Bob Jensen's New Bookmarks on  October 31, 2009
Bob Jensen at Trinity University 

For earlier editions of Fraud Updates go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
For earlier editions of Tidbits go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TidbitsDirectory.htm
For earlier editions of New Bookmarks go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/bookurl.htm 

Click here to search Bob Jensen's web site if you have key words to enter --- Search Box in Upper Right Corner.
For example if you want to know what Jensen documents have the term "Enron" enter the phrase Jensen AND Enron. Another search engine that covers Trinity and other universities is at http://www.searchedu.com/

Bob Jensen's Blogs --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/JensenBlogs.htm
Current and past editions of my newsletter called New Bookmarks --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/bookurl.htm
Current and past editions of my newsletter called Tidbits --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TidbitsDirectory.htm
Current and past editions of my newsletter called Fraud Updates --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

Many useful accounting sites (scroll down) --- http://www.iasplus.com/links/links.htm

Cool Search Engines That Are Not Google --- http://www.wired.com/epicenter/2009/06/coolsearchengines

Accounting program news items for colleges are posted at http://www.accountingweb.com/news/college_news.html
Sometimes the news items provide links to teaching resources for accounting educators.
Any college may post a news item.

How to author books and other materials for online delivery
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm
How Web Pages Work --- http://computer.howstuffworks.com/web-page.htm

Bob Jensen's essay on the financial crisis bailout's aftermath and an alphabet soup of appendices can be found at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm

Federal Revenue and Spending Book of Charts (Great Charts on Bad Budgeting) ---
http://www.heritage.org/research/features/BudgetChartBook/index.html

The Master List of Free Online College Courses --- http://universitiesandcolleges.org/

Free Online Textbooks, Videos, and Tutorials --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ElectronicLiterature.htm#Textbooks
Free Tutorials in Various Disciplines --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob2.htm#Tutorials
Edutainment and Learning Games --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm#Edutainment
Open Sharing Courses --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/updateee.htm#OKI
The Master List of Free Online College Courses ---
http://universitiesandcolleges.org/

Bob Jensen's threads for online worldwide education and training alternatives ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Crossborder.htm

"U. of Manitoba Researchers Publish Open-Source Handbook on Educational Technology," by Steve Kolowich, Chronicle of Higher Education, March 19, 2009 --- http://chronicle.com/wiredcampus/index.php?id=3671&utm_source=wc&utm_medium=en

Social Networking for Education:  The Beautiful and the Ugly
(including Google's Wave and Orcut for Social Networking and some education uses of Twitter)
Updates will be at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ListservRoles.htm

Some Accounting Blogs

Paul Pacter's IAS Plus (International Accounting) --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
International Association of Accountants News --- http://www.aia.org.uk/
AccountingEducation.com and Double Entries --- http://www.accountingeducation.com/
Gerald Trites'eBusiness and XBRL Blogs --- http://www.zorba.ca/
AccountingWeb --- http://www.accountingweb.com/   
SmartPros --- http://www.smartpros.com/
Management and Accounting Blog --- http://maaw.info/

Bob Jensen's Sort-of Blogs --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/JensenBlogs.htm
Current and past editions of my newsletter called New Bookmarks --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/bookurl.htm
Current and past editions of my newsletter called Tidbits --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/TidbitsDirectory.htm
Current and past editions of my newsletter called Fraud Updates --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

Popular IFRS Learning Resources:
Check out the popular IFRS learning Deloitte link is http://www.deloitteifrslearning.com/  
Also see the free IFRS course (with great cases) --- Click Here
Also see the Virginia Tech IFRS Course --- Send a request to John Brozovsky [jbrozovs@VT.EDU]

I found from the UK that might be helpful for IFRS learning resources --- Click Here
http://www.icaew.com/index.cfm/route/150551/icaew_ga/en/Library/Links/Accounting_standards/IAS_IFRS/Sources_for_International_Financial_Reporting_Standards_IFRS_and_International_Accounting_Standards_IAS

A Special Tribute to My Open Sharing Friend Will Yancey ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Yancey.htm

Giving Stuff Away Free on the Internet ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ListservRoles.htm#Free 

50 Most Common Mistakes Made by Traders and Investors ---
http://www.ratiotrading.com/2009/09/50-common-mistakes-most-traders-make/

CPA Exam to Undergo Transformation --- http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Web/20092194.htm

Some Accounting History Sites

Bob Jensen's Accounting History in a Nutshell and Links --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#AccountingHistory


Accounting History Libraries at the University of Mississippi (Ole Miss) --- http://www.olemiss.edu/depts/accountancy/libraries.html
The above libraries include international accounting history.
The above libraries include film and video historical collections.

MAAW Knowledge Portal for Management and Accounting --- http://maaw.info/

Academy of Accounting Historians and the Accounting Historians Journal ---
http://www.accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aah/

Sage Accounting History --- http://ach.sagepub.com/cgi/pdf_extract/11/3/269

A nice timeline on the development of U.S. standards and the evolution of thinking about the income statement versus the balance sheet is provided at:
"The Evolution of U.S. GAAP: The Political Forces Behind Professional Standards (1930-1973)," by Stephen A. Zeff, CPA Journal, January 2005 --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/105/infocus/p18.htm
Part II covering years 1974-2003 published in February 2005 --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2005/205/index.htm 

A nice timeline of accounting history --- http://www.docstoc.com/docs/2187711/A-HISTORY-OF-ACCOUNTING

From Texas A&M University
Accounting History Outline --- http://acct.tamu.edu/giroux/history.html

Canadian Printer and Publisher (history of various trades and industries) ---  http://link.library.utoronto.ca/cpp/
You can search for various industry terms such as accounting, cost, bookkeeping, etc.

Bob Jensen's timeline of derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds

History of Fraud in America --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm
Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm

 




Humor Between August 1 and August 31, 2009
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book09q3.htm#Humor083109 

Humor Between July 1 and July 31. 2009
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book09q3.htm#Humor073109 

Humor Between June 1 and June 30. 2009
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book09q2.htm#Humor063009  

Humor Between May 1 and May 31, 2009 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book09q2.htm#Humor053109    

Humor Between April 1 and April 30, 2009 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book09q2.htm#Humor043009   

Humor Between March 1 and March 31, 2009 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book09q1.htm#Humor033109  

Humor Between February 1 and February 28, 2009 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book09q1.htm#Humor022809   

Humor Between January 1 and January 31, 2009 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/book09q1.htm#Humor01310



  • Although this tidbit may seem off topic, one of my goals in life is to stimulate applied research on how to visualize multivariate financial data and other performance data (including qualitative data). I’m hoping other researchers can find success where I’ve failed --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpvisual/000datavisualization.htm

    "A New Graphical Representation of the Periodic Table:  But is the latest redrawing of Mendeleev's masterpiece an improvement?" MIT's Technology Review, October 6, 2009  ---
    http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/arxiv/24204/?nlid=2410

    The periodic table has been stamped into the minds of countless generations of schoolchildren. Immediately recognised and universally adopted, it has long since achieved iconic status.

    So why change it? According to Mohd Abubakr from Microsoft Research in Hyderabad, the table can be improved by arranging it in circular form. He says this gives a sense of the relative size of atoms--the closer to the centre, the smaller they are--something that is missing from the current form of the table. It preserves the periods and groups that make Mendeleev's table so useful. And by placing hydrogen and helium near the centre, Abubakr says this solves the problem of whether to put hydrogen with the halogens or alkali metals and of whther to put helium in the 2nd group or with the inert gases.

    That's worthy but flawed. Unfortunately, Abubakr's arrangement means that the table can only be read by rotating it. That's tricky with a textbook and impossible with most computer screens.

    The great utility of Mendeleev's arrangements was its predictive power: the gaps in his table allowed him to predict the properties of undiscovered elements. It's worth preserving in its current form for that reaosn alone.

    However, there's another relatively new way of arranging the elements developed by Maurice Kibler at Institut de Physique Nucleaire de Lyon in France that may have new predictive power.

    Kibler says the symmetries of the periodic table can be captured by a group theory, specifically the composition of the special orthogonal group in 4 + 2 dimensions with the special unitary group of degree 2 (ie SO (4,2) x SU(2)).

    Continued in article

    Bob Jensen's threads on visualization of data ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/352wpvisual/000datavisualization.htm

    October 7, 2009 reply from Jagdish Gangolly [gangolly@GMAIL.COM]

    Bob,

    You may like to add these sites to your data visualisation page. 

    My favourite, which I require my students in Statistics to read, is:
    http://www.math.yorku.ca/SCS/Gallery/).

    http://www.webdesignerdepot.com/2009/06/50-great-examples-of-data-visualization/

    http://www.smashingmagazine.com/2007/08/02/data-visualization-modern-approaches/

    http://images.businessweek.com/ss/09/08/0812_data_visualization_heroes/index.htm

    http://mashable.com/2007/05/15/16-awesome-data-visualization-tools/

    http://www.datavisualization.ch/

    http://www.tableausoftware.com/data-visualization-software

    http://reference.wolfram.com/mathematica/guide/DataVisualization.html

    Jagdish S. Gangolly
    Department of Informatics
    College of Computing & Information
    State University of New York at Albany
    Harriman Campus, Building 7A, Suite 220
    Albany, NY 12222
    Phone: 518-956-8251, Fax: 518-956-8247

     


    myMISlab is a web-based tutorial tool

    I generally avoid posting advertisements unless I think a large number of readers have a particular interest in the product or service.

    Pearson's myMISlab is a web-based tutorial tool that integrates business applications with Microsoft Office—including Excel, Access, and SharePoint — http://www.mymislab.com/tt_training.asp

    Jensen Comment
    When I taught AIS or MIS, I always insisted that student learn how to use MS Access so they better understand relational database systems. myMISlab could be greatly improved with tutorials for MS Access, although such tutorials are widely available elsewhere, including in the MS Access software itself. I provide ree video helpers for MS Access at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/video/acct5342/

    PQQ stands for Possible Quiz Question material.

    Bob Jensen's helpers on Excel, JavaScript, and Other Helpers and Videos ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HelpersVideos.htm


    "All aboard the insolvency gravy train:  Insolvency practitioners are making vast sums out of the recession ... and leaving creditors with pennies," by Prem Sikka, The Guardian, October 23, 2009 ---
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/23/insolvency-administration-industry-fees

    "Insolvency: a licence to print money:  Chapter 11 is not all it's cracked up," by Prim Sikka, "The Guardian," July 17, 2008 --- http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/jul/17/conservatives

    Bob Jensen's threads on Insolvent Vultures Feeding on Insolvency ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Vultures
     


    Question
    When might you want to run Linux on your Windows computer?
    "E-Banking on a Locked Down (Non-Microsoft) PC," by Brian Krebs
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm#IdentityTheft 

    Part II ---
    http://voices.washingtonpost.com/securityfix/2009/10/e-banking_on_a_locked_down_pc.html?wprss=securityfix


    FIN 48
    October 21, 2009 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

    IRS Commissioner Doug Shulman spoke at a conference of the National Association of Corporate Directors that I attended earlier this week. He covered the income tax risk issues that directors should be concerned about. I thought this was a very good summary of both what auditors and tax accountants should be interested in and I refer interested parties to his posted remarks at:
    http://media-newswire.com/release_1103133.html 

    Denny Beresford

    Bob Jensen's threads on FIN 48, 2009 ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FIN48

    Bob Jensen's taxation helpers are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/BookBob1.htm#010304Taxation


    Raise Your Guinness Glasses
    It may not be the first company to offer pensions and health care benefits to employees, but it was one of the first companies to do so in history.

    "Guinness celebrates 250 years:  In 1759, Arthur Guinness signed a 9,000-year lease on a brewery. Centuries later, his eponymous dark stout is one of Ireland's best-known exports" by Julianne Pepitone, CNN Money, September 24, 2009 ---
    http://money.cnn.com/2009/09/24/news/companies/guinness_250_anniversary/

  • But 250 years later, it's clearly worked out well. The brewery at St. James's Gate has helped make Guinness stout one of the most successful beer brands worldwide.

    To celebrate what the company has dubbed "Arthur's Day," stout-lovers around the world lifted a glass of the foamy black brew to Arthur Thursday at 17:59 Greenwich Mean Time, or 1:59 ET. (See correction, below.)

    Guinness parent Diageo PLC expects thousands to attend an invitation-only party tonight at the Dublin brewery, where musical acts Tom Jones, Kasabian and Estelle will play. Additionally, other artists will perform at events being held at four major music venues and 28 smaller pubs across the city.

    Guinness may be distinctly Irish, but the celebration of its birth is happening all over the world; parties are being hosted in more than 150 different countries, according to the beermaker's website.

    To mark the occasion, Diageo PLC has pledged to give €2.5 million this year from the Arthur Guinness Fund to entrepreneurs.

    The company says its founder was one of the first employers in Ireland to provide pensions and health care for workers, and the foundation aims to preserve that legacy.


    Why single out capitalism for immorality and ethics misbehavior?

    Making capitalism ethical is a tough task – and possibly a hopeless one.
    Prem Sikka (see below)

    The global code of conduct of Ernst & Young, another global accountancy firm, claims that "no client or external relationship is more important than the ethics, integrity and reputation of Ernst & Young". Partners and former partners of the firm have also been found guilty of promoting tax evasion.
    Prem Sikka (see below)

    Jensen Comment
    Yeah right Prem, as if making the public sector and socialism ethical is an easier task. The least ethical nations where bribery, crime, and immorality are the worst are likely to be the more government (dictator) controlled and lower on the capitalism scale. And in the so-called capitalist nations, the lowest ethics are more apt to be found in the public sector that works hand in hand with bribes from large and small businesses.

    Rotten Fraud in General --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
    Rotten Fraud in the Public Sector (The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws) --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers

    We hang the petty thieves and appoint the great ones to public office.
    Aesop

    Congress is our only native criminal class.
    Mark Twain --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mark_Twain

    Why should members of Congress be allowed to profit from insider trading?
    Amid broad congressional concern about ethics scandals, some lawmakers are poised to expand the battle for reform: They want to enact legislation that would prohibit members of Congress and their aides from trading stocks based on nonpublic information gathered on Capitol Hill. Two Democrat lawmakers plan to introduce today a bill that would block trading on such inside information. Current securities law and congressional ethics rules don't prohibit lawmakers or their staff members from buying and selling securities based on information learned in the halls of Congress.
    Brody Mullins, "Bill Seeks to Ban Insider Trading By Lawmakers and Their Aides," The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006; Page A1 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114351554851509761.html?mod=todays_us_page_one

    The Culture of Corruption Runs Deep and Wide in Both U.S. Political Parties:  Few if any are uncorrupted
    Committee members have shown no appetite for taking up all those cases and are considering an amnesty for reporting violations, although not for serious matters such as accepting a trip from a lobbyist, which House rules forbid. The data firm PoliticalMoneyLine calculates that members of Congress have received more than $18 million in travel from private organizations in the past five years, with Democrats taking 3,458 trips and Republicans taking 2,666. . . But of course, there are those who deem the American People dumb as stones and will approach this bi-partisan scandal accordingly. Enter Democrat Leader Nancy Pelosi, complete with talking points for her minion, that are sure to come back and bite her .... “House Minority Leader Nancy Pelosi (D-Calif.) filed delinquent reports Friday for three trips she accepted from outside sponsors that were worth $8,580 and occurred as long as seven years ago, according to copies of the documents.
    Bob Parks, "Will Nancy Pelosi's Words Come Back to Bite Her?" The National Ledger, January 6, 2006 --- http://www.nationalledger.com/artman/publish/article_27262498.shtml 

    And when they aren't stealing directly, lawmakers are caving in to lobbying crooks
    Drivers can send their thank-you notes to Capitol Hill, which created the conditions for this mess last summer with its latest energy bill. That legislation contained a sop to Midwest corn farmers in the form of a huge new ethanol mandate that began this year and requires drivers to consume 7.5 billion gallons a year by 2012. At the same time, Congress refused to include liability protection for producers of MTBE, a rival oxygen fuel-additive that has become a tort lawyer target. So MTBE makers are pulling out, ethanol makers can't make up the difference quickly enough, and gas supplies are getting squeezed.
    "The Gasoline Follies," The Wall Street Journal, March 28, 2006; Page A20  --- Click Here

    Once again, the power of pork to sustain incumbents gets its best demonstration in the person of John Murtha (D-PA). The acknowledged king of earmarks in the House gains the attention of the New York Times editorial board today, which notes the cozy and lucrative relationship between more than two dozen contractors in Murtha's district and the hundreds of millions of dollars in pork he provided them. It also highlights what roughly amounts to a commission on the sale of Murtha's power as an appropriator: Mr. Murtha led all House members this year, securing $162 million in district favors, according to the watchdog group Taxpayers for Common Sense. ... In 1991, Mr. Murtha used a $5 million earmark to create the National Defense Center for Environmental Excellence in Johnstown to develop anti-pollution technology for the military. Since then, it has garnered more than $670 million in contracts and earmarks. Meanwhile it is managed by another contractor Mr. Murtha helped create, Concurrent Technologies, a research operation that somehow was allowed to be set up as a tax-exempt charity, according to The Washington Post. Thanks to Mr. Murtha, Concurrent has boomed; the annual salary for its top three executives averages $462,000.
    Edward Morrissey, Captain's Quarters, January 14, 2008 --- http://www.captainsquartersblog.com/mt/archives/016617.php

    "Several Democrats, including some closed allied to Speaker Nancy Pelosi, are the subject of ethics complaints," by Holly Bailey, Newsweek Magazine, October 3, 2009 --- http://www.newsweek.com/id/216687

    Nancy Pelosi likes to brag that she's "drained the swamp" when it comes to corruption in the House, but ethics problems could come back to haunt Democrats in 2010. Democrats are currently the subject of 12 of the 16 complaints pending before the House ethics committee. Two of the lawmakers under scrutiny—Reps. Jack Murtha and Charlie Rangel—have close ties to Pelosi, who has come under criticism for not asking them to resign their committee posts. Murtha, chairman of a key defense-appropriations subcommittee, is is not formally under investigation but the ethics committee is reviewing political contributions he and other House lawmakers received from lobbying firm whose clients received millions of dollars in Defense earmarks. Rangel, chairman of the Ways and Means Committee, is facing scrutiny for not fully disclosing assets. The ethics committee is also looking into ties between Rangel and a developer who leased rent-controlled apartments to the congressman, and whether Rangel improperly used his House office to raise funds for a public policy institute in his name. Rangel and Murtha deny any wrongdoing. (Another lawmaker under investigation: Rep. Jesse Jackson Jr., who, according to the committee, "may have offered to raise funds" for then–Illinois governor Rod Blagojevich in exchange for the president's Senate seat—a charge Jackson denies. The panel deferred its probe at the request of the Justice Department, which is conducting its own inquiry.)

    Pelosi has said little about Rangel's ethics problems, or those involving other Democrats; a Pelosi spokesman, Brendan Daly, e-mails NEWSWEEK, "The speaker has said that [Rangel] should not step aside while the independent, bipartisan ethics committee is investigating."

    But watchdog groups, not to mention Republicans, are calling Pelosi hypocritical (as if they weren't equally hypocritical) since Democrats won back control of the House by, in part, trashing the GOP's ethics lapses. Republicans already plan to use the ethics issue against Democrats in 2010. Though Rangel and Murtha aren't as known as Tom DeLay, the GOP poster boy for scandal in 2006, the party aims to change that: this week the House GOP plans to introduce a resolution calling on Rangel to resign his committee post.

    Pelosi "promised to run the most ethical Congress in history," says Ken Spain, a spokesman for the National Republican Congressional Committee, "and instead of cracking down on corruption, she promotes it (to garner votes in Congress)." Daly responds, "Since Democrats took control of Congress, we have strengthened the ethics process." (Daly has some magnificent ocean front property for sale in Arizona.)

    "Can morality be brought to market?" by Prem Sikka, The Guardian, October 7, 2009 ---
    http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/oct/07/bae-business-ethics-morality-markets

    The BAE bribery scandal has once again brought discussions of business ethics to the fore. Politicians also claim to be interested in promoting morality in markets, but have not explained how this can be achieved.

    There is no shortage of companies wrapping themselves in claims of ethical conduct to disarm critics. BAE boasts a global code of conduct, which claims that "its leaders will act ethically, promote ethical conduct both within the company and in the markets in which we operate". In the light of the revelations about the way the company secured its business contracts, such claims must be doubted.

    BAE is not alone. There is a huge gap between corporate talk and action, and a few illustrations would help to highlight this gap. KPMG is one of the world's biggest accountancy firms. Its global code of conduct states that the firm is committed to "acting lawfully and ethically, and encouraging this behaviour in the marketplace … maintaining independence and objectivity, and avoiding conflicts of interest". Yet the firm created an extensive organisational structure to devise tax avoidance and tax evasion schemes. Former managers have been found guilty of tax evasion and the firm was fined $456m for "criminal wrongdoing".

    The global code of conduct of Ernst & Young, another global accountancy firm, claims that "no client or external relationship is more important than the ethics, integrity and reputation of Ernst & Young". Partners and former partners of the firm have also been found guilty of promoting tax evasion.

    UBS, a leading bank, has been fined $780m by the US authorities for facilitating tax evasion, but it told the world that "UBS upholds the law, respects regulations and behaves in a principled way. UBS is self-aware and has the courage to face the truth. UBS maintains the highest ethical standards."

    British Airways paid a fine of £270m after admitting price fixing on fuel surcharges on its long-haul flights while its code of conduct promised that it would behave responsibly and ethically towards its customers.

    These are just a tiny sample that shows that corporations say one thing but do something completely different. This hypocrisy is manufactured by corporate culture, and unless that process is changed there is no prospect of securing moral corporations or markets.

    The key issue is that companies cannot buck the systemic pressures to produce ever higher profits. Capitalism is not accompanied by any moral guidance on how high these profits have to be, but shareholders always demand more. Markets do not ask any questions about the quality of profits or the human consequences of ever-rising returns. Behind a wall of secrecy, company directors devise plans to fleece taxpayers and customers to increase profits, and are rewarded through profit-related remuneration schemes. The social system provides incentives for unethical behaviour.

    Within companies, daily routines encourage employees to prioritise profit-making even if that is unethical. For example, tax departments within major accountancy firms operate as profit centres. The performance of their employees is assessed at regular intervals, and those generating profits are rewarded with salary increases and career advancements. In time, the routines of devising tax avoidance schemes and other financial dodges become firmly established norms, and employees are desensitised to the consequences.

    With increasing public scepticism, and pressure from consumer groups and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), companies manage their image by publishing high-sounding statements. Ethics itself has become big business, and armies of consultants and advisers are available for hire to enable companies to manage their image. No questions are raised about the internal culture or the economic incentives for misbehaviour. It is far cheaper for companies to publish glossy brochures than to pay taxes or improve customer and public welfare. The payment of fines has become just another business cost.

    Making capitalism ethical is a tough task – and possibly a hopeless one. Any policy for encouraging ethical corporate conduct has to change the nature of capitalism and corporations so that companies are run for the benefit of all stakeholders, rather than just shareholders. Pressures to change corporate culture could be facilitated by closing down persistently offending companies, imposing personal penalties on offending executives and offering bounties to whistleblowers.

    Rotten Fraud in General --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

    Rotten Fraud in the Public Sector (The Most Criminal Class Writes the Laws) --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers

     


    Among Friends
    FBI Arrest in What Appears to Be the World's Largest Case Involving Insider Information
    More and more keeps coming out, including revelations of wiretapping

    "8 trades the insiders allegedly made The government's case against the Galleon crew includes transactions in companies like Google, AMD, Hilton and Sun," by Michael Copeland, Fortune, October 19, 2009 --- Click Here
    http://money.cnn.com/2009/10/19/markets/insider_trading_arrests.fortune/?postversion=2009101912

    The government's case in what it is calling the largest insider trading case involving a U.S. hedge fund contains a detailed list of trades involving household-name companies.

    Investigators have pieced together a case that alleges more than $25 million in illegal gains based on trading in 2006-09 on companies including Advanced Micro Devices (AMD, Fortune 500), Akamai (AKAM), Clearwire (CLWR), Google (GOOG, Fortune 500), Hilton, Polycom (PLCM) and Sun Microsystems (JAVA, Fortune 500), among others.

    The six people charged include hedge fund billionaire Raj Rajaratnam, founder of Galleon Group; Robert Moffat, IBM's (IBM, Fortune 500) top hardware executive and an oft-discussed CEO candidate; Mark Curland and Danielle Chiesi, executives of the hedge fund New Castle Partners; Anil Kumar, a director at consulting firm McKinsey & Co.; and Rajiv Goel, an executive in Intel's treasury department.

    Just what did they allegedly do? Using information gleaned from wiretapped conversations between the accused and others, along with the statements of an apparent informant, SEC investigators have pieced together a series of episodes alleging to show how the defendants used inside information and well-timed trades to turn million-dollar profits.

    Those charged have yet to enter pleas in the case. Jim Waldman, a lawyer for Rajaratman, told the Wall Street Journal that the hedge fund chief "is innocent. We're going to fight the charges." Lawyers for some of the other accused said their clients are shocked by the charges and deny wrongdoing.

    What follows is a condensed account of eight major trades the suspects made and the inside information they capitalized on, according to the the SEC investigation and complaint. At the center of some of the trades is an unnamed "Tipper A," a person who gathered a great deal of information on companies for Rajaratnam, and whose identity presumably will be made public as the case unfolds in court.

    Polycom beats the Street

    On Jan. 10, 2006, the unnamed source identified in the SEC's complaint as "Tipper A" told Galleon's Rajaratnam that, based on information received from a Polycom insider, revenues at the video-conferencing company for the fourth-quarter of 2005 were about to beat Wall Street estimates. Polycom was set to announce its earnings more than two weeks later.

    Rajaratnam sent an instant message to his trader instructing him to "buy 60 [thousand shares] PLCM" for certain Galleon Tech funds. All told, from Jan. 10 through Jan. 25, the date of the Polycom earnings release, Rajaratnam and Galleon bought 245,000 shares of Polycom and 500 Polycom call-option contracts. Polycom did beat the Street, and collectively, the Galleon Tech funds made over $570,000 in connection with their Polycom trades based on Tipper A's tip.

    The same scenario was repeated for Polycom's first-quarter 2006 earnings, the complaint says. Galleon made $165,000 on the information. Tipper A made $22,000.

    The Hilton takeover

    Tipper A allegedly obtained confidential information in advance of a July 3, 2007, announcement that a private equity group would be buying Hilton for $47.50 per share, a premium of $11.45 over the July 3 closing price. Tipper A obtained the information from an analyst who, at the time, was working at Moody's, a rating agency that was evaluating Hilton's debt in connection with the planned buyout. Tipper A bought call option contracts based on the information, and passed on the tip to Rajaratnam.

    On July 3, Rajaratnam and Galleon bought 400,000 shares of Hilton in the Galleon Tech funds. That evening, the Hilton transaction was announced. Tipper A sold all of the Hilton call option contracts for a profit of more than $630,000, the complaint says. To compensate the source for the Hilton tip, Tipper A paid the source $10,000. The Galleon Tech funds sold their Hilton shares after the July 3 announcement for a profit of more than $4 million.

    Google Misses

    Around July 10, 2007, a PR consultant to Google allegedly told Tipper A that Google's second-quarter earnings per share would be down about 25 cents. The Street had estimated yet another strong quarter for the search giant, which was scheduled to report earnings July 19.

    Two days later Tipper A bought put options in Google and passed along details of the pending Google miss to Rajaratnam. He and Galleon began buying Google put options for the Galleon Tech funds, and continued buying them through July 19. In addition, Galleon funds bought other options betting on a fall in Google shares and sold short Google stock beginning July 17.

    On July 19, Google announced its earnings results, disclosing that its earnings-per-share was indeed 25 cents lower than the prior quarter. Google's share price fell from over $548 per share to almost $520 per share. The Galleon Tech funds' profits from the Google tip were almost $8 million. Tipper A sold all of the put options the day after the July 19 announcement for a profit of over $500,000.

    Trading in Intel

    Rajaratnam allegedly tapped former Wharton classmate and Intel executive Rajiv Goel just before Intel's (INTL) scheduled fourth-quarter 2006 earnings announcement to get inside information on the world's largest chipmaker. On Jan. 8, 2007, Rajaratnam contacted Intel's Goel. The next day, Rajaratnam bought 1 million shares of Intel at $21.08 per share. On Jan, 11, he bought 500,000 more at $21.65 per share.

    Goel and Rajaratnam communicated again multiple times over the Martin Luther King Day weekend that followed. On Tuesday, Jan. 16, the day the markets reopened, Rajaratnam reversed course, selling the Galleon Tech funds' entire 1.5 million share long position in Intel at $22.03 per share, and making a profit of a little over $1 million

    Later that day, after the markets closed, Intel released its fourth-quarter 2006 earnings. Although the company's earnings beat analysts' projections, its guidance was below expectations. Intel's stock price fell nearly 5% on the news, but Rajaratnam was already out of the stock.

    According to Intel officials, Goel has been placed on administrative leave pending the court case.

    Clearwire Gets a Partner

    In early February 2008, Goel allegedly tipped Rajaratnam that there was a pending joint venture between wireless broadband company Clearwire and Sprint (S, Fortune 500). Intel was a huge shareholder in Clearwire. Over the next three months, Galleon Tech funds bought and sold Clearwire shares on three occasions. Each time, the Galleon Tech funds traded in advance of news reports relating to the deal between Clearwire and Sprint, and shortly after calls between Goel and Rajaratnam. Overall, the Galleon Tech funds realized gains of about $780,000 on their Clearwire trading between February and May 2008. On May 8, the joint venture between Sprint and Clearwire was publicly announced.

    As payback for Goel's tips, Rajaratnam (or someone acting on his behalf) executed trades in Goel's personal brokerage account based on inside information concerning Hilton and PeopleSupport (the government notes that a Galleon director sits on the PeopleSupport's board of directors though no charges of wrongdoing have been brought against that person), which resulted in nearly $250,000 in profits for Goel.

    Shorting Akamai

    Another hedge fund executive, New Castle's Danielle Chiesi, is an acquaintance of Rajaratnam. When an Akamai executive told her that the Internet infrastructure company would trend lower in the company's second-quarter 2008 guidance to investors, the government claims she passed along the information to Rajaratnam. The consensus among Akamai's management was that Akamai's stock price would decline in the wake of the lowered guidance scheduled for July 30.

    Chiesi and the Akamai source spoke multiple times between July 2 and July 24. Chiesi told what she had learned from the Akamai source to her colleague at New Castle, Mark Kurland. On July 25, several New Castle funds took short positions in Akamai shares. The positions grew through July 30. Rajaratnam's Galleon funds also built up a short position during the same period.

    In its second-quarter 2008 earnings announcement on July 30, Akamai's results disappointed investors. The stock fell nearly 20% following the announcement. New Castle made $2.4 million. The Galleon Tech funds took home more than $3.2 million.

    IBM knows Sun

    In January 2009, IBM was conducting due diligence on Sun Microsystems in preparation for an offer to buy it (Sun was ultimately bought by Oracle (ORCL, Fortune 500)). As part of that process, Sun opened its books to IBM, providing its second-quarter 2009 results in advance of the scheduled Jan. 27 announcement.

    Because much of Sun's business is hardware, IBM's top hardware executive Robert Moffat was involved in the evaluation of Sun. Moffat allegedly had access to Sun's earnings results. He and Chiesi were also friends and contacted each other repeatedly during January 2009. The frequency of contact between the two increased just prior to the Sun earnings release, investigators say.

