires drivers to
consume 7.5 billion gallons a year by 2012. At the same time, Congress refused
to include liability protection for producers of MTBE, a rival oxygen
fuel-additive that has become a tort lawyer target. So MTBE makers are pulling
out, ethanol makers can't make up the difference quickly enough, and gas
supplies are getting squeezed.
"The Gasoline Follies," The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006; Page
A20 ---
Click Here
Once again, the power of pork to sustain incumbents gets its best demonstration
in the person of John Murtha (D-PA). The acknowledged king of earmarks in the
House gains the attention of the New York Times editorial board today, which
notes the cozy and lucrative relationship between more than two dozen
contractors in Murtha's district and the hundreds of millions of dollars in pork
he provided them. It also highlights what roughly amounts to a commission on the
sale of Murtha's power as an appropriator: Mr. Murtha led all House members this
year, securing $162 million in district favors, according to the watchdog group
Taxpayers for Common Sense. ... In 1991, Mr. Murtha used a $5 million earmark to
create the National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence in Johnstown to
develop anti-pollution technology for the military. Since then, it has garnered
more than $670 million in contracts and earmarks. Meanwhile it is managed by
another contractor Mr. Murtha helped create, Concurrent Technologies, a research
operation that somehow was allowed to be set up as a tax-exempt charity,
according to The Washington Post. Thanks to Mr. Murtha, Concurrent has boomed;
the annual salary for its top three executives averages $462,000.
Edward Morrissey, Captain's Quarters, January 14, 2008 ---
http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/archives/016617.php
"Several Democrats, including some closed allied to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, are
the subject of ethics complaints," by Holly Bailey, Newsweek Magazine,
October 3, 2009 ---
http://www.newsweek.com/id/216687
Nancy Pelosi likes to brag that she's
"drained the swamp" when it comes to corruption in the House, but ethics
problems could come back to haunt Democrats in 2010. Democrats are currently
the subject of 12 of the 16 complaints pending before the House ethics
committee. Two of the lawmakers under scrutiny—Reps. Jack Murtha and Charlie
Rangel—have close ties to Pelosi, who has come under criticism for not
asking them to resign their committee posts. Murtha, chairman of a key
defense-appropriations subcommittee, is is not formally under investigation
but the ethics committee is reviewing political contributions he and other
House lawmakers received from lobbying firm whose clients received millions
of dollars in Defense earmarks. Rangel, chairman of the Ways and Means
Committee, is facing scrutiny for not fully disclosing assets. The ethics
committee is also looking into ties between Rangel and a developer who
leased rent-controlled apartments to the congressman, and whether Rangel
improperly used his House office to raise funds for a public policy
institute in his name. Rangel and Murtha deny any wrongdoing. (Another
lawmaker under investigation: Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr., who, according to the
committee, "may have offered to raise funds" for then–Illinois governor Rod
Blagojevich in exchange for the president's Senate seat—a charge Jackson
denies. The panel deferred its probe at the request of the Justice
Department, which is conducting its own inquiry.)
Pelosi has said little about Rangel's
ethics problems, or those involving other Democrats; a Pelosi spokesman,
Brendan Daly, e-mails NEWSWEEK, "The speaker has said that [Rangel] should
not step aside while the independent, bipartisan ethics committee is
investigating."
But watchdog groups, not to mention
Republicans, are calling Pelosi hypocritical (as if
they weren't equally hypocritical)
since Democrats won back control of the House by, in part, trashing the
GOP's ethics lapses. Republicans already plan to use the ethics issue
against Democrats in 2010. Though Rangel and Murtha aren't as known as Tom
DeLay, the GOP poster boy for scandal in 2006, the party aims to change
that: this week the House GOP plans to introduce a resolution calling on
Rangel to resign his committee post.
Pelosi "promised to run the most ethical
Congress in history," says Ken Spain, a spokesman for the National
Republican Congressional Committee,
"and instead of cracking down on corruption, she
promotes it (to garner votes in Congress)."
Daly responds, "Since Democrats
took control of Congress, we have strengthened the ethics process." (Daly
has some magnificent ocean front property for sale in Arizona.)
"Can morality be brought to market?" by Prem Sikka, The Guardian,
October 7, 2009 ---
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/07/bae-business-ethics-morality-markets
The
BAE bribery scandal has once again brought
discussions of business ethics to the fore. Politicians also claim to be
interested in promoting
morality in markets, but have not explained how
this can be achieved.
There is no shortage of
companies wrapping themselves in claims of ethical conduct to disarm
critics. BAE boasts a global
code of conduct, which claims that "its leaders
will act ethically, promote ethical conduct both within the company and in
the markets in which we operate". In the light of the revelations about the
way the company secured its business contracts, such claims must be doubted.
BAE is not alone. There is
a huge gap between corporate talk and action, and a few illustrations would
help to highlight this gap. KPMG is one of the world's biggest accountancy
firms. Its
global code of conduct states that the firm is
committed to "acting lawfully and ethically, and encouraging this behaviour
in the marketplace … maintaining independence and objectivity, and avoiding
conflicts of interest". Yet the firm created an extensive organisational
structure to devise
tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes. Former
managers have been
found guilty of tax evasion and the firm was fined
$456m for "criminal
wrongdoing".
The
global code of conduct of Ernst & Young, another
global accountancy firm, claims that "no client or external relationship is
more important than the ethics, integrity and reputation of Ernst & Young".
Partners and former partners of the firm have also been found
guilty of promoting tax evasion.
UBS, a leading bank, has
been fined $780m by the US authorities for
facilitating tax evasion, but it told the world
that "UBS upholds the law, respects regulations and behaves in a principled
way. UBS is self-aware and has the courage to face the truth. UBS maintains
the highest ethical standards."
British Airways paid a
fine of £270m after admitting
price fixing on fuel surcharges on its long-haul
flights while its
code of conduct promised that it would behave
responsibly and ethically towards its customers.
These are just a tiny sample that shows that
corporations say one thing but do something completely different. This
hypocrisy is manufactured by corporate culture, and unless that process is
changed there is no prospect of securing moral corporations or markets.
The key issue is that companies cannot buck the
systemic pressures to produce ever higher profits. Capitalism is not
accompanied by any moral guidance on how high these profits have to be, but
shareholders always demand more. Markets do not ask any questions about the
quality of profits or the human consequences of ever-rising returns. Behind
a wall of secrecy, company directors devise plans to fleece taxpayers and
customers to increase profits, and are rewarded through profit-related
remuneration schemes. The social system provides incentives for unethical
behaviour.
Within companies, daily routines encourage
employees to prioritise profit-making even if that is unethical. For
example, tax departments within major accountancy firms operate as profit
centres. The performance of their employees is assessed at regular
intervals, and those generating profits are rewarded with salary increases
and career advancements. In time, the routines of devising tax avoidance
schemes and other financial dodges become firmly established norms, and
employees are desensitised to the consequences.
With increasing public scepticism, and pressure
from consumer groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), companies
manage their image by publishing high-sounding statements. Ethics itself has
become big business, and armies of consultants and advisers are available
for hire to enable companies to manage their image. No questions are raised
about the internal culture or the economic incentives for misbehaviour. It
is far cheaper for companies to publish glossy brochures than to pay taxes
or improve customer and public welfare. The payment of fines has become just
another business cost.
Making capitalism ethical is a tough task – and
possibly a hopeless one. Any policy for
encouraging ethical corporate conduct has to change the nature of capitalism
and corporations so that companies are run for the benefit of all
stakeholders, rather than just shareholders. Pressures to change corporate
culture could be facilitated by closing down persistently offending
companies, imposing personal penalties on offending executives and offering
bounties to whistleblowers.
Rotten Fraud in General ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Rotten Fraud in the Public Sector (The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers
Among Friends
FBI Arrest in What Appears to Be the World's Largest Case Involving
Insider Information
More and more keeps coming out, including revelations of wiretapping
"8 trades the insiders allegedly made The government's case against the
Galleon crew includes transactions in companies like Google, AMD, Hilton and
Sun," by Michael Copeland, Fortune, October 19, 2009 ---
Click Here
http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/19/markets/insider_trading_arrests.fortune/?postversion=2009101912
The government's case in what it is calling the
largest insider trading case involving a U.S. hedge fund contains a detailed
list of trades involving household-name companies.
Investigators have pieced together a case that
alleges more than $25 million in illegal gains based on trading in 2006-09
on companies including Advanced Micro Devices (AMD, Fortune 500), Akamai (AKAM),
Clearwire (CLWR), Google (GOOG, Fortune 500), Hilton, Polycom (PLCM) and Sun
Microsystems (JAVA, Fortune 500), among others.
The six people charged include hedge fund
billionaire Raj Rajaratnam, founder of Galleon Group; Robert Moffat, IBM's
(IBM, Fortune 500) top hardware executive and an oft-discussed CEO
candidate; Mark Curland and Danielle Chiesi, executives of the hedge fund
New Castle Partners; Anil Kumar, a director at consulting firm McKinsey &
Co.; and Rajiv Goel, an executive in Intel's treasury department.
Just what did they allegedly do? Using information
gleaned from wiretapped conversations between the accused and others, along
with the statements of an apparent informant, SEC investigators have pieced
together a series of episodes alleging to show how the defendants used
inside information and well-timed trades to turn million-dollar profits.
Those charged have yet to enter pleas in the case.
Jim Waldman, a lawyer for Rajaratman, told the Wall Street Journal that the
hedge fund chief "is innocent. We're going to fight the charges." Lawyers
for some of the other accused said their clients are shocked by the charges
and deny wrongdoing.
What follows is a condensed account of eight major
trades the suspects made and the inside information they capitalized on,
according to the the SEC investigation and complaint. At the center of some
of the trades is an unnamed "Tipper A," a person who gathered a great deal
of information on companies for Rajaratnam, and whose identity presumably
will be made public as the case unfolds in court.
Polycom beats the Street
On Jan. 10, 2006, the
unnamed source identified in the SEC's complaint as "Tipper A" told
Galleon's Rajaratnam that, based on information received from a Polycom
insider, revenues at the video-conferencing company for the fourth-quarter
of 2005 were about to beat Wall Street estimates. Polycom was set to
announce its earnings more than two weeks later.
Rajaratnam sent an
instant message to his trader instructing him to "buy 60 [thousand shares]
PLCM" for certain Galleon Tech funds. All told, from Jan. 10 through Jan.
25, the date of the Polycom earnings release, Rajaratnam and Galleon bought
245,000 shares of Polycom and 500 Polycom call-option contracts. Polycom did
beat the Street, and collectively, the Galleon Tech funds made over $570,000
in connection with their Polycom trades based on Tipper A's tip.
The same scenario was
repeated for Polycom's first-quarter 2006 earnings, the complaint says.
Galleon made $165,000 on the information. Tipper A made $22,000.
The Hilton takeover
Tipper A allegedly
obtained confidential information in advance of a July 3, 2007, announcement
that a private equity group would be buying Hilton for $47.50 per share, a
premium of $11.45 over the July 3 closing price. Tipper A obtained the
information from an analyst who, at the time, was working at Moody's, a
rating agency that was evaluating Hilton's debt in connection with the
planned buyout. Tipper A bought call option contracts based on the
information, and passed on the tip to Rajaratnam.
On July 3, Rajaratnam and
Galleon bought 400,000 shares of Hilton in the Galleon Tech funds. That
evening, the Hilton transaction was announced. Tipper A sold all of the
Hilton call option contracts for a profit of more than $630,000, the
complaint says. To compensate the source for the Hilton tip, Tipper A paid
the source $10,000. The Galleon Tech funds sold their Hilton shares after
the July 3 announcement for a profit of more than $4 million.
Google Misses
Around July 10, 2007, a
PR consultant to Google allegedly told Tipper A that Google's second-quarter
earnings per share would be down about 25 cents. The Street had estimated
yet another strong quarter for the search giant, which was scheduled to
report earnings July 19.
Two days later Tipper A
bought put options in Google and passed along details of the pending Google
miss to Rajaratnam. He and Galleon began buying Google put options for the
Galleon Tech funds, and continued buying them through July 19. In addition,
Galleon funds bought other options betting on a fall in Google shares and
sold short Google stock beginning July 17.
On July 19, Google
announced its earnings results, disclosing that its earnings-per-share was
indeed 25 cents lower than the prior quarter. Google's share price fell from
over $548 per share to almost $520 per share. The Galleon Tech funds'
profits from the Google tip were almost $8 million. Tipper A sold all of the
put options the day after the July 19 announcement for a profit of over
$500,000.
Trading in Intel
Rajaratnam allegedly tapped former Wharton classmate
and Intel executive Rajiv Goel just before Intel's (INTL)
scheduled fourth-quarter 2006 earnings announcement to get inside
information on the world's largest chipmaker. On Jan. 8, 2007, Rajaratnam
contacted Intel's Goel. The next day, Rajaratnam bought 1 million shares of
Intel at $21.08 per share. On Jan, 11, he bought 500,000 more at $21.65 per
share.
Goel and Rajaratnam
communicated again multiple times over the Martin Luther King Day weekend
that followed. On Tuesday, Jan. 16, the day the markets reopened, Rajaratnam
reversed course, selling the Galleon Tech funds' entire 1.5 million share
long position in Intel at $22.03 per share, and making a profit of a little
over $1 million
Later that day, after the
markets closed, Intel released its fourth-quarter 2006 earnings. Although
the company's earnings beat analysts' projections, its guidance was below
expectations. Intel's stock price fell nearly 5% on the news, but Rajaratnam
was already out of the stock.
According to Intel
officials, Goel has been placed on administrative leave pending the court
case.
Clearwire Gets a Partner
In early February 2008, Goel allegedly tipped
Rajaratnam that there was a pending joint venture between wireless broadband
company Clearwire and Sprint (S,
Fortune 500). Intel
was a huge shareholder in Clearwire. Over the next three months, Galleon
Tech funds bought and sold Clearwire shares on three occasions. Each time,
the Galleon Tech funds traded in advance of news reports relating to the
deal between Clearwire and Sprint, and shortly after calls between Goel and
Rajaratnam. Overall, the Galleon Tech funds realized gains of about $780,000
on their Clearwire trading between February and May 2008. On May 8, the
joint venture between Sprint and Clearwire was publicly announced.
As payback for Goel's
tips, Rajaratnam (or someone acting on his behalf) executed trades in Goel's
personal brokerage account based on inside information concerning Hilton and
PeopleSupport (the government notes that a Galleon director sits on the
PeopleSupport's board of directors though no charges of wrongdoing have been
brought against that person), which resulted in nearly $250,000 in profits
for Goel.
Shorting Akamai
Another hedge fund
executive, New Castle's Danielle Chiesi, is an acquaintance of Rajaratnam.
When an Akamai executive told her that the Internet infrastructure company
would trend lower in the company's second-quarter 2008 guidance to
investors, the government claims she passed along the information to
Rajaratnam. The consensus among Akamai's management was that Akamai's stock
price would decline in the wake of the lowered guidance scheduled for July
30.
Chiesi and the Akamai
source spoke multiple times between July 2 and July 24. Chiesi told what she
had learned from the Akamai source to her colleague at New Castle, Mark
Kurland. On July 25, several New Castle funds took short positions in Akamai
shares. The positions grew through July 30. Rajaratnam's Galleon funds also
built up a short position during the same period.
In its second-quarter
2008 earnings announcement on July 30, Akamai's results disappointed
investors. The stock fell nearly 20% following the announcement. New Castle
made $2.4 million. The Galleon Tech funds took home more than $3.2 million.
IBM knows Sun
In January 2009, IBM was conducting due diligence on Sun Microsystems in
preparation for an offer to buy it (Sun was ultimately bought by Oracle (ORCL,
Fortune 500)).
As part of that process, Sun opened its books to IBM, providing its
second-quarter 2009 results in advance of the scheduled Jan. 27
announcement.
Because much of Sun's
business is hardware, IBM's top hardware executive Robert Moffat was
involved in the evaluation of Sun. Moffat allegedly had access to Sun's
earnings results. He and Chiesi were also friends and contacted each other
repeatedly during January 2009. The frequency of contact between the two
increased just prior to the Sun earnings release, investigators say.
On Jan. 26, New Castle
began acquiring a substantial long position in Sun. On Jan. 27, after the
market close, Sun reported earnings that exceeded Wall Street's estimates,
posting a two-cent per-share profit when analysts had expected a loss. Sun
shares soared 21% on the news. New Castle made almost $1 million.
AMD gets out of manufacturing
On June 1, 2008, McKinsey
& Co. began advising Advanced Micro Devices over its negotiations with two
Abu Dhabi sovereign entities. One, a joint venture with the Abu Dhabi
government, Advanced Technology Investment Co., would take over AMD's chip
manufacturing. The other, an Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund, Mubadala
Investment Co., would provide a large investment in AMD (in the end, it
would total $314 million). According to the SEC, Anil Kumar was one of the
McKinsey team briefed on the negotiations. Kumar also knew Rajaratnam.
On Aug. 14, Kumar learned
that the two deals were finally getting done. The next day he told
Rajaratnam, investigators say. Almost immediately, Rajaratnam and Galleon
increased their long position in AMD by buying more than 2.5 million shares
in Galleon funds and continuing to build their long position until just
before the announcement of the AMD transactions. Rajaratnam and Galleon
bought 4 million AMD shares on Sept. 25 and 26, and 1.65 million more on
Oct. 3. On Oct. 8, the deals were announced publicly. AMD's stock price
increased by about 25%. All told, the value of Galleon's entire position in
AMD increased approximately $9.5 million in Oct. 6-7.
However, the allegedly ill-gotten gain was wiped out by the financial crisis
of the time. Because the Galleon Tech funds had accumulated much of their
AMD position beginning in August, before the crisis sent stock prices,
including AMD's, tumbling in September and October, the funds lost money on
the overall trade
"Billionaire among 6 nabbed in inside trading case: Wall Street wake-up
call: Hedge fund boss, 5 others charged in $25M-plus insider trading case,"
by Larry Neumeister and Candice Choi, Yahoo News, October 16, 2009
---
Click Here
One of America's wealthiest men was among
six hedge fund managers and corporate executives arrested Friday in a hedge
fund insider trading case that authorities say generated more than $25
million in illegal profits and was a wake-up call for Wall Street.
Raj Rajaratnam, a portfolio manager for
Galleon Group, a hedge fund with up to $7 billion in assets under
management, was accused of conspiring with others to use insider information
to trade securities in several publicly traded companies, including Google
Inc.
U.S. Magistrate Judge Douglas F. Eaton set
bail at $100 million to be secured by $20 million in collateral despite a
request by prosecutors to deny bail. He also ordered Rajaratnam, who has
both U.S. and Sri Lankan citizenship, to stay within 110 miles of New York
City.
U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara told a news
conference it was the largest hedge fund case ever prosecuted and marked the
first use of court-authorized wiretaps to capture conversations by suspects
in an insider trading case.
He said the case should cause financial
professionals considering insider trades in the future to wonder whether law
enforcement is listening.
"Greed is not good," Bharara said. "This
case should be a wake-up call for Wall Street."
Joseph Demarest Jr., the head of the New
York FBI office, said it was clear that "the $20 million in illicit profits
come at the expense of the average public investor."
The Securities and Exchange Commission,
which brought separate civil charges, said the scheme generated more than
$25 million in illegal profits.
Robert Khuzami, director of enforcement at
the SEC, said the charges show Rajaratnam's "secret of success was not
genius trading strategies."
"He is not the master of the universe. He
is a master of the Rolodex," Khuzami said.
Galleon Group LLP said in a statement it
was shocked to learn of Rajaratnam's arrest at his apartment. "We had no
knowledge of the investigation before it was made public and we intend to
cooperate fully with the relevant authorities," the statement said.
The firm added that Galleon "continues to
operate and is highly liquid."
Rajaratnam, 52, was ranked No. 559 by
Forbes magazine this year among the world's wealthiest billionaires, with a
$1.3 billion net worth.
According to the Federal Election
Commission, he is a generous contributor to Democratic candidates and
causes. The FEC said he made over $87,000 in contributions to President
Barack Obama's campaign, the Democratic National Committee and various
campaigns on behalf of Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer and
New Jersey U.S. Sen. Robert Menendez in the past five years. The Center for
Responsive Politics, a watchdog group, said he has given a total of $118,000
since 2004 -- all but one contribution, for $5,000, to Democrats.
The Associated Press has learned that even
before his arrest, Rajaratnam was under scrutiny for helping bankroll Sri
Lankan militants notorious for suicide bombings.
Papers filed in U.S. District Court in
Brooklyn allege that Rajaratnam worked closely with a phony charity that
channeled funds to the Tamil Tiger terrorist organization. Those papers
refer to him only as "Individual B." But U.S. law enforcement and government
officials familiar with the case have confirmed that the individual is
Rajaratnam.
At an initial court appearance in U.S.
District Court in Manhattan, Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh Klein sought
detention for Rajaratnam, saying there was "a grave concern about flight
risk" given Rajaratnam's wealth and his frequent travels around the world.
His lawyer, Jim Walden, called his client
a "citizen of the world," who has made more than $20 million in charitable
donations in the last five years and had risen from humble beginnings in the
finance profession to oversee hedge funds responsible for nearly $8 billion.
Walden promised "there's a lot more to
this case" and his client was ready to prepare for it from home. Rajaratnam
lives in a $10 million condominium with his wife of 20 years, their three
children and two elderly parents. Walden noted that many of his employees
were in court ready to sign a bail package on his behalf.
Rajaratnam -- born in Sri Lanka and a
graduate of University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business -- has
been described as a savvy manager of billions of dollars in technology and
health care hedge funds at Galleon, which he started in 1996. The firm is
based in New York City with offices in California, China, Taiwan and India.
He lives in New York.
According to a criminal complaint filed in
U.S. District Court in Manhattan, Rajaratnam obtained insider information
and then caused the Galleon Technology Funds to execute trades that earned a
profit of more than $12.7 million between January 2006 and July 2007. Other
schemes garnered millions more and continued into this year, authorities
said.
Bharara said the defendants benefited from
tips about the earnings, earnings guidance and acquisition plans of various
companies. Sometimes, those who provided tips received financial benefits
and sometimes they just traded tips for more inside information, he added.
The timing of the arrests might be
explained by a footnote in the complaint against Rajaratnam. In it, an FBI
agent said he had learned that Rajaratnam had been warned to be careful and
that Rajaratnam, in response, had said that a former employee of the Galleon
Group was likely to be wearing a "wire."
The agent said he learned from federal
authorities that Rajaratnam had a ticket to fly from Kennedy International
Airport to London on Friday and to return to New York from Geneva,
Switzerland next Thursday.
Also charged in the scheme are Rajiv Goel,
51, of Los Altos, Calif., a director of strategic investments at Intel
Capital, the investment arm of Intel Corp., Anil Kumar, 51, of Santa Clara,
Calif., a director at McKinsey & Co. Inc., a global management consulting
firm, and Robert Moffat, 53, of Ridgefield, Conn., senior vice president and
group executive at International Business Machines Corp.'s Systems and
Technology Group.
