Table of Contents
FBI Corporate Fraud Hotline (Toll Free)
888-622-0177
Large Public Accounting Firm Lawsuits
Carl Olson's CPA Watch ---
http://cpawatch.org/index.htm
What has gone wrong with CPA auditors? ---
http://cpawatch.org/CPAsGoneWrong.htm
Huron Consulting Group Book Cooking Scandal
Helpers for Courses on Fraud and Forensic
Accounting
The Fate of the Large Auditing Firms After
the 2008 Banking Meltdown
The Enron, Andersen, and Worldcom Scandal Modules Have Been
Moved to ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm
Bob Jensen's Enron Quiz (and answers) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnronQuiz.htm
Daily News Sites for Accountancy, Tax, Fraud, IFRS, XBRL, Accounting History,
and More ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AccountingNews.htm
Business Ethics ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Business_ethics
Lots of Good Links
Introductory Quotations
Creative Earnings Management, Agency Theory, and Accounting
Manipulations to Cook the Books ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation
Forensic Accounting
Cooking
the Books
Fraud Updates and Other Updates to the Accounting and Finance
Scandals ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Commercial
Scholarly Journals and Monopoly Publishers Are Ripping Off Libraries and Scholars
Rotten
to the Core: Mutual Fund, Media, Investment Banking Scandals, and Security
Analysis Frauds ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Media Coverage is Very,
Very Good and Very, Very Bad
From Enron to Earnings Reports, How Reliable is the Media's Coverage?
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Media
The Andersen, Enron, and WorldCom
Scandals
The Saga of Auditor Professionalism and
Independence
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
How to Improve Audit Reports
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
Risk-Based Auditing Under Attack
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
What's Right and What's
Wrong With (SPEs), SPVs, and VIEs ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Accounting Scandals
The funny thing is that I never looked up this item before now. Jim Mahar noted
that it is a good link.
Accounting Scandals ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Accounting_scandals
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting scandals are in various documents:
Accounting Firms ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
Fraud Conclusion ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
Enron ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm
Rotten to the Core ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Fraud Updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
American History of Fraud ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudAmericanHistory.htm
Fraud in General ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Future
of Auditing --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#FutureOfAuditing
Fraud Detection and Reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
American
History of Fraud --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm
Daily News Sites for Accountancy, Tax, Fraud, IFRS, XBRL,
Accounting History, and More ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AccountingNews.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on ethics and accounting education are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm#AccountingEducation
The Saga of Aud itor
Professionalism and Independence ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on great
minds in management are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/00overview/GreatMinds.htm
Incompetent and Corrupt Audits are Routine ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm#IncompetentAudits
Computer Fraud Casebook: The Bytes that Bite ---
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2009/Sep/BookshelfReview3.htm
Richard Campbell notes a nice white collar crime blog edited by some law
professors ---
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/whitecollarcrime_blog/
Lexis Nexis Fraud Prevention Site ---
http://risk.lexisnexis.com/prevent-fraud
From the AICPA
Overview of Certified in Financial Forensics (CFF) Credential ---
Click Here
http://www.aicpa.org/InterestAreas/ForensicAndValuation/Membership/Pages/Overview
Certified in Financial Forensics Credential.aspx
Accounting Professor Blogs
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ListServRoles.htm
Example
FraudBytes (Mark Zimbelman) ---
http://fraudbytes.blogspot.com/
2011 PCAOB Standards and Related Rules
Published by the AICPA
http://www.cpa2biz.com/AST/Main/CPA2BIZ_Primary/AuditAttest/Standards/PCAOBStandards/PRDOVR~PC-057207/PC-057207.jsp
Accounting Humor
Although somewhat dated, Corporate Scandal provides a nice summary of
many of the recent scandals ---
http://www.econstats.com/scandal.htm
Investor Protection Trust ---
http://www.investorprotection.org/
This site provides teaching materials.
The Investor
Protection Trust provides independent, objective information to help
consumers make informed investment decisions. Founded in 1993 as part of a
multi-state settlement to resolve charges of misconduct, IPT serves as an
independent source of non-commercial investor education materials. IPT
operates programs under its own auspices and uses grants to underwrite
important initiatives carried out by other organizations.
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud
prevention and fraud reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
Bob Jensen's personal finance
helpers ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm#InvestmentHelpers
Legal Research References
Daily News Sites for Accountancy, Tax, Fraud, IFRS, XBRL, Accounting
History, and More ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AccountingNews.htm
March 13, 2010 message from David Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
I know that most Big4
lawsuits are settled out of court. Is there anyplace on the web a listing of
Big 4 lawsuits?
Although it might be argued
that settling is a business decision, I think a settlement is a symbolic
defeat by the CPA firm.
David Albrecht
March 14, 2010 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi
David,
Lawyers are going to use their very expensive legal research databases. A
list of sources in the U.S. is provided in
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_Research
I
know of no free Web reference that records all criminal and civil actions
where a Big Four firm is a defendant.
Big Four lawsuits can arise in over 100 nations (recently one of the largest
actions in history was filed in Hong Kong, where the Ernst & Young partner
in charge was actually jailed) ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#Ernst
The Audit
Analytics database has a lot of the auditor lawsuits classified by year ---
http://www.auditanalytics.com/
Examples for 2006 are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AuditingFirmLitigationNov2006.pdf
In
the U.S. there are both state and federal jurisdictions. And there can be
individual or class action lawsuits brought by plaintiffs. One of the better
sources for federal securities class action lawsuits is the Stanford
University Law School Federal Class Action Clearinghouse ---
http://securities.stanford.edu/
But this by no means covers most of the lawsuits against large auditing
firms. In fact, the database has surprisingly few hits for Big Four firms.
Many of the SEC lawsuits are not in this database.
Keep in mind that auditors are usually secondary in lawsuits with their
clients being the primary defendants. Most of the lawsuits are probably
filed in the state where a corporate client is licensed as a corporation,
which gives Delaware a lot of lawsuits.
For the past ten years I’ve tried to keep tidbits on the highly publicized
lawsuits involving large auditing firms ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Interestingly, auditing firms sometimes win in courts, as recently happened
when Ernst & Young emerged as a winner.
For lawsuits dealing with derivative financial instruments I also have a
tidbit timeline at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
Of
course the lawyers are going to use their very expensive legal research
databases. A list of sources in the U.S. is provided in
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Legal_Research
I
don’t have time at the moment, but it would be interesting to see how much
PwC provides in the Comperio database. Since this database is heavily used
by clients, my guess is that Comperio is not a good source for searching
auditor lawsuits.
There are also instances where an auditing firm is a plaintiff, usually
where it is suing a former client.
There can also be criminal cases like the recent case where the managing
partner of PwC in England was charged with stealing money from PwC to pay
for the luxurious tastes of his mistress ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm#PwC
Bob Jensen
March 14, 2010 reply from Orenstein, Edith
[eorenstein@FINANCIALEXECUTIVES.ORG]
Some
limited data regarding litigation for the six largest audit firms (U.S. data
only, as of 2007) was provided by the Center for Audit Quality (CAQ) - an
affiliate of the AICPA, in reports to the
U.S. Treasury Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP).
For example,
among
CAQ's reports to ACAP,
CAQ's Jan. 23, 2008 report to ACAP included a section on
Litigation. A caveat in the CAQ report states:
"Information regarding litigation is highly sensitive, because of the risk
that the data could be used
unfairly against a firm in litigation. For these reasons, the data presented
in this report were gathered from the six audit firms and aggregated (the
data relate only to claims against the six U.S. firms and do not include
claims in U.S. courts against any non-U.S. firms that are members of the
same networks). To prevent "reverse engineering" of the data to tie specific
facts to a specific lawsuit or firm, the data have been grouped - for
example, aggregating data from several different years. The litigation data
discussed in this report do not include information relating to government
inquiries, investigations, or enforcement actions.31" [Footnote 31 in the
CAQ report states: "2007 litigation data in this report reflect submissions
by five firms of information as of December 20, 2007 and by one firm of
information as of November 30, 2007."]
Additionally,
CAQ's Second Supplement to ACAP (4/16/08) included data on private
actions and shareholder class actions.
Treasury's
ACAP published its
final report in 2008; here is related summary in
FEI blog.
Edith
Orenstein
Director of Accounting Policy Analysis and Communications
Financial Executives International (FEI)
1250 Headquarters Plaza, West Tower, 7th Floor
Morristown, NJ 07932
(973) 765-1046
eorenstein@financialexecutives.org
web:
www.financialexecutives.org
blog:
www.financialexecutives.blogspot.com
twitter:
www.twitter.com/feiblog
March
14,2010 message from Francine McKenna
[retheauditors@GMAIL.COM]
Dave,
I try to keep up
as best I can on litigation against the auditors. It's not easy since I am
not an attorney and do not have access to their databases. I depend of the
"kindness of lawyer strangers" to help me often.
It's not easy
since auditors are often one of many defendants in a class action lawsuit ,
for example. Often news reports or other blog posts do not include all the
defendants if auditors are not the focus of the story. Which they are often
not. Which is why my site is useful.
I look at the
lists compiled by Kevin LaCroix on his site DandODiary.com of securities
litigation and class action suits, Francis Pileggi of DelawareLitigation.com
also mentions suits against or by auditors (as in the Deloitte suit against
their own Vice Chairman ) when they make it to Delaware Chancery Court. They
both keep an eye out for me now and it was Frans=cis who alerted me to both
the judgement against Deloitte's Flanagan and the recent "in pari delicto"
case against pwC.
I also use a site
called Justia to look for all other suits against the firms, often focused
on suits in Federal Courts.
http://dockets.justia.com/
The Stanford Law
School database is also useful for getting the actual filings and documents.
http://securities.stanford.edu/
Interestingly PwC
does a great job tracking everyone else's 10b-5 litigation - except their
own. You will never see auditor litigation broken out in their report. ---
http://10b5.pwc.com/public/Default.aspx
Bob is right to
say that there's a whole slew of suits, at times very large and important
that are outside of the US, such as the ones in Hong Kong against EY. For
that I count on Google Alerts (and my blog readers) to alert me, sometimes
at odd hours of the night, of new developments.
http://retheauditors.com/category/auditor-litigation/
http://retheauditors.com/2009/07/11/mckenna-on-auditor-litigation-securities-dockets-mid-year-update/
fm
Carl Olson's CPA Watch ---
http://cpawatch.org/index.htm
What has gone wrong with CPA auditors? ---
http://cpawatch.org/CPAsGoneWrong.htm
"Audit Flaws Revealed, at Long Last,"
by Floyd Norris, The New York Times, October 20, 2011 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/21/business/deloittes-failings-revealed-but-only-after-3-years.html?_r=1
Thank you Beryl Simonson for the heads up.
With hindsight, we
now know that auditors in 2007 should have been looking carefully at bank
books.
They should have
drilled into allowances for loan losses, and they should have been
especially alert for signs that the banks were playing games when they sold
loans. Auditors should have carefully reviewed how the banks were valuing
their mortgage-backed securities and loans that they planned to sell.
It won’t surprise
you to learn that in at least one case, the auditor seems to have done a
pretty poor job.
What may be
surprising is that the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board figured
that out at the time, and was harshly critical of Deloitte & Touche, one of
the Big Four audit firms, for not doing the work to check assumptions in
those areas and for being overly reliant on whatever the bank’s management
said was proper.
Those comments were
made after the board’s inspectors reviewed Deloitte’s audit of a bank’s 2006
results, as part of the annual inspection of the firm. The inspection of 61
Deloitte audits concluded in November 2007.
Had the auditor
taken the criticism to heart, it might have gone back in and checked more
thoroughly.
But it did not.
The bank was not
named in the report, even in the previously confidential part released this
week.
I thought it might
have been Washington Mutual, a Deloitte client that collapsed in September
2008, but Deloitte says that was not the case.
Deloitte, in its
response to the board, stated that at the bank, “the audit procedures
performed, the conclusions reached and the related documentation were
appropriate in the circumstances.”
In other words,
Deloitte concluded the board simply did not understand what it was talking
about.
All that became
public in early 2008, when the censored version of the board’s report became
public. But it was little remarked on at the time. Now we have seen the rest
of the report, and it is even more critical.
The report said its
inspections indicated “a firm culture that allows, or tolerates, audit
approaches that do not consistently emphasize the need for an appropriate
level of critical analysis and collection of objective evidence, and that
rely largely on management representations.”
Deloitte responded
by denying almost everything. It did not like the “second guessing” shown by
the regulators. It said “we strongly take exception” to the observation
about its culture, which it said was simply wrong.
In any case, the
firm concluded, “there were only a limited number of instances,” not nearly
enough to justify questioning Deloitte’s quality controls.
The board
inspectors found problems in 27 of the 61 Deloitte audits.
The Sarbanes-Oxley
law that established the board included provisions to protect the public
images of audit firms. If a board inspection found problems with the quality
control systems, that was to be kept confidential unless the firm did not
move to fix the problems over the following year. Then the release could be
delayed while the firm tried to persuade the board to keep the information
private. If that effort failed, the firm could appeal to the Securities and
Exchange Commission.
Only then could the
report be made public. So in this case, it took 41 months from the issuance
of the report — more than three years — for Deloitte’s clients to learn of
the problem.
The board
also has the authority to file enforcement actions against auditors, but
those, too, are private until the S.E.C. rules on an appeal. It is as if
charges of robbery had to be kept confidential until all appeals had been
completed. There is no way to know if the accounting board has taken action
against anyone. An auditor that the board deems to be in violation of rules
may keep working for years while secret proceedings continue.
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Norris is not telling us subscribers on the AECM anything we've not already
stated before. But it's important for the world to know more about the warts of
CPA auditors.
I myself have repeatedly hit the
failure of audit firms to properly insist on realistic loan losses in my threads
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm#AuditFirms
My archives of CPA lawsuits on these issues are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
My all-time heroes
Frank Partnoy and Lynn Turner contend that Wall Street bank accounting is an
exercise in writing fiction: Watch the video! (a bit slow loading) Lynn Turner
is Partnoy's co-author of the white paper "Make Markets Be Markets" "Bring
Transparency to Off-Balance Sheet Accounting," by Frank Partnoy, Roosevelt
Institute, March 2010 ---
http://makemarketsbemarkets.org/modals/report_off.php
Recently I wrote the following tidbit
about audit reform:
If audit reform swaggered into a Luckenbach, Texas saloon, it would be "all
hat and no horse"
The ladies of the night would die laughing at that "itty-bitty thang" that
walked in
And it would need a ladder to peek over the top of the spittoon
"Recent Comments On European and U.S. Audit Reform," by Francine
McKenna, re:TheAuditors, October 4, 2011 ---
http://retheauditors.com/2011/10/04/recent-comments-on-european-and-u-s-audit-reform/
The topic of audit industry reform is hot again.
OK, that’s relative to where you stand on what’s hot. But in the world of
legal and regulatory compliance and auditors the only thing hotter would be
a significant development in the
New York Attorney General’s case against Ernst & Young.
Here in the U.S. the PCAOB has been busy. I’ll
give them – mostly Chairman James Doty and the Investor Advisory Group led
by Board Member Steve Harris – credit for that. The Investor Advisory Group
– rather, the boldest amongst them – recently sent
a letter to the PCAOB to provide comments on the
PCAOB’s June 21, 2011 Concept Release entitled Possible Revisions to
PCAOB Standards Related to Reports on Audited Financial Statements and
Related Amendments to PCAOB Standards.
It is worth noting that a number of other
parties agree that the current form of the auditor’s report fails to
meet the legitimate needs of investors. First, the U.S. Treasury
Advisory Committee on the Auditing Profession (ACAP) called for the
PCAOB to undertake a standard-setting initiative to consider
improvements to the standard audit report. The ACAP members support “…
improving the content of the auditor’s report beyond the current
pass/fail model to include a more relevant discussion about the audit of
the financial statements.”
Second, surveys conducted by the CFA Institute
in 2008 and 2010 indicate that research analysts want auditors to
communicate more information in their reports.
Finally, even leaders of the accounting
profession have acknowledged that the audit report needs to become more
relevant. In testimony before ACAP, Dennis Nally, Chairman of PwC
International stated, “It’s not difficult to imagine a world where the …
trend to fair value measurement — lead one to consider whether it is
necessary to change the content of the auditor’s report to be more
relevant to the capital markets and its various stakeholders.”
Finally, leaders of the accounting profession
have previously stated that changes to the audit report should reflect
investor preferences. In their 2006 White Paper, the CEOs of the six
largest accounting firms stated, “The new (reporting) model should be
driven by the wants of investors and other users of company
information …” (their emphasis).
Before we turn to a discussion of the IAG
investor survey, we believe it is important to underscore the
fundamental but often overlooked fact that the issuer’s investors,
not its audit committee or management team or the company itself, are
the auditor’s client. It is therefore not only appropriate, but
essential, that investors’ views and preferences take center stage as
the PCAOB considers possible changes to the format and content of the
audit report.
In the meantime, I’ve written two articles about
the proposals on auditor regulation before the European Commission.
In Forbes, I told you not to count on
Europe to reform the audit model or auditors, in general.
The audit industry is reportedly under siege in
Europe and on the verge of being broken up, restrained, and rotated
until all the good profit is spun out.
This is neither a foregone conclusion nor
highly likely.
The European Commission’s internal markets
commissioner Michel Barnier is talking tough, but the rhetoric should be
no surprise to those who have been following the European response to
the financial crisis closely…
Please read the rest at Forbes.com,
“Don’t Count On Europe To Reform Auditors And Accounting”.
In American Banker, I focused on the
impact of auditor reforms on financial services. Why is the European
Commission taking such strong action now? Why is the U.S. lagging so far
behind?
The clamor for accountability from the auditors
for financial crisis failures and losses has been much louder, much
stronger, and going on much longer in the U.K. and Europe, than in the
United States. Barnier’s most dramatic proposals are viewed by most
commenters as a reaction to the bank failures. “Auditors play an
essential role in financial markets: financial actors need to be able to
trust their statements,” Barnier told the Financial
Times. “There are weaknesses in the way
the audit sector works today. The crisis highlighted them.”
There’s is a concern on both sides of the
Atlantic over long-standing auditor relationships.
The average auditor tenure for the largest 100
U.S. companies by market cap is 28 years. The U.S. accounting regulator,
the PCAOB, highlighted the auditor tenure trap in its recent Concept
Release on Auditor Independence and Auditor Rotation. According to The
Independent, quoting a recent House of
Lords report, only one of the FTSE 100 index’s members uses a non-Big
Four firm and the average relationship lasts 48 years. Some of the U.S.
bailout recipients — General Motors, AIG, Goldman Sachs, Citigroup — and
crisis failure Lehman had as
long or longer relationships with their
auditors…
Please read the rest at American Banker,
“Bank Debacles Drive Europe to Raise the Bar on Audits”.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on
auditor professionalism and independence are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
College Business Officers Hear a
Fraud Detective's Cautionary Tales of True Crime," by Scott Carlson,
Chronicle of Higher Education, June 12, 2011 ---
http://chronicle.com/article/College-Business-Officers-Hear/128205/
It's not often that
a conference session feels like a true-crime show. And yet Angela Morelock,
a forensic accountant with the accounting firm BKD, delivered material like
that and more in a talk here that detailed the bad, the really bad, and the
mind-bogglingly bad in the fraud and embezzlement cases that her firm has
investigated.
Her presentation
was designed to educate administrators, gathered here at the annual meeting
of the National Association of College and University Business Officers,
about common fraud scams and patterns that might indicate something is
wrong.
But before going
into the statistics, she posted on a screen a ditty, scribbled out by, and
found in the office of, a fraud perpetrator in the accounting office of a
pharmacy chain: "Oh, what a tangled web we weave when first we practice to
deceive. But once we've practiced for a while, oh my, how we've improved our
style!"
"Fraud cases, every
single time, are hindsight 20/20," she said. "It's a little bit amazing to
me—the subtle clues, the small things, that we will miss. Tell me how this
hangs in the cubicle of someone in an accounting department for an extended
period of time without someone asking about it."
That was one of the
big takeaways from Ms. Morelock's talk: Fraud perpetrators will leave
lifestyle clues that they are up to no good. In her experience, criminals
tend to follow recognizable patterns. They like to give gifts, and they are
compulsive shoppers. Gambling problems are common among them.
They tend to be
long-term employees, who start small and rationalize their thefts over time.
They can be male or female, but statistics say that the big losses usually
happen with more-educated, high-ranking employees. That is in part because
there are all sorts of checks and controls on the financial transactions
handled by low-level employees, whom some assume to be more prone to fraud
and theft. However, the supervisors of those employees are often not
subjected to the same controls and scrutiny, opening a window for abuse. Ms.
Morelock told of a supervisor at one business who collected the cash drawers
from various clerks, and took one home every day for 10 years, until she had
collected $1.3-million.
And then there are
the things that just don't add up, Ms. Morelock said, and she related
another of her many war stories: A bookkeeper at a church organization went
on vacation, and a diamond certificate in her name arrived at her work,
which set off alarm bells. Right off the bat, Ms. Morelock found that the
employee, who was making $45,000 a year, had purchased a $390,000 house,
which her co-workers knew about.
The employee had
paid for the house in cash, skimmed off of the organization. And she bought
a lot more, like big-screen TV's, video games, and appliances. "These
lifestyle clues are the best early warning signs," Ms. Morelock said.
Schemes Involving Vendors
One common
oversight, where fraud dwells, is where employees choose vendors. "That
power, to be the one who chooses the vendor, is a significant power that we
often don't focus on enough," Ms. Morelock said. "That is where fake
vendors, conflicts of interests, kickback schemes, and straw-vendor schemes
originate."
Here is how a
straw-vendor scheme works, based on another real case: A graphic designer
can pick a printer for his work with an organization. He sets up his friend,
who is not a printer, as the vendor and places printing orders through the
friend. The friend goes out and finds a real printer to handle the actual
printing. The friend gets the job printed and bills the organization at an
inflated price, and the organization pays. Then the graphic designer and his
friend pay the printer's lower cost, and split the profits.
For Ms. Morelock,
the case proves that you can find fraud in the most unlikely corners of an
organization. "Most of us would look a graphic designer and think, What kind
of fraud risk could that person possibly be?" she said. In the case Ms.
Morelock uncovered, the graphic designer and his friend netted $600,000 in
their five-year scam.
Fraud cases in
higher education tend to be lower than in other organizations, she pointed
out, but certain parts of higher education have been more troublesome. "We
have seen a lot of athletic-department scams recently, that go everywhere
from travel expenses and ATM cards to misuse of booster funds," she said.
"Although many organizations consider booster funds to be separate from the
college or university, guess whose name hits the front page of the paper
when there is a problem?" she said. She also alluded to a ticket-scalping
scandal that has plagued the University of Kansas.
Continued in this article
Jensen Comment
Frauds and thefts can take place even
where we least expect ti.
Church and School Embezzlement
---
http://churchembezzlement.blogspot.com/
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Federal securities class action
lawsuits increased 19 percent in 2008, with almost half involving firms in the
financial services sector according to the annual report prepared by the
Stanford Law School Securities Class Action Clearinghouse in cooperation with
Cornerstone Research ---
http://securities.stanford.edu/scac_press/20080106_YIR08_Press_Release.pdf
Especially note the 2008 Year in Review link at
http://securities.stanford.edu/clearinghouse_research/2008_YIR/20080106.pdf
COSO
Releases Latest Fraud Study.
May 21, 2010 ---
http://financialexecutives.blogspot.com/2010/05/sec-fasb-pcaob-testimony-posted-for.html
Yesterday,
COSO
announced
the release of a new research study,
Fraudulent Financial Reporting: 1998-2007, that
examines 347 alleged accounting fraud cases identified by a review of U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) Accounting and Auditing Enforcement
Releases (AAER's) issued over a ten-year period ending December 31, 2007.