    On Jan. 26, New Castle began acquiring a substantial long position in Sun. On Jan. 27, after the market close, Sun reported earnings that exceeded Wall Street's estimates, posting a two-cent per-share profit when analysts had expected a loss. Sun shares soared 21% on the news. New Castle made almost $1 million.

    AMD gets out of manufacturing

    On June 1, 2008, McKinsey & Co. began advising Advanced Micro Devices over its negotiations with two Abu Dhabi sovereign entities. One, a joint venture with the Abu Dhabi government, Advanced Technology Investment Co., would take over AMD's chip manufacturing. The other, an Abu Dhabi sovereign wealth fund, Mubadala Investment Co., would provide a large investment in AMD (in the end, it would total $314 million). According to the SEC, Anil Kumar was one of the McKinsey team briefed on the negotiations. Kumar also knew Rajaratnam.

    On Aug. 14, Kumar learned that the two deals were finally getting done. The next day he told Rajaratnam, investigators say. Almost immediately, Rajaratnam and Galleon increased their long position in AMD by buying more than 2.5 million shares in Galleon funds and continuing to build their long position until just before the announcement of the AMD transactions. Rajaratnam and Galleon bought 4 million AMD shares on Sept. 25 and 26, and 1.65 million more on Oct. 3. On Oct. 8, the deals were announced publicly. AMD's stock price increased by about 25%. All told, the value of Galleon's entire position in AMD increased approximately $9.5 million in Oct. 6-7.

    However, the allegedly ill-gotten gain was wiped out by the financial crisis of the time. Because the Galleon Tech funds had accumulated much of their AMD position beginning in August, before the crisis sent stock prices, including AMD's, tumbling in September and October, the funds lost money on the overall trade

    "Billionaire among 6 nabbed in inside trading case Wall Street wake-up call: Hedge fund boss, 5 others charged in $25M-plus insider trading case," by Larry Neumeister and Candice Choi,  Yahoo News, October 16, 2009 --- Click Here

    One of America's wealthiest men was among six hedge fund managers and corporate executives arrested Friday in a hedge fund insider trading case that authorities say generated more than $25 million in illegal profits and was a wake-up call for Wall Street.

    Raj Rajaratnam, a portfolio manager for Galleon Group, a hedge fund with up to $7 billion in assets under management, was accused of conspiring with others to use insider information to trade securities in several publicly traded companies, including Google Inc.

    U.S. Magistrate Judge Douglas F. Eaton set bail at $100 million to be secured by $20 million in collateral despite a request by prosecutors to deny bail. He also ordered Rajaratnam, who has both U.S. and Sri Lankan citizenship, to stay within 110 miles of New York City.

    U.S. Attorney Preet Bharara told a news conference it was the largest hedge fund case ever prosecuted and marked the first use of court-authorized wiretaps to capture conversations by suspects in an insider trading case.

    He said the case should cause financial professionals considering insider trades in the future to wonder whether law enforcement is listening.

    "Greed is not good," Bharara said. "This case should be a wake-up call for Wall Street."

    Joseph Demarest Jr., the head of the New York FBI office, said it was clear that "the $20 million in illicit profits come at the expense of the average public investor."

    The Securities and Exchange Commission, which brought separate civil charges, said the scheme generated more than $25 million in illegal profits.

    Robert Khuzami, director of enforcement at the SEC, said the charges show Rajaratnam's "secret of success was not genius trading strategies."

    "He is not the master of the universe. He is a master of the Rolodex," Khuzami said.

    Galleon Group LLP said in a statement it was shocked to learn of Rajaratnam's arrest at his apartment. "We had no knowledge of the investigation before it was made public and we intend to cooperate fully with the relevant authorities," the statement said.

    The firm added that Galleon "continues to operate and is highly liquid."

    Rajaratnam, 52, was ranked No. 559 by Forbes magazine this year among the world's wealthiest billionaires, with a $1.3 billion net worth.

    According to the Federal Election Commission, he is a generous contributor to Democratic candidates and causes. The FEC said he made over $87,000 in contributions to President Barack Obama's campaign, the Democratic National Committee and various campaigns on behalf of Hillary Rodham Clinton, U.S. Sen. Charles Schumer and New Jersey U.S. Sen. Robert Menendez in the past five years. The Center for Responsive Politics, a watchdog group, said he has given a total of $118,000 since 2004 -- all but one contribution, for $5,000, to Democrats.

    The Associated Press has learned that even before his arrest, Rajaratnam was under scrutiny for helping bankroll Sri Lankan militants notorious for suicide bombings.

    Papers filed in U.S. District Court in Brooklyn allege that Rajaratnam worked closely with a phony charity that channeled funds to the Tamil Tiger terrorist organization. Those papers refer to him only as "Individual B." But U.S. law enforcement and government officials familiar with the case have confirmed that the individual is Rajaratnam.

    At an initial court appearance in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, Assistant U.S. Attorney Josh Klein sought detention for Rajaratnam, saying there was "a grave concern about flight risk" given Rajaratnam's wealth and his frequent travels around the world.

    His lawyer, Jim Walden, called his client a "citizen of the world," who has made more than $20 million in charitable donations in the last five years and had risen from humble beginnings in the finance profession to oversee hedge funds responsible for nearly $8 billion.

    Walden promised "there's a lot more to this case" and his client was ready to prepare for it from home. Rajaratnam lives in a $10 million condominium with his wife of 20 years, their three children and two elderly parents. Walden noted that many of his employees were in court ready to sign a bail package on his behalf.

    Rajaratnam -- born in Sri Lanka and a graduate of University of Pennsylvania's Wharton School of Business -- has been described as a savvy manager of billions of dollars in technology and health care hedge funds at Galleon, which he started in 1996. The firm is based in New York City with offices in California, China, Taiwan and India. He lives in New York.

    According to a criminal complaint filed in U.S. District Court in Manhattan, Rajaratnam obtained insider information and then caused the Galleon Technology Funds to execute trades that earned a profit of more than $12.7 million between January 2006 and July 2007. Other schemes garnered millions more and continued into this year, authorities said.

    Bharara said the defendants benefited from tips about the earnings, earnings guidance and acquisition plans of various companies. Sometimes, those who provided tips received financial benefits and sometimes they just traded tips for more inside information, he added.

    The timing of the arrests might be explained by a footnote in the complaint against Rajaratnam. In it, an FBI agent said he had learned that Rajaratnam had been warned to be careful and that Rajaratnam, in response, had said that a former employee of the Galleon Group was likely to be wearing a "wire."

    The agent said he learned from federal authorities that Rajaratnam had a ticket to fly from Kennedy International Airport to London on Friday and to return to New York from Geneva, Switzerland next Thursday.

    Also charged in the scheme are Rajiv Goel, 51, of Los Altos, Calif., a director of strategic investments at Intel Capital, the investment arm of Intel Corp., Anil Kumar, 51, of Santa Clara, Calif., a director at McKinsey & Co. Inc., a global management consulting firm, and Robert Moffat, 53, of Ridgefield, Conn., senior vice president and group executive at International Business Machines Corp.'s Systems and Technology Group.

    The others charged in the case were identified as Danielle Chiesi, 43, of New York City, and Mark Kurland, 60, also of New York City.

    According to court papers, Chiesi worked for New Castle, the equity hedge fund group of Bear Stearns Asset Management Inc. that had assets worth about $1 billion under management. Kurland is a top executive at New Castle.

    Kumar's lawyer, Isabelle Kirshner, said of her client: "He's distraught." He was freed on $5 million bail, secured in part by his $2.5 million California home.

    Kerry Lawrence, an attorney representing Moffat, said: "He's shocked by the charges."

    Bail for Kurland was set at $3 million while bail for Moffat and Chiesi was set at $2 million each. Lawyers for Moffat and Chiesi said their clients will plead not guilty. The law firm representing Kurland did not immediately return a phone call for comment.

    A message left at Goel's residence was not immediately returned. He was released on bail after an appearance in California.

    A criminal complaint filed in the case shows that an unidentified person involved in the insider trading scheme began cooperating and authorities obtained wiretaps of conversations between the defendants.

    In one conversation about a pending deal that was described in a criminal complaint, Chiesi is quoted as saying: "I'm dead if this leaks. I really am. ... and my career is over. I'll be like Martha (expletive) Stewart."

    Stewart, the homemaking maven, was convicted in 2004 of lying to the government about the sale of her shares in a friend's company whose stock plummeted after a negative public announcement. She served five months in prison and five months of home confinement.

    Prosecutors charged those arrested Friday with conspiracy and securities fraud.

    A separate criminal complaint in the case said Chiesi and Moffat conspired to engage in insider trading in the securities of International Business Machines Corp.

    According to another criminal complaint in the case, Chiesi and Rajaratnam were heard on a government wiretap of a Sept. 26, 2008, phone conversation discussing whether Chiesi's friend Moffat should move from IBM to a different technology company to aid the scheme.

    "Put him in some company where we can trade well," Rajaratnam was quoted in the court papers as saying.

    The complaint said Chiesi replied: "I know, I know. I'm thinking that too. Or just keep him at IBM, you know, because this guy is giving me more information. ... I'd like to keep him at IBM right now because that's a very powerful place for him. For us, too."

    According to the court papers, Rajaratnam replied: "Only if he becomes CEO." And Chiesi was quoted as replying: "Well, not really. I mean, come on. ... you know, we nailed it."

    Continued in article

    "Arrest of Hedge Fund Chief Unsettles the Industry," by Michael J. de la Merced and Zachery Kouwe, The New York Times, October 18, 2009 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/19/business/19insider.html?_r=1

    The firm made no secret that its investors included technology executives. Among them was Anil Kumar, a McKinsey director who did consulting work for Advanced Micro Devices and was charged in the scheme. Another defendant, Rajiv Goel, is an Intel executive who is accused of leaking information about the chip maker’s earnings and an investment in Clearwire.

    Prosecutors also say that a Galleon executive on the board of PeopleSupport, an outsourcing company, regularly tipped off Mr. Rajaratnam about merger negotiations with a subsidiary of Essar Group of India. Regulatory filings by PeopleSupport last year identified the director as Krish Panu, a former technology executive. He was not charged on Friday.

    Galleon has previously been accused of wrongdoing by regulators. In 2005, it paid more than $2 million to settle an S.E.C. lawsuit claiming it had conducted an illegal form of short-selling.

    The Deep Shah Insiders Leak at Moody's:  What $10,000 Bought
    Leaks such as this are probably impossible to stop
    What disturbs me is that the Blackstone Group would exploit investors based up such leaks

    "Moody's Analysts Are Warned to Keep Secrets," by Serena Ing, The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2009 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125599951161895543.html?mod=article-outset-box

    From their first day at Moody's Investors Service, junior analysts are warned against sharing confidential information with outsiders. They are even told not to mention company names in the elevators at the credit-rating firm's Lower Manhattan headquarters.

    Federal prosecutors now allege that a former junior analyst, identified by a person familiar with the matter as Deep Shah, breached that trust in July 2007 when he passed on inside information about Blackstone Group's pending $26 billion takeover of Hilton Hotels.

    Mr. Shah and other employees of the ratings firm, owned by publicly traded Moody's Corp., had advance notice about the takeover as part of a standing practice to prebrief credit analysts about planned deals. Prosecutors allege that the junior analyst shared the Hilton information with an unidentified third party, who in turn passed the tip to Galleon Group's Raj Rajaratnam. The tip enabled Mr. Rajaratnam to reap $4 million in profits from trading Hilton shares, a federal complaint alleges.

    While Mr. Shah's role in the alleged insider-trading affair is small, his link to the third party -- now a key cooperating witness in the probe -- could shed light on how investigators uncovered the trading ring. Unusual trading in Hilton's shares was one of the first events that attracted scrutiny from regulators in 2007. The same cooperating witness was friends with an executive at Polycom Inc. and also passed on information about Google Inc.

    The complaint said the cooperating witness arranged to pay $10,000 to the Moody's associate analyst, a title that describes staffers who aren't considered full analysts but assist them in analyzing data. Mr. Shah hasn't been charged with a crime. It isn't known if he is under investigation or if he will face charges.

    Mr. Shah couldn't be reached for comment. A Moody's spokesman declined to comment on the alleged role of Mr. Shah. He reiterated the company's statement last week, saying that the alleged wrongdoing by one of its employees "would be an egregious violation" of the rating firm's policies.

    Moody's has drawn flak in the past year for inaccurate credit ratings on mortgage securities and has had to battle recent accusations from a former employee that it still issues inflated ratings on complex securities. Throughout the financial crisis, however, Moody's credit ratings on corporate bonds have largely conformed to expectations.

    Still, critics say the Hilton incident may raise questions about whether ratings firms should be privy to inside information. Companies often inform rating analysts about mergers, acquisitions or other transactions ahead of time, to let analysts digest and analyze the information and announce rating actions soon after the deals become public.

    Like law firms and investment banks, credit-rating agencies have policies and controls to limit the number of people privy to inside information. "But you can't watch everyone all the time, and if someone is determined to violate the law they will do so," said Scott McCleskey, a former Moody's compliance officer who is now U.S. managing editor of Complinet Inc.

    Mr. Shah, who is in his mid-20s, left Moody's more than a year ago and is believed to have returned to his home country of India, according to former colleagues. One ex-colleague described him as "mellow."

    He joined the ratings firm in an entry-level position, and worked with analysts who rated companies in the technology, lodging and gaming sectors, according to Moody's reports that listed Mr. Shah's name from 2005 to early 2008.

    According to the U.S. attorney's complaint, Hilton executives contacted a Moody's lead analyst by phone on the afternoon of July 2, the day before Blackstone Group announced it would acquire Hilton. The complaint said that, shortly afterward, an associate analyst "involved" in the rating called the unidentified third party three times from a cellphone with information that Hilton was to be taken private. The information was passed to Mr. Rajaratnam who traded Hilton's stock, according to the complaint.

    As an associate analyst, Mr. Shah would have been paid roughly $90,000 in annual salary, plus a bonus that could reach $30,000, according to former Moody's employees.

    Bob Jensen's fraud updates ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm 

    Rotten to the Core ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm


    "SEC Proposes Changes for 'Dark Pools'," SmartPros, October 21, 2009 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x67909.xml 

    Federal regulators are proposing tighter oversight for so-called "dark pools," trading systems that don't publicly provide price quotes and compete with major stock exchanges.

    The Securities and Exchange Commission voted Wednesday to propose new rules that would require more stock quotes in the "dark pool" systems to be publicly displayed. The changes could be adopted sometime after a 90-day public comment period.

    The alternative trading systems, private networks matching buyers and sellers of large blocks of stocks, have grown explosively in recent years and now account for an estimated 7.2 percent of all share volume. SEC officials have identified them as a potential emerging risk to markets and investors.

    The SEC initiative is the latest action by the agency seeking to bring tighter oversight to the markets amid questions about transparency and fairness on Wall Street. The SEC has floated a proposal restricting short-selling - or betting against a stock - in down markets.

    Last month, the agency proposed banning "flash orders," which give traders a split-second edge in buying or selling stocks. A flash order refers to certain members of exchanges - often large institutions - buying and selling information about ongoing stock trades milliseconds before that information is made public.

    Institutional investors like pension funds may use dark pools to sell big blocks of stock away from the public scrutiny of an exchange like the New York Stock Exchange or Nasdaq Stock Market that could drive the share price lower.

    "Given the growth of dark pools, this lack of transparency could create a two-tiered market that deprives the public of information about stock prices," SEC Chairman Mary Schapiro said before the vote at the agency's public meeting.

    Republican Commissioners Kathleen Casey and Troy Paredes, while voting to put out the proposed new rules for public comment, cautioned against rushing to overly broad regulation that could have a negative impact on market innovation and competition.

    Dark pools might decide to maintain stock trading at levels below those that trigger required public display under the proposed rules, Paredes said. "Darker dark pools" could be worse than the current situation, he suggested.

    When investors place an order to buy or sell a stock on an exchange, the order is normally displayed for the public to view. With some dark pools, investors can signal their interest in buying or selling a stock but that indication of interest is communicated only to a group of market participants.

    That means investors who operate within the dark pool have access to information about potential trades which other investors using public quotes do not, the SEC says.

    The SEC proposal would require indications of interest to be treated like other stock quotes and subject to the same disclosure rules.

    Continued in article

    Bob Jensen's threads on mutual fund and index fund and insurance company scandals are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#MutualFunds

    Bob Jensen's threads on the Efficient Markets Hypothesis (EMH) are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH 


    This tutorial includes how to edit video in Windows 7
    "Manage All Your Media in Windows 7 From online streaming to all-new library controls, here's how to get more out of Windows 7's new multimedia features," by Zack Stem, PC World via The Washington Post, October 22, 2009 --- Click Here
    http://snipurl.com/windows7multimedia    [www_washingtonpost_com] 

     Whether you're leaping directly from Windows XP to Windows 7 or you stopped in Vista territory along the way, you'll find that the latest version of Microsoft's operating system handles media files in several new ways. The methods for photo and video importing, editing, and exporting have been all updated. You have new options for sharing and streaming files between computers. And media libraries become more-versatile vessels for finding and managing media files. I'll explain how to get started with these and other entertainment features of Windows 7

    Check Out the Libraries

    Windows 7 manages media files differently than previous Windows OSs did. It retains the familiar Pictures, Videos, Music, and Documents folders, but you can assign additional library locations in order to collect your media files more dynamically.

    The libraries in Windows 7 organize file types to help applications find media more easily. By default, programs look to the Pictures, Videos, Music, and Documents folders instead of having to scrutinize your whole disk. Windows XP and Vista tied media libraries to those specific folder locations. For example, Windows Media Player watched vigilantly over C:\Users\[username]\Music. Then, anytime you added new audio files to that folder, Media Player showed them in your music library. If you wanted Media Player to look for media in other areas--say, in the iTunes music folder or in another user's music library--you had to add the new locations manually within the program.

    In Windows 7, the Pictures, Videos, Music, and Documents folders are not the only doors into those libraries; you can add any other disk location you like, and library-savvy applications will automatically pool media wherever it's stored.

    Add Libraries

    Instead of manually curating media in the traditional user folders, you can turn any folder into a library. Applications will know where to find media, and you can keep your computer organized in whatever way you want.

    For example, you can turn a networked folder into an auxiliary library, or even pool music files from a different user on the same PC. Or transform your Downloads folder into a library, instantly putting MP3 and video downloads into media applications. Here's how (the process is the same for any of these situations).

    Open the Start Menu, and click your username. Open the Downloads folder, and pick Include in library, Music. Then select Include in library, Movies. Henceforth, without your having to open them immediately after downloading them, your PC will automatically slurp music and movie files into Windows Media Player.

    To remove the library status of a folder, open a window in the desktop and then navigate to that library folder in the left pane. In our case, the menu path is Libraries, Music, Downloads. Right-click the library-enabled folder--Downloads--and choose Remove location from library.

    Get Windows Live Essentials

    Windows 7's standard installation omits some previously bundled Windows software, including Photo Gallery and Movie Maker, but you can still download these apps at the Windows Live Essentials download page. Click Download on the right side, and save and run the file.

    In the installer, mark the checkbox for each piece of software you want to add. If you're on the prowl for useful multimedia options, check Photo Gallery, Movie Maker Beta, and Silverlight. (You're likely to encounter Silverlight video-streaming sites such as Netflix, so you might as well add it to Windows 7 now.) Click Install, and after several minutes, okay the final prompts to exit the installation. (I skipped changing my default home page and other needy-relationship-style requests.)

    You can sign up

    Use these groupings to your advantage. Click Next and then click Add tags next to any of the groups. Enter a few keywords from that particular photo session, separating them with semicolons. Click Import.

    If you shot RAW files, the program may prompt you to download and install an additional codec. I had to go through that process to accommodate photos from my digital SLR camera; but once you've installed the extra piece of software, Windows 7 can display the higher-end RAW files in the same manner as it does JPEGs.

    Publish a Photo Gallery Online

    Your friends and family can view your photos through the Windows Live site. After importing and arranging an album, you can upload the images within Windows Live Photo Gallery.

    Within that application, right-click My Pictures, and pick Create new folder. Name the new folder. Drag in pictures that you want to publish online. Click the name of the folder within the main window near the top to select all of the pictures. Choose Publish, Online album. Sign into your Windows Live account if needed.

    Give the album a title and in the pop-up menu choose who can view the pictures. Change the value for 'Upload size' in the pop-up menu if you wish; Medium gives enough detail for Web viewing; Large and Original allow ample size for displaying on a big TV, printing, and otherwise downloading. Then click Publish.

    After the photos have finished uploading, the program will prompt you with the option to view them. Click View Album to open the page in your Web browser. If you miss that option, click your account name in the upper right corner of Windows Live Photo Gallery, and select View your photos. Copy the link from the Web page, and share it with your friends.

    If you decide to limit who can see one of your albums, visit that album's Web page, and click Shared with: Everyone (public) at the bottom of the page. Click Edit Permissions on the following page, and uncheck the Everyone (public) box. If you've made friends through the Network area of Windows Live, pick the My network box instead. Otherwise, you can add individual e-mail contacts at the bottom. (Press the spacebar to speed up entry of the next address.)

    Back in Photo Gallery, you can add more photos to a published group by selecting the new pictures and choosing Publish, [gallery name]. Hold Shift and click the first and last images to select pictures in sequence, or hold down Ctrl and click pictures to group them in any order you like.

    Import Photos and Videos Into Windows Live Movie Maker

    Windows Live Movie Maker eschews video capture tools in favor of relying on the rest of Windows 7. If you connect a DV camcorder to a Win 7 PC, the capture process should automatically launch outside Movie Maker.

    Click the Import the entire video radio button, enter a name, and click Next. Click the Import videos as multiple files checkbox, and the tool will splice the tape into your individual shots. Approve the next windows to import the tape; the importing process will take exactly as much time as your footage does to play.

    Once your PC has captured your media, you have some options for adding clips to a video in Windows Live Movie Maker. From the desktop, drag your photos and videos into the right pane in that program. If that area is blocked, drag the files over the Movie Maker icon in the Taskbar, continue to hold the mouse down, and then drop them into the right pane. Alternatively, select Add above Videos and photos in the software, select the media, and click Open.

    You'll want to rearrange and trim various clips during the editing process, but at this point all of them are part of your movie. If you added too many clips or images, delete them from the storyboard by clicking the files and then clicking Remove.

    Edit Your Movie

    Windows Live Movie Maker cuts the timeline view, focusing instead on arranging clips in a storyboard. Just drag and drop each clip and each image to place them in the desired order within the right pane. Since some video clips run too long, you'll need to trim them into shape.

    Click a video clip to select it; then click the Edit tab at the top of the window, and click Trim. At this point, you can adjust the in- and out-point sliders (which govern the length of the clip, by trimming from one or both extremities) at the beginning and end of the timeline. Press the spacebar or click the Play icon to view a sample from the full clip, playing only between the edited points.

    If you're satisfied, click Save and close to finish. You'll make the edit here, but the original video file will stay the same, in case you want to reimport it later.

    Continued in this long article

    Bob Jensen's tools and tricks of the trade are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/thetools.htm


    "Saturn (Now Defunct Automobile): A Wealth of Lessons from Failure," University of Pennsylvania's Knowledge@Wharton, October 28, 2009 --- http://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2366


    Another one from that Ketz guy
    He knows about Altman’s Z-score model for non-manufacturers ---
    http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bankruptcy_prediction

    "Hertz Diverts and Subverts (Where Are You, Mary?)," by: J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, October 2009 ---
    http://accounting.smartpros.com/x67864.xml 

    In a recent perversion, Hertz Global Holdings (HTZ) sued Audit Integrity because it had the audacity to predict that Hertz was in danger of bankruptcy. This is another example of issuer retaliation and it must stop. The Congress and the SEC need to rein in corporate America when it attempts to enforce censorship against anybody that criticizes them.

    The facts in the case are simple.  Earlier this year Audit Integrity moved Hertz on to its watch list for companies in financial distress.  Hertz demanded a retraction and sent a copy of the letter to 19 other firms that made the list, encouraging them to join Hertz  in “protecting the investing public.”  Then Hertz sued Audit Integrity for defamation.  (See Sue Reisinger, “Hertz GC Sues Analyst Who Said Company Could Go Bankrupt”)

    Audit Integrity responded with an open letter to the SEC.  James Kaplan, Chairman of Audit Integrity, wrote “As Hertz’s ultimate goal was to silence an independent research firm calling regulatory and investor attention to the company’s real and material financial risk, the matter warrants an investigation by the Securities and Exchange Commission.”

    Quite frankly, the court should just toss out the case.  Any introductory student of mine can compute the Altman Z-score and indeed discover that Hertz is in financial distress.  Its 2008 10-K is quite revealing, with net income a negative $1.2 billion and EBIT a negative $164 million.  Retained earnings has a deficit of almost one billion dollars.  And its capital structure is heavily tilted on the debt side as its debt-equity ratio exceeds 10.  Any neophyte would agree with Audit Integrity.

    Altman’s Z-score model for non-manufacturers is:

     Z = 6.56 * WC/TA + 3.26 * RE/TA + 6.72 * EBIT/TA + 1.05 * BVE/TD

    where WC = working capital
    TA= total assets
    RE = retained earnings
    EBIT = earnings before interest and taxes
    BVE = book value of equity and
    TD = total debts.

    One interprets the Z-score as follows.  If Z>2.6, then we predict the firm is healthy and relatively free from financial distress.  If 1.1<Z<2.6, the company is in the indeterminate zone.  It faces some financial distress, but more investigation is needed to determine how serious it is.  But, if Z<1.1, then the model predicts that the firm faces a serious chance of going into bankruptcy.

    When I plug Hertz’s 2008 numbers into the model, I obtain a Z-score of 0.417.  Altman’s model therefore predicts bankruptcy.  I guess Hertz should sue Professor Altman for inventing such a model.  After all, if the firm goes under, it must be his fault.

    A few years ago Senator Wyden expressed concerns about corporate managers who attempt to intimidate those who issue research reports critical of them and their operations.  He correctly stated that the impact of such retaliation could have an adverse reaction on the publication of objective research, which in turn could have a negative impact on the quality of information that is employed by the investment community and could lead to an inefficient allocation of resources.

    Chairman Cox responded to the Senator on September 1, 2005.  He stated that he shared Sen. Wyden’s concerns about issuer retaliation and its adverse impact on the investment community.  He promised to tackle the issue, but never did. 

    Mary Schapiro, it is your turn.  Are you going to embrace the mission statement of the SEC and be an advocate for investors or are you going to be like your predecessor and say one thing but behind the scenes enable managers and directors to defraud the investment community?

    Issuer retaliation is an incredible problem in this country.  If it isn’t stopped, independent investors will stop performing independent research analyses.  And there will be more and more Enrons bursting on the scene. 

    Mary, where are you?  Where do you stand on the issues of the day?

    Jensen Comment
    An enormous problem faced by security analysts, credit rating agencies, and auditors is that when a company is on the edge of bankruptcy, these professionals are no longer confined to professionalism in evaluation. They become decision makers to the extent that "yelling fire" greatly increases the odds of helping to cause a fire.

    Bob Jensen's threads on difficulties security analysts encounter when trying (or not trying) to issue negative reports on companies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#InvestmentBanking

    Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm


    Here’s an expanded view of questions raised about which constituencies credit rating agencies (and by analogy auditing firms) really serve.

    A message forwarded by my anonymous friend Larry on October 18, 2009

    How Moody's sold its ratings -- and sold out investors | McClatchy ---
    http://www.mcclatchydc.com/politics/story/77244.html
    Instead, Moody's promoted executives who headed its "structured finance" division, which assisted Wall Street in packaging loans into securities for sale to investors. It also stacked its compliance department with the people who awarded the highest ratings to pools of mortgages that soon were downgraded to junk. Such products have another name now: "toxic assets."

    "In 2001, Moody's had revenues of $800.7 million; in 2005, they were up to $1.73 billion; and in 2006, $2.037 billion. The exploding profits were fees from packaging . . . and for granting the top-class AAA ratings, which were supposed to mean they were as safe as U.S. government securities," said Lawrence McDonald in his recent book, "A Colossal Failure of Common Sense."

    Nobody cared about due diligence so long as the money kept pouring in during the housing boom. Moody's stock peaked in February 2007 at more than $72 a share.

    Billionaire investor Warren Buffett's firm Berkshire Hathaway owned 15 percent of Moody's stock by the end of 2001, company reports show. That stake, largely still intact, meant that the Oracle from Omaha reaped huge financial rewards while Moody's overlooked the glaring problems in pools of subprime mortgages.

    A Berkshire spokeswoman had no comment.

    Moody's wasn't alone in ignoring the mounting problems. It wasn't even first among competitors. The financial industry newsletter Asset-Backed Alert found that Standard & Poor's participated in 1,962 deals in 2006 involving pools of loans, while Moody's did 1,697. In 2005, Standard & Poor's did 1,754 deals to Moody's 1,120. Fitch was well behind both.

    http://www.mcclatchydc.com/politics/story/77244.html

    Jensen Comment
    I’m frantically searching the writings of my very technical hero, Janet Tavakoli, to discover that all this is not true about my other hero, Warren Buffett. Of course there are huge and unknown, at this points, degrees of culpability.

    Janet is pretty rough on the ratings agencies in her writings. However, she’s always kind to Warren. One of my all-time favorite books is her Dear Mr. Buffet book. On Page 107, Janet writes as follows:

    At the end of 2007, Berkshire Hathaway owned 78 million shares of Moody’s Corporation, one of the top three rating agencies (the same shares owned when I first met Warren Buffett in 2005), representing just over 19 percent of the capital stock. The cot basis of the shares is $499 million. At the end of 200, the value was just under $1 billion. By the end of 2006, the value was around $3.3 billion, but it dropped to $1.7 billion at the end of 2007. The sharp increase in revenues is due chiefly to revenues generated from rating structured financial products, and the sharp decrease was due to the disillusionment of the market with the integrity of the ratings.

    On Page 109, Janet continues to berate the rating agency cartel (where I think it might be possible to substitute auditors for rating agencies interchangeably):

    The rating agencies seem to not care about the market’s forgiveness since not only have they not apologized ---  a necessary but not sufficient condition --- they seem to feel the market should change. Specifically, the market should change its point of view about what it expects from the rating agencies. Yet it seems that the market has the right to expect rating agencies to follow the basic principles of statistics.

    The tactic has mainly been successful because the rating agencies act as a cartel, leveraging their joint power to have fees magically converge and have ratings so similar that they have participated overrating AAA structured products backed by dodgy loans in 2007 that took substantial principal losses. Meanwhile, many market professionals, including me, pointed out in print that the AAA ratings were maeaningless. The rating agencies presented a farily united front in defending their methods (except for Fitch, which also participated on overrated CDOs and later seemed more responsive to downgrading structured products.

    . . .

    “Ma and pa” retail investors found that AAA product ended up in their pension funds and mutual funds because their money managers gave too much credence to an AAA rating.

    But nowhere have I yet found where Janet alludes to any insider profiteering on the part of Warren Buffett who also lost billions of dollars in the crash The difference between “ma and pa” and Mr. Buffet is that a billion dollars is pocket change to Warren Buffet. He can easily recoup his losses legitimately in trades with stupid hedge fund managers and bankers that rely too much on fallible models (at least that’s what mathematician Janet Tavakoli tells us in a very enlightening way).