The others charged in the case were
identified as Danielle Chiesi, 43, of New York City, and Mark Kurland, 60,
also of New York City.
According to court papers, Chiesi worked
for New Castle, the equity hedge fund group of Bear Stearns Asset Management
Inc. that had assets worth about $1 billion under management. Kurland is a
top executive at New Castle.
Kumar's lawyer, Isabelle Kirshner, said of
her client: "He's distraught." He was freed on $5 million bail, secured in
part by his $2.5 million California home.
Kerry Lawrence, an attorney representing
Moffat, said: "He's shocked by the charges."
Bail for Kurland was set at $3 million
while bail for Moffat and Chiesi was set at $2 million each. Lawyers for
Moffat and Chiesi said their clients will plead not guilty. The law firm
representing Kurland did not immediately return a phone call for comment.
A message left at Goel's residence was not
immediately returned. He was released on bail after an appearance in
California.
A criminal complaint filed in the case
shows that an unidentified person involved in the insider trading scheme
began cooperating and authorities obtained wiretaps of conversations between
the defendants.
In one conversation about a pending deal
that was described in a criminal complaint, Chiesi is quoted as saying: "I'm
dead if this leaks. I really am. ... and my career is over. I'll be like
Martha (expletive) Stewart."
Stewart, the homemaking maven, was
convicted in 2004 of lying to the government about the sale of her shares in
a friend's company whose stock plummeted after a negative public
announcement. She served five months in prison and five months of home
confinement.
Prosecutors charged those arrested Friday
with conspiracy and securities fraud.
A separate criminal complaint in the case
said Chiesi and Moffat conspired to engage in insider trading in the
securities of International Business Machines Corp.
According to another criminal complaint in
the case, Chiesi and Rajaratnam were heard on a government wiretap of a
Sept. 26, 2008, phone conversation discussing whether Chiesi's friend Moffat
should move from IBM to a different technology company to aid the scheme.
"Put him in some company where we can
trade well," Rajaratnam was quoted in the court papers as saying.
The complaint said Chiesi replied: "I
know, I know. I'm thinking that too. Or just keep him at IBM, you know,
because this guy is giving me more information. ... I'd like to keep him at
IBM right now because that's a very powerful place for him. For us, too."
According to the court papers, Rajaratnam
replied: "Only if he becomes CEO." And Chiesi was quoted as replying: "Well,
not really. I mean, come on. ... you know, we nailed it."
Continued in article
"Arrest of Hedge Fund Chief Unsettles the Industry," by Michael J. de la
Merced and Zachery Kouwe, The New York Times, October 18, 2009 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/business/19insider.html?_r=1
The firm made no secret that its investors included
technology executives. Among them was Anil Kumar, a McKinsey director who
did consulting work for Advanced Micro Devices and was charged in the
scheme. Another defendant, Rajiv Goel, is an Intel executive who is accused
of leaking information about the chip maker’s earnings and an investment in
Clearwire.
Prosecutors also say that a Galleon executive on
the board of PeopleSupport, an outsourcing company, regularly tipped off Mr.
Rajaratnam about merger negotiations with a subsidiary of Essar Group of
India. Regulatory filings by PeopleSupport last year identified the director
as Krish Panu, a former technology executive. He was not charged on Friday.
Galleon has previously been accused of wrongdoing
by regulators. In 2005, it paid more than $2 million to settle an S.E.C.
lawsuit claiming it had conducted an illegal form of short-selling.
The Deep Shah Insiders Leak at Moody's: What $10,000 Bought
Leaks such as this are probably impossible to stop
What disturbs me is that the Blackstone Group would exploit investors based up
such leaks
"Moody's Analysts Are Warned to Keep Secrets," by Serena Ing, The Wall
Street Journal, October 20, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125599951161895543.html?mod=article-outset-box
From their first day at Moody's Investors
Service, junior analysts are warned against sharing confidential information
with outsiders. They are even told not to mention company names in the
elevators at the credit-rating firm's Lower Manhattan headquarters.
Federal prosecutors now allege that a
former junior analyst, identified by a person familiar with the matter as
Deep Shah, breached that trust in July 2007 when he passed on inside
information about Blackstone Group's pending $26 billion takeover of Hilton
Hotels.
Mr. Shah and other employees of the
ratings firm, owned by publicly traded Moody's Corp., had advance notice
about the takeover as part of a standing practice to prebrief credit
analysts about planned deals. Prosecutors allege that the junior analyst
shared the Hilton information with an unidentified third party, who in turn
passed the tip to Galleon Group's Raj Rajaratnam. The tip enabled Mr.
Rajaratnam to reap $4 million in profits from trading Hilton shares, a
federal complaint alleges.
While Mr. Shah's role in the alleged
insider-trading affair is small, his link to the third party -- now a key
cooperating witness in the probe -- could shed light on how investigators
uncovered the trading ring. Unusual trading in Hilton's shares was one of
the first events that attracted scrutiny from regulators in 2007. The same
cooperating witness was friends with an executive at Polycom Inc. and also
passed on information about Google Inc.
The complaint said the cooperating witness
arranged to pay $10,000 to the Moody's associate analyst, a title that
describes staffers who aren't considered full analysts but assist them in
analyzing data. Mr. Shah hasn't been charged with a crime. It isn't known if
he is under investigation or if he will face charges.
Mr. Shah couldn't be reached for comment.
A Moody's spokesman declined to comment on the alleged role of Mr. Shah. He
reiterated the company's statement last week, saying that the alleged
wrongdoing by one of its employees "would be an egregious violation" of the
rating firm's policies.
Moody's has drawn flak in the past year
for inaccurate credit ratings on mortgage securities and has had to battle
recent accusations from a former employee that it still issues inflated
ratings on complex securities. Throughout the financial crisis, however,
Moody's credit ratings on corporate bonds have largely conformed to
expectations.
Still, critics say the Hilton incident may
raise questions about whether ratings firms should be privy to inside
information. Companies often inform rating analysts about mergers,
acquisitions or other transactions ahead of time, to let analysts digest and
analyze the information and announce rating actions soon after the deals
become public.
Like law firms and investment banks,
credit-rating agencies have policies and controls to limit the number of
people privy to inside information. "But you can't watch everyone all the
time, and if someone is determined to violate the law they will do so," said
Scott McCleskey, a former Moody's compliance officer who is now U.S.
managing editor of Complinet Inc.
Mr. Shah, who is in his mid-20s, left
Moody's more than a year ago and is believed to have returned to his home
country of India, according to former colleagues. One ex-colleague described
him as "mellow."
He joined the ratings firm in an
entry-level position, and worked with analysts who rated companies in the
technology, lodging and gaming sectors, according to Moody's reports that
listed Mr. Shah's name from 2005 to early 2008.
According to the U.S. attorney's
complaint, Hilton executives contacted a Moody's lead analyst by phone on
the afternoon of July 2, the day before Blackstone Group announced it would
acquire Hilton. The complaint said that, shortly afterward, an associate
analyst "involved" in the rating called the unidentified third party three
times from a cellphone with information that Hilton was to be taken private.
The information was passed to Mr. Rajaratnam who traded Hilton's stock,
according to the complaint.
As an associate analyst, Mr. Shah would
have been paid roughly $90,000 in annual salary, plus a bonus that could
reach $30,000, according to former Moody's employees.
Bob Jensen's fraud updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Rotten to the Core ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
"SEC Proposes Changes for 'Dark Pools'," SmartPros, October 21,
2009 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x67909.xml
Federal regulators are proposing tighter oversight
for so-called "dark pools," trading systems that don't publicly provide
price quotes and compete with major stock exchanges.
The Securities and Exchange Commission voted
Wednesday to propose new rules that would require more stock quotes in the
"dark pool" systems to be publicly displayed. The changes could be adopted
sometime after a 90-day public comment period.
The alternative trading systems, private networks
matching buyers and sellers of large blocks of stocks, have grown
explosively in recent years and now account for an estimated 7.2 percent of
all share volume. SEC officials have identified them as a potential emerging
risk to markets and investors.
The SEC initiative is the latest action by the
agency seeking to bring tighter oversight to the markets amid questions
about transparency and fairness on Wall Street. The SEC has floated a
proposal restricting short-selling - or betting against a stock - in down
markets.
Last month, the agency proposed banning "flash
orders," which give traders a split-second edge in buying or selling stocks.
A flash order refers to certain members of exchanges - often large
institutions - buying and selling information about ongoing stock trades
milliseconds before that information is made public.
Institutional investors like pension funds may use
dark pools to sell big blocks of stock away from the public scrutiny of an
exchange like the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq Stock Market that could
drive the share price lower.
"Given the growth of dark pools, this lack of
transparency could create a two-tiered market that deprives the public of
information about stock prices," SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro said before the
vote at the agency's public meeting.
Republican Commissioners Kathleen Casey and Troy
Paredes, while voting to put out the proposed new rules for public comment,
cautioned against rushing to overly broad regulation that could have a
negative impact on market innovation and competition.
Dark pools might decide to maintain stock trading
at levels below those that trigger required public display under the
proposed rules, Paredes said. "Darker dark pools" could be worse than the
current situation, he suggested.
When investors place an order to buy or sell a
stock on an exchange, the order is normally displayed for the public to
view. With some dark pools, investors can signal their interest in buying or
selling a stock but that indication of interest is communicated only to a
group of market participants.
That means investors who operate within the dark
pool have access to information about potential trades which other investors
using public quotes do not, the SEC says.
The SEC proposal would require indications of
interest to be treated like other stock quotes and subject to the same
disclosure rules.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on mutual fund and index fund and insurance company
scandals are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#MutualFunds
Bob Jensen's threads on the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH
This tutorial includes how to edit video in Windows 7
"Manage All Your Media in Windows 7 From online streaming to all-new library
controls, here's how to get more out of Windows 7's new multimedia features,"
by Zack Stem, PC World via The Washington Post, October 22, 2009
---
Click Here
http://snipurl.com/windows7multimedia [www_washingtonpost_com]
Whether you're leaping directly from
Windows XP to Windows 7 or you stopped in Vista territory along the way,
you'll find that the latest version of Microsoft's operating system handles
media files in several new ways. The methods for photo and video importing,
editing, and exporting have been all updated. You have new options for
sharing and streaming files between computers. And media libraries become
more-versatile vessels for finding and managing media files. I'll explain
how to get started with these and other entertainment features of Windows 7
Check Out the Libraries
Windows 7 manages media files differently
than previous Windows OSs did. It retains the familiar Pictures, Videos,
Music, and Documents folders, but you can assign additional library
locations in order to collect your media files more dynamically.
The libraries in Windows 7 organize file
types to help applications find media more easily. By default, programs look
to the Pictures, Videos, Music, and Documents folders instead of having to
scrutinize your whole disk. Windows XP and Vista tied media libraries to
those specific folder locations. For example, Windows Media Player watched
vigilantly over C:\Users\[username]\Music. Then, anytime you added new audio
files to that folder, Media Player showed them in your music library. If you
wanted Media Player to look for media in other areas--say, in the iTunes
music folder or in another user's music library--you had to add the new
locations manually within the program.
In Windows 7, the Pictures, Videos, Music,
and Documents folders are not the only doors into those libraries; you can
add any other disk location you like, and library-savvy applications will
automatically pool media wherever it's stored.
Add Libraries
Instead of manually curating media in the
traditional user folders, you can turn any folder into a library.
Applications will know where to find media, and you can keep your computer
organized in whatever way you want.
For example, you can turn a networked
folder into an auxiliary library, or even pool music files from a different
user on the same PC. Or transform your Downloads folder into a library,
instantly putting MP3 and video downloads into media applications. Here's
how (the process is the same for any of these situations).
Open the Start Menu, and click your
username. Open the Downloads folder, and pick Include in library, Music.
Then select Include in library, Movies. Henceforth, without your having to
open them immediately after downloading them, your PC will automatically
slurp music and movie files into Windows Media Player.
To remove the library status of a folder,
open a window in the desktop and then navigate to that library folder in the
left pane. In our case, the menu path is Libraries, Music, Downloads.
Right-click the library-enabled folder--Downloads--and choose Remove
location from library.
Get Windows Live Essentials
Windows 7's standard installation omits
some previously bundled Windows software, including Photo Gallery and Movie
Maker, but you can still download these apps at the Windows Live Essentials
download page. Click Download on the right side, and save and run the file.
In the installer, mark the checkbox for
each piece of software you want to add. If you're on the prowl for useful
multimedia options, check Photo Gallery, Movie Maker Beta, and Silverlight.
(You're likely to encounter Silverlight video-streaming sites such as
Netflix, so you might as well add it to Windows 7 now.) Click Install, and
after several minutes, okay the final prompts to exit the installation. (I
skipped changing my default home page and other needy-relationship-style
requests.)
You can sign up
Use these groupings to your advantage.
Click Next and then click Add tags next to any of the groups. Enter a few
keywords from that particular photo session, separating them with
semicolons. Click Import.
If you shot RAW files, the program may
prompt you to download and install an additional codec. I had to go through
that process to accommodate photos from my digital SLR camera; but once
you've installed the extra piece of software, Windows 7 can display the
higher-end RAW files in the same manner as it does JPEGs.
Publish a Photo Gallery Online
Your friends and family can view your
photos through the Windows Live site. After importing and arranging an
album, you can upload the images within Windows Live Photo Gallery.
Within that application, right-click My
Pictures, and pick Create new folder. Name the new folder. Drag in pictures
that you want to publish online. Click the name of the folder within the
main window near the top to select all of the pictures. Choose Publish,
Online album. Sign into your Windows Live account if needed.
Give the album a title and in the pop-up
menu choose who can view the pictures. Change the value for 'Upload size' in
the pop-up menu if you wish; Medium gives enough detail for Web viewing;
Large and Original allow ample size for displaying on a big TV, printing,
and otherwise downloading. Then click Publish.
After the photos have finished uploading,
the program will prompt you with the option to view them. Click View Album
to open the page in your Web browser. If you miss that option, click your
account name in the upper right corner of Windows Live Photo Gallery, and
select View your photos. Copy the link from the Web page, and share it with
your friends.
If you decide to limit who can see one of
your albums, visit that album's Web page, and click Shared with: Everyone
(public) at the bottom of the page. Click Edit Permissions on the following
page, and uncheck the Everyone (public) box. If you've made friends through
the Network area of Windows Live, pick the My network box instead.
Otherwise, you can add individual e-mail contacts at the bottom. (Press the
spacebar to speed up entry of the next address.)
Back in Photo Gallery, you can add more
photos to a published group by selecting the new pictures and choosing
Publish, [gallery name]. Hold Shift and click the first and last images to
select pictures in sequence, or hold down Ctrl and click pictures to group
them in any order you like.
Import Photos and Videos Into Windows
Live Movie Maker
Windows Live Movie Maker eschews video
capture tools in favor of relying on the rest of Windows 7. If you connect a
DV camcorder to a Win 7 PC, the capture process should automatically launch
outside Movie Maker.
Click the Import the entire video radio
button, enter a name, and click Next. Click the Import videos as multiple
files checkbox, and the tool will splice the tape into your individual
shots. Approve the next windows to import the tape; the importing process
will take exactly as much time as your footage does to play.
Once your PC has captured your media, you
have some options for adding clips to a video in Windows Live Movie Maker.
From the desktop, drag your photos and videos into the right pane in that
program. If that area is blocked, drag the files over the Movie Maker icon
in the Taskbar, continue to hold the mouse down, and then drop them into the
right pane. Alternatively, select Add above Videos and photos in the
software, select the media, and click Open.
You'll want to rearrange and trim various
clips during the editing process, but at this point all of them are part of
your movie. If you added too many clips or images, delete them from the
storyboard by clicking the files and then clicking Remove.
Edit Your Movie
Windows Live Movie Maker cuts the timeline
view, focusing instead on arranging clips in a storyboard. Just drag and
drop each clip and each image to place them in the desired order within the
right pane. Since some video clips run too long, you'll need to trim them
into shape.
Click a video clip to select it; then
click the Edit tab at the top of the window, and click Trim. At this point,
you can adjust the in- and out-point sliders (which govern the length of the
clip, by trimming from one or both extremities) at the beginning and end of
the timeline. Press the spacebar or click the Play icon to view a sample
from the full clip, playing only between the edited points.
If you're satisfied, click Save and close
to finish. You'll make the edit here, but the original video file will stay
the same, in case you want to reimport it later.
Continued in this long article
Bob Jensen's tools and tricks of the trade are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm
"Saturn (Now Defunct Automobile): A Wealth of Lessons from Failure,"
University of Pennsylvania's Knowledge@Wharton, October 28, 2009 ---
http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2366
Another one from that Ketz guy
He knows about Altman’s Z-score model for non-manufacturers
---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bankruptcy_prediction
"Hertz Diverts and Subverts (Where Are You, Mary?)," by: J. Edward
Ketz, SmartPros, October 2009 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x67864.xml
In a recent perversion, Hertz Global Holdings (HTZ)
sued Audit Integrity because it had the audacity to predict that Hertz was
in danger of bankruptcy. This is another example of issuer retaliation and
it must stop. The Congress and the SEC need to rein in corporate America
when it attempts to enforce censorship against anybody that criticizes them.
The facts in the case are simple. Earlier this
year Audit Integrity moved Hertz on to its watch list for companies in
financial distress. Hertz demanded a retraction and sent a copy of the
letter to 19 other firms that made the list, encouraging them to join Hertz
in “protecting the investing public.” Then Hertz sued Audit Integrity for
defamation. (See Sue Reisinger, “Hertz
GC Sues Analyst Who Said Company Could Go Bankrupt”)
Audit Integrity responded with an
open letter to the SEC. James Kaplan, Chairman of
Audit Integrity, wrote “As Hertz’s ultimate goal was to silence an
independent research firm calling regulatory and investor attention to the
company’s real and material financial risk, the matter warrants an
investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.”
Quite frankly, the court should just toss out the
case. Any introductory student of mine can compute the Altman Z-score and
indeed discover that Hertz is in financial distress. Its 2008 10-K is quite
revealing, with net income a negative $1.2 billion and EBIT a negative $164
million. Retained earnings has a deficit of almost one billion dollars.
And its capital structure is heavily tilted on the debt side as its
debt-equity ratio exceeds 10. Any neophyte would agree with Audit
Integrity.
Altman’s Z-score model for non-manufacturers is:
Z = 6.56 * WC/TA + 3.26 * RE/TA + 6.72 * EBIT/TA +
1.05 * BVE/TD
where WC = working capital
TA= total assets
RE = retained earnings
EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes
BVE = book value of equity and
TD = total debts.
One interprets the Z-score as follows. If Z>2.6,
then we predict the firm is healthy and relatively free from financial
distress. If 1.1<Z<2.6, the company is in the indeterminate zone. It faces
some financial distress, but more investigation is needed to determine how
serious it is. But, if Z<1.1, then the model predicts that the firm faces a
serious chance of going into bankruptcy.
When I plug Hertz’s 2008 numbers into the model, I
obtain a Z-score of 0.417. Altman’s model therefore predicts bankruptcy. I
guess Hertz should sue Professor Altman for inventing such a model. After
all, if the firm goes under, it must be his fault.
A few years ago Senator Wyden expressed concerns
about corporate managers who attempt to intimidate those who issue research
reports critical of them and their operations. He correctly stated that the
impact of such retaliation could have an adverse reaction on the publication
of objective research, which in turn could have a negative impact on the
quality of information that is employed by the investment community and
could lead to an inefficient allocation of resources.
Chairman Cox responded to the Senator on September
1, 2005. He stated that he shared Sen. Wyden’s concerns about issuer
retaliation and its adverse impact on the investment community. He promised
to tackle the issue, but never did.
Mary Schapiro, it is your turn. Are you going to
embrace the mission statement of the SEC and be an advocate for investors or
are you going to be like your predecessor and say one thing but behind the
scenes enable managers and directors to defraud the investment community?
Issuer retaliation is an incredible problem in this
country. If it isn’t stopped, independent investors will stop performing
independent research analyses. And there will be more and more Enrons
bursting on the scene.
Mary, where are you? Where do you stand on the
issues of the day?
Jensen Comment
An enormous problem faced by security analysts, credit rating agencies, and
auditors is that when a company is on the edge of bankruptcy, these
professionals are no longer confined to professionalism in evaluation. They
become decision makers to the extent that "yelling fire" greatly increases the
odds of helping to cause a fire.
Bob Jensen's threads on difficulties security analysts encounter when
trying (or not trying) to issue negative reports on companies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#InvestmentBanking
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Here’s an expanded view of questions raised about which
constituencies credit rating agencies (and by analogy auditing firms) really
serve.
A message
forwarded by my anonymous friend Larry on October 18, 2009
How Moody's sold its ratings -- and sold out investors | McClatchy ---
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/politics/story/77244.html
Instead, Moody's promoted executives who headed
its "structured finance" division, which assisted Wall Street in packaging
loans into securities for sale to investors. It also stacked its compliance
department with the people who awarded the highest ratings to pools of
mortgages that soon were downgraded to junk. Such products have another name
now: "toxic assets."
"In 2001, Moody's had revenues of $800.7 million; in 2005, they were up
to $1.73 billion; and in 2006, $2.037 billion. The exploding profits were
fees from packaging . . . and for granting the top-class AAA ratings, which
were supposed to mean they were as safe as U.S. government securities," said
Lawrence McDonald in his recent book, "A Colossal Failure of Common Sense."
Nobody cared about due diligence so long as the
money kept pouring in during the housing boom. Moody's stock peaked in
February 2007 at more than $72 a share.
Billionaire investor Warren Buffett's firm
Berkshire Hathaway owned 15 percent of Moody's
stock by the end of 2001, company reports show. That stake, largely still
intact, meant that the Oracle from Omaha reaped huge financial rewards while
Moody's overlooked the glaring problems in pools of subprime mortgages.
A Berkshire spokeswoman had no comment.
Moody's wasn't alone in ignoring the mounting problems. It wasn't even
first among competitors. The financial industry newsletter Asset-Backed
Alert found that Standard & Poor's participated in 1,962 deals in 2006
involving pools of loans, while Moody's did 1,697. In 2005, Standard &
Poor's did 1,754 deals to Moody's 1,120. Fitch was well behind both.
http://www.mcclatchydc.com/politics/story/77244.html
Jensen Comment
I’m frantically searching the writings of my very technical hero, Janet Tavakoli,
to discover that all this is not true about my other hero, Warren Buffett. Of
course there are huge and unknown, at this points, degrees of culpability.
