Bob Jensen's Threads on Return on Business Valuation, Business Combinations, 
Investment (ROI), and Pro Forma Financial Reporting

 

Bob Jensen at Trinity University

Introduction to Fair Value Accounting

Introduction to P/E Ratios and Business Valuation

Business Valuation Blunders by the Pros

Controversial Issues in Pro Forma Financial Reporting

E-Business and E-Commerce  ROI Complications

Putting ROI Through The Wringer 

Fair Value and Fair Value Hedges

Forecasting  

KPMG's Business Valuation and Risk Measurement

Measuring Value of Products and Services

Free Online Real Estate Valuations

Business Valuation References and Resources (Including Business Combinations) 

Valuation Issues Related to Derivative Financial Instruments and FAS 133, FAS 138, and IAS 39
Bob Jensen's documents, cases, and glossaries on FAS 133, FAS 138, and IAS 39 are linked at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

Bob Jensen's theory document related to valuation of intangibles is at 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm
 

Real Options, Option Pricing Theory, and Arbitrage Pricing Theory 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/realopt.htm

Things to Consider When Valuing Options ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/sfas123/jensen01.htm

Bob Jensen's theory documents related to valuation are linked at 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory

Bob Jensen's Documents on e-Commerce and e-Business 
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm
 

Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various links:

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

Fair Value Accounting Book Review (Meeting the New FASB Requirements)

From SmartPros on May 1, 2006
Fair Value for Financial Reporting by Alfred King highlights the accounting and auditing requirements for fair value information and offers a detailed explanation of how the FASB is going to change "fair value," from determining the fair value of intangible assets to selecting and working with an appraiser --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x35458.xml

Fair Value for Financial Reporting: Meeting the New FASB Requirements
by Alfred M. King
ISBN: 0-471-77184-8
Hardcover 352 pages April 2006

 

This is what Professor Jim Mahar says about ERisk in the March 24, 2003 edition of TheFinanceProfessor (an absolutely fabulous newsletter) --- www.FinanceProfessor.com 

Erisk.com. I simply love the site. I know it has been site of the week before, but it is so good, it earned it again. Try it, you’ll love the case studies and the newsletter! http://www.erisk.com

ERisk --- http://www.erisk.com/ 

ERisk is the leading provider of strategic solutions for risk and capital management. We deliver a unique combination of world-class analytics for risk-based capital, strategic risk management expertise, risk transfer advice and risk information.

You can find out more about our products and services in the Overview section. On this page, you can find out more about the people and ideas that power our company.

The ERisk Report --- http://www.erisk.com/about/about_company.asp?ct=n#report 

The ERisk Report is a concise monthly briefing for senior financial executives. Every month, contributors from ERisk's team of risk management experts address today's most pressing issues in strategic risk and capital management. Sign up today for your personal copy of this cutting-edge publication!

Vol 1.6: Measuring the return on risk management; leveraging the economic benefits of risk management

Vol 1.5: Putting the real value on customer relationships; rolling out risk management

Vol 1.4: Making risk more transparent; fed takes pulse of economic capital practices

Vol 1.3: Credit scoring: robots versus humans; James Lam's three lessons from Enron

Vol 1.2: Weathering credit losses; regulators line up behind economic capital

Vol 1.1: Revamping your credit ratings system; measuring bank profitability

The ERisk Portal --- http://www.erisk.com/portal/home.asp 
Resources for Enterprise Risk Management

ERisk today continues to successfully develop and install its analytics at client sites, conduct high-value consulting engagements, offer unbiased advice on risk transfer alternatives, and attract thousands of readers to the ERisk portal.

 

 Introduction to Fair Value Accounting

  • Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

     


    May 17, 2006 message from Peter Walton

    I would like to take this opportunity to let you know about a forthcoming book from Routledge:

    The Routledge Companion to Fair Value and Financial Reporting --- Click Here

    Edited by Peter Walton

    May 2007: 246x174: 406pp

    Hb: 978-0-415-42356-4: £95.00 $170.00

    Jensen Comment
    Even though I have a paper published in this book, I will receive no compensation from sales of the book. And since I'm retired, lines on a resume no longer matter.


    FASB Statement No. 107
    Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments
    (Issue Date 12/91)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement extends existing fair value disclosure practices for some instruments by requiring all entities to disclose the fair value of financial instruments, both assets and liabilities recognized and not recognized in the statement of financial position, for which it is practicable to estimate fair value. If estimating fair value is not practicable, this Statement requires disclosure of descriptive information pertinent to estimating the value of a financial instrument. Disclosures about fair value are not required for certain financial instruments listed in paragraph 8.

    This Statement is effective for financial statements issued for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1992, except for entities with less than $150 million in total assets in the current statement of financial position. For those entities, the effective date is for fiscal years ending after December 15, 1995.

    FASB Statement No. 115
    Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities
    (Issue Date 5/93)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement addresses the accounting and reporting for investments in equity securities that have readily determinable fair values and for all investments in debt securities. Those investments are to be classified in three categories and accounted for as follows:

    Debt securities that the enterprise has the positive intent and ability to hold to maturity are classified as held-to-maturity securities and reported at amortized cost.

    Debt and equity securities that are bought and held principally for the purpose of selling them in the near term are classified as trading securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses included in earnings.

    Debt and equity securities not classified as either held-to-maturity securities or trading securities are classified as available-for-sale securities and reported at fair value, with unrealized gains and losses excluded from earnings and reported in a separate component of shareholders' equity.

    This Statement does not apply to unsecuritized loans. However, after mortgage loans are converted to mortgage-backed securities, they are subject to its provisions. This Statement supersedes FASB Statement No. 12, Accounting for Certain Marketable Securities, and related Interpretations and amends FASB Statement No. 65, Accounting for Certain Mortgage Banking Activities, to eliminate mortgage-backed securities from its scope.

    This Statement is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1993. It is to be initially applied as of the beginning of an enterprise's fiscal year and cannot be applied retroactively to prior years' financial statements. However, an enterprise may elect to initially apply this Statement as of the end of an earlier fiscal year for which annual financial statements have not previously been issued.

    FASB Statement No. 130
    Reporting Comprehensive Income
    (Issue Date 6/97)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement establishes standards for reporting and display of comprehensive income and its components (revenues, expenses, gains, and losses) in a full set of general-purpose financial statements. This Statement requires that all items that are required to be recognized under accounting standards as components of comprehensive income be reported in a financial statement that is displayed with the same prominence as other financial statements. This Statement does not require a specific format for that financial statement but requires that an enterprise display an amount representing total comprehensive income for the period in that financial statement.

    This Statement requires that an enterprise (a) classify items of other comprehensive income by their nature in a financial statement and (b) display the accumulated balance of other comprehensive income separately from retained earnings and additional paid-in capital in the equity section of a statement of financial position.

    This Statement is effective for fiscal years beginning after December 15, 1997. Reclassification of financial statements for earlier periods provided for comparative purposes is required.

     

    FASB Statement No. 133 and Amendments in FAS 137, 138, 149, and 155
    Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities
    (Issue Date 6/98)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement establishes accounting and reporting standards for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, (collectively referred to as derivatives) and for hedging activities. It requires that an entity recognize all derivatives as either assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure those instruments at fair value. If certain conditions are met, a derivative may be specifically designated as (a) a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability or an unrecognized firm commitment, (b) a hedge of the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction, or (c) a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, an unrecognized firm commitment, an available-for-sale security, or a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction. The accounting for changes in the fair value of a derivative (that is, gains and losses) depends on the intended use of the derivative and the resulting designation.

    For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability or a firm commitment (referred to as a fair value hedge), the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change together with the offsetting loss or gain on the hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged. The effect of that accounting is to reflect in earnings the extent to which the hedge is not effective in achieving offsetting changes in fair value. For a derivative designated as hedging the exposure to variable cash flows of a forecasted transaction (referred to as a cash flow hedge), the effective portion of the derivative's gain or loss is initially reported as a component of other comprehensive income (outside earnings) and subsequently reclassified into earnings when the forecasted transaction affects earnings. The ineffective portion of the gain or loss is reported in earnings immediately. For a derivative designated as hedging the foreign currency exposure of a net investment in a foreign operation, the gain or loss is reported in other comprehensive income (outside earnings) as part of the cumulative translation adjustment. The accounting for a fair value hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment or an available-for-sale security. Similarly, the accounting for a cash flow hedge described above applies to a derivative designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of a foreign-currency-denominated forecasted transaction. For a derivative not designated as a hedging instrument, the gain or loss is recognized in earnings in the period of change. Under this Statement, an entity that elects to apply hedge accounting is required to establish at the inception of the hedge the method it will use for assessing the effectiveness of the hedging derivative and the measurement approach for determining the ineffective aspect of the hedge. Those methods must be consistent with the entity's approach to managing risk.

    This Statement applies to all entities. A not-for-profit organization should recognize the change in fair value of all derivatives as a change in net assets in the period of change. In a fair value hedge, the changes in the fair value of the hedged item attributable to the risk being hedged also are recognized. However, because of the format of their statement of financial performance, not-for-profit organizations are not permitted special hedge accounting for derivatives used to hedge forecasted transactions. This Statement does not address how a not-for-profit organization should determine the components of an operating measure if one is presented.

    This Statement precludes designating a nonderivative financial instrument as a hedge of an asset, liability, unrecognized firm commitment, or forecasted transaction except that a nonderivative instrument denominated in a foreign currency may be designated as a hedge of the foreign currency exposure of an unrecognized firm commitment denominated in a foreign currency or a net investment in a foreign operation.

    This Statement amends FASB Statement No. 52, Foreign Currency Translation, to permit special accounting for a hedge of a foreign currency forecasted transaction with a derivative. It supersedes FASB Statements No. 80, Accounting for Futures Contracts, No. 105, Disclosure of Information about Financial Instruments with Off-Balance-Sheet Risk and Financial Instruments with Concentrations of Credit Risk, and No. 119, Disclosure about Derivative Financial Instruments and Fair Value of Financial Instruments. It amends FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, to include in Statement 107 the disclosure provisions about concentrations of credit risk from Statement 105. This Statement also nullifies or modifies the consensuses reached in a number of issues addressed by the Emerging Issues Task Force.

    This Statement is effective for all fiscal quarters of fiscal years beginning after June 15, 1999. Initial application of this Statement should be as of the beginning of an entity's fiscal quarter; on that date, hedging relationships must be designated anew and documented pursuant to the provisions of this Statement. Earlier application of all of the provisions of this Statement is encouraged, but it is permitted only as of the beginning of any fiscal quarter that begins after issuance of this Statement. This Statement should not be applied retroactively to financial statements of prior periods.

    FASB Statement No. 142
    Goodwill and Other Intangible Assets
    (Issue Date 6/01)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]

    This Statement changes the subsequent accounting for goodwill and other intangible assets in the following significant respects:
    • Acquiring entities usually integrate acquired entities into their operations, and thus the acquirers' expectations of benefits from the resulting synergies usually are reflected in the premium that they pay to acquire those entities. However, the transaction-based approach to accounting for goodwill under Opinion 17 treated the acquired entity as if it remained a stand-alone entity rather than being integrated with the acquiring entity; as a result, the portion of the premium related to expected synergies (goodwill) was not accounted for appropriately. This Statement adopts a more aggregate view of goodwill and bases the accounting for goodwill on the units of the combined entity into which an acquired entity is integrated (those units are referred to as reporting units).

       

    • Opinion 17 presumed that goodwill and all other intangible assets were wasting assets (that is, finite lived), and thus the amounts assigned to them should be amortized in determining net income; Opinion 17 also mandated an arbitrary ceiling of 40 years for that amortization. This Statement does not presume that those assets are wasting assets. Instead, goodwill and intangible assets that have indefinite useful lives will not be amortized but rather will be tested at least annually for impairment. Intangible assets that have finite useful lives will continue to be amortized over their useful lives, but without the constraint of an arbitrary ceiling.

       

    • Previous standards provided little guidance about how to determine and measure goodwill impairment; as a result, the accounting for goodwill impairments was not consistent and not comparable and yielded information of questionable usefulness. This Statement provides specific guidance for testing goodwill for impairment. Goodwill will be tested for impairment at least annually using a two-step process that begins with an estimation of the fair value of a reporting unit. The first step is a screen for potential impairment, and the second step measures the amount of impairment, if any. However, if certain criteria are met, the requirement to test goodwill for impairment annually can be satisfied without a remeasurement of the fair value of a reporting unit.

       

    • In addition, this Statement provides specific guidance on testing intangible assets that will not be amortized for impairment and thus removes those intangible assets from the scope of other impairment guidance. Intangible assets that are not amortized will be tested for impairment at least annually by comparing the fair values of those assets with their recorded amounts.

       

    • This Statement requires disclosure of information about goodwill and other intangible assets in the years subsequent to their acquisition that was not previously required. Required disclosures include information about the changes in the carrying amount of goodwill from period to period (in the aggregate and by reportable segment), the carrying amount of intangible assets by major intangible asset class for those assets subject to amortization and for those not subject to amortization, and the estimated intangible asset amortization expense for the next five years.
  • FASB Statement No. 155
    Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments—an amendment of FASB Statements No. 133 and 140
    (Issue Date 02/06)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]
     

    This Statement amends FASB Statements No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities, and No. 140, Accounting for Transfers and Servicing of Financial Assets and Extinguishments of Liabilities. This Statement resolves issues addressed in Statement 133 Implementation Issue No. D1, “Application of Statement 133 to Beneficial Interests in Securitized Financial Assets.”

    This Statement:

    Permits fair value remeasurement for any hybrid financial instrument that contains an embedded derivative that otherwise would require bifurcation

    Clarifies which interest-only strips and principal-only strips are not subject to the requirements of Statement 133

    Establishes a requirement to evaluate interests in securitized financial assets to identify interests that are freestanding derivatives or that are hybrid financial instruments that contain an embedded derivative requiring bifurcation

    Clarifies that concentrations of credit risk in the form of subordination are not embedded derivatives

    Amends Statement 140 to eliminate the prohibition on a qualifying special-purpose entity from holding a derivative financial instrument that pertains to a beneficial interest other than another derivative financial instrument.

    Reasons for Issuing This Statement

    In January 2004, the Board added this project to its agenda to address what had been characterized as a temporary exemption from the application of the bifurcation requirements of Statement 133 to beneficial interests in securitized financial assets.

    Prior to the effective date of Statement 133, the FASB received inquiries on the application of the exception in paragraph 14 of Statement 133 to beneficial interests in securitized financial assets. In response to the inquiries, Implementation Issue D1 indicated that, pending issuance of further guidance, entities may continue to apply the guidance related to accounting for beneficial interests in paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140. Those paragraphs indicate that any security that can be contractually prepaid or otherwise settled in such a way that the holder of the security would not recover substantially all of its recorded investment should be subsequently measured like investments in debt securities classified as available-for-sale or trading under FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, and may not be classified as held-to-maturity. Further, Implementation Issue D1 indicated that holders of beneficial interests in securitized financial assets that are not subject to paragraphs 14 and 362 of Statement 140 are not required to apply Statement 133 to those beneficial interests until further guidance is issued.

    How the Changes in This Statement Improve Financial Reporting

    This Statement improves financial reporting by eliminating the exemption from applying Statement 133 to interests in securitized financial assets so that similar instruments are accounted for similarly regardless of the form of the instruments. This Statement also improves financial reporting by allowing a preparer to elect fair value measurement at acquisition, at issuance, or when a previously recognized financial instrument is subject to a remeasurement (new basis) event, on an instrument-by-instrument basis, in cases in which a derivative would otherwise have to be bifurcated. Providing a fair value measurement election also results in more financial instruments being measured at what the Board regards as the most relevant attribute for financial instruments, fair value.

    Effective Date and Transition

    This Statement is effective for all financial instruments acquired or issued after the beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins after September 15, 2006. The fair value election provided for in paragraph 4(c) of this Statement may also be applied upon adoption of this Statement for hybrid financial instruments that had been bifurcated under paragraph 12 of Statement 133 prior to the adoption of this Statement. Earlier adoption is permitted as of the beginning of an entity’s fiscal year, provided the entity has not yet issued financial statements, including financial statements for any interim period for that fiscal year. Provisions of this Statement may be applied to instruments that an entity holds at the date of adoption on an instrument-by-instrument basis.

    At adoption, any difference between the total carrying amount of the individual components of the existing bifurcated hybrid financial instrument and the fair value of the combined hybrid financial instrument should be recognized as a cumulative-effect adjustment to beginning retained earnings. The cumulative-effect adjustment should be disclosed gross (that is, aggregating gain positions separate from loss positions) determined on an instrument-by-instrument basis. Prior periods should not be restated.

     

    FASB Statement No. 157
    Fair Value Measurements
    (Issue Date 09/06)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]
     

    This Statement defines fair value, establishes a framework for measuring fair value in generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), and expands disclosures about fair value measurements. This Statement applies under other accounting pronouncements that require or permit fair value measurements, the Board having previously concluded in those accounting pronouncements that fair value is the relevant measurement attribute. Accordingly, this Statement does not require any new fair value measurements. However, for some entities, the application of this Statement will change current practice.