The COSO Fraud Study updates COSO's previous 10-year
study of fraud and was led by the same core academic research team as COSO's
previous Fraud Study.
COSO's Fraud Study provides an in-depth analysis of the nature, extent and
characteristics of accounting frauds occurring throughout the ten years, and
provides helpful insights regarding new and ongoing issues needing to be
addressed.
COSO is more formally known as The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of
the Treadway Commission, and the five sponsoring organizations are the
AAA,
AICPA,
FEI, IIA, and
IMA. More
COSO info is available on their website,
www.coso.org.
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
University of Illinois at Chicago Report
on Massive Political Corruption in Chicago
"Chicago Is a 'Dark Pool Of Political Corruption'," Judicial Watch,
February 22, 2010 ---
http://www.judicialwatch.org/blog/2010/feb/dark-pool-political-corruption-chicago
A major U.S. city
long known as a hotbed of pay-to-play politics infested with clout and
patronage has seen nearly 150 employees, politicians and contractors get
convicted of corruption in the last five decades.
Chicago has
long been distinguished for its pandemic of public corruption, but actual
cumulative figures have never been offered like this. The astounding
information is featured in a
lengthy report published by one of Illinois’s
biggest public universities.
Cook County,
the nation’s second largest, has been a
“dark pool of political corruption” for more than
a century, according to the informative study conducted by the University of
Illinois at Chicago, the city’s largest public college. The report offers a
detailed history of corruption in the Windy City beginning in 1869 when
county commissioners were imprisoned for rigging a contract to paint City
Hall.
It’s downhill from
there, with a plethora of political scandals that include 31 Chicago
alderman convicted of crimes in the last 36 years and more than 140
convicted since 1970. The scams involve bribes, payoffs, padded contracts,
ghost employees and whole sale subversion of the judicial system, according
to the report.
Elected
officials at the highest levels of city, county and state
government—including prominent judges—were the perpetrators and they worked
in various government locales, including the assessor’s office, the county
sheriff, treasurer and the President’s Office of Employment and Training.
The last to fall was renowned
political bully Isaac Carothers, who just a few
weeks ago pleaded guilty to federal bribery and tax charges.
In the last few
years alone several dozen officials have been convicted and more than 30
indicted for taking bribes, shaking down companies for political
contributions and rigging hiring. Among the convictions were fraud,
violating court orders against using politics as a basis for hiring city
workers and the disappearance of 840 truckloads of asphalt earmarked for
city jobs.
A few months
ago the city’s largest newspaper revealed that Chicago aldermen keep a
secret, taxpayer-funded pot of cash (about $1.3
million) to pay family members, campaign workers and political allies for a
variety of questionable jobs. The covert account has been utilized for
decades by Chicago lawmakers but has escaped public scrutiny because it’s
kept under wraps.
Judicial
Watch has extensively investigated Chicago corruption, most recently the
conflicted ties of top White House officials to
the city, including Barack and Michelle Obama as well as top administration
officials like Chief of Staff Rahm Emanual and Senior Advisor David Axelrod.
In November Judicial Watch
sued Chicago Mayor Richard Daley's office to
obtain records related to the president’s failed bid to bring the Olympics
to the city.
Bob Jensen's threads on the sad state of
governmental accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#GovernmentalAccounting
Bob Jensen's threads on political
corruption are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#Lawmakers
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudUpdates.htm
Forensic Accounting Course Materials
November 3, 2009 message from Eileen Taylor
[eileen_taylor@NCSU.EDU]
Need advice on choosing a textbook for an MBA class
on fraud (to be taken mostly by Master of Accounting students).
I am deciding between Albrecht's Fraud Examination
and Hopwood's Forensic Accounting. I also plan to have students read Cynthia
Cooper's book, Journey of a Corporate Whistleblower.
I will be teaching a three-week version of the
course this summer as a study abroad, but also will be converting it into a
16 week semester-long 3 hour course.
Any suggestions would be helpful -
Thank you,
Eileen
November 3, 2009 reply from Bob Jensen
Hi Eileen,
I'm really not able to give you an opinion on either
choice for a textbook. But before making a decision I always compared the
end-of-chapter material and the solutions manual to accompany that material.
If the publisher did not pay for good end-of-chapter material I always view
the textbook to be a cheap shot. The end-of-chapter material is much harder
to write than the chapter material itself.
I also look for real world cases and illustrations.
Don't forget the wealth of material, some free, at
the site of the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners ---
http://www.acfe.com/
I would most certainly consider using some of this material on homework and
examinations.
Instead of a textbook you might use the ACFE online
self-study materials ($79) ---
Click Here
There is a wonderful range of topics covered ---
http://snipurl.com/acleselfstudy [eweb_acfe_com]
Accounting
and Auditing
Computers
and Technology
Criminology and Ethics
Fraud
Investigation
Fraud
Schemes
Interviewing and Reporting
Legal
Elements of Fraud
Spanish
Titles
Bob Jensen
"A Model Curriculum for Education in Fraud and Forensic Accounting,"
by Mary-Jo Kranacher, Bonnie W. Morris, Timothy A. Pearson, and Richard A.
Riley, Jr., Issues in Accounting Education, November 2008. pp. 505-518
(Not Free) ---
Click Here
There are other articles on fraud and forensic accounting in this November
edition of IAE:
Incorporating Forensic Accounting and Litigation Advisory Services Into
the Classroom Lester E. Heitger and Dan L. Heitger, Issues in Accounting
Education 23(4), 561 (2008) (12 pages)]
West Virginia University: Forensic Accounting and Fraud Investigation (FAFI)
A. Scott Fleming, Timothy A. Pearson, and Richard A. Riley, Jr., Issues
in Accounting Education 23(4), 573 (2008) (8 pages)
The Model Curriculum in Fraud and Forensic Accounting and Economic Crime
Programs at Utica College George E. Curtis, Issues in Accounting
Education 23(4), 581 (2008) (12 pages)
Forensic Accounting and FAU: An Executive Graduate Program George R.
Young, Issues in Accounting Education 23(4), 593 (2008) (7 pages)
The Saint Xavier University Graduate Program in Financial Fraud
Examination and Management William J. Kresse, Issues in Accounting
Education 23(4), 601 (2008) (8 pages)
Also see
"Strain, Differential Association, and Coercion: Insights from the Criminology
Literature on Causes of Accountant's Misconduct," by James J. Donegan and
Michele W. Ganon, Accounting and the Public Interest 8(1), 1 (2008) (20
pages)
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
FBI Corporate Fraud Chart in August 2008 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/aug2008/ataglance.htm#Chart1.htm
A great blog on securities and accounting fraud ---
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/securities/
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud and forensic accounting
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Business schools, eager to impart ethics, are paying
white-collar felons to recite the error of their ways
"Using Ex-Cons to Scare MBAs Straight," by Porter, Business
Week, April 24, 2008 ---
Click Here
Bob Jensen's threads on white collar crime include the
following links:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
"Study Tallies Corporations Not
Paying Income Tax," by Lynley Browning, The New York Times, August
12, 2008 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/13/business/13tax.html?_r=1&dbk
Two out of every
three United States corporations paid no federal income taxes from 1998
through 2005, according to a report released Tuesday by the Government
Accountability Office, the investigative arm of Congress.
The study, which is
likely to add to a growing debate among politicians and policy experts over
the contribution of businesses to Treasury coffers, did not identify the
corporations or analyze why they had paid no taxes. It also did not say
whether they had been operating properly within the tax code or illegally
evading it.
The study covers
1.3 million corporations of all sizes, most of them small, with a collective
$2.5 trillion in sales. It includes foreign corporations that do business in
the United States.
Among foreign
corporations, a slightly higher percentage, 68 percent, did not pay taxes
during the period covered — compared with 66 percent for United States
corporations. Even with these numbers, corporate tax receipts have risen
sharply as a percentage of federal revenue in recent years.
The G.A.O. study
was done at the request of two Democratic senators, Carl Levin of Michigan
and Byron L. Dorgan of North Dakota. In recent years, Senator Levin has held
investigations on tax evasion and urged officials and regulators to examine
whether corporations were abusing tax laws by shifting income earned in
higher-tax jurisdictions, like the United States, to overseas subsidiaries
in low-tax jurisdictions.
Senator Levin said
in written remarks on Tuesday that “this report makes clear that too many
corporations are using tax trickery to send their profits overseas and avoid
paying their fair share in the United States.”
But the G.A.O. said
that it did not have enough data to address the role of what some policy
experts say is a crucial factor in profits sent overseas.
That factor, known
as transfer pricing, involves corporations’ charging their overseas
subsidiaries lower prices for goods and services, a common move that lowers
a corporation’s tax bill. A number of corporations are in transfer-pricing
disputes with the Internal Revenue Service.
Either way, the
nearly 1,000 largest United States corporations were more likely than
smaller ones to pay taxes.
In 2005, one in
four large United States corporations paid no taxes on revenue of $1.1
trillion, compared with 66 percent in the overall pool. Large corporations
are those with at least $250 million in assets or annual sales of at least
$50 million.
Joshua Barro, a
staff economist at the Tax Foundation, a conservative research group, said
that the largest corporations represented only 1 percent of the total number
of corporations but more than 90 percent of all corporate assets.
The vast majority
of the large corporations that did not pay taxes had net losses, he said,
and thus no income on which to pay taxes. “The notion that there is a large
pool of untaxed corporate profits is incorrect.”
In 2004, a
G.A.O. study said that 7 in 10 of all foreign corporations doing business in
the United States, or foreign-controlled corporations, paid no taxes from
1996 through 2000, compared with 6 in 10 United States corporations.
This article has been revised to
reflect the following correction:
Correction: August 14, 2008
An article on Wednesday about a Government Accountability Office study
reporting on the percentage of corporations that paid no federal income
taxes from 1998 through 2005 gave an incorrect figure for the estimated tax
liability of the 1.3 million companies covered by the study. It is not $875
billion. The correct amount cannot be calculated because it would be based
on the companies’ paying the standard rate of 35 percent on their net
income, a figure that is not available. (The incorrect figure of $875
billion was based on the companies’ paying the standard rate on their $2.5
trillion in gross sales.)
FBI Corporate Fraud Chart in August 2008 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/aug2008/ataglance.htm#Chart1.htm
From Smart Stops of the Web, Journal of accountancy, October
2008 ---
|
HAVE FRAUD FEARS?
Search no further than the AICPA’s offering of
antifraud and forensic accounting resources. Click “Tools and Aids”
to download Managing the Business Risk of Fraud: A Practical
Guide, which outlines principles for establishing effective
fraud risk management. The paper was released jointly by the AICPA,
the Association of Certified Fraud Examiners and The Institute of
Internal Auditors (see “Highlights,”
page 16). The site also offers fraud detection and prevention tips,
including an “Indicia of Fraud” checklist and case studies. There’s
also information on the newly created Certified in Financial
Forensics (CFF) credential (see “News
Digest,” Aug. 08, page 30) and upcoming Web seminars.
BE
CRIME SMART
Think of the most outrageous
business fraud scheme you’ve ever heard of— you’re likely to find
it, plus hundreds of other white-collar crime cases—at this site
from the FBI. Look under “Don’t Be Cheated” for a fraud awareness
test or click on “Know Your Frauds” for access to the FBI’s analysis
of common fraud schemes, including the prime bank note scheme,
telemarketing fraud and up-and-coming Internet scams. CPAs and
financial professionals can access details on options backdating,
securities scams and investment fraud under “Interesting Cases” or
learn about the FBI’s major programs involving corporate, hedge fund
and bankruptcy fraud.
SURF THE FRAUD NET
Jim Kaplan, a government auditor and author of
The Auditor’s Guide to Internet Resources, 2nd Edition,
hosts this Internet portal for auditors, which provides fraud
policies, procedures, codes of ethics and articles on a range of
topics, including internal auditing, fraud risk mitigation and
preventing embezzlement. The site also features a newsfeed, piping
in daily fraud news from around the world.. |
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Accounting
Education Shares Some of the
Blame --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm#AccountingEducation
Corporate Fraud Reporting
Report on the Transparency International Global
Corruption Barometer 2007 ---
http://www.transparency.org/content/download/27256/410704/file/GCB_2007_report_en_02-12-2007.pdf
E XECUTIVE
SUMMARY
– GLOBAL
CORRUPTION
BAROMETER
2007...................2
P AYING
BRIBES AROUND THE WORLD CONTINUES TO BE ALL TOO COMMON
......3
Figure 1. Demands for bribery, by
region 3
Table 1. Countries most affected by
bribery 4
Figure 2. Experience of bribery
worldwide, selected services 5
Table 2. Percentage of respondents
reporting that they paid a bribe to obtain a service 5
Figure 3. Experience with bribery, by
service 6
Figure 4. Selected Services:
Percentage of respondents who paid a bribe, by region 7
Figure 5. Comparing Bribery: 2006 and
2007 8
C ORRUPTION
IN KEY INSTITUTIONS: POLITICAL
PARTIES AND THE
LEGISLATURE
VIEWED AS MOST CORRUPT ............................................................8
Figure 6. Perceived levels of
corruption in key institutions, worldwide 9
Figure 7. Perceived levels of
corruption in key institutions, comparing 2004 and 2007 10
E XPERIENCE
V.
PERCEPTIONS OF CORRUPTION
–
DO THEY ALIGN?...................10
Figure 8. Corruption Perceptions Index v. citizens’
experience with bribery 11
L EVELS
OF CORRUPTION EXPECTED TO RISE OVER THE NEXT THREE YEARS....11
Figure 9. Corruption will get worse,
worldwide 11
Figure 10. Expectations about the
future: Comparing 2003 and 2007 12
P UBLIC
SCEPTICISM OF GOVERNMENT EFFORTS TO FIGHT CORRUPTION
–
IN
MOST PLACES
.......................................................................................................13
Table 3. How effectively is government fighting corruption?
The country view 13
C ONCLUSIONS
......................................................................................................13
A PPENDIX
1: THE
GLOBAL
CORRUPTION
BAROMETER
2007 QUESTIONNAIRE15
A PPENDIX
2: THE
GLOBAL
CORRUPTION
BAROMETER
– ABOUT
THE SURVEY17
A PPENDIX
3: REGIONAL
GROUPINGS..................................................................20
G LOBAL
CORRUPTION
BAROMETER
2007..........................................................20
A PPENDIX
4: COUNTRY
TABLES..........................................................................21
Table 4.1: Respondents who paid a
bribe to obtain services 21
Table 4.2: Corruption’s impact on
different sectors and institutions 22
Table 4.3: Views of corruption in the
future 23
Table 4.4: Respondents' evaluation of their
government's efforts to fight corruption 24
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's Rotten to the Core threads are
at ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
The FEI has a new 16-page fraud checklist that can be
downloaded for $50. Access to an online database is $129 ---
Click Here
"New research provides
resources on fraud prevention and financial reporting," AccountingWeb,
January 18, 2008 ---
http://www.accountingweb.com/cgi-bin/item.cgi?id=104443
Financial
Executives Research Foundation (FERF), the research affiliate of Financial
Executives International (FEI), has announced the release of two important
new pieces of research designed to aid public company management and
corporate boards in the efficient evaluation of their assessment of
reporting issues and internal controls. A new FERF Study, entitled "What's
New in Financial Reporting: Financial Statement Notes from Annual Reports,"
examines disclosures from 2006 annual reports for the 100 largest
publicly-traded companies which used particularly innovative techniques to
clearly address difficult accounting issues. The study identifies and
analyzes recent reporting trends and common practices in financial
statements.
The report illustrates how
companies addressed specific accounting issues recently promulgated by
the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB), and by the Securities
and Exchange Commission (SEC), and in doing so, uncovered a number of
trends, which included:
-
Most of the disclosures
selected appear to have been developed specifically for a company's
own operations and industry standards, rather than "boilerplate"
disclosures.
-
Four accounting areas
identified with a considerable variation in disclosures. The
examples cited in these areas used innovative techniques to clearly
address difficult accounting issues.
- Commitments and
contingencies
- Derivatives and
financial instruments
- Goodwill and
intangibles
- Revenue
recognition
Twenty-five out of
100 filers in the 2006 reporting season reported tangible asset
impairments as a critical accounting policy.
Many companies
report condensed consolidating cash flows statements as part of
their segment disclosures, although not required by SFAS No. 131,
Disclosures about Segments of an Enterprise and Related Information.
To further facilitate
use of this report as a reference tool, all of the financial statement
footnotes gathered for the study are available to members on the
Financial Executives International Web site.
"FERF undertook this study
to provide our members with an illustration of how companies have used
innovative techniques to clearly address difficult accounting concerns,"
said Cheryl Graziano, vice president, research and operations for FERF.
"Recent accounting issues publicized by the FASB and the SEC have had a
direct impact on members of the financial community, and the report shows
that many companies are taking action."
"We hope that all financial
executives can utilize the report as both a quick update to summarize recent
trends in the most annual reporting season, as well as a reference to
address common accounting issues. The convenience of the online database
will provide executives with a readily handy tool when drafting their own
annual reports," said Graziano.
A second piece of research
by FEI, entitled the "FERF Fraud Risk Checklist," provides boards of
directors and management with a series of questions to help in assessing the
potential risk factors associated with fraudulent financial reporting and
the misappropriation of assets. These questions were developed from a number
of key sources on financial fraud and offer executives a single framework in
which to evaluate their company's reporting, while providing a sample
structure for management to use in documenting its thought process and
conclusions.
"Making improvements to
compliance with Sarbanes Oxley is a daily practice for financial executives,
and the first step in efficient evaluation of internal controls is the
proper assessment of potential exposures or risks associated with fraud,"
said Michael Cangemi, president and CEO, Financial Executives International.
"Through conversations with members of the financial community, we learned
that, while this type of risk assessment is a routine skill for auditors,
many members of management are not always familiar with this concept. This
checklist combines knowledge from the leading resources on fraud to help
financial management take a proactive step in evaluating their company's
practices and identifying areas for improvement."
The annual report
study, including the full report and access to the online database, and the
fraud checklist, are available for purchase on the
FEI Web site
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
January 29, 2008 message from Sikka, Prem N
[prems@essex.ac.uk]
Dear Bob,
Here is an item for your website.
I have been writing regular blogs for The
Guardian, a UK national newspaper. The articles are available at
http://commentisfree.guardian.co.uk/prem_sikka/index.html
and offer a critical commentary on
business and accountancy matters. For three days after each article the
website takes readers' comments and colleagues are welcome to add comments,
critical or otherwise. The most recent article appeared on 29 January 2008.
There is now also an extensive database of
corporate and accountancy misdemeanours on the AABA website
(
http://www.aabaglobal.org
<https://exchange5.essex.ac.uk/exchweb/bin/redir.asp?URL=http://www.aabaglobal.org/>
) and may interest scholars, students,
journalists and citizens concerned about the abuse of power.
Regards
Prem Sikka
Professor of Accounting
University of Essex
Colchester, Essex CO4 3SQ
UK
Office Tel: +44(0)1206 873773
Office Fax: +44 (01206) 873429
Jensen Comment
I added Professor Sikka's message to the following sites:
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001.htm
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
The Consumer Fraud Portion of this Document Was Moved to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
Labor Unions Resist Efforts to Require Truthful
Financial Disclosures
Tax Fraud and Scams
How
Technology Can Be Used to Reduce Fraud
Health Care and
Medical Billing Fraud
Online
(Internet) Frauds, Consumer Frauds, and Credit Card Scams
Corporate Governance is in a Crisis
Government
Subsidies, Pork Barrels, and Accountability --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudRotten.htm#Government
The Professions of Investment Banking and Security Analysis are Rotten to
the Core This module was moved to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Derivative Financial Instruments Fraud ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#DerivativesFrauds
FAS 133 Trips of
Freddie Mac --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm#FreddieMac
What is initial public offering (IPO) spinning and
why is it illegal?
Are Women More Ethical and Moral?
Example from the Stanford Law School Database
Future CPA --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/cpaaway.htm
Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/damages.htm
You might enjoy "The AICPA's Prosecution of Dr. Abraham Briloff: Some
Observations," by Dwight M. Owsen --- http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/pi/newsletr/spring99/item07.htm
I think Briloff was trying to save the profession from what it is now going
through in the wake of the Enron scandal.
Bob Jensen's threads on ecommerce and revenue reporting tricks and frauds
--- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm
For revenue reporting frauds --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/eitf01.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Resources
to prevent and discover fraud from the Association of Fraud Examiners --- http://www.cfenet.com/resources/resources.asp
Self-study
training for a career in fraud examination --- http://marketplace.cfenet.com/products/products.asp
Fraud Detection and Reporting ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
Source for United Kingdom reporting on financial
scandals and other news ---
http://www.financialdirector.co.uk
International Corruption Surveys and Indices --- http://www.transparency.org/cpi/
- TI Bribe Payers Survey
- TI Corruption Perceptions Index
- TI-Kenya Urban Bribery Index
- TI-Mexicana Encuestra Nacional de Corrupcion y Buen Gobierno
- National Survey on corruption and Governance (NSCG) (in Spanish)
- Transparęncia Brasil Survey
The Enron, Andersen, and Worldcom Scandal Modules Are At --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Selected Scandals in the Largest Remaining Public
Accounting Firms
The Sad State of Professional Discipline in Public Accountancy
Big 4 Securities Class Action Litigation- Citing Auditor as Defendants ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/AuditingFirmLitigationNov2006.pdf
"SEC Accountant Fines Largely Go Unpaid," SmartPros, June 7, 2006 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x53399.xml
The Securities and Exchange Commission has taken
disciplinary action against more than 50 accountants in 2005 and 2006 for
misconduct in scandals big and small. But few have paid a dime to compensate
shareholders for their varying levels of neglect or complicity.
It also turns out that nearly half of them continue
to hold valid state licenses to hang out their shingles as certified public
accountants, based on an examination of public records by The Associated
Press.
So while the SEC has forbidden these CPAs from
preparing, auditing or reviewing financial statements for a public company,
they remain free to perform those very same services for private companies
and other organizations that may be unaware of their professional misdeeds.
Some would say the accounting profession has taken
its fair share of lumps, particularly with the abrupt annihilation of Arthur
Andersen LLP and the jobs of thousands of auditors who had nothing to do
with the firm's Enron Corp. account. Meantime, the big auditing firms are
paying hundreds of millions of dollars in damages - without admitting or
denying wrongdoing - to settle assorted charges of professional malpractice.
Individual penance is another matter, however, and
here the accountants aren't being held so accountable.
Part of the trouble is that there doesn't appear to
be an established system of communication by which the SEC automatically
notifies state accounting regulators of federal disciplinary actions. In
several instances, state accounting boards were unaware a licensee had been
disciplined by the SEC until it was brought to their attention in the
reporting for this column. The SEC says it refers all disciplinary actions
to the relevant state boards, so the cause of any breakdowns in these
communications is unclear.
Another obstacle may be that some state boards do
not have ample resources to tackle the sudden swell of financial scandals.
It's not as if, for example, the Texas State Board of Public Accountancy had
ever before dealt with an accounting fraud as vast as that perpetrated at
Houston-based Enron.
"We don't have the staff on board to manage the
extra workload that the profession has been confronted with over the last
few years," said William Treacy, executive director of the Texas board. "So
we contracted with the attorney general's office to provide extra
prosecutorial power."
Treacy said his office is usually notified of SEC
actions concerning Texas-licensed CPAs, but the process isn't automatic.
With other states, communications from the SEC
appear less certain. If nothing else, many boards rely upon license renewals
to learn about SEC actions, but that only works if the applicants respond
truthfully to questions about whether they've been disciplined by any
federal or state agency. A spokeswoman for Georgia's board said one CPA
recently disciplined by the SEC had renewed his license online without
disclosing it.