    Expert Financial Predictions (Jon Stewart's hindsight video scrapbook) --- http://www.technologyreview.com/blog/post.aspx?bid=354&bpid=23077&nlid=1840
    You have to watch the first third of this video before it gets into the scrapbook itself
    The problem unmentioned here is one faced by auditors and credit rating agencies of risky clients every day:  Predictions are often self fulfilling
    If an auditor issues going concern exceptions in audit reports, the exceptions themselves will probably contribute to the downfall of the clients
    The same can be said by financial analysts who elect to trash a company's financial outlook
    Hence we have the age-old conflict between holding back on what you really secretly predict versus pulling the fire alarm on a troubled company
    There are no easy answers here except to conclude that it auditors and credit rating agencies appeared to not reveal many of their inner secret predictions in 2008
    Auditing firms and credit rating agencies lost a lot of credibility in this economic crisis, but they've survived many such stains on their reputations in the past
    By now we're used to the fact that the public is generally aware of the fire before the auditors and credit rating agencies pull the alarm lever
    On the other hand, financial wizards who pull the alarm lever on nearly every company all the time lose their credibility in a hurry

    Bob Jensen's threads on credit rating agencies are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#CreditRatingAgencies

    Bob Jensen's threads on auditor professionalism are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#Professionalism


    Question
    At this juncture why would IBM spend almost $10 billion for its own shares?

    Hint
    The wildly-popular eps ratio has a denominator.

    "IBM to spend $5 billion more on stock buyback," MIT's Technology Review, October 27, 2009 ---
    http://www.technologyreview.com/wire/23815/?nlid=2465

    IBM Corp. has boosted its stock buyback program by $5 billion, a sign of the company's ability to spit out cash despite the fact the recession has choked off revenue growth.

    The announcement Tuesday brings IBM's pot for stock repurchases to $9.2 billion, and the company, based in Armonk, N.Y., plans to ask for more at a board meeting in April 2010. IBM said it has spent $73 billion on dividends and buybacks since 2003.

    Buybacks are one lever companies pull to meet earnings targets, since they increase earnings per share by reducing the number of shares outstanding. IBM has set aggressive earnings targets, and twice this year raised its profit forecast for 2009, surprising investors since revenue has fallen since last year. IBM has said it sees corporate spending on technology "stabilizing." One way IBM wrings more profit despite lower sales is by using software to automate certain tasks done by humans and focusing on projects like the "smart" power grid that can carry higher profit margins than other services work.

    IBM's current forecasts call for earnings per share of at least $9.85 this year, and the company has maintained that it is "well ahead" of its pace for 2010 earnings of $10 to $11 per share.

    IBM ended the third quarter with $11.5 billion in cash. Free cash flow, a sign of a company's ability to generate more cash, was $3.4 billion, up $1.3 billion from a year ago. Revenue in the past nine months is down nearly 11 percent from a year ago.

    Certainly it’s widely viewed in the financial analyst community that IBM is trying to prop up eps with share buy backs:
    “Jul 16, 2009 ... (As if anyone except Wall Street cared about EPS, which IBM largely makes ... of dollars it expends buying up mountains of its own shares.” ...
    www.theregister.co.uk/2009/07/16/ibm_q2_2009_numbers /

    Time and time again executives manage earnings in demonstration that many (most?) do not believe in efficient markets and strongly believe PT Barnum’s famous quote:  “A sucker is born every minute.”

    Earnings Management Ploys --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation

    Quality of Earnings Disputes --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings

    Return on Investment Controversies --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm


    "Learning To Love Insider Trading Here's a hot tip: Want to keep companies honest, make the markets work more efficiently and encourage investors to diversify? Let insiders buy and sell, argues Donald J. Boudreaux," The Wall Street Journal, October 24, 2009 --- Click Here

    It's Halloween season, and the scariest demons in the world of business are insider traders, lurking behind every stockbroker's desk and four-star restaurant banquette. They whisper dark corporate secrets into the ears of venal speculators, and inflict pain and agony upon ordinary investors.

    Time to stop telling horror stories. Federal agents are wasting their time slapping handcuffs on hedge fund traders like Raj Rajaratnam, the financier charged last week with trading on nonpublic information involving IBM, Google and other big companies. The reassuring truth: Insider trading is impossible to police and helpful to markets and investors. Parsing the difference between legal and illegal insider trading is futile—and a disservice to all investors. Far from being so injurious to the economy that its practice must be criminalized, insiders buying and selling stocks based on their knowledge play a critical role in keeping asset prices honest—in keeping prices from lying to the public about corporate realities.

    Prohibitions on insider trading prevent the market from adjusting as quickly as possible to changes in the demand for, and supply of, corporate assets. The result is prices that lie.

    And when prices lie, market participants are misled into behaving in ways that harm not only themselves but also the economy writ large.

    Remember the 1970s-era price ceiling on gasoline? By causing prices at the pump to lie about the scarcity of oil, that price ceiling led Americans to waste untold hours waiting in lines to fuel their cars. Similar wastes occur when corporate assets are mispriced.

    Suppose that unscrupulous management drives Acme Inc. to the verge of bankruptcy. Being unscrupulous, Acme's managers succeed for a time in hiding its perilous financial condition from the public. During this lying time, Acme's share price will be too high. Investors will buy Acme shares at prices that conceal the company's imminent doom. Creditors will extend financing to Acme on terms that do not compensate those creditors for the true risks that they are unknowingly undertaking. Perhaps some of Acme's employees will turn down good job offers at other firms in order to remain at what they are misled to believe is a financially solid Acme Inc.

    Eventually, of course, those misled investors, creditors and workers will suffer financial losses. But the economy as a whole loses, too. Capital that would otherwise have been invested in firms more productive than Acme Inc. never gets to those firms. So compared with what would have happened had people not been misled by Acme's deceitfully high share price, those better-run firms don't enhance their efficiencies as much. They don't expand their operations as much. They don't create as many good jobs. Consumers don't enjoy the increased outputs, improved product qualities and lower prices that would otherwise have resulted.

    In short, overall economic efficiency is reduced.

    It's in the public interest, therefore, that prices adjust as quickly and as completely as possible to underlying economic realities—that prices adjust to convey to market participants as clearly as possible the true state of those realities.

    As argued forcefully by Henry Manne in his 1966 book "Insider Trading and the Stock Market," prohibitions on insider trading prevent asset prices from adjusting in this way. Mr. Manne, dean emeritus at George Mason University School of Law, pointed out that when insiders trade on their nonpublic, nonproprietary information, they cause asset prices to reflect that information sooner than otherwise and therefore prompt other market participants to make better decisions.

    This achievement can have ramifications beyond a few percentage-point increases in productivity growth.

    According to Mr. Manne, corporate scandals such as Enron and Global Crossing would occur much less frequently and impose fewer costs if the government didn't prohibit insider trading. As Mr. Manne said a few years ago in a radio interview, "I don't think the scandals would ever have erupted if we had allowed insider trading because there would be plenty of people in those companies who would know exactly what was going on, and who couldn't resist the temptation to get rich by trading on the information, and the stock market would have reflected those problems months and months earlier than they did under this cockamamie regulatory system we have."

    Another potential benefit of lifting the ban on insider trading is explained by Harvard University economist Jeffrey Miron: "In a world with no ban, small investors might fear to trade individual stocks and would face a greater incentive to diversify; that is also a good thing."

    Not only do insider-trading prohibitions slow economic growth, promote corporate mismanagement and discourage investment diversification, their application also is unavoidably biased.

    These prohibitions are meant to prevent all insiders with non-public information from profiting from the use of such information before it becomes public. It follows that unbiased application of these prohibitions should target not only traders whose inside information prompts them to actively buy or sell assets, but also traders whose inside information prompts them not to make asset purchases or sales that they would have made were it not for their inside information.

    The insider who learns that the Food and Drug Administration will approve a new blockbuster drug developed by a major drug company, for example, obviously profits from this information if it prompts him to buy 1,000 shares of the company that he otherwise wouldn't have bought. So, too, though, does the insider profit who, upon learning the same information, abandons her plans to sell 1,000 shares of the company. But because insider "nontrading" is undetectable, only the former insider is practically subject to prosecution and punishment.

    And because opportunities to profit through insider "non-trading" might well occur with the same frequency as opportunities to profit through insider trading, as many as half of those investment decisions influenced by inside information might be undetectable.

    This bias is not only a source of prosecutorial unfairness; its existence casts doubt on the assumption that insider trading is so harmful that it must be treated as a criminal offense. After all, if capital markets continue to function as well as they do given that many investment decisions potentially influenced by inside information are unstoppable because they are undetectable, why believe that the detectable portion of investment decisions influenced by inside information would be harmful if they were legal?

    There are, of course, situations in which it is in the interest of both a company and the public for that company to delay the release of information. Such information should be protected as company property.

    If, say, a big software firm plans to acquire a small, publicly traded software firm because such a merger would create greater production efficiencies, then an early leak of this information could undermine its merger efforts—and, hence, jeopardize the prospect of achieving greater efficiencies. With the public knowing that the big firm is seeking a controlling interest in the smaller firm, the price of that smaller firm's shares might well rise so high that it is no longer profitable for the big company to acquire a controlling share.

    The big company, therefore, has a legitimate interest in preventing insiders from trading on the knowledge that it plans to acquire the smaller firm. And the general public has an interest in permitting the company (and other firms in similar circumstances) to prevent trading on such inside information.

    As University of Michigan law professor Adam Pritchard emphasizes, the challenge is to distinguish information that should be treated as proprietary from information that does not warrant such treatment. While this challenge is theoretically easy—protect only that information whose revelation to the public through insider trading would likely reduce overall economic efficiency—practically it is devilishly difficult.

    Fortunately, neither elected officials nor government bureaucrats need to bother themselves with solving this challenge.

    Discovering what types of inside information are proprietary and which are not proprietary—and, hence, which types of information are appropriate to protect and which not to protect from insider trading—can be left to corporations themselves.

    Each corporation should be free to specify in its by-laws the types of information that insiders may not trade on. Any insiders who trade on such information would violate that firm's by-laws and, hence, subject themselves to suit by that firm. Corporations whose by-laws prohibit all or some insider trading will have standing to sue anyone who violates their by-laws. People who trade on inside information not protected by corporate by-laws would be acting perfectly legally.

    Won't corporations simply make all of their inside information off-limits to inside trading?

    No. The reason is that corporations must compete for that most demanding and vigilant of all clients: capital. Shares in a corporation whose by-laws prevent insiders from trading on, say, knowledge of executive malfeasance will be a riskier—and a less attractive—investment than shares in a corporation that doesn't proscribe such insider trading. Corporations that allow trading on inside knowledge will enjoy a lower cost of capital than will corporations that prevent such trading.

    Competition is a beautiful thing: It will punish firms that are either overly inclusive or under-inclusive in the sorts of information that they shield from inside trading.

    This decentralized competitive method for selecting information that is proprietary, and thus off-limits to inside traders, isn't perfect. But the relevant comparison isn't with an ideal, perfectly working world. The relevant comparison is with the existing approach: Government officials have decided that all insider trading is unlawful and that anyone accused of insider trading is subject to criminal prosecution.

    A less heavy-handed, less bureaucratic, less politicized, and more decentralized method for determining when inside information should, and when it shouldn't, be traded on is preferable to Uncle Sam's blanket proscription.

    In addition to taking the responsibility of defining insider trading from political agencies that are inevitably political, allowing proscriptions on insider trading to be defined exclusively by companies permits corporations to customize their insider-trading proscriptions.

    Different corporations have different mixes of investments in physical, human, financial and intellectual capital. Corporations also differ in their business plans. Companies whose successes depend heavily upon their financial-investment strategies will be more likely to have stronger and broader prohibitions on insider trading than will companies whose successes depend upon the development of new consumer products.

    Or not. The above is simply my best guess. Perhaps there's something I'm missing about companies whose successes depend upon the development of new consumer products that makes them especially vulnerable to insider trading. And that's the point. My "best guess" isn't very reliable, and nor are those of politicians and bureaucrats.

    By allowing companies as they compete for capital to experiment with different ways of dealing with insider trading, we would discover which proscriptions work best for some kinds of firms and which proscriptions work best for other kinds of firms.

    Relying upon competition and the self-interest of shareholders and creditors (both actual and potential) to discover which types of information are proprietary—and, hence, protected from insider trading—and which types of information are not proprietary removes politics from this vital task. Importantly, it also replaces the unreliable judgments and "best guesses" of political officials with the much more reliable determinations of competition.

    Here's a comment that that I sent to the WSJ and is now online among the other comments posted by the WSJ for this article.
    Bob Jensen

     

    Hi John,

    Surely you jest or have not read about "the market for lemons" in which the market is only left with lemons that nobody will buy.

    And do you want to buy and sell securities knowing that insiders are selling secret information to the counterparty to your trades that remains hidden on your side of the table?

    Do you want to buy new shares of Phizer not knowing what a big seller knows about the huge new cancer prevention drug that Phizer counted on causes brain damage?

    Do you want to sell your shares in Exxon without knowing what a big buyer knows about a new slant drilling discovery that allows tapping of the second largest natural gas field in the world (in Pennsylvania and upstate NY).

    Yeah its really fair to allow fat cats and drug dealers to buy inside information kept secret from you.

    The bottom line is that you and millions of other investors will pull out of the asymmetrical information trading markets.

    The Market for Lemons --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Market_for_Lemons

    "The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism" is a 1970 paper by the economist George Akerlof. It discusses information asymmetry, which occurs when the seller knows more about a product than the buyer. Akerlof, Michael Spence, and Joseph Stiglitz jointly received the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 2001 for their research related to asymmetric information. Akerlof's paper uses the market for used cars as an example of the problem of quality uncertainty. There are good used cars and defective used cars ("lemons"), but because of asymmetric information about the car (the seller knows much more about the problems of the car than the buyer), the buyer of a car does not know beforehand whether it is a good car or a lemon. So the buyer's best guess for a given car is that the car is of average quality; accordingly, he/she will be willing to pay for it only the price of a car of known average quality. This means that the owner of a good used car will be unable to get a high enough price to make selling that car worthwhile. Therefore, owners of good cars will not place their cars on the used car market. This is sometimes summarized as "the bad driving out the good" in the market. "Lemon market" effects have also been noted in other markets, such as used computers and the online dating "market" . There are also parallels in the insurance market, where, unless a mandate for insurance is in place, it is those most likely to need insurance compensation (i.e., those most likely to get in accidents) who tend most to buy insurance, eliminating the advantage of diffusing risk that insurance is supposed to provide (adverse selection).

     

    1 Asymmetric information
    2 Used cars
    3 Criteria
    4 Impact on markets
    5 Laws in the United States
    6 Criticism
    7 See also
    8 References
    9 Further reading
    10 External links

    Bob Jensen's rotten to the core threads ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm

     


    Foreign Currency Complications in Valuation Analysis

    Big Mac Index of Purchasing Power Parity --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Mac_Index

    "CHART OF THE DAY: The iPod And Big Mac Indexes Just Don't Work," by John Carney and Kamelia Angelova, Business Insider, October 20, 2009 ---
    http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-ipod-vs-big-mac-2009-10

    The Economist's Big Mac Index and the new iPod Nano Index from CommSec are both cute ways of getting attention for the organizations that produce them. But do they really measure anything economically significant?
     
    The idea is that the indexes are supposed to expose the relative under- or over-valuation of various currencies. In theory, the same good should trade at broadly the same price across the globe if
    exchange rates are adjusting properly. When goods wind up priced very differently in different locations, it suggests something is out of whack.

    But a side-by-side comparison of the Big Mac Index and the iPod Nano Index suggests that these might not really be good metrics for measuring
    currency valuations. As you can see, the two indexes result in wildly uncorrelated results. If it were really a matter of currency valuation, you’d expect both to show similar valuation problems. Instead, the pattern just seems random.

     


    Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and Core Earnings

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review, September 25, 2009

    Investors, It Pays to Mind the GAAP Gaps
    by Mark Gongloff
    Sep 18, 2009
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: Earning Announcements, Earnings Per Share, Earnings Quality, Generally accepted accounting principles, Impairment, Income from Continuing Operations, Income Statement, Operating Income, SEC, Securities and Exchange Commission

    SUMMARY: The article analyzes the historical differences between operating earnings and net income, or "GAAP earnings" since the first quarter of 2000 and relates the earnings per share to current stock prices via P/E ratios. In the second-quarter of 2009, "so-called operating earnings, which exclude one-time items such as credit-market write-downs, nearly matched earnings conforming to...GAAP....Companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index earned an estimated $13.81 a share in the quarter on an operating basis, compared with $13.51 in GAAP earnings."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article is useful for discussing quality of earnings disclosures in any financial accounting class.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) What do you think the author is referring to when he uses the term "GAAP earnings"? According to the article, how may GAAP earnings differ from operating earnings as reported by publicly-traded companies?

    2. (Introductory) What are the implications for stock market prices of the relationship, or differences, between reported GAAP earnings and operating earnings as disclosed by the companies analyzed for this article (those in the S&P 500)?

    3. (Introductory) What other implications are highlighted by analysts as stemming from this difference in reported earnings numbers?

    4. (Advanced) What does it mean to say that GAAP earnings "...get reported to the government but get less attention on earnings day"? To whom in the government are these earnings reported?

    5. (Advanced) What is the difference between operating earnings and net income? Do you think that the operating earnings described in this article agree with operating earnings as presented on an income statement prepared in accordance with GAAP? In your answer, specifically consider treatment required for impairment charges for goodwill or other long-lived assets.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Investors, It Pays to Mind the GAAP Gaps," by Mark Gongloff, The Wall Street Journal,  September 18, 2009 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125322419751520977.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    Two earnings data points that tend to coexist in parallel universes have lately come notably close to colliding.

    In the second-quarter earnings season, so-called operating earnings, which exclude one-time items such as credit-market write-downs, nearly matched earnings conforming to Generally Accepted Accounting Principles, or GAAP, which get reported to the government but get less attention on earnings day.

    Companies in the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index earned an estimated $13.81 a share in the quarter on an operating basis, compared with $13.51 in GAAP earnings.

    That is the closest those two earnings measures have been since the first quarter of 2000. The gap widens in recessions and did so significantly in the latest downturn. That they nearly matched last quarter offers another sign of market stability.

    Still, the relative harmony of the second quarter seems a fluke. For the past 14 years, the gap between the two measures has grown persistently, with operating earnings topping GAAP earnings by an average of $2.47 a share per quarter.

    When using a 10-year trailing average of earnings to erase cyclical gyrations, operating earnings are nearly 24% higher than GAAP earnings, the highest ever.

    It isn't clear why the difference has grown so wide. One inescapable conclusion is that, since 1995, either by happy accident or accounting shenanigans, one-time losses have grown more quickly than one-time gains, elevating the operating earnings that Wall Street watches.

    The investment implications are many. For one thing, two earnings measures produce two market valuations. The S&P 500 trades at 21 times the past 10 years' GAAP earnings and 17 times operating earnings. Neither is exactly cheap, but one is much pricier than the other.

    Operating earnings help investors get a feel for a company's long-term profitability, but companies pay dividends out of GAAP earnings, notes Capital Economics market economist John Higgins.

    Investors are well advised to watch both figures for another reason: Some companies have bigger differences between GAAP and operating earnings than others. According to research by Société Générale quantitative strategist Andrew Lapthorne, those with bigger gaps tend to underperform in the long run.

    S&P Core Earnings
    For years Standard and Poors has recognized that GAAP earnings can be misleading to investors relative to what are called the S&P Core Earnings that adjust for some "deficiencies" in GAAP. Sometimes the adjustments are for disclosures that are not booked. For example, for years the S&P Core earnings adjusted for unbooked employee stock options that, prior to revision of FAS 123, were not expensed by most companies (only one of the Fortune 500 companies expensed employee stock options before FAS 123 was revised).

    "Beyond The Balance Sheet Earnings Quality," by  Kurt Badanhausen, Jack Gage, Cecily Hall, Michael K. Ozanian, Forbes, January 28, 2005 --- http://www.forbes.com/home/business/2005/01/26/bbsearnings.html 

    It's not how much money a company is making that counts, it's how it makes its money. The earnings quality scores from RateFinancials aim to evaluate how closely reported earnings reflect the cash that the companies' businesses are generating and how well their balance sheets reflect their true economic position. Companies in the winners table have the best earnings quality (they are generating a lot of sustainable cash from their operations), while companies in the losers table have been boosting their reported earnings with such tricks as unexpensed stock options, low tax rates, asset sales, off-balance-sheet financing and deferred maintenance of the pension fund.

    Krispy kreme doughnuts is the latest illustration of the fact that stunning earnings growth can mask a lot of trouble. Not long ago the doughnut maker was a glamour stock with a 60% earnings-per-share growth rate and a multiple to match-70 times trailing earnings. Now the stock is at $9.61, down 72% from May, when the company first issued an earnings warning. Turns out Krispy Kreme may have leavened profits in the way it accounted for the purchase of franchised stores and by failing to book adequate reserves for doubtful accounts. So claims a shareholder lawsuit against the company. Krispy Kreme would not comment on the suit. 

    Investors are not auditors, they don't have subpoena power, and they can't know about such disasters in advance. But sometimes they can get hints that the quality of a company's earnings is a little shaky. In Krispy's case an indication that it was straining to deliver its growth story came three years ago in its use of synthetic leases to finance expansion. Forbes described these leases in a Feb. 18, 2002 story that did not please the company. Another straw in the wind: weak free cash flow from operations. You get that number by taking the "cash flow from operations" reported on the "consolidated statement of cash flows," then subtracting capital expenditures. Solid earners usually throw off lots of positive free cash flow. At Krispy the figure was negative.

     Is there a Krispy Kreme lurking in your portfolio? For this, the fifth installment in our Beyond the Balance Sheet series, we asked the experts at RateFinancials of New York City ( www.ratefinancials.com ) to look into earnings quality among the companies included in the S&P 500 Index. The tables at right display the outfits that RateFinancials puts at the top and at the bottom of the quality scale. The ratings are to a degree subjective and, not surprisingly, some of the companies at the bottom take exception. General Motors feels that RateFinancials understates its cash flow. But at minimum RateFinancials' work warns investors to look closely at the financial statements of the suspect companies. 

    A lot of factors went into the ratings produced by cofounders Victor Germack and Harold Paumgarten, research director Allan Young and ten analysts. A company that expenses stock options is probably not straining to meet earnings forecasts, so it gets a plus. Overoptimistic assumptions about future earnings on a pension fund artificially prop up earnings and thus rate a minus. A low tax rate is a potential indicator of trouble: Maybe the low profit reported to the Internal Revenue Service is all too true and the high profit reported to shareholders an exaggeration. Other factors relate to discontinued operations (booking a one-time gain from selling a business is bad), corporate governance (companies get black marks for having poison pills), inventory (if it piles up faster than sales, then business may be weakening) and free cash flow (a declining number is bad).

    Continued in this section of Forbes

    Included in Standard & Poor's definition of Core Earnings are 
    • employee stock options grant expenses, 
    • restructuring charges from on-going operations, 
    • write-downs of depreciable or amortizable operating assets, 
    • pensions costs 
    • purchased research and development. 

    Excluded from this definition are 

    • impairment of goodwill charges, 
    • gains or losses from asset sales, pension gains, 
    • unrealized gains or losses from hedging activities, merger and acquisition related fees
    • litigation settlements

    For more on S&P Core Earnings see Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and Core Earnings --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings


    Oil and Gas Accounting Under IFRS

    October 16, 2009 message from Ed Scribner

    Does anyone know where U.S. oil companies stand on adoption of IFRS? Presumably their current accounting methods fall within “the overall accounting framework established by the IASB,” so they would be able to continue to use those methods for at least awhile.


    Ed Scribner
    New Mexico State University
    Las Cruces, NM, USA

    October 18, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Ed,

    Exxon-Mobil and other large multinational companies want badly to bury U.S. GAAP in favor of IFRS. They are the wind beneath the wings of the Big Four auditing firms’ advocacy of IFRS. They are also active behind the scenes in setting IFRS they way they want IFRS. (see the quotation below)

    Actually, the large companies were not a problem when the SEC caved in to the “oil industry” when it dropped the requirement that dry holes be fully expensed when declared hopeless. The political heat came from smaller wildcatting operators who would see their earnings fluctuate from enormous losses to enormous gains year-to-year because of the impact of one or two dry holes in some years and no dry holes in other years. A few dry holes have negligible impact on Exxon year in and year out.

    Also the big oil companies benefit when small operations go bankrupt, because the big players can then buy up the drilling rights of small players in the industry.

    "Powerful players: How constituents captured the setting of IFRS 6, an accounting standard for the extractive industries," by Corinne L. Cortesea, Helen J. Irvineb and Mary A. Kaidonisa, ScienceDirect, 2008 ---
    Click Here
     

    Abstract
    This paper illustrates the influence of powerful players in the setting of IFRS 6, a new International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) for the extractive industries. A critical investigative inquiry of the international accounting standard setting process, using Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA), reveals some of the key players, analyses the surrounding discourse and its implications, and assesses the outcomes. An analysis of small cross-section of comment letters submitted to the International Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) by one international accounting firm, one global mining corporation and one industry group reveal the hidden coalitions between powerful players. These coalitions indicate that the regulatory process of setting IFRS 6 has been captured by powerful extractive industries constituents so that it merely codifies existing industry practice.

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting standard setting controversies ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting


    "71% of senior financial executives say that FASB should set U.S. accounting standards, not IASB or U.S. Congress," by Kristi Grgeta, Grant Thornton, October 29, 2009

    October 30m 2009 message from Tom Selling [tom.selling@GROVESITE.COM]

    For Immediate Release

    For more information, please contact:
    Kristi Grgeta
    T
    312.602.8720
    E Kristi.Grgeta@gt.com

    71% of senior financial executives say that FASB should set U.S. accounting standards, not IASB or U.S. Congress

    More than half of public companies still have no plans to use XBRL even after SEC mandate

     CHICAGO, October 29, 2009 – In a national survey of U.S. CFOs and senior comptrollers conducted by Grant Thornton LLP, the U.S. member firm of Grant Thornton International Ltd, the majority (71%) believe that the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) should set U.S. accounting standards, not the SEC, the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) or the U.S. Congress.

     EXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) usage has picked up some among public companies, increasing to 17 percent in September 2009 from 12 percent in March 2009; however, this increase is not as significant as one might expect given the SEC mandate that public companies use XBRL as early as June 2009 and no later than 2011. Even more surprising is that more than half (52%) of public companies still report that they have no plans to use XBRL.

     Fifty-nine percent of the survey respondents report that their companies would continue to use leases more or less in the same manner as they currently do, even though the FASB has tentatively decided that all lease obligations should be recognized as liabilities on the statement of financial position with a corresponding “right of use” asset. CFOs also feel that companies should report their own debt on their financial statements at amortized historical cost (43%), rather than at fair value (38%) or at the discounted amount of the expected future payments (18%).

    Ideally, who should set U.S. accounting standards?

     

    All

    Public

    Private

    A national independent board supervised by a national regulator (e.g., the Financial Accounting Standards Board)

    71%

    70%

    71%

    An international independent board supervised by international entities such as the International Organization of Securities Regulators, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (e.g., the International Accounting Standards Board)

    24%

    23%

    25%

    The global accounting profession (e.g., the International Federation of Accountants)

    20%

    16%

    21%

    A national regulator (e.g., the SEC)

    16%

    18%

    16%

    A body designated by an international entity such as the United Nations Council on Trade and Development or the World Trade Organization

    3%

    2%

    3%

    National legislatures (e.g., the U.S. Congress)

    3%

    4%

    2%

    Does your company currently report financial results using eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL)?

     

    All

    Public

    Private

    Yes

    6%

    17%

    3%

    No

    94%

    83%

    97%

     

    If no, when do you plan to report using XBRL?

     

     

    All

    Public

    Private

    Before 2010

    1%

    6%

    1%

    Before 2011

    8%

    25%

    5%

    After 2011

    6%

    18%

    3%

    No plans at this time

    84%

    52%

    92%

    The FASB has tentatively decided that all lease obligations should be recognized as liabilities on the statement of financial position with a corresponding “right of use” asset. Would a requirement to recognize lease obligations on the statement of financial position cause you to change the way in which you finance operations?

     

    All

    Public

    Private

    Yes, we would continue to use leases or lease financing, but possibly with significant changes in the provisions of the agreements.

    12%

    13%

    12%

    Yes, we would be less inclined to make use of lease financing.

    14%

    16%

    13%

    No, we would continue to use leases more or less in the same manner as we currently do.

    59%

    57%

    61%

    Don’t know

    15%

    14%

    14%

     How should firms report their own debt on their financial statements?

     

    All

    Public

    Private

    At amortized historical cost

    43%

    47%

    42%

    At fair value

    38%

    33%

    38%

    At the discounted amount of the expected future payments

    18%

    19%

    18%

    Other

    2%

    2%

    2%

    - ends -

    About the Survey

    Grant Thornton LLP conducted the biannual national survey from Sept. 21 through Oct. 2, 2009, with 846 U.S. CFOs and senior comptrollers participating. 

    About Grant Thornton LLP

    The people in the independent firms of Grant Thornton International Ltd provide personalized attention and the highest quality service to public and private clients in more than 100 countries. Grant Thornton LLP is the U.S. member firm of Grant Thornton International Ltd, one of the six global audit, tax and advisory organizations. Grant Thornton International Ltd and its member firms are not a worldwide partnership, as each member firm is a separate and distinct legal entity.

    In the U.S., visit Grant Thornton LLP at www.GrantThornton.com

    Bob Jensen's threads on the movement to replace U.S. GAAP in favor of IASB international standards ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting


    Case:  Multinational Tax Controversies

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 15, 2009

    Business Fends Off Tax Hit
    by Neil King Jr. and Elizabeth Williamson
    Oct 13, 2009
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: Tax Laws, Tax Policy, Taxation, Treasury Department

    SUMMARY: "The Obama Administration has shelved a plan to raise more than $200 billion in new taxes on multinational companies following a blitz of complaints from businesses." Obama met with business leaders over the summer of 2009 and each time discussed a proposal to end the exception to U.S. taxation of worldwide corporate earnings in cases in which the earnings are retained overseas and not repatriated. Repatriation typically occurs by subsidiaries paying dividends to parent corporations. "Lurking behind the tax debate was the administration's need for new sources of revenue to fund its...spending..." and the deficit.

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article can be used to introduce taxation of multinational corporations and the influence of politics on setting tax law.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) How are U.S. companies earnings from foreign operations taxed in the U.S.? According to the article, how does that compare to taxation policies in the rest of the world?

    2. (Advanced) What exception to this policy is currently a part of U.S. tax law? How does this exception result in the "counterintuitive" result that " businesses investing here are paying a higher tax rate than if they're investing overseas"?

    3. (Advanced) What does it mean to repatriate earnings?

    4. (Introductory) What is the reason that President Obama has proposed eliminating the exception from taxation for earnings by foreign operations that are not repatriated, at least according to some?

    5. (Introductory) How did leaders of corporate America manage to stave off this tax change?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Business Fends Off Tax Hit," by Neil King Jr. and Elizabeth Williamson, The Wall Street Journal, October 13, 2009 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125539099758581443.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    The Obama administration has shelved a plan to raise more than $200 billion in new taxes on multinational companies following a blitz of complaints from businesses.

    A contingent of Silicon Valley chief executives, for example, traveled to Washington in late September to speak out against the proposal to change how the federal government taxes overseas profits. They came away from meetings with key congressmen relieved.