Janet is pretty rough on the ratings agencies in her
writings. However, she’s always kind to Warren. One of my all-time favorite
books is her Dear Mr. Buffet book. On Page 107, Janet writes as follows:
At
the end of 2007, Berkshire Hathaway owned 78 million shares of Moody’s
Corporation, one of the top three rating agencies (the same shares owned when I
first met Warren Buffett in 2005), representing just over 19 percent of the
capital stock. The cot basis of the shares is $499 million. At the end of 200,
the value was just under $1 billion. By the end of 2006, the value was around
$3.3 billion, but it dropped to $1.7 billion at the end of 2007. The sharp
increase in revenues is due chiefly to revenues generated from rating structured
financial products, and the sharp decrease was due to the disillusionment of the
market with the integrity of the ratings.
On Page 109, Janet continues to berate the rating agency
cartel (where I think it might be possible to substitute auditors for rating
agencies interchangeably):
The
rating agencies seem to not care about the market’s forgiveness since not
only have they not apologized --- a necessary but not sufficient condition ---
they seem to feel the market should change. Specifically, the market
should change its point of view about what it expects from the rating agencies.
Yet it seems that the market has the right to expect rating agencies to follow
the basic principles of statistics.
The
tactic has mainly been successful because the rating agencies act as a cartel,
leveraging their joint power to have fees magically converge and have ratings so
similar that they have participated overrating AAA structured products backed by
dodgy loans in 2007 that took substantial principal losses. Meanwhile, many
market professionals, including me, pointed out in print that the AAA ratings
were maeaningless. The rating agencies presented a farily united front in
defending their methods (except for Fitch, which also participated on overrated
CDOs and later seemed more responsive to downgrading structured products.
. . .
“Ma
and pa” retail investors found that AAA product ended up in their pension funds
and mutual funds because their money managers gave too much credence to an AAA
rating.
But nowhere have I yet found where Janet alludes to any
insider profiteering on the part of Warren Buffett who also lost billions of
dollars in the crash The difference between “ma and pa” and Mr. Buffet is that a
billion dollars is pocket change to Warren Buffet. He can easily recoup his
losses legitimately in trades with stupid hedge fund managers and bankers that
rely too much on fallible models (at least that’s what mathematician Janet
Tavakoli tells us in a very enlightening way).
Expert Financial Predictions (Jon Stewart's hindsight video
scrapbook) ---
http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/post.aspx?bid=354&bpid=23077&nlid=1840
You have to watch the first third of this video before it gets into the
scrapbook itself
The problem unmentioned here is one faced by auditors and credit rating agencies
of risky clients every day: Predictions are often self fulfilling
If an auditor issues going concern exceptions in audit reports, the exceptions
themselves will probably contribute to the downfall of the clients
The same can be said by financial analysts who elect to trash a company's
financial outlook
Hence we have the age-old conflict between holding back on what you really
secretly predict versus pulling the fire alarm on a troubled company
There are no easy answers here except to conclude that it auditors and
credit rating agencies appeared to not reveal many of their inner secret
predictions in 2008
Auditing firms and credit rating agencies lost a lot of credibility in this
economic crisis, but they've survived many such stains on their reputations in
the past
By now we're used to the fact that the public is generally aware of the fire
before the auditors and credit rating agencies pull the alarm lever
On the other hand, financial wizards who pull the alarm lever on nearly every
company all the time lose their credibility in a hurry
Bob Jensen's
threads on credit rating agencies are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies
Bob Jensen's threads on
auditor professionalism are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#Professionalism
Question
At this juncture why would IBM spend almost $10 billion for its own shares?
Hint
The wildly-popular eps ratio has a denominator.
"IBM to spend $5 billion more on stock buyback," MIT's Technology Review,
October 27, 2009 ---
http://www.technologyreview.com/wire/23815/?nlid=2465
IBM Corp. has boosted its stock buyback program by
$5 billion, a sign of the company's ability to spit out cash despite the
fact the recession has choked off revenue growth.
The announcement Tuesday brings IBM's pot for stock
repurchases to $9.2 billion, and the company, based in Armonk, N.Y., plans
to ask for more at a board meeting in April 2010. IBM said it has spent $73
billion on dividends and buybacks since 2003.
Buybacks are one lever companies pull to meet
earnings targets, since they increase earnings per share by reducing the
number of shares outstanding. IBM has set aggressive earnings targets, and
twice this year raised its profit forecast for 2009, surprising investors
since revenue has fallen since last year. IBM has said it sees corporate
spending on technology "stabilizing." One way IBM wrings more profit despite
lower sales is by using software to automate certain tasks done by humans
and focusing on projects like the "smart" power grid that can carry higher
profit margins than other services work.
IBM's current forecasts call for earnings per share
of at least $9.85 this year, and the company has maintained that it is "well
ahead" of its pace for 2010 earnings of $10 to $11 per share.
IBM ended the third quarter with $11.5 billion in
cash. Free cash flow, a sign of a company's ability to generate more cash,
was $3.4 billion, up $1.3 billion from a year ago. Revenue in the past nine
months is down nearly 11 percent from a year ago.
Certainly it’s
widely viewed in the financial analyst community that IBM is trying to prop up
eps with share buy backs:
“Jul 16, 2009 ... (As if anyone except
Wall Street cared about EPS, which
IBM largely makes ... of dollars it
expends buying up mountains of its own shares.”
...
www.theregister.co.uk/2009/07/16/ibm_q2_2009_numbers
/
Time and time
again executives manage earnings in demonstration that many (most?) do not
believe in efficient markets and strongly believe PT Barnum’s famous quote: “A
sucker is born every minute.”
Earnings Management Ploys ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation
Quality of Earnings Disputes ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings
Return on Investment Controversies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm
"Learning To Love Insider Trading Here's a hot tip: Want to keep
companies honest, make the markets work more efficiently and encourage
investors to diversify? Let insiders buy and sell, argues Donald J.
Boudreaux," The Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2009 ---
Click Here
It's Halloween season, and the scariest
demons in the world of business are insider traders, lurking behind every
stockbroker's desk and four-star restaurant banquette. They whisper dark
corporate secrets into the ears of venal speculators, and inflict pain and
agony upon ordinary investors.
Time to stop telling horror stories.
Federal agents are wasting their time slapping handcuffs on hedge fund
traders like Raj Rajaratnam, the financier charged last week with trading on
nonpublic information involving IBM, Google and other big companies. The
reassuring truth: Insider trading is impossible to police and helpful to
markets and investors. Parsing the difference between legal and illegal
insider trading is futile—and a disservice to all investors. Far from being
so injurious to the economy that its practice must be criminalized, insiders
buying and selling stocks based on their knowledge play a critical role in
keeping asset prices honest—in keeping prices from lying to the public about
corporate realities.
Prohibitions on insider trading prevent
the market from adjusting as quickly as possible to changes in the demand
for, and supply of, corporate assets. The result is prices that lie.
And when prices lie, market participants
are misled into behaving in ways that harm not only themselves but also the
economy writ large.
Remember the 1970s-era price ceiling on
gasoline? By causing prices at the pump to lie about the scarcity of oil,
that price ceiling led Americans to waste untold hours waiting in lines to
fuel their cars. Similar wastes occur when corporate assets are mispriced.
Suppose that unscrupulous management
drives Acme Inc. to the verge of bankruptcy. Being unscrupulous, Acme's
managers succeed for a time in hiding its perilous financial condition from
the public. During this lying time, Acme's share price will be too high.
Investors will buy Acme shares at prices that conceal the company's imminent
doom. Creditors will extend financing to Acme on terms that do not
compensate those creditors for the true risks that they are unknowingly
undertaking. Perhaps some of Acme's employees will turn down good job offers
at other firms in order to remain at what they are misled to believe is a
financially solid Acme Inc.
Eventually, of course, those misled
investors, creditors and workers will suffer financial losses. But the
economy as a whole loses, too. Capital that would otherwise have been
invested in firms more productive than Acme Inc. never gets to those firms.
So compared with what would have happened had people not been misled by
Acme's deceitfully high share price, those better-run firms don't enhance
their efficiencies as much. They don't expand their operations as much. They
don't create as many good jobs. Consumers don't enjoy the increased outputs,
improved product qualities and lower prices that would otherwise have
resulted.
In short, overall economic efficiency is
reduced.
It's in the public interest, therefore,
that prices adjust as quickly and as completely as possible to underlying
economic realities—that prices adjust to convey to market participants as
clearly as possible the true state of those realities.
As argued forcefully by Henry Manne in his
1966 book "Insider Trading and the Stock Market," prohibitions on insider
trading prevent asset prices from adjusting in this way. Mr. Manne, dean
emeritus at George Mason University School of Law, pointed out that when
insiders trade on their nonpublic, nonproprietary information, they cause
asset prices to reflect that information sooner than otherwise and therefore
prompt other market participants to make better decisions.
This achievement can have ramifications
beyond a few percentage-point increases in productivity growth.
According to Mr. Manne, corporate scandals
such as Enron and Global Crossing would occur much less frequently and
impose fewer costs if the government didn't prohibit insider trading. As Mr.
Manne said a few years ago in a radio interview, "I don't think the scandals
would ever have erupted if we had allowed insider trading because there
would be plenty of people in those companies who would know exactly what was
going on, and who couldn't resist the temptation to get rich by trading on
the information, and the stock market would have reflected those problems
months and months earlier than they did under this cockamamie regulatory
system we have."
Another potential benefit of lifting the
ban on insider trading is explained by Harvard University economist Jeffrey
Miron: "In a world with no ban, small investors might fear to trade
individual stocks and would face a greater incentive to diversify; that is
also a good thing."
Not only do insider-trading prohibitions
slow economic growth, promote corporate mismanagement and discourage
investment diversification, their application also is unavoidably biased.
These prohibitions are meant to prevent
all insiders with non-public information from profiting from the use of such
information before it becomes public. It follows that unbiased application
of these prohibitions should target not only traders whose inside
information prompts them to actively buy or sell assets, but also traders
whose inside information prompts them not to make asset purchases or sales
that they would have made were it not for their inside information.
The insider who learns that the Food and
Drug Administration will approve a new blockbuster drug developed by a major
drug company, for example, obviously profits from this information if it
prompts him to buy 1,000 shares of the company that he otherwise wouldn't
have bought. So, too, though, does the insider profit who, upon learning the
same information, abandons her plans to sell 1,000 shares of the company.
But because insider "nontrading" is undetectable, only the former insider is
practically subject to prosecution and punishment.
And because opportunities to profit
through insider "non-trading" might well occur with the same frequency as
opportunities to profit through insider trading, as many as half of those
investment decisions influenced by inside information might be undetectable.
This bias is not only a source of
prosecutorial unfairness; its existence casts doubt on the assumption that
insider trading is so harmful that it must be treated as a criminal offense.
After all, if capital markets continue to function as well as they do given
that many investment decisions potentially influenced by inside information
are unstoppable because they are undetectable, why believe that the
detectable portion of investment decisions influenced by inside information
would be harmful if they were legal?
There are, of course, situations in which
it is in the interest of both a company and the public for that company to
delay the release of information. Such information should be protected as
company property.
If, say, a big software firm plans to
acquire a small, publicly traded software firm because such a merger would
create greater production efficiencies, then an early leak of this
information could undermine its merger efforts—and, hence, jeopardize the
prospect of achieving greater efficiencies. With the public knowing that the
big firm is seeking a controlling interest in the smaller firm, the price of
that smaller firm's shares might well rise so high that it is no longer
profitable for the big company to acquire a controlling share.
The big company, therefore, has a
legitimate interest in preventing insiders from trading on the knowledge
that it plans to acquire the smaller firm. And the general public has an
interest in permitting the company (and other firms in similar
circumstances) to prevent trading on such inside information.
As University of Michigan law professor
Adam Pritchard emphasizes, the challenge is to distinguish information that
should be treated as proprietary from information that does not warrant such
treatment. While this challenge is theoretically easy—protect only that
information whose revelation to the public through insider trading would
likely reduce overall economic efficiency—practically it is devilishly
difficult.
Fortunately, neither elected officials nor
government bureaucrats need to bother themselves with solving this
challenge.
Discovering what types of inside
information are proprietary and which are not proprietary—and, hence, which
types of information are appropriate to protect and which not to protect
from insider trading—can be left to corporations themselves.
Each corporation should be free to specify
in its by-laws the types of information that insiders may not trade on. Any
insiders who trade on such information would violate that firm's by-laws
and, hence, subject themselves to suit by that firm. Corporations whose
by-laws prohibit all or some insider trading will have standing to sue
anyone who violates their by-laws. People who trade on inside information
not protected by corporate by-laws would be acting perfectly legally.
Won't corporations simply make all of
their inside information off-limits to inside trading?
No. The reason is that corporations must
compete for that most demanding and vigilant of all clients: capital. Shares
in a corporation whose by-laws prevent insiders from trading on, say,
knowledge of executive malfeasance will be a riskier—and a less
attractive—investment than shares in a corporation that doesn't proscribe
such insider trading. Corporations that allow trading on inside knowledge
will enjoy a lower cost of capital than will corporations that prevent such
trading.
Competition is a beautiful thing: It will
punish firms that are either overly inclusive or under-inclusive in the
sorts of information that they shield from inside trading.
This decentralized competitive method for
selecting information that is proprietary, and thus off-limits to inside
traders, isn't perfect. But the relevant comparison isn't with an ideal,
perfectly working world. The relevant comparison is with the existing
approach: Government officials have decided that all insider trading is
unlawful and that anyone accused of insider trading is subject to criminal
prosecution.
A less heavy-handed, less bureaucratic,
less politicized, and more decentralized method for determining when inside
information should, and when it shouldn't, be traded on is preferable to
Uncle Sam's blanket proscription.
In addition to taking the responsibility
of defining insider trading from political agencies that are inevitably
political, allowing proscriptions on insider trading to be defined
exclusively by companies permits corporations to customize their
insider-trading proscriptions.
Different corporations have different
mixes of investments in physical, human, financial and intellectual capital.
Corporations also differ in their business plans. Companies whose successes
depend heavily upon their financial-investment strategies will be more
likely to have stronger and broader prohibitions on insider trading than
will companies whose successes depend upon the development of new consumer
products.
Or not. The above is simply my best guess.
Perhaps there's something I'm missing about companies whose successes depend
upon the development of new consumer products that makes them especially
vulnerable to insider trading. And that's the point. My "best guess" isn't
very reliable, and nor are those of politicians and bureaucrats.
By allowing companies as they compete for
capital to experiment with different ways of dealing with insider trading,
we would discover which proscriptions work best for some kinds of firms and
which proscriptions work best for other kinds of firms.
Relying upon competition and the
self-interest of shareholders and creditors (both actual and potential) to
discover which types of information are proprietary—and, hence, protected
from insider trading—and which types of information are not proprietary
removes politics from this vital task. Importantly, it also replaces the
unreliable judgments and "best guesses" of political officials with the much
more reliable determinations of competition.
Here's a comment that that I sent to the WSJ and is now
online among the other comments posted by the WSJ for this article.
Bob Jensen
Hi John,
Surely you jest or have not read about "the market for
lemons" in which the market is only left with lemons that nobody will buy.
And do you want to buy and sell securities knowing that
insiders are selling secret information to the counterparty to your trades that
remains hidden on your side of the table?
Do you want to buy new shares of Phizer not knowing what
a big seller knows about the huge new cancer prevention drug that Phizer counted
on causes brain damage?
Do you want to sell your shares in Exxon without knowing
what a big buyer knows about a new slant drilling discovery that allows tapping
of the second largest natural gas field in the world (in Pennsylvania and
upstate NY).
Yeah its really fair to allow fat cats and drug dealers
to buy inside information kept secret from you.
The bottom line is that you and millions of other
investors will pull out of the asymmetrical information trading markets.
The Market for Lemons ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_for_Lemons
"The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism"
is a 1970 paper by the economist
George Akerlof. It discusses
information asymmetry, which occurs when the seller knows more about a
product than the buyer. Akerlof,
Michael Spence, and
Joseph Stiglitz jointly received the
Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2001 for their research
related to asymmetric information. Akerlof's paper uses the
market for used
cars as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty. There are good
used cars and defective used cars ("lemons"), but because of asymmetric
information about the car (the seller knows much more about the problems of
the car than the buyer), the buyer of a car does not know beforehand whether
it is a good car or a lemon. So the buyer's best guess for a given car is
that the car is of average quality; accordingly, he/she will be willing to
pay for it only the price of a car of known average quality. This means that
the owner of a good used car will be unable to get a high enough price to
make selling that car worthwhile. Therefore, owners of good cars will not
place their cars on the used car market. This is sometimes summarized as
"the bad driving out the good" in the market. "Lemon market" effects have
also been noted in other markets, such as used computers and the online
dating "market" . There are also parallels in the insurance market, where,
unless a mandate for insurance is in place, it is those most likely to need
insurance compensation (i.e., those most likely to get in accidents) who
tend most to buy insurance, eliminating the advantage of diffusing risk that
insurance is supposed to provide (adverse
selection).
1 Asymmetric information
2 Used cars
3 Criteria
4 Impact on markets
5 Laws in the United States
6 Criticism
7 See also
8 References
9 Further reading
10 External links
Bob Jensen's rotten to the core threads ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Foreign Currency Complications in Valuation Analysis
Big Mac Index of Purchasing Power Parity ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Mac_Index
"CHART OF THE DAY: The iPod And Big Mac Indexes Just Don't Work," by John
Carney and Kamelia Angelova, Business Insider, October 20, 2009 ---
http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-ipod-vs-big-mac-2009-10
The Economist's Big Mac Index and the
new
iPod Nano Index from CommSec are
both cute ways of getting attention for the organizations that produce them.
But do they really measure anything economically significant?
The idea is that the indexes are supposed to expose the relative under- or
over-valuation of various currencies. In theory, the same good should trade
at broadly the same price across the globe if
exchange
rates are adjusting properly. When
goods wind up priced very differently in different locations, it suggests
something is out of whack.
But a side-by-side comparison of the Big Mac Index and the iPod Nano Index
suggests that these might not really be good metrics for measuring
currency valuations. As you can see,
the two indexes result in wildly uncorrelated results. If it were really a
matter of currency valuation, you’d expect both to show similar valuation
problems. Instead, the pattern just seems random.

Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and Core Earnings
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review, September 25, 2009
Investors, It Pays to Mind the GAAP Gaps
by Mark
Gongloff
Sep 18, 2009
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Earning
Announcements, Earnings Per Share, Earnings Quality, Generally accepted
accounting principles, Impairment, Income from Continuing Operations, Income
Statement, Operating Income, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission
SUMMARY: The
article analyzes the historical differences between operating earnings and
net income, or "GAAP earnings" since the first quarter of 2000 and relates
the earnings per share to current stock prices via P/E ratios. In the
second-quarter of 2009, "so-called operating earnings, which exclude
one-time items such as credit-market write-downs, nearly matched earnings
conforming to...GAAP....Companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index
earned an estimated $13.81 a share in the quarter on an operating basis,
compared with $13.51 in GAAP earnings."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The
article is useful for discussing quality of earnings disclosures in any
financial accounting class.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory)
What do you think the author is referring to when he uses the term "GAAP
earnings"? According to the article, how may GAAP earnings differ from
operating earnings as reported by publicly-traded companies?
2. (Introductory)
What are the implications for stock market prices of the relationship, or
differences, between reported GAAP earnings and operating earnings as
disclosed by the companies analyzed for this article (those in the S&P 500)?
3. (Introductory)
What other implications are highlighted by analysts as stemming from this
difference in reported earnings numbers?
4. (Advanced)
What does it mean to say that GAAP earnings "...get reported to the
government but get less attention on earnings day"? To whom in the
government are these earnings reported?
5. (Advanced)
What is the difference between operating earnings and net income? Do you
think that the operating earnings described in this article agree with
operating earnings as presented on an income statement prepared in
accordance with GAAP? In your answer, specifically consider treatment
required for impairment charges for goodwill or other long-lived assets.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Investors, It Pays to Mind the GAAP Gaps," by Mark Gongloff, The Wall
Street Journal, September 18, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125322419751520977.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Two earnings data points that tend to coexist in
parallel universes have lately come notably close to colliding.
In the second-quarter earnings season, so-called
operating earnings, which exclude one-time items such as credit-market
write-downs, nearly matched earnings conforming to Generally Accepted
Accounting Principles, or GAAP, which get reported to the government but get
less attention on earnings day.
Companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index
earned an estimated $13.81 a share in the quarter on an operating basis,
compared with $13.51 in GAAP earnings.
That is the closest those two earnings measures
have been since the first quarter of 2000. The gap widens in recessions and
did so significantly in the latest downturn. That they nearly matched last
quarter offers another sign of market stability.
Still, the relative harmony of the second quarter
seems a fluke. For the past 14 years, the gap between the two measures has
grown persistently, with operating earnings topping GAAP earnings by an
average of $2.47 a share per quarter.
When using a 10-year trailing average of earnings
to erase cyclical gyrations, operating earnings are nearly 24% higher than
GAAP earnings, the highest ever.
It isn't clear why the difference has grown so
wide. One inescapable conclusion is that, since 1995, either by happy
accident or accounting shenanigans, one-time losses have grown more quickly
than one-time gains, elevating the operating earnings that Wall Street
watches.
The investment implications are many. For one
thing, two earnings measures produce two market valuations. The S&P 500
trades at 21 times the past 10 years' GAAP earnings and 17 times operating
earnings. Neither is exactly cheap, but one is much pricier than the other.
Operating earnings help investors get a feel for a
company's long-term profitability, but companies pay dividends out of GAAP
earnings, notes Capital Economics market economist John Higgins.
Investors are well advised to watch both figures
for another reason: Some companies have bigger differences between GAAP and
operating earnings than others. According to research by Société Générale
quantitative strategist Andrew Lapthorne, those with bigger gaps tend to
underperform in the long run.
S&P Core Earnings
For years Standard and Poors has recognized that GAAP earnings can be
misleading to investors relative to what are called the S&P Core Earnings that
adjust for some "deficiencies" in GAAP. Sometimes the adjustments are for
disclosures that are not booked. For example, for years the S&P Core earnings
adjusted for unbooked employee stock options that, prior to revision of FAS 123,
were not expensed by most companies (only one of the Fortune 500 companies
expensed employee stock options before FAS 123 was revised).
"Beyond The Balance Sheet Earnings Quality,"
by Kurt Badanhausen, Jack Gage,
Cecily Hall, Michael K. Ozanian, Forbes, January 28, 2005 ---
http://www.forbes.com/home/business/2005/01/26/bbsearnings.html
It's not how much money a company is making that
counts, it's how it makes its money. The earnings quality scores from
RateFinancials aim to evaluate how closely reported earnings reflect the
cash that the companies' businesses are generating and how well their
balance sheets reflect their true economic position. Companies in the
winners table have the best earnings quality (they are generating a lot of
sustainable cash from their operations), while companies in the losers table
have been boosting their reported earnings with such tricks as unexpensed
stock options, low tax rates, asset sales, off-balance-sheet financing and
deferred maintenance of the pension fund.