    Reason for Issuing This Statement

    Prior to this Statement, there were different definitions of fair value and limited guidance for applying those definitions in GAAP. Moreover, that guidance was dispersed among the many accounting pronouncements that require fair value measurements. Differences in that guidance created inconsistencies that added to the complexity in applying GAAP. In developing this Statement, the Board considered the need for increased consistency and comparability in fair value measurements and for expanded disclosures about fair value measurements.

    Differences between This Statement and Current Practice

    The changes to current practice resulting from the application of this Statement relate to the definition of fair value, the methods used to measure fair value, and the expanded disclosures about fair value measurements.

    The definition of fair value retains the exchange price notion in earlier definitions of fair value. This Statement clarifies that the exchange price is the price in an orderly transaction between market participants to sell the asset or transfer the liability in the market in which the reporting entity would transact for the asset or liability, that is, the principal or most advantageous market for the asset or liability. The transaction to sell the asset or transfer the liability is a hypothetical transaction at the measurement date, considered from the perspective of a market participant that holds the asset or owes the liability. Therefore, the definition focuses on the price that would be received to sell the asset or paid to transfer the liability (an exit price), not the price that would be paid to acquire the asset or received to assume the liability (an entry price).

    This Statement emphasizes that fair value is a market-based measurement, not an entity-specific measurement. Therefore, a fair value measurement should be determined based on the assumptions that market participants would use in pricing the asset or liability. As a basis for considering market participant assumptions in fair value measurements, this Statement establishes a fair value hierarchy that distinguishes between (1) market participant assumptions developed based on market data obtained from sources independent of the reporting entity (observable inputs) and (2) the reporting entity’s own assumptions about market participant assumptions developed based on the best information available in the circumstances (unobservable inputs). The notion of unobservable inputs is intended to allow for situations in which there is little, if any, market activity for the asset or liability at the measurement date. In those situations, the reporting entity need not undertake all possible efforts to obtain information about market participant assumptions. However, the reporting entity must not ignore information about market participant assumptions that is reasonably available without undue cost and effort.

    This Statement clarifies that market participant assumptions include assumptions about risk, for example, the risk inherent in a particular valuation technique used to measure fair value (such as a pricing model) and/or the risk inherent in the inputs to the valuation technique. A fair value measurement should include an adjustment for risk if market participants would include one in pricing the related asset or liability, even if the adjustment is difficult to determine. Therefore, a measurement (for example, a “mark-to-model” measurement) that does not include an adjustment for risk would not represent a fair value measurement if market participants would include one in pricing the related asset or liability.

    This Statement clarifies that market participant assumptions also include assumptions about the effect of a restriction on the sale or use of an asset. A fair value measurement for a restricted asset should consider the effect of the restriction if market participants would consider the effect of the restriction in pricing the asset. That guidance applies for stock with restrictions on sale that terminate within one year that is measured at fair value under FASB Statements No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, and No. 124, Accounting for Certain Investments Held by Not-for-Profit Organizations.

    This Statement clarifies that a fair value measurement for a liability reflects its nonperformance risk (the risk that the obligation will not be fulfilled). Because nonperformance risk includes the reporting entity’s credit risk, the reporting entity should consider the effect of its credit risk (credit standing) on the fair value of the liability in all periods in which the liability is measured at fair value under other accounting pronouncements, including FASB Statement No. 133, Accounting for Derivative Instruments and Hedging Activities.

    This Statement affirms the requirement of other FASB Statements that the fair value of a position in a financial instrument (including a block) that trades in an active market should be measured as the product of the quoted price for the individual instrument times the quantity held (within Level 1 of the fair value hierarchy). The quoted price should not be adjusted because of the size of the position relative to trading volume (blockage factor). This Statement extends that requirement to broker-dealers and investment companies within the scope of the AICPA Audit and Accounting Guides for those industries.

    This Statement expands disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and liabilities in interim and annual periods subsequent to initial recognition. The disclosures focus on the inputs used to measure fair value and for recurring fair value measurements using significant unobservable inputs (within Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy), the effect of the measurements on earnings (or changes in net assets) for the period. This Statement encourages entities to combine the fair value information disclosed under this Statement with the fair value information disclosed under other accounting pronouncements, including FASB Statement No. 107, Disclosures about Fair Value of Financial Instruments, where practicable.

    The guidance in this Statement applies for derivatives and other financial instruments measured at fair value under Statement 133 at initial recognition and in all subsequent periods. Therefore, this Statement nullifies the guidance in footnote 3 of EITF Issue No. 02-3, “Issues Involved in Accounting for Derivative Contracts Held for Trading Purposes and Contracts Involved in Energy Trading and Risk Management Activities.” This Statement also amends Statement 133 to remove the similar guidance to that in Issue 02-3, which was added by FASB Statement No. 155, Accounting for Certain Hybrid Financial Instruments.

    How the Conclusions in This Statement Relate to the FASB’s Conceptual Framework

    The framework for measuring fair value considers the concepts in FASB Concepts Statement No. 2, Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting Information. Concepts Statement 2 emphasizes that providing comparable information enables users of financial statements to identify similarities in and differences between two sets of economic events.

    The definition of fair value considers the concepts relating to assets and liabilities in FASB Concepts Statement No. 6, Elements of Financial Statements, in the context of market participants. A fair value measurement reflects current market participant assumptions about the future inflows associated with an asset (future economic benefits) and the future outflows associated with a liability (future sacrifices of economic benefits).

    This Statement incorporates aspects of the guidance in FASB Concepts Statement No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, as clarified and/or reconsidered in this Statement. This Statement does not revise Concepts Statement 7. The Board will consider the need to revise Concepts Statement 7 in its conceptual framework project.

    The expanded disclosures about the use of fair value to measure assets and liabilities should provide users of financial statements (present and potential investors, creditors, and others) with information that is useful in making investment, credit, and similar decisions—the first objective of financial reporting in FASB Concepts Statement No. 1, Objectives of Financial Reporting by Business Enterprises.

     

    FASB Statement No. 159
    The Fair Value Option for Financial Assets and Financial Liabilities—Including an amendment of FASB Statement No. 115

    (Issue Date 02/07)
    [Full Text] [Summary] [Status]
     
  • Why Is the FASB Issuing This Statement?

    This Statement permits entities to choose to measure many financial instruments and certain other items at fair value. The objective is to improve financial reporting by providing entities with the opportunity to mitigate volatility in reported earnings caused by measuring related assets and liabilities differently without having to apply complex hedge accounting provisions. This Statement is expected to expand the use of fair value measurement, which is consistent with the Board’s long-term measurement objectives for accounting for financial instruments.

    What Is the Scope of This Statement—Which Entities Does It Apply to and What Does It Affect?

    This Statement applies to all entities, including not-for-profit organizations. Most of the provisions of this Statement apply only to entities that elect the fair value option. However, the amendment to FASB Statement No. 115, Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity Securities, applies to all entities with available-for-sale and trading securities. Some requirements apply differently to entities that do not report net income.

    The following are eligible items for the measurement option established by this Statement:

    Recognized financial assets and financial liabilities except:

    An investment in a subsidiary that the entity is required to consolidate

    An interest in a variable interest entity that the entity is required to consolidate

    Employers’ and plans’ obligations (or assets representing net overfunded positions) for pension benefits, other postretirement benefits (including health care and life insurance benefits), postemployment benefits, employee stock option and stock purchase plans, and other forms of deferred compensation arrangements, as defined in FASB Statements No. 35, Accounting and Reporting by Defined Benefit Pension Plans, No. 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, No. 106, Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits Other Than Pensions, No. 112, Employers’ Accounting for Postemployment Benefits, No. 123 (revised December 2004), Share-Based Payment, No. 43, Accounting for Compensated Absences, No. 146, Accounting for Costs Associated with Exit or Disposal Activities, and No. 158, Employers’ Accounting for Defined Benefit Pension and Other Postretirement Plans, and APB Opinion No. 12, Omnibus Opinion—1967

    Financial assets and financial liabilities recognized under leases as defined in FASB Statement No. 13, Accounting for Leases (This exception does not apply to a guarantee of a third-party lease obligation or a contingent obligation arising from a cancelled lease.)

    Deposit liabilities, withdrawable on demand, of banks, savings and loan associations, credit unions, and other similar depository institutions

    Financial instruments that are, in whole or in part, classified by the issuer as a component of shareholder’s equity (including “temporary equity”). An example is a convertible debt security with a noncontingent beneficial conversion feature.

    Firm commitments that would otherwise not be recognized at inception and that involve only financial instruments

    Nonfinancial insurance contracts and warranties that the insurer can settle by paying a third party to provide those goods or services

    Host financial instruments resulting from separation of an embedded nonfinancial derivative instrument from a nonfinancial hybrid instrument.

    How Will This Statement Change Current Accounting Practices?

    The fair value option established by this Statement permits all entities to choose to measure eligible items at fair value at specified election dates. A business entity shall report unrealized gains and losses on items for which the fair value option has been elected in earnings (or another performance indicator if the business entity does not report earnings) at each subsequent reporting date. A not-for-profit organization shall report unrealized gains and losses in its statement of activities or similar statement.

    The fair value option:

    May be applied instrument by instrument, with a few exceptions, such as investments otherwise accounted for by the equity method

    Is irrevocable (unless a new election date occurs)

    Is applied only to entire instruments and not to portions of instruments.

    How Does This Statement Contribute to International Convergence?

    The fair value option in this Statement is similar, but not identical, to the fair value option in IAS 39, Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement. The international fair value option is subject to certain qualifying criteria not included in this standard, and it applies to a slightly different set of instruments.

    What Is the Effective Date of This Statement?

    This Statement is effective as of the beginning of an entity’s first fiscal year that begins after November 15, 2007. Early adoption is permitted as of the beginning of a fiscal year that begins on or before November 15, 2007, provided the entity also elects to apply the provisions of FASB Statement No. 157, Fair Value Measurements.

    No entity is permitted to apply this Statement retrospectively to fiscal years preceding the effective date unless the entity chooses early adoption. The choice to adopt early should be made after issuance of this Statement but within 120 days of the beginning of the fiscal year of adoption, provided the entity has not yet issued financial statements, including required notes to those financial statements, for any interim period of the fiscal year of adoption.

    This Statement permits application to eligible items existing at the effective date (or early adoption date).

     


    Foreign Currency Complications in Valuation Analysis

    Big Mac Index of Purchasing Power Parity --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Mac_Index

    "CHART OF THE DAY: The iPod And Big Mac Indexes Just Don't Work," by John Carney and Kamelia Angelova, Business Insider, October 20, 2009 ---
    http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-of-the-day-ipod-vs-big-mac-2009-10

    The Economist's Big Mac Index and the new iPod Nano Index from CommSec are both cute ways of getting attention for the organizations that produce them. But do they really measure anything economically significant?
     
    The idea is that the indexes are supposed to expose the relative under- or over-valuation of various currencies. In theory, the same good should trade at broadly the same price across the globe if
    exchange rates are adjusting properly. When goods wind up priced very differently in different locations, it suggests something is out of whack.

    But a side-by-side comparison of the Big Mac Index and the iPod Nano Index suggests that these might not really be good metrics for measuring
    currency valuations. As you can see, the two indexes result in wildly uncorrelated results. If it were really a matter of currency valuation, you’d expect both to show similar valuation problems. Instead, the pattern just seems random.


    Many other U.S. and International Standards directly or indirectly impact on fair value accounting!

     

     

     

    Introduction to Valuation

    Bob Jensen's site on The Controversy Over Fair Value (Mark-to-Market) Financial Reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue


     


    Damodaran Online: A Great Sharing Site from a Finance Professor at New York University and Textbook Writer --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    This site has great sections on corporate finance, investments, valuation, spreadsheets, research, etc. For example, take a look at the helpers on valuation --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    You can pick the valuation approach that you would like to go to, to see illustrations, solutions and other supporting material.

       
      Discounted Cash flow Valuation
      Relative Valuation
      Option Pricing Approaches to Valuation
      Acquisition Valuation
      EVA, CFROI and other Value Enhancement Strategies

     

    Or you can pick the material that you are interested in.

           
    Spreadsheets Overheads Datasets References
    Problems & Solutions Derivations and Discussion Valuation Examples PowerPoint presentations

    Jim Mahar's finance sharing site (especially note his great blog link) --- http://financeprofessor.com/

    Financial Rounds from an anonymous finance professor --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    Bob Jensen's threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value controversies in accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen's finance and investment helpers are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on September 22, 2006

    TITLE: FASB to Issue Retooled Rule for Valuing Corporate Assets
    REPORTER: David Reilly
    DATE: Sep 15, 2006
    PAGE: C3
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Advanced Financial Accounting, Fair Value Accounting

    SUMMARY: On 9/15/2006, the FASB issued Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements. The standard "...provides enhanced guidance for using fair value to measure assets and liabilities. The standard also responds to investors' requests for expanded information about the extent to which companies measure assets and liabilities at fair value, the information used to measure fair value, and the effect of fair value measurements on earnings." (Source: FASB News Release available on their web site at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml) This new standard must be used as guidance whenever reporting entities use fair value to measure value assets and liabilities as a required or acceptable method of applying GAAP.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What is the purpose of issuing Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157? In your answer, describe how this standard should help to alleviate discrepancies in practice. To help answer this question, you may access the FASB's own news release about the standard, available at http://www.fasb.org/news/nr091506.shtml or the new standard itself, available on the FASB's web site.

    2.) From your own knowledge, cite an example in which fair value is used to measure an asset or liability in corporate balance sheets. Why is fair value an appropriate measure for including these assets and liabilities in corporate balance sheets?

    3.) What is the major difficulty with using fair values for financial reporting that is cited in the article?

    4.) Define the term "historical cost." Name two flaws with the use of historical costs, one cited in the article and one based on your own knowledge. Be sure to explain the flaw clearly.

    5.) How does this standard help to alleviate the issue described in answer to question 3? Again, you may access the FASB's web site, and the news release in particle, to answer this question.

    6.) The article closes with a statement that "The FASB hopes to counter some of [the issues cited in the article] by expanding disclosures required for all balance sheet items measure at fair value..." What could be the possible problem with that requirement?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "FASB to Issue Retooled Rule For Valuing Corporate Assets New Method Repeals Limits Spurred by Enron Scandal; Critics Worry About Abuses," by David Reilly,  The Wall Street Journal, September 15, 2006; Page C3 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115828639109763950.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

    Accounting rule makers have wrapped up an overhaul of a tricky but important method of valuing corporate assets, despite some critics' warning that the change could reopen the door to abuses like those seen at Enron Corp.

    The overhaul, contained in an accounting standard that could be issued as early as today, will repeal a ban put in place after Enron collapsed into bankruptcy court in late 2001 amid an array of accounting irregularities. The ban prohibited companies immediately booking gains or losses from complex financial instruments whose real value may not be known for years.

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board's new rule will require companies to base "fair" values for certain items on what they would fetch from a sale in an open market to a third party. In the past, firms often would use internal models to determine the value of instruments that didn't have a readily available price.

    FASB prohibited that practice after Enron used overly optimistic models to value multiyear power contracts in a bid to pad earnings. The ban was meant to give the board time to come up with a new approach to determining fair values.

    The accounting rule makers say the new standard will give companies, auditors and investors much needed, and more nuanced, guidance on how to measure market values. Companies will have to think, "it's not my own estimate of what something is worth to me, but what the market would demand for this," said Leslie Seidman, an FASB member. While clarifying how to come up with appropriate values for some instruments, the new standard doesn't expand the use of what is known as fair-value accounting.

    Critics say the new rule reopens the door to manipulation and possibly fraud by unscrupulous managers. Requiring market values for instruments where there isn't a ready price in a market can be "a license for management to invent the financial statements to be whatever they want them to be," Damon Silvers, associate general counsel for the AFL-CIO, said at a meeting of an FASB advisory group this spring.

    Jousting over the standard reflects a deep rift within accounting circles. For decades, accounting values were mostly based on historical cost, or what a company paid for a particular asset. In recent years, accounting rules have moved toward the use of market values, known as fair-value accounting. In some ways this reflects the shift in the U.S. from a manufacturing to a service economy, where intangible assets are more important than the plant and equipment that previously defined a company's financial strength.

    Starting in the mid-1980s, companies also began using ever-more-complicated financial instruments such as futures, options and swaps to manage interest-rate, currency and other risks. Such contracts often can't be measured based on their cost. This spurred the use of market values, thought to be more realistic. But these values can be tough to determine because many complex financial instruments are tailor-made and don't trade on open markets in the same way as stocks.

    Of course, valuations based on historical cost also have flaws. The savings-and-loan crisis of the late 1980s, for example, was prompted in part by thrifts carrying loans on their balance sheets at historical cost, even though the loans had plummeted in value.

    Robert Herz, the FASB's chairman, acknowledges the difficulty in coming up with a market, or fair, value for many instruments. In discussions, he often asks how a company could reasonably be expected to come up with a fair value for a 30-year swap agreement on the Thai currency, the baht, which is a bet on the future value of that currency against another.

    The answer, according to Mr. Herz and the FASB, is to base the value on what a willing third-party would pay in the market and possibly include a discount to reflect the uncertainty inherent in the approach.