    Obama aides say the administration has set the idea aside for now, but may return to it as part of a broader tax overhaul sometime next year. The White House had billed the proposed change as an overdue fix to the tax code and potentially a key revenue-raiser.

    "This has gone all of a sudden from red-hot to white-cold," says Michael Klayko, chief executive of Brocade Communications Systems Inc., a large data-storage company. But he says he is concerned that if the proposed tax changes get entangled in the health-care overhaul, "it could go back to red-hot again."

    The story of the business community's campaign against the tax changes and the Obama administration's eventual retreat offers a window into the often uneasy relations between the White House and the corporate world. It suggests that an administration that was critical of business at the height of the financial crisis is becoming more accommodating. The White House, through a series of presidential lunches and other outreach, is trying to soothe tensions with multinational companies.

    Lurking behind the tax debate was the administration's need for new sources of revenue to fund its increased spending. Jason Furman, a White House economic adviser, made that point clear at the end of a session with a dozen or so lobbyists in March. Catherine Schultz, head of tax policy at the National Foreign Trade Council, who was at the meeting, says Mr. Furman basically told the group: "We need the money."

    Critics long have complained that the provision encourages companies to avoid U.S. taxes by expanding production on foreign soil. On the campaign trail last year, President Barack Obama promised repeatedly to "end tax breaks for companies that ship jobs overseas."

    U.S. businesses counter that the deferral provision allows them to better compete globally, which in turn allows them to expand their U.S. operations, too. If the deferral were eliminated, they contend, the financial damage to their businesses would require them to cut jobs in the U.S.

    The issue has drawn little public attention, having been overshadowed by debates on health care, climate change and financial regulation. But it may have colored relations between the White House and the business community as much as any issue.

    Companies ranging from Microsoft Corp. to General Electric Co. to International Business Machines Corp. put the topic at the top of their Washington agendas. Many CEOs and business lobbyists say the proposal -- and the rhetoric used to push it -- betrayed a tone-deafness on business issues among the president and his advisers. White House officials say the issue has often dominated discussions during meetings with CEOs.

    The first sign that Mr. Obama planned to make good on his campaign promise came Feb. 26, when he released his proposed $3.6 trillion budget for fiscal 2010. The 134-page blueprint included revisions to the tax rules for U.S. companies operating overseas, which it said would raise $210 billion over 10 years.

    The proposal sent tremors through the business community. Two weeks later, semiconductor chief executives and chairmen gathered in Washington. The group included Craig Barrett, then chairman of Intel Corp., and John Daane, chief executive of high-tech company Altera Corp. At a round-table discussion with reporters, the executives slammed the administration for seeking tax changes that would "punish" companies with offshore operations. They said they resented suggestions from the Obama campaign that their practices were somehow unpatriotic.

    Dozens of other CEOs, from some of the country's largest companies, raised similar complaints in interviews and opinion pieces. Brian Ferguson, then-chief executive of Eastman Chemical Co., told an industry trade publication that Mr. Obama's tax plans posed "potentially devastating" challenges to those parts of the U.S. manufacturing sector that rely heavily on foreign sales.

    When Mr. Obama addressed a gathering of CEOs at a Washington hotel on March 12, IBM Chief Executive Samuel Palmisano asked the president about the deferral issue. The provision, Mr. Palmisano said, "has been very, very important" in helping U.S. companies compete abroad. "So what we really are asking for," he said, "is just an open dialogue."

    Mr. Obama said he would seek "the right balance," but showed little inclination to budge. Most Americans found it "counterintuitive," he said, that "businesses investing here are paying a higher tax rate than if they're investing overseas." It was important to have a tax code "that reflects those values," he told the CEOs.

    Within days, the Business Roundtable, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the National Association of Manufacturers began releasing studies intended to show that scrapping the deferral would hurt U.S. competitiveness, spurring companies to shift jobs overseas to save money or giving a leg up to foreign competitors. One study looked at the gradual elimination of the deferral allowance for U.S. shipping companies between 1975 and 1986, and the sector's subsequent rapid contraction as foreign operators gained the upper hand. The groups also sent letters to leaders of the House and Senate, signed by nearly 200 companies, that criticized the proposal.

    Hoping to clear the air, Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner hosted a conference call March 25 with top executives from a dozen companies, including IBM, Citigroup Inc., GE, Google Inc. and Honeywell International Inc. Also on the call were Lawrence Summers, the White House economic adviser, and Valerie Jarrett, Mr. Obama's top aide for corporate outreach. The Obama aides said they were open to discussing the provision, and insisted that it wouldn't hit companies as hard as some CEOs thought, participants recall.

    Tensions flared in May when Mr. Obama said in a speech he intended to push ahead with revamping the overseas tax rules. The president said the existing tax code "makes it perfectly legal for companies to avoid paying their fair share." He blasted tax cheats who were "shirking" their responsibilities and vowed to clean up "a tax code that says you should pay lower taxes if you create a job in Bangalore, India, than if you create one in Buffalo, New York."

    Continued in article

    Bob Jensen's threads on the budget crisis ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/entitlements.htm


    Ford Outfoxes the Chicken Tax
    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 1, 2009

    To Outfox the Chicken Tax, Ford Strips Its Own Vans
    by: Matthew Dolan
    Date: Sep 23, 2009 

    SUMMARY: Ford goes to unusual lengths to dodge U.S. restrictions on importing trucks into America.

    DISCUSSION: 

    1.     What is the "chicken tax"? When did it originate? What was the reason for its implementation? Why does it continue to be in force?

    2.     What does Ford do to work around the chicken tax? Do these actions comply with the law? Why or why not? What are Ford's other options? What are the pros and cons of each of these alternatives? Which do you think is the best alternative for Ford in this situation?

    3.     Why does the U.S. government make these types of distinctions for similar categories of products or components? Argue a case to support that assertion that rules applying to similar categories be more consistent. What is the case to support the current situation in which different tariffs apply for similar categories?

    "To Outfox the Chicken Tax, Ford Strips Its Own Vans Logic Takes a Back Seat -- and Windows, as Auto Maker Plays Tariff Games," by Matthew Dolan, The Wall Street Journal, September 23, 2009 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125357990638429655.html?mod=djem_jie_360

    Several times a month, Transit Connect vans from a Ford Motor Co. factory in Turkey roll off a ship here shiny and new, rear side windows gleaming, back seats firmly bolted to the floor.

    Their first stop in America is a low-slung, brick warehouse where those same windows, never squeegeed at a gas station, and seats, never touched by human backsides, are promptly ripped out.

    The fabric is shredded, the steel parts are broken down, and everything is sent off along with the glass to be recycled.

    Why all the fuss and feathers? Blame the "chicken tax."

    The seats and windows are but dressing to help Ford navigate the wreckage of a 46-year-old trade spat. In the early 1960s, Europe put high tariffs on imported chicken, taking aim at rising U.S. sales to West Germany. President Johnson retaliated in 1963, in part by targeting German-made Volkswagens with a tax on imports of foreign-made trucks and commercial vans.

    The 1960s went the way of love beads and sitar records, but the chicken tax never died. Europe still has a tariff on imports of U.S. chicken, and the U.S. still hits delivery vans imported from overseas with a 25% tariff. American companies have to pay, too, which puts Ford in the weird position of circumventing U.S. trade rules that for years have protected U.S. auto makers' market for trucks.

    The company's wiggle room comes from the process of defining a delivery van. Customs officials check a bunch of features to determine whether a vehicle's primary purpose might be to move people instead. Since cargo doesn't need seats with seat belts or to look out the window, those items are on the list. So Ford ships all its Transit Connects with both, calls them "wagons" instead of "commercial vans." Installing and removing unneeded seats and windows costs the company hundreds of dollars per van, but the import tax falls dramatically, to 2.5 percent, saving thousands.

    Customs officials won't discuss individual company's strategies, but Stephen Biegun, Ford's vice president for international governmental affairs, says the practice complies with the letter of the law. "We are free-traders, full stop," he says.

    Foreign auto makers have long crossed swords with the chicken tax. Toyota Motor Corp., Nissan Motor Co. and Honda Motor Co. took the straightforward route and built plants in the U.S.

    Subaru, owned by Fuji Heavy Industries Ltd. of Japan, imported a small pickup in the 1980s called the Bi-drive Recreational All-terrain Transporter, or BRAT. But it wasn't a taxable truck, because it had two lawn-chair-like seats bolted to the open bed. (President Reagan owned a red one, according to Subaru.)

    With the globalization of the auto industry, American companies have joined the game. Until recently, Chrysler Group LLC imported Dodge Sprinter vans made in Düsseldorf, Germany, by former owner Daimler AG. The engine, transmission, axles and wheels were removed, allowing the truck bodies to cross the border as auto components, which aren't subject to the tax. Daimler then reassembled the vehicles at a factory in Ladson, S.C.

    Ford launched the Transit Connect in 2002. The compact commercial van with a distinctive raised roof was designed to haul goods through urban areas with tight streets. Since then, more than 600,000 of the vehicles have been sold.

    When gas prices spiked, Ford saw a market among small-business owners in the U.S. Prices start at $20,780, much lower than would have been possible if Ford had to cover the chicken tax. Sales are off to a fast start. In August, Ford sold more than 2,200 in the U.S.

    "It's great for city driving," said Duff Goldman, owner of Charm City Cakes in Baltimore and star of Ace of Cakes on the Food Network. "It's shorter, smaller and has really good fuel economy." He bought a black Transit Connect last month. Since he doesn't carry passengers, his van has no windows or seats in the back.

    The vans leave Turkey on cargo ships owned by Wallenius Wilhelmsen Logistics. Once they arrive in Baltimore, they are driven into a warehouse, where 65 workers from the shipping company's WWL Vehicle Services Americas Inc. convert them into commercial vehicles amid the blare of rock music and the whirring of industrial fans.

    On a recent afternoon, a handful of vans passed through the warehouse unmolested as passenger wagons. But the vast majority were lined up to have windows pulled out, and they all had their rear seats removed.

    In one lane, supervisor Robert Dowdy watched as two workers removed the rear side windows. They cut out the rubber seal with a special knife and popped out the glass using suction cups. The space is plugged with a metal panel that cures for 15 minutes before being tested outside for waterproofing.

    At the start of that same lane, Mayso Lawrence unhooked a rear seat belt as easily as he would pop the top off a soda bottle. Using a drill, he quickly unscrewed six bolts to free the seats. Workers at the other end dump the seats into cardboard boxes, which are hoisted onto an open tractor-trailer and shipped to Ohio. Ford says the shredded seat fabric and foam become landfill cover, while the steel is processed for other uses.

    "I never thought about why we take out the seats, but if that's what the customer wants, that's what we'll give them," Mr. Lawrence said.

    With the seat removed, Mr. Lawrence puts in a new floor panel to cover the holes, toots the horn to signal he's finished, then gets to work on another van. The whole process takes him less than five minutes.

    Rob Stevens, chief engineer for Ford's commercial vehicles, says the auto maker decided against shipping the seats back to Turkey for use in the next wave of vans for the U.S.

    "We thought going through the recycling process was best," he said. "The steel is valuable."

    As Bastiat showed 150 years ago, you don't create wealth by destruction.
    "Clunker Cash Is Anything But Smart Money," by Randall Forsyth, Barron's, August 4, 2009 ---
    http://online.barrons.com/article/SB124931671451601915.html 


    Eugene Fama Lecture: Masters of Finance, Oct 2, 2009
    Videos Fama Lecture: Masters of Finance From the American Finance Association's "Masters in Finance" video series, Eugene F. Fama presents a brief history of the efficient market theory. The lecture was recorded at the University of Chicago in October 2008 with an introduction by John Cochrane.
    http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/2009/10/fama-lecture-masters-of-finance.html#more
    Bob Jensen's threads on the EMH --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH

    Fama Video on Market Efficiency in a Volatile Market
    Widely cited as the father of the efficient market hypothesis and one of its strongest advocates, Professor Eugene Fama examines his groundbreaking idea in the context of the 2008 and 2009 markets. He outlines the benefits and limitations of efficient markets for everyday investors and is interviewed by the Chairman of Dimensional Fund Advisors in Europe, David Salisbury.
    http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/2009/08/fama-on-market-efficiency-in-a-volatile-market.html#more

    Other Fama and French Videos --- http://www.dimensional.com/famafrench/videos/


    Video:  Interesting look at 8 common investment mistakes that uses Big Brown (the horse, not the delivery company). ---
    http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/2009/10/video-on-common-mistakes.html

    Last night's (October 7, 2009) PBS NewsHour took a look at the bearish obsession du jour, the commercial real estate market. Real estate analyst Bob White took them around to show some of the ugliest cases out there. (via Square Feet)
    http://www.businessinsider.com/a-guided-tour-of-nyc-commercial-real-estate-wreckage-video-2009-10

    Bob Jensen's investment helpers are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm#InvestmentHelpers


    Way out there on (or beyond) the leading edge
    "Caltech Scientists Develop Novel Use of Neurotechnology to Solve Classic Social Problem, September 10, 2009 --- http://media.caltech.edu/press_releases/13288
    Jim Mahar clued me into this link

    Economists and neuroscientists from the California Institute of Technology (Caltech) have shown that they can use information obtained through functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) measurements of whole-brain activity to create feasible, efficient, and fair solutions to one of the stickiest dilemmas in economics, the public goods free-rider problem—long thought to be unsolvable.

    This is one of the first-ever applications of neurotechnology to real-life economic problems, the researchers note. "We have shown that by applying tools from neuroscience to the public-goods problem, we can get solutions that are significantly better than those that can be obtained without brain data," says Antonio Rangel, associate professor of economics at Caltech and the paper's principal investigator.

    The paper describing their work was published today in the online edition of the journal Science, called Science Express.

    Examples of public goods range from healthcare, education, and national defense to the weight room or heated pool that your condominium board decides to purchase. But how does the government or your condo board decide which public goods to spend its limited resources on? And how do these powers decide the best way to share the costs?

    "In order to make the decision optimally and fairly," says Rangel, "a group needs to know how much everybody is willing to pay for the public good. This information is needed to know if the public good should be purchased and, in an ideal arrangement, how to split the costs in a fair way."

    In such an ideal arrangement, someone who swims every day should be willing to pay more for a pool than someone who hardly ever swims. Likewise, someone who has kids in public school should have more of her taxes put toward education.

    But providing public goods optimally and fairly is difficult, Rangel notes, because the group leadership doesn't have the necessary information. And when people are asked how much they value a particular public good—with that value measured in terms of how many of their own tax dollars, for instance, they’d be willing to put into it—their tendency is to lowball.

    Why? “People can enjoy the good even if they don’t pay for it,” explains Rangel. "Underreporting its value to you will have a small effect on the final decision by the group on whether to buy the good, but it can have a large effect on how much you pay for it."

    In other words, he says, “There’s an incentive for you to lie about how much the good is worth to you.”

    That incentive to lie is at the heart of the free-rider problem, a fundamental quandary in economics, political science, law, and sociology. It's a problem that professionals in these fields have long assumed has no solution that is both efficient and fair.

    In fact, for decades it's been assumed that there is no way to give people an incentive to be honest about the value they place on public goods while maintaining the fairness of the arrangement.

    “But this result assumed that the group's leadership does not have direct information about people's valuations,” says Rangel. “That's something that neurotechnology has now made feasible.”

    And so Rangel, along with Caltech graduate student Ian Krajbich and their colleagues, set out to apply neurotechnology to the public-goods problem.

    In their series of experiments, the scientists tried to determine whether functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) could allow them to construct informative measures of the value a person assigns to one or another public good. Once they’d determined that fMRI images—analyzed using pattern-classification techniques—can confer at least some information (albeit "noisy" and imprecise) about what a person values, they went on to test whether that information could help them solve the free-rider problem.

    They did this by setting up a classic economic experiment, in which subjects would be rewarded (paid) based on the values they were assigned for an abstract public good.

    As part of this experiment, volunteers were divided up into groups. “The entire group had to decide whether or not to spend their money purchasing a good from us,” Rangel explains. “The good would cost a fixed amount of money to the group, but everybody would have a different benefit from it.”

    The subjects were asked to reveal how much they valued the good. The twist? Their brains were being imaged via fMRI as they made their decision. If there was a match between their decision and the value detected by the fMRI, they paid a lower tax than if there was a mismatch. It was, therefore, in all subjects' best interest to reveal how they truly valued a good; by doing so, they would on average pay a lower tax than if they lied.

    “The rules of the experiment are such that if you tell the truth,” notes Krajbich, who is the first author on the Science paper, “your expected tax will never exceed your benefit from the good.”

    In fact, the more cooperative subjects are when undergoing this entirely voluntary scanning procedure, “the more accurate the signal is,” Krajbich says. “And that means the less likely they are to pay an inappropriate tax.”

    This changes the whole free-rider scenario, notes Rangel. “Now, given what we can do with the fMRI,” he says, “everybody’s best strategy in assigning value to a public good is to tell the truth, regardless of what you think everyone else in the group is doing.”

    And tell the truth they did—98 percent of the time, once the rules of the game had been established and participants realized what would happen if they lied. In this experiment, there is no free ride, and thus no free-rider problem.

    “If I know something about your values, I can give you an incentive to be truthful by penalizing you when I think you are lying,” says Rangel.

    While the readings do give the researchers insight into the value subjects might assign to a particular public good, thus allowing them to know when those subjects are being dishonest about the amount they'd be willing to pay toward that good, Krajbich emphasizes that this is not actually a lie-detector test.

    “It’s not about detecting lies,” he says. “It’s about detecting values—and then comparing them to what the subjects say their values are.”

    “It’s a socially desirable arrangement,” adds Rangel. “No one is hurt by it, and we give people an incentive to cooperate with it and reveal the truth.”

    “There is mind reading going on here that can be put to good use,” he says. “In the end, you get a good produced that has a high value for you.”

    From a scientific point of view, says Rangel, these experiments break new ground. “This is a powerful proof of concept of this technology; it shows that this is feasible and that it could have significant social gains.”

    And this is only the beginning. “The application of neural technologies to these sorts of problems can generate a quantum leap improvement in the solutions we can bring to them,” he says.

    Indeed, Rangel says, it is possible to imagine a future in which, instead of a vote on a proposition to fund a new highway, this technology is used to scan a random sample of the people who would benefit from the highway to see whether it's really worth the investment. "It would be an interesting alternative way to decide where to spend the government's money," he notes.

    In addition to Rangel and Krajbich, other authors on the Science paper, “Using neural measures of economic value to solve the public goods free-rider problem,” include Caltech's Colin Camerer, the Robert Kirby Professor of Behavioral Economics, and John Ledyard, the Allen and Lenabelle Davis Professor of Economics and Social Sciences. Their work was funded by grants from the National Science Foundation, the Gordon and Betty Moore Foundation, and the Human Frontier Science Program.

     

    Jensen Comment
    Are Rangel and Kribich overlooking a fundamental problem in economic theory or are they overcoming that problem?
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EconomicTheoryErrors
    In particular note Economic Theory Errors. Simoleon Sense, September 23, 2009

    It would seem to me that the pattern recognition approach suggested by Rangel and Kribich is a far out way of overcoming the scaling problem of utility models.


    Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?

    October 2, 2009 message from PwC's CFOdirect Network [CFOdirect_Network@PWC_Assurance.messages1.com]

  • Today the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) provided many smaller companies with additional time to comply with the SEC's internal control audit requirements. Under the final extension, non-accelerated filers (generally companies with a public float below $75 million) will be required to comply with the SEC's internal control audit requirements beginning with annual reports for fiscal years ending on or after June 15, 2010. The additional extension does not affect companies with fiscal year-ends between June 15 and December 14.

    October 2, 2009 message from Glen L Gray [glen.gray@CSUN.EDU]

    http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/newsbysector/banksandfinance/6252501/KPMG-and-PwC-Reykjavik-offices-are-raided-by-Icelandic-police.html

    Police raid KPMG, PwC offices regarding failure of Icelandic banks Icelandic offices of accounting firms KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers were raided by police during an investigation into the failure of Iceland's three biggest banks. Police seized documents and computer data related to banks Kaupthing, Glitnir and Landsbanki. Officials are looking into allegations that accounting and reporting requirements were violated at those banks, the failure of which drove the country into a financial crisis. Telegraph (London) (10/1)

    Glen L. Gray, PhD, CPA
    Accounting & Information Systems, COBAE
    California State University, Northridge
    18111 Nordhoff ST
    Northridge, CA 91330-8372
    818.677.3948
    818.677.2461 (messages)
    http://www.csun.edu/~vcact00f

    "Can We Go Back to the Good Old Days?" by Dennis R. Beresford, The CPA Journal --- http://www.nysscpa.org/cpajournal/2004/1204/perspectives/p6.htm 
    Note the section on Internal Controls

    Recently I visited my pharmacy to pick up eyedrops for my two golden retrievers. Before he would give me the prescription, the pharmacist insisted I sign a form on behalf of Murphy and Millie, representing that they had been apprised of their rights under the new medical privacy rules. This ludicrous situation is a good illustration of how complicated life has gotten.

    I was still shaking my head later that same day when I was clicking mindlessly through the 150 or so channels that my local cable TV service makes available to me. I happened to land on The Andy Griffith Show, and the few minutes I spent with Andy, Barney, Opie, and Aunt Bea got me thinking about the Good Old Days. Wouldn’t it be nice, I thought, to go back to the Good Old Days of the profession in the early 1960s when I graduated from college?

    Back then, accounting was really simple. The Accounting Principles Board hadn’t issued any standards yet, and FASB didn’t exist. So we didn’t have 880 pages listing all of the current rules and guidance on derivative financial instruments, for example. The totality of authoritative GAAP at that time fit in one softbound booklet about one-third the size of the new derivatives guidance.

    In those Good Old Days, the SEC had been around for quite a while but it rarely got excited about accounting matters. Neither mandatory quarterly reporting nor management’s discussion and analysis (MD&A) had yet come into being, for example. And annual report footnotes could actually be read in an hour or so.

    The country had eight major accounting firms, and becoming a partner in one was a truly big deal. Lawsuits against accounting firms were rare, and almost none of them resulted in substantial damages against the accountants.

    In short, accounting seemed more like a true profession, with good judgment and experience key requirements for success.

    Of course, however much we might like to return to simpler times, it’s easier said than done. And most of us would never give up the many benefits of progress, such as photocopiers, personal computers, e-mail, the Internet, and cellphones. But I think that accounting rules may have become more complicated than necessary.

    Let me start with a mea culpa. You may remember the famous line from the comic strip Pogo: “We have met the enemy, and he is us!” Well, you may be tempted to rephrase that quote to “We have met the enemy, and he is … Beresford!”

    I plead guilty to having led the development of 40 or so new accounting standards over my time at FASB. A number of them had pervasive effects on financial statements, and some have been costly to apply. I always tried to be as practical as possible, however, although probably few would say that I was 100% successful in meeting that objective.

    In any event, more-recent accounting standards and proposals seem to be getting increasingly complicated and harder to apply. Even the best-intentioned accountants have difficulty keeping up with all of the changes from FASB, the AICPA, the SEC, the EITF, and the IASB. And some individual standards, such as those on derivatives and variable-interest entities, are almost impossible for professionals, let alone laypeople, to decipher.

    Furthermore, these days, companies are subject to what I’ll call quadruple jeopardy. They have to apply GAAP as best they can, but they are then subject to as many as four levels of possible second-guessing of their judgments.

    First, the external auditors must weigh in. Second, the SEC will now be reviewing all public companies’ reports at least once every three years. Third, the PCAOB will be looking at a sample of accounting firms’ audits, and that could include any given company’s reports. Finally, the plaintiff’s bar is always looking for opportunities to challenge accounting judgments and extort settlements. Broad Principles Versus Detailed Rules

    I suspect that all this second-guessing is what leads many companies and auditors to ask for more-detailed accounting rules. But we may have reached the point of diminishing returns. In response to the complexity and sheer volume of many current standards, some have suggested that accounting standards should be broad principles rather than detailed rules. FASB and the SEC have expressed support for the general notion of a principles-based approach to accounting standards. (It’s kind of like apple pie and motherhood: Who can object to broad principles?) Of course, implementing such an approach is problematic.

    In 2002, FASB issued a proposal on this matter. And last year the SEC reported to Congress on the same topic. Specific things that FASB suggested could happen include the following:

    Standards should always state very clear objectives. Standards should have a clearly defined scope and there should be few, if any, exceptions (e.g., for certain industries). Standards should contain fewer alternative accounting treatments (e.g., unrealized gains and losses on marketable securities could all be run through income rather than the various approaches used at present). FASB also said that a principles-based approach probably would include less in the way of detailed interpretive and implementation guidance. Thus, companies and auditors would be expected to rely more on professional judgment in applying the standards.

    The SEC prefers to call this approach “objectives-based” rather than “principles-based.” SEC Chief Accountant Donald Nicolaisen recently repeated the SEC’s support for such an approach, agreeing with the notion of clearly identifying and articulating the objective for each standard. Although he also suggested that objectives-based standards should avoid bright-line tests such as lease capitalization rules, he called for “sufficiently detailed” implementation guidance, including real-world examples.

    Although FASB and the SEC may have reached a meeting of the minds on the overall notion of more general principles, they may disagree on the key point of how much implementation guidance to provide. FASB thinks that a principles-based approach should include less implementation guidance and rely more on judgment, while the SEC thinks that “sufficiently detailed” guidance is needed, and I suspect that would make it difficult to significantly reduce complexity in some cases.

    In any event, FASB recently said that it may take “several years or more” for preparers and auditors to adjust to a change to less detail. Meantime, little has changed with respect to individual standards, which if anything are becoming even harder to understand and apply.

    I’ve heard FASB board members say that FASB Interpretation (FIN) 46, on variable-interest entities (VIE), is an example of a principles-based standard. I assume they say this because FIN 46 states an objective of requiring consolidation when control over a VIE exists. But the definition of a VIE and the rules for determining when control exists are extremely difficult to understand.

    FASB recently described what it meant by the operationality of an accounting standard. The first condition was that standards have to be comprehensible to readers with a reasonable level of knowledge and sophistication. This doesn’t seem to be the case for FIN 46. Many auditors and financial executives have told me that only a few individuals in the country truly know how to apply FIN 46. And those few individuals often disagree among themselves!

    Such complications make it difficult to get decisions on many accounting matters from an audit engagement team. Decisions on VIEs, derivatives, and securitization transactions, to name a few, must routinely be cleared by an accounting firm’s national experts. And with section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOA) and new concerns about auditor independence, getting answers is now even harder. For example, in the past, companies would commonly consult with their auditors on difficult accounting matters. But now the PCAOB may view this as a control weakness, under the assumption that the company lacks adequate internal expertise. And if auditors get too involved in technical decisions before a complex transaction is completed, the SEC or the PCAOB might decide that the auditors aren’t independent, because they’re auditing their own decisions.

    When things become this complicated, I wonder whether it’s time for a new approach. Maybe we do need to go back to the Good Old Days.

    Internal Controls

    Today, financial executives are probably more concerned about internal controls than new accounting requirements. For the first time, all public companies must report on the adequacy of their internal controls over financial reporting, and outside auditors must express their opinion on the company’s controls. Many people have questioned whether this incredibly expensive activity is worth the presumed benefit to investors. While one might argue that the section 404 rules are a regulatory overreaction, shareholders should expect good internal controls. And audit committees, as shareholders’ representatives, must demand those good controls. So this has been by far the most time-consuming topic at all audit committee meetings I’ve attended in the past couple of years.

    Companies and auditors are spending huge sums this year to ensure that transactions are properly processed and controlled. Yet the most perfect system of internal controls and the best audit of them might not catch an incorrect interpretation of GAAP. A good example of this was contained in the PCAOB’s August 2004 report on its initial reviews of the Big Four’s audit practices. The report noted that all four firms had missed the fact that some clients had misapplied EITF Issue 95-22. As the New York Times (August 27, 2004) noted, “The fact that all of the top firms had been misapplying it raised issues of just how well they know the sometimes complicated rules.”

    Responding to a different criticism in that same PCAOB report, KPMG noted, “Three knowledgeable informed bodies—the firm, the PCAOB, and the SEC—had reached three different conclusions on proper accounting, illustrating the complex accounting issues registrants, auditors and regulators all face.”

    Fair Value Accounting

    Even those who are very confident about their understanding of the current accounting rules shouldn’t get complacent: Fair value accounting is right around the corner, making things even harder. In fact, it is already required in several recent standards.

    Continued in article

    You can read more about Section 404 at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/SOX_404


    European bankers don't want FASB-like approach to impairment adjustments
    Tweedie noted that the IASB had heard from banks in Europe that they did not want to adopt the U.S. approach on accounting for impaired assets. “I want to emphasize that the alternative of adopting a portion of the FASB approach to impairment, promulgated in April, would not bring about a level playing field,” he said. “Furthermore, on many issues, EU financial institutions would not want us to adopt the U.S. approach on impairment. As I said in June, given the urgency of the fundamental issues surrounding IAS 39, none of us can afford the potential protracted back-and-forth resulting from piecemeal changes in international and U.S. standards that would undermine the comprehensive and desperately needed reform that is under way.”
    "IASB Not Waiting for FASB," WebCPA, October 20, 2009 ---
    http://www.webcpa.com/news/IASB-Not-Waiting-FASB-52087-1.html

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue


    "The Myth of Regulation," by J. Edward Ketz, SmartPros, October 2009 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x67705.xml

    Mark Twain remarked that "There is no distinctively native American criminal class except Congress." He was wrong. He should have included presidents and the SEC.

    On August 4 the SEC accused General Electric of accounting fraud (Litigation Release No. 21166), but it chose not to disclose who committed the frauds and it did not punish the criminals.  Instead, the SEC fined the victims—the shareholders—$50 million.  Worse, the SEC protracted the so-called investigation so long that even if the felons were indicted, the case likely would get tossed out of court because of the statute of limitations.  This is just one example of many injustices by the SEC during the last decade that reveals how this agency has supported the efforts of some managers and directors to defraud the investing public.

    I infer that Congress and recent presidents have approved these activities, for Congress, Bush, and Obama have done nothing to improve matters.  They have given the appearance of caring, but thwarted any real, effective measures.
    Congress enacted Sarbanes-Oxley and President Bush signed the legislation.  But Sarbanes-Oxley did little to dampen the activities of criminally-minded managers and directors.  This was because it did so little to improve enforcement activities.  Sarbanes-Oxley merely required a variety of studies and increased penalties and required auditors to report on the firm’s internal controls.  But these actions have not lessened securities fraud or accounting shenanigans.

    More recently President Obama claims to fight the problems that caused the financial crisis by advocating a new agency.  “The Consumer Financial Protection Agency will have the power to ensure that consumers get information that is clear and concise, and to prevent the worst kinds of abuses.”  Many business writers have critiqued this proposal for a variety of reasons.  I agree with them, but I think there is a deeper problem and that is the myth of regulation.

    What Obama is really trying to do is give American voters the impression that he is in charge, that he cares about them, and that he is improving matters so that the chances of another financial meltdown is infinitesimal.  It is political legerdemain.

    As long as managers have perverse incentives to cheat investors and as long as the SEC goes after only the little guys and ignores managers at Enron, WorldCom, Madoff Investments Securities, and GE, nothing is going to change.  If the Congress and if the President want to improve matters—and I have no idea if they really do—then they must change the set of incentives and disincentives.  To effect real change, the system must punish managers and directors who lie and steal and cover it up with scandalous financial reporting.