Krispy kreme doughnuts is the latest illustration
of the fact that stunning earnings growth can mask a lot of trouble. Not
long ago the doughnut maker was a glamour stock with a 60%
earnings-per-share growth rate and a multiple to match-70 times trailing
earnings. Now the stock is at $9.61, down 72% from May, when the company
first issued an earnings warning. Turns out Krispy Kreme may have leavened
profits in the way it accounted for the purchase of franchised stores and by
failing to book adequate reserves for doubtful accounts. So claims a
shareholder lawsuit against the company. Krispy Kreme would not comment on
the suit.
Investors are not auditors, they don't have
subpoena power, and they can't know about such disasters in advance. But
sometimes they can get hints that the quality of a company's earnings is a
little shaky. In Krispy's case an indication that it was straining to
deliver its growth story came three years ago in its use of synthetic leases
to finance expansion. Forbes described these leases in a Feb. 18, 2002 story
that did not please the company. Another straw in the wind: weak free cash
flow from operations. You get that number by taking the "cash flow from
operations" reported on the "consolidated statement of cash flows," then
subtracting capital expenditures. Solid earners usually throw off lots of
positive free cash flow. At Krispy the figure was negative.
Is there a Krispy Kreme lurking in your portfolio?
For this, the fifth installment in our Beyond the Balance Sheet series, we
asked the experts at RateFinancials of New York City (
www.ratefinancials.com ) to look into earnings quality among the
companies included in the S&P 500 Index. The tables at right display the
outfits that RateFinancials puts at the top and at the bottom of the quality
scale. The ratings are to a degree subjective and, not surprisingly, some of
the companies at the bottom take exception. General Motors feels that
RateFinancials understates its cash flow. But at minimum RateFinancials'
work warns investors to look closely at the financial statements of the
suspect companies.
A lot of factors went into the ratings produced by
cofounders Victor Germack and Harold Paumgarten, research director Allan
Young and ten analysts. A company that expenses stock options is probably
not straining to meet earnings forecasts, so it gets a plus. Overoptimistic
assumptions about future earnings on a pension fund artificially prop up
earnings and thus rate a minus. A low tax rate is a potential indicator of
trouble: Maybe the low profit reported to the Internal Revenue Service is
all too true and the high profit reported to shareholders an exaggeration.
Other factors relate to discontinued operations (booking a one-time gain
from selling a business is bad), corporate governance (companies get black
marks for having poison pills), inventory (if it piles up faster than sales,
then business may be weakening) and free cash flow (a declining number is
bad).
Continued in this section of Forbes
Included in
Standard & Poor's definition of Core Earnings are
- employee stock options
grant expenses,
- restructuring charges
from on-going operations,
- write-downs of
depreciable or amortizable operating assets,
- pensions costs
- purchased research and
development.
Excluded
from this definition are
- impairment of goodwill
charges,
- gains or losses from
asset sales, pension gains,
- unrealized gains or
losses from hedging activities, merger and acquisition related
fees
- litigation settlements
|
For more on S&P Core Earnings see Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and
Core Earnings ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings
Oil and Gas Accounting Under IFRS
October 16, 2009 message from Ed Scribner
Does anyone know where U.S. oil companies stand on
adoption of IFRS? Presumably their current accounting methods fall within
“the overall accounting framework established by the IASB,” so they would be
able to continue to use those methods for at least awhile.
Ed Scribner
New Mexico State University
Las Cruces, NM, USA
October 18, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Ed,
Exxon-Mobil and other large multinational companies
want badly to bury U.S. GAAP in favor of IFRS. They are the wind beneath the
wings of the Big Four auditing firms’ advocacy of IFRS. They are also active
behind the scenes in setting IFRS they way they want IFRS. (see the
quotation below)
Actually, the large companies were not a problem when
the SEC caved in to the “oil industry” when it dropped the requirement that
dry holes be fully expensed when declared hopeless. The political heat came
from smaller wildcatting operators who would see their earnings fluctuate
from enormous losses to enormous gains year-to-year because of the impact of
one or two dry holes in some years and no dry holes in other years. A few
dry holes have negligible impact on Exxon year in and year out.
Also the big oil companies benefit when small
operations go bankrupt, because the big players can then buy up the drilling
rights of small players in the industry.
"Powerful players: How constituents captured the
setting of IFRS 6, an accounting standard for the extractive industries," by
Corinne L. Cortesea, Helen J. Irvineb and Mary A. Kaidonisa,
ScienceDirect, 2008 ---
Click Here
Abstract
This paper illustrates the influence of powerful players in the
setting of IFRS 6, a new International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS)
for the extractive industries. A critical investigative inquiry of the
international accounting standard setting process, using Critical Discourse
Analysis (CDA), reveals some of the key players, analyses the surrounding
discourse and its implications, and assesses the outcomes. An analysis of
small cross-section of comment letters submitted to the International
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) by one international accounting firm,
one global mining corporation and one industry group reveal the hidden
coalitions between powerful players. These coalitions indicate that the
regulatory process of setting IFRS 6 has been captured by powerful
extractive industries constituents so that it merely codifies existing
industry practice.
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting standard setting controversies ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
"71% of senior financial executives say that FASB should set U.S. accounting
standards, not IASB or U.S. Congress," by Kristi Grgeta, Grant Thornton, October
29, 2009
October 30m 2009 message from Tom Selling
[tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]
For Immediate Release
For more information, please contact:
Kristi Grgeta
T
312.602.8720
E
Kristi.Grgeta@gt.com
71% of senior financial executives say that FASB should set U.S. accounting
standards, not IASB or U.S. Congress
More than half of public companies still have no plans to use XBRL even
after SEC mandate
CHICAGO, October 29, 2009 – In a national survey of U.S. CFOs and senior
comptrollers conducted by Grant Thornton LLP, the U.S. member firm of Grant
Thornton International Ltd, the majority (71%) believe that the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) should set U.S. accounting standards, not
the SEC, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or the U.S.
Congress.
EXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) usage has picked up some
among public companies, increasing to 17 percent in September 2009 from 12
percent in March 2009; however, this increase is not as significant as one
might expect given the SEC mandate that public companies use XBRL as early
as June 2009 and no later than 2011. Even more surprising is that more than
half (52%) of public companies still report that they have no plans to use
XBRL.
Fifty-nine percent of the survey respondents report that their companies
would continue to use leases more or less in the same manner as they
currently do, even though the FASB has tentatively decided that all lease
obligations should be recognized as liabilities on the statement of
financial position with a corresponding “right of use” asset. CFOs also feel
that companies should report their own debt on their financial statements at
amortized historical cost (43%), rather than at fair value (38%) or at the
discounted amount of the expected future payments (18%).
Ideally, who should set U.S. accounting standards?
|
|
All |
Public |
Private |
|
A national independent board supervised by a national regulator
(e.g., the Financial Accounting Standards Board) |
71% |
70% |
71% |
|
An international independent board supervised by international
entities such as the International Organization of Securities
Regulators, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund
(e.g., the International Accounting Standards Board) |
24% |
23% |
25% |
|
The global accounting profession (e.g., the International Federation
of Accountants) |
20% |
16% |
21% |
|
A national regulator (e.g., the SEC) |
16% |
18% |
16% |
|
A body designated by an international entity such as the United
Nations Council on Trade and Development or the World Trade
Organization |
3% |
2% |
3% |
|
National legislatures (e.g., the U.S. Congress) |
3% |
4% |
2% |
Does your company currently report financial results using eXtensible
Business Reporting Language (XBRL)?
|
|
All |
Public |
Private |
|
Yes |
6% |
17% |
3% |
|
No |
94% |
83% |
97% |
If no, when do you plan to report using XBRL?
|
|
All |
Public |
Private |
|
Before 2010 |
1% |
6% |
1% |
|
Before 2011 |
8% |
25% |
5% |
|
After 2011 |
6% |
18% |
3% |
|
No plans at this time |
84% |
52% |
92% |
The FASB has tentatively decided that all lease obligations should be
recognized as liabilities on the statement of financial position with a
corresponding “right of use” asset. Would a requirement to recognize lease
obligations on the statement of financial position cause you to change the
way in which you finance operations?
|
|
All |
Public |
Private |
|
Yes, we would continue to use leases or lease financing, but
possibly with significant changes in the provisions of the
agreements. |
12% |
13% |
12% |
|
Yes, we would be less inclined to make use of lease financing. |
14% |
16% |
13% |
|
No, we would continue to use leases more or less in the same manner
as we currently do. |
59% |
57% |
61% |
|
Don’t know |
15% |
14% |
14% |
How
should firms report their own debt on their financial statements?
|
|
All |
Public |
Private |
|
At amortized historical cost |
43% |
47% |
42% |
|
At fair value |
38% |
33% |
38% |
|
At the discounted amount of the expected future payments |
18% |
19% |
18% |
|
Other |
2% |
2% |
2% |
- ends -
About the Survey
Grant Thornton LLP conducted the biannual national survey from Sept. 21
through Oct. 2, 2009, with 846 U.S. CFOs and senior comptrollers
participating.
About Grant Thornton LLP
The people in the independent firms of Grant Thornton International Ltd
provide personalized attention and the highest quality service to public and
private clients in more than 100 countries. Grant Thornton LLP is the U.S.
member firm of Grant Thornton International Ltd, one of the six global
audit, tax and advisory organizations. Grant Thornton International Ltd and
its member firms are not a worldwide partnership, as each member firm is a
separate and distinct legal entity.
In the U.S., visit Grant Thornton LLP at
www.GrantThornton.com
Bob Jensen's threads on the movement to replace U.S. GAAP in favor of IASB
international standards ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
Case: Multinational Tax Controversies
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 15,
2009
Business Fends Off Tax Hit
by Neil
King Jr. and Elizabeth Williamson
Oct 13, 2009
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Tax
Laws, Tax Policy, Taxation, Treasury Department
SUMMARY: "The
Obama Administration has shelved a plan to raise more than $200 billion in
new taxes on multinational companies following a blitz of complaints from
businesses." Obama met with business leaders over the summer of 2009 and
each time discussed a proposal to end the exception to U.S. taxation of
worldwide corporate earnings in cases in which the earnings are retained
overseas and not repatriated. Repatriation typically occurs by subsidiaries
paying dividends to parent corporations. "Lurking behind the tax debate was
the administration's need for new sources of revenue to fund
its...spending..." and the deficit.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The
article can be used to introduce taxation of multinational corporations and
the influence of politics on setting tax law.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory)
How are U.S. companies earnings from foreign operations taxed in the U.S.?
According to the article, how does that compare to taxation policies in the
rest of the world?
2. (Advanced)
What exception to this policy is currently a part of U.S. tax law? How does
this exception result in the "counterintuitive" result that " businesses
investing here are paying a higher tax rate than if they're investing
overseas"?
3. (Advanced)
What does it mean to repatriate earnings?
4. (Introductory)
What is the reason that President Obama has proposed eliminating the
exception from taxation for earnings by foreign operations that are not
repatriated, at least according to some?
5. (Introductory)
How did leaders of corporate America manage to stave off this tax change?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Business Fends Off Tax Hit," by Neil King Jr. and Elizabeth Williamson,
The Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125539099758581443.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
The Obama administration has shelved a
plan to raise more than $200 billion in new taxes on multinational companies
following a blitz of complaints from businesses.
A contingent of Silicon Valley chief
executives, for example, traveled to Washington in late September to speak
out against the proposal to change how the federal government taxes overseas
profits. They came away from meetings with key congressmen relieved.
Obama aides say the administration has set
the idea aside for now, but may return to it as part of a broader tax
overhaul sometime next year. The White House had billed the proposed change
as an overdue fix to the tax code and potentially a key revenue-raiser.
"This has gone all of a sudden from
red-hot to white-cold," says Michael Klayko, chief executive of Brocade
Communications Systems Inc., a large data-storage company. But he says he is
concerned that if the proposed tax changes get entangled in the health-care
overhaul, "it could go back to red-hot again."
The story of the business community's
campaign against the tax changes and the Obama administration's eventual
retreat offers a window into the often uneasy relations between the White
House and the corporate world. It suggests that an administration that was
critical of business at the height of the financial crisis is becoming more
accommodating. The White House, through a series of presidential lunches and
other outreach, is trying to soothe tensions with multinational companies.
Lurking behind the tax debate was the
administration's need for new sources of revenue to fund its increased
spending. Jason Furman, a White House economic adviser, made that point
clear at the end of a session with a dozen or so lobbyists in March.
Catherine Schultz, head of tax policy at the National Foreign Trade Council,
who was at the meeting, says Mr. Furman basically told the group: "We need
the money."
Critics long have complained that the
provision encourages companies to avoid U.S. taxes by expanding production
on foreign soil. On the campaign trail last year, President Barack Obama
promised repeatedly to "end tax breaks for companies that ship jobs
overseas."
U.S. businesses counter that the deferral
provision allows them to better compete globally, which in turn allows them
to expand their U.S. operations, too. If the deferral were eliminated, they
contend, the financial damage to their businesses would require them to cut
jobs in the U.S.
The issue has drawn little public
attention, having been overshadowed by debates on health care, climate
change and financial regulation. But it may have colored relations between
the White House and the business community as much as any issue.
Companies ranging from Microsoft Corp. to
General Electric Co. to International Business Machines Corp. put the topic
at the top of their Washington agendas. Many CEOs and business lobbyists say
the proposal -- and the rhetoric used to push it -- betrayed a tone-deafness
on business issues among the president and his advisers. White House
officials say the issue has often dominated discussions during meetings with
CEOs.
The first sign that Mr. Obama planned to
make good on his campaign promise came Feb. 26, when he released his
proposed $3.6 trillion budget for fiscal 2010. The 134-page blueprint
included revisions to the tax rules for U.S. companies operating overseas,
which it said would raise $210 billion over 10 years.
The proposal sent tremors through the
business community. Two weeks later, semiconductor chief executives and
chairmen gathered in Washington. The group included Craig Barrett, then
chairman of Intel Corp., and John Daane, chief executive of high-tech
company Altera Corp. At a round-table discussion with reporters, the
executives slammed the administration for seeking tax changes that would
"punish" companies with offshore operations. They said they resented
suggestions from the Obama campaign that their practices were somehow
unpatriotic.
Dozens of other CEOs, from some of the
country's largest companies, raised similar complaints in interviews and
opinion pieces. Brian Ferguson, then-chief executive of Eastman Chemical
Co., told an industry trade publication that Mr. Obama's tax plans posed
"potentially devastating" challenges to those parts of the U.S.
manufacturing sector that rely heavily on foreign sales.
When Mr. Obama addressed a gathering of
CEOs at a Washington hotel on March 12, IBM Chief Executive Samuel Palmisano
asked the president about the deferral issue. The provision, Mr. Palmisano
said, "has been very, very important" in helping U.S. companies compete
abroad. "So what we really are asking for," he said, "is just an open
dialogue."
Mr. Obama said he would seek "the right
balance," but showed little inclination to budge. Most Americans found it
"counterintuitive," he said, that "businesses investing here are paying a
higher tax rate than if they're investing overseas." It was important to
have a tax code "that reflects those values," he told the CEOs.
Within days, the Business Roundtable, the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers began
releasing studies intended to show that scrapping the deferral would hurt
U.S. competitiveness, spurring companies to shift jobs overseas to save
money or giving a leg up to foreign competitors. One study looked at the
gradual elimination of the deferral allowance for U.S. shipping companies
between 1975 and 1986, and the sector's subsequent rapid contraction as
foreign operators gained the upper hand. The groups also sent letters to
leaders of the House and Senate, signed by nearly 200 companies, that
criticized the proposal.
Hoping to clear the air, Treasury
Secretary Timothy Geithner hosted a conference call March 25 with top
executives from a dozen companies, including IBM, Citigroup Inc., GE, Google
Inc. and Honeywell International Inc. Also on the call were Lawrence
Summers, the White House economic adviser, and Valerie Jarrett, Mr. Obama's
top aide for corporate outreach. The Obama aides said they were open to
discussing the provision, and insisted that it wouldn't hit companies as
hard as some CEOs thought, participants recall.
Tensions flared in May when Mr. Obama said
in a speech he intended to push ahead with revamping the overseas tax rules.
The president said the existing tax code "makes it perfectly legal for
companies to avoid paying their fair share." He blasted tax cheats who were
"shirking" their responsibilities and vowed to clean up "a tax code that
says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, India,
than if you create one in Buffalo, New York."
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on the budget crisis ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/entitlements.htm
Ford Outfoxes the Chicken Tax
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 1,
2009
To Outfox the Chicken Tax, Ford Strips Its Own
Vans
by: Matthew
Dolan
Date: Sep 23, 2009
SUMMARY: Ford goes to unusual lengths to dodge U.S. restrictions on
importing trucks into America.
DISCUSSION:
1.
What is the "chicken tax"? When did it originate? What was the reason
for its implementation? Why does it continue to be in force?
2.
What does Ford do to work around the chicken tax? Do these actions
comply with the law? Why or why not? What are Ford's other options? What are
the pros and cons of each of these alternatives? Which do you think is the
best alternative for Ford in this situation?
3.
Why does the U.S. government make these types of distinctions for
similar categories of products or components? Argue a case to support that
assertion that rules applying to similar categories be more consistent. What
is the case to support the current situation in which different tariffs
apply for similar categories?
"To Outfox the Chicken Tax, Ford Strips Its Own Vans Logic Takes a Back Seat
-- and Windows, as Auto Maker Plays Tariff Games," by Matthew Dolan, The Wall
Street Journal, September 23, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125357990638429655.html?mod=djem_jie_360
Several times a month, Transit Connect
vans from a Ford Motor Co. factory in Turkey roll off a ship here shiny and
new, rear side windows gleaming, back seats firmly bolted to the floor.
Their first stop in America is a
low-slung, brick warehouse where those same windows, never squeegeed at a
gas station, and seats, never touched by human backsides, are promptly
ripped out.
The fabric is shredded, the steel parts
are broken down, and everything is sent off along with the glass to be
recycled.
Why all the fuss and feathers? Blame the
"chicken tax."
The seats and windows are but dressing to
help Ford navigate the wreckage of a 46-year-old trade spat. In the early
1960s, Europe put high tariffs on imported chicken, taking aim at rising
U.S. sales to West Germany. President Johnson retaliated in 1963, in part by
targeting German-made Volkswagens with a tax on imports of foreign-made
trucks and commercial vans.
The 1960s went the way of love beads and
sitar records, but the chicken tax never died. Europe still has a tariff on
imports of U.S. chicken, and the U.S. still hits delivery vans imported from
overseas with a 25% tariff. American companies have to pay, too, which puts
Ford in the weird position of circumventing U.S. trade rules that for years
have protected U.S. auto makers' market for trucks.
The company's wiggle room comes from the
process of defining a delivery van. Customs officials check a bunch of
features to determine whether a vehicle's primary purpose might be to move
people instead. Since cargo doesn't need seats with seat belts or to look
out the window, those items are on the list. So Ford ships all its Transit
Connects with both, calls them "wagons" instead of "commercial vans."
Installing and removing unneeded seats and windows costs the company
hundreds of dollars per van, but the import tax falls dramatically, to 2.5
percent, saving thousands.
Customs officials won't discuss individual
company's strategies, but Stephen Biegun, Ford's vice president for
international governmental affairs, says the practice complies with the
letter of the law. "We are free-traders, full stop," he says.
Foreign auto makers have long crossed
swords with the chicken tax. Toyota Motor Corp., Nissan Motor Co. and Honda
Motor Co. took the straightforward route and built plants in the U.S.
Subaru, owned by Fuji Heavy Industries
Ltd. of Japan, imported a small pickup in the 1980s called the Bi-drive
Recreational All-terrain Transporter, or BRAT. But it wasn't a taxable
truck, because it had two lawn-chair-like seats bolted to the open bed.
(President Reagan owned a red one, according to Subaru.)
With the globalization of the auto
industry, American companies have joined the game. Until recently, Chrysler
Group LLC imported Dodge Sprinter vans made in Düsseldorf, Germany, by
former owner Daimler AG. The engine, transmission, axles and wheels were
removed, allowing the truck bodies to cross the border as auto components,
which aren't subject to the tax. Daimler then reassembled the vehicles at a
factory in Ladson, S.C.
Ford launched the Transit Connect in 2002.
The compact commercial van with a distinctive raised roof was designed to
haul goods through urban areas with tight streets. Since then, more than
600,000 of the vehicles have been sold.
When gas prices spiked, Ford saw a market
among small-business owners in the U.S. Prices start at $20,780, much lower
than would have been possible if Ford had to cover the chicken tax. Sales
are off to a fast start. In August, Ford sold more than 2,200 in the U.S.
"It's great for city driving," said Duff
Goldman, owner of Charm City Cakes in Baltimore and star of Ace of Cakes on
the Food Network. "It's shorter, smaller and has really good fuel economy."
He bought a black Transit Connect last month. Since he doesn't carry
passengers, his van has no windows or seats in the back.
The vans leave Turkey on cargo ships owned
by Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics. Once they arrive in Baltimore, they are
driven into a warehouse, where 65 workers from the shipping company's WWL
Vehicle Services Americas Inc. convert them into commercial vehicles amid
the blare of rock music and the whirring of industrial fans.
On a recent afternoon, a handful of vans
passed through the warehouse unmolested as passenger wagons. But the vast
majority were lined up to have windows pulled out, and they all had their
rear seats removed.
In one lane, supervisor Robert Dowdy
watched as two workers removed the rear side windows. They cut out the
rubber seal with a special knife and popped out the glass using suction
cups. The space is plugged with a metal panel that cures for 15 minutes
before being tested outside for waterproofing.
At the start of that same lane, Mayso
Lawrence unhooked a rear seat belt as easily as he would pop the top off a
soda bottle. Using a drill, he quickly unscrewed six bolts to free the
seats. Workers at the other end dump the seats into cardboard boxes, which
are hoisted onto an open tractor-trailer and shipped to Ohio. Ford says the
shredded seat fabric and foam become landfill cover, while the steel is
processed for other uses.
"I never thought about why we take out the
seats, but if that's what the customer wants, that's what we'll give them,"
Mr. Lawrence said.
With the seat removed, Mr. Lawrence puts
in a new floor panel to cover the holes, toots the horn to signal he's
finished, then gets to work on another van. The whole process takes him less
than five minutes.
Rob Stevens, chief engineer for Ford's
commercial vehicles, says the auto maker decided against shipping the seats
back to Turkey for use in the next wave of vans for the U.S.
"We thought going through the recycling
process was best," he said. "The steel is valuable."
As Bastiat showed 150 years ago, you don't create
wealth by destruction.