    In an interview earlier this year, Mr. Herz said this valuation approach would reduce the likelihood of a recurrence of problems such as those seen at Enron. "The problem wasn't that Enron was using fair values, it was that they were using 'unfair' values," he said.

    Still, "the bottom line is that fair-value accounting is a great thing so long as you have market values," said J. Edward Ketz, an associate accounting professor at Pennsylvania State University, who is working on a book about the FASB's new standard. "If you don't, you get into some messy areas."

    The FASB hopes to counter some of these issues by expanding disclosures required for all balance-sheet items measured at fair value, the board's Ms. Seidman said.

    October 15, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    The original 157 Exposure Draft proposed a Fair Value Option (FVO) that would have allowed carrying of virtually any financial asset or liability at fair value rather than just limiting fair value accounting to selected items that are now required to be carried at fair value rather than historical cost. Business firms, and especially banks, generally are against fair value accounting (due to reporting instabilities that arise from fair value adjustments prior to contract settlements). The FASB backed off of the FVO when it issued FAS 157, thereby relegating FAS 157 to a standard that clarifies definitions of fair value in various circumstances. Hence FAS 157 is largely semantic and does not change the present fair value accounting rules.

    I asked Paul Pacter (at Deloitte in Hong Kong where he's still very active in helping to set IFRS and FASB standards) for an update on the FVO Project (commenced in 2004) that failed to impact the new FAS 157 standard. His reply is below.

    October 31 reply from Paul Pacter (CN - Hong Kong) [paupacter@deloitte.com.hk]

    Hi Bob,

    Yes, FASB's FV Option (FVO) t is very much active -- an ED on phase 1 was issued in January, and a final FAS is expected before year end.

    Thus phase 2 would go beyond IFRSs, though several IFRSs have FV options for individual types of assets. IAS 16 and IAS 38 allow it for PP&E and intangibles -- though the credit is to surplus, not P&L, no recycling, subsequent depreciation of revalued amounts. IAS 40 gives a FV option for investment property -- FV through P&L. IAS 41 isn't an option, it's a requirement for FV through P&L for agricultural assets.

    Phase 2 would commence in 2007.

    Re possible amendment to FAS 157, I don't think FASB plans to do that, though I suppose there might be some consequential amendment. But I don't think the FVO will change the definition of fair value that's in FAS 157.

    Here's FASB's web page: http://www.fasb.org/project/fv_option.shtml

    Warm regards,

    Paul

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm

    Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting, October 27, 2006 --- http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/

    Introduction
    I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on accounting. As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my commentary to comprise three different sorts of writing in which I may engage:
    § Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
    § Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the IASB.
    § Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that I think might have some general readership.

    The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of accounting per se to deal with matters of enormous significance to me such as corporate or public administration. Such expressions will not be too substantial a digression from the core subject matter because I believe that the foundation of good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is accounting.

    Source of my ideas on accounting
    I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my philosophy of accounting is derivative, as much of human knowledge is of course. It is not for nothing that Newtown said that if he can see so far it is because he stands on the shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri. As I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the lessons I learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting Measurement, a neglected work that will still be read in 1,000 years or so long as humankind survives whichever is the shorter. As the depredations of the standard setting craze are visited upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.

    The basic structure of accounting
    Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to begin by outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my mind, comprises three inter-related parts. These are:
    § Book-keeping.
    § Accounting.
    § Financial reporting.

    Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements in the underlying books of account. These financial data elements represent, or purport to represent, real world events. The heart of book-keeping is the double entry process. For instance at the most basic level a movement in cash will result in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or settlement of a liability and so on.

    I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of book-keeping. Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the movement of commodity is the proper subject matter of book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract should be similarly treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes. That is to adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable later on. Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had, based on the notion of commitment accounting, some years ago is beginning to unravel.

    Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is the process by which the integrity of the centre piece of book-keeping – the general ledger expressing double entry – is ensured. I will not concern myself with such processes though this is not to say that they are unimportant.

    Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a raw record expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of distillation and summation that enables the accountant to gain on overview of what has happened to the entity the subject of the accounting. Accounting fundamentally assumes that the accountant is periodically capable of saying something useful about the real world using his or her special form of notation.

    Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled into a comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body of rules. It differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number of ways. Most benignly it differs, for instance, by including ancillary information for the benefit of a reader beyond the mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the ideal there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting will, to some degree shape the order and format of the basic, book-keeping level so that the process of distillation and summation follows naturally to the final level of reporting without dramatic alteration.

    Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above can be seen, without much effort, to be only ideal and that in reality it does not arise. In short the golden strand that links the detailed recording of real world phenonmena to its final summation is broken.

    An example
    I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS 41, the IASB standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary production at all, I had not thought about this subject for years.

    IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’ accounting. Fair value accounting is the process by which current sale prices, or their proxies, are substituted for the past cost of any given item.

    For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard comprises land, the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to sustain the vine (support structures, irrigation channels etc.). Subsumed within the vine are the materials necessary for it to grow and start producing fruit. This will include the immature plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture and protect it, and the labour necessary to apply it.

    The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these components. Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour cost $1000. In the books will be recorded:

    Dr Vineyard $1000
    Cr Cash $1000

    At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will summarise this is a balance statement. He or she will then obtain, in some way, the current selling price of the vine. Presumably this will be the future cash stream of selling the fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.

    The accountant will then make the following incremental adjustment:

    Dr Vineyard $200
    Cr Equity $200

    Looked like this there is a connection between the original book-keeping and the periodic adjustment at the end of the accounting period. This is an illusion. The incremental entry disguises what is really happening. It is as follows:

    Dr Equity $1000
    Cr Vineyard $1000

    And

    Dr Vineyard $1200
    Cr Equity $1200

    Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping has been discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This is the truth of the matter. The subject matter of the first phase of accounting was a set of events arising in a bank and in the entity undertaking accounting. The subject matter of the second phase is a set of future sales to a party who does not yet exist.

    From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of corporate governance, the view produced by the first phase is next to useless. However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I had suppressed until recently, relates to the shattering of the linkages between the three levels of accounting in the final reporting process. This disquiet has returned as I contemplate the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting process.

    October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Robert,

    I hope you add many more entries to your blog.

    The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it provides no answer how to account for risk of many modern day contracts that were not imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in a simple world of transactions. For example, historical costs of forward contracts and swaps are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that may outweigh all the recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once we opened the door to fair value accounting to better account for risk, however, we opened the door to misleading the public that booked fair value adjustments can be aggregated much like we sum the current balances of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Such aggregations are generally nonsense.

    I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not. It goes as follows:

    Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
    Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.

    Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at http://www.zorba.ca/ )

    Jensen Comment
    This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---  not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender (stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical accounting versus pro forma accounting.

    Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of the time.
    "Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 --- http://physorg.com/news81068530.html

    I have written a more serious piece about both theoretical and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should emphasize that this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing fair value accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the culminating FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option to apply fair value accounting to all financial instruments even though it is still required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.

    My thoughts on this are at the following two links:

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    Bob Jensen

    October 30, 2006 reply from Robert B Walker [walkerrb@ACTRIX.CO.NZ]

    Bob

    Thanks for the support. I have answered you in my second installment ( www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com ).

     

    I shall continue to write if for no other reason than for myself. I have had it in mind to write a book. I shall begin doing so this way.

     

    Robert

    October 30, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    I have difficulty envisioning forward contracts as “executory contracts.” These appear to be to be executed contracts that are terminated when the cash finally flows.

    Fair value appears to be the only way to book forward contracts if they are to be booked at all, although fair value on the date they are signed is usually zero.

    Once you are in the fair value realm, you have all the aggregation problems, blockage problems, etc. that are mentioned at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm 

    I guess what I’d especially like you to address is the problem of aggregation in a balance sheet or income statement based upon heterogeneous measurements.

    Bob Jensen

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at various other links:

    I recently completed the first draft of a paper on fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm
    Comments would be helpful.

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#UnderlyingBases

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms

    Interest Rate Swap Valuation, Forward Rate Derivation, and Yield Curves for FAS 133 and IAS 39 on Accounting for Derivative Financial Instruments ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133swapvalue.htm


    Fair value is the estimated best disposal (exit, liquidation) value in any sale other than a forced sale.  It is defined as follows in Paragraph 540 on Page 243 of FAS 133:

    The amount at which an asset (liability) could be bought (incurred) or sold (settled) in a current transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced or liquidation sale. Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement, if available. If a quoted market price is available, the fair value is the product of the number of trading units times that market price. If a quoted market price is not available, the estimate of fair value should be based on the best information available in the circumstances. The estimate of fair value should consider prices for similar assets or similar liabilities and the results of valuation techniques to the extent available in the circumstances. Examples of valuation techniques include the present value of estimated expected future cash flows using discount rates commensurate with the risks involved, option- pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted spread models, and fundamental analysis.  Valuation techniques for measuring assets and liabilities should be consistent with the objective of measuring fair value. Those techniques should incorporate assumptions that market participants would use in their estimates of values, future revenues, and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates, default, prepayment, and volatility. In measuring forward contracts, such as foreign currency forward contracts, at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows, an entity should base the estimate of future cash flows on the changes in the forward rate (rather than the spot rate). In measuring financial liabilities and nonfinancial derivatives that are liabilities at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows (or equivalent outflows of other assets), an objective is to use discount rates at which those liabilities could be settled in an arm's-length transaction.

    This is old news, but it does provide some questions for students to ponder.  The main problem of fair value adjustment is that many ((most?) of the adjustments cause enormous fluctuations in earnings, assets, and liabilities that are washed out over time and never realized.  The main advantage is that interim impacts that “might be” realized are booked.  It’s a war between “might be” versus “might never.”  The war has been waging for over a century with respect to booked assets and two decades with respect to unbooked derivative instruments, contingencies, and intangibles.

    CFA analysts' group favors full fair value reporting
    The CFA Centre for Financial Market Integrity – a part of the CFA Institute – has published a new financial reporting model that, they believe, would greatly enhance the ability of financial analysts and investors to evaluate companies in making investment decisions. The Comprehensive Business Reporting Model proposes 12 principles to ensure that financial statements are relevant, clear, accurate, understandable, and comprehensive (See below).
    "Analysts' group favours full fair value reporting," IAS Plus, October 31, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

     

    CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity
    Comprehensive Business Reporting Model – Principles

    • 1. The company must be viewed from the perspective of a current investor in the company's common equity.
    • 2. Fair value information is the only information relevant for financial decision making.
    • 3. Recognition and disclosure must be determined by the relevance of the information to investment decision making and not based upon measurement reliability alone.
    • 4. All economic transactions and events should be completely and accurately recognized as they occur in the financial statements.
    • 5. Investors' wealth assessments must determine the materiality threshold.
    • 6. Financial reporting must be neutral.
    • 7. All changes in net assets must be recorded in a single financial statement, the Statement of Changes in Net Assets Available to Common Shareowners.
    • 8. The Statement of Changes in Net Assets Available to Common Shareowners should include timely recognition of all changes in fair values of assets and liabilities.
    • 9. The Cash Flow Statement provides information essential to the analysis of a company and should be prepared using the direct method only.
    • 10. Changes affecting each of the financial statements must be reported and explained on a disaggregated basis.
    • 11. Individual line items should be reported based upon the nature of the items rather than the function for which they are used.
    • 12. Disclosures must provide all the additional information investors require to understand the items recognized in the financial statements, their measurement properties, and risk exposures.

    Standards of Value: Theory and Applications
    Standards of Value covers the underlying assumption in many of the prominent standards of value, including Fair Market Value, investment value, and fair value. It discusses the specific purposes of the valuation, including divorce, shareholders' oppression, financial reporting, and how these standards are applied.
    Standards of Value: Theory and Applications, by Jay E. Fishman, Shannon P. Pratt, William J. Morrison Wiley:  ISBN: 0-471-69483-5 Hardcover 368 pages November 2006 US $95.00) --- http://www.wiley.com/WileyCDA/WileyTitle/productCd-0471694835.html


    "Will Fair Value Fly? Fair-value accounting could change the very basis of corporate finance," by Ronald Fink, CFO Magazine September 01, 2006 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/7851757/c_7873404?f=magazine_featured

    Much has changed in financial reporting since Andrew Fastow and Scott Sullivan, the finance chiefs of Enron and WorldCom, respectively, brought disgrace upon themselves, their employers, and, to a degree, their profession. Regulators and investors have pressed companies to be more open and forthcoming about their results — and companies have responded. According to a new CFO magazine survey, 82 percent of public-company finance executives disclose more information in their financial statements today then they did three years ago. But that positive finding won't quell calls for further accounting reform.

    The U.S. reporting system "faces a number of important and difficult challenges," Robert Herz, chairman of the Financial Accounting Standards Board, told the annual conference of the American Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Washington, D.C., last December. Chief among those, said Herz, is "the need to reduce complexity and improve the transparency and overall usefulness" of information reported to investors. ad

    Critics contend that generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) remain seriously flawed, even as companies have beefed up internal controls to comply with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. "We've done very little but play defense for the last five to six years," charges J. Michael Cook, chairman and CEO emeritus of Deloitte & Touche LLP. "It's time to play offense."

    Cook, a respected elder statesman in the accounting community, goes so far as to pronounce financial statements almost completely irrelevant to financial analysis as currently conducted. "The analyst community does workarounds based on numbers that have very little to do with the financial statements," says Cook. "Net income is a virtually useless number."

    How can financial statements become more relevant and useful? Many reformers, including Herz, believe that fair-value accounting must be part of the answer. In this approach, which FASB increasingly favors, assets and liabilities are marked to market rather than recorded on balance sheets at historical cost. Fair-value accounting, say its advocates, would give users of financial statements a far clearer picture of the economic state of a company.

    "I know what an asset is. I can see one, I can touch one, or I can see representations of one. I also know what liabilities are," says Thomas Linsmeier, a Michigan State University accounting professor who joined FASB in June. On the other hand, "I believe that revenues, expenses, gains, and losses are accounting constructs," he adds. "I can't say that I see a revenue going down the street. And so for me to have an accounting model that captures economic reality, I think the starting point has to be assets and liabilities."

    More than any other regulatory change, fair value promises to end the practice of earnings management. That's because a company's earnings would depend more on what happens on its balance sheet than on its income statement (see "The End of Earnings Management?" at the end of this article).

    But switching from historical cost would require enormous effort from overworked finance departments. Valuing assets in the absence of active markets could be overly subjective, making financial statements less reliable. Linsmeier's confidence notwithstanding, disputes could arise over the very definition of certain assets and liabilities. And using fair value could even distort a company's approach to deal-making and capital structure.

    A Familiar Concept Fair value is by no means unfamiliar to corporate-finance executives, as current accounting rules for such items as derivatives (FAS 133 and 155), securitizations (FAS 156), and employee stock option grants (FAS 123R) use it to varying degrees when recording assets and liabilities. So does a proposal issued last January for another rule, this one for accounting for all financial instruments. FASB's more recent proposals to include pensions and leases on balance sheets also embrace fair-value measurement (see "Be Careful What You Wish For" at the end of this article).

    While both Herz and Linsmeier are careful to note that they don't necessarily favor the application of fair value to assets and liabilities that lack a ready market, they clearly advocate its application where there's sufficient reason to believe the valuations are reliable. Corporate accounting, Herz says, is the only major reporting system that doesn't use fair value as its basis, and he points to the Federal Reserve's use of it in tracking the U.S. economy as sufficient reason for companies to adopt it.

    The corporate world, however, must grapple with its own complexities. For one, fair value could make it even more difficult to realize value from acquisitions. Take the question of contingent considerations, wherein the amount that acquirers pay for assets ultimately depends on their return. Under current GAAP, the balance-sheet value of assets that are transferred through such earnouts may reflect only the amount exchanged at the time the deal is completed, because the acquirer has considerable leeway in treating subsequent payments as expenses.

    Under fair value, the acquirer would also include on its balance sheet the present value of those contingent payments based on their likelihood of materializing. Since the money may never materialize, some finance executives contend those estimates could be unreliable and misleading. "I disagree with [this application of fair value] on principle," James Barge, senior vice president and controller for Time Warner, said during a conference on financial reporting last May. ad

    Barge cites the acquisition of intangible assets that a company does not intend to use as a further example of fair value's potentially worrisome effects. Under current GAAP, their value is included in goodwill and subject to annual impairment testing for possible write-off. But if, as FASB is contemplating, the value of those assets would be recorded on the balance sheet along with that of the associated tangible assets that were acquired, Barge worries that an immediate write-off would then be required — even though it would not reflect the acquiring company's economics.

    Fair value's defenders say such concerns are misplaced. The possibility that a contingent consideration won't materialize, for starters, is already reflected in an acquirer's bid, says Patricia McConnell, a Bear Stearns senior managing director who chairs the corporate-disclosure policy council of the CFA Institute, a group for financial analysts. "It's in the price," she says.

    As for intangibles that are acquired and then extinguished, the analyst says a write-off would not in fact be required under fair value if the transaction strengthens the acquirer's market position. That position would presumably be reflected in the value of the assets associated with those intangibles as recorded on the balance sheet under fair-value treatment.

    "It may be in buying a brand to gain monopolistic position that you don't have an expense," McConnell explains, "but rather you have the extinguishment of one asset and the creation of another." Yet McConnell, among others, admits that accounting for intangibles is an area that would need improvement even if FASB adopted fair value.

