Accounting Scandal Updates on September 10, 2002
Bob Jensen at Trinity University

Bob Jensen's main document on the Enron scandal and other accounting frauds is at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 



As Miklos pointed out on September 5 in a message to me, Andersen promised to stop shredding evidence in the "SEC vs. Sunbeam Case."  That was long before the shredding of documents in the Enron Case --- Miklos A. Vasarhelyi [miklosv@andromeda.rutgers.edu

"Former Sunbeam Chief Agrees to Ban and a Fine of $500,000," by Floyd Norris, The New York Times, September 5, 2002 

Albert J. Dunlap, the former chief executive of the Sunbeam Corporation, agreed yesterday to pay a $500,000 fine and to accept being banned from ever serving as an officer or director of a public company. Mr. Dunlap, who earlier agreed to pay $15 million to settle a shareholder suit, neither admitted nor denied allegations by the Securities and Exchange Commission that he engineered a large accounting fraud that inflated the profits of Sunbeam after he was hired to turn the company around in 1996, when he was viewed as a star on Wall Street. Russell A. Kersh, 48, the former chief financial officer of Sunbeam, and Mr. Dunlap's top aide before that at the Scott Paper Company, also settled charges by the S.E.C., agreeing to pay $200,000. He previously agreed to pay $250,000 to settle the shareholder suit. Mr. Dunlap, who embraced the nickname Chainsaw Al, became famous in the 1990's as he laid off thousands of workers at Scott Paper in what he said was a necessary move to cut costs. His autobiography, "Mean Business," became a best seller after he joined Sunbeam. "Most C.E.O.'s are ridiculously overpaid," he wrote in the book, "but I deserved the $100 million I took away when Scott merged with Kimberly-Clark." Mr. Dunlap, now 65, presumably still has most of that money, although, as his lawyer noted yesterday, he did not make any money from selling Sunbeam stock before those shares collapsed and the company went into bankruptcy last year. Justice Department officials would not comment yesterday on whether Mr. Dunlap might still face criminal charges. The S.E.C. said the fraud continued into 1998, so the five-year statute of limitations has yet to expire. When Mr. Dunlap was hired at Sunbeam, the company's share price leaped nearly 50 percent on the announcement, and it rose further after the company reported a turnaround in 1997. Sunbeam's board responded by agreeing to double Mr. Dunlap's base salary to $2 million a year.


E"x Official of Vatican Pleads Guilty in Conspiracy," by Paul Zielbauer, The New York Times, September 6, 2002 

A retired Vatican official who is an expert on Catholic canon law pleaded guilty today to a federal conspiracy charge for his role in an international insurance swindle run by Martin R. Frankel, the Greenwich financier who is now in prison. 

In a signed statement, Msgr. Emilio Colagiovanni, 82, whose career included sitting on the board that provides legal counsel to Pope John Paul II, pleaded guilty to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and launder money. He faces a maximum of five years in prison and a $250,000 fine. 

In the six-page statement, Monsignor Colagiovanni, an Italian citizen and a priest for 60 years, said that in 1998 and 1999 he helped Mr. Frankel defraud American insurance companies that Mr. Frankel wanted to buy. His contribution, he said, was allowing his own Rome-based foundation, the Monitor Ecclesiasticus Foundation, which publishes a journal of canon law edited by the monsignor, to siphon $50 million of Mr. Frankel's money into a second foundation. It had been created by Mr. Frankel specifically to acquire the companies, the monsignor acknowledged.

Bob Jensen's threads on fraud are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 


New York State Attorney General Eliot Spitzer has become the most feared man on Wall Street. What he wants is change--top to bottom. 