"Clunker Cash Is Anything But Smart Money," by Randall Forsyth, Barron's, August
4, 2009 ---
http://online.barrons.com/article/SB124931671451601915.html
Eugene Fama Lecture: Masters of Finance, Oct 2, 2009
Videos Fama Lecture: Masters of Finance From the American Finance Association's
"Masters in Finance" video series, Eugene F. Fama presents a brief history of
the efficient market theory. The lecture was recorded at the University of
Chicago in October 2008 with an introduction by John Cochrane.
http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/2009/10/fama-lecture-masters-of-finance.html#more
Bob Jensen's threads on the EMH ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH
Fama Video on Market Efficiency in a Volatile Market
Widely cited as the father of the efficient market hypothesis and one of its
strongest advocates, Professor Eugene Fama examines his groundbreaking idea in
the context of the 2008 and 2009 markets. He outlines the benefits and
limitations of efficient markets for everyday investors and is interviewed by
the Chairman of Dimensional Fund Advisors in Europe, David Salisbury.
http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/2009/08/fama-on-market-efficiency-in-a-volatile-market.html#more
Other Fama and French Videos ---
http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/videos/
Video: Interesting look at 8 common investment mistakes that uses Big
Brown (the horse, not the delivery company). ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/2009/10/video-on-common-mistakes.html
Last night's (October 7, 2009) PBS NewsHour took a look at the bearish
obsession du jour, the commercial real estate market. Real estate analyst Bob
White took them around to show some of the ugliest cases out there. (via
Square Feet)
http://www.businessinsider.com/a-guided-tour-of-nyc-commercial-real-estate-wreckage-video-2009-10
Bob Jensen's investment helpers are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm#InvestmentHelpers
Way out there on (or beyond) the leading edge
"Caltech Scientists Develop Novel Use of Neurotechnology to Solve Classic
Social Problem, September 10, 2009 ---
http://media.caltech.edu/press_releases/13288
Jim Mahar clued me into this link
Economists and neuroscientists from the California Institute of Technology
(Caltech) have shown that they can use information obtained through functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measurements of whole-brain activity to create
feasible, efficient, and fair solutions to one of the stickiest dilemmas in
economics, the public goods free-rider problem—long thought to be unsolvable.
This is
one of the first-ever applications of neurotechnology to real-life economic
problems, the researchers note. "We have shown that by applying tools from
neuroscience to the public-goods problem, we can get solutions that are
significantly better than those that can be obtained without brain data," says
Antonio Rangel, associate professor of economics at Caltech and the paper's
principal investigator.
The
paper describing their work was published today in the online edition of the
journal Science, called Science Express.
Examples
of public goods range from healthcare, education, and national defense to the
weight room or heated pool that your condominium board decides to purchase. But
how does the government or your condo board decide which public goods to spend
its limited resources on? And how do these powers decide the best way to share
the costs?
"In
order to make the decision optimally and fairly," says Rangel, "a group needs to
know how much everybody is willing to pay for the public good. This information
is needed to know if the public good should be purchased and, in an ideal
arrangement, how to split the costs in a fair way."
In such
an ideal arrangement, someone who swims every day should be willing to pay more
for a pool than someone who hardly ever swims. Likewise, someone who has kids in
public school should have more of her taxes put toward education.
But
providing public goods optimally and fairly is difficult, Rangel notes, because
the group leadership doesn't have the necessary information. And when people are
asked how much they value a particular public good—with that value measured in
terms of how many of their own tax dollars, for instance, they’d be willing to
put into it—their tendency is to lowball.
Why?
“People can enjoy the good even if they don’t pay for it,” explains Rangel.
"Underreporting its value to you will have a small effect on the final decision
by the group on whether to buy the good, but it can have a large effect on how
much you pay for it."
In other
words, he says, “There’s an incentive for you to lie about how much the good is
worth to you.”
That
incentive to lie is at the heart of the free-rider problem, a fundamental
quandary in economics, political science, law, and sociology. It's a problem
that professionals in these fields have long assumed has no solution that is
both efficient and fair.
In fact,
for decades it's been assumed that there is no way to give people an incentive
to be honest about the value they place on public goods while maintaining the
fairness of the arrangement.
“But
this result assumed that the group's leadership does not have direct information
about people's valuations,” says Rangel. “That's something that neurotechnology
has now made feasible.”
And so
Rangel, along with Caltech graduate student Ian Krajbich and their colleagues,
set out to apply neurotechnology to the public-goods problem.
In their
series of experiments, the scientists tried to determine whether functional
magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) could allow them to construct informative
measures of the value a person assigns to one or another public good. Once
they’d determined that fMRI images—analyzed using pattern-classification
techniques—can confer at least some information (albeit "noisy" and imprecise)
about what a person values, they went on to test whether that information could
help them solve the free-rider problem.
They did
this by setting up a classic economic experiment, in which subjects would be
rewarded (paid) based on the values they were assigned for an abstract public
good.
As part
of this experiment, volunteers were divided up into groups. “The entire group
had to decide whether or not to spend their money purchasing a good from us,”
Rangel explains. “The good would cost a fixed amount of money to the group, but
everybody would have a different benefit from it.”
The
subjects were asked to reveal how much they valued the good. The twist? Their
brains were being imaged via fMRI as they made their decision. If there was a
match between their decision and the value detected by the fMRI, they paid a
lower tax than if there was a mismatch. It was, therefore, in all subjects' best
interest to reveal how they truly valued a good; by doing so, they would on
average pay a lower tax than if they lied.
“The
rules of the experiment are such that if you tell the truth,” notes Krajbich,
who is the first author on the Science paper, “your expected tax will never
exceed your benefit from the good.”
In fact,
the more cooperative subjects are when undergoing this entirely voluntary
scanning procedure, “the more accurate the signal is,” Krajbich says. “And that
means the less likely they are to pay an inappropriate tax.”
This
changes the whole free-rider scenario, notes Rangel. “Now, given what we can do
with the fMRI,” he says, “everybody’s best strategy in assigning value to a
public good is to tell the truth, regardless of what you think everyone else in
the group is doing.”
And tell
the truth they did—98 percent of the time, once the rules of the game had been
established and participants realized what would happen if they lied. In this
experiment, there is no free ride, and thus no free-rider problem.
“If I
know something about your values, I can give you an incentive to be truthful by
penalizing you when I think you are lying,” says Rangel.
While
the readings do give the researchers insight into the value subjects might
assign to a particular public good, thus allowing them to know when those
subjects are being dishonest about the amount they'd be willing to pay toward
that good, Krajbich emphasizes that this is not actually a lie-detector test.
“It’s
not about detecting lies,” he says. “It’s about detecting values—and then
comparing them to what the subjects say their values are.”
“It’s a
socially desirable arrangement,” adds Rangel. “No one is hurt by it, and we give
people an incentive to cooperate with it and reveal the truth.”
“There
is mind reading going on here that can be put to good use,” he says. “In the
end, you get a good produced that has a high value for you.”
From a
scientific point of view, says Rangel, these experiments break new ground. “This
is a powerful proof of concept of this technology; it shows that this is
feasible and that it could have significant social gains.”
And this
is only the beginning. “The application of neural technologies to these sorts of
problems can generate a quantum leap improvement in the solutions we can bring
to them,” he says.
Indeed,
Rangel says, it is possible to imagine a future in which, instead of a vote on a
proposition to fund a new highway, this technology is used to scan a random
sample of the people who would benefit from the highway to see whether it's
really worth the investment. "It would be an interesting alternative way to
decide where to spend the government's money," he notes.
In
addition to Rangel and Krajbich, other authors on the Science paper, “Using
neural measures of economic value to solve the public goods free-rider problem,”
include Caltech's Colin Camerer, the Robert Kirby Professor of Behavioral
Economics, and John Ledyard, the Allen and Lenabelle Davis Professor of
Economics and Social Sciences. Their work was funded by grants from the National
Science Foundation, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and the Human
Frontier Science Program.
Jensen Comment
Are Rangel and Kribich overlooking a fundamental problem in economic theory or
are they overcoming that problem?
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EconomicTheoryErrors
In particular note Economic Theory Errors. Simoleon Sense, September 23, 2009
It would seem to me that the pattern recognition approach suggested by Rangel
and Kribich is a far out way of overcoming the scaling problem of utility
models.
Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?
October 2, 2009 message from PwC's CFOdirect Network
[CFOdirect_Network@PWC_Assurance.messages1.com]
Today the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
provided many smaller companies with additional time to comply with the
SEC's internal control audit requirements. Under the final extension,
non-accelerated filers (generally companies with a public float below $75
million) will be required to comply with the SEC's internal control audit
requirements beginning with annual reports for fiscal years ending on or
after June 15, 2010. The additional extension does not affect companies with
fiscal year-ends between June 15 and December 14.
October 2,
2009 message from Glen L Gray
[glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/6252501/KPMG-and-PwC-Reykjavik-offices-are-raided-by-Icelandic-police.html
Police raid KPMG, PwC offices regarding failure of Icelandic banks Icelandic
offices of accounting firms KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers were raided by
police during an investigation into the failure of Iceland's three biggest
banks. Police seized documents and computer data related to banks Kaupthing,
Glitnir and Landsbanki. Officials are looking into allegations that accounting
and reporting requirements were violated at those banks, the failure of which
drove the country into a financial crisis. Telegraph (London) (10/1)
Glen L. Gray, PhD, CPA
Accounting & Information Systems, COBAE
California State University, Northridge
18111 Nordhoff ST
Northridge, CA 91330-8372
818.677.3948
818.677.2461 (messages)
http://www.csun.edu/~vcact00f
"Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The
CPA Journal ---
http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm
Note the section on Internal Controls
Recently I visited my
pharmacy to pick up eyedrops for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give
me the prescription, the pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy
and Millie, representing that they had been apprised of their rights under the
new medical privacy rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of
how complicated life has gotten.
I was still shaking my
head later that same day when I was clicking mindlessly through the 150 or so
channels that my local cable TV service makes available to me. I happened to
land on The Andy Griffith Show, and the few minutes I spent with Andy, Barney,
Opie, and Aunt Bea got me thinking about the Good Old Days. Wouldn’t it be nice,
I thought, to go back to the Good Old Days of the profession in the early 1960s
when I graduated from college?
Back then, accounting was
really simple. The Accounting Principles Board hadn’t issued any standards yet,
and FASB didn’t exist. So we didn’t have 880 pages listing all of the current
rules and guidance on derivative financial instruments, for example. The
totality of authoritative GAAP at that time fit in one softbound booklet about
one-third the size of the new derivatives guidance.
In those Good Old Days,
the SEC had been around for quite a while but it rarely got excited about
accounting matters. Neither mandatory quarterly reporting nor management’s
discussion and analysis (MD&A) had yet come into being, for example. And annual
report footnotes could actually be read in an hour or so.
The country had eight
major accounting firms, and becoming a partner in one was a truly big deal.
Lawsuits against accounting firms were rare, and almost none of them resulted in
substantial damages against the accountants.
In short, accounting
seemed more like a true profession, with good judgment and experience key
requirements for success.
Of course, however much
we might like to return to simpler times, it’s easier said than done. And most
of us would never give up the many benefits of progress, such as photocopiers,
personal computers, e-mail, the Internet, and cellphones. But I think that
accounting rules may have become more complicated than necessary.
Let me start with a mea
culpa. You may remember the famous line from the comic strip Pogo: “We have met
the enemy, and he is us!” Well, you may be tempted to rephrase that quote to “We
have met the enemy, and he is … Beresford!”
I plead guilty to having
led the development of 40 or so new accounting standards over my time at FASB. A
number of them had pervasive effects on financial statements, and some have been
costly to apply. I always tried to be as practical as possible, however,
although probably few would say that I was 100% successful in meeting that
objective.
In any event, more-recent
accounting standards and proposals seem to be getting increasingly complicated
and harder to apply. Even the best-intentioned accountants have difficulty
keeping up with all of the changes from FASB, the AICPA, the SEC, the EITF, and
the IASB. And some individual standards, such as those on derivatives and
variable-interest entities, are almost impossible for professionals, let alone
laypeople, to decipher.
Furthermore, these days,
companies are subject to what I’ll call quadruple jeopardy. They have to apply
GAAP as best they can, but they are then subject to as many as four levels of
possible second-guessing of their judgments.
First, the external
auditors must weigh in. Second, the SEC will now be reviewing all public
companies’ reports at least once every three years. Third, the PCAOB will be
looking at a sample of accounting firms’ audits, and that could include any
given company’s reports. Finally, the plaintiff’s bar is always looking for
opportunities to challenge accounting judgments and extort settlements. Broad
Principles Versus Detailed Rules
I suspect that all this
second-guessing is what leads many companies and auditors to ask for
more-detailed accounting rules. But we may have reached the point of diminishing
returns. In response to the complexity and sheer volume of many current
standards, some have suggested that accounting standards should be broad
principles rather than detailed rules. FASB and the SEC have expressed support
for the general notion of a principles-based approach to accounting standards.
(It’s kind of like apple pie and motherhood: Who can object to broad
principles?) Of course, implementing such an approach is problematic.
In 2002, FASB issued a
proposal on this matter. And last year the SEC reported to Congress on the same
topic. Specific things that FASB suggested could happen include the following:
Standards should always
state very clear objectives. Standards should have a clearly defined scope and
there should be few, if any, exceptions (e.g., for certain industries).
Standards should contain fewer alternative accounting treatments (e.g.,
unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities could all be run through
income rather than the various approaches used at present). FASB also said that
a principles-based approach probably would include less in the way of detailed
interpretive and implementation guidance. Thus, companies and auditors would be
expected to rely more on professional judgment in applying the standards.
The SEC prefers to call
this approach “objectives-based” rather than “principles-based.” SEC Chief
Accountant Donald Nicolaisen recently repeated the SEC’s support for such an
approach, agreeing with the notion of clearly identifying and articulating the
objective for each standard. Although he also suggested that objectives-based
standards should avoid bright-line tests such as lease capitalization rules, he
called for “sufficiently detailed” implementation guidance, including real-world
examples.
Although FASB and the SEC
may have reached a meeting of the minds on the overall notion of more general
principles, they may disagree on the key point of how much implementation
guidance to provide. FASB thinks that a principles-based approach should include
less implementation guidance and rely more on judgment, while the SEC thinks
that “sufficiently detailed” guidance is needed, and I suspect that would make
it difficult to significantly reduce complexity in some cases.
In any event, FASB
recently said that it may take “several years or more” for preparers and
auditors to adjust to a change to less detail. Meantime, little has changed with
respect to individual standards, which if anything are becoming even harder to
understand and apply.
I’ve heard FASB board
members say that FASB Interpretation (FIN) 46, on variable-interest entities
(VIE), is an example of a principles-based standard. I assume they say this
because FIN 46 states an objective of requiring consolidation when control over
a VIE exists. But the definition of a VIE and the rules for determining when
control exists are extremely difficult to understand.
FASB recently described
what it meant by the operationality of an accounting standard. The first
condition was that standards have to be comprehensible to readers with a
reasonable level of knowledge and sophistication. This doesn’t seem to be the
case for FIN 46. Many auditors and financial executives have told me that only a
few individuals in the country truly know how to apply FIN 46. And those few
individuals often disagree among themselves!
Such complications make
it difficult to get decisions on many accounting matters from an audit
engagement team. Decisions on VIEs, derivatives, and securitization
transactions, to name a few, must routinely be cleared by an accounting firm’s
national experts. And with section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) and new
concerns about auditor independence, getting answers is now even harder. For
example, in the past, companies would commonly consult with their auditors on
difficult accounting matters. But now the PCAOB may view this as a control
weakness, under the assumption that the company lacks adequate internal
expertise. And if auditors get too involved in technical decisions before a
complex transaction is completed, the SEC or the PCAOB might decide that the
auditors aren’t independent, because they’re auditing their own decisions.
When things become this
complicated, I wonder whether it’s time for a new approach. Maybe we do need to
go back to the Good Old Days.
Internal Controls
Today, financial
executives are probably more concerned about internal controls than new
accounting requirements. For the first time, all public companies must report on
the adequacy of their internal controls over financial reporting, and outside
auditors must express their opinion on the company’s controls. Many people have
questioned whether this incredibly expensive activity is worth the presumed
benefit to investors. While one might argue that the section 404 rules are a
regulatory overreaction, shareholders should expect good internal controls. And
audit committees, as shareholders’ representatives, must demand those good
controls. So this has been by far the most time-consuming topic at all audit
committee meetings I’ve attended in the past couple of years.
Companies and auditors
are spending huge sums this year to ensure that transactions are properly
processed and controlled. Yet the most perfect system of internal controls and
the best audit of them might not catch an incorrect interpretation of GAAP. A
good example of this was contained in the PCAOB’s August 2004 report on its
initial reviews of the Big Four’s audit practices. The report noted that all
four firms had missed the fact that some clients had misapplied EITF Issue
95-22. As the New York Times (August 27, 2004) noted, “The fact that all of the
top firms had been misapplying it raised issues of just how well they know the
sometimes complicated rules.”
Responding to a different
criticism in that same PCAOB report, KPMG noted, “Three knowledgeable informed
bodies—the firm, the PCAOB, and the SEC—had reached three different conclusions
on proper accounting, illustrating the complex accounting issues registrants,
auditors and regulators all face.”
Fair Value Accounting
Even those who are very
confident about their understanding of the current accounting rules shouldn’t
get complacent: Fair value accounting is right around the corner, making things
even harder. In fact, it is already required in several recent standards.
Continued in article
You can read more about Section 404 at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOX_404
European bankers don't want FASB-like approach to impairment adjustments
Tweedie noted that the IASB had heard from banks in
Europe that they did not want to adopt the U.S. approach on accounting for
impaired assets. “I want to emphasize that the alternative of adopting a portion
of the FASB approach to impairment, promulgated in April, would not bring about
a level playing field,” he said. “Furthermore, on many issues, EU financial
institutions would not want us to adopt the U.S. approach on impairment. As I
said in June, given the urgency of the fundamental issues surrounding IAS 39,
none of us can afford the potential protracted back-and-forth resulting from
piecemeal changes in international and U.S. standards that would undermine the
comprehensive and desperately needed reform that is under way.”
"IASB Not Waiting for FASB," WebCPA, October 20, 2009 ---
http://www.webcpa.com/news/IASB-Not-Waiting-FASB-52087-1.html
Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue
"The Myth of Regulation," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, October
2009 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x67705.xml
Mark Twain remarked that "There is no distinctively
native American criminal class except Congress." He was wrong. He should
have included presidents and the SEC.
On August 4 the SEC accused General Electric of
accounting fraud (Litigation
Release No. 21166), but it chose not to disclose
who committed the frauds and it did not punish the criminals. Instead, the
SEC fined the victims—the shareholders—$50 million. Worse, the SEC
protracted the so-called investigation so long that even if the felons were
indicted, the case likely would get tossed out of court because of the
statute of limitations. This is just one example of many injustices by the
SEC during the last decade that reveals how this agency has supported the
efforts of some managers and directors to defraud the investing public.
I infer that Congress and recent presidents have
approved these activities, for Congress, Bush, and Obama have done nothing
to improve matters. They have given the appearance of caring, but thwarted
any real, effective measures.
Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley and President Bush signed the legislation.
But Sarbanes-Oxley did little to dampen the activities of criminally-minded
managers and directors. This was because it did so little to improve
enforcement activities. Sarbanes-Oxley merely required a variety of studies
and increased penalties and required auditors to report on the firm’s
internal controls. But these actions have not lessened securities fraud or
accounting shenanigans.
More recently President Obama claims to fight the
problems that caused the financial crisis by advocating a new agency. “The
Consumer Financial Protection Agency will have the power to ensure that
consumers get information that is clear and concise, and to prevent the
worst kinds of abuses.” Many business writers have critiqued this proposal
for a variety of reasons. I agree with them, but I think there is a deeper
problem and that is the myth of regulation.
What Obama is really trying to do is give American
voters the impression that he is in charge, that he cares about them, and
that he is improving matters so that the chances of another financial
meltdown is infinitesimal. It is political legerdemain.
As long as managers have perverse incentives to
cheat investors and as long as the SEC goes after only the little guys and
ignores managers at Enron, WorldCom, Madoff Investments Securities, and GE,
nothing is going to change. If the Congress and if the President want to
improve matters—and I have no idea if they really do—then they must change
the set of incentives and disincentives. To effect real change, the system
must punish managers and directors who lie and steal and cover it up with
scandalous financial reporting.
More regulation might make society feel better, but
that just is an indication that most Americans have little understanding of
economics. They will continue to lose in the stock markets until they
insist elected officials do something substantive.
My fear is that Democrats will rally around Obama
while Republicans vilify him, similar to the previous administration when
Republicans rallied around Bush and Democrats denigrated him. There is too
much partisanship in this country and not enough rational analysis.
Americans need to understand that both presidents have failed us by
supporting new legislation and by crippling better enforcement. (For
whatever it is worth, this is one of the reasons I am an Independent.)
Jensen Comment
The problem of regulation is that the industries being regulated end up owning
the regulators until the next big scandal makes headlines. Bob Jensen's threads
on the need for better regulation and enforcement are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Madoff Accountant to Plead Guilty
The former accountant to convicted Ponzi-scheme
operator Bernard Madoff is expected to plead guilty to fraud and other charges
at a hearing next week, prosecutors said Friday. In a letter to U.S. District
Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney's office in
Manhattan said they expect David G. Friehling to plead guilty at a hearing Nov.
3 under a cooperation agreement with the government. Assistant U.S. Attorney
Lisa Baroni, in her letter, said the charges Mr. Friehling is expected to plead
guilty to are securities fraud, investment advisor fraud, obstructing or
impeding the administration of Internal Revenue laws, and four counts of making
false filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
Chad Bray, The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125691406152218719.html?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTWhatsNews
"Audit firms left unprotected against claims of negligence," by Alex
Spence, London Times, September 28, 2009 ---
http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/support_services/article6851623.ece
Britain’s big four auditing firms have been left
exposed to a surge in negligence claims after the Government refused to
limit further the damages they could face.
Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) lobbied hard for a cap on payouts. Senior
figures involved in the discussions said that Lord Mandelson, the Business
Secretary, appeared receptive to their concerns but stopped short of
changing the law.
The decision is a huge blow to the firms — some
face lawsuits relating to Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion fraud — which believe
there may not be another chance for a change in the law for at least two
years. They fear that they will be targeted by investors and liquidators
seeking to recover losses from Madoff-style frauds and big company failures.
At present, auditors can be held liable for the
full amount of losses in the event of a collapse, even if they are found to
be only partly to blame.
In April, representatives of the companies met Lord
Mandelson to plead for new measures to cap their liability. They warned that
British business could be plunged into chaos if one of them were bankrupted
by a blockbuster lawsuit.
However, an official of the Department for
Business, Innovation and Skills said: “The 2006 Companies Act already allows
auditor liability limitation where companies and their auditors want to take
this course.”
Under present company law, directors can agree to
restrict their auditors’ liability if shareholders approve; however, to
date, no blue-chip company has done so. Directors have seen little advantage
in limiting their auditors’ liability, and objections by the US Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC) have also been a significant obstacle.
The SEC opposes caps on the ground that their
introduction could lead to secret deals whereby directors agree to restrict
liability in return for auditors compromising on their oversight of a
company’s accounts. The SEC could attempt to block caps put in place by
British companies that have operations in the United States.