    Deceptive Debt? Another area of concern involves capital structure, with Barge suggesting that fair value may make it more difficult to finance growth with debt. He contends that marking a company's debt to market could make a company look more highly exposed to interest-rate risk than it really is, noting during the May conference that Time Warner's debt was totally hedged.

    Barge also cited as problematic the hypothetical case of a company whose creditworthiness is downgraded by the rating agencies. By marking down the debt's value on its balance sheet, the company would realize more income, a scenario Barge called "nonsensical." He warned of a host of such effects arising under fair value when a company changes its capital structure.

    Proponents find at least some of the complaints about fair value and corporate debt to be misplaced. Herz notes fair value would require the company to mark the hedge as well as the debt to market, so that if a company is hedging interest-rate risk effectively, its balance sheet should accurately reflect its lack of any exposure.

    What's more, fair value could also improve balance sheets in some cases. When, for instance, a company owns an interest in another whose results it need not consolidate, the equity holder's proportion of the other company's assets and liabilities is currently carried at historical cost. If, however, the other company's assets have gained value and were marked to market, the equity holder's own leverage might decrease.

    A real-life case in point: If the chemical company Valhi marked to market its 39 percent stake in Titanium Metals, Valhi's own ratio of long-term debt to equity would fall from 90 percent (at the end of 2005) to 56 percent, according to Jack T. Ciesielski, publisher of The Analyst's Accounting Observer newsletter. ad

    Still, even some fair-value proponents share Barge's concern about credit downgrades. As Ciesielski, a member of FASB's Emerging Issues Task Force, wrote last April in a report on the board's proposal for the use of fair value for financial instruments, it is "awfully counterintuitive" for a company to show rising earnings when its debt-repayment capacity is declining.

    Herz and other fair-value proponents disagree, noting that the income accrues to the benefit of the shareholders, not to bondholders. "It's not at all counterintuitive," asserts Rebecca McEnally, director for capital-markets policy of the CFA Institute Centre for Financial Market Integrity, citing the fact that the item is classified under GAAP as "income from forgiveness of indebtedness." But Ciesielski says investors are unlikely to understand that, and that fair value, in this case at least, may not produce useful results.

    Resolving the Issues Even some of FASB's critics agree, however, that the current system needs improvement, and that fair value can help provide it. "Fair value in general is more relevant than historical cost and can lead to reduced complexity and greater transparency," Barge admits, though he has noted that the use of fair value may also lead to "soft" results that "you can't audit."

    For much the same reason, Colleen Cunningham, president and CEO of Financial Executives International (FEI), expressed concern in testimony before Congress last March that "overly theoretical and complex standards can result in financial reporting of questionable accuracy and can create a significant cost burden, with little benefit to investors." In an interview, she explains that her biggest concern is that FASB is pushing ahead with fair-value-based rules without sufficient input from preparers. "Let's resolve the issues" before proceeding, she insists.

    Herz concedes that numerous issues surrounding fair value need to be addressed. But important users of financial statements are pressing him to move forward on fair value without delay. As a comment letter that the CFA Institute sent to FASB put it: "All financial decision-making should be based on fair value, the only relevant measurement for assets, liabilities, revenues, and expenses."

    Meanwhile, Herz isn't waiting for the conceptual framework to be completed before enacting new rules that embrace fair value. "In the end, we're not going to get everybody agreeing," Herz says. "So we have to make decisions" despite lingering disagreement.

    Ironically, one fair-value-based proposal that FASB issued recently may have created an artful means of defusing opposition. The Board's proposal for financial instruments gives preparers of financial reports the choice of using historical cost or fair value in recording the instruments on their balance sheets. That worries some people, who say giving companies a choice of methods will make it harder to compare their results, even when they're in the same industry.

    Continued in article

     


    "Guidance on fair value measurements under FAS 123(R)," IAS Plus, May 8, 2006 ---
    http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

    Deloitte & Touche (USA) has updated its book of guidance on FASB Statement No. 123(R) Share-Based Payment: A Roadmap to Applying the Fair Value Guidance to Share-Based Payment Awards (PDF 2220k). This second edition reflects all authoritative guidance on FAS 123(R) issued as of 28 April 2006. It includes over 60 new questions and answers, particularly in the areas of earnings per share, income tax accounting, and liability classification. Our interpretations incorporate the views in SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin Topic 14 "Share-Based Payment" (SAB 107), as well as subsequent clarifications of EITF Topic No. D-98 "Classification and Measurement of Redeemable Securities" (dealing with mezzanine equity treatment). The publication contains other resource materials, including a GAAP accounting and disclosure checklist. Note that while FAS 123 is similar to IFRS 2 Share-based Payment, there are some measurement differences that are Described Here.

    Bob Jensen's threads on employee stock options are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/sfas123/jensen01.htm


    Fair Value Accounting Book Review (Meeting the New FASB Requirements)

    From SmartPros on May 1, 2006
    Fair Value for Financial Reporting by Alfred King highlights the accounting and auditing requirements for fair value information and offers a detailed explanation of how the FASB is going to change "fair value," from determining the fair value of intangible assets to selecting and working with an appraiser --- http://accounting.smartpros.com/x35458.xml

    Fair Value for Financial Reporting: Meeting the New FASB Requirements
    by Alfred M. King
    ISBN: 0-471-77184-8
    Hardcover 352 pages April 2006

     

    Click to Download the Comprehensive Business Reporting Model from the CFA Institute website.
    Click here for Press Release (PDF 26k).

    As you can see below, the war is not over yet.  In fact it has intensified between corporations (especially banks) versus standard setters versus members of the academy.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educators' Review on April 2, 2004

    TITLE: As IASB Unveils New Rules, Dispute With EU Continues 
    REPORTER: David Reilly 
    DATE: Mar 31, 2004 
    PAGE: A2 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB108067939682469331,00.html  
    TOPICS: Generally accepted accounting principles, Fair Value Accounting, Insider trading, International Accounting, International Accounting Standards Board

    SUMMARY: Despite controversy with the European Union (EU), the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) is expected to release a final set of international accounting standards. Questions focus on the role of the IASB, controversy with the EU, and harmonization of the accounting standards.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) What is the role of the IASB? What authority does the IASB have to enforce standards?

    2.) List three reasons that a country would choose to follow IASB accounting standards. Why has the U.S. not adopted IASB accounting standards?

    3.) Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of harmonization of accounting standards throughout the world. Why is it important the IASB reach a resolution with the EU over the disputed accounting standards?

    4.) What is fair value accounting? Why would fair value accounting make financial statements more volatile? Is increased volatility a valid argument for not adopting fair value accounting? Does GAAP in the United States require fair value accounting? Support your answers.

    There are a number of software vendors of FAS 133 valuation software.

    One of the major companies is Financial CAD --- http://www.financialcad.com/ 

    FinancialCAD provides software and services that support the valuation and risk management of financial securities and derivatives that is essential for banks, corporate treasuries and asset management firms. FinancialCAD’s industry standard financial analytics are a key component in FinancialCAD solutions that are used by over 25,000 professionals in 60 countries.

    See software.

    Fair value accounting politics in the revised IAS 39

    From Paul Pacter's IAS Plus on July 13, 2005 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm
    Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/IASBFairValueFAQ.pdf

     
    The European Commission has published Frequently Asked Questions – IAS 39 Fair Value Option (FVO) (PDF 94k), providing the Commission's views on the following questions:
    • Why did the Commission carve out the full fair value option in the original IAS 39 standard?
    • Do prudential supervisors support IAS 39 FVO as published by the IASB?
    • When will the Commission to adopt the amended standard for the IAS 39 FVO?
    • Will companies be able to apply the amended standard for their 2005 financial statements?
    • Does the amended standard for IAS 39 FVO meet the EU endorsement criteria?
    • What about the relationship between the fair valuation of own liabilities under the amended IAS 39 FVO standard and under Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Law Directive?
    • Will the Commission now propose amending Article 42(a) of the Fourth Company Directive?
    • What about the remaining IAS 39 carve-out relating to certain

    On June 23, 2005, the Financial Accounting Standards Board issued an Exposure Draft (ED) entitled "Fair Value Measurements."  The original ED can be downloaded free at
    http://www.fasb.org/draft/ed_fair_value_measurements.pdf

    "Response to the FASB's Exposure Draft on Fair Value Measurements," AAA Financial Standards Committee, Accounting Horizons, September 2005, pp. 187-195 --- http://aaahq.org/pubs/electpubs.htm

    RESPONSES TO SPECIFIC ISSUES

    The FASB invited comment on all matters related to the ED, but specifically requested comments on 14 listed issues.  The Committee's comments are limited to those issues for which empirical research provides some insights, or those sections of the ED that are conceptually inconsistent or unclear.  The Committee has previously commented on other fair-value-related documents issued by the FASB and other standard-setting bodies.  This letter reiterates comments expressed in those letters to the extent they are germane to the measurement issues contained in the ED.  However, to better understand our perspective on reporting fair value information in the financial statements and related notes, we refer readers to those comment letters (i.e., AAA FASC 1998, 2000).

    Issue 1: Definition of Fair Value

    The Committee believes that the ED contains some conceptual inconsistencies between the definition and application of the fair value measurement attribute.  The ED proposes a definition of fair value that is relatively independent of the entity-specific use of the assets held or settlement of the liabilities owed.  In contrast, the proposed standard and related implementation guidance includes measurement that is, at times, directly determined by the entity-specific use of the asset or settlement of the liability in question.

    Some of the inconsistencies with respect to fair value measurement might be attributable to the attempt to apply general, high-level fair value guidance to the idiosyncratic attributes of specific accounts and transactions.  In some cases, application to specific accounts and transactions requires deviation from an entity-independent notion of fair value to one that includes consideration of the specific types and uses of assets held or liabilities owed by companies.  For example, as we note in our discussion of Issue 6 (below), one of the examples in the ED suggests that the fair value of a machine should include an adjustment of quoted market prices (based on comparable machines) for installation costs.  However, such an adjustment is dependent on the individual circumstances of the company that purchases the equipment.  That is, installation costs are included in the fair value of an asset only when the firm intends to use that asset for income producing activities.  Alternatively, if the firm intends to sell the asset, then installation costs are ignored.

    Some members of the Committee, however, do not perceive an inconsistency between the definition and application of the fair value measurement attribute.  These members view the definition of fair value and the context within which it is applied (i.e., the valuation premise) to be distinct, albeit related, attributes.  Although the definition of fair value can be entity-independent, the valuation premise (e.g., value-in-use or value-in-exchange) cannot.  Further, these members argue that ignoring the valuation premise in determining fair value could lead to unsatisfactory outcomes.  For example, if installation costs are ignored regardless of the valuation premise, then immediately after purchasing an asset for use in income-producing activities, firms would suffer impairment losses equal to the installation costs incurred to prepare the assets for use.

    The Committee raises the example of machinery installation costs to illustrate the confusion we experienced trying to reconcile the high-level (seemingly entity-independent) definition of fair value with the contextually determined application standards.  We note that the Introduction of the Ed suggests that the intent of the proposed guidance in the ED is to establish fair value measures that would be referenced in other authoritative accounting to establish fair value measures that would be referenced in other authoritative accounting pronouncements.  Presumably, these other pronouncements would also establish reasonable deviations from the entity-independent notion of fair value.  The Committee believes the most effective general purpose fair value measurement standard would adopt a general notion of fair value that is consistent across the definition of fair value, the accounting standard, and the implementation guidance.  To the extent the Board generally believes that fair value is an entity-specific concept, the high-level definition should reflect this as well.

    Issues 4 and 5: Valuation Premise and Fair Value Hierarchy

    Related to our previous comments, some members of the Committee perceive a contradiction between the definition of fair value in paragraphs 4 and 5 of the ED and the valuation premise described in paragraph 13.  The definition of fair value provided in paragraph 5 suggests a pure value-in-exchange perspective where fair value is determined by the market price that would occur between willing parties.  In contrast, the valuation premise described in paragraph 13 suggests that the fair value estimate can follow either a value-in-use perspective or a value-in-exchange perspective.

    Moreover, the fair value hierarchy described in the ED gives the highest priority to fair value measurements based on market inputs regardless of the valuation premise.  Some members of the Committee believe that quoted market prices are not necessarily an appropriate measure of fair value when a value-in-use premise is being considered.  This is especially true when a quoted price for an identical asset in an active reference market (i.e., a Level 1 estimate) exists, but is significantly different from a value-in-use estimate computed by taking the present value of the firm-specific future cash flows expected to be generated by the asset (i.e., a Level 3 estimate).  In such instances, following the fair value hierarchy might lead to a fair value estimate more in character with a value-in-exchange premise than a value-in-use premise.

    In summary, the Committee believes that: (1) integrating the two valuation premises (i.e., value-in-use and value-in-exchange) into the definition of fair value itself and (2) elaborating on the differences between the two premises would help ensure more consistent application of the standard.

    Issue 6: Reference Market

    Some members of the Committee are confused by the guidance related to determining the appropriate reference market.  With respect to the Level 1 reference market, the ED states that when multiple active markets exist, the most advantageous market should be used.  The most advantageous market is determined by comparing prices across multiple markets net of transactions costs.  However, the ED requires that transactions costs be ignored subsequently in determining the fair value measurement.  In our view, ignoring transactions costs is problematic because we believe such costs are an ordinary and predictable part of executing a transaction.

    In Example 5 (paragraph B9 (b) of the ED) where two markets, A and B, are considered, the price in Market B ($35) is more advantageous than the price in Market A ($25), ignoring transaction costs.  However, the fair value estimate is determined using the price in Market A because the transactions cost in Market B ($20) is much higher than in Market A ($5).  The guidance is less clear if we modify the example by reducing the transaction costs for Market B to $15.  In this instance, neither market is advantageous in a "net" sense, but Market B would yield the highest fair value estimate (ignoring transactions costs), which provides managers an opportunity to pick the most desirable figure based on their reporting objectives.

    Omitting transactions costs from the fair value estimate in Example 5 contrasts sharply with Example 3 (Appendix B, paragraph B7 (a)) where the value-in-use fair value estimate of a machine is determined by adjusting the quoted market price of a comparable machine by installation costs.  Installation costs are ignored only if the firm intends to dispose of the asset (Appendix B, paragraph B7 (b)).  Thus, managerial intent plays an integral role in determining whether fair value is computed with or without installation costs, but the same does not hold for transaction costs.  Since transaction costs are not relevant unless management intends to dispose of the asset, the Committee agrees that ignoring transaction costs is justified when a value-in-use premise is appropriate, but the Committee questions the appropriateness of ignoring transaction costs when a value-in-exchange premise is adopted.

    Issue 7: Pricing in Active Dealer Markets

    The ED requires that the fair value of financial instruments traded in active dealer markets where bid and asked prices are readily available be estimated using bid prices for assets and asked prices for liabilities.  Some Committee members believe that this requirement is inconsistent with the general concept of fair value and seems to be biased toward valuing assets and liabilities at value-in-exchange instead of value-in-use.  Limiting our discussion to the asset case, if a buyer establishes a long position through a dealer, the buyer must pay the asked price.  By purchasing the asset at the asked price, the buyer clearly expects to earn an acceptable rate of return on the investment in the asset (at the higher price).  Moreover, if after purchasing the asset, the buyer immediately applies the ED's proposed fair value measurement guidance (i.e., bid price valuation), the buyer would incur a loss on the asset equal to the bid-ask spread.

    In general, the bid price seems relevant only if the holder wishes to liquidate his/her position.  Although the Committee is not largely in favor of managerial intent-based fair value measures, we are uncomfortable with a bias toward a value-in-exchange premise for assets in-use.  If the Board decides to retain bid-based (ask-based) accounting for dealer traded assets (liabilities) in the final standard, then we propose that the final standard more clearly describe the conceptual basis for liquidation basis asset and liability valuation.

    Issue 9: Level 3 Estimates

    Level 3 estimates require considerable judgment in terms of both the selection and application of valuation techniques.  As a result, estimates using different valuation techniques with different assumptions will likely yield widely varying fair value estimates.  Examples 7 and 8 in Appendix B of the ED illustrate the wide variance in fair value estimates obtained with different valuation techniques.  The ED allows considerable latitude in both the valuation technique and inputs used.  Due to their incentives, managers might use the flexibility afforded by the proposed standard to produce biased and unreliable estimates.  The measurement guidance proposed in the ED is similar to the unstructured and imprecise category of standards analyzed by Nelson et al.  (2002).  They find that managers are more likely to attempt (and auditors are less likely to question) earnings management under such standards compared to more precise standards.

    The income approach to determining a Level 3 fair value estimate encompasses a basket of valuation techniques including two different present value techniques--the discount rate adjustment technique and the expected present value technique.4  The ED conjectures that these two techniques should produce the same fair values (see paragraphs A12, A13 and FN 17).  But, from an application perspective, this conjecture is not consistent with empirical results from studies of human judgment and decision making.5  In particular, psychology research repeatedly shows that people are very poor intuitive statisticians (e.g., people consistently make axiomatic violations when estimating probabilistic outcomes).  In light of these findings, statements such as "the estimated fair values should be the same" provide preparers, auditors, and users with an unfounded (and descriptively false) belief that the techniques suggested in the ED will produce the same fair value estimates.