    More regulation might make society feel better, but that just is an indication that most Americans have little understanding of economics.  They will continue to lose in the stock markets until they insist elected officials do something substantive.

    My fear is that Democrats will rally around Obama while Republicans vilify him, similar to the previous administration when Republicans rallied around Bush and Democrats denigrated him.  There is too much partisanship in this country and not enough rational analysis.  Americans need to understand that both presidents have failed us by supporting new legislation and by crippling better enforcement.  (For whatever it is worth, this is one of the reasons I am an Independent.)

    Jensen Comment
    The problem of regulation is that the industries being regulated end up owning the regulators until the next big scandal makes headlines. Bob Jensen's threads on the need for better regulation and enforcement are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm


    Madoff Accountant to Plead Guilty
    The former accountant to convicted Ponzi-scheme operator Bernard Madoff is expected to plead guilty to fraud and other charges at a hearing next week, prosecutors said Friday. In a letter to U.S. District Judge Alvin K. Hellerstein, prosecutors from the U.S. Attorney's office in Manhattan said they expect David G. Friehling to plead guilty at a hearing Nov. 3 under a cooperation agreement with the government. Assistant U.S. Attorney Lisa Baroni, in her letter, said the charges Mr. Friehling is expected to plead guilty to are securities fraud, investment advisor fraud, obstructing or impeding the administration of Internal Revenue laws, and four counts of making false filings with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission.
    Chad Bray, The Wall Street Journal, October 30, 2009 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125691406152218719.html?mod=WSJ_hps_LEFTWhatsNews


    "Audit firms left unprotected against claims of negligence," by Alex Spence, London Times, September 28, 2009 ---
    http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/support_services/article6851623.ece

    Britain’s big four auditing firms have been left exposed to a surge in negligence claims after the Government refused to limit further the damages they could face.

    Deloitte, Ernst & Young, KPMG and PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) lobbied hard for a cap on payouts. Senior figures involved in the discussions said that Lord Mandelson, the Business Secretary, appeared receptive to their concerns but stopped short of changing the law.

    The decision is a huge blow to the firms — some face lawsuits relating to Bernard Madoff’s $65 billion fraud — which believe there may not be another chance for a change in the law for at least two years. They fear that they will be targeted by investors and liquidators seeking to recover losses from Madoff-style frauds and big company failures.

    At present, auditors can be held liable for the full amount of losses in the event of a collapse, even if they are found to be only partly to blame.

    In April, representatives of the companies met Lord Mandelson to plead for new measures to cap their liability. They warned that British business could be plunged into chaos if one of them were bankrupted by a blockbuster lawsuit.

    However, an official of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills said: “The 2006 Companies Act already allows auditor liability limitation where companies and their auditors want to take this course.”

    Under present company law, directors can agree to restrict their auditors’ liability if shareholders approve; however, to date, no blue-chip company has done so. Directors have seen little advantage in limiting their auditors’ liability, and objections by the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) have also been a significant obstacle.

    The SEC opposes caps on the ground that their introduction could lead to secret deals whereby directors agree to restrict liability in return for auditors compromising on their oversight of a company’s accounts. The SEC could attempt to block caps put in place by British companies that have operations in the United States.

    The big four auditors had hoped to persuade Lord Mandelson to amend the legislation to address the SEC’s concerns and to encourage companies to limit their auditors’ liability.

    Peter Wyman, a senior PwC partner, who was involved in the discussions, said that the Government’s lack of action was disappointing. He said: “The Government, having legislated to allow proportionate liability for auditors, is apparently content to have its policy frustrated by a foreign regulator.”

    Auditors are often hit with negligence claims in the aftermath of a company failure because they are perceived as having deep pockets and remain standing while other parties may have disappeared or been declared insolvent.

    In 2005 Ernst & Young was sued for £700 million by Equitable Life, its former audit client, after the insurance company almost collapsed. The claim was dropped but could have bankrupted the firm’s UK arm if it had succeeded.

    This year KPMG was sued for $1 billion by creditors of New Century, a failed sub-prime lender, and PwC has faced questions over its audit of Satyam, the Indian outsourcing company that was hit by a long- running accounting fraud.

    Three of the big four are also facing numerous lawsuits relating to their auditing of the feeder funds that channelled investors into Madoff’s Ponzi scheme.

    Investors and accounting regulators worry that the big four’s dominance of the audit market is so great that British business would be thrown into disarray if one of the four were put out of business by a huge court action. All but two FTSE 100 companies are audited by the four.

    Mr Wyman said: “The failure of a large audit firm would be very damaging to the capital markets at a time when they are already fragile.”

    Arthur Andersen, formerly one of the world’s five biggest accounting firms, collapsed in 2002 as a result of its role in the Enron scandal.

    Suits you

    KPMG A defendant in a class-action lawsuit in the Southern District of New York against Tremont, a Bernard Madoff feeder fund

    Ernst & Young Sued by investors in a Luxembourg court with UBS for oversight of a European Madoff feeder fund

    PwC Included in several lawsuits in Canada claiming damages of up to $2 billion against Fairfield Sentry, a big Madoff feeder fund

    KPMG Sued in the US for at least $1 billion by creditors of New Century Financial, a failed sub-prime mortgage lender, which claimed that KPMG’s auditing was “recklessly and grossly negligent”

    Deloitte Sued by the liquidators of two Bear Stearns-related hedge funds that collapsed at the start of the credit crunch

    Jensen Comment
    After the Enron, Worldcom, and other scandals there was serious doubt as to whether private investors would abandon equity capital markets. SOX was enacted to save Wall Street. It is doubtful that we, as accountants and auditors, will ever be able to return to "the good old days."

    When the banks greatly underestimated loan losses, where were the auditors?
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#AuditFirms

    Bob Jensen's threads on CPA firm litigation losses are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm

    Will the large international auditing firms survive?
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Auditors


    Banks Still Cannot Resist Understating Loan Loss Reserves

    BB&T Net Falls 58% as Bad Loans Surge
    by Matthias Rieker and Joan E. Solsman
    Oct 20, 2009
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: Allowance For Doubtful Accounts, Bad Debts, Banking, Loan Loss Allowance

    SUMMARY: BB&T Corp. is a Winston-Salem, N.C., bank that has been "...considered among the best-run regional banks." The bank has "...reported a continued rise in delinquent loans in states hit by the recession, such as North Carolina, rather than those known more for being clobbered by the mortgage meltdown....BB&T Chief Executive Kelly King said during a conference call with investors that the company added $263 million to its loan-loss reserve, which he called 'a significant number.' Some investors hoped BB&T would write off bad loans more decisively than it did and build its loan-loss reserve more aggressively, analysts said."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Questions relate to loan loss reserve process and understanding the implications of types of loan losses-those on delinquent loans from states hit hard by recession, rather than from states with significant real estate value losses.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) Describe the process of creating reserves against losses for loans and writing off bad loans. Specifically describe when the expense for bad debts impacts a bank's-or a company's-income calculation.

    2. (Introductory) How do trends in loan write-offs and loan delinquencies inform the process of creating reserves for loan losses?

    3. (Advanced) What is the significance for future profits of not creating a sufficient reserve for loan losses?

    4. (Advanced) Analysts following BB&T stated that they wished the bank would write off bad loans "decisively" and build its loan-loss reserve "aggressively" even as the bank's chief executive described the balance in the loan-loss reserve as a "significant number." Why would analysts and investors prefer a "more aggressive approach." Include in your answer a comment on the notion of conservatism in accounting.

    5. (Advanced) What is the significance of the source of loans going bad-that is, loans made in states hit hard by recession versus the real estate market downfall. In your answer, also comment on commercial versus personal loan categories as well.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "BB&T Net Falls 58% as Bad Loans Surge," by Matthias Rieker and Joan E. Solsman, The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 20 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125595468300993939.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    If last week's earnings by three of the largest U.S. banks gave investors hope that the end of steep losses from soured loans might be closer, regional bank BB&T Corp. delivered a setback Monday.

    The Winston-Salem, N.C., bank, long considered among the best-run regional banks, reported a continued rise in delinquent loans in states hit by the recession, such as North Carolina, rather than those known more for being clobbered by the mortgage meltdown.

    "The core BB&T sees more cracks in credit," said analyst Kevin Fitzsimmons of Sandler O'Neill & Partners LP.

    In 4 p.m. New York Stock Exchange composite trading, BB&T fell $1.22, or 4.3%, to $27.03, with investors also selling off other regional banks into the rising market Monday. "Regionals simply don't have any firepower to withstand rapidly eroding commercial assets" even if losses from consumer loans are stabilizing, analyst Todd Hagerman of Collins Stewart LLC said.

    BB&T Chief Executive Kelly King said during a conference call with investors that the company added $263 million to its loan-loss reserve, which he called "a significant number." Some investors hoped BB&T would write off bad loans more decisively than it did and build its loan-loss reserve more aggressively, analysts said.

    Third-quarter profit fell 58% to $152 million, or 23 cents a share, down from $358 million, or 65 cents a share, a year earlier.

    Credit-loss provisions soared 95% to $709 million from $364 million a year earlier, while rising from the second quarter's $701 million. Nonperforming assets, or loans in danger of going bad, rose to 2.5% from 1.2% a year earlier and 2.2% from the previous quarter.

    BB&T "has a lot more real-estate exposure than the money centers, plus it does not have nearly as much capital markets to offset" such losses than big banks such as Bank of America Corp. and Citigroup Inc. that reported earnings last week, said Jeff Davis of FTN Equity Capital Markets Corp.

    Losses from bad loans "are going to find the peak in the next two or three quarters," Mr. King said, adding that "nonperformance of the industry and for us continue to increase probably at a declining rate of increase."

    BB&T strengthened its capital base in August with a $963 million offering of common stock after it purchased Colonial Bank, a unit of Colonial BancGroup Inc., Montgomery, Ala., that was seized by regulators in August.

    In June, BB&T became one of the first U.S. banks to pay back the capital infusion it got from the Treasury Department's Troubled Asset Relief Program.

    In the latest quarter, average client deposits were up 20% from a year earlier amid the Colonial takeover, while average loans and leases held for investment showed a 6% increase.

    Why did the auditors approve such understated loan loss reserves in the subprime scandals?  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#AuditFirms


    The Pending IASB Migrane
    The IASB may be very, very sorry if and when IFRS replaces U.S. GAAP

    It appears that financial innovation will not let up on the future, downsized, Wall Street
    The International Accounting Standards Board may regret the day when and if it takes over the duties of the U.S. FASB. IFRS is way behind in dealing with U.S.-style financial innovation, and this may be one of the biggest hurdles facing the IASB.

    Yale's Professor Robert Shiller has a September 27, 2009 article that I will quote below, but first there are some things to consider for accounting educators reading this tidbit.

    IFRS needs huge updates on the following types of contracting and financial engineering:

    One of the huge problems that accountants, particularly auditors and accounting standard setters, have is understanding the fluid and dynamic world of financial innovation, especially as was and is still taking place on Wall Street. KPMG lost the huge Fannie Mae audit largely because of the enormous financial statement revisions caused by improper compliance with FAS 133. All the large firms are now facing huge lawsuits due to alleged negligence in accounting for loan loss reserves and poisonous traunches ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#AuditFirms

    When will auditors learn about complexities of financial risk?
    The following is an example:

  • "Did Wells Fargo's Auditors Miss Repurchase Risk?" by Francine McKenna, ClusterStock, September 20, 2009 --- http://www.businessinsider.com/john-carney-did-wells-fargos-auditors-miss-repurchase-risk-2009-9

    On Friday, the Business Insider worried that Wells Fargo may be making the same fatal mistake AIG did underestimating, or worse, naively ignoring Collateral Call Risk. 

    The concern was focused on potential exposure from the credit default swaps portfolio they inherited from Wachovia. In WFC's annual report the Buiness Insider saw limited discussion of this risk and no details of the reserves for it.

    There are two possible ways to account for the lack of discussion of Collateral Call Risk.  Either Wachovia wrote its derivative contracts in ways that don’t permit buyers to demand more collateral or Wells Fargo is not disclosing this risk. (A third possibility—that they don't even seem aware that they have this risk — seems remote after AIG.)

    When I read that, I saw eerie parallels with New Century, all the more so because of the auditor connection – both Wells Fargo and Wachovia and New Century (now in Chapter 11) are audited by KPMG.  New Century was not too transparent either and, as a result, many people, including some very sophisticated investors were caught with their pants down. KPMG is accused in a $1 billion dollar lawsuit of not just being incompetent, but of aiding, abetting, and covering up New Century’s fraudulent loan loss reserve calculations just so they could keep their lucrative client happy and viable.

    From the lawsuit:

    KPMG’s audit and review failures concerning New Century’s reserves highlights KPMG’s gross negligence, and its calamitous effect — including the bankruptcy of New Century.  New Century engaged in admittedly high risk lending.  Its public filings contained pages of risk factors…New Century’s calculations for required reserves were wrong and violated GAAP. For example, if New Century sold a mortgage loan that did not meet certain conditions, New Century was required to repurchase that loan.  New Century’s loan repurchase reserve calculation assumed that all such repurchases occur within 90 days of when New Century sold the loan, when in fact that assumption was false.

    In 2005 New Century informed KPMG that the total outstanding loan repurchase requests were $188 million.  If KPMG only considered the loans sold within the prior 90 days, the potential liability shrank to $70 million.  Despite the fact that KPMG knew the 90 day look-back period excluded over $100 million in repurchase requests, KPMG nonetheless still accepted the flawed $70 million measure used by New Century to calculate the repurchase reserve.  The obvious result was that New Century significantly under reserved for its risks.

    How does the New Century situation and KPMG’s role in it remind me of Wells Fargo now?  Well, in both cases, there’s no disclosure of the quantity and quality of the repurchase risk to the organization. Back in March of 2007, I wrote about the lack of disclosure of this repurchase risk in New Century’s 2005 annual report:

    There are 17 pages of discussion of general and REIT specific risk associated with this company, but no mention of the specific risk of the potential for their banks to accelerate the repurchase of mortgage loans financed under their significant number of lending arrangements….it does not seem that reserves or capital/liquidity requirements were sufficient to cover the possibility that one of or more lenders could for some reason decide to call the loans. Did the lenders have the right to call the loans unilaterally? It does say that if one called the loans it is likely that all would. Didn’t someone think that this would be a very big number (US 8.4 billion) if that happened.

    Some have been writing since 2005 about the elephant in the room that is mortgage loan repurchase risk:

    Even if a lender sells most of the loans it originates, and, theoretically, passes the risk of default on to the buyer of the loan, there remains an elephant lurking in the room: the risk posed to mortgage bankers from the representations and warranties made by them when they sell loans in the secondary market… in bad times, the holders of the loans have been known to require a second "scrubbing" of the loan files, looking for breaches of representations and warranties that will justify requiring the originator to repurchase the loan. …A "pure" mortgage banker, who holds and services few loans, may think he's passed on the risk (absent outright fraud). Sophisticated originators know better…When the cycle turns (as it always does) and defaults rise, those originating lenders who sacrificed sound underwriting in return for fee income will find the grim reaper knocking at their door once again, whether or not they own the loan.

    Clusterstock quoted Wells Fargo from page 127 of their 2008 Annual Report (emphasis added):

    In certain loan sales or securitizations, we provide recourse to the buyer whereby we are required to repurchase loans at par value plus accrued interest on the occurrence of certain credit-related events within a certain period of time. The maximum risk of loss…In 2008 and in 2007, we did not repurchase a significant amount of loans associated with these agreements.

    But earlier, on page 114, there is a footnote to a chart representing loans in their balance sheet that have been securitized--including residential mortgages and securitzations sold to FNMA and FHLMC--where servicing is their only form of continuing involvement. 

    However, the delinquencies and charge off figures do not include sold loans. Wells Fargo tells us these numbers do not represent their potential obligations for repurchase if FNMA and FHLMC decide their underwriting standards were not up to par.

    Delinquent loans and net charge-offs exclude loans sold to FNMA and FHLMC. We continue to service the loans and would only experience a loss if required to repurchasea delinquent loan due to a breach in original representations and warranties associated with our underwriting standards.

    So where are those numbers?  Where is the number that correlates to the $8.4 billion dollar exposure that brought down New Century?  Wells Fargo saw an almost 300% increase from 2007 to 2008 in delinquencies and 200% increase in charge offs from commercial loans and a 300% increase in delinquencies and 350% increase in charge offs on residential loans they still hold. Can anyone say with certainty that we won’t see FNMA and FHLMC come back and force some repurchases on Wells Fargo for lax underwriting standards?

    This is all we get from Wells Fargo in the 2008 Annual Report:  

    During 2008, noninterest income was affected by changes in interest rates, widening credit spreads, and other credit and housing market conditions, including… 

    The lack of disclosure of this issue here mirrors the lack of disclosure in New Century and perhaps in other KPMG clients such at Citigroup, Countrywide ( now inside Bank of America) and others.  How do I know there could be a pattern? Because the inspections of KPMG by the PCAOB, their regulator, tell us they have been called on auditing deficiencies just like this.  Do we have to wait for a post-failure lawsuit to bring some sense, and some sunshine, to the system?

    Francine McKenna is Editor of Re: The Auditors.

    Will auditors survive the huge lawsuits concerning their negligence in estimating loan losses in the subprime mortgage and CDO crisis --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#Auditors

    Bob Jensen's threads on auditing firm lawsuits --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

  • And it appears that financial innovation will not let up on the future, downsized, Wall Street

    "In defence of financial innovation," by Yale's Robert Shiller, Financial Times, September 27, 2009 ---
    http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/c4a74ba2-ab83-11de-9be4-00144feabdc0.html?nclick_check=1

    Many appear to think that the increasing complexity of financial products is the source of the world financial crisis. In response to it, many argue that regulators should actively discourage complexity.

    The June 2009 US Treasury white paper seemed to say this. The paper said that a new consumer financial protection agency be “authorised to define standards for ‘plain vanilla’ products that are simpler and have straightforward pricing,” and “require all providers and intermediaries to offer these products prominently, alongside whatever other lawful products they choose to offer”.

    The July 2009, HM Treasury white paper “Reforming Financial Markets” similarly advocated “improving access to simple, transparent products so that there is always an easy-to-understand option for consumers who are not looking for potentially complex or sophisticated products.”

    They do have a point. Unnecessary complexity can be a problem that regulators should worry about, if the complexity is used to obfuscate and deceive, or if people do not have good advice on how to use them properly. Complexity was indeed used that way in this crisis by some banks who created special purpose vehicles (to evade bank capital requirements) and by some originators of complex mortgage securities (to fool the ratings agencies and ultimate investors).

    Modern behavioural economics shows that there are distinct limits to people’s ability to understand and deal with complex instruments. They are often inattentive to details and fail even to read or understand the implications of the contracts they sign. Recently, this failure led many homebuyers to take on mortgages that were unsuitable for them, which later contributed to massive defaults.

    But any effort to deal with these problems has to recognise that increased complexity offers potential rewards as well as risks. New products must have an interface with consumers that is simple enough to make them comprehensible, so that they will want these products and use them correctly. But the products themselves do not have to be simple.

    The advance of civilisation has brought immense new complexity to the devices we use every day. A century ago, homes were little more than roofs, walls and floors. Now they have a variety of complex electronic devices, including automatic on-off lighting, communications and data processing devices. People do not need to understand the complexity of these devices, which have been engineered to be simple to operate.

    Financial markets have in some ways shared in this growth in complexity, with electronic databases and trading systems. But the actual financial products have not advanced as much. We are still mostly investing in plain vanilla products such as shares in corporations or ordinary nominal bonds, products that have not changed fundamentally in centuries.

    Why have financial products remained mostly so simple? I believe the problem is trust. People are much more likely to buy some new elec­tronic device such as a laptop than a sophisticated new financial product. People are more worried about hazards of financial products or the integrity of those who offer them.

    The problem is that financial breakdowns come with low frequency. Since flaws in the financial system may appear decades apart, it is hard to figure out how some new financial device will behave. Moreover, because of the low frequency of crises, people who use financial instruments often have little or no personal experience with the crises and so trust is harder to establish.

    When people invest for their children’s education or their retirement, they are concerned about risks that will not become visible for years. They may not be able to rebound from mistaken purchases of faulty financial devices and they may suffer if circumstances develop that create risks that could have been protected against.

    Thus, to facilitate financial progress, we need regulators who ensure trust in sophisticated products. They must work towards clearing the way to widespread use of better products, concerning themselves with both safety and creative ideas. They must not simply be law enforcers against the shenanigans of cynical promoters, but also be open to making complex ideas work that have the potential to improve public welfare. Unfortunately, the crisis has sharply reduced trust in our financial system.

    At this point in history, there has been over-reliance on housing as an investment. It is an appealing investment as it is simple to understand: we see the home we own every day. But in using housing as a big savings vehicle, people have built homes that are larger than needed and hard to maintain. This extra housing would be expected to have a negative return in the form of depreciation.

    The popular reliance on housing as an investment, combined with the increased leverage with newer mortgage practices, contributed to the housing bubble that has now burst, resulting in historically unprecedented numbers of foreclosures. The fact that a bubble could grow this large and burst is a sure sign of imperfect financial institutions, not of overly complex institutions.

    Unfortunately, people do not trust some good innovations that could protect them better. The innovations in mortgages in recent years (involving such things as option-adjustable rate mortgages) are not products of sophisticated financial theory. I have proposed the idea of “continuous workout mortgages”, motivated by basic principles of risk management. The privately issued mortgage would protect against exigencies such as recessions or drops in home prices. Had such mortgages been offered before this crisis, we would not have the rash of foreclosures. Yet, even after the crisis, regulators seem to be assuming a plain vanilla mortgage is just what we need for the future.

    Another example of a potentially useful innovation is the target-date fund (also called life-cycle fund) that invests money for people’s retirement in a way that is specifically tailored for people their age. Such a fund plans for young people to take greater risks and for older people to invest more conservatively. Target-date funds, first introduced by Wells Fargo and BGI in the 1990s, are growing in importance, but few people commit the bulk of their portfolio to such funds, or make use of target-date funds that might make adjustments for their other investments. It appears that people do not fully trust that these funds are designed correctly, or would protect them from crises.

    Another innovation that is underused is retirement annuities that include protections against potential risks. There are life annuities that protect people against outliving their wealth, inflation-indexed annuities that protect against inflation, impaired-life annuities that protect against having problems in old age that require they spend more money and generational annuities that exploit the possibilities of intergenerational risk sharing. But most people do not make use of any of these.

    Ideally, all of these protections for retirement income should be rolled into a unified product. Such products are not generally available yet. Certainly, people might be mistrustful of committing their life savings to such a complex new product at first even if it were available. So, such products are not offered and people often do nothing to protect themselves against most of these risks.

    Behind the creation of any such new retail products there needs to be an increasingly complex financial infrastructure so that professionals who try to create them can manage a full array of risks. We need liquid international markets for real estate price indices, owner-occupied and commercial, for aggregate macroeconomic risks such as gross domestic product and unemployment, for human longevity risks, as well as broader and more effective long-term markets for energy risks. These are markets for the risks that were not managed as the crisis unfolded, and they create a deeper array of possibilities for new retail financial products.

    It is critical that we take the opportunity of the crisis to promote innovation-enhancing financial regulation and not let this be eclipsed by superficially popular issues. Despite the apparent improvement in the economy, the crisis is not over and so the public continues to support government-led interventions. Doing this means encouraging better dialogue between private-sector innovators and regulators. My experience with regulators suggests that they are intelligent and well-meaning but often bogged down in bureaucracy. Regulatory agencies need to be given a stronger mission of encouraging innovation. They must hire enough qualified staff to understand the complexity of the innovative process and talk to innovators with less of a disapprove-by-the-rules stance and more that of a contributor to a complex creative process.

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm

    What's Right and What's troublesome about synthetics, (SPEs), SPVs, and VIEs in accounting standards?
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm


    IFRS Mess: The AICPA is finally looking for a horse to pull the IASB cart

    The AICPA has always put the cart before the horse when coming out strong for replacing U.S. GAAP with IFRS before calling for better funding of the IASB (the international standard setting body has lower funding than the FASB). The U.S. will probably have provide the largest share of IASB funding in a manner similar to funding of the United Nations, but what portion will Congress agree to for carrying the IASB?

    The IASB in recent years has relied heavily on joint projects with the higher-funded FASB. Whereas the FASB can afford a talented full-time research staff, the IASB has to rely more on volunteers and part time helpers.

    In my opinion the large international accounting firms that all so intensely want to bury U.S. GAAP should provide a huge endowment (maybe $100 million or more) for the IASB much like they provided endowment funds years ago for the FASB. Since the IASB will have a world monopoly on standard setting, it needs much more funding for support staff and advance communications technology and worldwide educational support funding.

    "AICPA Calls for Permanent, Independent Funding Source for IASB," SmartPros, October 6, 2009 --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x67813.xml

    Barry C. Melancon, president and CEO of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, speaking at a roundtable of global accounting leaders in New York City today called for a permanent, independent funding mechanism for the International Accounting Standards Committee Foundation, the governing body of the International Accounting Standards Board.

    “We believe it is imperative the foundation find a permanent funding solution for the International Accounting Standard Board’s activities,” Melancon said at a roundtable discussion on the IASB’s constitution. “A permanent funding solution would ensure that the IASB has appropriate resources to carry out its mission and would lead to world-wide confidence in the IASB’s role as an independent accounting standard setter,” Melancon said.

    Based in London, the IASB sets global accounting rules known as International Financial Reporting Standards and recognized in 113 countries. The U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission is considering whether to require U.S. publicly-traded corporations to use IFRS for financial reports in U.S. markets as soon as 2014. The IASCF has proposed changes to its constitution that seek to establish a sustainable funding system for the board to help insulate standard setters from short-term political pressures.

    “We strongly support the eventual use of a single set of high-quality, comprehensive global accounting standards by public companies in the preparation of transparent and comparable financial reports throughout the world, and thus continue to strongly support the objectives of the IASCF and the IASB," Melancon said.

    In the United States, the AICPA will encourage the SEC to use part of the current levy on U.S. public companies for accounting standard setting activities as a permanent funding source for the IASB, Melancon said.

    Background About IFRS
    International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are accounting standards developed by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) that are becoming the global standard for the preparation of public company financial statements. The IASB is an independent accounting standard-setting body that is the international equivalent of the U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board in Norwalk, Conn., which sets U.S. generally accepted accounting principles.

    The IASB consists of 14 members from nine countries, including the United States. It is funded by contributions from major accounting firms, private financial institutions and industrial companies, central and development banks, and other international and professional organizations throughout the world.

    In 2008, the AICPA governing Council voted to recognize the IASB as an international accounting standard setter, giving AICPA member CPAs the option of using IFRS for private companies. In 2007, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission approved use of IFRS for U.S. financial reports filed by foreign publicly-held companies that use IFRS in their home country.

    The AICPA has taken an active role in helping CPAs understand IFRS. The AICPA publishes the Web site www.ifrs.com, the premier source for IFRS resources in the United States. The AICPA has developed a variety of courses, publications, articles and case studies to help Americans learn about IFRS and understand the changes, challenges and opportunities that a U.S. transition to IFRS will bring.

    For more information about IFRS, visit www.ifrs.com. Among other items, a list of frequently asked questions explaining IFRS and its applicability in the United States is available.


    Good News and Bad News:  Update on IAS 39 Revisions

    I call your attention to the IAS Plus summary of the
    Notes from the IASB Special Board Meeting
    October 6,  2009 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

    The IASB met for a special meeting relating to the IAS 39 replacement project. Several Board members including the Chairman, FASB members, and FASB staff joined the meeting via video link.

    Many of these items are especially interesting when teaching IFRS, when teaching contemporary issues in accountancy, and when teaching about accounting for derivative financial instruments and hedge accounting (although recent amendments of IAS 39 have taken this famous/infamous and very complicated standard beyond the scope of the original IAS 39 and the current FAS 133 in the U.S.)

    There are various items taken up in the October 6 IASB meeting not discussed below. Hence if you're interested in the entire meeting go to the IASB Special Board Meeting summary: 
    October 6,  2009 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

    One significant difference that will arise between IAS 39 and FAS 133 lies in the IAS decision to end the requirement of bifurcation of host contracts (such as mortgage loans) from embedded derivatives (such as the embedded option to pay the loan off before maturity) when the underlying (such as a LIBOR interest rate) of the host contract is not "clearly and closely related" to the underlying of the embedded derivative.

    Accounting for embedded derivatives

    The Board was presented with the alternative to eliminate bifurcation of embedded derivatives. Several Board members were concerned that this decision together with the frozen spread approach adopted for measurement of financial liabilities would lead to hybrid instruments with a financial liability as a host not to be valued at fair value. By implication this means that the derivative part of the hybrid instruments would be valued at the frozen spread approach and not fair value. The staff defended this position by arguing that the credit adjustment to the derivative portion of the hybrid contract would not be significant. One Board member was particularly concerned about the effect of this decision on convergence – a point reinforced by a FASB member who expressed his view that such IASB decision would make convergence in this area next to impossible.

    Nonetheless, the Board narrowly approved the elimination of bifurcation of financial liabilities as well as financial assets.

    The above decision will lead to fewer derivative financial instruments being booked under FAS 39 relative to what would be booked under FAS 133. It seems to me to be politically incorrect to bring about such changes at a time when the SEC is still wavering to eliminate U.S. GAAP in favor of IASB standards.

    What the IASB seems to have ignored is the valuation problems created by unique (customized) instruments that are not traded in the markets. Suppose Security AB with a "closely related" embedded Option B is Bond A that is actively traded with the embedded embedded Option B for paying off the debt before maturity. Early payoff embedded options are extremely common in bonds that are actively traded in the securities markets. Usually the embedded options for early payoff are deemed clearly and closely related under IAS 39 rules such that the embedded Option B previously did not have to be bifurcated and accounted for separately as a derivative financial instrument. Market values of Security AB impound both the value of the security and its embedded (non-bifurcated) option. Until the IASB changed its position on October 6, however, embedded options that were not clearly and closely related had to be bifurcated and accounted for separately.

    For example, suppose Security ABXY is Security AB plus embedded Options X and Y that are not "clearly and closely related" in terms of underlyings.  Further assume Options X and Y can be valued in their own options markets. In other words there are deep and active markets for valuing Security AB, Option X, and Option Y. There is no deep and active market for the customized Security ABXY. Security ABXY is a unique, customized security that is not traded in an active and deep market.

    It is highly unlikely that the total value of Security ABXY is the additive sum of the values of Security AB plus the value of Option X plus the value of Option Y. These components of Security ABXY are likely to interact such that valuation of Security ABXY becomes exceedingly difficult if the embedded Options X and Y are not bifurcated. In terms of FAS 157, it is no longer possible to apply the sought-after Level 1 valuation for Security ABXY, even though Level 1 can be applied if the embedded Option X and Options Y were bifurcated.

    Alas, throughout history accountants have been very good at naively adding up components of value that are not truly additive. For example, throughout the history of accounting firms have added up balance sheet asset values and reported the sum as the total value of Total Assets when the assets have interactions (covariances) that are totally ignored in the summation process. Only when buyers and sellers negotiate for the purchase/sale of the entire bundle (in mergers and acquisitions) do accountants reveal that, in truth, they understand that the accounting figure for "Total Assets" on the balance sheet is sheer nonsense.