Ransom Jones, CPA-Investigator for the Mississippi
State Board of Public Accountancy, said most of his leads come from other
accountants, media reports and annual registrations.
"The SEC doesn't necessarily notify the board,"
said Jones, whose agency revoked the licenses of key players in the scandal
at Mississippi-based WorldCom.
Some state boards appear more vigilant than others
in policing their membership. The boards in California and Ohio have
punished most of their licensees who have been disciplined by the SEC since
the start of 2005.
New York regulators haven't yet penalized any
locals targeted by the SEC in that timeframe, though they have taken action
against two disciplined by the SEC's new Public Company Accounting Oversight
Board. It is conceivable that cases are underway but not yet disclosed, or
that some individuals have been cleared despite the SEC's findings. A
spokesman for the New York State Education Department said all SEC referrals
are probed, but not all forms of misconduct are punishable under local
statute. New rules now under consideration would strengthen those
disciplinary powers, he said.
Meanwhile, although the SEC deserves credit for
de-penciling those CPAs who've breached their duties as gatekeepers of
financial integrity, barely any of those individuals have been asked to make
amends financially.
No doubt, except for those elevated to CEO or CFO,
most accountants are not paid as handsomely as the corporate elite. That
said, partners from top accounting firms are were [sic] paid well enough to
cough up more than the SEC has sought, which in most cases has been zero.
Earlier this year, in what the SEC crowed about as
a landmark settlement, three partners for KPMG LLP agreed to pay a combined
$400,000 in fines regarding a $1.2 billion fraud at Xerox Corp. One of those
fined still holds his license in New York.
"The SEC has never sought serious money from errant
CPAs," said David Nolte of Fulcrum Financial Inquiry LLP. "Unfortunately,
the small fines in the Xerox case set a record of the amount paid, so
everyone else has also gotten off easy."
It's not that the CPAs found culpable in scandals
don't deserve a right to redemption, or just to earn a living. Most of the
bans against practicing before the SEC are temporary, spanning anywhere from
a year to 10 years.
But the presumed deterrent of SEC action is
weakened if federal and state regulators don't work together on a consistent
message so bad actors don't get a free pass at the local level.
Large Public Accounting Firm Lawsuits
Accounting
Education Shares Some of the
Blame --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm#AccountingEducation
The SEC will not tolerate a pattern of growing
restatements, audit failures, corporate failures and massive investor
losses," Pitt said in a news conference. "Somehow we have got to put a
stop to the vicious cycle that has now been in evidence for far too many
years."
Suggested Reforms
Suggested Reforms (Including those of Warren Buffet and the Andersen Accounting
Firm)
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Major New Law in the Wake of the Accounting and
Finance Scandals
SARBANES-OXLEY ACT OF 2002 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud082002.htm
Bottom-Line Commentary
of Bob Jensen
Bottom-Line
Commentary of Bob Jensen: Systemic Problems That Won't Go Away
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
Links Related to Andersen, Enron, Worldcom, and
Other Frauds
The Enron, Andersen, and Worldcom Scandal Modules --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Association of Certified Fraud Examiners ---
http://www.acfe.com/home.asp
In particular note the Code of Business Ethics and Conduct ---
http://www.acfe.com/documents/code_of_business_ethics.pdf
Fraud Resources Center ---
http://www.acfe.com/fraud/fraud.asp
Fraud Prevention Check-Up ---
http://www.acfe.com/fraud/check.asp
Fraud Prevention CD-ROM ---
http://www.acfe.com/fraud/cd.asp
How to Prevent Small Business Fraud ---
http://www.acfe.com/documents/smallbusinessfraudexcerpt.pdf
Other Downloads ---
http://www.acfe.com/fraud/downloads.asp
Also note the explosion of salaries of Certified Fraud Examiners ---
http://www.acfe.com/documents/2005comp-guide.pdf
PricewaterhouseCoopers - Global Economic Crime Survey 2003 ---
http://www.acfe.com/documents/2003_PwC_CrimeReport.pdf
FraudNet the Government Accountability Office (GAO) --- http://www.gao.gov/fraudnet/fraudnet.htm
The Institute of Internal Auditors ---
http://www.theiia.org/
AICPA's Business Valuation and Forensic & Litigation Services Center (not
free to the public) ---
http://bvfls.aicpa.org/
Fraud Position Statement of the Institute of Internal Auditors of the UK and
Ireland ---
http://www.blindtiger.co.uk/IIA/uploads/48dc2e62-f2a7bd939a--7c26/2003FraudPositionStatement.pdf
I snipped this link to
http://snipurl.com/IIAFraudStatementUK
The Fraud Detectives
Consultant Network --- http://www.frauddetectives.com/
This is a helpful site, although I
might add that accountants, attorneys, and others can list themselves free at
this site with no filtering with regard to skills and experience.
Some fraud links from B2B Today ---
http://snipurl.com/B2BfraudLinks
Introductory Quotations
| Quotations for the Enron/Andersen scandals were
moved to
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudEnron.htm#Quotations
Turning to business, the board rapidly
approved a series of transactions, according to the minutes and a
report later commissioned by Hollinger. The board awarded a
private company, controlled by Lord Black, $38 million in
"management fees" as part of a move by Lord Black's team
to essentially outsource the company's management to itself. It
agreed to sell two profitable community newspapers to another
private company controlled by Lord Black and Hollinger executives
for $1 apiece. The board also gave Lord Black and his colleagues a
cut of profits from a Hollinger Internet unit. Finally,
the directors gave themselves a raise. The meeting lasted about an
hour and a half, according to the minutes and two directors who
were present.
Robert Frank and Elena Cheney --- Click
here to read part of their article
"Real Accounting Fraud," by Thomas J. DiLorenzo, The Free
Market, April 2002 ---
http://www.mises.org/freemarket_detail.asp?control=395&sortorder=articledate
If the Enron bankruptcy proves
anything, it is that there are sinners in all walks of life, and
that the market economy provides mechanisms for rooting out and
punishing systematic liars. Those who clamor for Congress to “do
something” to assure that this kind of thing will never happen
again are delusional if they think Congress has the ability to
legislate away sin or otherwise improve on the market system of
profit and loss. Such delusions are a testament to the
successful brainwashing of generations of public school students
who have been taught to worship the “god” of the state and to
look to it to solve all of life’s problems.
Accounting fraud at Enron is such a big
story because it is so exceptional; only once in a blue moon
does a major corporation destroy itself in this way. In
contrast, “accounting” fraud is an inherent feature of
government.
There is no such thing as real
accounting in government, of course, since there are no
profit-and-loss statements, only budgets. Consequently, there is
no way of ever knowing, in an accounting sense, whether
government is adding value or destroying it. All we know is that
the budget grew by a certain amount, for some ostensible
purpose. And government is constantly lying to the public about
how much of the public’s money is being spent and what it is
being spent on.
As Gene Epstein has reported in
Barron’s, during the Clinton administration, vast sums were
transferred from the Social Security and Federal Highway Trust
Funds to the budget so that Clinton and the Republican Congress
could take “credit” for balancing the budget. Any corporate CEO
who raided his employees’ pension fund and put the money in the
company coffers so that the bottom line would look good and he
could earn himself a fat bonus would end up in prison.
The federal government practices what
it calls “baseline budgeting,” whereby federal agencies announce
that they wish to increase their budgets by, say, 10 percent a
year, and if they only increase them by 5 percent that is called
a 5 percent budget “cut.” There can be no better example of
accounting fraud than calling a budget increase a cut.
The General Accounting Office,
Congressional Budget Office, and other federal agencies also use
“static analysis” when analyzing and reporting to the public on
tax policy changes. That is, they assume that taxation has no
effect whatsoever on economic behavior. So, if we have a $10
trillion economy, and impose a flat 75-percent income tax, these
“authoritative” sources will announce that the IRS expects to
collect $7.5 trillion in revenues, each year, ignoring several
hundred years of economic theory and practice.
Continued in article
Clinton's famously crude remark
And I hope that comes through in the
book (see below for references to the book Infectious
Greed). I am very critical of the
tax law changes that created the incentives for companies to pay
executives with stock options, which were made at the beginning
of the Clinton Administration to appease populist
anti-corporation forces among his supporters by appearing to do
something about what, even then, was alleged to be execessive
pay for corporate executives. Not to mention his
Administration's hands-off approach to Wall Street
(when Arthur Levitt headed the SEC).
There's that great story --- perhaps apocoryphal --- that I
recount in the book about Clinton's famously crude remark when
he discovered that voters cared much more about whether the
stocks were going up than his economic program.
Frank Partnoy, Partnoy's Solutions, welling@weeden,
October 21, 2005
|
|
Selected works of FRANK PARTNOY
Bob Jensen at Trinity University
1. Who is Frank Partnoy?
Cheryl Dunn requested that I do a review of my
favorites among the “books that have influenced [my] work.”
Immediately the succession of FIASCO books by Frank Partnoy
came to mind. These particular books are not the best among related
books by Wall Street whistle blowers such as Liar's Poker:
Playing the Money Markets by Michael Lewis in 1999 and Monkey
Business: Swinging Through the Wall Street Jungle by John Rolfe
and Peter Troob in 2002. But in1997. Frank Partnoy was the first
writer to open my eyes to the enormous gap between our assumed
efficient and fair capital markets versus the “infectious greed”
(Alan Greenspan’s term) that had overtaken these markets.
Partnoy’s succession of FIASCO books,
like those of Lewis and Rolfe/Troob are reality books written from
the perspective of inside whistle blowers. They are somewhat
repetitive and anecdotal mainly from the perspective of what each
author saw and interpreted.
My favorite among the capital market fraud
books is Frank Partnoy’s latest book Infectious Greed: How Deceit
and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Henry Holt & Company,
Incorporated, 2003, ISBN: 080507510-0- 477 pages). This is the most
scholarly of the books available on business and gatekeeper
degeneracy. Rather than relying mostly upon his own experiences,
this book drawn from Partnoy’s interviews of over 150 capital
markets insiders of one type or another. It is more scholarly
because it demonstrates Partnoy’s evolution of learning about
extremely complex structured financing packages that were the
instruments of crime by banks, investment banks, brokers, and
securities dealers in the most venerable firms in the U.S. and other
parts of the world. The book is brilliant and has a detailed and
helpful index.
What did I learn most from Partnoy?
I learned about the failures and complicity of
what he terms “gatekeepers” whose fiduciary responsibility was to
inoculate against “infectious greed.” These gatekeepers instead
manipulated their professions and their governments to aid and abet
the criminals. On Page 173 of Infectious Greed, he writes
the following:
Page #173
When Republicans captured the House of Representatives in
November 1994--for the first time since the Eisenhower
era--securities-litigation reform was assured. In a January 1995
speech, Levitt outlined the limits on securities regulation that
Congress later would support: limiting the statute-of-limitations
period for filing lawsuits, restricting legal fees paid to lead
plaintiffs, eliminating punitive-damages provisions from securities
lawsuits, requiring plaintiffs to allege more clearly that a
defendant acted with reckless intent, and exempting "forward looking
statements"--essentially, projections about a company's future--from
legal liability.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform
Act of 1995 passed easily, and Congress even overrode the veto of
President Clinton, who either had a fleeting change of heart about
financial markets or decided that trial lawyers were an even more
important
constituency than Wall Street. In any event, Clinton and Levitt
disagreed about the issue, although it wasn't fatal to Levitt, who
would remain SEC chair for another five years.
He later introduces Chapter 7 of Infectious
Greed as follows:
Pages 187-188
The regulatory changes
of 1994-95 sent three messages to corporate CEOs. First, you are
not likely to be punished for "massaging" your firm's accounting
numbers. Prosecutors rarely go after financial fraud and, even when
they do, the typical punishment is a small fine; almost no one goes
to prison. Moreover, even a fraudulent scheme could be recast as
mere earnings management--the practice of smoothing a
company's earnings--which most executives did, and regarded as
perfectly legal.
Second, you should use
new financial instruments--including options, swaps, and other
derivatives--to increase your own pay and to avoid costly
regulation. If complex derivatives are too much for you to
handle--as they were for many CEOs during the years immediately
following the 1994 losses--you should at least pay yourself in stock
options, which don't need to be disclosed as an expense and have a
greater upside than cash bonuses or stock.
Third, you don't need
to worry about whether accountants or securities analysts will tell
investors about any hidden losses or excessive options pay. Now
that Congress and the Supreme Court have insulated accounting firms
and investment banks from liability--with the Central Bank decision
and the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act--they will be much
more willing to look the other way. If you pay them enough in fees,
they might even be willing to help.
Of course, not every
corporate executive heeded these messages. For example, Warren
Buffett argued that managers should ensure that their companies'
share prices were accurate, not try to inflate prices artificially,
and he criticized the use of stock options as compensation. Having
been a major shareholder of Salomon Brothers, Buffett also
criticized accounting and securities firms for conflicts of
interest.
But for every Warren
Buffett, there were many less scrupulous CEOs. This chapter
considers four of them: Walter Forbes of CUC International, Dean
Buntrock of Waste Management, Al Dunlap of Sunbeam, and Martin Grass
of Rite Aid. They are not all well-known among investors, but their
stories capture the changes in CEO behavior during the mid-1990s.
Unlike the "rocket scientists" at Bankers Trust, First Boston, and
Salomon Brothers, these four had undistinguished backgrounds and
little training in mathematics or finance. Instead, they were
hardworking, hard-driving men who ran companies that met basic
consumer needs: they sold clothes, barbecue grills, and prescription
medicine, and cleaned up garbage. They certainly didn't buy swaps
linked to LIBOR-squared.
The book Infectious Greed has chapters
on other capital markets and corporate scandals. It is the best
account that I’ve ever read about Bankers Trust the Bankers Trust
scandals, including how one trader named Andy Krieger almost
destroyed the entire money supply of New Zealand. Chapter 10 is
devoted to Enron and follows up on Frank Partnoy’s invited testimony
before the United States Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs,
January 24, 2002 ---
http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/012402partnoy.htm
The controversial writings of Frank Partnoy
have had an enormous impact on my teaching and my research.
Although subsequent writers wrote somewhat more entertaining
exposes, he was the one who first opened my eyes to what goes on
behind the scenes in capital markets and investment banking.
Through his early writings, I discovered that there is an enormous
gap between the efficient financial world that we assume in agency
theory worshipped in academe versus the dark side of modern reality
where you find the cleverest crooks out to steal money from widows
and orphans in sophisticated ways where it is virtually impossible
to get caught. Because I read his 1997 book early on, the ensuing
succession of enormous scandals in finance, accounting, and
corporate governance weren’t really much of a surprise to me.
From his insider perspective he reveals a world
where our most respected firms in banking, market exchanges, and
related financial institutions no longer care anything about
fiduciary responsibility and professionalism in disgusting contrast
to the honorable founders of those same firms motivated to serve
rather than steal.
Young men and women from top universities of
the world abandoned almost all ethical principles while working in
investment banks and other financial institutions in order to become
not only rich but filthy rich at the expense of countless pension
holders and small investors. Partnoy opened my eyes to how easy it
is to get around auditors and corporate boards by creating
structured financial contracts that are incomprehensible and serve
virtually no purpose other than to steal billions upon billions of
dollars.
Most importantly, Frank Partnoy opened my eyes
to the psychology of greed. Greed is rooted in opportunity and
cultural relativism. He graduated from college with a high sense of
right and wrong. But his standards and values sank to the criminal
level of those when he entered the criminal world of investment
banking. The only difference between him and the crooks he worked
with is that he could not quell his conscience while stealing from
widows and orphans.
Frank Partnoy has a rare combination of
scholarship and experience in law, investment banking, and
accounting. He is sometimes criticized for not really understanding
the complexities of some of the deals he described, but he rather
freely admits that he was new to the game of complex deceptions in
international structured financing crime.
2. What really happened at Enron?
I begin with the following document the best thing I ever read
explaining fraud at Enron.
Testimony of Frank Partnoy Professor of Law, University of San Diego
School of Law Hearings before the United States Senate Committee on
Governmental Affairs, January 24, 2002 ---
http://www.senate.gov/~gov_affairs/012402partnoy.htm
The following selected quotations from his
Senate testimony speak for themselves:
- Quote: In
other words, OTC derivatives markets, which for the most part did
not exist twenty (or, in some cases, even ten) years ago, now
comprise about 90 percent of the aggregate derivatives market,
with trillions of dollars at risk every day. By those measures,
OTC derivatives markets are bigger than the markets for U.S.
stocks. Enron may have been just an energy company when it was
created in 1985, but by the end it had become a full-blown OTC
derivatives trading firm. Its OTC derivatives-related assets and
liabilities increased more than five-fold during 2000 alone.
- Quote: And,
let me repeat, the OTC derivatives markets are largely
unregulated. Enron’s trading operations were not regulated, or
even recently audited, by U.S. securities regulators, and the OTC
derivatives it traded are not deemed securities. OTC derivatives
trading is beyond the purview of organized, regulated exchanges.
Thus, Enron – like many firms that trade OTC derivatives – fell
into a regulatory black hole.
- Quote:
Specifically, Enron used derivatives and special purpose vehicles
to manipulate its financial statements in three ways. First, it
hid speculator losses it suffered on technology stocks. Second,
it hid huge debts incurred to finance unprofitable new businesses,
including retail energy services for new customers. Third, it
inflated the value of other troubled businesses, including its new
ventures in fiber-optic bandwidth. Although Enron was founded as
an energy company, many of these derivatives transactions did not
involve energy at all.
- Quote:
Moreover, a thorough inquiry into these dealings also should
include the major financial market “gatekeepers” involved with
Enron: accounting firms, banks, law firms, and credit rating
agencies. Employees of these firms are likely to have knowledge
of these transactions. Moreover, these firms have a
responsibility to come forward with information relevant to these
transactions. They benefit directly and indirectly from the
existence of U.S. securities regulation, which in many instances
both forces companies to use the services of gatekeepers and
protects gatekeepers from liability.
- Quote:
Recent cases against accounting firms – including Arthur Andersen
– are eroding that protection, but the other gatekeepers remain
well insulated. Gatekeepers are kept honest – at least in theory
– by the threat of legal liability, which is virtually
non-existent for some gatekeepers. The capital markets would be
more efficient if companies were not required by law to use
particular gatekeepers (which only gives those firms market
power), and if gatekeepers were subject to a credible threat of
liability for their involvement in fraudulent transactions.
Congress should consider expanding the scope of securities fraud
liability by making it clear that these gatekeepers will be liable
for assisting companies in transactions designed to distort the
economic reality of financial statements.
- Quote: In a
nutshell, it appears that some Enron employees used dummy accounts
and rigged valuation methodologies to create false profit and loss
entries for the derivatives Enron traded. These false entries
were systematic and occurred over several years, beginning as
early as 1997. They included not only the more esoteric financial
instruments Enron began trading recently – such as fiber-optic
bandwidth and weather derivatives – but also Enron’s very
profitable trading operations in natural gas derivatives.
-
Quote: The difficult
question is what to do about the gatekeepers. They occupy a
special place in securities regulation, and receive great benefits
as a result. Employees at gatekeeper firms are among the most
highly-paid people in the world. They have access to superior
information and supposedly have greater expertise than average
investors at deciphering that information. Yet, with respect to
Enron, the gatekeepers clearly did not do their job.
3. What are some of Frank Partnoy’s
best-known books?
Frank Partnoy, FIASCO: Blood in the Water on
Wall Street (W. W. Norton & Company, 1997, ISBN 0393046222, 252
pages).
This is the first of a
somewhat repetitive succession of Partnoy’s “FIASCO” books that
influenced my life. The most important revelation from his
insider’s perspective is that the most trusted firms on Wall Street
and financial centers in other major cities in the U.S., that were
once highly professional and trustworthy, excoriated the guts of
integrity leaving a façade behind which crooks less violent than the
Mafia but far more greedy took control in the roaring 1990s.
After selling a
succession of phony derivatives deals while at Morgan Stanley,
Partnoy blew the whistle in this book about a number of his
employer’s shady and outright fraudulent deals sold in rigged
markets using bait and switch tactics. Customers, many of them
pension fund investors for schools and municipal employees, were
duped into complex and enormously risky deals that were billed as
safe as the U.S. Treasury.
His books have
received mixed reviews, but I question some of the integrity of the
reviewers from the investment banking industry who in some instances
tried to whitewash some of the deals described by Partnoy. His
books have received a bit less praise than the book Liars Poker
by Michael Lewis, but critics of Partnoy fail to give credit that
Partnoy’s exposes preceded those of Lewis.
Frank Partnoy, FIASCO: Guns, Booze and
Bloodlust: the Truth About High Finance (Profile Books, 1998,
305 Pages)
Like his earlier
books, some investment bankers and literary dilettantes who reviewed
this book were critical of Partnoy and claimed that he
misrepresented some legitimate structured financings. However, my
reading of the reviewers is that they were trying to lend credence
to highly questionable offshore deals documented by Partnoy. Be
that as it may, it would have helped if Partnoy had been a bit more
explicit in some of his illustrations.
Preface
1. A Better Opportunity
2. The House of Cards
3. Playing Dice
4. A Mexican Bank Fiesta
5. F.I.A.S.C.O.
6. The Queen of RAVs
7. Don't Cry for Me, Argentina
8. The Odd Couple
9. The Tequila Effect
10. MX
11. Sayonara
Frank Partnoy, FIASCO: The Inside Story of a
Wall Street Trader (Penguin, 1999, ISBN 0140278796, 283 pages).
This is a blistering
indictment of the unregulated OTC market for derivative financial
instruments and the devious million and billion dollar deals
conceived by drunken sexual deviates in investment banking. Among
other things, Partnoy describes Morgan Stanley’s annual drunken
skeet-shooting competition.
This is also one of
the best accounts of the “fiasco” caused by Merrill Lynch in which
Orange Counting lost over a billion dollars and was forced into
bankruptcy.
Frank Partnoy, Infectious Greed: How Deceit
and Risk Corrupted the Financial Markets (Henry Holt & Company,
Incorporated, 2003, ISBN: 080507510-0, 477 pages)
Partnoy shows how
corporations gradually increased financial risk and lost control
over overly complex structured financing deals that obscured the
losses and disguised frauds pushed corporate officers and their
boards into successive and ingenious deceptions." Major corporations
such as Enron, Global Crossing, and WorldCom entered into enormous
illegal corporate finance and accounting. Partnoy documents the
spread of this epidemic stage and provides some suggestions for
restraining the disease.
4. What are examples of related books that
are somewhat more entertaining than Partnoy’s early books?
Michael Lewis, Liar's Poker: Playing the
Money Markets (Coronet, 1999, ISBN 0340767006)
Lewis writes in
Partnoy’s earlier whistleblower style with somewhat more intense and
comic portrayals of the major players in describing the double
dealing and break down of integrity on the trading floor of Salomon
Brothers.
John Rolfe and Peter Troob, Monkey Business:
Swinging Through the Wall Street Jungle (Warner Books,
Incorporated, 2002, ISBN: 0446676950, 288 Pages)
This is a hilarious tongue-in-cheek
account by Wharton and Harvard MBAs who thought they were starting
out as stock brokers for $200,000 a year until they realized that
they were on the phones in a bucket shop selling sleazy IPOs to
unsuspecting institutional investors who in turn passed them along
to widows and orphans. They write. "It took us another six
months after that to realize that we were, in fact, selling crappy
public offerings to investors."