    Some members of the Committee believe that the ED should explicitly caution preparers, auditors, and users by stating that individuals consistently make these judgment errors.  Further, these Committee members recommend that the ED require companies (when practicable) to (1) independently use the discount rate adjustment and expected present value techniques if they decide to use a present value approach to determine fair value and (2) reconcile the results of the two techniques in a meaningful fashion and document the reconciliation so it can be audited for reasonableness.  Moreover, the application of the present value techniques should be independent of suggested or existing fair value figures when practicable (e.g., the fair value amount recorded in the previous year's financial statements), because psychology research finds that preconceived targets and legacy amounts unduly influence current judgments and decisions (e.g., through "anchoring" and insufficient adjustment).

    Although the disclosures required under paragraph 25 of the ED provide some information regarding the potential reliability of a Level 3 estimate, they do not provide alternative benchmark models that the firm may have considered in determining those fair value estimates.  Hence, the Committee also recommends that the FASB consider requiring firms to disclose (1) fair value estimates under alternative valuation techniques, and (2) sensitivity of fair value estimates to the specific assumptions and inputs used.

    Issue 11: Fair Value Disclosures

    As mentioned previously, the Committee believes that the proposed fair value measurement disclosures are not complete.  The Committee believes that when a firm uses alternative valuation methods to determine fair value, information regarding the alternative techniques and inputs employed should be provided.  Furthermore, users of financial statements would get a better understanding of the reliability of fair value estimates if the financial statements provide detailed disclosures related to (1) fair value estimates produced by alternative valuation techniques and reasons for selecting a preferred estimate, and (2) information about the sensitivity of fair value estimates to changes in assumptions and inputs.

    The Committee also notes that the ED requires the expanded set of reliability related disclosures only for fair value estimates reported in the balance sheet (paragraph 25).  A complete set of financial statements also includes many fair value estimates reported in the notes to the financial statements.  Some members of the Committee believe that financial statement users would also benefit from receiving the reliability related disclosures for fair values disclosed in the footnotes.  Moreover, application of the fair value hierarchy has implications for the reliability of the unrealized gains and losses reported in net (or comprehensive) income.  Accordingly, some members recommend that firms be required to disclose a breakdown of unrealized gains or losses based on how the related fair value amounts were determined (i.e., quoted prices of identical items, quoted prices of similar items, valuation models with significant market inputs, or valuation models with significant entity inputs.)

    CONCLUSION

    The Committee supports the formulation of a single standard that provides guidance on fair value measurement.  We believe that such a standard would improve the consistency of fair value measurement across the many standards that require fair value reporting and disclosure.  In this comment letter, we identify some potential inconsistencies between fair value definitions and fair value determination, and suggest ways to improve disclosures so that users of financial statements can better appreciate the reliability (or lack thereof) of fair value estimates.

    Although the Committee recognizes that the ED is intended to provide fair value measurement guidance, we wish to caution against promulgating pronouncements that completely eliminate historical cost information from the financial statements.  Evidence reported in Dietrich et al. (2000) suggests that historical cost information is incrementally informative even after fair value information is included in regression analyses.


    4    FASB Concept Statement No. 7, Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting Measurements, describes these techniques, albeit using different terminology.  In that Concepts Statement, traditional present value refers to the discount rate adjustment technique, while expected cash flow approach refers to the expected present value technique.

    5    Probability-related judgments and decisions are among the oldest branches of psychology and decision-science research.  Two excellent resources that catalogue the problems that individuals have with probability judgments and statistical reasoning are Baron (2000) and Goldstein and Hogarth (1997).

     

    What are the advantages and disadvantages of requiring fair value accounting for all financial instruments as well as derivative financial instruments?

    Advantages:

     

    1. Eliminate arbitrary FAS 115 classifications that can be used by management to manipulate earnings (which is what Freddie Mac did in 2001 and 1002.
    2. Reduce problems of applying FAS 133 in hedge accounting where hedge accounting is now allowed only when the hedged item is maintained at historical cost.
    3. Provide a better snap shot of values and risks at each point in time.  For example, banks now resist fair value accounting because they do not want to show how investment securities have dropped in value.

     

    Disdvantages:

     

    1. Combines fact and fiction in the sense that unrealized gains and losses due to fair value adjustments are combined with “real” gains and losses from cash transactions.  Many, if not most, of the unrealized gains and losses will never be realized in cash.  These are transitory fluctuations that move up and down with transitory markets.  For example, the value of a $1,000 fixed-rate bond moves up and down with interest rates when at expiration it will return the $1,000 no matter how interest rates fluctuated over the life of the bond.
    2. Sometimes difficult to value, especially OTC securities.
    3. Creates enormous swings in reported earnings and balance sheet values.
    4. Generally fair value is the estimated exit (liquidation) value of an asset or liability.  For assets, this is often much less than the entry (acquisition) value for a variety of reasons such as higher transactions costs of entry value, installation costs (e.g., for machines), and different markets  (e.g., paying dealer prices for acquisition and blue book for disposal).  For example, suppose Company A purchases a computer for $2 million that it can only dispose of for $1 million a week after the purchase and installation.  Fair value accounting requires expensing half of the computer in the first week even though the computer itself may be utilized for years to come.  This violates the matching principle of matching expenses with revenues, which is one of the reasons why fair value proponents generally do not recommend fair value accounting for operating assets. 
       

    "Derivatives and hedging:  An Analyst's Response to US FAS 133," by Frank Will, Corporate Finance Magazine, June 2002, http://www.corporatefinancemag.com/pdf/122341.pdf 

    However, FAS 133 still needs further clarification and improvement as the example of Fannie Mae shows. Analysts focus more on the economic value of a company and less on unrealised gains and losses.  Much of the FAS 133 volatility in earnings and in equity does not consistently reflect the economic situation.  This makes it difficult to interpret the figures.  Therefore, analysts welcome the decision of some companies voluntarily to disclose a separate set of figures excluding the effect of FAS 133.

    For more on Frank Will's analysis of FAS 133, Fair Value Accounting, and Fannie Mae, go to http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/caseans/000index.htm 

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory.htm 

    You can read more about fair value at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/speakers/133glosf.htm#F-Terms 

    Forwarded on May 11, 2003 by Patrick E Charles [charlesp@CWDOM.DM

    Mark-to-market rule should be written off

    Richard A. Werner Special to The Daily Yomiuri

    Yomiuri

    Since 1996, comprehensive accounting reforms have been gradually introduced in Japan. Since fiscal 2000, the valuation of investment securities owned by firms has been based on their market value at book-closing. Since fiscal 2001, securities held on a long-term basis also have been subjected to the mark-to-market rule. Now, the Liberal Democratic Party is calling for the suspension of the newly introduced rule to mark investments to market, as well as for a delay in the introduction of a new rule that requires fixed assets to be valued at their market value.

    The proponents of so-called global standards are up in arms at this latest intervention by the LDP. If marking assets to market is delayed, they argue, the nation will lag behind in the globalization of accounting standards. Moreover, they argue that corporate accounts must be as transparent as possible, and therefore should be marked to market as often and as radically as possible. On the other hand, opponents of the mark-to-market rule argue that the recent slump in the stock market, which has reached a 21-year low, can at least partly be blamed on the new accounting rules.

    What are we to make of this debate? Let us consider the facts. Most leading industrialized countries, such as Britain, France and Germany, so far have not introduced mark-to-market rules. Indeed, the vast majority of countries currently do not use them.

    Nevertheless, there is enormous political pressure to utilize mark-to-market accounting, and many countries plan to introduce the standard in 2005 or thereafter.

    Japan decided to adopt the new standard ahead of everyone else, based on the advice given by a few accountants--an industry that benefits from the revision of accounting standards as any rule change guarantees years of demand for their consulting services.

    However, so far there has not been a broad public debate about the overall benefits and disadvantages of the new standard. The LDP has raised the important point that such accounting changes might have unintended negative consequences for the macroeconomy.

    Let us first reflect on the microeconomic rationale supporting mark-to-market rules. They are said to render company accounts more transparent by calculating corporate balance sheets using the values that markets happen to indicate on the day of book- closing. Since book-closing occurs only once, twice or, at best, four times a year, any sudden or temporary move of markets on these days--easily possible in these times of extraordinary market volatility--will distort accounts rather than rendering them more transparent.

    Second, it is not clear that marking assets to market reflects the way companies look at their assets. While they know that market values are highly volatile, there is one piece of information about corporate assets that have an undisputed meaning for

    firms: the price at which they were actually bought.

    The purchase price matters as it reflects actual transactions and economic activity. Marking to market, on the other hand, means valuing assets at values at which they were never transacted. The company has neither paid nor received this theoretical money in exchange for the assets. This market value is hence a purely fictitious value. Instead of increasing transparency, we end up increasing the part of the accounts that is fiction.

    While the history of marking to market is brief, we do have some track record from the United States, which introduced mark-to-market accounting in the 1990s.

    Did the introduction increase accounting transparency? The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board last November concluded that the new rule of marking to market allowed Enron Energy Services Inc. to book profits from long-term energy contracts immediately rather than when the money was actually received.

    This enabled Enron executives to create the illusion of a profitable business unit despite the fact that the truth was far from it. Thanks to mark-to-market accounting, Enron's retail division managed to hide significant losses and book billions of dollars in profits based on inflated predictions of future energy prices. Enron's executives received millions of dollars in bonuses when the energy contracts were signed.

    The U.S. Financial Accounting Standards Board task force recognized the problems and has hence recommended the mark-to-market accounting rule be scrapped. Since this year, U.S. energy companies will only be able to report profits as income actually is received.

    Marking to market thus creates the illusion that theoretical market values can actually be realized. We must not forget that market values are merely the values derived on the basis of a certain number of transactions during the day in case.

    Strictly speaking, it is a false assumption to extend the same values to any number of assets that were not actually transacted at that value on that day.

    When a certain number of the 225 stocks constituting the Nikkei Stock Average are traded at a certain price, this does not say anything about the price that all stocks that have been issued by these 225 companies would have traded on that day.

    As market participants know well, the volume of transactions is an important indicator of how representative stock prices can be considered during any given day. If the index falls 1 percent on little volume, this is quickly discounted by many observers as it means that only a tiny fraction of shares were actually traded. If the market falls 1 percent on record volume, then this may be a better proxy of the majority of stock prices on that day.

    The values at which U.S. corporations were marked to market at the end of December 1999, at the peak of a speculative bubble, did little to increase transparency. If all companies had indeed sold their assets on that day, surely this would have severely depressed asset prices.

    Consider this: If your neighbor decides to sell his house for half price, how would you feel if the bank that gave you a mortgage argued that, according to the mark-to- market rule, it now also must halve the value of your house--and, as a result, they regret to inform you that you are bankrupt.

    We discussed the case of traded securities. But in many cases a market for the assets on a company's books does not actually exist. In this case, accountants use so-called net present value calculations to estimate a theoretical value. This means even greater fiction because the theoretical value depends crucially on assumptions made about interest rates, economic growth, asset markets and so on.

    Given the dismal track record of forecasters in this area, it is astonishing to find that serious accountants wish corporate accounts to be based on them.

    There are significant macroeconomic costs involved with mark-to-market accounting. As all companies will soon be forced to recalculate their balance sheets more frequently, the state of financial markets on the calculation day will determine whether they are still "sound," or in accounting terms, "bankrupt." While book value accounting tends to reduce volatility in markets to some extent, the new rule can only increase it. The implications are especially far-reaching in the banking sector since banks are not ordinary businesses, but fulfill the public function of creating and providing the money supply on which economic growth depends.

    U.S. experts warned years ago that the introduction of marking to market could create a credit crunch. As banks will be forced to set aside larger loan-loss reserves to cover loans that may have declined in value on the day of marking, bank earnings could be reduced. Banks might thus shy away from making loans to small or midsize firms under the new rules, where a risk premium exists and hence the likelihood of marking losses is larger. As a result, banks would have a disincentive to lend to small firms. Yet, for all we know, the small firm loans may yet be repaid in full.

    If banks buy a 10-year Japanese government bond with the intention to hold it until maturity, and the economy recovers, thus pushing down bond prices significantly, the market value of the government bonds will decline. Banks would thus be forced to book substantial losses on their bond holdings despite the fact that, by holding until maturity, they would never actually have suffered any losses. Japanese banks currently have vast holdings of government bonds. The change in accounting rules likely will increase problems in the banking sector. As banks reduce lending, economic growth will fall, thereby depressing asset prices, after which accountants will quickly try to mark down everyone's books.

    Of course, in good times, the opposite may occur, as we saw in the case of Enron. During upturns, marking to market may boost accounting figures beyond the actual state of reality. This also will boost banks' accounts (similar to the Bank for International Settlements rules announced in 1988), thus encouraging excessive lending. This in turn will fuel an economic boom, which will further raise the accounting values of assets.

    Thus does it make sense to mark everything to fictitious market values? We can conclude that marking to market has enough problems on the micro level to negate any potential benefits. On the macro level, the disadvantages will be far larger as asset price volatility will rise, business cycles will be exacerbated and economic activity will be destabilized.

    The world economy has done well for several centuries without this new rule. There is no evidence that it will improve anything. To the contrary, it is likely to prove harmful. The LDP must be lauded for its attempt to stop the introduction of these new accounting rules.

    Werner is an assistant professor of economics at Sophia University and chief economist at Tokyo-based investment adviser Profit Research Center Ltd.


    Measuring the Business Value of Stakeholder Relationships – all about social capital and how high-trust relationships affect the bottom line. Plus a new measurement tool for benchmarking the quality of stakeholder relationships --- www.cim.sfu.ca/newsletter 

    Trust, shared values and strong relationships aren't typical financial indicators but perhaps they should be. A joint study by CIM and the Schulich School of Business is examining the link between high trust stakeholder relationships and business value creation. The study is sponsored by the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants (CICA).

    The research team is looking at how social capital can be applied to business. The aim of this project is to better understand corporate social capital, measure the quality of relationships, and provide the business community with ways to improve those relationships and in turn improve their bottom line.

    Because stakeholder relationships all have common features, direct comparisons of the quality of relationships can be made across diverse stakeholder groups, companies and industries.

    Social capital is “the stock of active connections among people; the trust, mutual understanding, and shared values and behaviors that bind the members of human networks and communities and make cooperative action possible” (Cohen and Prusak, 2000).

    So far the research suggests that trust, a cooperative spirit and shared understanding between a company and its stakeholders creates greater coherence of action, better knowledge sharing, lower transaction costs, lower turnover rates and organizational stability. In the bigger picture, social capital appears to minimize shareholder risk, promote innovation, enhance reputation and deepen brand loyalty.

    Preliminary results show that high levels of social capital in a relationship can build upon themselves. For example, as a company builds reputation among its peers for fair dealing and reliability in keeping promises, that reputation itself becomes a prized asset useful for sustaining its current alliances and forming future ones.

    The first phase of the research is now complete and the study moves into its second phase involving detailed case studies with six companies that have earned a competitive business advantage through their stakeholder relationships. Click here for a full report

    Bob Jensen's discussion of valuation and aggregation issues can be found at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudConclusion.htm 


    That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a marketplace is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future than individuals are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of markets working within companies has started to seep out into some of the nation's largest corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and Hewlett-Packard are bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures contracts on such "commodities" as sales, product success and supplier behavior. The concept: a work force contains vast amounts of untapped, useful information that a market can unlock. "Markets are likely to revolutionize corporate forecasting and decision making," says Robin Hanson, an economist at George Mason University, in Virginia, who has researched and developed markets. "Strategic decisions, such as mergers, product introductions, regional expansions and changing CEOs, could be effectively delegated to people far down the corporate hierarchy, people not selected by or even known to top management."
    Barbara Kiviat (See below)

    "The End Of Management? by Barbara Kiviat, Time Magazine, July 12, 2004, pp. 88-92 --- http://www.time.com/time/insidebiz/printout/0,8816,1101040712-660965,00.html 

    The end of management just might look something like this. You show up for work, boot up your computer and log onto your company's Intranet to make a few trades before getting down to work. You see how your stocks did the day before and then execute a few new orders. You think your company should step up production next month, and you trade on that thought. You sell stock for the production of 20,000 units and buy stock that represents an order for 30,000 instead. All around you, as co-workers arrive at their cubicles, they too flick on their computers and trade.

    Together, you are buyers and sellers of your company's future. Through your trades, you determine what is going to happen and then decide how your company should respond. With employees in the trading pits betting on the future, who needs the manager in the corner office?

    That scenario isn't as farfetched as you might think. It's called a prediction market, based on the notion that a marketplace is a better organizer of insight and predictor of the future than individuals are. Once confined to research universities, the idea of markets working within companies has started to seep out into some of the nation's largest corporations. Companies from Microsoft to Eli Lilly and Hewlett-Packard are bringing the market inside, with workers trading futures contracts on such "commodities" as sales, product success and supplier behavior. The concept: a work force contains vast amounts of untapped, useful information that a market can unlock. "Markets are likely to revolutionize corporate forecasting and decision making," says Robin Hanson, an economist at George Mason University, in Virginia, who has researched and developed markets. "Strategic decisions, such as mergers, product introductions, regional expansions and changing CEOs, could be effectively delegated to people far down the corporate hierarchy, people not selected by or even known to top management."