The big four auditors had hoped to persuade Lord
Mandelson to amend the legislation to address the SEC’s concerns and to
encourage companies to limit their auditors’ liability.
Peter Wyman, a senior PwC partner, who was involved
in the discussions, said that the Government’s lack of action was
disappointing. He said: “The Government, having legislated to allow
proportionate liability for auditors, is apparently content to have its
policy frustrated by a foreign regulator.”
Auditors are often hit with negligence claims in
the aftermath of a company failure because they are perceived as having deep
pockets and remain standing while other parties may have disappeared or been
declared insolvent.
In 2005 Ernst & Young was sued for £700 million by
Equitable Life, its former audit client, after the insurance company almost
collapsed. The claim was dropped but could have bankrupted the firm’s UK arm
if it had succeeded.
This year KPMG was sued for $1 billion by creditors
of New Century, a failed sub-prime lender, and PwC has faced questions over
its audit of Satyam, the Indian outsourcing company that was hit by a long-
running accounting fraud.
Three of the big four are also facing numerous
lawsuits relating to their auditing of the feeder funds that channelled
investors into Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.
Investors and accounting regulators worry that the
big four’s dominance of the audit market is so great that British business
would be thrown into disarray if one of the four were put out of business by
a huge court action. All but two FTSE 100 companies are audited by the four.
Mr Wyman said: “The failure of a large audit firm
would be very damaging to the capital markets at a time when they are
already fragile.”
Arthur Andersen, formerly one of the world’s five
biggest accounting firms, collapsed in 2002 as a result of its role in the
Enron scandal.
Suits you
KPMG A defendant in a class-action lawsuit
in the Southern District of New York against Tremont, a Bernard Madoff
feeder fund
Ernst & Young Sued by investors in a
Luxembourg court with UBS for oversight of a European Madoff feeder fund
PwC Included in several lawsuits in Canada
claiming damages of up to $2 billion against Fairfield Sentry, a big Madoff
feeder fund
KPMG Sued in the US for at least $1 billion
by creditors of New Century Financial, a failed sub-prime mortgage lender,
which claimed that KPMG’s auditing was “recklessly and grossly negligent”
Deloitte Sued by the liquidators of two Bear
Stearns-related hedge funds that collapsed at the start of the credit crunch
Jensen Comment
After the
Enron, Worldcom, and other scandals there was serious doubt as to whether
private investors would abandon equity capital markets. SOX was enacted to save
Wall Street. It is doubtful that we, as accountants and auditors, will ever be
able to return to "the good old days."
When the banks greatly underestimated loan losses, where were the
auditors?
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#AuditFirms
Bob Jensen's threads on CPA firm litigation losses are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Will the large international auditing firms survive?
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Auditors
Banks Still Cannot Resist Understating Loan Loss Reserves
BB&T Net Falls 58% as Bad Loans Surge
by Matthias
Rieker and Joan E. Solsman
Oct 20, 2009
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Allowance
For Doubtful Accounts, Bad Debts, Banking, Loan Loss Allowance
SUMMARY: BB&T
Corp. is a Winston-Salem, N.C., bank that has been "...considered among the
best-run regional banks." The bank has "...reported a continued rise in
delinquent loans in states hit by the recession, such as North Carolina,
rather than those known more for being clobbered by the mortgage
meltdown....BB&T Chief Executive Kelly King said during a conference call
with investors that the company added $263 million to its loan-loss reserve,
which he called 'a significant number.' Some investors hoped BB&T would
write off bad loans more decisively than it did and build its loan-loss
reserve more aggressively, analysts said."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Questions
relate to loan loss reserve process and understanding the implications of
types of loan losses-those on delinquent loans from states hit hard by
recession, rather than from states with significant real estate value
losses.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory)
Describe the process of creating reserves against losses for loans and
writing off bad loans. Specifically describe when the expense for bad debts
impacts a bank's-or a company's-income calculation.
2. (Introductory)
How do trends in loan write-offs and loan delinquencies inform the process
of creating reserves for loan losses?
3. (Advanced)
What is the significance for future profits of not creating a sufficient
reserve for loan losses?
4. (Advanced)
Analysts following BB&T stated that they wished the bank would write off bad
loans "decisively" and build its loan-loss reserve "aggressively" even as
the bank's chief executive described the balance in the loan-loss reserve as
a "significant number." Why would analysts and investors prefer a "more
aggressive approach." Include in your answer a comment on the notion of
conservatism in accounting.
5. (Advanced)
What is the significance of the source of loans going bad-that is, loans
made in states hit hard by recession versus the real estate market downfall.
In your answer, also comment on commercial versus personal loan categories
as well.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"BB&T Net Falls 58% as Bad Loans Surge," by Matthias Rieker and Joan E.
Solsman, The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 20 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125595468300993939.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
If last week's earnings by three of the largest
U.S. banks gave investors hope that the end of steep losses from soured
loans might be closer, regional bank BB&T Corp. delivered a setback Monday.
The Winston-Salem, N.C., bank, long considered
among the best-run regional banks, reported a continued rise in delinquent
loans in states hit by the recession, such as North Carolina, rather than
those known more for being clobbered by the mortgage meltdown.
"The core BB&T sees more cracks in credit," said
analyst Kevin Fitzsimmons of Sandler O'Neill & Partners LP.
In 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite
trading, BB&T fell $1.22, or 4.3%, to $27.03, with investors also selling
off other regional banks into the rising market Monday. "Regionals simply
don't have any firepower to withstand rapidly eroding commercial assets"
even if losses from consumer loans are stabilizing, analyst Todd Hagerman of
Collins Stewart LLC said.
BB&T Chief Executive Kelly King said during a
conference call with investors that the company added $263 million to its
loan-loss reserve, which he called "a significant number." Some investors
hoped BB&T would write off bad loans more decisively than it did and build
its loan-loss reserve more aggressively, analysts said.
Third-quarter profit fell 58% to $152 million, or
23 cents a share, down from $358 million, or 65 cents a share, a year
earlier.
Credit-loss provisions soared 95% to $709 million
from $364 million a year earlier, while rising from the second quarter's
$701 million. Nonperforming assets, or loans in danger of going bad, rose to
2.5% from 1.2% a year earlier and 2.2% from the previous quarter.
BB&T "has a lot more real-estate exposure than the
money centers, plus it does not have nearly as much capital markets to
offset" such losses than big banks such as Bank of America Corp. and
Citigroup Inc. that reported earnings last week, said Jeff Davis of FTN
Equity Capital Markets Corp.
Losses from bad loans "are going to find the peak
in the next two or three quarters," Mr. King said, adding that
"nonperformance of the industry and for us continue to increase probably at
a declining rate of increase."
BB&T strengthened its capital base in August with a
$963 million offering of common stock after it purchased Colonial Bank, a
unit of Colonial BancGroup Inc., Montgomery, Ala., that was seized by
regulators in August.
In June, BB&T became one of the first U.S. banks to
pay back the capital infusion it got from the Treasury Department's Troubled
Asset Relief Program.
In the latest quarter, average client deposits were
up 20% from a year earlier amid the Colonial takeover, while average loans
and leases held for investment showed a 6% increase.
Why did the auditors approve such understated loan loss reserves in the
subprime scandals?
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#AuditFirms
The Pending IASB Migrane
The IASB may be very, very sorry if and when IFRS replaces U.S. GAAP
It appears that financial innovation will not let up on the future,
downsized, Wall Street
The International Accounting Standards Board may regret the day when and if it
takes over the duties of the U.S. FASB. IFRS is way behind in dealing with
U.S.-style financial innovation, and this may be one of the biggest hurdles
facing the IASB.
Yale's Professor Robert Shiller has a September 27, 2009 article that I
will quote below, but first there are some things to consider for accounting
educators reading this tidbit.
IFRS needs huge updates on the following types of
contracting and financial engineering:
One of the huge problems that accountants, particularly auditors and
accounting standard setters, have is understanding the fluid and dynamic world
of financial innovation, especially as was and is still taking place on Wall
Street. KPMG lost the huge Fannie Mae audit largely because of the enormous
financial statement revisions caused by improper compliance with FAS 133. All
the large firms are now facing huge lawsuits due to alleged negligence in
accounting for loan loss reserves and poisonous traunches ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#AuditFirms
When will auditors learn about complexities of financial risk?
The following is an example:
The IASB in recent years has relied heavily on joint projects with the
higher-funded FASB. Whereas the FASB can afford a talented full-time research
staff, the IASB has to rely more on volunteers and part time helpers.
In my opinion the large international accounting firms that all so intensely
want to bury U.S. GAAP should provide a huge endowment (maybe $100 million or
more) for the IASB much like they provided endowment funds years ago for the
FASB. Since the IASB will have a world monopoly on standard setting, it needs
much more funding for support staff and advance communications technology and
worldwide educational support funding.
Many of these items are especially interesting when teaching IFRS, when
teaching contemporary issues in accountancy, and when teaching about accounting
for derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting (although recent
amendments of IAS 39 have taken this famous/infamous and very complicated standard beyond the scope
of the original IAS 39 and the current FAS 133 in the U.S.)
There are various items taken up in the October 6 IASB meeting not discussed
below. Hence if you're interested in the entire meeting go to the IASB Special Board Meeting
summary:
October 6, 2009 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
One significant difference that will arise between IAS 39 and FAS 133 lies in
the IAS decision to end the requirement of bifurcation of host contracts (such
as mortgage loans) from embedded derivatives (such as the embedded option to pay
the loan off before maturity) when the underlying (such as a LIBOR interest
rate) of the host contract is not "clearly and closely related" to the
underlying of the embedded derivative.
The above decision will lead to fewer derivative financial instruments being
booked under FAS 39 relative to what would be booked under FAS 133. It seems to
me to be politically incorrect to bring about such changes at a time when the
SEC is still wavering to eliminate U.S. GAAP in favor of IASB standards.
What the IASB seems to have ignored is the valuation problems created by
unique (customized) instruments that are not traded in the markets. Suppose
Security AB with a "closely related" embedded Option B is Bond A that is
actively traded with the embedded embedded Option B for paying off the debt
before maturity. Early payoff embedded options are extremely common in bonds
that are actively traded in the securities markets. Usually the embedded options
for early payoff are deemed clearly and closely related under IAS 39 rules such
that the embedded Option B previously did not have to be bifurcated and
accounted for separately as a derivative financial instrument. Market values of
Security AB impound both the value of the security and its embedded
(non-bifurcated) option. Until the IASB changed its position on October 6,
however, embedded options that were not clearly and closely related had to be
bifurcated and accounted for separately.
For example, suppose Security ABXY is Security AB plus embedded Options X and
Y that are not "clearly and closely related" in terms of underlyings.
Further assume Options X and Y can be valued in their own options markets. In
other words there are deep and active markets for valuing Security AB, Option X,
and Option Y. There is no deep and active market for the customized Security
ABXY. Security ABXY is a unique, customized security that is not traded in an
active and deep market.
It is highly unlikely that the total value of Security ABXY is the additive
sum of the values of Security AB plus the value of Option X plus the value of
Option Y. These components of Security ABXY are likely to interact such that
valuation of Security ABXY becomes exceedingly difficult if the embedded Options
X and Y are not bifurcated. In terms of FAS 157, it is no longer possible to
apply the sought-after Level 1 valuation for Security ABXY, even though Level 1
can be applied if the embedded Option X and Options Y were bifurcated.
Alas, throughout history accountants have been very good at naively adding up
components of value that are not truly additive. For example, throughout the
history of accounting firms have added up balance sheet asset values and
reported the sum as the total value of Total Assets when the assets have
interactions (covariances) that are totally ignored in the summation process.
Only when buyers and sellers negotiate for the purchase/sale of the entire
bundle (in mergers and acquisitions) do accountants reveal that, in truth, they
understand that the accounting figure for "Total Assets" on the balance sheet is
sheer nonsense.
Cash flow hedge accounting, like foreign exchange hedge accounting, entails
offsetting changes in value of the hedging derivative with a posting to an
equity account (FAS 133 requires posting to OCI). The simplifying feature of
cash flow hedge accounting is that it makes no difference whether the hedged
item is booked (e.g., a bond asset or liability having variable rate revenue) or
unbooked (e.g., a forecasted transaction to buy inventory or to buy/sell
fixed-rate bonds at a future date where the fixed-rate is currently unknown).
The reason cash flow hedging is not affected by a difference between a booked
or unbooked hedged item is that a hedged item subject to cash flow risk has no
future value risk. Consider a variable rate bond having a booked value of
$1,000. There is future cash flow risk, but the future value of the bond will
always be $1,000 assuming no change in credit risk (I am only considering a
hedge of cash flow risk here). Similarly, if Southwest Airlines has a forecasted
transaction to buy a million gallons of jet fuel at spot rates six months from
now, there is no risk that the value on the purchase will differ from the value
of jet fuel on that future date. Value risk arises when the forecasted
transaction is instead a firm commitment to buy at some price other than spot
rates. But if there is a firm commitment price there is no cash flow risk (only
value risk that the purchase price will differ from the spot price on the date
of the purchase).
Fair value hedge accounting is more complicated because it matters greatly
whether the hedged item is booked or not booked. For example, there is no cash
flow risk of booked inventory already bought and paid for in a warehouse. There
is, however, purchase-price value risk that the spot price of that inventory
diverge from the price already paid for the inventory. Companies frequently
hedge the fair value of inventory (although this is not necessarily a hedge of
profit if selling prices are not hedged and only purchase prices are hedged if
purchase and selling prices are not perfectly correlated).
Hedge accounting is not usually allowed (or called for) when hedging a booked
item carried at fair value. In theory the changes in value of the hedged item
should offset the changes in the value of the hedging derivative contract and
any hedging ineffectiveness should be charged to current earnings in any case.
If the hedged item is carried at historical cost, no such offset would arise and
hedge accounting is called for at least to the extent the hedge is effective.
Under FAS 133 and IAS 39, the hedge accounting for such a hedged item calls for
change the basis of accounting of the hedged item during the hedge accounting
period. Instead of the customary historical cost accounting (say for jet fuel
inventory), the hedge accounting rules call for a change to fair value
accounting of that inventory during the hedging period.
The most confusing part of fair value hedge accounting arises when the hedged
item is not booked. For example, purchase contracts are typically not booked in
accounting (never have been and hopefully never will be). For example, if
Southwest Airlines signs a firm commitment to buy jet fuel six months from now
at $2.89 per gallon the firm commitment is not booked. There is no cash flow
risk since the purchase price is fixed. There is value risk, however, that the
spot price in six months will be higher or lower than the $2.89 purchase
(forward, strike) price.
Now the accounting becomes complicated because there is no booked hedged item
value to be offset by a change in the booked hedging derivative change in value.
Fair value hedge accounting of unbooked hedged items calls for changes in the
value of the booked hedging contract to be offset by a posting to an equity
account. In FAS 133 the FASB recommends a badly-named equity account called Firm
Commitment. For example, to see how this works
03forfut.pps slide show file listed at
http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
The above slide show compares cash flow hedging versus fair value hedging of
booked items versus fair value hedging of unbooked (forecasted transaction)
hedged items.
Above I said that the "Firm Commitment" equity account called for in FAS 133
is badly named because changes in the value of fair value hedging contracts are
not firm commitments (although they may hedge a firm commitment unbooked hedged
item). I would've preferred some other name like "unrealized change in fair
value hedging contracts" as an equity account.
Now the debate centers on whether the "Firm Commitment" equity account used
for fair value hedge accounting of unbooked hedged items is tantamount to the "OCI"
equity account used for booked and unbooked cash flow and FX hedge accounting?
Firstly, there is a difference since fair value hedges to not impact any
equity account if the hedged items are booked and carried at fair value
themselves. Fair value hedges of unbooked items create the special and confusing
aspect of hedge accounting relief for fair value hedging.
What the IASB is currently debating with respect to amending IAS 39 is
whether hedge accounting would be greatly simplified by always offsetting
changes in hedge contact fair value to OCI (by whatever name) to the extent the
hedge is effective. Presumably the changes in the value of a booked hedged item
would also be charged to OCI (e.g., like available for sale investment changes
in value are currently accounted for under the amended FAS 115/130). Such
accounting could apply equally to cash flow, fair value, and FX hedges.
The reasoning of the IASB on October 6 seems to have been that the proposed
"simplification" of fair value hedge accounting is would not leave any hedge
ineffectiveness to be charged to current earnings for some fair value hedges
whereas all hedge ineffectiveness of cash flow and FX hedges is charged to
current earnings.
Hedges are often not fully effective at interim points in time. Options as
hedging derivatives, for example, are notoriously ineffective as hedges and
seldom meet the "80-125 percent test" of hedge effectiveness specified in
Paragraph BC 106 of IAS 39. One reason is that speculators are more often more
dominant in options trading markets vis-a-vis commodities markets themselves.
Option values are divided into two components --- time value plus intrinsic
value (equal the amount by which an option is in-the-money). Interim changes
(before option expiration) in total option hedging value seldom satisfy the
"80-125 percent test" or hedge effectiveness. It is common in hedge accounting
under FAS 133 and IAS 39 rules to charge all changes in an option's time value
to current earnings and only allow hedge accounting relief to changes in
intrinsic value (which are zero until if and when the option is in-the-money).
It would be a sorry state of affairs if the IASB had essentially voted for
hedge ineffectiveness to be ignored for fair value hedging. This would be
entirely inconsistent with hedge accounting for cash flow and FX hedges where
both FAS 133 ahd IAS 39 require that hedge ineffectiveness be posted to current
earnings. This is also required at present for fair value hedge ineffectiveness.
How sad it would be if the IASB voted in a huge inconsistency for treating hedge
ineffectiveness for fair value hedging relative to cash flow and FX hedge
accounting.
Whew! That was a close one that came within eight votes, at the IASB special
meeting on October 6, of injecting a huge inconsistency between fair value
hedging versus cash flow and FX hedge accounting. If the proposed amendment had
passed it would greatly simplify the accounting at the expense of greatly
complicating financial statement analysis.
Remember that if a nation replaces local GAAP with IFRS, that nation is not
allowed to cherry pick which IFRS standards to enforce versus not enforce or
introduce for publically traded companies. Supposedly the European carve out of
IAS 39 provisions was a phenomenon that the IASB will not allow in the future.
It’s complicated to allow multiple sets of standards/laws in a given
jurisdiction. It’s absolutely absurd to allow a given company/person to have
discretionary choice of what set to apply. The large international corporations
and CPA firms are trying to convince us that, in terms of publically traded
companies in the global economy, the definition of a “jurisdiction” is the
“world.”
I’m not totally convinced about the need for detailed world accounting
standards given the totally different importance of publically traded equity
shares in some nations vis-à-vis other nations. For example, the importance of
equity capital and creative financing (structures, synthetics, tranches, etc.)
in Germany is totally different in Germany versus the United States. Since IFRS
is most heavily rooted in European nations, this is probably why IFRS lacks
standards for creative equity financing in the United States.
It’s most confusing to have more than one set of standards in a given
jurisdiction, just as it is confusing to have more than one set of laws in one
jurisdiction. This is why I never supported the move by the SEC to allow foreign
companies to list on the NYSE under IFRS while the majority of listings (from
the U.S.) are under US GAAP. For example revenues are realized differently under
IFRS versus FASB rules. More importantly, IFRS has no standards whatsoever
covering some of the important things covered in the FASB such as accounting for
Lifo, SPEs, SPVs, VIEs, and synthetics (such as synthetic leasing).
Having two sets of accounting standards for the NYSE greatly complicates
comparability beyond the failure on a single set of standards to have perfect
comparability. It adds big noise to smaller noise in the context of
communications theory.
That is not to say that a given jurisdiction must have identical
standards/laws as other jurisdictions, especially when there are circumstantial
differences between jurisdictions. It makes sense to me to allow jurisdictions
to experiment and innovate in the setting of standards and laws within certain
fundamentals of human rights (very broad standards/laws deemed to be universal).
I don’t think that IFRS has limited itself to “broad fundamentals of investor
rights.”
Canada (and some other nations) are now facing controversies of possibly
having two sets of laws regarding murder, statutory rape, etc. --- Shiria law
for Subset A of citizens versus Canadian law for the Subset B majority of
citizens ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia
This is a very complicated issue that extends well beyond the setting of
accounting standards. One of the big complications is crossover crime, where a
person from Subset A commits a crime on a person from Subset B and vice versa.
Of course we’ve faced similar problems for years with foreign embassies not
being totally subjected to local laws. This sadly allows UN delegates to park in
any fire lane of their choosing in NYC.
For nearly eight years I’ve updated (usually daily) a log
on fraud. This is like a chronological journal from which I also posted to
various sites that I maintain on fraud.
One of the best ways to search these logs is via Bing (or
Google, Yahoo, etc.). For example, suppose you are interested in Bill and Hold
fraud. You can enter the search terms [“Bob Jensen” AND “Fraud Updates” AND
“Bill and Hold”] (without the square brackets) at
http://www.bing.com/
It may seem surprising, but I’m having better results in
most cases these days using Microsoft’s Bing search engine than either Google or
Yahoo ---
http://www.bing.com/
But Cha Cha is not a major search engine and may lag in such controls. I
really don't cha cha on the dance floor or on the computer.
"FASB, as Expected, Approves Accounting Changes That Benefits Tech
Companies," by Michael Rapoport, The Wall Street Journal, September 24,
2009 ---
"New Revenue-Recognition Rules: The Apple of Apple's Eye?
The computer company and other tech outfits are likely to cash in on
revenue-recognition changes if the new regs take on an international flavor," by
Marie Leone, CFO.com, September 16, 2009 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14440468?f=most_read
While Steve Jobs was preparing to introduce the new
Apple iPod nano last week, the company's chief accountant, Betsy Rafael, was
sending off a second letter to the Financial Accounting Standards Board
related to revenue recognition. At issue: how FASB might rework the rules
related to recognizing revenue for software that's bundled into a product
and never sold separately.
The rule is especially important to Apple because
it affects the revenue related to two of the company's most successful
products — the iPod and the iPhone. If FASB's time line holds to form, and
the rules are recast in 2011 the way Apple hopes they will be, the company
could be able to book revenue faster, yielding less time between product
launches and associated revenue gains. In theory, a successful launch — and
its attendant revenue — would drive up Apple's earnings, and possibly stock
price, in the same quarter the product is introduced, according to several
news reports that came out earlier this week.
Apple and other tech companies have been lobbying
for a rewrite of the so-called multiple deliverables, or bundling, rule for
quite some time. They argue that current U.S. generally accepted accounting
principles make it hard for product makers to reap the full reward of
successful products quickly. That's mainly because U.S. GAAP is stringent
about when and how companies recognize revenue generated by software sales.
"The requirements are that when you sell more than
one product or service at one time, you have to break down the total sale
value in[to] individual pieces. Establishing the individual values under
U.S. GAAP is solely a function of how the company prices those products and
services over time," PricewaterhouseCoopers's Dean Petracca told CFO in an
earlier interview. Contracts typically include such multiple "deliverables"
as hardware, software, professional services, maintenance, and support — all
of which are valued and accounted for differently.