    **********

    I was especially intrigued by the following module in the IAS Plus Notes:

    Application of cash flow hedge accounting mechanics to fair value hedges

    The Board considered the application of the Board's September 2009 decision to replace fair value hedge accounting with a mechanism that permitted recognition outside profit or loss of gains and losses on financial instruments designated as hedging instruments – that is, applying the mechanics of cash flow hedge accounting also to fair value hedges. The major implication would be the application of the so-called 'lower-of test' to fair value hedges. The 'lower-of test', currently applied to cash flow hedges only, ensures that only ineffectiveness due to excess cash flows on the hedging instrument (that is, the derivative) is recognised in profit or loss.

    The Board members disagreed with the extension of the 'lower-of test' to fair value hedges. The Board was concerned that it was inconsistent with the nature of fair value hedging, could lead to changes in eligibility of portions, could have unintended consequences in the area of deliberately under-hedging, and in effect would lead to a situation that there would be no ineffectiveness in fair value hedges as such. A FASB member clarified that in the FASB approach to hedge accounting (given the recent discussions over the issue) the 'lower of test' would not be applied to fair value hedges.

    After a short debate the Board decided by a bare majority (8 votes) to retain the 'lower-of test' for cash flow hedges only. A third of the Board members abstained in this vote.

    Jensen Comment
    Cash flow hedge accounting in FAS 133 and IAS 39 is relatively straight forward when a derivative financial instrument (e.g., forward contract, futures contract, swap, or option) is used to hedge cash flow risk in a hedged item (forecasted transaction or a booked item subject to cash flow risk such as a variable-rate bond or purchase contract setting the purchase price at an unknown future spot price or rate).

    Cash flow hedge accounting, like foreign exchange hedge accounting, entails offsetting changes in value of the hedging derivative with a posting to an equity account (FAS 133 requires posting to OCI). The simplifying feature of cash flow hedge accounting is that it makes no difference whether the hedged item is booked (e.g., a bond asset or liability having variable rate revenue) or unbooked (e.g., a forecasted transaction to buy inventory or to buy/sell fixed-rate bonds at a future date where the fixed-rate is currently unknown).

    The reason cash flow hedging is not affected by a difference between a booked or unbooked hedged item is that a hedged item subject to cash flow risk has no future value risk. Consider a variable rate bond having a booked value of $1,000. There is future cash flow risk, but the future value of the bond will always be $1,000 assuming no change in credit risk (I am only considering a hedge of cash flow risk here). Similarly, if Southwest Airlines has a forecasted transaction to buy a million gallons of jet fuel at spot rates six months from now, there is no risk that the value on the purchase will differ from the value of jet fuel on that future date. Value risk arises when the forecasted transaction is instead a firm commitment to buy at some price other than spot rates. But if there is a firm commitment price there is no cash flow risk (only value risk that the purchase price will differ from the spot price on the date of the purchase).

    Fair value hedge accounting is more complicated because it matters greatly whether the hedged item is booked or not booked. For example, there is no cash flow risk of booked inventory already bought and paid for in a warehouse. There is, however, purchase-price value risk that the spot price of that inventory diverge from the price already paid for the inventory. Companies frequently hedge the fair value of inventory (although this is not necessarily a hedge of profit if selling prices are not hedged and only purchase prices are hedged if purchase and selling prices are not perfectly correlated).

    Hedge accounting is not usually allowed (or called for) when hedging a booked item carried at fair value. In theory the changes in value of the hedged item should offset the changes in the value of the hedging derivative contract and any hedging ineffectiveness should be charged to current earnings in any case. If the hedged item is carried at historical cost, no such offset would arise and hedge accounting is called for at least to the extent the hedge is effective. Under FAS 133 and IAS 39, the hedge accounting for such a hedged item calls for change the basis of accounting of the hedged item during the hedge accounting period. Instead of the customary historical cost accounting (say for jet fuel inventory), the hedge accounting rules call for a change to fair value accounting of that inventory during the hedging period.

    The most confusing part of fair value hedge accounting arises when the hedged item is not booked. For example, purchase contracts are typically not booked in accounting (never have been and hopefully never will be). For example, if Southwest Airlines signs a firm commitment to buy jet fuel six months from now at $2.89 per gallon the firm commitment is not booked. There is no cash flow risk since the purchase price is fixed. There is value risk, however, that the spot price in six months will be higher or lower than the $2.89 purchase (forward, strike) price.

    Now the accounting becomes complicated because there is no booked hedged item value to be offset by a change in the booked hedging derivative change in value. Fair value hedge accounting of unbooked hedged items calls for changes in the value of the booked hedging contract to be offset by a posting to an equity account. In FAS 133 the FASB recommends a badly-named equity account called Firm Commitment. For example, to see how this works 03forfut.pps slide show file listed at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/
    The above slide show compares cash flow hedging versus fair value hedging of booked items versus fair value hedging of unbooked (forecasted transaction) hedged items.

    Above I said that the "Firm Commitment" equity account called for in FAS 133 is badly named because changes in the value of fair value hedging contracts are not firm commitments (although they may hedge a firm commitment unbooked hedged item). I would've preferred some other name like "unrealized change in fair value hedging contracts" as an equity account.

    Now the debate centers on whether the "Firm Commitment" equity account used for fair value hedge accounting of unbooked hedged items is tantamount to the "OCI" equity account used for booked and unbooked cash flow and FX hedge accounting?

    Firstly, there is a difference since fair value hedges to not impact any equity account if the hedged items are booked and carried at fair value themselves. Fair value hedges of unbooked items create the special and confusing aspect of hedge accounting relief for fair value hedging.

    What the IASB is currently debating with respect to amending IAS 39 is whether hedge accounting would be greatly simplified by always offsetting changes in hedge contact fair value to OCI (by whatever name) to the extent the hedge is effective. Presumably the changes in the value of a booked hedged item would also be charged to OCI (e.g., like available for sale investment changes in value are currently accounted for under the amended FAS 115/130). Such accounting could apply equally to cash flow, fair value, and FX hedges.

    If the above simplification sounds too ideal, what is holding it up? Why did the IASB turn down this simplification in the October 6, 2009 special board meeting?

    The reasoning of the IASB on October 6 seems to have been that the proposed "simplification" of fair value hedge accounting is would not leave any hedge ineffectiveness to be charged to current earnings for some fair value hedges whereas all hedge ineffectiveness of cash flow and FX hedges  is charged to current earnings.

    Hedges are often not fully effective at interim points in time. Options as hedging derivatives, for example, are notoriously ineffective as hedges and seldom meet the "80-125 percent test" of hedge effectiveness specified in Paragraph BC 106 of IAS 39. One reason is that speculators are more often more dominant in options trading markets vis-a-vis commodities markets themselves.

    Option values are divided into two components --- time value plus intrinsic value (equal the amount by which an option is in-the-money). Interim changes (before option expiration) in total option hedging value seldom satisfy the "80-125 percent test" or hedge effectiveness. It is common in hedge accounting under FAS 133 and IAS 39 rules to charge all changes in an option's time value to current earnings and only allow hedge accounting relief to changes in intrinsic value (which are zero until if and when the option is in-the-money).

    It would be a sorry state of affairs if the IASB had essentially voted for hedge ineffectiveness to be ignored for fair value hedging. This would be entirely inconsistent with hedge accounting for cash flow and FX hedges where both FAS 133 ahd IAS 39 require that hedge ineffectiveness be posted to current earnings. This is also required at present for fair value hedge ineffectiveness. How sad it would be if the IASB voted in a huge inconsistency for treating hedge ineffectiveness for fair value hedging relative to cash flow and FX hedge accounting.

    Whew! That was a close one that came within eight votes, at the IASB special meeting on October 6, of injecting a huge inconsistency between fair value hedging versus cash flow and FX hedge accounting. If the proposed amendment had passed it would greatly simplify the accounting at the expense of greatly complicating financial statement analysis.

    For added illustrations go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/CaseAmendment.htm

    My PowerPoint shows, examination materials, and free tutorials are at
    http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/

    My overall links to FAS 133 and IAS 39 free tutorials are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm

     


    "Trends in Intermediate Accounting," by Lesley H. Davidson and William H. Francisco, New Accountant Magazine, October 2009 --- http://newaccountantusa.com/Davidson&Francisco.pdf

    Abstract There is an ever-growing amount of information that must be covered in intermediate accounting courses. Recently this expansion of the body of knowledge has been accelerated by two main factors. The first factor is the increasing scrutiny of the accounting profession by regulators as a result of the financial failure of many large corporations during the past decade. The second is the upcoming introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Accounting Professors have seen an ever growing amount of information being “crammed” into the standard intermediate accounting two course sequence which is typically used on most campuses in the United States. This manuscript explores the concept of altering the typical intermediate accounting sequence for the benefit of student understanding and comprehension of an ever growing body of knowledge.

    TRENDS IN INTERMEDIATE ACCOUNTING

    If you ask any accounting faculty member which course is the “weed out” course for accounting majors, the answer will likely come back intermediate. Ask any recent accounting graduate what their most difficult course was in college and the answer will usually be intermediate accounting. In the typical business college you will find wide agreement that to be successful in accounting you must get through the landmine field known as intermediate accounting. Marketing and management majors are filled with the bloody corpses of students who started out as accounting majors and thanks to intermediate have changed their degree goals. Why has this happened? Several factors could be responsible for the link between the intermediate sequence and the dropout rate for accounting majors.

    One factor is that the workload needed to cover the material can be daunting. Talk to almost any seasoned advisor and they will probably give you the same advice listed in the Rutgers University FAQ guide. “The junior year is a difficult one for accounting majors. During the fall semester in particular I often hear students complain about the heavy workload”. This workload complaint is likely to be heard by accounting professors at nearly every business school in the country.

    A second dropout inducing factor is the complexity of the material. It does not seem to be the quality of the student but the amount and complexity of the work that are the basic problem. In an article by Elaine Waples, of Purdue University Calumet, she accurately stated “Many students face considerable difficulty in successfully completing intermediate accounting. The amount of material typically covered is substantial and the course requires of the student a significant increase in motivation, analytical ability, and academic effort over the usual principles or introductory financial accounting class.” Though the intermediate sequence is normally not taken until the junior year, most students have never faced a course this challenging in their college careers.

    Thirdly the body of knowledge in financial accounting seems to continue to grow unabatedly. Professors Anderson and Boynton of California Polytechnic San Luis Obispo said “Attempts by faculty to integrate growing bodies of accounting standards, regulatory requirements, and academic research into their courses have contributed to a general perception of overload. The problem seems most acute in intermediate accounting.” This statement highlights the case that as society and the profession demand more and more of our students there is no expansion of the time allowed to digest the material.

    On the horizon we can see a need for even more course material coverage in intermediate with the inclusion of International Financial Reporting Standards. In examining the four leading intermediate accounting textbooks newest editions, it is easy to see how the scope of material being covered has increased. On average the books by lead authors Spiceland, Kieso, Nikolai, and Stice have increased an average of 7.2% from their prior editions. Additionally many of the comments listed on the various publishers’ websites attribute much of the increase to the incorporation of IFRS. Specifically the Stice textbook website states, “As the business workplace becomes more global, students need to understand how accounting practices may differ depending on the countries involved in a transaction. Nearly every chapter includes updated coverage of this nature and relevant sections that discuss the international standards.” It goes on to say “A new chapter (Chapter 22) offers coverage of International Financial Reporting Standards to reflect the changing nature of the financial reporting environment.”

    The website for the Nikolai book states, “New convergence overview: … details the process that the FASB and IASB are using to converge U.S. GAAP and international GAAP. Chapter 2 summarizes the tentative Joint FASB and IASB Conceptual Framework… for each of these chapters the text includes at least one IFRS versus U.S. discussion box that contains an updated and expanded summary of the differences between the two.” It goes on to say that problems require comparisons of how solutions would change under IFRS or to solve the assignment using IFRS. As can be readily seen, these are not replacements but rather additions to the body of knowledge. In reviewing these changes it becomes obvious that examination of alternative course coverage options is a relevant discussion for any accounting program.

    Continued in article


    What allows UN delegates to park in any fire lane of their choosing in NYC? We can argue from one side that having one set of world laws restricting parking in fire lanes would eliminate such a grave danger. But we can also argue that failure of the world legislators to agree on a set of fire lane parking laws endangers us worse than having localized-jurisdictional laws, because then anybody (not just UN delegates) in the U.S. could then park in fire lanes across the entire United States.

    Remember that if a nation replaces local GAAP with IFRS, that nation is not allowed to cherry pick which IFRS standards to enforce versus not enforce or introduce for publically traded companies. Supposedly the European carve out of IAS 39 provisions was a phenomenon that the IASB will not allow in the future.

    It’s complicated to allow multiple sets of standards/laws in a given jurisdiction. It’s absolutely absurd to allow a given company/person to have discretionary choice of what set to apply. The large international corporations and CPA firms are trying to convince us that, in terms of publically traded companies in the global economy, the definition of a “jurisdiction” is the “world.”

    I’m not totally convinced about the need for detailed world accounting standards given the totally different importance of publically traded equity shares in some nations vis-à-vis other nations. For example, the importance of equity capital and creative financing (structures, synthetics, tranches, etc.) in Germany is totally different in Germany versus the United States. Since IFRS is most heavily rooted in European nations, this is probably why IFRS lacks standards for creative equity financing in the United States.

    It’s most confusing to have more than one set of standards in a given jurisdiction, just as it is confusing to have more than one set of laws in one jurisdiction. This is why I never supported the move by the SEC to allow foreign companies to list on the NYSE under IFRS while the majority of listings (from the U.S.) are under US GAAP. For example revenues are realized differently under IFRS versus FASB rules. More importantly, IFRS has no standards whatsoever covering some of the important things covered in the FASB such as accounting for Lifo, SPEs, SPVs, VIEs, and synthetics (such as synthetic leasing).

    Having two sets of accounting standards for the NYSE greatly complicates comparability beyond the failure on a single set of standards to have perfect comparability. It adds big noise to smaller noise in the context of communications theory.

    That is not to say that a given jurisdiction must have identical standards/laws as other jurisdictions, especially when there are circumstantial differences between jurisdictions. It makes sense to me to allow jurisdictions to experiment and innovate in the setting of standards and laws within certain fundamentals of human rights (very broad standards/laws deemed to be universal). I don’t think that IFRS has limited itself to “broad fundamentals of investor rights.”

    Canada (and some other nations) are now facing controversies of possibly having two sets of laws regarding murder, statutory rape, etc. --- Shiria law for Subset A of citizens versus Canadian law for the Subset B majority of citizens --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sharia 

    This is a very complicated issue that extends well beyond the setting of accounting standards. One of the big complications is crossover crime, where a person from Subset A commits a crime on a person from Subset B and vice versa.

    Of course we’ve faced similar problems for years with foreign embassies not being totally subjected to local laws. This sadly allows UN delegates to park in any fire lane of their choosing in NYC.

    Bob Jensen’s threads on controversies in the setting of accounting standards are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting 


     


    Binging, but not cha chaing, Fraud Updates

    For nearly eight years I’ve updated (usually daily) a log on fraud. This is like a chronological journal from which I also posted to various sites that I maintain on fraud.

    The September 30, 2009 log has been added to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm

    One of the best ways to search these logs is via Bing (or Google, Yahoo, etc.). For example, suppose you are interested in Bill and Hold fraud. You can enter the search terms [“Bob Jensen” AND “Fraud Updates” AND “Bill and Hold”] (without the square brackets) at http://www.bing.com/

    It may seem surprising, but I’m having better results in most cases these days using Microsoft’s Bing search engine than either Google or Yahoo --- http://www.bing.com/

    Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm

    Bing Update:  When I recommended Bing I was not aware of the following:
    "Bing! So That's What A Swizzle Stick Is," by Michael Arrington, Tech Crunch via The Washington Post, October 7, 2009 --- Click Here

    Microsoft's new Bing search engine just can't seem to stay out of the red light district, no matter how hard they try.

    There's no denying it is hands down the best porn search engine on the planet (although ChaCha is pretty good too). But Bing also had a snafu with Google ads that showed the search engine for "pornography" queries. Google took the blame for that one (see updates to that post), and at least it only showed up for people actually querying the adult term.

    Now, a new controversy has popped up around a Microsoft ad unit that scrapes a page for content and then shows relevant Bing queries. The ads normally work fine. But last week Bing started showing an ad unit that contained sexually explicit terms, including at least one that I had never heard of before (the swizzle stick). Best of all, the ads were displayed on a WonderHowTo web page showing only Home & Garden content.

    You can see the queries that were self-generated by Bing for the ad unit in the image. This isn't just R-rated run of the mill porn stuff. This is stuff that's still illegal in some states. Particularly that top query.

    Microsoft is saying this is a bug, and they've taken down all of these ad units on all sites until they understand what happened. The unit is supposed to scrape only the page being viewed. In this case, WonderHowTo has sexually explicit content on other areas of the site, which may be triggering the ad content.

    Said Microsoft's Senior Director Online Audience Business Group Adam Sohn, who wasn't too happy with the ad: "We are very cognizant of what we want the Bing brand to stand for, and this is not it."

    My response ¿ "well, at least it's educational."

    Jensen Comment
    Nevertheless Bing is a good search engine, and you can avoid the porn by not looking for it and ignoring advertisements (that I never look at anyway in Google or Bing or Yahoo). Google still has the huge advantage of cached documents that can be found after they are no longer posted at their original Websites. I assume that all the major search engines will step up controls on the appropriateness of advertising for the general public (that includes children using search engines).

    But Cha Cha is not a major search engine and may lag in such controls. I really don't cha cha on the dance floor or on the computer.

    But instead of a computer spitting out answers (see Google, etc.), real (cha chaing) human beings answer instead.
    "The Mystery Of The ChaCha Eiffel Tower Fail Pic," by Michael Arrington, Tech Crunch, October 29, 2008 ---
    http://www.techcrunch.com/2008/10/29/the-mystery-of-the-chacha-eiffel-tower-fail-pic/

    I’ve aimed a lot of criticism at human powered search engine ChaCha over the last couple of years. The service lets users ask questions, just like a normal search engine. But instead of a computer spitting out answers (see Google, etc.), real human beings answer instead.

    The ChaCha service was absurd in its original web version, which has since been discontinued. The mobile version is actually very useful, although we questioned its scalability when it launched. New information from the company suggests they’re keeping costs low enough to make a business model out of it. More on that soon.

    Now about this image.

    Some fairly funny answers occasionally come back from the human guides, who early on at least had to deal with a lot of prank queries. But none of the ones we’ve seen compare to the one to the right, which is a Digg favorite tonight. It describes the Eiffel Tower sexual position (yes, you learn something new every day) in response to a completely unrelated query about a Randy Newman show in Seattle.

    I contacted the company about it and got the following message:

    I appreciate your reaching out to me regarding this iPhone prank. We researched this as soon as it came to our attention and our logs indicate that the answer displayed was definitely to a question previously asked by this same user. So yes, this is a fake as this person is misrepresenting what actually occurred. They actually asked one question (to which the answer was sent) and then a second question shortly thereafter and then received the answer to the first question which, due to the way messages are threaded on an iPhone display, the answer is appearing below a different question than the one that was asked to spawn the answer that is displayed.

    So in the end this was a bit of a trick apparently used to misrepresent what happened in order to get some laughs – which appears to be working as this is getting some serious play across the Web!

    Ok that sounds more than reasonable. But when I go to the URL in the image, it shows the question and answer linked (see below). I understand how text messages back and forth can get out of order, but not how the wrong answer can be linked to the wrong question in ChaCha’s own database. I also note the guide was on the job for one whole day before this happened. I’ve emailed the company for further clarification.

    I still recommend Bing when you’re not fully satisfied with your Google hits. I can't say I recommend Cha Cha, but then I've never tried it.

    Bob Jensen's search helpers are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/searchh.htm


    Spanish scientists develop the first intelligent financial search engine ---
    http://www.uc3m.es/portal/page/portal/actualidad_cientifica/noticias/financial_search_engine
    Link forwarded by Glen Gray

    Researchers from the Carlos III University of Madrid (UCM3) have completed the development of the first search engine designed to search for information from the financial and stock market sector based on semantic technology, which enables one to make more accurate thematic searches adapted to the needs of each user.

    Unlike conventional search engines, SONAR -so named by its creators- enables the user to perform structured searches which are not based solely on concordance with a series of key words. This corporate financial search engine based on semantic technology, as described on the project website (www.proyecto-sonar.org), was developed by researchers from the UC3M in partnership with the University of Murcia, el Instituto de Empresa (the Business Institute) and the company Indra. According to its creators, it has two main advantages. First, its effectiveness in a concrete domain- that of finance- which is closely defined and has very precise vocabulary. According to Juan Miguel Gómez Berbís, from the Computer Department of the UC3M “This verticality distinguishes SONAR from other more generic search engines, such as Google or Bing” Second, its capacity to establish relations between news, share valuations and prices via logical reasoning.

    The first prototype works by making use of semantic web elements. Basically, the system collects data from both public information sources (Internet) and private, corporate ones (Intranet), adds them to a repository of semantically recorded data (labelled and structured) and allows intelligent access to this data. To achieve this, the platform incorporates an inference engine, a mechanism capable of performing reasoning tasks on the recorded information, as well as a natural language processor, which helps the user to perform the search in the simplest way possible. In this way the results obtained are matched to requests, eliminating ambiguities in polysemic terms, for example in searches carried out by users on stored data. “SONAR enables us to establish relations between different sources of information and discover and expand our knowledge, while at the same time it allows us to classify them so that users can get much more benefit from the experience”

    Potential users

    This search tool is designed for both private investors and large financial concerns. Its creators anticipate that it will be a very useful tool for analysts and stockbrokers. “It will be especially useful to the finance departments of banks and saving banks or to add to an existing search engine added value over its competitors” Gómez Berbís points out. And the search for accurate, reliable, relevant information in this business area has become a key factor in a domain where speed and quality of data are critical factors with an exceptional impact on business processes.

    According to the researchers, this project aims to respond to a need from the financial sector, that is, the analysis of a large volume of information in order to take decisions. In this way, the execution of this project will allow the financial community to have access to a set of intelligent systems for the aggregated search of information in the financial domain and enable them to improve procedures for integrating company information and processes. Researchers are currently incorporating new functions into the search tool and also receiving requests to adapt it to other domains, such as transport and biotechnology. In any case, the project is constantly evolving in order to enhance accuracy and reliability. “In SONAR2 we are working on two Intelligent Decision Support Systems for Financial Investments, one based on Fundamental Analysis and the other on Technical Chartist Analysis, which assists the work of the trader and average investor”, reveals professor Gómez Berbis.

    SONAR is a research project carried out by the UC3m’s SoftLab group, directed by professors Juan Miguel Gómez Berbís and Ángel García Crespo. It is an intelligent, financial search engine and is part of the Ministry of Industry, Tourism and Trade’s AVANZA I+D Program. The University of Murcia and the Instituto de Empresa (Business Institute) have also collaborated in this project, together with Indra.

    Semantic Web Searching --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/searchh.htm#Xerox

     


    Revenue Recognition Controversies

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review, September 25, 2009

    FASB, as Expected, Approves Accounting Changes That Benefits Tech Companies
    by Michael Rapoport
    Sep 24, 2009
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: FASB, Financial Accounting Standards Board, Revenue Recognition, Software Industry

    SUMMARY: The article reports on FASB ratification of EITF Consensus positions developed at the EITF meeting on September 9-10, 2009. Issue No. 08-1, "Revenue Arrangements with Multiple Deliverables" is now included in Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Subtopic 605-25; Issue No. 09-3, "Certain Revenue Arrangements That Include Software Elements" is now included in ASC Topic 985. The FASB decisions related to the ASC 605-25 Subtopic significantly expand disclosure requirements for multiple-deliverable revenue arrangements. The decisions related to ASC Topic 985 removes tangible products (e.g., computer hardware, smart phones, etc.) from the scope of software revenue requirements and provides guidance on when software included in the sale of such products is subject to software revenue requirements (formerly documented in AICPA SOP 97-2).

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Questions relate to revenue recognition practices and related concepts in qualitative characteristics of accounting information, suitable for use in an advanced level financial accounting course.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) The articles indicate that the FASB has "approved accounting changes." What process actually occurred at the FASB meeting on Wednesday, September 23, 2009? (Hint: access the FASB web site at www.fasb.org. Click on the Board Activities tab, then the Action Alert, then the summary of Board Decisions for that date. Scroll down to the topics reported on in this WSJ article.)

    2. (Advanced) In general, what are the current requirements when sales of technology products, such as computers and smart phones, include both a hardware and a software component?

    3. (Advanced) Describe how the accounting requirements described in answer to question 2 above has now changed.

    4. (Introductory) According to the article, these changes are expected to increase profitability for tech companies. Was that the FASB's goal in approving changes to these accounting requirements? Explain. Include in your answer references to the qualitative characteristics of accounting information that you believe the FASB and its EITF are considering in making these accounting changes.

    5. (Advanced) What are multiple deliverables in a software sale? What is the residual method for determining revenue recognition of these products? What is the change in accounting for these sales?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    RELATED ARTICLES: 
    Accounting Shift Would Lift Tech Profits
    by Michael Rapoport, Yukari Iwatani Kane and Ben Worthen
    Sep 24, 2009
    Page: M3

    "FASB, as Expected, Approves Accounting Changes That Benefits Tech Companies," by Michael Rapoport, The Wall Street Journal, September 24, 2009 ---

    Accounting rule makers approved a change that will give a boost to technology companies and other firms by allowing them to recognize some revenue, and profits, faster.

    As expected, the Financial Accounting Standards Board signed off on a rule that helps companies that sell goods and services like smart phones and other high-tech devices combining hardware and software, or home appliances that come with installation and service contracts.

    Under current accounting rules, companies often must defer large portions of revenue from such sales, recognizing them gradually over time, instead of immediately when the sale is made. The rule change would give companies more flexibility in crediting more of that revenue to results upfront.

    The move wouldn't change the total revenue and earnings a company reports over time, and the cash flowing into a company remains the same. But companies contend the change would better align their reported results with the true performance of their business.

    Apple Inc. is expected to be one of the beneficiaries of the new rules, because it would change how the company reports revenue from its iPhone. Currently, Apple recognizes iPhone revenue over a two-year period, and said recently that overall revenue and earnings in its latest quarter would have been much higher if it didn't have to defer revenue for the iPhone and its Apple TV product. An Apple spokesman couldn't be reached for comment.

    Apple has pushed for the change; among the other tech companies that have publicly supported it are Cisco Systems Inc., Palm Inc., Xerox Corp., Dell Inc., International Business Machines Corp. and Hewlett-Packard Co.

    The change will take effect in 2011 for most companies, though they will be allowed to adopt it earlier.

    "New Revenue-Recognition Rules: The Apple of Apple's Eye? The computer company and other tech outfits are likely to cash in on revenue-recognition changes if the new regs take on an international flavor," by Marie Leone, CFO.com,  September 16, 2009 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/14440468?f=most_read

  • While Steve Jobs was preparing to introduce the new Apple iPod nano last week, the company's chief accountant, Betsy Rafael, was sending off a second letter to the Financial Accounting Standards Board related to revenue recognition. At issue: how FASB might rework the rules related to recognizing revenue for software that's bundled into a product and never sold separately.

    The rule is especially important to Apple because it affects the revenue related to two of the company's most successful products — the iPod and the iPhone. If FASB's time line holds to form, and the rules are recast in 2011 the way Apple hopes they will be, the company could be able to book revenue faster, yielding less time between product launches and associated revenue gains. In theory, a successful launch — and its attendant revenue — would drive up Apple's earnings, and possibly stock price, in the same quarter the product is introduced, according to several news reports that came out earlier this week.

    Apple and other tech companies have been lobbying for a rewrite of the so-called multiple deliverables, or bundling, rule for quite some time. They argue that current U.S. generally accepted accounting principles make it hard for product makers to reap the full reward of successful products quickly. That's mainly because U.S. GAAP is stringent about when and how companies recognize revenue generated by software sales.

    "The requirements are that when you sell more than one product or service at one time, you have to break down the total sale value in[to] individual pieces. Establishing the individual values under U.S. GAAP is solely a function of how the company prices those products and services over time," PricewaterhouseCoopers's Dean Petracca told CFO in an earlier interview. Contracts typically include such multiple "deliverables" as hardware, software, professional services, maintenance, and support — all of which are valued and accounted for differently.

    The complex accounting rule has left many product makers waiting for a chance to voice their displeasure at the standards, and the most recent comment period saw such giants as Xerox, IBM, Dell, and Hewlett-Packard — as well as relative newcomers like Palm and Tivo — make their case to FASB. In all, 34 companies wrote to FASB during the month-long comment period that ended in August to register their opinions on the accounting treatment of multiple elements.

    A broader revenue-recognition discussion paper was issued by FASB and the International Accounting Standards Board in December 2008 for a six-month comment period. The boards are currently reviewing the comments, and an exposure draft on revenue recognition, which is the penultimate step to a new global rule, is expected out next year.

    Regarding the issue of multiple deliverables, most technology companies would like to see FASB move closer to international standards with regard to bundled software, and drop the requirement for vendor-specific objective evidence. Under GAAP, VSOE of fair value is preferable when available, according to Sal Collemi, a senior manager at accounting and audit firm Rothstein Kass.

    Basically, VSOE is equivalent to the price charged by the vendor when a deliverable is sold separately — or if not sold separately, the price established by management for a separate transaction that is not likely to change, explains Collemi. Third-party evidence of fair value, such as prices charged by competitors, is acceptable if vendor-specific evidence is unavailable. Many technology companies argue that it is sometimes impossible to measure the fair value of a component that is not sold separately, but rather is an integral part of the product — as is the Apple software for the iPod series of products.

    At the same time, international financial reporting standards require companies to use the price regularly charged when an item is sold as the best evidence of fair value. The alternative approach, under IFRS, is the cost-plus margin, says Collemi. That is, the IFRS puts the onus on management to value a product component based on what it costs to manufacture the piece plus the profit-margin share built into the item. Management usually bases its valuation on historic sales as well as current market-established sale prices. The cost-plus margin is not allowed under GAAP.

    With respect to bundled components, the IFRS focuses on "the substance of the transaction and the thought process and ingredients that go into the transaction," contends Collemi, who says the standard's objective is to make economic sense out of the transaction. FASB's take on the subject is more conservative: the U.S. rule maker calls for objective evidence to establish value.

    Some critics say the IFRS approach invites abuse, because it's based on management assumptions. But Collemi contends that GAAP accounting is filled with rules and interpretations that require management estimates, and that the burden is on management to produce the correct numbers. What's more, auditors are in place to act as a backstop to verify the processes used to arrive at management estimates. "If management is following the spirit of the transaction and doing the right thing," adds Collemi, "then it is up to auditors to challenge the estimates."

    Continued in article

    "How to predict Apple’s gross margins," July 18, 2009 ---
    http://brainstormtech.blogs.fortune.cnn.com/2009/07/18/how-to-predict-apples-gross-margins/

    Apple’s (AAPL) fiscal third quarter earnings are due out Tuesday, July 21, and once again the Street is focused on the big numbers — revenues, earnings and units sold for the Mac, iPhone and iPod.

    But savvy analysts will be paying closer attention to the number that is the best measure of a firm’s profitability: gross margin, expressed as the ratio of profits to revenues. Or

    (Revenue – Cost of sales) / Revenue

    Apple’s gross margins, which have averaged 34.8% over the past eight quarters, are the envy of the industry. Dell’s (DELL) first quarter GM, by contrast, was 17.6% and the company warned Wall Street last week that it is expecting a “modest decline” next quarter.