There are other
books along a similar vein that may be more revealing and
entertaining than the early books of Frank Partnoy, but he was one
of the first, if not the first, in the roaring 1990s to reveal the
high crime taking place behind the concrete and glass of Wall
Street. He was the first to anticipate many of the scandals that
soon followed. And his testimony before the U.S. Senate is the
best concise account of the crime that transpired at Enron. He
lays the blame clearly at the feet of government officials (read
that Wendy Gramm) who sold the farm when they deregulated the
energy markets and opened the doors to unregulated OTC derivatives
trading in energy. That is when Enron really began bilking the
public.
|
If the Big Four shrinks to the Big Three, some
clients will continuously employ all three firms. Accounting
Firm 1 hired for audits is not allowed to perform tax services or
information system consulting. Accounting
Firm 2 hired for tax services runs a liability risk if it also designs
the information system feeding the tax information.
Accounting Firm 3 hired for information systems consulting is not
allowed to perform audits and probably should not perform tax services.
It will be very confusing unless something is done to distinguish the
external accountants in the client's offices. I suggest color codes.
What will the colors be,
after there are but three?
I wonder if the Big Three will adopt distinct
colors. As I recall Andersen
employees preferred orange shirts when demonstrating outside the Justice
Department (in a pouring rain) around the time Andersen was being tried
for obstruction of justice in the destruction of Enron’s audit files.
White has been pretty well taken up by medical services.
Black has always been the most popular auditor color --- when I
worked for Ernst, I was required to have a black fedora to match my
black suits. But undertakers
also prefer black. Traders
in the commodity pits wear bright colors.
Why can’t accountants do the same?
Seriously, I always thought Andersen's choice of orange was rather
ironic. This is too close to prison-orange for a firm that is trying to
fend off a criminal conviction.
Quotations
At a time when U.S. firms are more reliant than ever
on quality accounting and auditing services, the influential Business Roundtable
is supporting liability caps for auditors. The Roundtable is worried that the
Big Four accounting firms could soon shrink to three or fewer firms if Congress
doesn't act to stem the liabilities the firms face when things go wrong.
"Business Roundtable Supports Auditor Liability Cap," AccountingWeb,
January 18, 2005 --- http://www.accountingweb.com/item/100390
Discontent is rightfully rising over CEO pay versus performance
In fact, the boss enjoyed a hefty raise
last year. The chief executives at 179 large companies that had filed
proxies by last Tuesday - and had not changed leaders since last year -
were paid about $9.84 million, on average, up 12 percent from 2003,
according to Pearl Meyer & Partners, the compensation consultants.
Surely, chief executives must have done something spectacular to justify
all that, right? Well, that's not so clear. The link between rising pay
and performance remained muddy - at best. Profits and stock prices are
up, but at many companies they seem to reflect an improving economy
rather than managerial expertise. Regardless, the better numbers set off
sizable incentive payouts for bosses. With investors still smarting from
the bursting of the tech bubble, the swift rebound in executive pay is
touching some nerves. "The disconnect between pay and performance keeps
getting worse," said Christianna Wood, senior investment officer for
global equity at Calpers, the California pension fund. "Investors were
really mad when pay did not come down during the three-year bear market,
and we are not happy now, when companies reward executives when the
stock goes up $2."
Claudia H. Deutsch, "My Big Fat C.E.O. Paycheck," The New York Times,
April 3, 2005 ---
http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/03/business/yourmoney/03pay.html?
Bob Jensen's threads on corporate fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's updates on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudUpdates.htm
Steve Albrecht (former American Accounting Association President and
Professor of Accounting at Brigham Young University) conducted
interviews when Barry Minkow was still in prison. You can read
Steve's account of the ZZZZ Best Fraud at http://www.swcollege.com/vircomm/stice_survey/sts/sts04.html
Question
Why is there so much investment fraud?
Answer
What we have is a perfect fraud storm. In
places across the country with an appreciating housing market, low
interest rates, and consumers dissatisfied with Wall Street returns,
you'll find people ripe for [perpetrators].
"Ten Questions for Barry Minkow," CFO Staff, by CFO
Magazine, January 2005, Page 20 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/3516399/c_3516777?f=magazine_alsoinside
The current head of the Fraud Discovery Institute, Barry Minkow, also
served more than seven years in prison for the infamous ZZZZ Best scam.
Barry Minkow says he plans to be remembered
for more than the ZZZZ Best Co. fraud. The 38-year-old Minkow served
more than seven years in prison for the infamous 1980s scam. But he
hopes that his current efforts as head of the Fraud Discovery
Institute and as pastor of The Community Bible Church in San Diego
will supersede his activities as CEO of the carpet-cleaning company.
This month his new book, Cleaning Up (Nelson Current), debuts.
1. Currently, you are fighting the very
crime you were convicted of. Isn't that ironic?
No one failed worse than I did at such a young age. Sure, you can
adjust the dollar amounts and say it was $10 billion with Bernie
Ebbers at WorldCom, but it doesn't matter. I was CEO of a public
company and I failed. [ZZZZ Best] was a fully reporting public company
with a stock that went from $12 to $80. And at 21, I got a 25-year
sentence and a $26 million restitution order, and that's [since been]
turned into $1 billion in fraud uncoverings.
2. What can other white-collar criminals
glean from your mistakes?
Jeff Skilling's and Andy Fastow's best days are ahead of them...if
they admit they did wrong, do whatever they can to pay back their
victims, and use the same talents they used to defraud people to help
them.
3. When you speak to executives about
fraud, what's your main message?
When I speak to executives, I wear my orange prison jumpsuit. It's
gimmicky... [but] the best way to stop fraud is to talk people out of
perpetrating it in the first place by doing two things: increasing the
perception of detection and increasing the perception of prosecution.
4. Are you surprised that the fraud
techniques you used are still out there?
It doesn't surprise me at all. Long before Enron was touring people on
phony trading floors, ZZZZ Best was touring people on buildings for
restoration jobs that we never did. Now the variation on a theme is
always there, but here's what we do: we lie about what we owe and we
lie about what we earn.
5. On what do you blame the rash of
corporate fraud in recent years?
It's a mentality called right equals forward motion and wrong is
anyone who gets in my way. You see, we used to endorse character and
integrity, but today the business ethic that reigns is achievement.
And whenever you establish the worth of someone based on what they can
do and not on who they are, you have created the environment for
fraud.
6. Are you skeptical of efforts, such as
Sarbanes-Oxley, to legislate ethics?
Let me tell you why this legislation is brilliant. Sarbox hit at a
common denominator of corporate fraud: bypassing systems of internal
controls. I would not have been able to perpetrate the ZZZZ Best fraud
if I had not been able to bypass the system of internal controls. And
you know who are heroes now — the internal auditors and the Public
Company Accounting Oversight Board. Unless you're a perpetrator, you
don't know how good these moves are.
7. Should the sentencing guidelines for
white-collar criminals be overhauled?
Yes, and judges should have more discretion. My judge is the one who
said that I had no conscience. Two years ago, he dismissed my $26
million restitution order, dismissed me from probation three years
early, and told me to go out and fight corporate fraud. [But] I don't
care if anyone goes to jail. The number-one thing white-collar
criminals need to do is give the money back to those hurt the most.
8. When will you be satisfied that you've
repaid your debt to society?
I won't be. Union Bank had a $7 million loan [against ZZZZ Best], and
I have a long way to go. But I haven't missed a payment in nine years.
They've gotten over $100,000 this year alone.
9. Why is there so much investment fraud?
What we have is a perfect fraud storm. In places across the country
with an appreciating housing market, low interest rates, and consumers
dissatisfied with Wall Street returns, you'll find people ripe for
[perpetrators].
10. What do you say to those who doubt
your conversion to the straight and narrow?
There's this great phrase in the Bible: "When the man's ways
please the Lord, he makes even his enemies be at peace with him."
The biggest critics of Barry Minkow should be law enforcement. They
absolutely know if someone is a fake or real. But they've been my
biggest supporters.
Instead of adding more
regulating agencies, I think we should simply make the FBI tougher on
crime and the IRS tougher on cheats
Our Main Financial Regulating
Agency: The SEC Screw Everybody Commission
One of the biggest regulation failures in history is the way the SEC
failed to seriously investigate Bernie Madoff's fund even after being
warned by Wall Street experts across six years before Bernie himself
disclosed that he was running a $65 billion Ponzi fund.
CBS Sixty Minutes on June 14,
2009 ran a rerun that is devastatingly critical of the SEC. If you’ve
not seen it, it may still be available for free (for a short time only)
at
http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=5088137n&tag=contentMain;cbsCarousel
The title of the video is “The Man Who Would Be King.”
Between 2002 and 2008 Harry
Markopolos repeatedly told (with indisputable proof) the Securities and
Exchange Commission that Bernie Madoff's investment fund was a fraud.
Markopolos was ignored and, as a result, investors lost more and more
billions of dollars. Steve Kroft reports.
Markoplos makes the SEC look
truly incompetent or outright conspiratorial in fraud.
I'm really surprised that the SEC
survived after Chris Cox messed it up so many things so badly.
As Far as Regulations Go
An
annual report issued by the Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI) shows
that the U.S. government imposed $1.17 trillion in new regulatory costs
in 2008. That almost equals the $1.2 trillion generated by individual
income taxes, and amounts to $3,849 for every American citizen.
According the 2009 edition of Ten Thousand Commandments: An Annual
Snapshot of the Federal Regulatory State, the government issued 3,830
new rules last year, and The Federal Register, where such rules are
listed, ballooned to a record 79,435 pages. “The costs of federal
regulations too often exceed the benefits, yet these regulations receive
little official scrutiny from Congress,” said CEI Vice President Clyde
Wayne Crews, Jr., who wrote the report. “The U.S. economy lost value in
2008 for the first time since 1990,” Crews said. “Meanwhile, our federal
government imposed a $1.17 trillion ‘hidden tax’ on Americans beyond the
$3 trillion officially budgeted” through the regulations.
Adam Brickley,
"Government Implemented Thousands of New Regulations Costing $1.17
Trillion in 2008," CNS News, June 12, 2009 ---
http://www.cnsnews.com/public/content/article.aspx?RsrcID=49487
Jensen Comment
I’m a long-time believer that industries being regulated end up
controlling the regulating agencies. The records of Alan Greenspan (FED)
and the SEC from Arthur Levitt to Chris Cox do absolutely nothing to
change my belief ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
How do industries leverage the
regulatory agencies?
The primary control mechanism is to have high paying jobs waiting in
industry for regulators who play ball while they are still employed by
the government. It happens time and time again in the FPC, EPA, FDA,
FAA, FTC, SEC, etc. Because so many people work for the FBI and IRS,
it's a little harder for industry to manage those bureaucrats. Also the
FBI and the IRS tend to focus on the worst of the worst offenders
whereas other agencies often deal with top management of the largest
companies in America.
Forensic Accounting
There’s a rather nice module on Forensic Accounting at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Forensic_Accounting
This includes links to a journal and career opportunities.
The link to the
following article was forwarded by Charles Wankel
[wankelc@VERIZON.NET]
"Account for
more than hill of beans," The Bay City Times Via The Saginaw News,
December 16, 2007 ---
Click Here
When Kojo Quartey
went to college to learn accounting 25 years ago, many considered
the job a steady, unexciting career.
But financial
scandals in recent years at Enron, WorldCom and other companies have
transformed the field, says Quartey, dean of Davenport University's
Donald W. Maine School of Business.
''When I was an
accounting student, we were all number crunchers. In this day and
age, it's a much more exciting field,'' he said.
Many accountants
today are seeking specialized training to work as detectives who can
sniff out financial fraud. They call themselves forensic
accountants.
Davenport, a Grand
Rapids-based university with branches at 5300 Bay in Kochville
Township and at 3930 Traxler Court in Bay County's Monitor Township,
has two online offerings in the growing field. One is a new
bachelor's degree in business administration in accounting fraud
investigation and the other is a forensic accounting examiner
certificate available to postgraduates.
Forensic accountants
undergo training to mind the books while keeping an eye out for
crime.
Demand for
accountants who have such training is skyrocketing, Quartey told a
group of Bay and Arenac county high school counselors.
In addition to
traditional accounting, forensic accountants may learn from law
enforcement experts about how to detect fraud, and from
psychologists about how to interview people to detect lying, Quartey
said.
Irene Bembenista
teaches classes at Davenport required for the forensic examiner
certificate.
''It's not just how
to do an audit, but what are some of the clues that would indicate
something more is going on? And ideas about where to further
investigate,'' said Bembenista, Davenport's associate business
school dean.
Bembenista said 10
years ago, people did not generally recognize forensic accounting as
a college career path.
A federal law
enacted in 2002 to reform accounting has brought the investigation
field into its own. It's also created job opportunities because it
requires accountants at public entities to maintain a separation of
duties, Bembenista said.
''Accountants aren't
allowed to do double duties, like taxes and audit the company at the
same time,'' she said.
''And businesses are
very interested in accountants with a fraud (detection) background,
because they are looking out for the well-being of the
organization.''
The starting salary
for an accounting fraud investigator is $48,000 to $60,000 a year,
and certified forensic examiners can earn more than $100,000 a year,
Davenport says compensation studies indicate.
Davenport has
about two dozen students enrolled in the forensic accounting
certificate curriculum, Quartey said. The next term begins in
January, and more information is available on the Internet at
www.davenport.edu
Bob Jensen's threads on forensic
accounting are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accountancy
careers are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Benford's Law --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benford%27s_law
Mathematical fraud detection, fraud mathematics, number theory
"I've Got Your Number How a mathematical phenomenon can help CPAs uncover fraud and other irregularities,"
Journal of Accountancy, May 1999, ---
http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/1999/May/nigrini.htm
"The Effective Use of Benford's Law to Assist in Detecting Fraud in Accounting Data," by Cindy Durtchsi, William Hillison,
and Carl Pacini,
Journal of Forensic Accounting, Vol. 5, 2004, pp. 17-34
http://www.auditnet.org/articles/JFA-V-1-17-34.pdf
Benford's Law Excel Add-in
http://benford.softalizer.com/
Accounting Teachers About Cooking the
Books Get Caught ... er ... Cooking the Books
The media and blogs are conveniently
pinning the Huron debacle on its Andersen roots, and hinting that the
Enron malfeasance bled into Huron.
What I find ironic below is that the
Huron Consulting Group is itself a consulting group on technical
accounting matters, internal controls, financial statement restatements,
accounting fraud, rules compliance, and accounting education. If any
outfit should've known better it was Huron Consulting Group ---
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/about.aspx
Huron Consulting Group was formed in May
of 2003 in Chicago with a core set of 213 following the implosion of
huge Arthur Andersen headquartered in Chicago. The timing is much more
than mere coincidence since a lot of Andersen professionals were
floating about looking for a new home in Chicago. In the past I've used
the Huron Consulting Group published studies and statistics about
financial statement revisions of other companies. I never anticipated
that Huron Consulting itself would become one of those statistics. I
guess Huron will now have more war stories to tell clients.
The media and
blogs are conveniently pinning the Huron debacle on its Andersen roots,
and hinting that the Enron malfeasance bled into Huron.
Big Four Blog, August 5, 2009 ---
http://www.blogcatalog.com/blog/life-after-big-four-big-four-alumni-blog/eae8a159803847f6a73af93c063058f9
"Can hobbled Huron Consulting survive
this scandal?" by Steven R. Strahler, Chicago Business,
August 4, 2009 ---
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=35019&seenIt=1
An accounting mess
at Huron Consulting Group Inc. that led to the decapitation of top
management and the collapse in its share price puts the survival of
the Chicago-based firm in jeopardy.
Huron’s damaged
reputation imperils its ability to provide credible expert witnesses
during courtroom proceedings growing out of its bread-and-butter
restructuring and disputes and investigations practices. Rivals are
poised to capture marketshare.
“These types of
firms have to be squeaky clean with no exceptions, and this was too
big of an exception,” says Allan Koltin, a Chicago-based accounting
industry consultant. “I respect the changes they made and the speed
(with which) they made them. I’m not sure they can recover from
this.”
Huron executives
declined to comment.
Late Friday, Huron
said it would restate results for the three years ended in 2008 and
for the first quarter of 2009, resulting in a halving of its
profits, to $63 million from $120 million, for the 39-month period.
Revenue projections for 2009 were cut by more than 10%, to a range
of $650 million to $680 million from $730 million to $770 million.
The company said its
hand was forced by its recent discovery that holders of shares in
acquired firms had an agreement among themselves to reallocate a
portion of their earn-out payments to other Huron employees. The
company said it had been unaware of the arrangement.
“The employee
payments were not ‘kickbacks’ to Huron management,” the company
said.
Whatever the
description, the fallout promises to shake Huron to its core. The
company’s stock plunged 70% Monday to about $14 per share, and law
firms were preparing to mount class-action shareholder litigation.
“If the public
doesn’t buy that the house is clean, my guess is some of the senior
talent will start to move very quickly,” says William Brandt,
president and CEO of Chicago-based restructuring firm Development
Specialists Inc. “Client retention is all that matters here.”
Publicly traded
competitors like Navigant Consulting Inc. are unlikely to make bids
for Huron because of the potential for damage to their own stock.
Private enterprises like Mesirow Financial stand as logical
employers as Huron workers jump ship.
“There certainly is
potential out there for clients and employees who may be looking at
different options, but at this point in the process it’s a little
early to tell what impact this will have,” says a Navigant
spokesman.
Huron’s woes led to
the resignation last week of Chairman and CEO Gary Holdren and Chief
Financial Officer Gary Burge, both of whom will stay on with the
firm for a time, and the immediate departure of Chief Accounting
Officer Wayne Lipski.
Mr. Holdren, 59, has
a certain amount of familiarity with turmoil.
He was among
co-founders of Huron in 2002, when their previous employer,
Andersen, folded along with its auditing client Enron Corp. He told
the Chicago Tribune in 2007, “Initially, when we’d call on potential
clients, they’d say, ‘Huron? Who are you? That sounds like Enron,’
or ‘Aren’t you guys supposed to be in jail? Why are you calling us?’
”
This year, it’s been
money issues dogging Huron. In the spring, shareholders twice
rejected proposals to sweeten an employee stock compensation plan.
Mr. Holdren’s total
compensation in 2008 was $6.5 million, according to Securities and
Exchange Commission filings. Mr. Burge received $1.2 million.
A Huron unit in June
sued five former consultants and their new employer, Sonnenschein
Nath & Rosenthal LLP, alleging that the defendants were using trade
secrets to lure Huron clients to the law firm. The defendants denied
the charges. The case is pending in Cook County Circuit Court.
"3 executives at Huron Consulting
Group resign over accounting missteps Consulting firm announces it will
restate financial results for the past 3 fiscal years,"by Wailin
Wong, Chicago Tribune, August 1, 2009 ---
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2009/aug/01/business/chi-sat-huron-0801-aug01
Chief Executive Gary
Holdren and two other top executives are resigning from
Chicago-based management consultancy Huron Consulting Group as the
company announced Friday it is restating financial statements for
three fiscal years.
Holdren’s
resignation as CEO and chairman was effective Monday and he will
leave Huron at the end of August, the company said in a statement.
Chief Financial Officer Gary Burge is being replaced in that post
but will serve as treasurer and stay through the end of the year.
Chief Accounting Officer Wayne Lipski is also leaving the company.
None of the departing executives will be paid severance, Huron said.
Huron will restate
its financial results for 2006, 2007, 2008 and the first quarter of
2009. The accounting missteps relate to four businesses that Huron
acquired between 2005 and 2007.
According to Huron’s
statement and a filing with the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the selling shareholders of the acquired businesses distributed some
of their payments to Huron employees. They also redistributed
portions of their earnings “in amounts that were not consistent with
their ownership percentages” at the time of the acquisition, Huron
said.
A Huron spokeswoman
declined to give the number of shareholders and employees involved,
saying the company was not commenting beyond its statement.
“I am greatly
disappointed and saddened by the need to restate Huron’s earnings,”
Holdren said in the statement. He acknowledged “incorrect”
accounting.
Huron said the
restatement’s total estimated impact on net income and earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization for the
periods in question is $57 million.
“Because the issue
arose on my watch, I believe that it is my responsibility and my
obligation to step aside,” said Holdren.
Huron said the
board’s audit committee had recently learned of an agreement between
the selling shareholders to distribute some of their payments to a
company employee. The committee then launched an inquiry into all of
Huron’s prior acquisitions and discovered the involvement of more
Huron employees.
Huron said it is
reviewing its financial reporting procedures and expects to find
“one or more material weaknesses” in the company’s internal
controls. The amended financial statements will be filed “as soon as
practicable,” Huron said.
James Roth, one of
Huron’s founders, is replacing Holdren as CEO. Roth was previously
vice president of Huron’s health and education consulting business,
the company’s largest segment. George Massaro, Huron’s former chief
operating officer who is the board of directors’ vice chairman, will
succeed Holdren as chairman.
James Rojas, another
Huron founder, is now the company’s CFO. Rojas was serving in a
corporate development role. Huron did not announce a replacement for
Lipski, the chief accounting officer.
The company’s shares
sank more than 57 percent in after-hours trading. The stock had
closed Friday at $44.35. Huron said it expects second-quarter
revenues between $164 million and $166 million, up about 15 percent
from the year-earlier quarter.
The company,
founded by former partners at the Andersen accounting firm including
Holdren, also said that it is conducting a separate inquiry into
chargeable hours in response to an inquiry from the SEC.
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting
firm frauds are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
December 3, 2009 reply from
Francine McKenna
[retheauditors@GMAIL.COM]
I, of course, blame Huron mostly on PwC.
That's my schtick.
http://retheauditors.com/2009/08/10/pwc-and-huron-consulting-goodwill-too-good-to-be-true/
But a little
bit on the AA legacy.
http://retheauditors.com/2009/08/04/huron-consulting-go-on-take-the-money-and-run/
Francine
Jensen Comment
First, kudos to the Audit Committee (John McCartney, Dubose Ausley and
James Edwards) for unearthing this issue and pursuing it fearlessly to
its terrible end at Huron Consulting.
From The Wall Street Journal Weekly Accounting Review on August 6, 2009
Huron Takes Big Hit as Accounting Falls
Short
by Gregory Zuckerman
Aug 05, 2009
Click here to view the
full article on WSJ.com
TOPICS: Accounting
Changes and Error Corrections, Advanced Financial Accounting,
Mergers and Acquisitions
SUMMARY: Huron
Consulting Group, Inc., was formed in May 2002 by partners from the
now-defunct Arthur Andersen LLP. "Today, fewer than 10% of the
company's employees came directly from Arthur Andersen." The firm
provides "...financial and legal consulting services, including
forensic-style investigative work...." The firm announced
restatement of earnings for fiscal years 2006, 2007, and 2008 and
the first quarter of 2009 due to inappropriate accounting for
payments made to acquire four businesses between 2005 and 2007. The
payments were made after the acquisitions for earn-outs: additional
amounts of cash payments or stock issuances based on earning
specific financial performance targets over a number of years
following the business combinations. However, portions of these
earn-out payments were redistributed to employees remaining with
Huron after the acquisitions based on specific performance measures
by these employees rather than being based on their relative
ownership interests in the firms prior to acquisition by Huron.
Consequently, those payments are deemed to be compensation expense.
The amounts restated thus reduce net income for the periods of
restatement and reduce future income amounts, but do not affect cash
flows of the firm. Negative shareholder reaction to this
announcement by a firm which provides consulting services in this
area certainly is not surprising.
CLASSROOM APPLICATION: Accounting
for allocation of a purchase price in a business combination is
covered in this article.
QUESTIONS:
1. (Introductory)
In general, how do we account for assets acquired in business
combinations? How are cash payments and stock issued to selling
shareholders accounted for?
2. (Introductory)
What are contingent payments in a business combination? What are the
two main types of contingent payments and what are their accounting
implications?