"The Enforcer:  Forget the perp walks. What he wants is change--top to bottom," by MNark Gimein,  FORTUNE, September 16, 2002 --- http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=209347

On Wall Street right now, there may be no person as feared as the attorney general of New York State. This is in some ways an utterly banal statement, one that probably won't surprise anybody who has been following press coverage of Eliot Spitzer's campaign against corruption in the financial world, a crusade that has already netted a $100 million fine from Merrill Lynch and is now continuing with an investigation of Citigroup's Salomon Smith Barney. But in another way it is quite extraordinary, really kind of unbelievable, because of one very striking fact: Spitzer has become the most feared man on Wall Street without arresting a single executive and, amazingly, without so much as indicting one investment bank, or a single employee of an investment bank.

In this fact is encapsulated what might be the essence of Spitzer's character, and the reason this unlikely enforcer might be the pivotal figure in the broad-ranging rethinking of American business. If any single person has goaded U.S. corporations to change most vigorously in the last months (well, any single person besides Jeffrey Skilling), it has been Spitzer. He has done it with a staff of no more than 15 or 20 lawyers working on securities law, a legal staff smaller than that of a third-tier investment bank. And he has done it without yet prosecuting a single big securities case.

Spitzer has been criticized for this as an arrogant meddler and an opportunist with an eye on New York's 2006 race for governor (he's almost certain to win a second term as attorney general this fall). But he has persevered in his mission of shaming and compelling the investment banks and their executives--right up to Sandy Weill, the head of conglomerate Citigroup--to end the despicable practice of giving their clients investment advice so dishonest and fraught with conflicts of interest that it has become worthless.

At first glance, Spitzer, 43, hardly seems a prime candidate for the job of articulating the anger over corporate corruption that has gripped ordinary Americans. "Articulate" is an Eliot Spitzer word, as are "rearticulate" and "recalibrate" and "critique." He is a policy enthusiast who drags friends to lectures and seminars on public affairs in his spare time. He is a product of Princeton and Harvard Law School, and even spent a couple of years working on mergers and acquisitions at top-tier law firm Skadden Arps. Thanks to his family's real estate fortune (he owns a string of Manhattan properties), he can afford to live with his wife, Silda Wall, and three daughters in exactly the kind of Fifth Avenue building favored by financial barons. He quips that half his friends are investment bankers and the other half are lawyers who represent investment bankers.

The last time we went through a spasm of greed and retribution on Wall Street, in the late 1980s, the iconic figure in law enforcement was U.S. Attorney Rudolph Giuliani. It was Giuliani who was responsible for putting Ivan Boesky and Michael Milken in jail. But it was also Giuliani who was responsible for pulling an investment banker off the floor of Kidder Peabody in handcuffs--on charges that were dropped because the U.S. Attorney's office never amassed enough evidence for a trial. Giuliani, by the way, now represents Merrill Lynch in private practice.

Spitzer, by contrast, is the antithesis of that stock character of law-enforcement legend, the street-brawling prosecutor. "Prosecutors have classically done a very good job of putting people in jail, but it doesn't change anything," says Michael Cherkasky, Spitzer's former boss in the Manhattan D.A.'s office racketeering unit. For Spitzer, putting people in jail is not the point of the prosecutor's job. Look at his biggest case at the Manhattan D.A.'s office, in which he showed both his creativity and his penchant for thinking big. Instead of using a mole to penetrate New York City's closed garment world, he opened a full-fledged garment factory (and in classic Spitzerian fashion, made sure his workers had health insurance). He wound up shutting down gangster Tommy Gambino's extortion business by prosecuting the mob boss, who was already facing the prospect of jail on other charges, on (of all things!) antitrust grounds and exacting a $12 million civil penalty. That paid for five years of intensive oversight and led to wholesale reform of the trucking business in Manhattan.

Continued at  http://www.fortune.com/indexw.jhtml?channel=artcol.jhtml&doc_id=209347

Bob Jensen's threads on "Rotten to the Core" are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland 


"How Star CSFB Banker Pressed For Shares in IPOs for Friends," by Randall Smith and Susan Pulliam, The Wall Street Journal, September 5, 2002.  An excerpt is quoted below:

 

For weeks, Salomon Smith Barney has been probed for directing hot new stocks to executives whose firms did business with the Wall Street firm.