The complex accounting rule has left many product
makers waiting for a chance to voice their displeasure at the standards, and
the most recent comment period saw such giants as Xerox, IBM, Dell, and
Hewlett-Packard — as well as relative newcomers like Palm and Tivo — make
their case to FASB. In all, 34 companies wrote to FASB during the month-long
comment period that ended in August to register their opinions on the
accounting treatment of multiple elements.
A broader revenue-recognition discussion paper was
issued by FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board in December
2008 for a six-month comment period. The boards are currently reviewing the
comments, and an exposure draft on revenue recognition, which is the
penultimate step to a new global rule, is expected out next year.
Regarding the issue of multiple deliverables, most
technology companies would like to see FASB move closer to international
standards with regard to bundled software, and drop the requirement for
vendor-specific objective evidence. Under GAAP, VSOE of fair value is
preferable when available, according to Sal Collemi, a senior manager at
accounting and audit firm Rothstein Kass.
Basically, VSOE is equivalent to the price charged
by the vendor when a deliverable is sold separately — or if not sold
separately, the price established by management for a separate transaction
that is not likely to change, explains Collemi. Third-party evidence of fair
value, such as prices charged by competitors, is acceptable if
vendor-specific evidence is unavailable. Many technology companies argue
that it is sometimes impossible to measure the fair value of a component
that is not sold separately, but rather is an integral part of the product —
as is the Apple software for the iPod series of products.
At the same time, international financial reporting
standards require companies to use the price regularly charged when an item
is sold as the best evidence of fair value. The alternative approach, under
IFRS, is the cost-plus margin, says Collemi. That is, the IFRS puts the onus
on management to value a product component based on what it costs to
manufacture the piece plus the profit-margin share built into the item.
Management usually bases its valuation on historic sales as well as current
market-established sale prices. The cost-plus margin is not allowed under
GAAP.
With respect to bundled components, the IFRS
focuses on "the substance of the transaction and the thought process and
ingredients that go into the transaction," contends Collemi, who says the
standard's objective is to make economic sense out of the transaction.
FASB's take on the subject is more conservative: the U.S. rule maker calls
for objective evidence to establish value.
Some critics say the IFRS approach invites abuse,
because it's based on management assumptions. But Collemi contends that GAAP
accounting is filled with rules and interpretations that require management
estimates, and that the burden is on management to produce the correct
numbers. What's more, auditors are in place to act as a backstop to verify
the processes used to arrive at management estimates. "If management is
following the spirit of the transaction and doing the right thing," adds
Collemi, "then it is up to auditors to challenge the estimates."
Continued in article
"How to predict Apple’s gross margins," July 18, 2009 ---
http://brainstormtech.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2009/07/18/how-to-predict-apples-gross-margins/
Apple’s (AAPL) fiscal third quarter earnings are due out Tuesday, July 21, and
once again the Street is focused on the big numbers — revenues, earnings and
units sold for the Mac, iPhone and iPod.
But
savvy analysts will be paying closer attention to the number that is the best
measure of a firm’s profitability: gross margin, expressed as the ratio of
profits to revenues. Or
(Revenue – Cost of sales) / Revenue
Apple’s gross margins, which have averaged 34.8% over the past eight quarters,
are the envy of the industry. Dell’s (DELL) first quarter GM, by contrast, was
17.6% and the company warned Wall Street last week that it is expecting a
“modest decline” next quarter.
In its
April earnings call, Apple low-balled its guidance numbers as usual, forecasting
a sharp drop in gross margins over the next 6 months. Specifically, it warned
analysts to expect no better than 33% in Q3 and “about 30%” in Q4.
But
Turley Muller, for one, doesn’t buy those numbers, and he should know.
Muller, who publishes a blog called Financial Alchemist, is one of a small group
of amateur analysts who track Apple closely and publish quarterly estimates that
are as good as — and often better than — the professionals’. In fact Muller’s
earnings estimates for Q2 were the best of the lot, missing the actual results
by just one penny (see here.)
For
Q3, he’s expecting Apple to report earnings of $1.35 per share on revenue of
$8.3 billion — far higher than the Street’s consensus ($1.16 on $8.16 billion).
Why
the discrepancy?
“Again
the story appears to be gross margin,” he writes. “Just like last quarter, when
Apple blew out the GM number with 36.4% (just as I had predicted) this quarter’s
GM (3Q) should be roughly the same as last quarter.
The
secret, he says, is in the profitability of the iPhone, “which is through the
roof.”
“Apple
tries to deflect that,” he says, but the evidence is right there, buried in a
chart he found in Apple’s SEC filings (see below). It shows Apple’s schedule for
deferred costs and revenue for the iPhone and Apple TV, which for legal reasons
are spread out over 24 months rather than being recorded at the time of sale.
Because Apple TV revenue is so small relative to the iPhone, this chart is a
pretty good proxy for the iPhone alone.
This
is complicated stuff, but the bottom line, as Muller points out, is that iPhone
profitability has been rising to the point where gross margins on the device are
over 50%.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's investment helpers are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/bookbob1.htm#InvestmentHelpers
Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
From The Big 4 Blog ---
http://www.bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/
Wednesday, September 30, 2009
Ernst & Young: External Challenges Drive Flat Revenue From FY 2008 To FY
2009
Ernst & Young just reported its combined worldwide results for the year
ending 30 June 2009 (FY09), the first Big4 firm to report its global
results.
Combined global firm revenues of US$21.4 billion
for the fiscal year ended 30 June 2009 (FY09) decreased a modest 0.2% in
local currency terms from the comparable period in FY 2008. In FY 2008, E&Y
reported US$23.0 billion in global revenues, and in US dollar terms, the
revenue actually declined 6.8% from 2008 to 2009. This shows the dramatic
effect of the appreciation of the US dollar in this period against foreign
currencies. In other words, one unit of foreign currency translated to much
fewer US dollars in the FY 2009 fiscal year compared to the FY 2008 fiscal
year. We have highlighted growth in both local currency and US$ terms in our
analysis.
Across E&Y’s five geographic areas, Japan grew at
7.5% in local terms, due to the acquisition of 1,000 professionals from
accountancy firm Misuzu; and revenues increased 20% in US$ terms. Europe,
Middle East, India and Africa (EMEIA) area grew 1.8% in local currency
terms, but declined 9.7% in US$ terms. Oceania decreased 0.4% in local
currency terms, but declined a dramatic 15.9% in US$ terms. The Far East
decreased 2.7% in local currency terms and 5.9% in US$ terms. The Americas
area decreased 3.2% in local currency terms but 5.5% in US$ terms.
There were some bright spots however, with many of
the emerging markets achieving strong growth, including the Middle East
(18.6%), India (13.1%) and Brazil (8.0%).
E&Y said that, “all of our service lines were
impacted by pricing pressure and fee reductions.” Despite that, Assurance
Services with FY 2009 revenues of $10.1 billion offset price pressure with
market-share gains, and revenues declined only 0.7% in local currency terms,
but 6.3% in US$ terms. Global Tax Services with FY 2009 revenues of $5.8
billion was up 1.8% in local currency terms due to increased tax
enforcement, but dropped 5.2% in US$ terms. Advisory Services with FY 2009
revenues of $3.6 billion was up 1.5% in local currency terms due to
sustained demand for risk management and performance improvement, but
dropped 6.0% in US$ terms. Transaction Advisory Services with FY 2009
revenues of $1.9 billion, had a 6.9% decrease in local currency terms due to
fall in M&A volumes, but revenues decreased a whopping 14.8% in US$ terms.
Ernst & Young’s employee levels were flat from 2008
into 2009 at 144,500 total employees. Americas declined 4.5% from year to
year, this was offset with growth in Japan, EMEIA and Far East. Employee
level changes across service lines was moderate in percentage terms from
year to year. Attrition levels would be certainly down due to the tough job
market, and it seems hiring levels just kept pace with departures.
The recently reported numbers from Deloitte UK and
PricewaterhouseCoopers UK were pre-indicators that the Big4 firms would not
be reporting blow-out results. And this first announcement from E&Y confirms
our premise that business for the Big4 has slowed down dramatically in the
last 15 months as the economic global crisis finally had an impact on the
Big4 firms due to reduced demand, price pressure and fee reductions. This
brings an abrupt stop to 5 year of double-digit % annual revenue growth at
all the Big4 firms.
The good news in this release is that revenues have
not shrunk by a large amount, showing that the Big4 firms have deep breadth
and penetration in every market and country in the world, and their services
continue to be in demand by clients as they navigate through this crisis. A
flat year to year scenario, given the deepest and most detrimental recession
since the Great Depression, is cause for somber reflection, but not for
alarm. Consider that Tax and Advisory Services actually grew for Ernst and
Young.
We’ll wait to see how the other Big4 firms report
results, Deloitte is certainly late this year in their results, but we would
expect that revenue growth is nearly flat and all firms will discuss
external challenges as the main driver of this situation.
When interest rates are confounded by uncertain foreign exchange movements
and an unpredictable dictator
An Economics/Finance Lesson from South of the Border: A Teaching Case With
Accounting Implications
From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 1,
2009
Venezuela to Sell $3 Billion in Dollar-Denominated Bonds
by Dan
Molinski and Darcy Crowe
Sep 29, 2009
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Advanced
Financial Accounting, Bond Prices, Bonds, Foreign Currency Exchange Rates
SUMMARY: "Venezuela
announced a dollar-denominated government-bond sale for at least $3 billion,
a move that gave the Bolivar currency a boost against the dollar in the
black market."
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Questions
relate primarily to factors in bond issuance, with some reference to
currency exchange, suitable for use in intermediate and advanced financial
accounting courses.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory)
Why is the Venezuelan government taking an action which is influencing black
market trades of the country's currency, the Bolivar? In your answer, define
the terms black market as well as fixed rate and floating rate for currency
exchanges.
2. (Advanced)
The bonds are "directed at people living or residing in Venezuela." Does
this mean they must acquire dollars to pay for these dollar-denominated
bonds in their home country? Explain.
3. (Introductory)
Venezuela's central bank said on its Web site the 2019 bond will have a
coupon of 7.75% while the 2024 bond will have an 8.25% coupon. What is a
coupon? Why do these two bonds issued by the same government have different
coupon rates?
4. (Advanced)
Based on information in the article, describe the expectations of the
effective interest rate for these bonds.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Venezuela to Sell $3 Billion in Dollar-Denominated Bonds," by Dan Molinski
and Darcy Crowe, The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125414560675846299.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Venezuela announced a dollar-denominated
government-bond sale for at least $3 billion, a move that gave the bolivar
currency a boost against the dollar in the black market.
Venezuela's Finance Ministry said that the bond
sale, which is being managed by Deutsche Bank AG and Citigroup Inc., would
come in two issues, one for $1.5 billion with a 2019 maturity and another
for the same amount, with a 2024 maturity.
The ministry statement said the sale is directed at
"people living or residing in Venezuela," who would pay for the bonds with
the bolivar. Investors would then be able to exchange them for dollars, and
that is the part that helped lift the bolivar, as the sale could absorb
excessive local demand for the U.S. currency.
The bolivar has for years traded at an official,
fixed rate of 2.15 for $1 that was set by the Socialist government of Hugo
Chávez. But that rigidity has spawned a robust, unregulated black market in
which the bolivar is much weaker. Last month, it cost as much as seven
bolivars for $1.
But speculation of the dollar-denominated bond sale
and the official announcement Monday turned the bolivar as strong as 5.2
bolivars for $1, nearly its best showing in 2009.
The government hopes the bond sale will allow the
bolivar to maintain its upward trend, which could allow manufacturers and
other local businesses easier access to dollars at cheaper levels so they
can buy goods and ramp up activity.
Based on calculations from Caracas brokerage firm
BBO Financial Services, the bond issue could allow investors to buy dollars
at a rate of 4.6 bolivars, a price well below the parallel market rate.
The primary market price for the bonds is seen at a
premium to par, with the price to be determined by auction, according to a
statement from a syndicate desk.
Venezuela's central bank said on its Web site the
2019 bond will have a coupon of 7.75%, while the 2024 bond will have an
8.25% coupon. The government will take orders through Friday, and results
will be announced Oct. 6, the bank said.
The sale is the first dollar-denominated issue by
the government in more than a year, although the state-run oil firm issued
$3 billion earlier this year.
The finance minister said over the weekend that
state-run entities would have the option of more bond sales during the
remainder of the year.
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm
FASB Accounting Standards Codification™—Four Volume Set ($195.00)
You can read the following (on September 30, 2009) at the FASB Website ---
Click Here
http://www.surveymethods.com/Preview.aspx?EAF4E0EDBEA4BDAFABE0E6EDE6AEB7B9ECAE&DO_NOT_COPY_THIS_LINK
In order to help us determine initial print
quantities for the following FASB hard copy bound editions, please indicate
your interest in the following publications. Please note that this is for
informational purposes only. Your ‘yes’ response to any or all of the items
below is in no way an obligation to purchase the publications.
*1. FASB Accounting Standards Codification™—Four
Volume Set ($195.00)
A four-volume bound edition of the FASB Accounting
Standards Codification™ will be available at the beginning of October 2009.
Quantity pricing will be offered in addition to a 20 percent discount for
academic users.
Jensen Question
I "cheated" and copied the link above where it says DO NOT COPY THIS
LINK.
Why would the FASB put this at the end of a URL?
Will the FBI come knocking at my door?
Bob Jensen's threads on the "dumb, dumb, dumb" FASB Codification ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
"GAAP Codification: An Ontological Perspective," by Zane L. Swanson
(University of Central Oklahoma) and Ron Freeze (Emporia State University), SSRN,
September 2, 2008 ---
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262059
Abstract:
The 2008 Financial Accounting Standards Board Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles (GAAP) codification initiative makes a significant step in the
consolidation and ease of use of standards applied to accounting practices.
The objective of this article is to identify the potential benefits of
enhancing the GAAP codification initiative by the application of an
accounting ontology framework. These benefits include: 1) Improved decision
making, 2) Faster assimilation of GAAP practices, and 3) an improved common
framework for facilitating communication between FASB, IFRS and the SEC. Our
study's analysis is meant to motivate discussion within the accounting
community about what the ultimate codification might be and provide a
starting point for creating an ontology that meets the consensus of the
community.
Bob Jensen's threads on the FASB's Codification database ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
Debt Versus Equity: Dense Fog on the Mezzanine Level
Deloitte has submitted a
Letter of Comment (PDF 277k) on the IASB's
Discussion Paper: Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Equity. We
strongly support development of a standard addressing how to distinguish between
liabilities and equity. We do not support any of the three approaches outlined
in the
Discussion Paper, but we
believe that the basic ownership approach is a suitable starting point. Below is
an excerpt from our letter. Past comment letters are
Here.
IASPlus, September 5, 2008 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
July 19, 2009 reply from John Anderson
[jcanderson27@COMCAST.NET]
Professor Jensen,
Thanks for your very interesting post!
This peek into the work of the IASB illustrates much of what is happening
within the IFRS iceberg … where 6/7th's of the activity is under the
surface, or else seemingly ignored in the US press and perhaps intentionally
under-reported by US professional organizations.
I have pulled the following excerpts from the IASB’s linked site in your
post ---
http://www.iasplus.com/dttletr/0809liabequity.pdf
The approach was prepared by staff of the Accounting Standards Committee of
Germany on behalf of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG)
and the German Accounting Standards Board (GASB) under the Pro-active
Accounting Activities in Europe Initiative (PAAinE) of EFRAG and the
European National Standard Setters.
The staff pointed out that the basic principle for the classification of
equity and liability has been established but that all other components
still represent work-in-progress.
Also:
The staff asked the Board whether there was agreement on acknowledging in
the IASB's forthcoming discussion paper that the European Financial
Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) had also issued a discussion paper on the
distinction between equity and liabilities. Most Board Members disagreed
with the staff's proposed wording and emphasised that the IASB should make
it clear that it had not deliberated the final version of the EFRAG
document, had therefore reached no final position on its merits and that the
acknowledgement of the existence of the EFRAG paper should not be seen as
the IASB endorsing the positions taken therein. It was decided to take the
staff proposals offline to agree a suitable wording.
Also:
The FASB document describes three approaches to distinguish equity
instruments and non-equity instruments:
·
basic ownership,
·
ownership-settlement, and
·
reassessed expected outcomes.
The FASB has reached a preliminary view that the basic ownership approach is
the appropriate approach for determining which instruments should be
classified as equity. The IASB has not deliberated any of the three
approaches, or any other approaches, to distinguishing equity instruments
and non-equity, and does not have any preliminary view.
The IASB's DP describes some implications of the three approaches in the
FASB document for IFRSs. For instance:
·
Significantly fewer instruments would be classified as equity under the
basic ownership approach than under IAS 32.
·
The ownership-settlement approach would be broadly consistent with the
classifications achieved in IAS 32. However, under the ownership-settlement
approach, more instruments would be separated into components and fewer
derivative instruments would be classified as equity.
The goal of the
Discussion Paper is to solicit views on whether FASB's proposals are a
suitable starting point for the IASB's deliberations. If the project is
added to the IASB's active agenda, the IASB intends to undertake it jointly
with the FASB. The IASB requests responses to the DP by 5 September 2008.
Click for
Press Release
PDF 52k).
My concerns are the following:
-
About a year ago I understood that in IFRS most Preferred Stock would be
classified as Debt, not Equity.
-
There was some question about Callable and Convertible Debt.
Today, going through the IASB’ abstract of all of their meetings on this
subject, I cannot determine if the Germans in ERFAG are arguing for
Preferred Stock to be classified as Equity or not. Logically their issue of
the Loss Absorbing nature of the Security should be the determining factor
for classifications and therefore classify Preferred Stock as Equity or not.
This is critical in areas like Boston where many of our VC backed companies
would be transformed into companies having little or no Equity under IFRS.
I have seen IFRS “experts” present on Route 128 in Boston and seemingly
being unaware of this difference between US GAAP and IFRS. Similarly,
Tweedie’s stand-by illustrative company from Scotland that he loves to use
is Johnnie Walker. This would indicate to me that maybe McGreevy should
introduce Tweedie to some of the Microsoft development now performed in
Ireland, unless Johnnie Walker is about to enter the Technology Business.
As has been the theme in some of my prior posts, after correctly bringing
the US position (FASB) into the discussions about a year ago, since then the
IASB seems to have its hands full dealing with the Contingencies from the
EU.
Clearly with 55 conventions in the EU, 2½ for each EU country, a key task
for the IASB is the de-Balkanization of the EU’s Accounting. During this
necessary period of consolidation within the EU, we should not be required
to mark time as the IASB planned during the EU conversion from 2005
throughout 2008. (The Credit Crunch and Financial Meltdown in September
2008 threw a monkey-wrench into these plans!)
As in their December 2008 Revenue Recognition “Discussion Paper” the IASB
seems to have their hands full now introducing these revolutionary new
concepts such as Equity Section Accounting and Revenue Recognition to their
subscribing countries. They are seemingly starting each exercise with a
blank sheet. Unfortunately this is no way conducive to their goal of
converging with us in the US. This methodology also will create excess
fatigue within the EU’s apparently limited and diffused technical resources.
Given that the IASB has been struggling with Equity Accounting since 2005
this also confirms my fear of future lack of responsiveness to newly arising
needs for new accounting regulations. We are now down to only the FASB in
this country. I shudder to consider a world with only the IASB. Could they
handle Cash in 3 months, or would this require further study?
They were quick with Derivatives in 2008 Q4 and in recent threats to us in
the US.
Apparently they can only be decisive in emotional moments of pique or fear!
Best Regards!
John
John Anderson, CPA, CISA, CISM, CGEIT, CITP
Financial & IT Business
Consultant
14
Tanglewood Road
Boxford,
MA
01921
jcanderson27@comcast.net
978-887-0623 Office
978-837-0092 Cell
978-887-3679
Fax
Bob Jensen's threads on Debt versus Equity ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FAS150
"Revenue Recognition: Will a Single Model Fly? Elements unique to
long-term contracts pose a challenge for FASB and IASB in their bid to create
one standard covering all customer relationships" by David McCann, CFO.com, July
2, 2009 ---
http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/13941548/c_2984368/?f=archives
Can U.S. and international accounting
standard-setters realize their dream of fashioning a single
revenue-recognition standard that would apply to all customer contracts?
While the answer won't be known for some time, it's safe to say there are
hurdles on the road ahead.
In a joint discussion paper issued last December in
which the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International
Accounting Standards Board proposed a model for a lone standard, they
acknowledged that an alternative approach could be needed for some
contracts. The almost 200 letters they received in a comment period that
ended June 19 did nothing to remove any doubts about whether having one
standard will be viable.
Most of the letters agreed that the standards
boards' goals are laudable. One main objective is to simplify and clarify
FASB's revenue-recognition rules, which currently are scattered among more
than 100 standards. Another is to offer more guidance than what's contained
in IASB's broadly worded revenue-recognition principle.
In meeting those twin objectives, the boards would
be advancing their overarching goal of converging U.S. and international
standards. The major goals aside, however, many commenters registered alarm
at specifics of the proposed model — especially concerning how revenue
should be recognized under long-term contracts.
Today, entities typically recognize revenue when
it's realized or realizable and the "earnings process" is substantially
complete. The new model instead would direct the entity to record the gain
when it performs an obligation under its contract, such as by delivering a
promised good or service to the customer. (The contract need not be written;
even a simple retail transaction involves an implicit contract in which the
customer agrees to provide consideration in return for an item.)
In a simple example, if the entity had agreed to
provide two products at different times, it would recognize revenue twice,
even if the contract stipulated that payment would not be made until the
second product was delivered. The discussion paper mentions several
permissible bases on which revenue could be allocated to the different
performance obligations. But the paper says the revenue should be in
proportion to the stand-alone selling price of the good or service
underlying a performance obligation. And for an item that's not sold
separately, a stand-alone price should be estimated — something that the
standards boards acknowledged could be hard to do.
A main purpose of the performance-obligation
approach is to iron out many of the disparities in how businesses account
for revenue, which the boards say make financial statements less useful than
they should be. The discussion paper gave the example of cable television
providers, which under FAS 51 account for connecting customers to the cable
network and providing the cable signal over the subscription period as
separate earnings processes. By contrast, under the Securities and Exchange
Commission's SAB 104, telephone companies account for up-front activation
fees and monthly fees for phone usage as part of the same earnings process.
"The fact that entities apply the earnings process
approach differently to economically similar transactions calls into
question the usefulness of that approach [and] reduces the comparability of
revenue across entities and industries," the discussion paper stated.
Long Engagements Perhaps the thorniest issue
arising from the standards boards' proposal involves long-term construction
or production contracts. Historically, under many such arrangements the
company recognizes revenue using the "percentage-of-completion" method — if
it's a three-year project with costs of $3 million, and $1 million of that
is expended in the first year, one-third of the revenue is reflected for
that year.