3. (Introductory)
Which of the above 2 types of contingent payments were employed in
the Huron acquisition agreements for businesses it acquired over the
years 2005 to 2008?
4. (Advanced)
Obtain the SEC 8_k filing by Huron for the restatement announcement,
dated July 31, 2009, and the filing answering subsequent questions
and answers as posted on its web site, dated August 3, 2009
available at
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1289848/000119312509160844/d8k.htm
and
http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1289848/000128984809000017/exh99-1.htm
respectively. What was the problem which made the original
acquisition accounting improper? What accounting standard
establishes requirements for handling corrections of errors such as
this? In your answer, explain why the company discloses that
investors must not rely on the previously released financial
statements.
5. (Advanced)
Refer specifically to the August 3, 2009, filing obtained above.
What were the ultimate journal entries made to correct these errors?
Explain the components of these entries.
6. (Advanced)
The author of this article writes that this error in reporting and
subsequently required restatement "...suggests [that] a closer
alliance between consulting and accounting isn't such a bad idea."
What is the SEC requirement that divides consulting and accounting?
Do you think this problem with reporting would have arisen had the
firm been allowed to perform both auditing, accounting, and
consulting services to its clients? Support your answer.
Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island
"Huron Takes Big Hit as Accounting Falls Short," by Gregory Zuckerman,
The Wall Street Journal, August 5, 2009 ---
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB124943146672806361.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC
Financial downturns often expose accounting problems at companies,
but scandals have been noticeably absent in the recent turmoil. Not
so anymore.
Late Friday, Huron Consulting Group Inc. said it would restate the
last three years of financial results, withdraw its 2009 earnings
guidance and lower its outlook for 2009 revenue. The accounting
snafu, which has decimated the company's shares, was all the more
surprising because Huron traces its roots to Arthur Andersen LLP,
the accounting firm at the heart of the last wave of scandals.
A dose of added irony is that Huron makes its money providing
financial and legal consulting services, including forensic-style
investigative work, and tries to help clients avoid these types of
mistakes.
"One of their businesses is forensic accounting -- they're experts
in this," says Sean Jackson, an analyst at Avondale Partners in
Nashville, Tenn., who dropped his rating to the equivalent of "hold"
from "buy." "Investors are saying, 'These guys had to know what
happened with the accounting, or they should have known.'"
Investors fear the accounting issues, which will reduce net income
by $57 million for the periods in question, might damage the firm's
credibility. Huron's shares fell 70% on Monday, well below the price
of its initial public offering in 2004. On Tuesday, Huron shares
rose four cents to $13.73.
Huron, based in Chicago, was started in May 2002 by refugees from
Arthur Andersen who fled the firm after it was indicted for its role
in the collapse of Enron Corp. At the time, the group said that it
would specialize in bankruptcy and litigation work, as well as
education and health-care consulting, and that it would work with
more than 70 former clients of Arthur Andersen. Arthur Andersen's
guilty verdict was later overturned, but it was too late to save the
firm, which was dismantled. Today, fewer than 10% of the company's
employees came directly from Andersen, according to a Huron
spokeswoman.
Huron on Friday also announced preliminary second-quarter revenue
that was shy of analyst expectations, along with the resignation of
Gary Holdren, its board chairman and chief executive, along with the
resignations of finance chief Gary Burge and chief accounting
officer Wayne Lipski. "No severance expenses are expected to be
incurred by the company as a result of these management changes,"
Huron's regulatory filing said.
After its founding by 25 Andersen partners and more than 200
employees, Huron grew rapidly. It soon had 600 employees and counted
firms like Pfizer, International Business Machines and General
Motors as clients. Growing scrutiny of accounting firms that also
did consulting made Huron's consulting-only business look promising,
and shares soared from below $20 five years ago to nearly $44 before
the news on Friday.
That is when Huron dropped its bombshell -- one that suggests a
closer alliance between consulting and accounting isn't always such
a bad idea. Huron is restating financial statements to correct how
it accounted for certain acquisition-related payments to employees
of four businesses that Huron purchased since 2005.
Huron said the employees shared "earn-outs," or financial rewards
based on the performance of acquired units after the transaction was
completed, with junior employees at the units who weren't involved
in the original sale. They also distributed some of the proceeds
based on performance of employees who remained at Huron, not based
on the ownership interests of those employees in the businesses that
were sold.
The payments were legal. The problem was how Huron accounted for
these payouts. The compensation should have been booked as a noncash
operating expense of the company. Huron said the payments "were not
kickbacks" to Huron management, but rather went to employees of the
acquired businesses.
The method the company used to book the payments served to increase
its profit. The adjustments reduced the company's net income,
earnings per share and other measures, though it didn't affect its
cash flow, assets or liabilities.
Part of investors' concern is that they aren't entirely sure what
happened at Huron. The company's executives aren't speaking with
analysts, some said on Tuesday.
Employees and big producers now might bolt from Huron, Avondale
Partners' Mr. Jackson says.
"It's still unclear what happened, but it's almost irrelevant at
this point," says Tim McHugh, an analyst at William Blair & Co., who
has the equivalent of a "hold" on the stock, down from a "buy" last
week. "The company's brand has been impaired and turnover of key
employees is a significant risk."
"Shocking Accounting Scandal at Huron Consulting Group," The Big
Four Blog, August 5, 2009 ---
http://bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/2009/08/shocking-accounting-scandal-at-huron.html
First, kudos to the Audit Committee (John McCartney, Dubose Ausley
and James Edwards) for unearthing this issue and pursuing it
fearlessly to its terrible end.
Second, shame on senior management to succumb to greed and not
complying strictly with accounting standards
Third, shame also on the auditor, PricewaterhouseCoopers for failing
to spot this issue, especially in 2008, when the amount of money
kept in goodwill was $31 million, three times the true net income of
Huron of only $10 million
Fourth, shame on Huron itself for providing accounting, internal
audit, internal controls, Sarbanes, and similar advice to its
corporate clients, while following shady accounting practices.
Physician, heal thyself first.
Finally, our sympathies for all the hard working and honest Huron
consultants who had nothing to do with acquisitions or their
accounting, and are likely as mad as anyone that this could happen
to them.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's fraud updates are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on earnings management and creative accounting are
at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#Manipulation
Bob Jensen's threads on audit professionalism ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud001c.htm
Andersen Partners in the Aftermath of Enron:
Protiviti and Huron in Particular
Some Andersen partners stayed on at the Andersen firm (that is no longer an
auditing firm) and some continued to make their living at Andersen's training
facility in St. Charles, Illinois. In 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court overturned
Andersen's conviction for obstruction of justice ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arthur_Andersen_LLP_v._United_States
The U.S. Supreme Court overturned the conviction of the Arthur Andersen
accounting firm for destroying documents related to its Enron account before the
energy giant's collapse. The ruling is not based upon guilt or innocence. It is
based only on a technicality in the judge's instructions to the jury. The ruling
will not lead to a revival of this once great firm that in the years preceding
its collapse became known for some terrible audits of firms like Waste
Management, Enron, Worldcom and other clients. For details see
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/4596949.stm
Also see
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x48441.xml
Former Andersen partners who formed two consulting firms are not fairing
so well at the moment. But the things at Protivii are a bit more rosy than
things at Huron.
First there's the huge book cooking (creative accounting) scandal at Huron
Consulting that has now sucked in PwC as well ---
Huron Consulting Group was formed in May of 2003 in Chicago with a core
set of 213 following the implosion of huge Arthur Andersen headquartered in
Chicago. The timing is much more than mere coincidence since a lot of Andersen
professionals were floating about looking for a new home in Chicago. In the past
I've used the Huron Consulting Group published studies and statistics about
financial statement revisions of other companies. I never anticipated that Huron
Consulting itself would become one of those statistics. I guess Huron will now
have more war stories to tell clients.
See the module above.
Protiviti was formed largely of Andersen's former internal auditing
consultants and has a history outlined below.
"Protiviti Responds to Tough Financial Crisis, Now More Bullish," The
Big Four Blog, February 8, 2010 ---
http://www.bigfouralumni.blogspot.com/
Protiviti, as many will recall, was principally
Andersen’s internal audit service line, and these professionals joined the
multi-billion dollar organization Robert Half International ($RHI) in 2002
to form their own division, separate from the staffing units for which RHI
is better known for – Accountemps, Office Team and Management Resources.
Starting with just over 700 employees in 25 locations, Protiviti has
certainly grown in size and scope, and now is a global business consulting
and internal audit firm providing risk, advisory, and transaction services;
with 2,500 professionals in 62 locations in 17 countries worldwide. The
Protiviti division accounts for 13% of total parent company RHI revenues;
and within Protiviti itself, international operations were 30% of total
Protiviti revenues.
All the senior management at Protiviti continue to be Andersen alumni:
Joseph A. Tarantino, President and Chief Executive
Officer, ex-head of Arthur Andersen’s Financial Services Assurance practice
for metropolitan New York
Carol M. Beaumier, Executive Vice President, Global Industry Programs,
ex-partner in Arthur Andersen’s Regulatory Risk Services practice
Robert B. Hirth Jr., Executive Vice President, Global Internal Audit,
ex-partner with Arthur Andersen
James Pajakowski, Executive Vice President, Global Risk Solutions,
ex-partner with Arthur Andersen
Gary Peterson, Executive Vice President, International Operations,
ex-partner at Arthur Andersen
We haven’t focused on Protiviti for the longest
time, but our attention was brought back after seeing RHI’s full year 2009
results. We were quite surprised to see that despite its size, Protiviti had
a full year 2009 loss. Yes, a loss of $30 million for the entire year on
revenues of $384 million.
To dig deeper into this situation, we had to go
back all the way to 2007, analyze a whole series of quarterly earnings and
read through multiple earnings transcripts (courtesy: SeekingAlpha.com).
An interesting picture emerges from our analysis,
vividly demonstrating the intensity and rapidity of the global slowdown, and
consequent management efforts to cope with business shrinkage.
In 2007, Protiviti had revenues of $552 million,
gross margin of $175 million (32% of revenues), and operating income of $21
million (4% of revenues). In 2008, revenues held reasonably flat at $547
million, but gross margin had decreased by $20 million to $155 million (28%
of revenues), and operating income fell by $14 million, a full 66% to $7
million (1% of revenues). In 2009, the situation had rapidly deteriorated,
with revenues falling 30% to $384 million, gross margin plunging by $75
million to $80 million (21% of revenues), and operating income declining
precipitously by $38 million to a net loss figure of $(31) million (negative
8% of revenues). In a matter of just 24 months, Protiviti’s top line had
eroded by 30% and its operations had gone from a healthy profit to a huge
loss.
A deeper look at the quarterly earnings for two
full years, 2008 and 2009, reveals the full extent of the situation.
In 2007, Protiviti had good operating results, with
3,300 employees, up a whopping 16% from 2006, as management hired talent in
sync with increased demand for its services.
From Q1-2008 to Q3-2008, in the first three
quarters of 2008, revenues continued at the 2007 quarterly run-rate of about
$140 million, but total costs, principally direct compensation costs from
all the increased staff levels were up 4%, increasing from 68% of revenues
in 2007 to 72% of revenues in the first three quarters of 2008. Things were
still on a decent footing at that time, operating income was a few million
dollars profit on the average each quarter, not at 2007 levels, but
certainly not at losses either. The expected increase in 2008 revenues had
not been seen, and the increased cost line continued to pressure Protiviti’s
profits. A review of the Q3-2008 quarterly earnings call shows that
management was cautiously optimistic about Protiviti’s performance and
prospects, and there were initial efforts to bring costs in line with flat
revenues. Given that RHI had not ever managed Protiviti through a downturn,
senior management could not provide decent guidance on revenues for the
upcoming fourth quarter.
Then, with the collapse of Lehman Brothers in
September 2008, the financial crisis became really severe in Q4-2008.
In Q4-2008, Protiviti’s revenues fell to $125
million, $15 million below the run rate seen in the last three quarters, but
Protiviti had already started moving to reducing its cost base. Both direct
costs and SG&A costs were quickly reined in, and the cost base in Q4-2008
was reduced by $12 million in comparison to Q3-2008, to almost offset the
$15 million loss in revenue. Overall, operating income for Q4-2008 decreased
to $1 million from $4 million in Q3-2009.
At the end of 2008, Protiviti had seen flat
revenues to 2007, but a sharp drop in profits. The firm had 3,200 employees,
100 lower than the 3,300 at the end of 2007, through some initial layoffs.
Its likely no-one imagined how 2009 would turn out.
In Q1-2009, Protiviti’s revenue fell to $100
million, $25 million below Q4-2008 (some of this was attributed to
seasonally slow first quarters), but this is when Protiviti really started
to manage its employee base. It took an $8 million extraordinary charge in
the quarter for severance costs, with an intent to manage its employee
compensation costs in line with falling revenues. There was also a
contemporaneous reduction in SG&A, but the quarter still ended with a $11
million operating loss, as total costs in the quarter could not come down
far enough with the rapid decline in revenue.
In Q2-2009, quarterly revenues had fallen another
$10 million to $90 million, however, the cost base also fell by $10 million
from the previous quarter and the operating loss position of $11 million
held steady from the prior quarter. Protiviti took an additional $2 million
employee severance restructuring charge in the quarter. By this time,
management had recognized the severity of the issue and were taking active
steps to manage costs in line with declining revenues. Management said that
US operations had better profitability than international operations, which
were being scrutinized in detail. Also, the division was taking steps to
diversify away purely from Internal Audit and Sarbox type work into IT audit
and co-sourcing to create a larger set of non-correlated service lines.
By Q3-2009, the positive cost impact of the
reductions in staff were showing on the bottom line. Q3-2009 revenues were
$96 million, a good $6 million better than the $90 million in Q2-2009 in
terms of revenue, with the third quarter being sequentially generally better
than the second quarter. Costs in Q3-2009 were also $7 million better than
Q2-2009, with the net result that operating profit increased by $12 million
from Q2-2009 to Q3-2009. Q3-2009 turned in a small operating income of $1
million. Q3-2009 gross margin% matched what were historical levels in the
first half of 2008.
In Q4-2009, the operating situation was quite
similar to Q3-2009, as revenues and costs generally held steady and flat.
Revenue was $96 million, staff utilization improved and operating income was
essentially zero.
Protiviti ended 2009 with $384 million in revenue,
30% lower than 2008, and with an operating loss of $21 million (net of
restructuring charges) compared with $7 million of operating profit in 2008.
The big change in 2009 was the employee base, the year ended with 2,500
employees, 700 employees lower than the end of the previous year. This was a
gut-wrenching 22% reduction in staff, in that 1 out of every 5 professionals
with Protiviti who was working at the end of 2008 was no longer at the firm
in 2009.
As we turn into 2010, management appears much more
bullish about Protiviti’s 2010 prospects and indicated generally that the
division will aim to generate positive operating profit for this year. The
problem seems to lie in Protiviti’s operations outside the US, which are
offsetting a higher level of US profitability, and there seems to be serious
effort to turn that around. It indicates that operating costs levels have
now been sized to a $400 million revenue business; and anecdotal evidence at
Protiviti consultants indicates there is growing confidence that there will
higher levels of business in this year.
Anyone who has passed through this crisis will
recall with clarity how difficult the last quarter of 2008 and the first
half of 2009 really was. This is a case study on Protiviti, but likely
representative of all consulting and accounting firms, who faced and
continue to face a crisis unprecedented in modern times. The decline in
Protiviti (a Big 4 firm spin off) is in line with the decreases in Advisory
service lines at the Big Four firms, however the magnitude of the fall is
much higher at Protiviti, much to its smaller size and smaller footprint in
higher-growth emerging countries of the world.
While we have been able only to tell the story from
the public financials, we do recognize there is a deep human cost, in terms
of lost jobs, continued unemployment, potentially poor morale, and tough
disengagement and working conditions. We invite Protiviti alumni to join the
Big4 LinkedIn group, which has a robust discussion and job board to extend
their network and keep abreast of developments. And if any of our readers
have first-hand or deeper knowledge of this situation, we welcome your
comments.
February 9, 2010 reply from Francine McKenna
[retheauditors@GMAIL.COM]
Another Andersen legacy
partners firm is FRA. it consists of only 6 or so partners
who do SEC/GAAP/IFRS consulting, no audit. Scott Taub of SEC
fame is part of the team, based in Chicago.
http://www.finra.com/scott.html
An interview I did with
Scott Taub at the Compliance Week Annual Conference in June
2009 is a big portion of this piece for Accountancy Magazine
in the UK.
http://retheauditors.com/2009/07/07/mckenna-in-accountancy-magazine/
fm
"Predicting Material
Accounting Misstatements"
Patricia M. Dechow University of California, Berkeley - Haas School of
Business
Weili Ge University of Washington - Michael G. Foster School of Business
Chad R. Larson Washington University, St. Louis
Richard G. Sloan Haas School of Business, UC Berkeley
SSRN, November 16, 2009
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=997483
Abstract:
We examine 2,190 SEC Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Releases (AAERs)
issued between 1982 and 2005. We obtain 676 firms that are alleged
to have misstated their quarterly or annual financial statements. We
examine the characteristics of misstating firms along five
dimensions: accrual quality; financial performance; non-financial
measures; off-balance sheet activities; and market-based measures.
We compare misstating firms to themselves during non-misstatement
years and misstating firms to the broader population of all publicly
listed firms. The results reveal that during misstatement years,
accruals and cash and credit sales are unusually high, while return
on assets and the number of employees are declining. In addition,
misstating firms finance more of their assets through operating
leases and have relatively less PP&E. We find that market pressures
appear to affect incentives to misstate. Misstating firms are
raising new financing, have higher market-to-book ratios, and strong
prior stock price performance. We develop a model to predict
accounting misstatements. The output of this model is a scaled
logistic probability that we term the F-Score, where values greater
than one suggest a greater likelihood of a misstatement.
Bob Jensen's threads on
Quality of Earnings, Restatements, and Core Earnings are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings
Accounting Teachers About
Cooking the Books Get Caught ... er ... Cooking the Books
The media and blogs are conveniently
pinning the Huron debacle on its Andersen roots, and hinting that the
Enron malfeasance bled into Huron.
What I find ironic below is
that the Huron Consulting Group is itself a consulting group on
technical accounting matters, internal controls, financial statement
restatements, accounting fraud, rules compliance, and accounting
education. If any outfit should've known better it was Huron Consulting
Group ---
http://www.huronconsultinggroup.com/about.aspx
Huron Consulting Group was
formed in May of 2003 in Chicago with a core set of 213 following the
implosion of huge Arthur Andersen headquartered in Chicago. The timing
is much more than mere coincidence since a lot of Andersen professionals
were floating about looking for a new home in Chicago. In the past I've
used the Huron Consulting Group published studies and statistics about
financial statement revisions of other companies. I never anticipated
that Huron Consulting itself would become one of those statistics. I
guess Huron will now have more war stories to tell clients.
The
media and blogs are conveniently pinning the Huron debacle on its
Andersen roots, and hinting that the Enron malfeasance bled into Huron.
Big Four Blog, August 5, 2009 ---
http://www.blogcatalog.com/blog/life-after-big-four-big-four-alumni-blog/eae8a159803847f6a73af93c063058f9
"Can hobbled Huron
Consulting survive this scandal?" by Steven R. Strahler, Chicago
Business, August 4, 2009 ---
http://www.chicagobusiness.com/cgi-bin/news.pl?id=35019&seenIt=1
An
accounting mess at Huron Consulting Group Inc. that led to the
decapitation of top management and the collapse in its share price
puts the survival of the Chicago-based firm in jeopardy.
Huron’s
damaged reputation imperils its ability to provide credible expert
witnesses during courtroom proceedings growing out of its
bread-and-butter restructuring and disputes and investigations
practices. Rivals are poised to capture marketshare.
“These
types of firms have to be squeaky clean with no exceptions, and this
was too big of an exception,” says Allan Koltin, a Chicago-based
accounting industry consultant. “I respect the changes they made and
the speed (with which) they made them. I’m not sure they can recover
from this.”
Huron
executives declined to comment.
Late
Friday, Huron said it would restate results for the three years
ended in 2008 and for the first quarter of 2009, resulting in a
halving of its profits, to $63 million from $120 million, for the
39-month period. Revenue projections for 2009 were cut by more than
10%, to a range of $650 million to $680 million from $730 million to
$770 million.
The company
said its hand was forced by its recent discovery that holders of
shares in acquired firms had an agreement among themselves to
reallocate a portion of their earn-out payments to other Huron
employees. The company said it had been unaware of the arrangement.
“The
employee payments were not ‘kickbacks’ to Huron management,” the
company said.
Whatever
the description, the fallout promises to shake Huron to its core.
The company’s stock plunged 70% Monday to about $14 per share, and
law firms were preparing to mount class-action shareholder
litigation.
“If the
public doesn’t buy that the house is clean, my guess is some of the
senior talent will start to move very quickly,” says William Brandt,
president and CEO of Chicago-based restructuring firm Development
Specialists Inc. “Client retention is all that matters here.”
Publicly
traded competitors like Navigant Consulting Inc. are unlikely to
make bids for Huron because of the potential for damage to their own
stock. Private enterprises like Mesirow Financial stand as logical
employers as Huron workers jump ship.
“There
certainly is potential out there for clients and employees who may
be looking at different options, but at this point in the process
it’s a little early to tell what impact this will have,” says a
Navigant spokesman.
Huron’s
woes led to the resignation last week of Chairman and CEO Gary
Holdren and Chief Financial Officer Gary Burge, both of whom will
stay on with the firm for a time, and the immediate departure of
Chief Accounting Officer Wayne Lipski.
Mr. Holdren,
59, has a certain amount of familiarity with turmoil.
He was
among co-founders of Huron in 2002, when their previous employer,
Andersen, folded along with its auditing client Enron Corp. He told
the Chicago Tribune in 2007, “Initially, when we’d call on potential
clients, they’d say, ‘Huron? Who are you? That sounds like Enron,’
or ‘Aren’t you guys supposed to be in jail? Why are you calling us?’
”
This year,
it’s been money issues dogging Huron. In the spring, shareholders
twice rejected proposals to sweeten an employee stock compensation
plan.
Mr.
Holdren’s total compensation in 2008 was $6.5 million, according to
Securities and Exchange Commission filings. Mr. Burge received $1.2
million.
A Huron
unit in June sued five former consultants and their new employer,
Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP, alleging that the defendants were
using trade secrets to lure Huron clients to the law firm. The
defendants denied the charges. The case is pending in Cook County
Circuit Court.
"3 executives at Huron
Consulting Group resign over accounting missteps Consulting firm
announces it will restate financial results for the past 3 fiscal years,"by
Wailin Wong, Chicago Tribune, August 1, 2009 ---
http://archives.chicagotribune.com/2009/aug/01/business/chi-sat-huron-0801-aug01
Chief
Executive Gary Holdren and two other top executives are resigning
from Chicago-based management consultancy Huron Consulting Group as
the company announced Friday it is restating financial statements
for three fiscal years.
Holdren’s
resignation as CEO and chairman was effective Monday and he will
leave Huron at the end of August, the company said in a statement.
Chief Financial Officer Gary Burge is being replaced in that post
but will serve as treasurer and stay through the end of the year.
Chief Accounting Officer Wayne Lipski is also leaving the company.
None of the departing executives will be paid severance, Huron said.
Huron will
restate its financial results for 2006, 2007, 2008 and the first
quarter of 2009. The accounting missteps relate to four businesses
that Huron acquired between 2005 and 2007.
According
to Huron’s statement and a filing with the Securities and Exchange
Commission, the selling shareholders of the acquired businesses
distributed some of their payments to Huron employees. They also
redistributed portions of their earnings “in amounts that were not
consistent with their ownership percentages” at the time of the
acquisition, Huron said.