Soon, the big unit of Citigroup Inc. may have company in the spotlight.

Frank Quattrone, the star technology-industry investment banker at Credit Suisse First Boston, pressed for greater allocations of IPOs for corporate executives whose companies had hired his firm to do investment-banking work, according to e-mail records and people familiar with the firm.

The e-mail records and other accounts of Mr. Quattrone's efforts are likely to become part of a probe by securities regulators into whether Wall Street firms improperly used the lure of quick profits on initial public offerings of stock to win investment-banking business during the 1990s stock boom.

Investigators for the National Association of Securities Dealers recently sought to interview John Schmidt, former chief of the brokerage group that worked with Mr. Quattrone, about how CSFB doled out hot IPOs to tech-group clients as part of a probe into so-called spinning, according to people familiar with the request. And just Wednesday, congressional investigators said they were broadening their probe into Wall Street's IPO practices to CSFB and Goldman Sachs Group Inc.

 

CSFB and Mr. Quattrone didn't have any immediate comment Wednesday; the NASD also declined to comment. Goldman said the firm would cooperate, but was "surprised to have been asked" for IPO data, saying it allocates IPOs properly.

 

Mr. Quattrone's actions in the tech IPO market long have been widely watched. His technology group helped CSFB lead-manage the largest number of hot IPOs in the dot-com boom, according to Thomson Financial. The brokers who worked with him, led by Mr. Schmidt, ran a group of accounts for more than 160 investment-banking clients, most of whom received between a few hundred and 1,000 shares of every CSFB-linked IPO, according to people familiar with the accounts. Each of the clients participated on a proportional basis in all the IPOs.

 

The accounts' performance was sizzling, rising by an estimated 600% in 1999 and 100% in 2000, according to one person familiar with their operation. The clients generally were offered the chance to open such accounts -- known as "Friends of Frank" accounts -- only after they had selected CSFB to lead their IPOs or arrange other transactions, the people familiar with them said.

 

The number of these plum accounts grew to 160 in early 2000 from 26 in January 1999, according to one CSFB e-mail. And the total size of the accounts grew to a peak of $150 million from $50 million in early 1999, according to a person familiar with them. Broker who managed accounts in the group routinely would sell about one-third of its allocation a few days after the IPO, another third about a month later and the rest at some subsequent point, the same person said.

 

Bob Jensen's threads on "Rotten to the Core" are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm#Cleland 


From FEI Express of September 6, 2002

One aspect of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act seeks to inspire good corporate behavior rather than impose it. Section 406 of the bill's Title IV (Enhanced Financial Disclosures) directs the SEC to issue rules that require issuers to disclose whether or not (and if not, why not), an "issuer has adopted a code of ethics applicable to its principal financial officer and comptroller or principal accounting officer, or persons performing similar functions." Moreover, public companies will also be required to disclose any change in or waiver of the code of ethics for senior financial officers.

Indeed, many companies already have a code of conduct that employees are expected to sign. The key change from the Sarbanes-Oxley provision is that companies should have a specialized code of ethics for financial officers. Under the Act, a "code of ethics" for financial officers should include "such standards as are reasonably necessary to promote- (1) honest and ethical conduct, including the ethical handling of actual or apparent conflicts of interest between personal and professional relationships; (2) full, fair, accurate, timely and understandable disclosure in the periodic reports required to be filed by the issuer; and (3) compliance with applicable governmental rules and regulations."

FEI has developed a model code for companies to use, based on FEI's Code of Ethics for members. The model is on our website at:

http://www.fei.org/download/sampleethics.pdf 

We're proud to say that industry leaders like United Technologies and Dow Chemical have already adopted the model. We trust this model will be helpful to you in complying with Sarbanes-Oxley and in our collective efforts to restore investor confidence and improve corporate governance.