    In its April earnings call, Apple low-balled its guidance numbers as usual, forecasting a sharp drop in gross margins over the next 6 months. Specifically, it warned analysts to expect no better than 33% in Q3 and “about 30%” in Q4.

    But Turley Muller, for one, doesn’t buy those numbers, and he should know.

    Muller, who publishes a blog called Financial Alchemist, is one of a small group of amateur analysts who track Apple closely and publish quarterly estimates that are as good as — and often better than — the professionals’. In fact Muller’s earnings estimates for Q2 were the best of the lot, missing the actual results by just one penny (see here.)

    For Q3, he’s expecting Apple to report earnings of $1.35 per share on revenue of $8.3 billion — far higher than the Street’s consensus ($1.16 on $8.16 billion).

    Why the discrepancy?

    “Again the story appears to be gross margin,” he writes. “Just like last quarter, when Apple blew out the GM number with 36.4% (just as I had predicted) this quarter’s GM (3Q) should be roughly the same as last quarter.

    The secret, he says, is in the profitability of the iPhone, “which is through the roof.”

    “Apple tries to deflect that,” he says, but the evidence is right there, buried in a chart he found in Apple’s SEC filings (see below). It shows Apple’s schedule for deferred costs and revenue for the iPhone and Apple TV, which for legal reasons are spread out over 24 months rather than being recorded at the time of sale. Because Apple TV revenue is so small relative to the iPhone, this chart is a pretty good proxy for the iPhone alone.

    This is complicated stuff, but the bottom line, as Muller points out, is that iPhone profitability has been rising to the point where gross margins on the device are over 50%.

    Continued in article

    Bob Jensen's investment helpers are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/bookbob1.htm#InvestmentHelpers

    Bob Jensen's threads on revenue accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm


    From The Big 4 Blog --- http://www.bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/

    Wednesday, September 30, 2009
    Ernst & Young: External Challenges Drive Flat Revenue From FY 2008 To FY 2009
    Ernst & Young just reported its combined worldwide results for the year ending 30 June 2009 (FY09), the first Big4 firm to report its global results.

    Combined global firm revenues of US$21.4 billion for the fiscal year ended 30 June 2009 (FY09) decreased a modest 0.2% in local currency terms from the comparable period in FY 2008. In FY 2008, E&Y reported US$23.0 billion in global revenues, and in US dollar terms, the revenue actually declined 6.8% from 2008 to 2009. This shows the dramatic effect of the appreciation of the US dollar in this period against foreign currencies. In other words, one unit of foreign currency translated to much fewer US dollars in the FY 2009 fiscal year compared to the FY 2008 fiscal year. We have highlighted growth in both local currency and US$ terms in our analysis.

    Across E&Y’s five geographic areas, Japan grew at 7.5% in local terms, due to the acquisition of 1,000 professionals from accountancy firm Misuzu; and revenues increased 20% in US$ terms. Europe, Middle East, India and Africa (EMEIA) area grew 1.8% in local currency terms, but declined 9.7% in US$ terms. Oceania decreased 0.4% in local currency terms, but declined a dramatic 15.9% in US$ terms. The Far East decreased 2.7% in local currency terms and 5.9% in US$ terms. The Americas area decreased 3.2% in local currency terms but 5.5% in US$ terms.

    There were some bright spots however, with many of the emerging markets achieving strong growth, including the Middle East (18.6%), India (13.1%) and Brazil (8.0%).

    E&Y said that, “all of our service lines were impacted by pricing pressure and fee reductions.” Despite that, Assurance Services with FY 2009 revenues of $10.1 billion offset price pressure with market-share gains, and revenues declined only 0.7% in local currency terms, but 6.3% in US$ terms. Global Tax Services with FY 2009 revenues of $5.8 billion was up 1.8% in local currency terms due to increased tax enforcement, but dropped 5.2% in US$ terms. Advisory Services with FY 2009 revenues of $3.6 billion was up 1.5% in local currency terms due to sustained demand for risk management and performance improvement, but dropped 6.0% in US$ terms. Transaction Advisory Services with FY 2009 revenues of $1.9 billion, had a 6.9% decrease in local currency terms due to fall in M&A volumes, but revenues decreased a whopping 14.8% in US$ terms.

    Ernst & Young’s employee levels were flat from 2008 into 2009 at 144,500 total employees. Americas declined 4.5% from year to year, this was offset with growth in Japan, EMEIA and Far East. Employee level changes across service lines was moderate in percentage terms from year to year. Attrition levels would be certainly down due to the tough job market, and it seems hiring levels just kept pace with departures.

    The recently reported numbers from Deloitte UK and PricewaterhouseCoopers UK were pre-indicators that the Big4 firms would not be reporting blow-out results. And this first announcement from E&Y confirms our premise that business for the Big4 has slowed down dramatically in the last 15 months as the economic global crisis finally had an impact on the Big4 firms due to reduced demand, price pressure and fee reductions. This brings an abrupt stop to 5 year of double-digit % annual revenue growth at all the Big4 firms.

    The good news in this release is that revenues have not shrunk by a large amount, showing that the Big4 firms have deep breadth and penetration in every market and country in the world, and their services continue to be in demand by clients as they navigate through this crisis. A flat year to year scenario, given the deepest and most detrimental recession since the Great Depression, is cause for somber reflection, but not for alarm. Consider that Tax and Advisory Services actually grew for Ernst and Young.

    We’ll wait to see how the other Big4 firms report results, Deloitte is certainly late this year in their results, but we would expect that revenue growth is nearly flat and all firms will discuss external challenges as the main driver of this situation.


    When interest rates are confounded by uncertain foreign exchange movements and an unpredictable dictator
    An Economics/Finance Lesson from South of the Border:  A Teaching Case With Accounting Implications

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 1, 2009

    Venezuela to Sell $3 Billion in Dollar-Denominated Bonds
    by Dan Molinski and Darcy Crowe
    Sep 29, 2009
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: Advanced Financial Accounting, Bond Prices, Bonds, Foreign Currency Exchange Rates

    SUMMARY: "Venezuela announced a dollar-denominated government-bond sale for at least $3 billion, a move that gave the Bolivar currency a boost against the dollar in the black market."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Questions relate primarily to factors in bond issuance, with some reference to currency exchange, suitable for use in intermediate and advanced financial accounting courses.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) Why is the Venezuelan government taking an action which is influencing black market trades of the country's currency, the Bolivar? In your answer, define the terms black market as well as fixed rate and floating rate for currency exchanges.

    2. (Advanced) The bonds are "directed at people living or residing in Venezuela." Does this mean they must acquire dollars to pay for these dollar-denominated bonds in their home country? Explain.

    3. (Introductory) Venezuela's central bank said on its Web site the 2019 bond will have a coupon of 7.75% while the 2024 bond will have an 8.25% coupon. What is a coupon? Why do these two bonds issued by the same government have different coupon rates?

    4. (Advanced) Based on information in the article, describe the expectations of the effective interest rate for these bonds.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Venezuela to Sell $3 Billion in Dollar-Denominated Bonds," by Dan Molinski and Darcy Crowe, The Wall Street Journal, September 29, 2009 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125414560675846299.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    Venezuela announced a dollar-denominated government-bond sale for at least $3 billion, a move that gave the bolivar currency a boost against the dollar in the black market.

    Venezuela's Finance Ministry said that the bond sale, which is being managed by Deutsche Bank AG and Citigroup Inc., would come in two issues, one for $1.5 billion with a 2019 maturity and another for the same amount, with a 2024 maturity.

    The ministry statement said the sale is directed at "people living or residing in Venezuela," who would pay for the bonds with the bolivar. Investors would then be able to exchange them for dollars, and that is the part that helped lift the bolivar, as the sale could absorb excessive local demand for the U.S. currency.

    The bolivar has for years traded at an official, fixed rate of 2.15 for $1 that was set by the Socialist government of Hugo Chávez. But that rigidity has spawned a robust, unregulated black market in which the bolivar is much weaker. Last month, it cost as much as seven bolivars for $1.

    But speculation of the dollar-denominated bond sale and the official announcement Monday turned the bolivar as strong as 5.2 bolivars for $1, nearly its best showing in 2009.

    The government hopes the bond sale will allow the bolivar to maintain its upward trend, which could allow manufacturers and other local businesses easier access to dollars at cheaper levels so they can buy goods and ramp up activity.

    Based on calculations from Caracas brokerage firm BBO Financial Services, the bond issue could allow investors to buy dollars at a rate of 4.6 bolivars, a price well below the parallel market rate.

    The primary market price for the bonds is seen at a premium to par, with the price to be determined by auction, according to a statement from a syndicate desk.

    Venezuela's central bank said on its Web site the 2019 bond will have a coupon of 7.75%, while the 2024 bond will have an 8.25% coupon. The government will take orders through Friday, and results will be announced Oct. 6, the bank said.

    The sale is the first dollar-denominated issue by the government in more than a year, although the state-run oil firm issued $3 billion earlier this year.

    The finance minister said over the weekend that state-run entities would have the option of more bond sales during the remainder of the year.

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm


    FASB Accounting Standards Codification™—Four Volume Set ($195.00)

    You can read the following (on September 30, 2009) at the FASB Website --- Click Here
    http://www.surveymethods.com/Preview.aspx?EAF4E0EDBEA4BDAFABE0E6EDE6AEB7B9ECAE&DO_NOT_COPY_THIS_LINK

    In order to help us determine initial print quantities for the following FASB hard copy bound editions, please indicate your interest in the following publications. Please note that this is for informational purposes only. Your ‘yes’ response to any or all of the items below is in no way an obligation to purchase the publications.

    *1. FASB Accounting Standards Codification™—Four Volume Set ($195.00)

    A four-volume bound edition of the FASB Accounting Standards Codification™ will be available at the beginning of October 2009. Quantity pricing will be offered in addition to a 20 percent discount for academic users.

    Jensen Question

    I "cheated" and copied the link above where it says DO NOT COPY THIS LINK.
    Why would the FASB put this at the end of a URL?
    Will the FBI come knocking at my door?

    Bob Jensen's threads on the "dumb, dumb, dumb" FASB Codification --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting


    "GAAP Codification: An Ontological Perspective," by Zane L. Swanson (University of Central Oklahoma) and Ron Freeze (Emporia State University), SSRN, September 2, 2008 --- http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1262059

    Abstract:
    The 2008 Financial Accounting Standards Board Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP) codification initiative makes a significant step in the consolidation and ease of use of standards applied to accounting practices. The objective of this article is to identify the potential benefits of enhancing the GAAP codification initiative by the application of an accounting ontology framework. These benefits include: 1) Improved decision making, 2) Faster assimilation of GAAP practices, and 3) an improved common framework for facilitating communication between FASB, IFRS and the SEC. Our study's analysis is meant to motivate discussion within the accounting community about what the ultimate codification might be and provide a starting point for creating an ontology that meets the consensus of the community.

    Bob Jensen's threads on the FASB's Codification database --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting


    Debt Versus Equity: Dense Fog on the Mezzanine Level
    Deloitte has submitted a Letter of Comment (PDF 277k) on the IASB's Discussion Paper: Financial Instruments with Characteristics of Equity. We strongly support development of a standard addressing how to distinguish between liabilities and equity. We do not support any of the three approaches outlined in the Discussion Paper, but we believe that the basic ownership approach is a suitable starting point. Below is an excerpt from our letter. Past comment letters are Here.
    IASPlus, September 5, 2008 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

    July 19, 2009 reply from John Anderson [jcanderson27@COMCAST.NET]

    Professor Jensen,

    Thanks for your very interesting post!  

    This peek into the work of the IASB illustrates much of what is happening within the IFRS iceberg … where 6/7th's of the activity is under the surface, or else seemingly ignored in the US press and perhaps intentionally under-reported by US professional organizations.  

    I have pulled the following excerpts from the IASB’s linked site in your post ---
    http://www.iasplus.com/dttletr/0809liabequity.pdf   

    The approach was prepared by staff of the Accounting Standards Committee of Germany on behalf of the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) and the German Accounting Standards Board (GASB) under the Pro-active Accounting Activities in Europe Initiative (PAAinE) of EFRAG and the European National Standard Setters.

    The staff pointed out that the basic principle for the classification of equity and liability has been established but that all other components still represent work-in-progress.

    Also:

    The staff asked the Board whether there was agreement on acknowledging in the IASB's forthcoming discussion paper that the European Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG) had also issued a discussion paper on the distinction between equity and liabilities. Most Board Members disagreed with the staff's proposed wording and emphasised that the IASB should make it clear that it had not deliberated the final version of the EFRAG document, had therefore reached no final position on its merits and that the acknowledgement of the existence of the EFRAG paper should not be seen as the IASB endorsing the positions taken therein. It was decided to take the staff proposals offline to agree a suitable wording.

    Also:

    The FASB document describes three approaches to distinguish equity instruments and non-equity instruments:

    ·         basic ownership,

    ·         ownership-settlement, and

    ·         reassessed expected outcomes.

    The FASB has reached a preliminary view that the basic ownership approach is the appropriate approach for determining which instruments should be classified as equity. The IASB has not deliberated any of the three approaches, or any other approaches, to distinguishing equity instruments and non-equity, and does not have any preliminary view.

    The IASB's DP describes some implications of the three approaches in the FASB document for IFRSs. For instance:

    ·         Significantly fewer instruments would be classified as equity under the basic ownership approach than under IAS 32.

    ·         The ownership-settlement approach would be broadly consistent with the classifications achieved in IAS 32. However, under the ownership-settlement approach, more instruments would be separated into components and fewer derivative instruments would be classified as equity.

    The goal of the Discussion Paper is to solicit views on whether FASB's proposals are a suitable starting point for the IASB's deliberations. If the project is added to the IASB's active agenda, the IASB intends to undertake it jointly with the FASB. The IASB requests responses to the DP by 5 September 2008. Click for Press Release PDF 52k).

    My concerns are the following:

    1. About a year ago I understood that in IFRS most Preferred Stock would be classified as Debt, not Equity.  
    2. There was some question about Callable and Convertible Debt.  

    Today, going through the IASB’ abstract of all of their meetings on this subject, I cannot determine if the Germans in ERFAG are arguing for Preferred Stock to be classified as Equity or not.  Logically their issue of the Loss Absorbing nature of the Security should be the determining factor for classifications and therefore classify Preferred Stock as Equity or not.  This is critical in areas like Boston where many of our VC backed companies would be transformed into companies having little or no Equity under IFRS.  I have seen IFRS “experts” present on Route 128 in Boston and seemingly being unaware of this difference between US GAAP and IFRS.  Similarly, Tweedie’s stand-by illustrative company from Scotland that he loves to use is Johnnie Walker.  This would indicate to me that maybe McGreevy should introduce Tweedie to some of the Microsoft development now performed in Ireland, unless Johnnie Walker is about to enter the Technology Business.  

    As has been the theme in some of my prior posts, after correctly bringing the US position (FASB) into the discussions about a year ago, since then the IASB seems to have its hands full dealing with the Contingencies from the EU.  

    Clearly with 55 conventions in the EU, 2½ for each EU country, a key task for the IASB is the de-Balkanization of the EU’s Accounting.  During this necessary period of consolidation within the EU, we should not be required to mark time as the IASB planned during the EU conversion from 2005 throughout 2008.  (The Credit Crunch and Financial Meltdown in September 2008 threw  a monkey-wrench into these plans!)  

    As in their December 2008 Revenue Recognition “Discussion Paper” the IASB seems to have their hands full now introducing these revolutionary new concepts such as Equity Section Accounting and Revenue Recognition to their subscribing countries.  They are seemingly starting each exercise with a blank sheet.  Unfortunately this is no way conducive to their goal of converging with us in the US.  This methodology also will create excess fatigue within the EU’s apparently limited and diffused technical resources.  

    Given that the IASB has been struggling with Equity Accounting since 2005 this also confirms my fear of future lack of responsiveness to newly arising needs for new accounting regulations.  We are now down to only the FASB in this country.  I shudder to consider a world with only the IASB.  Could they handle Cash in 3 months, or would this require further study?  

    They were quick with Derivatives in 2008 Q4 and in recent threats to us in the US.  

    Apparently they can only be decisive in emotional moments of pique or fear!  

    Best Regards! 

     

    John

     

    John Anderson, CPA, CISA, CISM, CGEIT, CITP

    Financial & IT Business Consultant

    14 Tanglewood Road

    Boxford, MA 01921

     

    jcanderson27@comcast.net

    978-887-0623   Office

    978-837-0092   Cell

    978-887-3679    Fax

    Bob Jensen's threads on Debt versus Equity ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FAS150


    "Revenue Recognition: Will a Single Model Fly? Elements unique to long-term contracts pose a challenge for FASB and IASB in their bid to create one standard covering all customer relationships" by David McCann, CFO.com, July 2,  2009 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/13941548/c_2984368/?f=archives

    Can U.S. and international accounting standard-setters realize their dream of fashioning a single revenue-recognition standard that would apply to all customer contracts? While the answer won't be known for some time, it's safe to say there are hurdles on the road ahead.

    In a joint discussion paper issued last December in which the Financial Accounting Standards Board and the International Accounting Standards Board proposed a model for a lone standard, they acknowledged that an alternative approach could be needed for some contracts. The almost 200 letters they received in a comment period that ended June 19 did nothing to remove any doubts about whether having one standard will be viable.

    Most of the letters agreed that the standards boards' goals are laudable. One main objective is to simplify and clarify FASB's revenue-recognition rules, which currently are scattered among more than 100 standards. Another is to offer more guidance than what's contained in IASB's broadly worded revenue-recognition principle.

    In meeting those twin objectives, the boards would be advancing their overarching goal of converging U.S. and international standards. The major goals aside, however, many commenters registered alarm at specifics of the proposed model — especially concerning how revenue should be recognized under long-term contracts.

    Today, entities typically recognize revenue when it's realized or realizable and the "earnings process" is substantially complete. The new model instead would direct the entity to record the gain when it performs an obligation under its contract, such as by delivering a promised good or service to the customer. (The contract need not be written; even a simple retail transaction involves an implicit contract in which the customer agrees to provide consideration in return for an item.)

    In a simple example, if the entity had agreed to provide two products at different times, it would recognize revenue twice, even if the contract stipulated that payment would not be made until the second product was delivered. The discussion paper mentions several permissible bases on which revenue could be allocated to the different performance obligations. But the paper says the revenue should be in proportion to the stand-alone selling price of the good or service underlying a performance obligation. And for an item that's not sold separately, a stand-alone price should be estimated — something that the standards boards acknowledged could be hard to do.

    A main purpose of the performance-obligation approach is to iron out many of the disparities in how businesses account for revenue, which the boards say make financial statements less useful than they should be. The discussion paper gave the example of cable television providers, which under FAS 51 account for connecting customers to the cable network and providing the cable signal over the subscription period as separate earnings processes. By contrast, under the Securities and Exchange Commission's SAB 104, telephone companies account for up-front activation fees and monthly fees for phone usage as part of the same earnings process.

    "The fact that entities apply the earnings process approach differently to economically similar transactions calls into question the usefulness of that approach [and] reduces the comparability of revenue across entities and industries," the discussion paper stated.

    Long Engagements Perhaps the thorniest issue arising from the standards boards' proposal involves long-term construction or production contracts. Historically, under many such arrangements the company recognizes revenue using the "percentage-of-completion" method — if it's a three-year project with costs of $3 million, and $1 million of that is expended in the first year, one-third of the revenue is reflected for that year.

    The single-model proposal, on the other hand, says that revenue should be recognized as an entity "transfers control" of goods and services to the customer. But many comment letters noted that the discussion paper did not clearly define what constitutes a transfer of control.

    A company that is constructing a building for a customer may regard the materials and labor being provided as a continuous transfer of goods and services, which under the proposed model could be construed as allowing them to continue to recognize revenue over the duration of the contract. But if the standard setters hold that "transfer of control" occurs when the building is completed and turned over to the customer, all of the revenue would have to be recognized in the final year of the contract.

    Lynne Triplett, a partner and revenue-recognition expert at Grant Thornton, told CFO.com that the way the discussion paper is written, "There could be questions as to whether there is continuous transfer of control, and to the extent there's not, there is going to be a significant difference between the way revenue is recognized today versus how it might be recognized in the future."

    That would create misleading financial statements, according to some of the comment letters. "The most concerning area of the discussion paper is the potential change to the accounting for long-term contracts," wrote Financial Executives International Canada. "Creating a model which results in 'lumpy' revenue recognition ... with a waterfall effect in one accounting period at the very end, is not useful to the readers of financial statements."

    Continued in article

    Jensen Comment
    Most of the argument centers on timing of revenue recognition such a in long-term contracts. But the important issues concern whether or not some transactions should be recognized as revenue. Much of this debate was left in many EITF dead ends that need to be explicitly resolved --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm

    But the track record of the IASB is not very strong  about explicit resolution of problems. Instead the IASB likes principles-based standards that, in my viewpoint, leaves too much to subjective judgment. This is one of the reasons why the revenue recognition standards to date issued by the IASB arguably constitute the greatest weakness in IFRS.

    Thank You John Anderson

    You’ve given us the most penetrating critique to date of IFRS in the context of when (probably not if) international accounting standards should replace U.S. GAAP.

    This seriously backs up Professor Sunder's argument that, not only should the IASB be given a world monopoly on accounting standard setting, it should not be given one before its standards are demonstrably better than other national standards, especially U.S. GAAP. I've always argued for at least giving the IASB more time to generate better standards. Year 2009 was just too soon, at least in the U.S., for IFRS-Lite and Year 2014 is just too soon for IFRS-Heavy.

    You can read about the IFRS-Lite and IFRS-Heavy express trains at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting

    July 16, 2009 message from John Anderson [jcanderson27@COMCAST.NET]

    I usually try to be very even-handed when discussing IFRS, but today please allow me to speak as a proponent of Convergence … but also an unbridled supporter of US GAAP! 

    First off, thanks for your honest and candid email. 

    I believe that this dramatizes the giant problem that I believe Tweedie and crew are all too belatedly realizing they have!  They have a lot to do!  This may account for some of the erratic comments and actions by IASB members over the last few months.  For example I am thinking of his colleague Mr. Smith from Fort Lauderdale who is really wigging-out at times!  Of course he has dedicated a decade or more of his life to the IASB so during those periods where the IASB could be confused with the Keystone Cops, we can all understand his justified frustration!  However, rather than focus more on any of these untoward actions or statements made by individuals, or at times their apparent threats to not proceed with Convergence as agreed, let’s just wish them well and hope they get down to business … as we in the US are waiting … and they now have the world spotlight on them that they seemed so determined to have. 

    I will not attempt to summarize the US Revenue Recognition work of over the last 12 years, but I will make these comments.  The joint IFRS communiqué from the FASB and the IASB was less than a particularly rigorous piece of work!  It read more like it was a first draft.  They have recently referred to it as only a “discussion paper.”  It was not a valid step to Convergence with the US and gave no indication of how they might be transforming their current IFRS into something comparable in quality to current US GAAP in this area.  They did not demonstrate a mastery of the current US concepts and certainly didn’t come close to introducing more advanced thinking which would be the prerogative of the IASB.  Instead they started out by focusing upon hypothetical Contract Assets and Liabilities.  However, in some sections they spoke like these Contract Assets and Liabilities were not merely illustrative, but were instead actually being booked.  When their own illustrative tools boggle them, and nobody does a final read through, we end up with stuff like this! 

    This was really only an elementary first step of introducing some of the concepts of Revenue Recognition to many people in other jurisdictions who have probably never given this subject any thought before!  I accept that this educational work by the IASB is needed, but they shouldn’t confuse this with Convergence with the US.  This dramatizes how in the area of Revenue Recognition, the IASB has a lot of ground to cover and must break their inertia.  The IASB not only has to cover this territory which may be somewhat new to some of their members, but they have to educate those around the world who are in the field and currently applying IFRS and make sure that they absorb this material.  It is always easier to start something and attend the parade … than to continue and sustain anything.  (It’s also much more fun to start something!) 

    Then, to raise questions about their institutional competence and control, they published IFRS SME before they determined what course they will follow in IFRS.  Further, in earlier drafts, IFRS SME was more conservative on Revenue Recognition than was IFRS, and ignored these vexing Contract Assets and Liabilities.  I have informally confirmed that this SME group is essentially operating independently of IFRS’s main team.  Finally in SME’s Final Draft, Revenue Recognition adopts a style and structure somewhat reminiscent the SAB statements from the SEC with 26 Revenue examples sited in the final document with varying degrees of discussion and guidance.  (Rules!)  However, within IFRS, the IASB is apparently more and more convinced that one single standard will serve as Revenue Recognition for Software, Power Utilities, and anything else that comes down the pike!  (Converging SME and IFRS may be yet another task.)  

    Here I am only discussing Software Revenue Recognition.  This is serious stuff in Boston, San Francisco, Seattle and other cities where we all know of companies where there are Ex-Management Teams that are currently doing time in US Prisons for violating these Accounting provisions.  They are not as prominent as Madoff, but they are in the same place.  Most will probably get out of prison within their lifetimes. 

    During his last visit to the US, Sir David (Tweedie) tried to dramatize how you can get around any rule if you want to.  One of his anecdotes was probably an ill-advised selection.  He must understand that thousands are listening to him when he is on stage in a webcast.  Further, advisors with attitudes of getting around certain rules can get people in this country some serious periods of incarceration. 

    In the US this is an area that is considered by many as very challenging.  However, it is an excellent area to study as it bares the bones of both systems and shows that US GAAP is more driven by the principle of Conservatism than is IFRS, at this time.  (Why can no proponents of IFRS ever tell me the Principles that these methods are based upon?  If they are particularly annoying I sometimes suggest it’s the principle of “Ease of Calculations!”  I have yet to get a response when doing this.  So I will supply this sort of Transparency as the apparent principle or basis of most of IFRS in this area, not stark Conservatism.  This is important, because it is time to stop pretending!  US GAAP is principles based … but it is not just bare principles!  I believe that IFRS also has some Rules!) 

    To directly answer your question, I have recompiled and attached my portion of the AICPA’s response to the FASB regarding IFRS (not SME).  You will be able to look at the response regarding Software Revenue.  In this example this change is demonstrated to be more than dramatic! 

    In the example Current Revenue is as follows:

    US GAAP        $0

    IFRS                $9.333M

    In the Software Revenue Recognition you’ll see my SOP 98-9 Residual Method contrasted against my “apportion the discount numbers” where I used the proposed IFRS Revenue Method.  This approach is similar to the FASB’s EITF 00.21 which I personally feel muddied the genius of SOP 97-2 and 98-9 authored by the AICPA!  EITF 00.21 is not the main thrust of US GAAP; SOP 98-9 is along with the Deferral Method for VSOE is the main thrust.  (Many IFRS people make the fundamental  mistake of assuming that Pre-Codification US GAAP is as simply laid out as IFRS.  They go to the FASB Statements and think that is it.  Wrong!  There were 25 other potential sources!  Hence the need for Codification with is similar to the ARB’s compiled in the US around 1951.) 

     

    IFRS Revenue shoots through the roof because front-end Revenue is not based only on the Principle of Conservatism and recognizing all discounts and Sales concessions or inducements on the Front-end! 

    US GAAP has principles like Conservatism.  In my example US GAAP demands all discounts be taken on the first piece of revenue recognized upon delivery. 

    However IFRS approach simply allocates like some practically trained Cost Accountant; not like a conservatively trained Financial Accountant!  

    The irony is this!  SME is more conservative than the main body of IFRS!  In the earlier drafts of SME you could not have deferred revenue at anything other than your normal margin.  Whereas IFRS allows zero margin sales t be maintained in Deferred Revenue!  Incredibly daft!  Excuse me … incredibly Un-Conservative! 

    Please prove to us how IFRS is more conservative, or else please suggest as to how you would remedy this dire GAP in the IFRS Methodology.  

    Thanks for your patience! 

    Best Regards! 

     

    John

     

    John Anderson, CPA, CISA, CISM, CGEIT, CITP

    Financial & IT Business Consultant

    14 Tanglewood Road

    Boxford, MA 01921

     

    jcanderson27@comcast.net

    978-887-0623   Office

    978-837-0092   Cell

    978-887-3679    Fax

    June 15, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi John,

    You wrote:

    *****Begin Quotation
    During his last visit to the US, Sir David
    (Tweedie) tried to dramatize how you can get around any rule if you want to.  One of his anecdotes was probably an ill-advised selection.  He must understand that thousands are listening to him when he is on stage in a webcast.  Further, advisors with attitudes of getting around certain rules can get people in this country some serious periods of incarceration. 
    *****End Quotation

    In addition to incarceration in the U.S. for violating GAAP rules, there is the even more common and very expensive lawsuit risk for breaking GAAP rules and failure to detect these breaches in audits --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm

    I’ve always argued (and repeated in a recent message to the AECM) that the main advantage of rules-based standards lies in dealing with enormous clients like Enron that became bullies with auditors. Auditors could point to a rule and then say they “have no choice.”

    In other words, the advantage of a rule is before the fact rather than after the fact!

    Of course when dealing with companies like Enron that want to want to cheat on the rules it’s essential for auditors to verify compliance. The famous 3% rule for SPE accounting in U.S. GAAP was not properly verified by Andersen’s audit team at Enron, and this more than anything else, probably led to the implosion of Andersen (at least it was the smoking gun) --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm

    Who knows what would’ve happened to Andersen and Enron under IFRS? There would not have been that smoking gun in an explicit 3% rule. At this point IFRS is too different on SPE accounting to predict what might have been the alternative scenario --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm

    Under IFRS we might still have both Enron and Andersen, and that would not necessarily be bad if Enron had pulled off most of its many leveraged gambles and Andersen had to be better auditors under SOX. Of course this is all speculation off the top of my head.

    Although Enron tried to screw California, Enron was not unique. Everybody was screwing California.

    Bob Jensen's threads on the express train's bumpy rails toward requiring IFRS-Heavy for public companies (Resistance is Futile) are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#MethodsForSetting

    Issues of principles-based versus rules-based standards are discussed at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Principles-Based


    Fade, Gain, and Cost Shifting Analysis  in gross profit analysis in construction accounting

    September 25, 2009 message from William Brighenti, CPA [accountantscpahartford@GMAIL.COM]

    If anyone has detailed information including an illustration of a fade analysis for contractors, please email me or post it.  I've posted one on my website:  http://www.cpa-connecticut.com/fade-analysis.htmlHowever, I suspect there may be other formats available allowing for better analysis.  Please email all suggestions, comments, and formats to accountantscpahartford@gmail.com.

    Thank you,

    William Brighenti, CPA,
    Accountants CPA Hartford

    http://www.cpa-connecticut.com

    September 25, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi William,

    There can be “gains” as well as “fades.” Also check under the contractors “cost shifting” behavior from contract to contract.

    Here are a few links to look at::

    http://www.eurojournals.com/irjfe_28_04.pdf

    Click Here
    http://www.dglcpas.com/wp-content/uploads/2009/07/cost_shifting.pdf

    Click Here
    http://blog.skodaminotti.com/blog/cleveland-construction-accounting/0/0/the-importance-of-gainfade-analyses

    Click Here
    http://blog.skodaminotti.com/blog/real-estate-and-construction-blog-5

    Click Here (CPE Course)
    http://www.cpa2biz.com/AST/Main/CPA2BIZ_Primary/Tax/PRDOVR~PC-186319/PC-186319.jsp

    Click Here
    http://www.thetfmshow.com/Assets/Content/doc/TU13%20-%20Financial%20Fundamentals%20pt%202.pdf

    Hope this helps.