A Huron
spokeswoman declined to give the number of shareholders and
employees involved, saying the company was not commenting beyond its
statement.
“I am
greatly disappointed and saddened by the need to restate Huron’s
earnings,” Holdren said in the statement. He acknowledged
“incorrect” accounting.
Huron said
the restatement’s total estimated impact on net income and earnings
before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization for the
periods in question is $57 million.
“Because
the issue arose on my watch, I believe that it is my responsibility
and my obligation to step aside,” said Holdren.
Huron said
the board’s audit committee had recently learned of an agreement
between the selling shareholders to distribute some of their
payments to a company employee. The committee then launched an
inquiry into all of Huron’s prior acquisitions and discovered the
involvement of more Huron employees.
Huron said
it is reviewing its financial reporting procedures and expects to
find “one or more material weaknesses” in the company’s internal
controls. The amended financial statements will be filed “as soon as
practicable,” Huron said.
James Roth,
one of Huron’s founders, is replacing Holdren as CEO. Roth was
previously vice president of Huron’s health and education consulting
business, the company’s largest segment. George Massaro, Huron’s
former chief operating officer who is the board of directors’ vice
chairman, will succeed Holdren as chairman.
James
Rojas, another Huron founder, is now the company’s CFO. Rojas was
serving in a corporate development role. Huron did not announce a
replacement for Lipski, the chief accounting officer.
The
company’s shares sank more than 57 percent in after-hours trading.
The stock had closed Friday at $44.35. Huron said it expects
second-quarter revenues between $164 million and $166 million, up
about 15 percent from the year-earlier quarter.
The
company, founded by former partners at the Andersen accounting firm
including Holdren, also said that it is conducting a separate
inquiry into chargeable hours in response to an inquiry from the
SEC.
Bob Jensen's threads on
accounting firm frauds are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Bob Jensen's Fraud Updates
are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudUpdates.htm
Cooking the Books
Before reading
this, you may want to read about creative
accounting and earnings management at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Earnings_management
From Jim Mahar's
blog on November 5, 2007 ---
http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/
Does
short-term debt lead to more "earnings
management"?
In another paper from the
FMAs,
Gupta and Fields
look at whether more short
term debt leads to more "earnings management."
Does short-term debt lead to more "earnings
management"?
Short answer: YES.
Longer answer:
Intuitively the idea behind the paper is that if
a firm has to go back to the capital markets,
they do not want to do so when times are bad. Of
course, sometimes times are bad. In those times,
management may be tempted to "manage" earnings
so that things do not appear as bad as they may
be.
The findings? Sure enough, managers seemingly
manage their firm's earnings more when the firm
has more short term debt.
A few look-ins:
From the Abstract (this is the best summary of
the entire paper):
"...results indicate that (i) firms with
more current debt are more susceptible to
managing earnings, (ii) this relation is
stronger for firms facing debt market
constraints (those without investment grade
debt) and (iii) auditor characteristics such
as auditor quality and tenure help diminish
this relation...."
Which fits intuition. Why?
* The more the constraints, the more incentive
the management has to manage earnings since if
they do not, they may not be able to refinance.
* Auditors would frown upon this behavior and
the stronger the auditor, the less likely it is
that the manager would manage earnings.
How does this "earnings management" manifest
itself? The most common way (although not the
only way) that managers manipulate earnings is
through the use of accruals . Thus, the authors
examine this and find:
"A one standard-deviation increase in
short-term debt (total current liabilities)
increases discretionary accruals by 1.69%
and increase total accruals by 2.28%. Our
evidence supports the idea that debt
maturity significantly impacts the tendency
of firms to manage earnings."
Which is a really interesting finding!
Sharing Site of Note --- http://www.dartmouth.edu/~msimmons/
Thank you Mark Simmons at Dartmouth for sharing internal
auditing and fraud investigation resources.
|
|
This site focuses on topics that deal
with Internal
Auditing and Fraud
Investigation with certain links
to other associated and relevant sources. It is dedicated to
sharing information.
Internal
Auditing
is an independent, objective assurance and consulting activity
designed to add value and improve an organization's
operations. It helps an organization accomplish its
objectives by bringing a systematic, disciplined approach to
evaluate and improve the effectiveness of risk management,
control, and governance processes. (Institute of
Internal Auditors)
Fraud
Investigation
consists of the multitude of steps necessary to resolve
allegations of fraud — interviewing witnesses, assembling
evidence, writing reports, and dealing with prosecutors and
the courts. (Association of Certified Fraud Examiners)
|
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on fraud detection and reporting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudReporting.htm
"Rash of Restatements Rattles," by K.C. Swanson, TheStreet.com,
March 17, 2004
http://www.thestreet.com/tech/kcswanson/10149112.html
Confession season is upon us, but the problem
so far isn't companies owing up to earnings shortfalls. Instead, they're
admitting past financial results were simply wrong.
Unnerved by a sterner accounting culture,
companies have been increasingly reaching back years to ratchet down
reported profits by tens or even hundreds of millions of dollars. Eyeing
the March 15 filing deadline for calendar 2003 annual reports,
Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY:NYSE) , P.F. Chang's (PFCB:Nasdaq)
, Veritas (VRTS:Nasdaq) and Nortel (NT :Nasdaq) this week
joined a fast-growing string of public companies to say prior financial
reports inflated real business trends.
The number of restated audited annual financial
statements hit a record high of 206 last year, according to
Chicago-based Huron Consulting Group. Observers say 2004 is already
shaping up as a banner year for revisions.
"There are certainly more high-profile
restatements and you're hearing about them more" compared to past years,
said Jeff Brotman, an accounting professor at the University of
Pennsylvania.
For Bristol-Myers Squibb, Nortel and Network
Associates (NET:NYSE) , recent restatements came on top of prior
restatements, much to the irritation of investors. In at least two
cases, the embarrassing double restatements prompted internal shifts;
Nortel put two of its financial executives on leave as part of a
bookkeeping probe. Network Associates fired PricewaterhouseCoopers,
according to various news reports, after the auditor cited "material
weakness" in its internal controls in the company's annual report.
Probably the biggest reason for the wave of
honesty is a host of new corporate governance and accounting rules in
the wake of the corporate reform legislation known as Sarbanes-Oxley,
which went into effect a year and a half ago. Also, accounting firms
have grown far more cautious, cowed by the collapse of auditor Arthur
Andersen in 2002 after massive fraud at its client Enron.
The upshot is that both managers and auditors
are now more likely to err on the side of conservative accounting.
"A lot of things in accounting are judgment
calls, gray areas," said Peter Ehrenberg, chair of the corporate finance
practice group at Lowenstein & Sandler, a Roseland, N.J.-based law firm.
"If there are issues in any given company and we were in 2000, a person
acting in good faith might easily say, 'We can pass on that.' But that
same person looking at the same facts today might say, 'There's too much
risk.'
"Certainly regulators in general are more
credible because they're much less likely to give the benefit of the
doubt in this environment," he added. "The auditors know that and
they're [therefore] less likely to stick their necks out."
Case in point: Last week Gateway (GTW:NYSE)
said longtime auditor PricewaterhouseCoopers won't work for it anymore.
PwC did the books back in 2000 and 2001 -- an era of aggressive
accounting that still haunts Gateway, though it's now under different
management.
From Executive Suite to Cell Block
Tougher law enforcement against corporate
offenders is also fueling more prudent behavior. The long-underfunded
Securities and Exchange Commission, which is now required to review
the financial statements of public companies every three years, has
finally been given more dollars to hire staff. In 2003, the SEC's
workforce was 11% higher than in 2001. This year, the agency's budget
allocation should allow it to expand its payroll an additional 9%, to
nearly 3,600 employees.
On the corporate side, CEOs and CFOs have had
to certify their financial reports since August 2002, also as a result
of Sarbanes-Oxley. "I think Sarbanes-Oxley makes executives ask the hard
questions they should have always asked," said Jeffrey Herrmann, a
securities litigator and partner in the Saddle Brook, N.J.-based law
firm of Cohn Lifland Pearlman Herrmann & Knopf. "Maybe today an
executive says to his accounting firm: 'I'm not going to regret anything
here about how we handled goodwill or reserves, am I? It isn't coming
back to haunt us, is it?' "
Recent government prosecutions against
high-level executives such as Tyco's Dennis Kozlowski,
Worldcom's Bernie Ebbers, and Enron's Andrew Fastow and Jeffrey
Skilling starkly underscore the penalties managers may face for playing
fast-and-loose with accounting.
Meanwhile, auditing firms are starting to
rotate staff, bringing in newcomers to take a fresh look at clients'
accounting. Also, new rules handed down by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board have prompted reassessments of past accounting methods,
which can lead to earnings revisions reaching back five years (the
period for which financial data is included in annual reports).
Another level of checks and balances on
accounting shenanigans arrived last April when the SEC ruled that
corporate audit committees must be composed entirely of members
independent from the company itself. "Audit committees are getting more
active and making sure that when they learn of problems, they're going
to be dealt with," said Curtis Verschoor, an accounting professor at
DePaul University.
In this environment of heightened scrutiny,
however, the notion that a restatement was tantamount to a financial
kiss of death has faded, too.
"We have now seen companies that issued
restatements that have lived to do business another day," said Brotman.
"The stock hasn't crashed; nobody's been fired or gone to jail; they
haven't lost access to the capital markets; there haven't been any more
shareholder lawsuits than there would have already been. If a company
does a restatement early, fully and explains exactly what it is and why,
it's not a lethal injection."
Meanwhile, corporate reform rules are being put
in place that could lead to yet more accounting cleanups down the road.
One provision will make companies find a way for whistleblowers to
confidentially report possible wrongdoings, noted Verschoor.
Still, "the pendulum swings both ways," said
Herrmann. "If the government continues to prosecute people in high-level
positions, maybe that will last for a while. It probably will send a
message and the fear of God will spread. But my guess is that politics
being what it is, somewhere down the line the spotlight will be off and
there will be fewer prosecutions."
A Round-Up of Recent Earnings Restatements
Some firms are no stranger to the restatement
dance |
| Company |
Financial Scoop |
Number of restatements in past
year |
| Bristol-Myers Squibb (BMY:NYSE) |
Restating fourth-quarter and full-year results for
2003 due to accounting errors. Follows an earlier restatement of
earnings between 1999 and 2002, as of early 2003 |
Twice |
| P.F. Chang's China Bistro (PFCB:Nasdaq) |
Will delay filing its 10K; plans to restate
earnings for prior years, including for calendar year 2003 |
Once |
| Veritas (VRTS:Nasdaq) |
Will restate earnings for 2001 through 2003 |
Once |
| Nortel (NT:NYSE) |
Will restate earnings for 2003 and earlier periods;
Nortel already restated earnings for the past three years in October
2003 |
Twice |
| Metris (MXT:NYSE) |
Restated its financial results for 1998 through
2002 and for the first three quarters of 2003 following an SEC
inquiry |
Once |
| Quovadx (QVDX:Nasdaq) |
Restating results for 2003 |
Once |
| WorldCom |
Restated pretax profits from 2000 and 2001; this
month former CEO Bernie Ebbers indicted on fraud charges in
accounting scandal that led to 2002 corporate bankruptcy |
Once |
| Service Corp. International (SRV:NYSE) |
Restating results for 2000 through 2003 |
Once |
| Flowserve (FLS:NYSE) |
Restating results for 1999 through 2003 |
Once |
| OM Group (OMG:NYSE) |
Restating results for 1999 through 2003 |
Once |
| IDX Systems (IDXC:Nasdaq) |
Restated results for 2003 |
Once |
| Network Associates (NET:NYSE) |
Restated results for 2003 this month; restated
earnings for periods from 1998 to 2003 after investigations by the
SEC and Justice Department |
Twice |
| Take-Two (TTWO:Nasdaq) |
In February, restated results from 1999 to 2003
following investigation by the SEC |
Once |
| Sipex (SIPX:Nasdaq) |
In February, restated results from 2003, marking
the second revision of third-quarter '03 results |
Twice |
|
Source:
SEC filings, media reports. |
March 1, 2004 message from Mike
Groomer
Bob,
Do you have any
idea about who coined the phrase “Cooking the Books? What is the lineage
of these magic words?
Mike
Hi Mike,
The phrase "cooking the books"
appears to have a long history. Several friends on the AECM found some
interesting facts and legends.
However, there may be a little
urban legend in some of this.
I suspect that the phrase may
have origins that will never be determined much like double entry
bookkeeping itself with unknown origins. And I'm not sure were the term
"books" first appeared although I suspect it goes back to when ledgers
were bound into "books."
Bob Jensen
March 1 messages from David
Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
-----Original
Message-----
From: David Albrecht
Sent: Monday, March 01, 2004 9:56 PM
Subject: Acct 321: Cooking the books
The phrase
"Cooking the Books" has been part of our linguistic heritage for over
two hundred years. Here is a discussion of the origination of the
phrase. Enjoy! Dr. Albrecht
http://www.wordwizard.com/clubhouse/founddiscuss1.asp?Num=3093
Just found another page.
from
http://www.wordwizard.com/clubhouse/founddiscuss1.asp?Num=3093
I'm doing a google search.
Interesting links so far:
Cost to society of cooking the
books - from Brookings Institute
http://www.brookings.edu/comm/policybriefs/pb106.htm
Cookie jar accounting -
http://www.investorwords.com/1121/cookie_jar_accounting.html
The bubbling corporate ethics
scandal and recipes for avoiding future stews. -
http://research.moore.sc.edu/Publications/B&EReview/B&E49/Be49_3/cooking.htm
Andersen cartoon -
http://www.claybennett.com/pages/andersen.html
Cooking the Books with Mike -
http://www.moneytalks.net/book.asp
Cartoons -
http://www.cartoonstock.com/directory/c/cooking_the_books.asp
Cooking the books, an old
recipe -
http://www.accountantsworld.com/DesktopDefault.aspx?tabid=2&faid=290
--> "No one knows for sure when all the ingredients in the phrase
'cooking the books' were first put together. Shakespeare was the first
to refer to "books" as a business ledger (King Lear, Act III, Scene iv,
"Keep...thy pen from lenders books"). The American Heritage Dictionary
of Idioms cites 1636 as the first time the word 'cook' was used to mean
falsify (but it didn't also include the word 'books'). Combining 'cook'
and 'books' may be a 20th century innovation. Even the origin of
"cooking the books" is controversial.
This is all I have time to
search,
David Albrecht
March 1, 2004 reply from Roy
Regel [Roy.Regel@BUSINESS.UMT.EDU]
A related term
is "cookbooking," as used in Gleim's 'Careers in Accounting: How to
Study for Success.' Per Gleim ". . .cookbooking is copying from the
chapter illustration, step-by-step. Barely more than rote memorization
is required to achieve false success. Do not cookbook!"
Isn't English
wonderful? :)
Roy Regel
March 1, 2004 reply from Richard
C. Sansing [Richard.C.Sansing@DARTMOUTH.EDU]
According to
http://www.businessballs.com/clichesorigins.htm , the phrase dates
back to the 18th century, to an (unattributed) report that used the
phrase "the books have been cooked." The report dealt with the conduct
of George Hudson and the accounts of the Eastern Counties Railways.
Richard Sansing
Following up on Richard Sansing's
lead, Mike answered his own question ---
http://www.businessballs.com/clichesorigins.htm
Bob Jensen
Original
Message-----
From: Groomer, S. Michael [mailto:groomer@indiana.edu]
Sent: Tuesday, March 02, 2004 9:40 AM
To: Jensen, Robert Subject: RE: Acct 321: Cooking the books
Hi Bob,
Yes… very
interesting… See below… Thanks for your efforts.
Best regards,
Mike
cook the books
- falsify business accounts - according to 18th century Brewer, 'cook
the books' originally appeared as the past tense 'the books have been
cooked' in a report (he didn't name the writer unfortunately) referring
to the conduct George Hudson (1700-71), 'the railway king', under whose
chairmanship the accounts of Eastern Counties Railways were falsified.
Brewer says then (1870) that the term specifically describes the
tampering of ledger and other trade books in order to show a balance in
favour of the bankrupt. Brewer also says the allusion is to preparing
meat for the table. These days the term has a wider meaning, extending
to any kind of creative accounting. Historical records bear this out,
and date the first recorded use quite accurately: Hudson made a fortune
speculating in railway shares, and then in 1845, which began the period
1845-47 known as 'railway mania' in Britain, he was exposed as a
fraudster and sent to jail. Other cliche references suggest earlier
usage, even 17th century, but there appears to be no real evidence of
this. There is an argument for Brewer being generally pretty reliable
when it comes to first recorded/published use, because simply he lived
far closer to the date of origin than reference writers of today. If you
read Brewer's Dictionary of Phrase and Fable you'll see it does have an
extremely credible and prudent style. The word 'book' incidentally comes
from old German 'buche' for beech wood, the bark of which was used in
Europe before paper became readily available. The verb 'cook' is from
Latin 'coquere'
Risk-Based
Auditing Under Attack
Selling New
Equity to Pay Dividends: Reminds Me About the South Sea Bubble of
1720 ---
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/South_Sea_bubble
"Fooling Some People All the Time"
"Melting
into Air: Before the financial system went bust, it went
postmodern," by John Lanchester, The New Yorker, November 10,
2008 ---
http://www.newyorker.com/arts/critics/atlarge/2008/11/10/081110crat_atlarge_lanchester
This is also why the
financial masters of the universe tend not to write books. If you
have been proved—proved—right, why bother? If you need to tell it,
you can’t truly know it. The story of David Einhorn and Allied
Capital is an example of a moneyman who believed, with absolute
certainty, that he was in the right, who said so, and who then
watched the world fail to react to his irrefutable demonstration of
his own rightness. This drove him so crazy that he did what was, for
a hedge-fund manager, a bizarre thing: he wrote a book about it.
The story
began on May 15, 2002, when Einhorn, who runs a hedge fund called
Greenlight Capital, made a speech for a children’s-cancer charity in
Hackensack, New Jersey. The charity holds an annual fund-raiser at
which investment luminaries give advice on specific shares. Einhorn
was one of eleven speakers that day, but his speech had a twist: he
recommended shorting—betting against—a firm called Allied Capital.
Allied is a “business development company,” which invests in
companies in their early stages. Einhorn found things not to like in
Allied’s accounting practices—in particular, its way of assessing
the value of its investments. The
mark-to-market accounting that Einhorn
favored is based on the price an asset would fetch if it were sold
today, but many of Allied’s investments were in small startups that
had, in effect, no market to which they could be marked. In
Einhorn’s view, Allied’s way of pricing its holdings amounted to
“the you-have-got-to-be-kidding-me method of accounting.” At the
same time, Allied was issuing new
equity, and, according to Einhorn, the
revenue from this could be used to fund the dividend payments that
were keeping Allied’s investors happy.
To Einhorn, this looked like a potential Ponzi scheme.
The next day,
Allied’s stock dipped more than twenty per cent, and a storm of
controversy and counter-accusations began to rage. “Those engaging
in the current misinformation campaign against Allied Capital are
cynically trying to take advantage of the current post-Enron
environment by tarring a great and honest company like Allied
Capital with the broad brush of a Big Lie,” Allied’s C.E.O. said.
Einhorn would be the first to admit that he wanted Allied’s stock to
drop, which might make his motives seem impure to the general
reader, but not to him. The function of hedge funds is, by his
account, to expose faulty companies and make money in the process.
Joseph Schumpeter described capitalism as “creative destruction”:
hedge funds are destructive agents, predators targeting the weak and
infirm. As Einhorn might see it, people like him are especially
necessary because so many others have been asleep at the wheel. His
book about his five-year battle with Allied, “Fooling Some of the
People All of the Time” (Wiley; $29.95), depicts analysts,
financial journalists, and the S.E.C. as being culpably complacent.
The S.E.C. spent three years investigating Allied. It found that
Allied violated accounting guidelines, but noted that the company
had since made improvements. There were no penalties. Einhorn calls
the S.E.C. judgment “the lightest of taps on the wrist with the
softest of feathers.” He deeply minds this, not least because the
complacency of the watchdogs prevents him from being proved right on
a reasonable schedule: if they had seen things his way, Allied’s
stock price would have promptly collapsed and his short selling
would be hugely profitable. As it was, Greenlight shorted Allied at
$26.25, only to spend the next years watching the stock drift
sideways and upward; eventually, in January of 2007, it hit
thirty-three dollars.
All this has a
great deal of resonance now, because, on May 21st of this year, at
the same charity event, Einhorn announced that Greenlight had
shorted another stock, on the ground of the company’s exposure to
financial derivatives based on dangerous subprime loans. The company
was Lehman Brothers. There was little delay in Einhorn’s being
proved right about that one: the toppling company shook the entire
financial system. A global cascade of
bank implosions ensued—Wachovia, Washington Mutual, and the
Icelandic banking system being merely some of the highlights to
date—and a global bailout of the entire system had to be put in
train. The short sellers were proved
right, and also came to be seen as culprits; so was mark-to-market
accounting, since it caused sudden, cataclysmic drops in the book
value of companies whose holdings had become illiquid. It is
therefore the perfect moment for a short-selling advocate of marking
to market to publish his account. One can only speculate whether
Einhorn would have written his book if he had known what was going
to happen next. (One of the things that have happened is that, on
September 30th, Ciena Capital, an Allied portfolio company to whose
fraudulent lending Einhorn dedicates many pages, went into
bankruptcy; this coincided with a collapse in the value of Allied
stock—finally!—to a price of around six dollars a share.) Given the
esteem with which Einhorn’s profession is regarded these days, it’s
a little as if the assassin of Archduke Franz Ferdinand had taken
the outbreak of the First World War as the timely moment to publish
a book advocating bomb-throwing—and the book had turned out to be
unexpectedly persuasive.
Heavy
Insider Trading ---
http://investing.businessweek.com/research/stocks/ownership/ownership.asp?symbol=ALD
Allied's
independent auditor is KPMG
KPMG has a lot of
problems with litigation ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud001.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on the collapse of the Banking System are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/2008Bailout.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on fraud are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Fraud.htm
Also see Fraud Rotten at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm
Bob
Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm
Also see the theory of fair value accounting at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FairValue
History of Fraud in America
---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/415wp/AmericanHistoryOfFraud.htm
"Heads Up Play With David
Einhorn," by Bess Levin, DealBreaker, December 21, 2010 ---
Click Here
http://dealbreaker.com/2010/12/heads-up-play-with-david-einhorn-a-qa/?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=Feed%3A+dealbreaker+%28Dealbreaker%29
If you’re
going to commit financial fraud, you probably don’t want to find
yourself sitting at a table across from David Einhorn, who will know
what you’re up to and share it with the world. Similarly, if you’ve
never played poker and have only ever had a 15 minute tutorial on
the game, you probably should avoid playing with the Greenlight
Capital founder, whose vastly superior skills will demonstrate just
how much you suck. As I like to live on the edge, yesterday in an
undisclosed location, I choose not to heed the wisdom of the latter.
Over several hands, Einhorn and I discussed the new edition of his
2008 book, “Fooling Some Of The People, All Of The Time.”
The
latest version includes an epilogue, and concludes the story of
Allied and Einhorn’s years of trying to get other people to listen
when he said something was up. As we
now know, Allied’s shares collapsed, Greenlight collected $35
million, and the hedge fund made another big (and correct) call on a
bank called Lehman Brothers, whose failure was, according to Einhorn,
“the Allied story all over again,” just on a bigger scale, with more
resounding consequences. Even after
the last crisis, which should have been a wake-up call, Einhorn
doesn’t think we’ve changed much and if anything, the reforms passed
only “encourage poor behavior and will likely foster an even bigger
crisis.” He and I chatted about that exciting event, Quantitative
Easing, Steve Eisman’s illicit pleasure of choice and more, plus
poker tips for people who really, really need them.