    To understand the hype, take a look at Hewlett-Packard's experience with forecasting monthly sales. A few years back, HP commissioned Charles Plott, an economist from the California Institute of Technology, to set up a software trading platform. A few dozen employees, mostly product and finance managers, were each given about $50 in a trading account to bet on what they thought computer sales would be at the end of the month. If a salesman thought the company would sell between, say, $201 million and $210 million worth, he could buy a security — like a futures contract — for that prediction, signaling to the rest of the market that someone thought that was a probable scenario. If his opinion changed, he could buy again or sell.

    When trading stopped, the scenario behind the highest-priced stock was the one the market deemed most likely. The traders got to keep their profits and won an additional dollar for every share of "stock" they owned that turned out to be the right sales range. Result: while HP's official forecast, which was generated by a marketing manager, was off 13%, the stock market was off only 6%. In further trials, the market beat official forecasts 75% of the time.

    Intrigued by that success, HP's business-services division ran a pilot last year with 14 managers worldwide, trying to determine the group's monthly sales and profit. The market was so successful (in one case, improving the prediction 50%) that it has since been integrated into the division's regular forecasts. Another division is running a pilot to see if a market would be better at predicting the costs of certain components with volatile prices. And two other HP divisions hope to be using markets to answer similar questions by the end of the year. "You could do zillions of things with this," says Bernardo Huberman, director of the HP group that designs and coordinates the markets. "The idea of being able to forecast something allows you to prepare, plan and make decisions. It's potentially huge savings."

    Eli Lilly, one of the largest pharmaceutical companies in the world, which routinely places multimillion-dollar bets on drug candidates that face overwhelming odds of failure, wanted to see if it could get a better idea of which compounds would succeed. So last year Lilly ran an experiment in which about 50 employees involved in drug development — chemists, biologists, project managers — traded six mock drug candidates through an internal market. "We wanted to look at the way scattered bits of information are processed in the course of drug development," says Alpheus Bingham, vice president for Lilly Research Laboratories strategy. The market brought together all the information, from toxicology reports to clinical results, and correctly predicted the three most successful drugs.

    What's more, the market data revealed shades of opinion that never would have shown up if the traders were, say, responding to a poll. A willingness to pay $70 for a particular drug showed greater confidence than a bid at $60, a spread that wouldn't show if you simply asked, Will this drug succeed? "When we start trading stock, and I try buying your stock cheaper and cheaper, it forces us to a way of agreeing that never really occurs in any other kind of conversation," says Bingham. "That is the power of the market."

    The current enthusiasm can be traced in part, oddly enough, to last summer's high-profile flop of a market that was supposed to help predict future terrorist attacks. A public backlash killed that Pentagon project a few months before its debut, but not before the media broadcast the notion that useful information embedded within a group of people could be drawn out and organized via a marketplace. Says George Mason's Hanson, who helped design the market: "People noticed." Another predictive market, the Iowa Electronic Markets at the University of Iowa, has been around since 1988. That bourse has accepted up to $500 from anyone wanting to wager on election results. Players buy and sell outcomes: Is Kerry a win or Bush a shoo-in? This is the same information that news organizations and pollsters chase in the run-up to election night. Yet Iowa outperforms them 75% of the time.

    Inspired by such results, researchers at Microsoft started running trials of predictive markets in February, finding the system inexpensive to set up. Now they're shopping around for the market's first real use. An early candidate: predicting how long it will take software testers to adopt a new piece of technology. Todd Proebsting, who is spearheading the initiative, explains, "If the market says they're going to be behind schedule, executives can ask, What does the market know that we don't know?" Another option: predicting how many patches, or corrections, will be issued in the first six months of using a new piece of software. "The pilots worked great, but we had little to compare it to," he says. "You can reason that this would do a good job. But what you really want to show is that this works better than the alternative."

    Ultimately, "you may someday see someone in a desk job or a manufacturing job doing day trading, knowing that's part of the job," says Thomas Malone, a management professor at M.I.T. who has written about markets. "I'm very optimistic about the long-term prospects."

    But no market is perfect. Economists are still unsure of the human factor: how to get people to play and do their best. In the stock market or even the Iowa prediction market, people put up their own money and trade to make more. That incentive ensures that people trade on their best information. But a company that asks employees to risk their own money raises ethical questions, so most corporate markets use play money to trade and small bonuses or prizes for good traders. "Though this may look like God's gift to business, there are problems with it," says Plott, who ran the first HP experiments. Tokyo-based Dentsu, one of the world's largest advertising firms, is still grappling with incentives for an ad forecasting market it will launch later this year with the help of News Futures, a U.S. consultancy.

    And even if companies can figure out how to make their internal markets totally efficient, there are plenty of reasons that corporate America isn't about to jump wholesale onto the markets bandwagon. For one thing, markets, based on individuals and individual interests, could threaten the kind of team spirit that many corporations have struggled to cultivate. Established hierarchies could be threatened too. After all, a market implies that the current data crunching and decision-making process may not be as good as a gamelike system that often includes lower-level employees. In a sense, an internal market's success suggests that if upper managers would just give up control, things would run better. Lilly, which is considering using a market to forecast actual drug success, is still grappling with the potential ramifications. "We already have a rigorous process," says Lilly's Bingham. "So what do you do if you use a market and get different data?" Throw it out? Or say that the market was smarter, impugning the tried-and-true system?

    There could be risks to individual workers in an internal trading system as well. If you lose money in the market, does that mean you're not knowledgeable about something you should be? "You have to get people used to the idea of being accountable in a very different way," says Mary Murphy-Hoye, senior principal engineer at Intel, which has been experimenting with internal markets. "I can now tell if planners are any good, because they're making money or they're not making money."

    Continued in article


    Robert Walker's First Blog Entry is About Fair Value Accounting, October 27, 2006 --- http://www.robertbwalkerca.blogspot.com/

    Introduction
    I have decided to begin a commentary which expresses my views on accounting. As I begin to do this I envisage the source of my commentary to comprise three different sorts of writing in which I may engage:
    § Simple notes directly to the ‘blog’ such as this.
    § Formal submissions I may make to various bodies including the IASB.
    § Letters or reports I may write for one reason or another that I think might have some general readership.

    The expression of my views will stray from the subject matter of accounting per se to deal with matters of enormous significance to me such as corporate or public administration. Such expressions will not be too substantial a digression from the core subject matter because I believe that the foundation of good ‘corporate governance’, to use a vogue term, is accounting.

    Source of my ideas on accounting
    I would have to confess that the foundation upon which I base my philosophy of accounting is derivative, as much of human knowledge is of course. It is not for nothing that Newtown said that if he can see so far it is because he stands on the shoulders of giants. In my case, that ‘giant’ is Yuiji Ijiri. As I begin a detailed exposition of my views I shall return to the lessons I learned many years ago from Theory of Accounting Measurement, a neglected work that will still be read in 1,000 years or so long as humankind survives whichever is the shorter. As the depredations of the standard setting craze are visited upon us with ever increasing complexity, the message delivered by Ijiri will be heeded more an more.

    The basic structure of accounting
    Without wishing to be too philosophical about it, I need to begin by outlining what I mean by accounting. Accounting, in my mind, comprises three inter-related parts. These are:
    § Book-keeping.
    § Accounting.
    § Financial reporting.

    Book-keeping is the process of recording financial data elements in the underlying books of account. These financial data elements represent, or purport to represent, real world events. The heart of book-keeping is the double entry process. For instance at the most basic level a movement in cash will result in the surrender or receipt of an asset, the incurring or settlement of a liability and so on.

    I have no complete and coherent theory of the limits of book-keeping. Clearly cash movement (change of ownership) or the movement of commodity is the proper subject matter of book-keeping. Whether all forms of contract should be similarly treated is not clear to me. I am inclined to say yes. That is to adopt Ijiri’s theory of commitment accounting, but I can foresee that this leads me to conclusions that I may find unpalatable later on. Incidentally I say this because an epiphany I had, based on the notion of commitment accounting, some years ago is beginning to unravel.

    Book-keeping goes beyond recording to encompass control. That is the process by which the integrity of the centre piece of book-keeping – the general ledger expressing double entry – is ensured. I will not concern myself with such processes though this is not to say that they are unimportant.

    Accounting is the process by which sense is made of what is a raw record expressed in the general ledger. It is the process of distillation and summation that enables the accountant to gain on overview of what has happened to the entity the subject of the accounting. Accounting fundamentally assumes that the accountant is periodically capable of saying something useful about the real world using his or her special form of notation.

    Financial reporting is the process by which data is assembled into a comprehensive view of the world in accordance with a body of rules. It differs, in the ideal, from accounting in a number of ways. Most benignly it differs, for instance, by including ancillary information for the benefit of a reader beyond the mere abstraction from the general ledger. Again in the ideal there is an inter-relationship between the three levels in the accounting hierarchy. That is, the rules of financial reporting will, to some degree shape the order and format of the basic, book-keeping level so that the process of distillation and summation follows naturally to the final level of reporting without dramatic alteration.

    Perhaps what concerns me is that the sentiment expressed above can be seen, without much effort, to be only ideal and that in reality it does not arise. In short the golden strand that links the detailed recording of real world phenonmena to its final summation is broken.

    An example
    I was asked recently by a student of accounting to explain IAS 41, the IASB standard on agriculture. As I don’t deal in primary production at all, I had not thought about this subject for years.

    IAS 41 admonishes the accountant to apply ‘fair value’ accounting. Fair value accounting is the process by which current sale prices, or their proxies, are substituted for the past cost of any given item.

    For instance, you may have a mature vineyard. The vineyard comprises land, the vine and its fruit, the plant necessary to sustain the vine (support structures, irrigation channels etc.). Subsumed within the vine are the materials necessary for it to grow and start producing fruit. This will include the immature plant, the chemical supplements necessary to nurture and protect it, and the labour necessary to apply it.

    The book-keeping process will faithfully record all of these components. Suppose for example the plant, fertliser and labour cost $1000. In the books will be recorded:

    Dr Vineyard $1000
    Cr Cash $1000

    At the end of the accounting period, the accountant will summarise this is a balance statement. He or she will then obtain, in some way, the current selling price of the vine. Presumably this will be the future cash stream of selling the fruit, suitably discounted. Assume that this is $1200.

    The accountant will then make the following incremental adjustment:

    Dr Vineyard $200
    Cr Equity $200

    Looked like this there is a connection between the original book-keeping and the periodic adjustment at the end of the accounting period. This is an illusion. The incremental entry disguises what is really happening. It is as follows:

    Dr Equity $1000
    Cr Vineyard $1000

    And

    Dr Vineyard $1200
    Cr Equity $1200

    Considered from the long perspective, the original book-keeping has been discarded and a substitute value put in its place. This is the truth of the matter. The subject matter of the first phase of accounting was a set of events arising in a bank and in the entity undertaking accounting. The subject matter of the second phase is a set of future sales to a party who does not yet exist.

    From a perspective of solvency determination, a vital element of corporate governance, the view produced by the first phase is next to useless. However, the disquiet I had in my mind which I had suppressed until recently, relates to the shattering of the linkages between the three levels of accounting in the final reporting process. This disquiet has returned as I contemplate the apparently unstoppable momentum of the standard setting process.

    October 28, 2006 reply from Bob Jensen

    Hi Robert,

    I hope you add many more entries to your blog.

    The problem with "original book-keeping" is that it provides no answers about how to account for risk of many modern day contracts that were not imagined when "original book-keeping" evolved in a simple world of transactions. For example, historical costs of forward contracts and swaps are zero and yet these contracts may have risks that may outweigh all the recorded debt under "original book-keeping." Once we opened the door to fair value accounting to better account for risk, however, we opened the door to misleading the public that booked fair value adjustments can be aggregated much like we sum the current balances of assets and liabilities on the balance sheet. Such aggregations are generally nonsense.

    I don't know if you saw my recent hockey analogy or not. It goes as follows:

    Goal Tenders versus Movers and Shakers
    Skate to where the puck is going, not to where it is.

    Wayne Gretsky (as quoted for many years by Jerry Trites at http://www.zorba.ca/ )

    Jensen Comment
    This may be true for most hockey players and other movers and shakers, but for goal tenders the eyes should be focused on where the puck is at every moment ---  not where it's going. The question is whether an accountant is a goal tender (stewardship responsibilities) or a mover and shaker (part of the managerial decision making team). This is also the essence of the debate of historical accounting versus pro forma accounting.

    Graduate student Derek Panchuk and professor Joan Vickers, who discovered the Quiet Eye phenomenon, have just completed the most comprehensive, on-ice hockey study to determine where elite goalies focus their eyes in order to make a save. Simply put, they found that goalies should keep their eyes on the puck. In an article to be published in the journal Human Movement Science, Panchuk and Vickers discovered that the best goaltenders rest their gaze directly on the puck and shooter's stick almost a full second before the shot is released. When they do that they make the save over 75 per cent of the time.
    "Keep your eyes on the puck," PhysOrg, October 26, 2006 --- http://physorg.com/news81068530.html

    I have written a more serious piece about both theoretical and practical problems of fair value accounting. I should emphasize that this was written after the FASB Exposure Draft proposing fair value accounting as an option for all financial instruments and the culminating FAS 157 that is mainly definitional and removed the option to apply fair value accounting to all financial instruments even though it is still required in many instances by earlier FASB standards.

    My thoughts on this are at the following link:

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FairValueDraft.htm

    Bob Jensen

     


    E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new exposure drafts (EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and Electronic Commerce: Using the Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the Audit of Financial Statements. Comments on both EDs, developed by IFAC's International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are due by January 15, 2002. See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html  

    The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151 

    The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish standards and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and disclosures contained in financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses audit considerations relating to the valuation, measurement, presentation and disclosure for material assets, liabilities and specific components of equity presented or disclosed at fair value in financial statements. Fair value measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may arise from both the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.

     

    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in MS Word format.

    File Size: 123 Kbytes
     
    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
    in Adobe Acrobat format.

    File Size: 209 Kbytes
     
     


     

     

    Introduction to Valuation

    Bob Jensen's site on The Controversy Over Fair Value (Mark-to-Market) Financial Reporting --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    Damodaran Online: A Great Sharing Site from a Finance Professor at New York University and Textbook Writer --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    This site has great sections on corporate finance, investments, valuation, spreadsheets, research, etc. For example, take a look at the helpers on valuation --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    You can pick the valuation approach that you would like to go to, to see illustrations, solutions and other supporting material.

       
      Discounted Cashflow Valuation
      Relative Valuation
      Option Pricing Approaches to Valuation
      Acquisition Valuation
      EVA, CFROI and other Value Enhancement Strategies

     

    Or you can pick the material that you are interested in.

           
    Spreadsheets Overheads Datasets References
    Problems & Solutions Derivations and Discussion Valuation Examples PowerPoint presentations

    Jim Mahar's finance sharing site (especially note his great blog link) --- http://financeprofessor.com/

    Financial Rounds from an anonymous finance professor --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    Bob Jensen's threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    Bob Jensen's finance and investment helpers are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm

    GAAP = Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (including rules, laws, and conventional practices)
    This definition is needed for the quote below, which is in the context of U.S. GAAP rather than international GAAP.

    The other lesson, perhaps even more tallied, GAAP should be on everyone's Top 10 list. The idea of GAAP -- so simple yet so radical -- is that tore important, is contained in the embrace of GAAP. When the intellectual achievements of the 20th century here should be a standard way of accounting for profit and loss in public businesses, allowing investors to see how a public company manages its money. This transparency is what allows investors to compare businesses as different as McDonald's, IBM and Tupperware, and it makes U.S. markets the envy of the world.
    Clay Shirky in "How Priceline Became A Real Business," The Wall Street Journal, August 13, 2001 
    http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB99765488066568057.djm&template=pasted-2001-08-13.tmpl
      

    "The future of the accounting and finance profession is changing daily. Tomorrow's accounting and finance professionals will shatter longstanding stereotypes as they shift from being backroom statisticians to boardroom strategists."  http://www.accountingweb.com/item/50518  (See below)

    If one were writing a history of the American capital market, it is a fair bet that the single most important innovation shaping that market was the idea of generally accepted accounting principles.
    Lawrence Summers, President of Harvard University and former Secretary of Treasury

    AICPA’s Business Valuation and Forensic & Litigation Services Community --- http://bvfls.aicpa.org/


    Question
    At this juncture why would IBM spend almost $10 billion for its own shares?

    Hint
    The wildly-popular eps ratio has a denomator.

    "IBM to spend $5 billion more on stock buyback," MIT's Technology Review, October 27, 2009 ---
    http://www.technologyreview.com/wire/23815/?nlid=2465

    IBM Corp. has boosted its stock buyback program by $5 billion, a sign of the company's ability to spit out cash despite the fact the recession has choked off revenue growth.

    The announcement Tuesday brings IBM's pot for stock repurchases to $9.2 billion, and the company, based in Armonk, N.Y., plans to ask for more at a board meeting in April 2010. IBM said it has spent $73 billion on dividends and buybacks since 2003.