The single-model proposal, on the other hand, says
that revenue should be recognized as an entity "transfers control" of goods
and services to the customer. But many comment letters noted that the
discussion paper did not clearly define what constitutes a transfer of
control.
A company that is constructing a building for a
customer may regard the materials and labor being provided as a continuous
transfer of goods and services, which under the proposed model could be
construed as allowing them to continue to recognize revenue over the
duration of the contract. But if the standard setters hold that "transfer of
control" occurs when the building is completed and turned over to the
customer, all of the revenue would have to be recognized in the final year
of the contract.
Lynne Triplett, a partner and revenue-recognition
expert at Grant Thornton, told CFO.com that the way the discussion paper is
written, "There could be questions as to whether there is continuous
transfer of control, and to the extent there's not, there is going to be a
significant difference between the way revenue is recognized today versus
how it might be recognized in the future."
That would create misleading financial statements,
according to some of the comment letters. "The most concerning area of the
discussion paper is the potential change to the accounting for long-term
contracts," wrote Financial Executives International Canada. "Creating a
model which results in 'lumpy' revenue recognition ... with a waterfall
effect in one accounting period at the very end, is not useful to the
readers of financial statements."
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Most of the argument centers on timing of revenue recognition such a in
long-term contracts. But the important issues concern whether or not some
transactions should be recognized as revenue. Much of this debate was left in
many EITF dead ends that need to be explicitly resolved ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
But the track record of the IASB is not very strong about explicit
resolution of problems. Instead the IASB likes principles-based standards that,
in my viewpoint, leaves too much to subjective judgment. This is one of the
reasons why the revenue recognition standards to date issued by the IASB
arguably constitute the greatest weakness in IFRS.
Thank You John Anderson
You’ve given us the most penetrating critique to date of IFRS in the
context of when (probably not if) international accounting standards should
replace U.S. GAAP.
This seriously backs up
Professor Sunder's argument that, not only should the IASB be given a world
monopoly on accounting standard setting, it should not be given one before
its standards are demonstrably better than other national standards, especially
U.S. GAAP. I've always argued for at least giving the IASB more time to generate
better standards. Year 2009 was just too soon, at least in the U.S., for
IFRS-Lite and Year 2014 is just too soon for IFRS-Heavy.
You can read about the IFRS-Lite and IFRS-Heavy express trains at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
July 16, 2009 message from John Anderson
[jcanderson27@COMCAST.NET]
I usually try to be very even-handed when discussing IFRS, but today please
allow me to speak as a proponent of Convergence … but also an unbridled
supporter of US GAAP!
First off, thanks for your honest and candid email.
I believe that this dramatizes the giant problem that I believe Tweedie and
crew are all too belatedly realizing they have! They have a lot to do!
This may account for some of the erratic comments and actions by IASB
members over the last few months. For example I am thinking of his
colleague Mr. Smith from Fort Lauderdale who is really wigging-out at
times! Of course he has dedicated a decade or more of his life to the IASB
so during those periods where the IASB could be confused with the Keystone
Cops, we can all understand his justified frustration! However, rather than
focus more on any of these untoward actions or statements made by
individuals, or at times their apparent threats to not proceed with
Convergence as agreed, let’s just wish them well and hope they get down to
business … as we in the US are waiting … and they now have the world
spotlight on them that they seemed so determined to have.
I will not attempt to summarize the US Revenue Recognition work of over the
last 12 years, but I will make these comments. The joint IFRS communiqué
from the FASB and the IASB was less than a particularly rigorous piece of
work! It read more like it was a first draft. They have recently referred
to it as only a “discussion paper.” It was not a valid step to Convergence
with the US and gave no indication of how they might be transforming their
current IFRS into something comparable in quality to current US GAAP in this
area. They did not demonstrate a mastery of the current US concepts and
certainly didn’t come close to introducing more advanced thinking which
would be the prerogative of the IASB. Instead they started out by focusing
upon hypothetical Contract Assets and Liabilities. However, in some
sections they spoke like these Contract Assets and Liabilities were not
merely illustrative, but were instead actually being booked. When their own
illustrative tools boggle them, and nobody does a final read through, we end
up with stuff like this!
This was really only an elementary first step of introducing some of the
concepts of Revenue Recognition to many people in other jurisdictions who
have probably never given this subject any thought before! I accept that
this educational work by the IASB is needed, but they shouldn’t confuse this
with Convergence with the US. This dramatizes how in the area of Revenue
Recognition, the IASB has a lot of ground to cover and must break their
inertia. The IASB not only has to cover this territory which may be
somewhat new to some of their members, but they have to educate those around
the world who are in the field and currently applying IFRS and make sure
that they absorb this material. It is always easier to start something and
attend the parade … than to continue and sustain anything. (It’s also much
more fun to start something!)
Then, to raise questions about their institutional competence and control,
they published IFRS SME before they determined what course they will follow
in IFRS. Further, in earlier drafts, IFRS SME was more conservative on
Revenue Recognition than was IFRS, and ignored these vexing Contract Assets
and Liabilities. I have informally confirmed that this SME group is
essentially operating independently of IFRS’s main team. Finally in SME’s
Final Draft, Revenue Recognition adopts a style and structure somewhat
reminiscent the SAB statements from the SEC with 26 Revenue examples sited
in the final document with varying degrees of discussion and guidance.
(Rules!) However, within IFRS, the IASB is apparently more and more
convinced that one single standard will serve as Revenue Recognition for
Software, Power Utilities, and anything else that comes down the pike!
(Converging SME and IFRS may be yet another task.)
Here I am only discussing Software Revenue Recognition. This is
serious stuff in Boston, San Francisco, Seattle and other cities where we
all know of companies where there are Ex-Management Teams that are currently
doing time in US Prisons for violating these Accounting provisions. They
are not as prominent as Madoff, but they are in the same place. Most will
probably get out of prison within their lifetimes.
During his last visit to the US, Sir David
(Tweedie)
tried to dramatize how you can get around any rule if you want to. One of
his anecdotes was probably an ill-advised selection. He must understand
that thousands are listening to him when he is on stage in a webcast.
Further, advisors with attitudes of getting around certain rules can get
people in this country some serious periods of incarceration.
In the US this is an area that is considered by many as very challenging.
However, it is an excellent area to study as it bares the bones of both
systems and shows that US GAAP is more driven by the principle of
Conservatism than is IFRS, at this time. (Why can no proponents of IFRS
ever tell me the Principles that these methods are based upon? If they are
particularly annoying I sometimes suggest it’s the principle of “Ease of
Calculations!” I have yet to get a response when doing this. So I will
supply this sort of Transparency as the apparent principle or basis of most
of IFRS in this area, not stark Conservatism. This is important, because it
is time to stop pretending! US GAAP is principles based … but it is not
just bare principles! I believe that IFRS also has some Rules!)
To directly answer your question, I have recompiled and attached my portion
of the AICPA’s response to the FASB regarding IFRS (not SME). You will be
able to look at the response regarding Software Revenue. In this example
this change is demonstrated to be more than dramatic!
In the example Current Revenue is as follows:
US GAAP $0
IFRS $9.333M
In the Software Revenue Recognition you’ll see my SOP 98-9 Residual Method
contrasted against my “apportion the discount numbers” where I used the
proposed IFRS Revenue Method. This approach is similar to the FASB’s EITF
00.21 which I personally feel muddied the genius of SOP 97-2 and 98-9
authored by the AICPA! EITF 00.21 is not the main thrust of US GAAP; SOP
98-9 is along with the Deferral Method for VSOE is the main thrust. (Many
IFRS people make the fundamental mistake of assuming that Pre-Codification
US GAAP is as simply laid out as IFRS. They go to the FASB Statements and
think that is it. Wrong! There were 25 other potential sources! Hence the
need for Codification with is similar to the ARB’s compiled in the US around
1951.)
IFRS Revenue shoots through the roof because front-end Revenue is not based
only on the Principle of Conservatism and recognizing all discounts and
Sales concessions or inducements on the Front-end!
US GAAP has principles like Conservatism. In my example US GAAP demands all
discounts be taken on the first piece of revenue recognized upon delivery.
However IFRS approach simply allocates like some practically trained Cost
Accountant; not like a conservatively trained Financial Accountant!
The irony is this! SME is more conservative than the main body of IFRS! In
the earlier drafts of SME you could not have deferred revenue at anything
other than your normal margin. Whereas IFRS allows zero margin sales t be
maintained in Deferred Revenue! Incredibly daft! Excuse me … incredibly
Un-Conservative!
Please prove to us how IFRS is more conservative, or else please suggest as
to how you would remedy this dire GAP in the IFRS Methodology.
Thanks for your patience!
Best Regards!
John
John Anderson, CPA, CISA, CISM, CGEIT, CITP
Financial & IT Business
Consultant
14
Tanglewood Road
Boxford,
MA
01921
jcanderson27@comcast.net
978-887-0623 Office
978-837-0092 Cell
978-887-3679 Fax
June 15, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi John,
You wrote:
*****Begin Quotation
During his last visit to the US, Sir David
(Tweedie)
tried to dramatize how you can get around any rule if you want to. One
of his anecdotes was probably an ill-advised selection. He must
understand that thousands are listening to him when he is on stage in a
webcast. Further, advisors with attitudes of getting around certain
rules can get people in this country some serious periods of
incarceration.
*****End Quotation
In addition to incarceration in the U.S. for violating GAAP rules, there is
the even more common and very expensive lawsuit risk for breaking GAAP rules
and failure to detect these breaches in audits ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
I’ve always argued (and repeated in a recent message to the AECM)
that the main advantage of rules-based standards lies in dealing with
enormous clients like Enron that became bullies with auditors. Auditors
could point to a rule and then say they “have no choice.”
In other words, the advantage of a rule is
before
the fact
rather than after the fact!
Of course when dealing with companies like Enron that want to
want to cheat on the rules it’s essential for auditors to verify compliance.
The famous 3% rule for SPE accounting in U.S. GAAP was not properly verified
by Andersen’s audit team at Enron, and this more than anything else,
probably led to the implosion of Andersen (at least it was the smoking gun)
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm
Who knows what would’ve happened to Andersen and Enron under IFRS?
There would not have been that smoking gun in an explicit 3% rule. At this
point IFRS is too different on SPE accounting to predict what might have
been the alternative scenario ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Under IFRS we might still have both Enron and Andersen, and that
would not necessarily be bad if Enron had pulled off most of its many
leveraged gambles and Andersen had to be better auditors under SOX. Of
course this is all speculation off the top of my head.
Although Enron tried to screw California, Enron was not unique.
Everybody was screwing California.
Bob Jensen's threads on the express train's bumpy rails toward requiring
IFRS-Heavy for public companies (Resistance is Futile) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting
Issues of principles-based versus rules-based standards are discussed at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Principles-Based
Fade, Gain, and Cost Shifting Analysis in gross profit analysis in
construction accounting
September 25, 2009 message from William Brighenti, CPA
[accountantscpahartford@GMAIL.COM]
If anyone has detailed
information including an illustration of a fade analysis for contractors,
please email me or post it. I've posted one on my website:
http://www.cpa-connecticut.com/fade-analysis.html.
However, I suspect there may be other formats
available allowing for better analysis. Please email all suggestions,
comments, and formats to
accountantscpahartford@gmail.com.
Thank you,
William Brighenti, CPA,
Accountants CPA Hartford
http://www.cpa-connecticut.com
September 25, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi William,
There can be “gains” as well as “fades.” Also check
under the contractors “cost shifting” behavior from contract to contract.
Here are a few links to look at::
http://www.eurojournals.com/irjfe_28_04.pdf
Click Here
http://www.dglcpas.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/cost_shifting.pdf
Click Here
http://blog.skodaminotti.com/blog/cleveland-construction-accounting/0/0/the-importance-of-gainfade-analyses
Click Here
http://blog.skodaminotti.com/blog/real-estate-and-construction-blog-5
Click Here (CPE Course)
http://www.cpa2biz.com/AST/Main/CPA2BIZ_Primary/Tax/PRDOVR~PC-186319/PC-186319.jsp
Click Here
http://www.thetfmshow.com/Assets/Content/doc/TU13%20-%20Financial%20Fundamentals%20pt%202.pdf
Hope this helps.
There is also an unrelated concept of fade analysis
in game theory ---
Parrondo's Paradox ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parrondo%27s_paradox
Bob Jensen
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm
From The
Wall Street Journal Accounting Review on October 8, 2009
Borrowing for Dividends Raises Worries
by Liz Rappaport
Oct 05, 2009
Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Bonds,
Debt, Dividends, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement
Analysis, Mergers and Acquisitions
SUMMARY: "Rock-bottom
interest rates and thawed credit markets are emboldening some companies to use
bond-sale proceeds...to pay out special dividends, buy back stock, or finance
acquisitions.... [In contrast,] most corporate-bond offerings during the
recession have been used to reduce debt or stockpile cash."
CLASSROOM
APPLICATION: The
article can be used in covering bond issuances, ratio analysis particularly of
debt-to-equity and interest versus earnings, dividend payments, and corporate
acquisitions.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory) What was the effective interest rate for corporations
with high credit ratings who issued bonds in September 2009? How does that rate
compare to one year ago?
2. (Introductory) What reasons for that change are given in the article?
Do they have anything to do with changing creditworthiness of the borrowers?
3. (Introductory) Compare the actions of Intel Corporation and TransDigm
Group, Inc., with their debt issuance. How are they similar? How are they
different?
4. (Advanced) What is the impact on a corporate balance sheet of issuing
debt? Describe the impact ignoring use of the proceeds, in essence assuming the
company will "stockpile" the cash.
5. (Introductory) Define the financial statement ratios of debt-to-equity
and times interest earned.
6. (Advanced) Describe the change in impact of debt issuance on a balance
sheet equation and the two financial ratios if the proceeds are used to pay
dividends to shareholders.
7. (Advanced) Can a company issue bonds in order to "reduce debt" as the
author says was done in during the recession and credit crisis? Explain,
proposing a better term for such a transaction.
8. (Introductory) The author uses two benchmarks to make clear the impact
of TransDigm Group's debt issuance and dividend payment. What are these
benchmarks? How does using them increase clarity about the size of the $425
million bond offering and the $7.50 to $7.70 per share special dividend?
9. (Advanced) The author also includes use of bond proceed to finance
acquisitions as a risky action. How have debt analysts reacted to Kraft's offer
to buy Cadbury?
10. (Advanced) Describe the impact of a business combination financed by
debt on the total combined balance sheets of the firms entering into the
business combination. How does this impact compare to using bond proceeds to pay
dividends to shareholders? How does it differ?
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Borrowing
for Dividends Raises Worries," by Liz Rappaport, October 5, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125470107157763085.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Rock-bottom interest rates and thawed credit markets are emboldening some
companies to use bond-sale proceeds to go on the offensive, even if that means
rewarding shareholders at the expense of bondholders.
The nascent trend is controversial because corporate borrowers are sinking
themselves deeper into debt to pay out special dividends, buy back stock or
finance acquisitions. While such moves were all the rage during the credit boom,
most corporate-bond offerings during the recession have been used to reduce debt
or stockpile cash.
Eric Felder, global head of credit trading at Barclays Capital, says the lure of
low rates and companies' stables of cash increases "the risk of non-bondholder
friendly events."
Last week's sale of $425 million of bonds by aircraft-parts manufacturer
TransDigm Group Inc. is one of the back-to-the-past corporate-bond deals causing
concern among some analysts. More than $360 million of the proceeds will be used
to pay a special cash dividend to shareholders and management of the Cleveland
company.
The added debt increased TransDigm's borrowings to 4.3 times its earnings before
interest and taxes, compared with 3.1 times before last week's deal. The
expected dividend of $7.50 to $7.70 a share is equal to nearly all of the net
income that TransDigm reported since the end of fiscal 2003, according to
Moody's Investors Service.
Moody's said the dividend "illustrates the company's aggressive financial
policy." Moody's gave the new debt a junk rating of B3, even though the ratings
firm said TransDigm's "strong operating performance will enable the company to
service the increased debt level."
Sean Maroney, director of investor relations at TransDigm, says the "stability
of our business, high profit margins and consistent cash flow" give the company
"the ability to support this level of leverage."
Borrowing from bondholders to pay shareholder dividends is "a hallmark of an
earlier credit era," Jeffrey Rosenberg, head of credit strategy at Bank of
America Merrill Lynch, wrote in a report Friday. Such deals were popular in 2003
and 2004, the last time the Federal Reserve lowered its benchmark interest rate
to historically low levels, keeping it at 1% for more than a year.
Companies like Dex Media Inc. took on debt to pay dividends to its
private-equity owners, including Carlyle Group and Welsh, Carson, Anderson &
Stowe, before taking the companies public. Dex Media filed for bankruptcy
earlier this year under a mountain of debt.
With the federal-funds rate at 0% for nine months now and confidence returning
to the stock and debt markets, investors have been driven to take on more risk.
That is flooding the corporate-bond market with cash. Investors poured $43
billion into investment-grade corporate-bond funds in the second quarter and
nearly $40 billion in the third quarter -- almost double previous peak quarters,
according to Lipper AMG Data Services.
The wave of buying drove down borrowing costs for the average highly rated
corporation to about 5%, according to Merrill, a level not seen since 2005. In
the heat of the crisis last October, such rates averaged 9%. Through the end of
September, more than 1,000 high-rated companies borrowed a record $860 billion,
according to Dealogic.
In July, Intel Corp. sold $1.75 billion of convertible bonds, planning to use
$1.5 billion of the proceeds to buy back shares. A spokesman for Intel declined
to comment.
The computer-chip giant has a strong credit rating of single-A, so it doesn't
carry a burdensome debt load. Still, the deal raised eyebrows among some
analysts and investors, who say floating debt to buy back stock could become
more common as companies regain confidence.
And as merger-and-acquisition activity revs up, the cheaper cost of debt
compared with equity is tempting companies to use bond sales as a deal-making
war chest.
Analysts are watching Kraft Foods Inc. in anticipation that the company would
finance its proposed purchase of U.K. chocolate, candy and chewing gum maker
Cadbury PLC by raising tons of debt. Last month's unsolicited bid by Kraft was
then valued at about $16.7 billion, but it could be weeks before Kraft submits a
formal offer.
Three major credit-ratings agencies have warned Kraft that they could slash the
company's debt ratings if the company reaches a deal agreement with Cadbury. At
the current offering price, Kraft would need to shell out at least $6 billion in
cash, much of it likely from the debt markets, according to corporate-bond
research firm Gimme Credit.
"Kraft is committed to maintaining an investment-grade rating," a Kraft
spokesman said, declining to comment further.
So far in 2009, returns to high-grade bond investors are 19%, according to
Merrill. "We've seen a feeding frenzy" because of low interest rates, says
Kathleen Gaffney, portfolio manager at Loomis, Sayles & Co. She sold some bonds
recently to take profits from the rally. Loomis Sayles wants to have cash on the
sidelines in case the Fed raises rates soon or Treasury bonds sell off.
Jensen
Comment
If you buy into the Modigliani and Miller Theorem of capital structure, how the
corporation is financed, including dividend payouts, is as follows:
The Modigliani-Miller theorem
(of
Franco Modigliani,
Merton Miller)
forms the basis for modern thinking on
capital structure. The basic theorem states that, under a certain market
price process (the classical
random walk),
in the absence of
taxes,
bankruptcy
costs, and
asymmetric information,
and in an
efficient market,
the value of a firm is unaffected by how that firm is financed. It does not
matter if the firm's capital is raised by issuing
stock
or selling debt.
It does not matter what the firm's
dividend
policy is.
Therefore, the Modigliani-Miller theorem is also often called the capital
structure irrelevance principle.
Modigliani was awarded the
1985 Nobel Prize in Economics for this and
other contributions.
Miller was awarded the 1990 Nobel Prize in Economics, along with
Harry Markowitz and
William Sharpe, for their "work in the
theory of financial economics," with Miller specifically cited for "fundamental
contributions to the theory of corporate finance."
Of course
these days, the assumption of market efficiency is a big stretch ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH
Bob
Jensen's threads on debt versus equity and capital structure (including investor
earn out contracts) are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FAS150
Bob
Jensen's bookmarks for financial ratios ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm#010303FinancialRatios
Also see
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_ratios
Bob
Jensen's threads on valuation of the firm are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm
Deloitte Heads Up
"Reconfiguring the Scope of Software Revenue Recognition Guidance," by
Rich Paul, Ryan Johnson, Sam Doolittle, and Rebecca Morrow, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Deloitte Heads Up, October 23, 2009 ---
http://www.iasplus.com/usa/headsup/headsup0910software.pdf
October 11, 2009 message from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
I do not even know what a course in accounting
research and analysis means.
David Albrecht
Hi David,
Since you got your doctorate at a very fine university (Virginia
Tech), I assume that you are being modest for purposes of stimulating
discussion on the AECM.
A course in "accounting research" can vary across an extremely wide
range from an undergraduate course that is more like a legal and
archival research course showing students how to locate international
financial data, accounting standards, and literature to advanced accountics doctoral seminars
that typically divide a number of courses on the basis of capital
markets (econometrics) research, behavioral (psychometrics, behavioral
finance/economics), and analytical (economic modeling, game theory,
agency theory, mathematical information economics).
The term “analysis” can also mean different things, but the usual
context is mathematical analytics apart from mathematical statistical
inference and data mining. The common example is economics game theory.
Since Joel Demski became dominant in the doctoral program at the
University of Florida, Florida’s doctoral program has become a model of
an accountics doctoral program heavy on the analytical side of research.
The outline of Florida's "accountics" doctoral program is shown below.
I've highlighted in red those courses that I think fit into what would be
termed "analysis" or "analytics" courses which of course are Joel
Demski's major research interests and contributions to accountics over the
years ---
http://www.cba.ufl.edu/fsoa/docs/phd_AccConcentration.pdf
PREREQUISITES
ACCOUNTING BACKGROUND
The Program assumes that new doctoral students have
a proficiency in accounting and business similar to that of an
undergraduate accounting major. This background does not necessarily
require a formal accounting degree, so long as the student can
establish a reasonable accounting background (such as a graduate
student who has taken several accounting courses in the MBA
program). Successful applicants who do not have a sufficient
accounting background must take the MBA Accounting sequence and
Intermediate Accounting in the coursework phase of the
Ph.D. program.
QUANTITATIVE BACKGROUND
The program assumes that new doctoral students have
taken the equivalent of three semesters of calculus and one semester
of linear algebra as mathematical background. Entering accounting
Ph.D. students who do not have this background can take any
necessary courses among the following University of Florida course
offerings. We encourage students who do not meet this mathematical
background to start taking the needed courses in the summer before
starting the program (or earlier if they can take equivalent courses
before arriving in Gainesville). Students can complete any needed
mathematical courses subsequent to matriculating in the fall.
MAC 2311 (or MAC
3472) Analytic Geometry and Calculus 1 (Honors Calculus 1)