Ridge Braunschweig 
Phil Livingston Chairman 
Chief Executive Officer

 


From SmartPros on August 29=8, 2002 --- http://www.smartpros.com/x35132.xml 

Investors in the failed energy group Enron Corp. said Tuesday they had secured a $40 million settlement from Andersen Worldwide, SC.

The deal was announced by University of California, the lead plaintiff in a class action suit against the accountant, which audited Enron's flawed books.

Andersen Worldwide is the Swiss-based coordinating entity of the Andersen accounting firms. Arthur Andersen, the US company that actually examined Enron's accounts, is not covered by the settlement.

"This substantial settlement is a favorable result for the class in light of the limited role of the non-US Andersen entities," University of California general counsel James Holst said.

It was one of the biggest recoveries from an accounting firm, he said in a statement.

"We regard this settlement as only a first step in obtaining recovery for the class, and will continue to pursue damages from the remaining defendants, most of whom had far deeper involvement in the Enron debacle than the overseas Andersen firms," Holst said.

Andersen Worldwide did not admit liability or wrongdoing, the university said. The settlement was subject to court approval.

The division of the Andersen Worldwide settlement between shareholders and pension holders had yet to be determined.

Enron filed for bankruptcy in December last year, its reputation shattered by a slew of accounting scandals.

The settlement, worked out over the past few weeks, included $15 million to finance costs -- but not attorney's fees -- of the continuing litigation.

The University of California said total losses experienced by all Enron shareholders were estimated at more than 25 billion dollars.

Arthur Andersen, the US accounting firm, was convicted in June of obstruction of justice for destroying tonnes of documents related to its former client Enron.

The verdict effectively ended the audit business for Andersen, which had been one of the Big Five global firms.

Prosecutors only now are narrowing in on Enron.

Last week, a former Enron executive , 37-year-old Michael Kopper, pleaded guilty in a court in Houston, Texas, to conspiracy to commit wire fraud and money laundering.

Prosecutors said it was a milestone in their efforts to build a criminal case against the energy trader's former management.


September 3, 2002 message from FinanceProfessor [FinanceProfessor@lb.bcentral.com

Attention returned to Worldcom this week and what it showed was not flattering. In what could be called a smoking email (giving a new definition to flames), Worldcom officials told employees to not cooperate with auditors. (in hindsight that may be a very costly mistake!) http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A64786-2002Aug26.html

In a related note, Scott Sullivan the former CFO of the struggling telecommunications firm was indicted for trying to hide debt from regulators and auditors.

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2222137.stm

If that wasn’t bad enough, Salomon Brothers admitted to giving WorldCom officials advantages in IPOs in order to court WorldCom’s investment banking business. The total amount the executives made on these deals is uncertain but Ebbers alone is reported to have made $11 million. Ebbers and Salomon are going to have much explaining to do as evidenced already by the SEC demanding records of their past IPOs.

http://www.msnbc.com/news/801581.asp

http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/2226966.stm

http://www.latimes.com/business/la-fi-worldcom31aug31.story

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A184-2002Aug26.html

http://slate.msn.com/?id=2070225


The main purpose of this message is to note the link forwarded by George Krull that provides a great series on Andersen. George is a professor (MSU PhD) who became an executive research partner for many years in Grant Thornton. He has been a long-time dedicated member of the American Accounting Association and is now teaching at Bradley.

However, I thought the old Michigan State University faculty and alumni might appreciate publicizing his entire message. For some of us, those were the good old days of academe --- we thought we knew the answers in those days.

Bob Jensen

-----Original Message----- 
From: Krull, George [mailto:gkrull@bumail.bradley.edu]  
Sent: Monday, September 02, 2002 12:02 PM 
To: Jensen, Robert Subject: The Fall of Andersen Four-part Series in the Chicago Tribune

September 2, 2002 12:02 CDT

Bob,

Here is a link to an excellent series that appears in the Chicago Tribune ( http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/showcase/chi-andersen.special  ). The series started yesterday and concludes on Wednesday, September 4.