Continued in article
How to Pass Price Risk Along to Uncle Sam
Agribusiness Lobby Reaps the Biggest Harvest in Washington DC
A farmer can sell his crop early at a high
price, say, in a futures contract, and still collect a subsidy check
after the harvest from the government if prices are down over all. The
money is not tied to what the farmer actually received for his crop. The
farmer does not even have to sell the crop to get the check, only prove
that the market has dropped below a certain set rate.
"Big Farms Reap Two Harvests With Subsidies a Bumper Crop," by
Timothy Egan, The New York Times, December 26, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2004/12/26/national/26farm.html?oref=login
The roadside sign welcoming people into this
state reads: "Nebraska, the Good Life." And for farmers
closing out their books at the end of a year when they earned more
money than at any time in the history of American agriculture, it
certainly looks like happy days.
But at a time when big harvests and record
farm income should mean that Champagne corks are popping across the
prairie, the prosperity has brought with it the kind of nervousness
seen in headlines like the one that ran in The Omaha World-Herald in
early December: "Income boom has farmers on edge."
For despite the fact that farm income has
doubled in two years, federal subsidies have also gone up nearly 40
percent over the same period - projected at $15.7 billion this year,
and $130 billion over the last nine years. And that bounty is drawing
fire from people who say that at this moment of farm prosperity, the
nation's subsidy system has never made less sense.
Even those deeply steeped in the system
acknowledge it seems counterintuitive. "I struggle with the same
question: how the hell can you have such high government payments if
farmers had such a great year?" said Keith Collins, the chief
economist for the Agriculture Department.
The answer lies in the quirks of the federal
farm subsidy system as well as in the way savvy farmers sell their
crops. Mr. Collins said farmers use the peculiar world of agriculture
market timing to get both high commodity prices and high subsidies.
"The biggest reason is with record
crops, prices have fallen," he said. "And farmers are taking
advantage of that."
A farmer can sell his crop early at a high
price, say, in a futures contract, and still collect a subsidy check
after the harvest from the government if prices are down over all. The
money is not tied to what the farmer actually received for his crop.
The farmer does not even have to sell the crop to get the check, only
prove that the market has dropped below a certain set rate.
Continued in article
Bob Jensen's threads on futures contracts and other derivative financial
instruments are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm
References
Risk-Based
Auditing Under Attack
From Smart Stops on the Web, Journal of Accountancy, January
2004, Page 27 ---
Accountability Resources Here
www.thecorporatelibrary.com
CPAs can read about corporate governance in the real
world in articles such as “Alliance Ousts Two Executives” and “Mutual
Fund Directors Avert Eyes as Consumers Get Stung” at this Web site.
Other resources here include related news items from wire services and
newspapers, details on specific shareholder action campaigns and links
to other corporate governance Web stops. And on the lighter side,
visitors can view a slide show of topical cartoons.
Cartoon archives ---
http://www.thecorporatelibrary.com/cartoons/tcl_cartoons.htm
Cartoon 1: Two kids competing on the blackboard. One
writes 2+2=4 and the other kid writes 2+2=40,000. Which kid as
the best prospects for an accounting career?
Cartoon 36: Where the Grasso is greener (Also see Cartoon 37)
Show-and-Tell
www.encycogov.com
This e-stop, while filled with information on corporate
governance, also features detailed flowcharts and tables on bankruptcy,
information retrieval and monitoring systems, as well as capital,
creditor and ownership structures. Practitioners will find six
definitions of the term corporate governance and a long list of
references to books, papers and periodicals about the topic.
Investors, Do Your Homework
www.irrc.org
At this Web site CPAs will find the electronic version
of the Investor Responsibility Research Center’s IRRC Social Issues
Reporter, with articles such as “Mutual Funds Seldom Support Social
Proposals.” Advisers also can read proposals from the Shareholder Action
Network and the IRRC’s review of NYSE and Sarbanes-Oxley Act reforms, as
well as use a glossary of industry terms to help explain to their
clients concepts such as acceleration, binding shareholder proposal
and cumulative voting.
Get Information Online
www.sarbanes-oxley.com
CPAs looking for links to recent developments on the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 can come here to review current SEC rules and
regulations with cross-references to specific sections of the act.
Visitors also can find the articles “Congress Eyes Mutual Fund Reform”
and “FBI and AICPA Join Forces to Help CPAs Ferret Out Fraud.”
Tech-minded CPAs will find the list of links to Sarbanes-Oxley
compliance software useful as well.
Direct From the Source
www.sec.gov/spotlight/sarbanes-oxley.htm
To trace the history of the SEC’s rule-making policies
for the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, CPAs can go right to the source at this Web
site and follow links to press releases pertaining to the commission’s
involvement since the act’s creation. Visitors also can navigate to the
frequently asked questions (FAQ) section about the act from the SEC’s
Division of Corporation Finance.
PCAOB Online
www.pcaobus.org
The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board e-stop
offers CPAs timely articles such as “Board Approves Registration of 598
Accounting Firms” and the full text of the Sarbanes-Oxley rules. Users
can research proposed standards on accounting support fees and audit
documentation and enforcement. Accounting firms not yet registered with
the PCAOB can do so here and check out the FAQ section about the
registration process.
Where are some great
resources (hard copy and electronic) for teaching ethics?
"An Inventory of Support Materials
for Teaching Ethics in the Post-Enron Era,” by C. William Thomas,
Issues in Accounting Education, February 2004, pp. 27-52 ---
http://aaahq.org/ic/browse.htm
ABSTRACT:
This paper presents a "Post-Enron" annotated bibliography of resources
for accounting professors who wish to either design a stand-alone course
in accounting ethics or who wish to integrate a significant component of
ethics into traditional courses across the curriculum. Many of the
resources listed are recent, but some are classics that have withstood
the test of time and still contain valuable information. The
resources listed include texts and reference works, commercial books,
academic and professional articles, and electronic resources such as
film and Internet websites. Resources are listed by subject
matter, to the extent possible, to permit topical access. Some
observations about course design, curriculum content, and instructional
methodology are made as well.
Bob Jensen's threads on resources
for accounting educators are at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/newfaculty.htm#Resources
"Kmart officials as purposely
violating accounting principles with the knowledge of the
company's auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers."
"Jury in Michigan Sides with
SEC in Kmart Case," SmartPros, June 1, 2009 ---
http://accounting.smartpros.com/x66692.xml
The former
head of Kmart Corp., who told jurors he was hired to save the
venerable retailer, was found liable Monday for misleading investors
about company finances before a bankruptcy filing in 2002.
The verdict
in the civil fraud trial followed 10 days of testimony in federal
court in Ann Arbor. The case was a fresh look at Charles Conaway's
brief tenure and the desperate scramble to keep Kmart afloat before
one of the largest bankruptcies in retail history.
The
Securities and Exchange Commission accused him of failing to
disclose that the retailer was delaying payments to suppliers to
save cash. The trial centered on a conference call with analysts and
Kmart's quarterly report to regulators, both in November 2001.
"It was a
clean sweep," SEC trial lawyer Alan Lieberman said of the verdict.
"It is
never enough for the numbers to be right. For the average investor,
the numbers being right do not tell the whole story," he said. "They
need to know the material information that management knows. The
foundation of the markets is full and honest disclosure."
The SEC
blamed Conaway for not sharing details in the report's
management-analysis section. He testified that he didn't write it,
didn't read it and relied on his chief financial officer and others.
During a
call with Wall Street analysts, Conaway said sales were poor - and
the stock took a 15 percent hit - but he didn't talk about the
vendor strategy or an ill-timed purchase of $800 million in
merchandise.
He
testified that Kmart had $1 billion in cash and credit when the call
was made and the quarterly report was filed. Conaway said it "never"
crossed his mind that he was withholding critical news.
The jury,
however, found that he acted "with intent to defraud or with
reckless disregard for the truth."
Despite
Conaway's testimony, the jury found that delaying payments to
vendors was a "material liquidity deficiency" affecting Kmart's
finances and should have been publicly reported.
Conaway's
lawyer, Scott Lassar, said they were disappointed with the verdict
and would pursue an appeal.
U.S.
Magistrate Judge Steven Pepe will handle the penalty phase. Conaway,
48, could be fined and banned from serving as an executive or
director at a public company.
He had a
successful career in the drugstore industry when he agreed in 2000
to try to turn around Kmart, which was no match for discount rivals
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. and Target Corp. Conaway was gone less than two
years later.
Kmart
emerged from Chapter 11 bankruptcy as a smaller company and now is
part of Sears Holdings Corp., based in Hoffman Estates, Ill.
The lawsuit
against Conaway and his former CFO, John McDonald Jr., was filed in
2005, three years after the bankruptcy.
Ronald
Kiima, formerly an assistant chief accountant at the SEC, said when
a company fails "there's a lot of `What did you know and when did
you know it?'"
"If
you don't give the sausage-making of what happened during a quarter,
that could be an issue," Kiima said in an interview. "For a CEO to
say he didn't lay eyes on the report is pretty damning."
Continued in article
Jensen Comment
Discount retailer Kmart came under investigation for irregular
accounting practices in 2002. In January an anonymous letter initiated
an internal probe of the company's accounting practices. The Detroit
News obtained a copy of the letter that contains allegations
pointing to senior Kmart officials as purposely violating accounting
principles with the knowledge of the company's
auditors, PricewaterhouseCoopers.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/82286
Bankrupt retailer Kmart
explained the impact of accounting irregularities and said employees
involved in questionable accounting practices are no longer with the
company.
http://www.accountingweb.com/item/90935
Kmart's CFO Steps up to Accounting Questions

|
|
AccountingWEB US - Sep-19-2002 - Bankrupt retailer
Kmart explained the impact of accounting irregularities in a
Form 10-Q filed with the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) this week. Chief Financial Officer Al Koch
said several employees involved in questionable
accounting practices are no longer with the company.
Speaking to the concerns about vendor allowances recently
raised in anonymous letters from in-house accountants, Mr.
Koch said, "It was not hugely widespread, but neither was it
one or two people."
The
Kmart
whistleblowers who wrote the letters said they were
being asked to record transactions in obvious violation of
generally accepted accounting principles. They also said
"resident auditors from PricewaterhouseCoopers are hesitant
to pursue these issues or even question obvious changes in
revenue and expense patterns."
In
response to the letters, the company admitted it had
erroneously accounted for certain vendor transactions as
up-front consideration, instead of deferring appropriate
amounts and recognizing them over the life of the contract.
It also said it decided to change its accounting method.
Starting with fourth quarter 2001, Kmart's policy is to
recognize a cost recovery from vendors only when a formal
agreement has been obtained and the underlying activity has
been performed.
According to this week's Form 10-Q, early recognition of
vendor allowances resulted in understatement of the
company's fiscal year 2000 net loss by approximately $26
million and overstatement of its fiscal year 2001 net loss
by approximately $78 million, both net of taxes. The 10-Q
also said the company has been looking at historical
patterns of markdowns and markdown reserves and their
relation to earnings.
Kmart is under investigation by the SEC and the Justice
Department. The Federal Bureau of Investigation, which is
handling the investigation for the U.S. Attorney, said its
investigation could result in criminal charges. In the
months before Kmart's bankruptcy filing, top executives took
home approximately $29 million in retention loans and
severance packages. A spokesperson for PwC said the firm is
cooperating with the investigations.
|
24 Days:
How Two Wall Street Journal Reporters Uncovered the Lies that Destroyed
Faith in Corporate America, by John R. Emshiller and Rebecca Smith (Haper
Collins, 2003, ISBN: 0060520736)
Here's a powerful Enron Scandal book in the words of the lead whistle
blower herself:
Power Failure: The Inside Story of the Collapse of
Enron
by
Mimi Swartz,
Sherron Watkins
ISBN: 0385507879
Format: Hardcover, 400pp
Pub. Date: March 2003 |
 |
Publisher: Doubleday & Company,
Incorporated
Edition Description: 1ST
|
“They’re still trying to hide the weenie,”
thought Sherron Watkins as she read a newspaper clipping about Enron two
weeks before Christmas, 2001. . . It quoted [CFO] Jeff McMahon
addressing the company’s creditors and cautioning them against a rash
judgment....
Related Books
Chronicling the inner workings of Andersen at
the height of its success, Toffler reveals "the making of an Android," the
peculiar process of employee indoctrination into the Andersen culture; how
Androids - both accountants and consultants--lived the mantra "keep the
client happy"; and how internal infighting and "billing your brains out"
rather than quality work became the all-important goals. Final Accounting
should be required reading in every business school, beginning with the
dean and the faculty that set the tone and culture." - Paul Volker, former
Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board.
The AccountingWeb, March 25, 2003.
Barbara Ley
Toffler is the former Andersen was the partner-in-charge of
Andersen's Ethics & Responsible Business Practices Consulting Services.
Title:
Final Accounting: Ambition, Greed and the Fall of Arthur Andersen
Authors: Barbara Ley Toffler, Jennifer Reingold
ISBN: 0767913825
Format: Hardcover, 288pp Pub.
Date: March 2003
Publisher: Broadway Books
Book Review from
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/tg/stores/detail/-/books/0767913825/reviews/002-8190976-4846465#07679138253200
Book
Description A withering exposé of the unethical practices that triggered
the indictment and collapse of the legendary accounting firm.
Arthur
Andersen's conviction on obstruction of justice charges related to the
Enron debacle spelled the abrupt end of the 88-year-old accounting firm.
Until recently, the venerable firm had been regarded as the accounting
profession's conscience. In Final Accounting, Barbara Ley Toffler,
former Andersen partner-in-charge of Andersen's Ethics & Responsible
Business Practices consulting services, reveals that the symptoms of
Andersen's fatal disease were evident long before Enron. Drawing on her
expertise as a social scientist and her experience as an Andersen
insider, Toffler chronicles how a culture of arrogance and greed
infected her company and led to enormous lapses in judgment among her
peers. Final Accounting exposes the slow deterioration of values that
led not only to Enron but also to the earlier financial scandals of
other Andersen clients, including Sunbeam and Waste Management, and
illustrates the practices that paved the way for the accounting fiascos
at WorldCom and other major companies.
Chronicling the
inner workings of Andersen at the height of its success, Toffler reveals
"the making of an Android," the peculiar process of employee
indoctrination into the Andersen culture; how Androids—both accountants
and consultants--lived the mantra "keep the client happy"; and how
internal infighting and "billing your brains out" rather than quality
work became the all-important goals. Toffler was in a position to know
when something was wrong. In her earlier role as ethics consultant, she
worked with over 60 major companies and was an internationally renowned
expert at spotting and correcting ethical lapses. Toffler traces the
roots of Andersen's ethical missteps, and shows the gradual decay of a
once-proud culture.
Uniquely
qualified to discuss the personalities and principles behind one of the
greatest shake-ups in United States history, Toffler delivers a chilling
report with important ramifications for CEOs and individual investors
alike.
From the Back
Cover "The sad demise of the once proud and disciplined firm of Arthur
Andersen is an object lesson in how 'infectious greed' and conflicts of
interest can bring down the best. Final Accounting should be required
reading in every business school, beginning with the dean and the
faculty that set the tone and culture.” -Paul Volker, former Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board
“This exciting
tale chronicles how greed and competitive frenzy destroyed Arthur
Andersen--a firm long recognized for independence and integrity. It
details a culture that, in the 1990s, led to unethical and anti-social
behavior by executives of many of America's most respected companies.
The lessons of this book are important for everyone, particularly for a
new breed of corporate leaders anxious to restore public confidence.”
-Arthur Levitt, Jr., former chairman of the Securities and Exchange
Commission
“This may be
the most important analysis coming out of the corporate disasters of
2001 and 2002. Barbara Toffler is trained to understand corporate
‘cultures’ and ‘business ethics’ (not an oxymoron). She clearly lays out
how a high performance, manically driven and once most respected
auditing firm was corrupted by the excesses of consulting and an
arrogant culture. One can hope that the leaders of all professional
service firms, and indeed all corporate leaders, will read and reflect
on the meaning of this book.” -John H. Biggs, Former Chairman and Chief
Executive Officer of TIAA CREF
“The book
exposes the pervasive hypocrisy that drives many professional service
firms to put profits above professionalism. Greed and hubris molded
Arthur Andersen into a modern-day corporate junkie ... a monster whose
self-destructive behavior resulted in its own demise." -Tom Rodenhauser,
founder and president of Consulting Information Services, LLC
"An intriguing
tale that adds another important dimension to the now pervasive national
corporate governance conversation. -Charles M. Elson, Edgar S. Woolard,
Jr., Professor of Corporate Governance, University of Delaware
“You could not
ask for a better guide to the fall of Arthur Andersen than an expert on
organizational behavior and business ethics who actually worked there.
Sympathetic but resolutely objective, Toffler was enough of an insider
to see what went on but enough of an outsider to keep her perspective
clear. This is a tragic tale of epic proportions that shows that even
institutions founded on integrity and transparency will lose everything
unless they have internal controls that require everyone in the
organization to work together, challenge unethical practices, and commit
only to profitability that is sustainable over the long term. One way to
begin is by reading this book. –Nell Minow, Editor, The Corporate
Library
About the
Author Formerly the Partner-in-Charge of Ethics and Responsible Business
Practices consulting services for Arthur Andersen, BARBARA LEY TOFFLER
was on the faculty of the Harvard Business School and now teaches at
Columbia University's Business School. She is considered one of the
nation's leading experts on management ethics, and has written
extensively on the subject and has consulted to over sixty Fortune 500
companies. She lives in the New York area. Winner of a Deadline Club
award for Best Business Reporting, JENNIFER REINGOLD has served as
management editor at Business Week and senior writer at Fast Company.
She writes for national publications such as The New York Times, Inc and
Worth and co-authored the Business Week Guide to the Best Business
Schools (McGraw-Hill, 1999).
Also see the review at
http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/23/business/yourmoney/23VALU.html
March 8, 2004
message from neil glass [neil.glass@get2net.dk]
Note that you can download the first chapter of his book for free.
The book may be purchased as an eBook or hard copy.
Dr. Jensen,
I just came across your website and was pleased
to find you talk about some of the frauds and other problems I reveal in
my latest book. If you had a moment, you might be amused to look at my
website only-on-the-net.com where I am trying to attract some attention
to my book Rip-Off: The scandalous inside story of the Management
Consulting Money Machine.
best wishes
neil glass
The link is
http://www.only-on-the-net.com/
The AICPA's Prosecution of Dr. Abraham Briloff, Some Observations ---
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/pi/newsletr/spring99/item07.htm
Art Wyatt admitted:
"ACCOUNTING PROFESSIONALISM: THEY JUST DON'T GET IT" ---
http://aaahq.org/AM2003/WyattSpeech.pdf
Here is some earlier related
material you can find at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudVirginia.htm
Lessons Learned From
Paul Volker:
The Culture of Greed Sucked the Blood Out of Professionalism
| In an effort
to save Andersen's reputation and life, the top executive officer,
Joe Berardino, in Andersen was replaced by the former Chairman of
the Federal Reserve Board, Paul Volcker. This great man,
Volcker, really tried to instantly change the culture of greed that
overtook professionalism in Andersen and other public
accounting firms, but it was too little too late --- at least for
Andersen.
The bottom line:
I have a
mental image of the role of an auditor. He’s a kind of umpire or
referee, mandated to keep financial reporting within the
established rules. Like all umpires, it’s not a popular or
particularly well paid role relative to the stars of the game. The
natural constituency, the investing public, like the fans at a
ball park, is not consistently supportive when their individual
interests are at stake. Matters of judgment are involved, and
perfection in every decision can’t be expected. But when the
“players”, with teams of lawyers and investment bankers, are in
alliance to keep reported profits, and not so incidentally the
value of fees and stock options on track, the pressures multiply.
And if the auditing firm, the umpire, is itself conflicted,
judgments almost inevitably will be shaded.
Paul Volcker (See below)
"Volcker says "new
Andersen" no longer possible," by Kevin Drawbaugh, CPAnet, May 17,
2002 ---
http://www.cpanet.com/up/s0205.asp?ID=0572
WASHINGTON, May 17 (Reuters) - Former Federal Reserve Board
Chairman Paul Volcker, who took charge of a rescue team at
embattled accounting firm Andersen (ANDR), said on Friday that
creating "a new Andersen" was no longer possible.
In a
letter to Sen. Paul Sarbanes, Volcker said he supports the
Maryland Democrat's proposals for reforming the U.S. financial
system to prevent future corporate disasters such as the collapse
of Enron Corp. (ENRNQ).
"The
sheer number and magnitude of breakdowns that have increasingly
become the daily fare of the business press pose a clear and
present danger to the effectiveness and efficiency of capital
markets," Volcker said in the letter released to Reuters.
"FINALLY, A TIME FOR
AUDITING REFORM"
REMARKS BY PAUL A. VOLCKER
AT THE CONFERENCE ON CREDIBLE FINANCIAL DISCLOSURES
KELLOGG SCHOOL OF MANAGEMENT
NORTHWESTERN UNIVERSITY
EVANSTON, ILLINOIS
JUNE 25, 2002
http://www.fei.org/download/Volker_Kellogg_Speech_6-25-02.pdf
How
ironic that we are meeting near Arthur Andersen Hall with the
leadership of the Leonard Spacek Professor of Accounting. From all
I have learned, the Andersen firm in general, and Leonard Spacek
in particular, once represented the best in auditing. Literally
emerging from the Northwestern faculty, Arthur Andersen
represented rigor and discipline, focused on the central mission
of attesting to the fairness and accuracy of the financial reports
of its clients.
The sad
demise of that once great firm is, I think we must now all
realize, not an idiosyncratic, one-off, event. The Enron affair is
plainly symptomatic of a larger, systemic problem. The state of
the accounting and auditing systems which we have so confidently
set out as a standard for all the world is, in fact, deeply
troubled.
The
concerns extend far beyond the profession of auditing itself.
There are important questions of corporate governance, which you
will address in this conference, but which I can touch upon only
tangentially in my comments. More fundamentally, I think we are
seeing the bitter fruit of broader erosion of standards of
business and market conduct related to the financial boom and
bubble of the 1990’s.
From
one angle, we in the United States have been in a remarkable era
of creative destruction, in one sense rough and tumble capitalism
at its best bringing about productivity-transforming innovation in
electronic technology and molecular biology. Optimistic visions of
a new economic era set the stage for an explosion in financial
values. The creation of paper wealth exceeded, so far as I can
determine, anything before in human history in relative and
absolute terms.
Encouraged by ever imaginative investment bankers yearning for
extraordinary fees, companies were bought and sold with great
abandon at values largely accounted for as “intangible” or “good
will”. Some of the best mathematical minds of the new generation
turned to the sophisticated new profession of financial
engineering, designing ever more complicated financial
instruments. The rationale was risk management and exploiting
market imperfections. But more and more it has become a game of
circumventing accounting conventions and IRS regulations.
Inadvertently or not, the result has been to load balance sheets
and income statements with hard to understand and analyze numbers,
or worse yet, to take risks off the balance sheet entirely. In the
process, too often the rising stock market valuations were
interpreted as evidence of special wisdom or competence,
justifying executive compensation packages way beyond any earlier
norms and relationships.
It was
an environment in which incentives for business management to keep
reported revenues and earnings growing to meet expectations were
amplified. What is now clear, is that insidiously, almost
subconsciously, too many companies yielded to the temptation to
stretch accounting rules to achieve that result.
I
state all that to emphasize the pressures placed on the auditors
in their basic function of attesting to financial statements.
Moreover, accounting firms themselves were caught up in the
environment – - to generate revenues, to participate in the new
economy, to stretch their range of services. More and more they
saw their future in consulting, where, in the spirit of the time,
they felt their partners could “better leverage” their talent and
raise their income.