    There is also an unrelated concept of fade analysis in game theory ---

    Parrondo's Paradox --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parrondo%27s_paradox

     Bob Jensen

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Review on October 8, 2009

    Borrowing for Dividends Raises Worries
    by Liz Rappaport
    Oct 05, 2009
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: Bonds, Debt, Dividends, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Mergers and Acquisitions

    SUMMARY: "Rock-bottom interest rates and thawed credit markets are emboldening some companies to use bond-sale proceeds...to pay out special dividends, buy back stock, or finance acquisitions.... [In contrast,] most corporate-bond offerings during the recession have been used to reduce debt or stockpile cash."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article can be used in covering bond issuances, ratio analysis particularly of debt-to-equity and interest versus earnings, dividend payments, and corporate acquisitions.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) What was the effective interest rate for corporations with high credit ratings who issued bonds in September 2009? How does that rate compare to one year ago?

    2. (Introductory) What reasons for that change are given in the article? Do they have anything to do with changing creditworthiness of the borrowers?

    3. (Introductory) Compare the actions of Intel Corporation and TransDigm Group, Inc., with their debt issuance. How are they similar? How are they different?

    4. (Advanced) What is the impact on a corporate balance sheet of issuing debt? Describe the impact ignoring use of the proceeds, in essence assuming the company will "stockpile" the cash.

    5. (Introductory) Define the financial statement ratios of debt-to-equity and times interest earned.

    6. (Advanced) Describe the change in impact of debt issuance on a balance sheet equation and the two financial ratios if the proceeds are used to pay dividends to shareholders.

    7. (Advanced) Can a company issue bonds in order to "reduce debt" as the author says was done in during the recession and credit crisis? Explain, proposing a better term for such a transaction.

    8. (Introductory) The author uses two benchmarks to make clear the impact of TransDigm Group's debt issuance and dividend payment. What are these benchmarks? How does using them increase clarity about the size of the $425 million bond offering and the $7.50 to $7.70 per share special dividend?

    9. (Advanced) The author also includes use of bond proceed to finance acquisitions as a risky action. How have debt analysts reacted to Kraft's offer to buy Cadbury?

    10. (Advanced) Describe the impact of a business combination financed by debt on the total combined balance sheets of the firms entering into the business combination. How does this impact compare to using bond proceeds to pay dividends to shareholders? How does it differ?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Borrowing for Dividends Raises Worries," by Liz Rappaport, October 5, 2009 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125470107157763085.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    Rock-bottom interest rates and thawed credit markets are emboldening some companies to use bond-sale proceeds to go on the offensive, even if that means rewarding shareholders at the expense of bondholders.

    The nascent trend is controversial because corporate borrowers are sinking themselves deeper into debt to pay out special dividends, buy back stock or finance acquisitions. While such moves were all the rage during the credit boom, most corporate-bond offerings during the recession have been used to reduce debt or stockpile cash.

    Eric Felder, global head of credit trading at Barclays Capital, says the lure of low rates and companies' stables of cash increases "the risk of non-bondholder friendly events."

    Last week's sale of $425 million of bonds by aircraft-parts manufacturer TransDigm Group Inc. is one of the back-to-the-past corporate-bond deals causing concern among some analysts. More than $360 million of the proceeds will be used to pay a special cash dividend to shareholders and management of the Cleveland company.

    The added debt increased TransDigm's borrowings to 4.3 times its earnings before interest and taxes, compared with 3.1 times before last week's deal. The expected dividend of $7.50 to $7.70 a share is equal to nearly all of the net income that TransDigm reported since the end of fiscal 2003, according to Moody's Investors Service.

    Moody's said the dividend "illustrates the company's aggressive financial policy." Moody's gave the new debt a junk rating of B3, even though the ratings firm said TransDigm's "strong operating performance will enable the company to service the increased debt level."

    Sean Maroney, director of investor relations at TransDigm, says the "stability of our business, high profit margins and consistent cash flow" give the company "the ability to support this level of leverage."

    Borrowing from bondholders to pay shareholder dividends is "a hallmark of an earlier credit era," Jeffrey Rosenberg, head of credit strategy at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, wrote in a report Friday. Such deals were popular in 2003 and 2004, the last time the Federal Reserve lowered its benchmark interest rate to historically low levels, keeping it at 1% for more than a year.

    Companies like Dex Media Inc. took on debt to pay dividends to its private-equity owners, including Carlyle Group and Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe, before taking the companies public. Dex Media filed for bankruptcy earlier this year under a mountain of debt.

    With the federal-funds rate at 0% for nine months now and confidence returning to the stock and debt markets, investors have been driven to take on more risk. That is flooding the corporate-bond market with cash. Investors poured $43 billion into investment-grade corporate-bond funds in the second quarter and nearly $40 billion in the third quarter -- almost double previous peak quarters, according to Lipper AMG Data Services.

    The wave of buying drove down borrowing costs for the average highly rated corporation to about 5%, according to Merrill, a level not seen since 2005. In the heat of the crisis last October, such rates averaged 9%. Through the end of September, more than 1,000 high-rated companies borrowed a record $860 billion, according to Dealogic.

    In July, Intel Corp. sold $1.75 billion of convertible bonds, planning to use $1.5 billion of the proceeds to buy back shares. A spokesman for Intel declined to comment.

    The computer-chip giant has a strong credit rating of single-A, so it doesn't carry a burdensome debt load. Still, the deal raised eyebrows among some analysts and investors, who say floating debt to buy back stock could become more common as companies regain confidence.

    And as merger-and-acquisition activity revs up, the cheaper cost of debt compared with equity is tempting companies to use bond sales as a deal-making war chest.

    Analysts are watching Kraft Foods Inc. in anticipation that the company would finance its proposed purchase of U.K. chocolate, candy and chewing gum maker Cadbury PLC by raising tons of debt. Last month's unsolicited bid by Kraft was then valued at about $16.7 billion, but it could be weeks before Kraft submits a formal offer.

    Three major credit-ratings agencies have warned Kraft that they could slash the company's debt ratings if the company reaches a deal agreement with Cadbury. At the current offering price, Kraft would need to shell out at least $6 billion in cash, much of it likely from the debt markets, according to corporate-bond research firm Gimme Credit.

    "Kraft is committed to maintaining an investment-grade rating," a Kraft spokesman said, declining to comment further.

    So far in 2009, returns to high-grade bond investors are 19%, according to Merrill. "We've seen a feeding frenzy" because of low interest rates, says Kathleen Gaffney, portfolio manager at Loomis, Sayles & Co. She sold some bonds recently to take profits from the rally. Loomis Sayles wants to have cash on the sidelines in case the Fed raises rates soon or Treasury bonds sell off.

    Jensen Comment
    If you buy into the Modigliani and Miller Theorem of capital structure, how the corporation is financed, including dividend payouts, is as follows:

    The Modigliani-Miller theorem (of Franco Modigliani, Merton Miller) forms the basis for modern thinking on capital structure. The basic theorem states that, under a certain market price process (the classical random walk), in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is unaffected by how that firm is financed. It does not matter if the firm's capital is raised by issuing stock or selling debt. It does not matter what the firm's dividend policy is. Therefore, the Modigliani-Miller theorem is also often called the capital structure irrelevance principle.

     

    Modigliani was awarded the 1985 Nobel Prize in Economics for this and other contributions.

    Miller was awarded the 1990 Nobel Prize in Economics, along with Harry Markowitz and William Sharpe, for their "work in the theory of financial economics," with Miller specifically cited for "fundamental contributions to the theory of corporate finance."

    Of course these days, the assumption of market efficiency is a big stretch ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH

    Bob Jensen's threads on debt versus equity and capital structure (including investor earn out contracts) are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FAS150

    Bob Jensen's bookmarks for financial ratios --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm#010303FinancialRatios
    Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_ratios

    Bob Jensen's threads on valuation of the firm are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm 


    Deloitte Heads Up
    "Reconfiguring the Scope of Software Revenue Recognition Guidance,"  by Rich Paul, Ryan Johnson, Sam Doolittle, and Rebecca Morrow, Deloitte & Touche LLP, Deloitte Heads Up, October 23, 2009 ---
    http://www.iasplus.com/usa/headsup/headsup0910software.pdf


    October 11, 2009 message from David Albrecht [albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]

    I do not even know what a course in accounting research and analysis means.

    David Albrecht


     

    Hi David,

    Since you got your doctorate at a very fine university (Virginia Tech), I assume that you are being modest for purposes of stimulating discussion on the AECM.

    A course in "accounting research" can vary across an extremely wide range from an undergraduate course that is more like a legal and archival research course showing students how to locate international financial data, accounting standards, and literature to advanced accountics doctoral seminars that typically divide a number of courses on the basis of capital markets (econometrics) research, behavioral (psychometrics, behavioral finance/economics), and analytical (economic modeling, game theory, agency theory, mathematical information economics).

    The term “analysis” can also mean different things, but the usual context is mathematical analytics apart from mathematical statistical inference and data mining. The common example is economics game theory.

    Since Joel Demski became dominant in the doctoral program at the University of Florida, Florida’s doctoral program has become a model of an accountics doctoral program heavy on the analytical side of research.

    The outline of Florida's "accountics" doctoral program is shown below. I've highlighted in red those courses that I think fit into what would be termed "analysis" or "analytics" courses which  of course are Joel Demski's major research interests and contributions to accountics over the years --- http://www.cba.ufl.edu/fsoa/docs/phd_AccConcentration.pdf

    PREREQUISITES

    ACCOUNTING BACKGROUND

    The Program assumes that new doctoral students have a proficiency in accounting and business similar to that of an undergraduate accounting major. This background does not necessarily require a formal accounting degree, so long as the student can establish a reasonable accounting background (such as a graduate student who has taken several accounting courses in the MBA program). Successful applicants who do not have a sufficient accounting background must take the MBA Accounting sequence and Intermediate Accounting in the coursework phase of the

    Ph.D. program.

    QUANTITATIVE BACKGROUND

    The program assumes that new doctoral students have taken the equivalent of three semesters of calculus and one semester of linear algebra as mathematical background. Entering accounting Ph.D. students who do not have this background can take any necessary courses among the following University of Florida course offerings. We encourage students who do not meet this mathematical background to start taking the needed courses in the summer before starting the program (or earlier if they can take equivalent courses before arriving in Gainesville). Students can complete any needed mathematical courses subsequent to matriculating in the fall.

    • MAC 2311 (or MAC 3472) Analytic Geometry and Calculus 1 (Honors Calculus 1)
       

    • MAC 2313 (or MAC 3473) Analytic Geometry and Calculus 2 (Honors Calculus 2
       

    • MAC 2313 (or MAC 3474) Analytic Geometry and Calculus 3 (Honors Calculus 3)
       

    • MAS 4105 Linear Algebra
       

    • STA 6329 Matrix Algebra and Statistical computing (this most likely is partly analytical and partly inferential)
       

    • ECO 7408 Mathematical Methods and Application to Economics

    ACCOUNTING SEMINARS

    All students must successfully complete the following courses:

    Overview of Accounting Research (first semester) 3

    Archival Research in Accounting 3

    Analytical Research in Accounting 3

    Experimental Research in Accounting 3

    BUSINESS CORE COURSES

    All students must successfully complete or demonstrate that they have completed the

    equivalent of the following courses:

    ECO 7404: Game Theory for Economists 2

    • ECO 7115: Microeconomic Theory 1 3

    • ECO 7113: Information Economics 2

    • FIN 7446: Corporate Finance 4

    • FIN 7447: Asset Pricing 2

    RESEARCH METHODS CORE COURSES

    All students must successfully complete or demonstrate that they have completed the

    equivalent of the following courses:

    • STA 6326: Introduction to Theoretical Statistics I 3

    • STA 6327: Introduction to Theoretical Statistics II 3

    • ECO 7424: Econometric Methods I 3

    • ECO 7426: Econometric Methods II or 3

    ECO 7415: Statistical Methods in Economics or MAR 7636: Research Methods in Marketing can be substituted 12

    SUPPORTING FIELD

    All students must take a minimum of four graduate-level courses (12 credits) in a supporting field, such as finance, economics, decision and information science, mathematics, political science, psychology or sociology.

    OTHER REQUIREMENTS

    1. First Year Summer Project – All students are required to execute a research project in the first summer of matriculation. The first year summer project requires students to replicate and extend, in a minor way, a published accounting paper. The intent of this project is to have the student explore a question, grapple with the data collection and analysis issues, and present the findings. The resulting paper is due no later than October 15th in the Fall semester of the second year. The presentation to the faculty of the first-year summer project constitutes the first year exam.

    2. Second Year Summer Project – All students are required to execute a research project in the second summer of matriculation. The second year project entails completing, presenting, and submitting a paper that demonstrates original thinking. The project is an independent scholarly effort with faculty providing broad, informal guidance. The resulting paper must be presented at a FSOA workshop no later than the end of the Fall semester of the third year.

    3. Teaching Requirement – All students are required to teach a minimum of one semester.

    You can read about Joel's major works at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Joel_Demski
    Most of these works involve mathematical analysis.

    In addition to Joel's extensive bibliography (often in partnership with Jerry Feltham) on accounting analytics, I'm virtually certain that a key component in the accountics program at Florida is the "Economics of Accounting" by Feltham and Christensen that commenced in 2002 with Volume 1 --- Click Here
     

    Product Details

    • Pub. Date of Volume 1: October 2002
    • Publisher: Springer-Verlag New York, LLC
    • Format: Hardcover, 620pp
    • Sales Rank: 588,703

     

    At sales rank 588,703, Volume 1 was not a major money maker, which is probably why only Volume 2 is not available from Amazon and Barnes & Noble. The two volumes are based on lectures notes for two graduate courses on the economic analysis of accounting information in markets and in organizations. The first volume, focusing on markets, looks at the basic role of information in facilitating decisions, public information and private investor information in equity markets, and the disclosure of private owner information in equity and product markets.

     
    Christensen, P.O., Feltham, G.A., Vol. 1, 2002, ISBN 978-1-4020-7229-1, Hardcover, Usually dispatched between 3 to 5 business days ... More
    $185.00
     
    Christensen, P.O., Feltham, G.A., Vol. 1, 2003, ISBN 978-0-387-23932-3, Softcover, Usually dispatched between 3 to 5 business days... More
    $95.00
     
    Christensen, P.O., Feltham, G., Vol. 2, 2005, ISBN 978-0-387-26597-1, Hardcover, Usually dispatched between 3 to 5 business days... More

    There is also a 2004 paperback book (out of print) entitled Economics of Accounting by Peter O. Christensen ---
    Click Here

    You might be interested in the eleven students who graduated from the accountics docotral program at the University of Florida in the "Demski era" --- http://www.cba.ufl.edu/fsoa/programs/phd/former.asp

    Former Ph.D. Students (since Year 2000)

    Degree Name Current Affiliation
    2009 Monika Causholli University of Kentucky
    2009 Liang Fu Oakland University
    2009 Hung Yuan (Richard) Lu California State at Fullerton
    2008 Jimenez, Carlos University of Texas at San Antonio
    2007 MacGregor, Jason Baylor University
    2006 Tian, Jie University of Alberta
    2005 Vlittis, Adamos University of Cyprus
    2004 Drymiotes, George University of Houston
    2004 Nan, Lin Carnegie Mellon
    2000 Blay, Allen D. Florida State University
    2000 Jensen, Kevan University of Oklahoma

    If we divided the very high cost of of one decade of Florida's accountancy doctoral program by 11, the cost per graduate is very high indeed. Of course many of the costs are joint costs among the business administration doctoral program graduates in the various disciplines in Florida's School of Business.

    I did not so much answer your question David as I did point the way on where to look.

    Although I'm all in favor of having some accountics programs (that require a high level of mathematics, econometrics/psychometrics, and mathematical statistics as well as data mining skills), I'm very disappointed that such programs took over all accountancy doctoral programs in North America (with the possible exception of the University of Central Florida).

    The accountics monopoly is, in my viewpoint, the major cause of the extreme shortage of accounting doctoral graduates, because potential applicants from the accounting profession who would like to teach accounting are turned off by having to spend five years or more studying mathematics, econometrics, psychometrics, game theory, agency theory, mathematical information economics, etc. Sadly there is now almost no accounting in the accountics doctoral programs, especially accounting needed to teach professional courses in financial accounting, tax, and auditing at the undergraduate and masters degree levels. Knowledge needed for teaching in those areas must be acquired before entering accounting doctoral programs.

    Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of accountancy doctoral programs can be found at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#DoctoralPrograms


    Accounting Research Course for Undergraduates and Masters Students

    October 18, 2009 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

    I teach a class for our MAcc program titled Accounting Policy and Research, although it is mainly the former. With respect to the latter, I introduce the students to the FASB Codification and they do three major cases that I develop that involve having to research financial accounting issues and prepare reports for a CFO or Partner based on the results of their research. Needless to say, the cases involve issues where there are no clear cut answers and the students must use the Codification, the concepts statements, and practical examples of what other companies have done in somewhat similar situations. I also insist that their reports comment on related audit, tax, and broader business issues and not be limited to just what they believe to be the "correct" GAAP answer.

    Denny Beresford

    October 18, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen

    First I want to point out that the FASB Codification database is now included in Comperio such that if your college gets access to Comperio, you may not need the AAA site license. Also the IASB library is included in Comperio such that no added purchases in international licenses is required. Of course Comperio a very comprehensive research library and costly accounting research library --- http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/comperio/index.jhtml

    Whether your company reports under US GAAP, IFRS, or both, Comperio's recently enhanced functionality offers you the ability to navigate both sets of financial reporting requirements using one accounting research tool. That tool gives you access to the same PwC interpretive guidance our own professional audit staff uses.

    If you can see this page, you can use Comperio—there’s no software to install: just go to the Comperio Web site and start researching! Content covers the FASB, EITF, AICPA, IASB, IFAC, PCAOB, SEC, FASAB and GASB, as well as the requirements of eight key countries from around the world. Plus, we've added the FASB’s new Accounting Standards Codification, which was launched in July 2009 as the single source of authoritative US accounting standards.

    If the course on “accounting research” is to be much like a law school course on “legal research,” it should focus on where to find answers. Denny suggested, among other things, teaching students how to use the FASB Codification database.

    As an extension, I recommend teaching students how to use PwC’s Comperio Virtual Library of Accounting Research --- http://www.pwc.com/gx/en/comperio/index.jhtml
    The biggest problem is the cost of a multi-user site license, although at Trinity University our program was so small that we could teach some of the basics with a single-user site license (which is not restricted to a given user, but does restrict the use to one user at a time).

    Such a course could also include some tax research if the tax courses are finding it cumbersome to teach both tax and tax research. Your college probably already has at least one tax research license such as CCH.

  • Since it is so common in the profession to use search engines, perhaps some attention could be given to “how scholars conduct searches” ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Searchh.htm#Scholars
    Most definitely the above link should be studied by doctoral students. However, undergraduates might also learn some of the basics of scholarly search.

    Bob Jensen


    "Deloitte Revenues Grow 1% Local Currency, Now Just Behind PricewaterhouseCoopers," Big Four Blog, October 26, 2009 --- http://bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/2009/10/deloitte-revenues-grow-1-local-currency.html

    Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, the global firm, just came out with its fiscal 2009 revenues for the year ending May 31, 2009. 2009 full year global revenue was US$26.1 billion, an actual increase in local currency terms of 1%, but a drop of 4.9% in US dollar terms from 2008. The tough economic climate and appreciating US dollar were the two main factors in 2009 which impacted Deloitte as much as it did other Big Four firms. However, a 1% growth in local currency bested both

    E&Y (0.2% increase in local currency
    http://bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/2009/09/ernst-young-external-challenges-drive.html ) and

    PwC (0.2% increase in local currency
    http://bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/2009/10/pwc-fy-2009-revenues-rise-modestly-from.html ).
    KPMG is yet to report its 2009 results, as its year ends in September 30, 2009.

    Despite this remarkable performance, Deloitte was unable to beat PwC to be the largest Big Four firm on the planet. Its 2009 revenues of $26.1 billion were behind PwC’s 2009 revenues of $26.2 billion by only $100 million or 0.4%. We indicated in our earlier post that a 4.5% decrease in Deloitte’s revenues in US$ terms would make it the largest among the Big4 firms. But this is only a statistical miss. By showing remarkable performance in 2009, arguably one of the toughest environments in recent memory, Deloitte has shown that it is a strong contender for the leadership position.

    “Achieving positive growth in this exceptionally difficult economic environment was the result of close attention to the needs of clients and a strong commitment to professional excellence by our member firm professionals. Despite the tough economy, we remain focused on our vision to be the standard of excellence and will continue to invest in pursuit of this vision,” said Jim Quigley, CEO of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu

    By service line, Consulting was the fastest grower at 7.3% in local currency terms. In US$ terms, Consulting revenue grew 2% from $6.3 billion in 2008 to $6.5 billion in 2009. Audit was relatively flat against 2008 in local currency terms. In US$ terms, Audit shrank by 6.4% from $12.7 billion to $11.9 billion. Tax was also relatively flat against 2008 in local currency terms. In US$ terms, Tax revenues decreased by 5.5% from $6.0 billion to $5.7 billion. Financial Advisory Services revenue fell 6.1% in local currency terms, but in US$ terms, fell by 13.8% from $2.4 billion in 2008 to $2.0 billion in 2009, driven by lower M&A activity.

    In terms of geography, Americas dropped 3.7% in US$ terms from $12.9 billion in 2008 to $12.5 billion in 2009. Europe, Middle East and Africa also dropped 9.0% in US$ terms from $11.3 billion in 2008 to $10.2 billion in 2009. Asia Pacific grew 4.7% in US$ terms from $3.2 billion in 2008 to $3.4 billion in 2009.

    The Asia Pacific region had local currency growth of 7.6% and was the fastest-growing region for the fifth consecutive year. India grew 29.9%, Australia grew 11.5% and Japan grew 11.3% in local currency terms. Europe, Middle East, and Africa region (EMEA) grew 2% but Americas declined 1.3% in local currency. Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America and the Caribbean posted high growth of 21.3%, 15.6% and 13.7% respectively, in local currency.

    Deloitte said that its aggregate compounded annual growth rate (CAGR) was 9.4 percent from 2005-2009 and 14.7 percent from 2005-2008, 2009 bringing an abrupt stop to a remarkable growth rate.

    Employment at Deloitte was a bright spot, during 2009, the firm hired more than 40,000 professionals. The workforce now stands at 168,651 people globally, representing a 4.5% (7,351) increase from 161,300 in 2008. Assuming 32,649 left the firm for the net to increase, the attrition rate comes out to be 20% in 2009 (32,649/161,300).


    "Phishing Scam Spooked FBI Director Off E-Banking," by Brian Krebs, The Washington Post, October 9, 2009 ---
    Click Here

    In announcing a crackdown on "phishing" e-mail scams that netted one of the FBI's largest cyber crime cases ever, FBI Director Robert Mueller on Wednesday offered a candid revelation: A personal close call with a phishing scam has kept his family away from online banking altogether.

    Addressing the Commonwealth Club of California in San Francisco, Mueller spoke at length about the insidiousness of cyber crime, and how cyber criminals had affected him personally.

    Not long ago, the head one of our nation's domestic agencies received an e-mail purporting to be from his bank. It looked perfectly legitimate, and asked him to verify some information. He started to follow the instructions, but then realized this might not be such a good idea.

    It turned out that he was just a few clicks away from falling into a classic Internet "phishing" scam--"phishing" with a "P-H." This is someone who spends a good deal of his professional life warning others about the perils of cyber crime. Yet he barely caught himself in time.

    He definitely should have known better. I can say this with certainty, because it was me.

    After changing all our passwords, I tried to pass the incident off to my wife as a "teachable moment." To which she replied: "It is not my teachable moment. However, it is our money. No more Internet banking for you!"

    So with that as a backdrop, today I want to talk about the nature of cyber threats, the FBI's role in combating them, and finally, how we can help each other to keep them at bay.

    Mueller's comments are an interesting contrast to the views expressed by the former director of the FBI's cyber division, James Finch, who said he wasn't going to let cyber thugs deprive him of the efficiencies and convenience that online banking have to offer.

    The following is an excerpt from an interview I had with Finch last August:

    Q: Do you do online banking?

    A: Yes, I do.

    Q: How long have you been doing that?

    A: Maybe 10 years?

    Q: And you don't get freaked out by what you see every day? I certainly do.

    A: Yeah, so does my wife. I do online banking. I pay my bills online. I file my taxes online. I truly believe in the Internet. Do I believe it's a scary place? Without a doubt. I'm in law enforcement, and I run the cyber division for the FBI. I don't want to say that I'm so intimidated by the bad guys that I am going to allow them to dictate taking full advantage of what I consider to be the benefits of the Internet. Yes, there are people who are targeting online bank accounts on a regular basis, but not to the point where it's going to cause me to stop using it.

     

    As a consumer, having your online banking account credentials stolen -- either via phishing or through password-stealing malicious software -- can be a harrowing experience, but it is usually not a costly one. The federal Electronic Funds Transfer Act ("Regulation E"), limits consumer liability for unauthorized transactions to $50, provided notice is given within 10 business days, or to $500 provided notice is given within 60 business days. Even so, retail banks often will work to make whole those customers who are victims of cyber fraud.

    On the other hand, business that bank online enjoy hardly any such protection. The precise obligations of a commercial bank and their business customers are spelled out in the agreement that those companies sign, but generally business customers agree to notify their bank of any suspicious or unauthorized transactions on the same day that the transaction in question occurs. Even then, there is no guarantee that the bank will be able to block or reverse any fraudulent transfers.

    Regardless of whether you bank online as a consumer or business customer, here are a few recommendations to help avoid becoming a victim of cyber thieves.

    -Do not click on links or attachments in unsolicited e-mail.

    -Junk any e-mail communications that claims to come from your bank alerting you that you need to sign in or update your information. Due to threats like phishing e-mails, few banks use this medium any more to communicate with customers. But If you find yourself wondering whether an e-mail you received really was about a problem with your account, pick up the phone and call your bank.

    -Keep your computer, Web browser and other software up-to-date with the latest software security updates: Many data-stealing malware threats arrive via hacked Web sites that leverage outdated or insecure browser plug-ins.

    -Keep a close eye on your checking and savings account balances. Notify your bank immediately of any suspicious charges.

    A copy of Director Mueller's remarks is available here.

    Bob Jensen's phishing threads are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/000start.htm#SpecialSection

    Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm


    "The Shorter, Faster, Cheaper MBA Accelerated MBA programs of a year or less are gaining in popularity, but critics say they're not right for everyone and may leave some students shortchanged, Business Week, October 15. 2009 ---
    http://www.businessweek.com/bschools/content/oct2009/bs20091015_554659.htm?link_position=link1 

    Schools in the U.S. are already responding to the demand from students for alternatives. One school starting a new program is Rutgers Business School (Rutgers Full-Time MBA Profile), which is launching a one-year MBA program in the summer of 2010. The school has offered a two-year MBA program on its Newark (N.J.) campus for years, but never offered a one-year program, says Susan Gilbert, Rutgers' associate dean of MBA programs, who was asked by the school to explore options for a new MBA program on the school's New Brunswick campus.

    While researching, she reviewed applicant data from the past few years and unearthed a surprising discovery; about 40% of the applicants to the school's two-year MBA program already held undergraduate business degrees and were likely up to speed on the concepts typically covered in first-year core MBA courses. Adding a one-year MBA program to the school's degree offerings seemed to make sense, Gilbert says, with the idea that the program would cater to these more experienced applicants. "There's a growing niche segment of students who aren't making as big of a career switch." Gilbert says. "They want their MBAs in a hurry in order to advance their career in the field and function that they are already in."

    Uptick in Enrollments

    Schools that already offer one-year MBA programs say they are starting to reap the rewards of catering to this new market of students. At Utah State University's Jon M. Huntsman School of Business, which has offered a one-year MBA for more than a decade, enrollment is at 56 students this fall, up from 43 last year. In fact, this year's class was so big that the first-year cohort couldn't fit into the classroom where lectures are typically held and had to move into the school's larger 80-person capacity classroom, says Ken Snyder, Huntsman's director of MBA programs.

    Continued in article

    Jensen Comment
    There are lots of pressures for change in academe, but shortening the MBA program to one year or less is not the type of change I advocate in any way, shape, or form. When other professions like medicine are adding to the education requirements, cheapening the MBA degree is not a good idea for status as a profession.

    I graduated from a one-year MBA program a hundred years ago and found it to be almost a joke. It got me out of a few business courses when I commenced a doctoral program in accountancy, but aside from that I think it did little for preparing me for a career in business. Of course, in Colorado in those days you could take the CPA examination as a senior majoring in accountancy. Hence, I entered the MBA program with the CPA exam already under my belt. In those days, an MBA degree in accountancy in Colorado also substituted for work experience, which made getting a license to practice in Colorado an even bigger joke (if I had not also worked in auditing and tax at Ernst and Ernst in Denver).

    The proof of the pudding so to is said to be placement. If recruiters are offering jobs to one-year MBA graduates then some might deem the education program to be a success. However, this can be misleading. Some one-year MBA programs cater to military officers or other applicants who are not seeking immediate changes in their jobs upon graduation. Recruiters may also have other agendas such as badly wanting to hire a top engineer or hospital administrator who just happened to get a one-year MBA degree before seeking a new job. And recruitment can be motivated by affirmative action that sometimes leads to hiring of graduates that were short changed in education.

    I am most definitely opposed to giving course credit or shortened degree programs to students with "work or other qualified life experience." By age 25, all God's children got "life experience." This in no way, shape, or form is a substitute for earned college credits --- well, er, maybe I could be convinced otherwise in a very unique circumstance, but as a general rule --- never!

    For MBA applicants who majored in business as undergraduates I would allow waiving some core courses, but I would insist on substituting other courses.

    Bob Jensen's thread on higher education controversies are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/HigherEdControversies.htm


    An Enron-Magnitude Fraud Involving Ernst & Young in Hong Kong
    It is quite rare for auditors of international CPA firms to be arrested for criminal conduct

    "KPMG (U.K.) accountancy chief fiddled £545,000 to pay for his new wife's luxury tastes," by Julie Moult, Daily Mail, August 26, 2009 --- Click Here

    Many of the criminal complaints concern tax shelter promotions by accounting firms. Thirteen of 17 KPMG employees had charges eventually dropped in the most famous of tax shelter cases, although others had earlier confessed to their crimes ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#KPMG


    Seven people including the former chief executive and chairman of accounting firm BDO Seidman LLP have been charged criminally in an allegedly fraudulent tax-shelter scheme that generated billions of dollars in false tax losses for clients --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#BDO
    "Former BDO Seidman vice chair pleads guilty to tax fraud," AccountingWeb, March 20, 2009 ---
    http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=107235 

    Another exception was where Andersen eventually folded after disclosure that the Houston office illegally destroyed records sought by the court.

     

    Edmund Dang, an Ernst & Young Hong Kong partner who was previously a manager on the Akai audit, was arrested on suspicion of forgery.

    "Ernst & Young chief steps down Ernst & Young chief steps down amid probe," by Enoch Yiu, Naomi Rovnick and Clifford Lo, Lexis/Nexis News, October 1, 2009 --- Click Here

    The Hong Kong and China chairman of Ernst & Young, whose Hong Kong offices were raided on Tuesday by the police in connection with a fraud probe, has stepped down from his post.

    Ernst & Young told the firm's partners yesterday in an e-mail that David Sun Tak-kei had relinquished his position. He will remain a partner with the firm and keep his o