It was good to see you in San Antonio. I was running to a meeting when we chatted for a brief moment. Let me add my congratulations to the many you received for your Outstanding Accounting Educator Award. Your remarks were moving 
( http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/000aaa/AAAaward_files/AAAaward02.htm  ).

I do remember those great discussions and conversations in the Teak room at the east end of Eppley Center. I was blessed to be a member of a truly great bunch of graduate students at MSU. Those students considered the faculty ( you, Arens, Miller,Salmonson, Edwards, Windal, etc.) as our friends and our professors. That created a very special learning environment, the likes of which I have not experienced many times since.

Best regards,

George

Bob Jensen's threads on the Andersen explosion are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 


"The fall of Andersen," Chicago Tribune --- http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/showcase/chi-andersen.special 

Chicago's Andersen accounting firm must stop auditing publicly traded companies following the firm's conviction for obstructing justice during the federal investigation into the downfall of Enron Corp. For decades, Andersen was a fixture in Chicago's business community and, at one time, the gold standard of the accounting industry. How did this legendary firm disappear?

Civil war splits Andersen
September 2, 2002.  Second of four parts

The fall of Andersen
September 1, 2002.  This series was reported by Delroy Alexander, Greg Burns, Robert Manor, Flynn McRoberts and E.A. Torriero. It was written by McRoberts.

Greed tarnished golden reputation
September 1, 2002.  First of four parts

'Merchant or Samurai?'
September 1, 2002.  Dick Measelle, then-chief executive of Andersen's worldwide audit and tax practice, explores a corporate cultural divide in an April 1995 newsletter essay to Andersen partners.

"Last Task at Andersen Turning Out the Lights, by Jonathan D. Glater, The Wall Street Journal, August 30, 2002

After 89 years, Arthur Andersen will cease to be an auditor of public companies tomorrow.

The remaining tasks of the once-proud firm  which was convicted in June of obstructing the government's investigation into the collapse of Enron, an Andersen client  are to deal with obligations and shut itself down. Of its roughly 28,000 employees, fewer than 3,000 are left; of more than 1,200 public-company audit clients, none will remain.

The remarkable decline of the firm, from its announcement in January that it had discovered improper shredding of documents related to its audit of Enron, has occurred in less than nine months. The employees who are left will have the thankless task of coping with lawsuits and leases.
"It's like a family member who has terminal cancer," said Gary Brentlinger, the human resources director for Andersen's offices in Houston, Austin, San Antonio and New Orleans. "We're watching the firm die."

Today at the firm's office in Houston, the epicenter of the Enron debacle, Mr. Brentlinger will most likely shut off the lights on one more of the 15 floors that the firm occupied when it had nearly 1,700 active employees there, instead of the fewer than 100 now. The offices in the other cities he oversees have already closed.

Partners who are at the firm and some who have recently left say that it will not file for bankruptcy protection but will continue to wind down its affairs, negotiating with landlords to get out of leases, operating Andersen's training center, arguing with former clients' new accountants about the accuracy of past audits, and, of course, defending itself in lawsuits. The liability of current and former partners in those lawsuits remains uncertain.
The firm will be supported by revenue earned from the audit season that concluded this spring, the sale of different practices and payments from partners getting out of their agreements not to compete against Andersen, partners say.

Little information is available about the financial condition of Andersen, a private partnership, but partners who have seen the financial statements for last year said that given its reduced payroll, it should be able to operate until it has to pay judgments or settlements in lawsuits. Some also said the firm would convert itself from a partnership to a corporation, providing those who remain at the firm more protection against any future liabilities.

The only significant, certain revenue source for Andersen in the future will come from its onetime sister consulting firm, now known as Accenture, which was separated from Andersen by an arbitrator's decision two years ago. Partners on the consulting side did not want to share profits with their less-profitable accountant brethren.