    Buybacks are one lever companies pull to meet earnings targets, since they increase earnings per share by reducing the number of shares outstanding. IBM has set aggressive earnings targets, and twice this year raised its profit forecast for 2009, surprising investors since revenue has fallen since last year. IBM has said it sees corporate spending on technology "stabilizing." One way IBM wrings more profit despite lower sales is by using software to automate certain tasks done by humans and focusing on projects like the "smart" power grid that can carry higher profit margins than other services work.

    IBM's current forecasts call for earnings per share of at least $9.85 this year, and the company has maintained that it is "well ahead" of its pace for 2010 earnings of $10 to $11 per share.

    IBM ended the third quarter with $11.5 billion in cash. Free cash flow, a sign of a company's ability to generate more cash, was $3.4 billion, up $1.3 billion from a year ago. Revenue in the past nine months is down nearly 11 percent from a year ago.

    Quality of Earnings Disputes --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#CoreEarnings 

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm


    "Among Different Classes of Equity:  Valuation models can be tailored to unique financing structures." by Andrew C. Smith and Jason C. Laurent, Journal of Accouintancy, March 2008 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/mar2008/allocating_value.htm 

    EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
    It is essential for board members, executive officers, CFOs, auditors and private equity investors to comprehend option-pricing models used to determine the per-share values of common and preferred shares.

    The AICPA Practice Aid, Valuation of Privately-Held-Company Equity Securities Issued as Compensation, describes three methods of allocating value between preferred and common equity, which include:

    Current Value Method (“CVM”) Probability Weighted Expected Return Method (“PWERM”) Option-Pricing Method (“OPM”)

    OPM, which is based on the Black-Scholes model, is a common method for allocating equity value between common and preferred shares.

    Valuation models must be tailored to the specific facts and circumstances of the equity in the company being valued.

    Bob Jensen's threads on fair value accounting are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Theory01.htm#FairValue


     


    They Do It With Mirrors --- GAAP Does Not "Cover" the entire GAP  
    An Analogy Between GAAP and the GAP in a  Woman's Dress or Skirt

    So what is wrong with GAAP in recent years?  GAAP's problems are somewhat like a "GAP" incident that took place in a Target Store (the story would have been better had it been inside a GAP Store) in San Antonio on August 21 (as reported on a local television station).  A man with a mirror was detained for peeking up the "GAP" beneath women's dresses.  Although he was tossed out of the store, this pervert was not arrested.  The police claimed they had nothing to charge him with, because there was no U.S. or Texas law against peeking beneath a woman's dress with a mirror.  Laws are enforced better in the U.S. than in many other nations, but the laws are incomplete for many types of egregious behavior.  In an analogous manner, GAAP is enforced better in the U.S. than in most other nations, but U.S. GAAP is incomplete and does not control certain types of egregious financial reporting behavior that is becoming increasingly common in the "New Economy" --- where intangible assets that are not measured well under GAAP comprise an increasing proportion of the value and earnings of business firms.  In some ways, business firms are trying to "Do It With Mirrors," thereby, causing a widening "GAP" in "GAAP."   I will now give you the WSJ quotation:

    But there's a catch. In recent years, P/E ratios have become increasingly polluted. The "E" in P/E used to refer simply to earnings as reported under generally accepted accounting principles, or GAAP. That's what it means when the historical average is cited. But in First Call's figure, the "E" relates to something fuzzier, called "operating earnings." And that can mean just about whatever a company wants it to mean.

    Based on earnings as reported under GAAP, the S&P 500 actually finished last week with a P/E ratio of 36.7, according to a Wall Street Journal analysis. That is higher than any other P/E previously recorded for the index. (Click here to see details of the calculation.)

    This suggests the overall stock market could be further from recovery than many suppose. "I don't think most people realize that the market is as overvalued as it is," says David Blitzer, chief investment strategist at S&P, a unit of McGraw-Hill Cos. "There probably are a lot of people who would sell some stock if they realized how overvalued the numbers are saying the market is."

    Jonathan Weil, "Companies Pollute Earnings Reports, Leaving P/E Ratios Hard to Calculate," The Wall Street Journal, August 21, 2001, Page A1.  For details and related articles, see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm 


    What we teach just won't float?

    Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman or Palepu, Healy, and Bernard.   The current task of valuing MCI illustrates how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking models.  If you've not attempted valuations with these models I suggest that you begin with my favorite case study:

    "Questrom vs. Federated Department Stores, Inc.:  A Question of Equity Value," May 2001 edition of Issues in Accounting Education, by University of Alabama faculty members Gary Taylor, William Sampson, and Benton Gup, pp. 223-256.

    In spite of all the sophistication in models, it is ever so common for intangibles and forecasting problems to sink the valuation models we teach.  I have more to say about intangibles at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 

    A question I always ask my students is:  What is the major thing that has to be factored in when valuing Microsoft Corporation?

    The answer I'm looking for is certainly not product innovation or something similar to that.  The answer is also not customer loyalty, although that probably is a huge factor.  The big factor is the massive cost of retraining the entire working world in something that replaces MS Office products (Excel, Word, PowerPoint, Outlook, etc.).  It simply costs too much to retrain workers in MS Office substitues even if we are so sick of security problems in Micosoft's systems.   How do you factor this "customer lock-in" into a Residual Income or FCF Model?  Our models are torpedoed by intangibles in the real world.

    MCI's customer base is another torpedo for valuation models.  Here the value seems to lie in a "web of corporate customers."  And nobody seems to be able to value that.

    "Valuing MCI in an Industry Awash in Questions," by Matt Richtel, The New York Times, February 9, 2005 --- http://www.nytimes.com/2005/02/09/business/09phone.html

    Industry bankers and accountants are trying to answer just that: What is the value of MCI, a company for which Qwest Communications has already made a tentative offer of about $6.3 billion, and on which Verizon Communications has been running the numbers. Conversations between MCI and Qwest have been suspended since late last week, and Verizon has yet to make a formal offer, people close to the negotiations say.

    Most analysts say MCI's extensive network assets in this country and Europe may have diminishing value because of the industry's continued capacity glut. Instead, they say, MCI's worth lies more in its web of corporate customers.

    But as MCI's revenue continues to tumble, the real trick for the accountants is trying to forecast the future. Can the company meet its stated goal of achieving profitable growth as a telecommunications company emphasizing Internet technology before the bottom falls out of its traditional voice and data business?

    Continued in article

    Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 


    What we teach just won't float?

    Quite a few of you out there, like me, are trying to teach analysis of financial statements and business analysis and valuation from books like Penman or Palepu, Healy, and Bernard.   The current task of valuing Amazon illustrates how frustrating this can be in the real world and how financial statement analysis that we teach, along with the revered Residual Income and Free Cash Flow Models, are often Titanic tasks in rearranging the deck chairs on sinking models.  

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on February 11, 2005

    TITLE: Amazon's Net Is Curtailed by Costs 
    REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan 
    DATE: Feb 03, 2005 
    PAGE: A3 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110735918865643669,00.html  
    TOPICS: Financial Accounting, Financial Statement Analysis, Income Taxes, Managerial Accounting, Net Operating Losses

    SUMMARY: Amazon "...had forecast that profit margins would rise in the fourth quarter, while Wall Street analysts had expected margins to remain about the same." The company's operating profits fell in the fourth quarter from 7.9% of revenue to 7%. The company's stock price plunged "14% in after-hours trading."

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) "Amazon said net income rose nearly fivefold, to $346.7 million, or 82 cents a share, from $73.2 million, or 17 cents a share a year earlier." Why then did their stock price drop 14% after this announcement?

    2.) Refer to the related article. How were some analysts' projections borne out by the earnings Amazon announced?

    3.) One analyst discussed in the related article, Ken Smith, disagrees with the majority of analysts' views as discussed under #2 above. Do you think that his viewpoint is supported by these results? Explain.

    4.) Summarize the assessments made in answers to questions 2 and 3 with the way in which Amazon's operating profits as a percentage of sales turned out this quarter.

    5.) Amazon's results "included a $244 million gain from tax benefits, stemming from Amazon's heavy losses earlier in the decade." What does that statement say about the accounting treatment of the deferred tax benefit for operating loss carryforwards when those losses were experienced? Be specific in describing exactly how these tax benefits were accounted for.

    6.) Why does Amazon adjust out certain items, including the tax gain described above, in assessing their earnings? In your answer, specifically state which items are adjusted out of earnings and why that adjustment might be made. What is a general term for announcing earnings in this fashion?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLES --- 
    TITLE: Web Sales' Boom Could Leave Amazon Behind 
    REPORTER: Mylene Mangalindan 
    ISSUE: Jan 21, 2005 
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB110627113243532202,00.html 

    Bob Jensen's threads on intangibles are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#TheoryDisputes 


    An Exercise in Valuation

    "Putting a Value on Google," by Scott Kessler, Business Week, June 11, 2004 --- http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content/jun2004/pi20040611_9275_pi076.htm 

    S&P takes a hard look at the search giant's fundamentals -- and at the valuations of its peers -- to find an answer

    Amid an enormous level of interest in the Google IPO -- from investors, the media, and seemingly every other person you talk to at cocktail parties -- we at Standard & Poor's Equity Research Services decided to take an unbiased look at the company and its competitive position (see BW Online, 6/11/04, "Google: What Lies Beyond Search?"), including commissioning a proprietary survey of Internet users (see BW Online, 6/14/04, "Search Users Weigh In on Google").

    Continued in the article


    There is a link to Banister Financial where you can find some tips of valuation and valuation frauds.


    "Independent" Auditors:  Are They Becoming Dependents?

    In recent years, a dramatic increase in the revenues big accounting firms derive from management consulting services has raised a red flag about auditor independence. The Wall Street Journal reported in April, for example, that just last year Sprint paid Ernst & Young $2.5 million for auditing but $63.8 million for other work, including $12 million for the deployment of a financial-information system. General Electric paid KPMG $24 million for auditing but more than three times that for other services.
    Study Finds Consulting Contracts Impair Auditor Objectivity --- http://www.smartpros.com/x30693.xml


    "What's the Investment Really Worth?" by Ann Grimes, The Wall Street Journal, December 3, 2003 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB107041216487726000,00.html?mod=mkts%5Fmain%5Fnews%5Fhs%5Fh 

    In Venture-Capital World, 'Standard Valuation' Rules Could Clear Up Questions

    In a sign that the private-equity world may be starting to feel the impact of corporate reorganization, an industry group Tuesday unveiled a set of guidelines aimed at standardizing the way private companies are valued.

    The move by a self-appointed but influential coalition, the Private Equity Industry Guidelines Group, comes in response to pressure for more transparency and consistency in valuing private-equity investments -- the business of corporate buyouts and venture capital. Historically, private-equity-investment valuations have been as much art as science, sometimes creating a scattering of valuations among firms holding the same investments.

    It is far from clear what impact the proposals will have on venture-capital and buyout funds, which hold billions of dollars in investments in closely held companies. The proposals are voluntary, and some top-tier investors said the recommendations, while welcome, wouldn't affect their funding choices. And the industry's National Venture Capital Association has yet to endorse the proposals.

    Still, the collapse of the technology sector has prompted investors in venture-capital funds -- which include wealthy individuals, college endowments and pension funds -- to express concerns that those funds failed to reflect potentially big losses in their investment portfolios.

    The guidelines, hammered out after a year of debate, were endorsed by 15 of the 18 firms represented on the PEIGG board, including HarborVest Partners LLC, Bank of America Corp. and the University of California Regents. The three other firms are expected to offer their endorsement shortly, the group said.

    "A common valuation system agreed on by both limited and general partners is an important step in the growth and maturation of the private-equity industry," said PEIGG Chairman William Franklin, managing director, Bank of America Capital Corp.

    Under the standards, venture-capital, leverage-buyout and other private-equity firms will be encouraged to adhere to a "fair-market value" approach consistent with generally accepted accounting principles when determining the value of private companies.

    The drive for standardization stems in part from the sometimes wildly different values recorded for similar investments. A case in point: Santera Systems, Inc. Last year, The Wall Street Journal reported that the same series of preferred stock in the Texas-based telecommunications firm was being valued at $4.42 a share by Austin Ventures at the same time that Sequoia Capital held it at 46 cents a share.

    Fair value is defined by the U.S. accounting industry as "the amount at which an investment could be exchanged in a current transaction between unrelated willing parties, other than in a forced liquidation sale," the group said.

    Currently, many private-equity industry-fund managers rely on historic cost as an approximation of fair-market value. While that may be a reliable estimate in the short run, at some point, "cost or the latest round of financing becomes less reliable as an approximation of fair value," the PEIGG guidelines say.

    The PEIGG guidelines recommend fund managers update the value of their portfolios on a quarterly basis, and review them rigorously at least once a year. They also recommend the establishment of valuation committees composed of investors to calculate valuations using a common methodology, an effort to minimize fund-manager bias.

    "If you don't have standards, it's difficult to compare apples to apples," says Rick Hayes, senior investment officer at the California Employees' Retirement System, the nation's largest public pension fund, which is in more than 360 limited partnerships. Mr. Hayes, who is involved with another industry group, the Institutional Limited Partners Association, has reviewed the guidelines and says he is supportive of the effort.

    Another source of pressure: fear of government regulation. "When I reflect back on when the group was formed in the fourth quarter of 2001, back then we were being bombarded with news of one corporate scandal after another in the public sector," Mr. Franklin said in an interview. "We felt at the time the government or regulators were going to potentially step in once they got done with our public brethren. That clearly was one of the motivating factors in developing guidelines."

    The recommendations will allow private-equity firms to periodically "write up" investments carried on their books at lower-than-market costs. While general partners were slow to write down losses, they are hesitant to mark them up. "That gives a very slanted view of the portfolio," Mr. Franklin says.

    At Calpers, Mr. Hayes, referring to a quickly appreciating investment, says: "The accuracy of that number is very important." That is because the way private equity works it can affect how much of the profit distribution goes to a general partner versus a limited partner. It can affect the LP's assessment of its own portfolio status. And it can affect the price that an LP may able to get if they wanted to sell its interest in the fund.

    Jim Breyer, managing partner at Accel Partners in Palo Alto, Calif., says the guidelines are "a move in the right direction," though he is doubtful about adopting them in full. He says he supports more consistency because "there still are a number of firms who don't write down aggressively enough."

    The next step for PEIGG is to send out their proposal for more feedback from, and it is hoped endorsements by, other industry groups, some of whom -- including ILPA and the Association for Investment Management and Research -- are considering guidelines of their own.


    How P/E Ratios Are Figured --- http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB998339424717089333.djm&template=pasted-2001-08-21.tmpl#DETAILS

    How the P/E Ratios Are Figured

    To calculate the price-to-earnings ratio for the Standard & Poor's 500-stock index, The Wall Street Journal divided the combined market capitalization of the 500 companies currently in the index by their most recently reported four quarters of earnings. These earnings exclude only items classified under generally accepted accounting principles as extraordinary items, discontinued operations or cumulative effects of changes in accounting principles.

    This methodology differs slightly from the one used by S&P, which updates earnings statistics for the index just once a quarter. S&P doesn't revise earnings from previously reported quarters to account for additions or deletions to the index. And it historically hasn't revised previously reported earnings to account for companies' financial restatements. The Journal's calculations show a trailing P/E of 36.7 as of Friday. S&P may report a somewhat lower P/E ratio when it releases its second-quarter earnings tally, depending on how it handles JDS Uniphase. JDS has announced a $50.6 billion loss for its fiscal year ended June 30. But JDS said it would restate results for the March 31 quarter so that most of the loss appears in that quarter, not in the June quarter. S&P has been considering revising its first-quarter earnings figures to reflect JDS's restated losses, but hasn't announced a decision.

    The Journal used data from Multex.com Inc. as well as companies' news releases and filings with the Securities and Exchange Commission. The P/E ratios in the Journal's daily stock-price tables are calculated using trailing earnings, excluding extraordinary items, accounting changes and discontinued operations.

     

    Operating Earnings vs. Reality
    Companies increasingly announce earnings on a 'pro forma' or 'operating' basis, excluding various charges that are ordinary expenses under generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP). The top chart shows how
    10 companies reported their most recent quarterly earnings, compared with their net income.
    Name
    Link to Earnings Report
    First Call
    Operating EPS
    Net Income
    Per-Share
    Per-Share
    Difference
    FMC
    earnings report
    $1.58 –$9.62 $11.20
    Applied Micro Circuits
    earnings report
    –0.05 –11.18 11.13
    Great Lakes Chemical
    earnings report
    +0.35 –3.06 3.41
    AMR
    earnings report
    –0.68 –3.29 2.61
    Conexant Systems
    earnings report
    –0.45 –3.02 2.57
    Eastman Chemical
    earnings report
    +0.55 –1.92 2.47
    Cummins
    earnings report
    +0.06 –2.14 2.20
    Qwest Communications
    earnings report
    +0.08 –1.99 2.07
    Broadcom
    earnings report
    –0.16 –1.73 1.57
    Sears Roebuck
    earnings report
    +0.96 –0.60 1.56

    Sources: company news releases; Thomson Financial/First Call


    Business Valuation Blunders by the Pros

    Dumb Deals 101
    By Allan Sloan
    NEWSWEEK
    , September 6, 2001 --- http://www.msnbc.com/news/621862.asp
    Attention, class. Smart people can make really stupid mistakes. Here’s a primer on some of the biggest investment fiascoes of recent years

    TO WIT, when investment madness grips the world, big, smart investors can succumb just like us not-so-big, not-so-smart types. The difference is that the big guys have lots more money to lose, and if they make big enough investments, they leave paper trails for all to see. Average people who bought dogs like ICG, Webvan and Teligent at their highs can weep in private. But big hitters like John Malone, Goldman Sachs or leveraged-buyout heavies Ted Forstmann and Tom Hicks operate on the public stage. And they can lose bets that are measured in the billions. Unlike Internet companies, most of which never had a credible plan to make money, the telecom start-ups generally had proven leaders, real assets and business plans that made a lot of sense.