I have a
mental image of the role of an auditor. He’s a kind of umpire or
referee, mandated to keep financial reporting within the
established rules. Like all umpires, it’s not a popular or
particularly well paid role relative to the stars of the game. The
natural constituency, the investing public, like the fans at a
ball park, is not consistently supportive when their individual
interests are at stake. Matters of judgment are involved, and
perfection in every decision can’t be expected. But when the
“players”, with teams of lawyers and investment bankers, are in
alliance to keep reported profits, and not so incidentally the
value of fees and stock options on track, the pressures multiply.
And if the auditing firm, the umpire, is itself conflicted,
judgments almost inevitably
Continued at
http://www.fei.org/download/Volker_Kellogg_Speech_6-25-02.pdf
"We're The Front Line For
Shareholders," by Phil Livingston (President of Financial
Executives International), January/February 2002 ---
http://www.fei.org/magazine/articles/1-2-2002_president.cfm
At FEI's
recent financial reporting conference in New York, Paul Volcker
gave the keynote address and declared that the accounting and
auditing profession were in a "state of crisis." Earlier that
morning, over breakfast, he lamented the daily bombardment of
financial reporting failures in the press.
I agree with
his assessment. The causes and contributing factors are numerous,
but one thing is clear: We as financial executives need to do
better, be stronger and take the lead in restoring the credibility
of financial reporting and preserving the capital markets.
If you
didn't already know it and believe it deeply, recent cases prove
the value of a financial management team that is ethical, credible
and clear in its communications. A loss of confidence in that team
can be a fatal blow, not just to the individuals, but to the
company or institution that entrusts its assets to their
stewardship. I think the FEI Code of Ethical Conduct says it best,
and it is worth reprinting the opening section here. The full code
(signed by all FEI members) can be found
here.
. . .
So how did
the profession reach the state Volcker describes as a crisis?
- The
market pressure for corporate performance has increased
dramatically over the last 10 years. That pressure has produced
better results for shareholders, but also a higher fatality rate
as management teams pressed too hard at the margin.
- The
standard-setters floundered in the issue de jour quagmire,
writing hugely complicated standards that were unintelligible
and irrelevant to the bigger problems.
- The
SEC fiddled while the dot-com bubble burst. Deriding and
undermining management teams and the auditors, the past
administration made a joke of financial restatements.
- We've
had no vision for the future of financial reporting. Annual
reports, 10Ks and 10Qs are obsolete. Bloomberg and Yahoo!
Finance have replaced the horse-and-buggy vehicles with summary
financial information linked to breaking news.
- We've
had no vision for the future of accounting. Today's mixed model
is criticized one day for recognizing unrealized fair value
contractual gains and alternatively for not recognizing the fair
value of financial instruments.
- The
auditors dropped their required skeptical attitude and embraced
business partnering philosophies. Adding value and justifying
the audit fees became the mandate. Management teams and audit
committees promoted this, too.
- Audit
committees have not kept up with the challenges of the
assignment. True financial reporting experts are needed on these
committees, not the general management expertise required by the
stock exchange rules.
Beta Gamma Sigma
honor society ---
http://cba.unomaha.edu/bg/
I’ve been a member of BGS for 40
years, but somehow I’ve managed to overlook B-Zine
From Beta Gamma
Sigma BZine Electronic Magazine ---
http://cba.unomaha.edu/bg/
CEOs may need to speak up
by Tim Weatherby, Beta Gamma Sigma
As more Fortune 500 companies and their executives are
sucked into the current crisis, it may be time for the good
guys to put their two cents in. The 2002 Beta Gamma Sigma
International Honoree did just that in April.
http://www.betagammasigma.org/news/bzine/august02feature.html
How Tyco's CEO
Enriched Himself
by Mark Maremont and Laurie P. Cohen, The
Wall Street Journal
The latest story of corporate abuse surrounds the former
Tyco CEO. This story provides a vivid example of the abuses
that are leading many to question current business practices.
http://www.msnbc.com/news/790996.asp
A Lucrative
Life at the Top
by MSNBC.com
Highlights pay and incentive packages of several former
corporate executives currently under investigation.
http://www.msnbc.com/news/783953.asp
A To-Do List for Tyco's CEO
by William C. Symonds, BusinessWeek online
The new CEO of Tyco has a tough job ahead of him cleaning
up the mess left behind.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_32/b3795050.htm
Implausible Deniability: The SEC Turns Up CEO Heat
by Diane Hess, TheStreet.com
The SEC's edict requires written statements, under oath,
from senior officers of the 1,000 largest public companies
attesting to the accuracy of their financial statements.
http://www.thestreet.com/markets/taleofthetape/10029865.html
Corporate Reform: Any Idea in a Storm?
by BusinessWeek online
Lawmakers eager to appease voters are trying all kinds of
things.
http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/02_32/b3795045.htm
Sealing Off the Bermuda Triangle
by Howard Gleckman, BusinessWeek online
Too many corporate tax dollars are disappearing because of
headquarters relocations, and Congress looks ready to act.
http://www.businessweek.com/bwdaily/dnflash/jun2002/nf20020625_2167.htm
"Adding Insult to Injury: Firms Pay Wrongdoers' Legal Fees," by
Laurie P. Cohen, The Wall Street Journal, February 17, 2004
---
http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107697515164830882,00.html?mod=home%5Fwhats%5Fnews%5Fus
You buy shares in a company. The
government charges one of the company's executives with fraud. Who
foots the legal bill?
All too often, it's you.
Consider the case of a former Rite Aid
Corp. executive. Four days before he was set to go to trial last
June, Frank Bergonzi pleaded guilty to participating in a criminal
conspiracy to defraud Rite Aid while he was the company's chief
financial officer. "I was aggressive and I pressured others to be
aggressive," he told a federal judge in Harrisburg, Pa., at the
time.
Little more than a month later, Mr.
Bergonzi sued his former employer in Delaware Chancery Court,
seeking to force the company to pay more than $5 million in unpaid
legal and accounting fees he racked up in connection with his
defense in criminal and civil proceedings. That was in addition to
the $4 million that Rite Aid had already advanced for Mr.
Bergonzi's defense in civil, administrative and criminal
proceedings.
In October, the Delaware court sided with
Mr. Bergonzi. It ruled that Rite Aid was required to advance Mr.
Bergonzi's defense fees until a "final disposition" of his legal
case. The court interpreted that moment as sentencing, a time that
could be months -- or even years -- away. Mr. Bergonzi has agreed
to testify against former colleagues at coming trials before he is
sentenced for his crimes.
Rite Aid's insurance, in what is known as
a directors-and-officers liability policy, already has been
depleted by a host of class-action suits filed against the company
in the wake of a federal investigation into possible fraud that
began in late 1999. "The shareholders are footing the bill"
because of the "precedent-setting" Delaware ruling, laments Alan
J. Davis, a Philadelphia attorney who unsuccessfully defended Rite
Aid against Mr. Bergonzi.
Rite Aid eventually settled with Mr.
Bergonzi for an amount it won't disclose. While it is entitled to
recover the fees it has paid from Mr. Bergonzi after he is
sentenced, the 58-year-old defendant has testified he has few
remaining assets. "We have no reason to believe he'll repay" Rite
Aid, Mr. Davis says.
Rite Aid has lots of company. In recent
government cases involving Cendant Corp.; WorldCom Inc., now known
as MCI; Enron Corp.; and Qwest Communications International Inc.,
among others, companies are paying the legal costs of former
executives defending themselves against fraud allegations. The
amount of money being paid out isn't known, as companies typically
don't specify defense costs. But it totals hundreds of millions,
or even billions of dollars. A company's average cost of defending
against shareholder suits last year was $2.2 million, according to
Tillinghast-Towers Perrin. "These costs are likely to climb much
higher, due to a lot of claims for more than a billion dollars
each that haven't been settled," says James Swanke, an executive
at the actuarial consulting firm.
Continued in the article
Corporate Accountability: A Toolkit for Social Activists
The Stakeholder Alliance (ala our friend Ralph Estes and
well-meaning social accountant) ---
http://www.stakeholderalliance.org/
From the Chicago Tribune,
February 19, 2002 ---
http://www.smartpros.com/x33006.xml
International Standards Needed, Volcker Says
WASHINGTON, Feb. 19, 2002 (Knight-Ridder / Tribune News Service) —
Enron Corp.'s collapse was a symptom of a financial recklessness
that spread during the 1990s economic boom as investors and
corporate executives pursued profits at all costs, former Federal
Reserve Chairman Paul Volcker told a Senate committee Thursday.
Volcker
-- chairman of the new oversight panel created by Enron's auditor,
the Andersen accounting firm, to examine its role in the financial
disaster -- told the Senate Banking Committee he hoped the debacle
would accelerate current efforts to achieve international
accounting standards. Such standards could reassure investors
around the world that publicly traded companies met certain
standards regardless of where such companies were based, he said.
"In the
midst of the great prosperity and boom of the 1990s, there has
been a certain erosion of professional, managerial and ethical
standards and safeguards," Volcker said.
"The
pressure on management to meet market expectations, to keep
earnings rising quarter by quarter or year by year, to measure
success by one 'bottom line' has led, consciously or not, to
compromises at the expense of the public interest in full,
accurate and timely financial reporting," he added.
But the
74-year-old economist also blamed the new complexity of corporate
finance for contributing the problem. "The fact is," Volcker said
"the accounting profession has been hard-pressed to keep up with
the growing complexity of business and finance, with its
mind-bending complications of abstruse derivatives, seemingly
endless varieties of securitizations and multiplying,
off-balance-sheet entities. (Continued in the article.)
|
May 15, 2003 message from Dave Albrecht
[albrecht@PROFALBRECHT.COM]
I've been teaching Intermediate Financial Accounting for several
years. Recently, I've been thinking about having students read a
supplemental book . Given the current upheaval, there are several
possibilities for additional reading. Can anyone make a recommendation?
BTW, these books would make great summer reading.
Dave Albrecht
Benston et. al. (2003). Following the Money:
The Enron Failure and the State of Corporate Disclosure.
Berenson, Alex. (2003). The Number: How the
Drive for Quarterly Earnings Corrupted Wall Street and Corporate
America.
Brewster, Mike. (2003). Unaccountable: How the
Accounting Profession Forfeited an Public Trust.
Brice & Ivins. (2002.) Pipe Dreams: Greed, Ego
and the Death of Enron.
DiPiazza & Eccles. (2002). Building Public
Trust: The Future of Corporate Reporting.
Fox, Loren. (2002). Enron, the Rise and Fall.
Jeter, Lynne W. (2003). Disconnected: Deceit
and Betrayal at WorldCom.
Mills, D. Quinn. (2003). Wheel, Deal and Steal:
Deceptive Accounting, Deceitful CEOs, and Ineffective Reforms.
Mulford & Comiskey. (2002). The Financial
Numbers Game: Detecting Creative Accounting Practices.
Nofsinger & Kim. (2003). Infectious Greed:
Restoring Confidence in America's Companies.
Squires, Susan. (2003). Inside Arthur Andersen:
Shifting Values, Unexpected Consequences.
Swartz & Watkins. (2003). Power Failure: The
Inside Story of the Collapse of Enron.
Toffler, Barbara. (2003). Final Accounting:
Ambition, Greed and the Fall of Arthur Andersen
May 15, 2003 reply from Bruce Lubich
[blubich@UMUC.EDU]
I would add Schilit, Howard. (2002) Financial
Shenanigans.
Bruce Lubich
May 15, 2003 reply from Neal Hannon
[nhannon@COX.NET]
Suggested Additions to Summer Book List:
Financial Shenanigans : How to Detect
Accounting Gimmicks & Fraud in Financial Reports by Howard Schilit
(McGraw-Hill Trade; 2nd edition (March 1, 2002))
How Companies Lie: Why Enron Is Just the Tip of
the Iceberg by Richard J. Schroth, A. Larry Elliott
Quality Financial Reporting by Paul B. W.
Miller, Paul R. Bahnson
Take On the Street: What Wall Street and
Corporate America Don't Want You to Know by Arthur Levitt, Paula Dwyer
(Contributor)
And for fun: Who Moved My Cheese? An Amazing
Way to Deal with Change in Your Work and in Your Life by Spencer, M.D.
Johnson, Kenneth H. Blanchard
Neal J. Hannon, CMA Chair, I.T. Committee,
Institute of Management Accountants Member, XBRL_US Steering Committee
University of Hartford (860) 768-5810 (401) 769-3802 (Home Office)
Book Recommendation from The AccountingWeb on April 25, 2003
The professional service accounting firm is
being threatened by a variety of factors: new technology, intense
competition, consolidation, an inability to incorporate new services
into a business strategy, and the erosion of public trust, just to name
a few. There is relief. And promise. And hope. In The Firm of the
Future: A Guide for Accountants, Lawyers, and Other Professional
Services, confronts the tired, conventional wisdom that continues to
fail its adherents, and present bold, proven strategies for restoring
vitality and dynamism to the professional service firm.
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471264245/accountingweb
Question
What is COSO?
Answer ---
http://www.coso.org/
COSO is a voluntary private sector organization
dedicated to improving the quality of financial reporting through
business ethics, effective internal controls, and corporate governance.
COSO was originally formed in 1985 to sponsor the National Commission on
Fraudulent Financial Reporting, an independent private sector initiative
which studied the causal factors that can lead to fraudulent financial
reporting and developed recommendations for public companies and their
independent auditors, for the SEC and other regulators, and for
educational institutions.
The National Commission was jointly sponsored
by the five major financial professional associations in the United
States, the American Accounting Association, the American Institute of
Certified Public Accountants, the Financial Executives Institute, the
Institute of Internal Auditors, and the National Association of
Accountants (now the Institute of Management Accountants). The
Commission was wholly independent of each of the sponsoring
organizations, and contained representatives from industry, public
accounting, investment firms, and the New York Stock Exchange.
The Chairman of the National Commission was
James C. Treadway, Jr., Executive Vice President and General Counsel,
Paine Webber Incorporated and a former Commissioner of the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. (Hence, the popular name "Treadway
Commission"). Currently, the COSO Chairman is John Flaherty, Chairman,
Retired Vice President and General Auditor for PepsiCo Inc.
Title: ENRON: A Professional's Guide to the Events, Ethical
Issues, and Proposed Reforms
Authur: L. Berkowitz, CPA
ISBN: 0-8080-0825-0
Publisher: CCH ---
http://tax.cchgroup.com/Store/Products/CCE-CCH-1959.htm?cookie%5Ftest=1
Pub. Date: July 2002
Title: Take On
the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America Don't Want You to Know,
Authors: Arthur Levitt and Paula Dwyer (Arthor Levitt is the
highly controversial former Chairman of the SEC)
Format: Hardcover, 288pp. This is also available as a MS
Reader eBook ---
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/ISBNinquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0375422358
ISBN: 0375421785
Publisher: Pantheon Books
Pub. Date: October 2002
See
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0375421785
This is
Levitt's no-holds-barred memoir of his turbulent tenure as chief
overseer of the nation's financial markets. As working Americans poured
billions into stocks and mutual funds, corporate America devised
increasingly opaque strategies for hoarding most of the proceeds. Levitt
reveals their tactics in plain language, then spells out how to
intelligently invest in mutual funds and the stock market. With
integrity and authority, Levitt gives us a bracing primer on the
collapse of the system for overseeing our capital markets, and sage,
essential advice on a discipline we often ignore to our peril - how not
to lose money.
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0375421785/accountingweb
Don Ramsey called my attention
to the following audio interview:
For a one-hour audio archive of Diane
Rehm's recent interview with Arthur Levitt, go to this URL:
http://www.wamu.org/ram/2002/r2021015.ram
A free video from Yale University and the AICPA (with an introduction
by Professor Rick Antle and Senior Associate Dean from Yale). This
video can be downloaded to your computer with a single click on a button
at http://www.aicpa.org/video/
It might be noted that Barry Melancon is in the midst of controversy with
ground swell of CPAs and academics demanding his resignation vis-a-vis
continued support he receives from top management of large accounting
firms and business corporations.
A New
Accounting Culture
Address by Barry C. Melancon
President and CEO, American Institute of CPAs
September 4, 2002
Yale Club - New York City
Taped immediately upon completion
From The Conference Board
Corporate Citizenship in the New Century: Accountability,
Transparency, and Global Stakeholder Engagement
Publication Date: July 2002
Report Number: R-1314-02-RR ---
http://www.conference-board.org/publications/describe.cfm?id=574
My new and updated
documents the recent accounting and investment scandals are at the
following sites:
Bob Jensen's threads on the Enron/Andersen scandals are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm
Bob Jensen's SPE threads are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/speOverview.htm
Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm
Bob Jensen's
Summary of Suggested Reforms ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudProposedReforms.htm
Bob Jensen's
Bottom Line Commentary ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
The Virginia Tech
Overview: What Can We Learn From Enron? ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudVirginia.htm
Disconnected: Deceit and Betrayal at WorldCom,
by Lynne W. Jeter
Inside Arthur Andersen: Shifting Values, Unexpected Consequences
by Lorna McDougall, Cynthia Smith, Susan E. Squires, William R. Yeack.
Final Accounting: Ambition, Greed and the Fall of Arthur Andersen
by Barbara Ley Toffler and Jennifer Reingold
Bisk CPEasy's "Accounting Profession Reform: Restoring Confidence in
the System" ---
http://www.cpeasy.com/
"The
fall of Andersen," Chicago Tribune ---
http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/showcase/chi-andersen.special
Chicago's
Andersen accounting firm must stop auditing publicly traded companies
following the firm's conviction for obstructing justice during the
federal investigation into the downfall of Enron Corp. For decades,
Andersen was a fixture in Chicago's business community and, at one time,
the gold standard of the accounting industry. How did this legendary
firm disappear?
Civil war splits Andersen
September 2, 2002.
Second of four parts
The fall of Andersen
September 1, 2002. This
series was reported by Delroy Alexander, Greg Burns, Robert Manor, Flynn
McRoberts and E.A. Torriero. It was written by McRoberts.
Greed tarnished golden reputation
September 1, 2002. First
of four parts
'Merchant or Samurai?'
September 1, 2002. Dick
Measelle, then-chief executive of Andersen's worldwide audit and tax
practice, explores a corporate cultural divide in an April 1995
newsletter essay to Andersen partners.
What will the
U.S. accounting business look like when the dust settles on Arthur
Andersen?
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud041202.htm#Future
Also see
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm
The Washington Post put
together a terrific Corporate Scandal Primer that includes reviews and
pictures of the "players," "articles,", and an "overview" of each major
accounting and finance scandal of the Year 2002 ---
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/business/scandals/primer/index.html
I added this
link to my own reviews at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Governance
The AccountingWeb recommends a number of books on accounting fraud ---
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/ASIN/0471353787/accountingweb/103-6121868-8139853
- The Fraud Identification Handbook by George B. Allen (Preface)
- Financial Investigation and Forensic Accounting by George A. Manning
- Business Fraud by James A. Blanco, Dave Evans
- Document Fraud and Other Crimes of Deception by Jesse M. Greenwald,
Holly K. Tuttle (Illustrator)
- Fraud Auditing and Forensic Accounting by Jack Bologna, et al
- The Financial Numbers Game by Charles W. Mulford, Eugene E. Comiskey
- How to Reduce Business Losses from Employee Theft and Customer Fraud
by Alfred N. Weiner
- Financial Statement Fraud by Zabihollah Rezaee, Joseph T. Wells
- Transnational Criminal Organizations, Cybercrime, and Money
Laundering by James R. Richards
The three books below are reviewed in the December 2002 issue of the
Journal of Accountancy, pp. 88-90 ---
http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/dec2002/person.htm
Two Books on Financial Statement Fraud
Financial Statement Fraud: Prevention and Detection
by Zabihollah Razaee (Certified Fraud Examiner and Accounting Professor
at the University of Memphis)
Format: Hardcover, 336pp.
ISBN: 0471092169
Publisher: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated
Pub. Date: March 2002
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0471092169
The Financial Numbers Game: Detecting Creative Accounting
Practices
by Charles W. Mulford and Eugene Comiskey (good old boys from the
Georgia Institute of Technology)
Format: Paperback, 408pp.
ISBN: 0471370088
Publisher: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated
Pub. Date: February 2002
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0471370088
One New Book on Accounting Professionalism and Public Trust
Building Public Trust: The Future of Corporate Reporting
by Samuel A. DiPiazza, Jr (CEO of PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC))
and Robert G. Eccies (President of Advisory Capital Partners)
Format: Hardcover, 1st ed., 192pp.
ISBN: 0471261513
Publisher: Wiley, John & Sons, Incorporated
Pub. Date: June 2002
http://search.barnesandnoble.com/booksearch/isbnInquiry.asp?userid=16UOF6F2PF&isbn=0471261513
Books on Fraud --- Enter the word "fraud" in the search box at
http://www.bn.com/
Yahoo's choices for top fraud sites ---
http://dir.yahoo.com/Society_and_Culture/Crime/Types_of_Crime/Fraud/Finance_and_Investment/
You might enjoy "The AICPA's Prosecution of Dr. Abraham Briloff: Some
Observations," by Dwight M. Owsen ---
http://accounting.rutgers.edu/raw/aaa/pi/newsletr/spring99/item07.htm
I think Briloff was trying to save the profession from what it is now
going through in the wake of the Enron scandal.
My Interview With The Baltimore Sun ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudBaltimoreSun.htm
My Philadelphia Inquirer
Interview 1 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/philadelphia_inquirer.htm
My Philadelphia Inquirer
Interview 2 ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudPhiladelphiaInquirere022402.htm
My Interview With National Public Radio ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraudNPRfeb7.htm
Articles on Internal Auditing and
Fraud Investigation
Web Site of Mark R. Simmons, CIA CFE
http://www.dartmouth.edu/~msimmons/
Internal
auditing is an independent, objective assurance and consulting
activity designed to add value and improve an organization's operations.
It helps an organization accomplish its objectives by bringing a
systematic, disciplined approach to evaluate and improve the
effectiveness of risk management, control, and governance
processes. (Institute of Internal Auditors)
Fraud
Investigation consists of the multitude of steps necessary to
resolve allegations of fraud - interviewing witnesses, assembling
evidence, writing reports, and dealing with prosecutors and the courts.
(Association of Certified Fraud Examiners)
This site focuses on topics
that deal with
Internal Auditing and
Fraud Investigation with certain
hyper-links to other associated and relevant sources. It is
dedicated to sharing information.
Other Shared and Unshared Course Material
You might find some useful material at
http://www.indiana.edu/~aisdept/newsletter/current/forensic%20accounting.html
I have two cases and some links to John Howland's course materials at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5342/262wp/262case1.htm
You might find some materials of interest at
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce/assurance.htm
Also see
http://www.networkcomputing.com/1304/1304ws2.html
Micromash has a bunch of courses, but I don't think they share
materials for free ---
http://www.cyberu.com/classes.asp
Important Database --- From the Scout
Report on February 1, 2001
LLRX.com: Business Filings Databases
http://www.llrx.com/columns/roundup19.htm
This column from Law Library Resource Xchange (LLRX)
(last mentioned in the September 7, 2001 Scout Report) by Kathy Biehl
becomes more interesting with every revelation of misleading corporate
accounting practices. This is a straightforward listing of state
government's efforts to provide easy access to required disclosure
filings of businesses within each state. Each entry is clearly
annotated, describing services offered and any required fees (most
services here are free). The range of information and services varies
considerably from very basic (i.e. "name availability") to complete
access to corporate filings. The noteworthy exception here is tax
filings. Most states do not currently include access to filings with
taxing authorities.
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List of
Securities Fraud Class Actions
SORTED BY COMPANY NAME
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