Accenture now has more than three years left on a five-year contract to send more than 10,000 employees each year to what is called Andersen University, the Andersen training campus in St. Charles, Ill. A spokeswoman for Accenture did not disclose the value of the contract.

Winding down Andersen's business is a tremendously messy and complicated task. Even as many employees left or were laid off in recent months, others had to sort through audit work papers and other client files and make sure that they could be understood not only by another auditor but also by the operator of a document storage center, said Lisa T. Fair, a former Andersen partner in Atlanta who now works for Deloitte & Touche.

"We hold documents that clients have for audits, for lawsuits, for anything like that," Ms. Fair said, adding that the Atlanta office of Andersen had entrusted all its documents to a storage center. "We had to make sure that those things were easily found" by a client's new auditor, she said.
The process converted Andersen's offices into a nightmare of paper and storage boxes, several employees recalled.

"You end up doing a lot more things that you wouldn't normally do," said David C. Meyer, a former Andersen partner who landed at PricewaterhouseCoopers in Houston. There were fewer people to help organize documents, make copies or even carry boxes, he said.

"We probably had 20,000 files in our office alone," Mr. Brentlinger said. As people have left and the files have gone into storage, he said, Andersen staff members have removed papers from floors of its offices in a downtown Houston skyscraper and turned off the lights, leaving only furniture and artwork. Office supplies were donated to charities. Negotiations over leases remain.
Mr. Brentlinger said about 80 percent of the professional staff members from his office had found new jobs.

The support that Andersen managed to give to its people was impressive, said Dean McMann, chief executive of Ransford, an executive recruiter and adviser to consulting and accounting firms. "This has been the most professional winding down of a firm that I've ever seen," he said. "The sad thing is a great firm went away, but they did it in style."

The exit process has been difficult emotionally and logistically for people trying to put Andersen's paperwork in order while conducting job searches. Joseph J. Floyd, an Andersen partner in the Boston office, and some colleagues managed to set up their own consulting firm in less than two months, even as the Andersen office was closing down.

"We were all struggling with what to do with our practices," Mr. Floyd said. Packing up the Andersen office and setting up office space for the Huron Consulting Group, his new firm, "was seven days a week and probably most waking hours of those days," he said.
While setting up a new business or negotiating with another firm for a job, partners leaving the firm or their new employer had to pay hundreds of thousands of dollars to get out of provisions of their partnership agreement that prohibited them from competing with Andersen. Those amounts, which had to be negotiated, could reach $500,000 a partner, one former partner said.

"It was very dynamic, and there were a lot of moving parts," said E. J. Huntley, a former Andersen partner in Houston who helped found Avail, a 35-memberconsulting firm. The firm has been operating for barely two months. The different negotiations to set up the new firm took place as Andersen was making the transition from incredibly busy to eerily quiet, he said. "It was a surreal experience."

No piece of the shutdown, even physically closing offices, has been simple. Andersen has had to disconnect from its e-mail system, update its conference-calling operations to take into account offices that closed, and sell all the computers and other hardware in the closed offices.
Perhaps the most daunting task for those who remain at Andersen in the coming months will be coping with lawsuits. There are suits filed by angry shareholders and creditors of former clients like Enron and suits filed by retired partners worried about pension financing, none of which have yet been settled. The suits seek billions of dollars  far more money than Andersen has.

Andersen's lawyers say they still plan to appeal the firm's criminal conviction by a Houston jury as soon as possible. Sentencing is scheduled for Oct. 16.

Bob Jensen's threads on Andersen are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/fraud.htm 


The North American Securities Administrators Association provides a listing of the top 10 investment scams being investigated by state securities regulators. Some of the examples published by NASAA have involved accountants and may serve as current examples to use in ethics teaching --- http://www.nasaa.org/nasaa/abtnasaa/display_top_story.asp?stid=307 

"Top 10" Investment Scams Listed by State Securities Regulators

WASHINGTON (August 26, 2002) – State securities regulators today released a list of the “Top 10” scams, risky investments or sales practice abuses they’re fighting. New to the third annual list are unscrupulous brokers, conflicts of interest in analyst research, charitable gift annuities, and oil and natural gas scams.

“Record-low interest rates and a bear market on Wall Street have created a bull market in fraud on Main Street,” said Joseph Borg, president of the North American Securities Administrators Association (NASAA)¹ and director of the Alabama Securities Commission. “Con artists know investors are concerned about the volatile stock market and low yields on bonds and bank deposits, so they pitch their scams as safe alternatives and promise high returns – an impossible combination.”

The 2002 list was again topped by independent insurance agents selling risky or fraudulent securities. Borg said that while most independent insurance agents are honest professionals, too many are letting high commissions lure them into selling high risk or fraudulent investments.

The federal war on terror and large budget deficits at the state level are diverting or pinching resources to fight investment fraud, Borg warned.

“Putting people in jail gives investors the biggest bang for their regulatory buck,” said Borg. “So legislators at all levels need to ensure that regulators and prosecutors have sufficient resources to successfully bring securities fraud cases.”

Here are the “Top 10” investment scams, ranked roughly in order of prevalence or seriousness:

1. Unlicensed individuals, such as independent insurance agents, selling securities.  
In hundreds of cases from Washington state to Florida, scam artists are using high commissions to entice independent insurance agents into selling investments they may know little about. The person running the scam instructs the independent sales force – usually insurance agents but sometimes investment advisers and accountants – to promise high returns with little or no risk. For example:
· In an alleged scam sold almost entirely by independent insurance agents, investors in at least 14 states lost close to $30 million. According to Ohio securities regulators, money raised from the sale of fictitious limited partnerships was used to make interest payments to another group of promissory note investors. Both groups were promised double-digit returns. In April a court issued a preliminary injunction and appointed a receiver in connection with the allegations. 
(The NASAA says the persons running these scams are usually independent insurance agents, but some have been investment advisers or accountants.)

· Earlier this month, an Arizona insurance agent was sentenced to 10 years in prison for selling $1.8 million in worthless stock and bogus promissory notes to investors. Another Arizona insurance agent was sentenced in May to five years in prison for scamming 32 elderly investors out of nearly $2 million by first soliciting them to purchase ‘living trusts’ and then switching them into annuities and finally into bogus promissory notes. A third Arizona insurance agent, working with his two sons, scammed $16.2 million by selling high risk brokered CDs, viatical contracts, real estate deals and equipment leases. They were ordered to repay all $16.2 million and fined another $133,000.

To verify that a person is licensed or registered to sell securities, call your state securities regulator. If the person is not registered, don’t invest.

2. Unscrupulous stockbrokers. 
The declining stock market has caused some brokers to cut corners or resort to outright fraud, say state securities regulators. At the same time, some investors have grown more cautious and are scrutinizing their brokerage statements for unexplained fees, unauthorized trades or other irregularities. In North Dakota, regulators investigated a complaint from an investor who received conflicting account statements. They discovered that two brokers working for H.D. Vest Investment Securities Inc. issued phony account statements to cover up losses from hundreds of unauthorized trades. The brokers had also made unsuitable recommendations such as risky options contracts. Under a settlement with state securities regulators, H.D. Vest agreed to repay clients’ out-of-pocket losses plus 6 percent, totaling over $3.2 million.

In New York, the attorney general’s office took action against seven brokers and two firms for bilking hundreds of elderly investors out of more than $12.5 million through a pay telephone scam. The brokers pressured investors into liquidating their CDs, annuities and IRAs, sometimes at significant penalty, and promised them “risk-free” 14 percent returns. So far one firm has agreed to pay $5.9 million in restitution.

3. Analyst research conflicts. 
In May, the New York Attorney General’s