    You might think the biggest smart-money bets were lost from imploding stocks of well-known Internet companies like Priceline, Yahoo and Amazon. Not so. Most of the money was lost in telecommunications companies that were formed to provide spiffy “broadband” Internet-video-voice-data stuff. Unlike Internet companies, most of which never had a credible plan to make money, the telecom start-ups generally had proven leaders, real assets and business plans that made a lot of sense. But so many companies flooded in that they slaughtered each other. How could so many smart investors have been so foolish? What were they thinking? Martin Fridson, the chief junk-bond strategist for Merrill Lynch, says that already-hot Internet and telecom markets turned incandescent when money came flooding into the United States after the Asian financial meltdown started in 1997. “Ideas that you would have called ridiculous at other times got funded,” he says. Another major factor in “smart” money’s flooding into telecom start-ups was that the nation’s biggest telecom, AT&T, bought upstart Teleport, and No. 2 WorldCom bought MFS and Brooks Fiber, all at fancy prices. This encouraged others to rush out and start up telecoms that could then be sold quickly to hairy-chested, deep-pocketed phone companies that, it turned out, weren’t buying. So, you see, it wasn’t just callow twentysomething supposed geniuses who lost big time on the Internet-telecom bubble, but seasoned smart people, too. There are enough examples here for a whole M.B.A. course. Call it Dumb Deals 101. So we’ve composed a list based on an unscientific combination of big names who made big investments that went bad embarrassingly quickly—and unwittingly provided us all a broader business lesson. We’re not counting people like Amazon’s Jeff Bezos or Priceline’s Jay Walker, who lost paper fortunes, money they never really had. As you can imagine, our dealmakers were less than eager to talk on the record, so these case studies are based on public filings and background interviews. The current value, if any, of their investments is our estimate based on recent stock prices. And let’s be generous—some of these companies are indeed going to survive. But make no mistake. It will take a miracle for our investors to come out ahead. And now, for our list of lessons that these investors learned the hard way. And, by the way, should have known in the first place.

    LESSON #1 Don’t buy into your own hype
    Paul Allen invested $1.65 billion in RCN in February 2000. Current value: $100 million. . . . .

    LESSON #2 Buying low and selling high really is a good idea after all
    John Malone’s Liberty Media invested $1.5 billion in ICG and Teligent in 1999 and 2000. Current value: $40 million. . . . 

    LESSON #3 A discounted price isn’t necessarily a bargain
    Janus Funds bought $930 million of WebMD stock in January 2000. Current value: $75 million-$140 million.. . .

    LESSON #4 Going steady isn’t the same as marriage
    Verizon invested $1.7 billion in Metromedia Fiber in March 2000. Current value: $100 million. . . . 

    LESSON #5 Stick with what you know,
    Part I Hicks Muse invested $1 billion in four telecom start-ups in 1999 and 2000. Current value: $0. . . . 

    LESSON #6 Stick with what you know,
    Forstmann, Little invested $2 billion in XO and McLeodUSA in 1999, and an additional $350 million in them this year. Current value: $400 million. . . . 

    LESSON #7 Don’t mistake reinventing the wheel for innovation
    Goldman Sachs and others invested $850 million in Webvan between 1998 and 2000. Current value: $0. . . . 

    LESSON #8 Remember to include a worst-case scenario
    AT&T invested $3.4 billion for operating control of At Home in 2000 and 2001. Current value: $0. . . . 

    LESSON #9 The private sector isn’t always smarter than bureaucrats
    European phone companies spent $96 billion for wireless Internet licenses starting in 2000. Current value: lots, lots less. . . . 

    FINAL EXAM The overarching lesson here is an eternal one: markets can swing from being irrationally exuberant to being totally depressed in an instant.
    Heaven help you if you don’t see the switch coming. When even smart people start acting as if there’s some truth to the four most dangerous words on Wall Street—”this time it’s different”—you can be sure it’s time to take the money off the table. And the one thing you can certainly bet on is that when the next investment mania strikes, that broader lesson—and, for that matter, all the dealmaking-for-dummies lessons we just discussed—will have been completely forgotten.


    Questions
    Why might you want to teach a modified IRR?

    Is the reinvestment-at-the-same-rate assumption true?
    It may not be, when interim cash inflows occur far in the future, or if there is limited available capital to fund competing projects.

    Is timing important?
    Yes, it is vital. A change in the expected receipt of future cash inflows by as little as 30 days has a significant impact on the computed IRR.

    "Spreadsheets at Work: Rating Your Own IRR Some tips for doing these key calculations; and introducing "modified" internal rate of return," by Richard Block and Jan Bell, CFO.com, February 20, 2009 --- http://www.cfo.com/article.cfm/13052407/c_2984312?f=FinanceProfessor/SBU

    It is budgeting season again. Financial analysts are completing their analyses of the R&D or capital spending projects being proposed. And financial executives are either anxiously awaiting those analyses, or already getting started on their reviews. No doubt the analyses include investment costs, anticipated future savings, discounted cash flows, computed internal rates of return, and a ranking of which projects make the "cut," and which do not.

    Almost certainly, a spreadsheet was used for each project — to compute the discounted cash flows, the internal rates of return, and the presentation of the overall rankings.

    You will take comfort, of course, because these analyses, and your decision on which projects to accept or fund, were based on a sound financial principle: namely, the better the internal rate of return, the better the project.

    But is that comfort warranted? Or might you be vulnerable to the weaknesses long pointed out — if too often ignored — by researchers who have warned that IRR calculations often contain built-in reinvestment assumptions that improperly improve the appearance of bad projects, or make the good ones look too good .

    IRR, of course, is the actual compounded annual rate of return from an investment, often used as a key metric in evaluating capital projects to determine whether an investment should be made. IRR also is used in conjunction with the Net Present Value (NPV) function, determining the current value of the sum of a future series of negative and positive cash flows; namely investments and savings. The prescribed discount factor to be used in computing NPV is the company's weighted average cost of capital, or WACC. The internal rate of return is the annual rate of return, also known as the discount factor, which makes the NPV zero.

    The rub in justifying long-term project funding decisions by using IRR is two-fold. First, IRR assumes that interim cash inflows, or savings, will be "reinvested," and will produce a return — the reinvestment rate — equal to the "finance rate" used to fund the cash outflows (the investment.) Second, the anticipated investment cash outflows required for the project, and for the anticipated cash inflows from savings once the project is complete, are so far in the future that their timing is difficult to determine with reasonable accuracy.

    Is the reinvestment-at-the-same-rate assumption true? It may not be, when interim cash inflows occur far in the future, or if there is limited available capital to fund competing projects. Is timing important? Yes, it is vital. A change in the expected receipt of future cash inflows by as little as 30 days has a significant impact on the computed IRR.

    But by knowing and using the subtleties of the various IRR functions available in an electronic spreadsheet, we can safeguard ourselves against miscalculations based on faulty assumptions, and minimize the range of error by early detection of faulty assumptions.

    In this article, part one of a two-part series, we will study the reinvestment issue. The second article will address how to reduce inaccuracies — minimizing the range of error — based on timing concerns.

    Continued in article


    The Berkeley Electronic Press publishes the Journal of Business Valuation and Economic Loss Analysis --- http://www.bepress.com/jbvela/

    Why does the title of this journal strike me as funny?
    Is there a hidden message here?


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Review on October 8, 2009

    Borrowing for Dividends Raises Worries
    by Liz Rappaport
    Oct 05, 2009
    Click here to view the full article on WSJ.com

    TOPICS: Bonds, Debt, Dividends, Financial Accounting, Financial Analysis, Financial Statement Analysis, Mergers and Acquisitions

    SUMMARY: "Rock-bottom interest rates and thawed credit markets are emboldening some companies to use bond-sale proceeds...to pay out special dividends, buy back stock, or finance acquisitions.... [In contrast,] most corporate-bond offerings during the recession have been used to reduce debt or stockpile cash."

    CLASSROOM APPLICATION: The article can be used in covering bond issuances, ratio analysis particularly of debt-to-equity and interest versus earnings, dividend payments, and corporate acquisitions.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1. (Introductory) What was the effective interest rate for corporations with high credit ratings who issued bonds in September 2009? How does that rate compare to one year ago?

    2. (Introductory) What reasons for that change are given in the article? Do they have anything to do with changing creditworthiness of the borrowers?

    3. (Introductory) Compare the actions of Intel Corporation and TransDigm Group, Inc., with their debt issuance. How are they similar? How are they different?

    4. (Advanced) What is the impact on a corporate balance sheet of issuing debt? Describe the impact ignoring use of the proceeds, in essence assuming the company will "stockpile" the cash.

    5. (Introductory) Define the financial statement ratios of debt-to-equity and times interest earned.

    6. (Advanced) Describe the change in impact of debt issuance on a balance sheet equation and the two financial ratios if the proceeds are used to pay dividends to shareholders.

    7. (Advanced) Can a company issue bonds in order to "reduce debt" as the author says was done in during the recession and credit crisis? Explain, proposing a better term for such a transaction.

    8. (Introductory) The author uses two benchmarks to make clear the impact of TransDigm Group's debt issuance and dividend payment. What are these benchmarks? How does using them increase clarity about the size of the $425 million bond offering and the $7.50 to $7.70 per share special dividend?

    9. (Advanced) The author also includes use of bond proceed to finance acquisitions as a risky action. How have debt analysts reacted to Kraft's offer to buy Cadbury?

    10. (Advanced) Describe the impact of a business combination financed by debt on the total combined balance sheets of the firms entering into the business combination. How does this impact compare to using bond proceeds to pay dividends to shareholders? How does it differ?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    "Borrowing for Dividends Raises Worries," by Liz Rappaport, October 5, 2009 ---
    http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125470107157763085.html?mod=djem_jiewr_AC

    Rock-bottom interest rates and thawed credit markets are emboldening some companies to use bond-sale proceeds to go on the offensive, even if that means rewarding shareholders at the expense of bondholders.

    The nascent trend is controversial because corporate borrowers are sinking themselves deeper into debt to pay out special dividends, buy back stock or finance acquisitions. While such moves were all the rage during the credit boom, most corporate-bond offerings during the recession have been used to reduce debt or stockpile cash.

    Eric Felder, global head of credit trading at Barclays Capital, says the lure of low rates and companies' stables of cash increases "the risk of non-bondholder friendly events."

    Last week's sale of $425 million of bonds by aircraft-parts manufacturer TransDigm Group Inc. is one of the back-to-the-past corporate-bond deals causing concern among some analysts. More than $360 million of the proceeds will be used to pay a special cash dividend to shareholders and management of the Cleveland company.

    The added debt increased TransDigm's borrowings to 4.3 times its earnings before interest and taxes, compared with 3.1 times before last week's deal. The expected dividend of $7.50 to $7.70 a share is equal to nearly all of the net income that TransDigm reported since the end of fiscal 2003, according to Moody's Investors Service.

    Moody's said the dividend "illustrates the company's aggressive financial policy." Moody's gave the new debt a junk rating of B3, even though the ratings firm said TransDigm's "strong operating performance will enable the company to service the increased debt level."

    Sean Maroney, director of investor relations at TransDigm, says the "stability of our business, high profit margins and consistent cash flow" give the company "the ability to support this level of leverage."

    Borrowing from bondholders to pay shareholder dividends is "a hallmark of an earlier credit era," Jeffrey Rosenberg, head of credit strategy at Bank of America Merrill Lynch, wrote in a report Friday. Such deals were popular in 2003 and 2004, the last time the Federal Reserve lowered its benchmark interest rate to historically low levels, keeping it at 1% for more than a year.

    Companies like Dex Media Inc. took on debt to pay dividends to its private-equity owners, including Carlyle Group and Welsh, Carson, Anderson & Stowe, before taking the companies public. Dex Media filed for bankruptcy earlier this year under a mountain of debt.

    With the federal-funds rate at 0% for nine months now and confidence returning to the stock and debt markets, investors have been driven to take on more risk. That is flooding the corporate-bond market with cash. Investors poured $43 billion into investment-grade corporate-bond funds in the second quarter and nearly $40 billion in the third quarter -- almost double previous peak quarters, according to Lipper AMG Data Services.

    The wave of buying drove down borrowing costs for the average highly rated corporation to about 5%, according to Merrill, a level not seen since 2005. In the heat of the crisis last October, such rates averaged 9%. Through the end of September, more than 1,000 high-rated companies borrowed a record $860 billion, according to Dealogic.

    In July, Intel Corp. sold $1.75 billion of convertible bonds, planning to use $1.5 billion of the proceeds to buy back shares. A spokesman for Intel declined to comment.

    The computer-chip giant has a strong credit rating of single-A, so it doesn't carry a burdensome debt load. Still, the deal raised eyebrows among some analysts and investors, who say floating debt to buy back stock could become more common as companies regain confidence.

    And as merger-and-acquisition activity revs up, the cheaper cost of debt compared with equity is tempting companies to use bond sales as a deal-making war chest.

    Analysts are watching Kraft Foods Inc. in anticipation that the company would finance its proposed purchase of U.K. chocolate, candy and chewing gum maker Cadbury PLC by raising tons of debt. Last month's unsolicited bid by Kraft was then valued at about $16.7 billion, but it could be weeks before Kraft submits a formal offer.

    Three major credit-ratings agencies have warned Kraft that they could slash the company's debt ratings if the company reaches a deal agreement with Cadbury. At the current offering price, Kraft would need to shell out at least $6 billion in cash, much of it likely from the debt markets, according to corporate-bond research firm Gimme Credit.

    "Kraft is committed to maintaining an investment-grade rating," a Kraft spokesman said, declining to comment further.

    So far in 2009, returns to high-grade bond investors are 19%, according to Merrill. "We've seen a feeding frenzy" because of low interest rates, says Kathleen Gaffney, portfolio manager at Loomis, Sayles & Co. She sold some bonds recently to take profits from the rally. Loomis Sayles wants to have cash on the sidelines in case the Fed raises rates soon or Treasury bonds sell off.

    Jensen Comment
    If you buy into the Modigliani and Miller Theorem of capital structure, how the corporation is financed, including dividend payouts,

    The Modigliani-Miller theorem (of Franco Modigliani, Merton Miller) forms the basis for modern thinking on capital structure. The basic theorem states that, under a certain market price process (the classical random walk), in the absence of taxes, bankruptcy costs, and asymmetric information, and in an efficient market, the value of a firm is unaffected by how that firm is financed. It does not matter if the firm's capital is raised by issuing stock or selling debt. It does not matter what the firm's dividend policy is. Therefore, the Modigliani-Miller theorem is also often called the capital structure irrelevance principle.

    Modigliani was awarded the 1985 Nobel Prize in Economics for this and other contributions.

    Miller was awarded the 1990 Nobel Prize in Economics, along with Harry Markowitz and William Sharpe, for their "work in the theory of financial economics," with Miller specifically cited for "fundamental contributions to the theory of corporate finance."

    Of course these days, the assumption of market efficiency is a big stretch ---
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH

    Bob Jensen's threads on debt versus equity and capital structure (including investor earn out contracts) are at
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#FAS150

    Bob Jensen's bookmarks for financial ratios --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm#010303FinancialRatios
    Also see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Financial_ratios

    Bob Jensen's threads on valuation of the firm are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm 


    Alpha Return on Investment --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_(investment)

    What the professional investors don't tell you ---
    I downloaded this video --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/FinancialRounds.flv

    From the Financial Rounds Blog on September 4, 2009 ---
    http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    When I teach investments, there's always a section on market efficiency. A key point I try to make is that any test of market efficiency suffers from the "joint hypothesis" problem - that the test is not tests market efficiency, but also assumes that you have the correct model for measuring the benchmark risk-adjusted return.

    In other words, you can't say that you have "alpha" (an abnormal return) without correcting for risk.


    Falkenblog makes exactly this point:
     

    In my book Finding Alpha I describe these strategies, as they are built on the fact that alpha is a residual return, a risk-adjusted return, and as 'risk' is not definable, this gives people a lot of degrees of freedom. Further, it has long been the case that successful people are good at doing one thing while saying they are doing another.
     
    Even better, he's got a pretty good video on the topic (it also touches on other topics). Enjoy.

    You can watch the video under September 4, 2009 at http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
    I downloaded this video --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/FinancialRounds.flv

    Bob Jensen's threads on market efficiency (EMH) are at 
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH

    Bob Jensen's threads on market efficiency (EMH) are at 
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH

     


    There's a shelf of financial bestsellers whose titles now sound absurd: Ravi Batra's The Great Depression of 1990; James Glassman's Dow 36,000; Harry Figgie's Bankruptcy 1995: The Coming Collapse of America and How to Stop It. There’s BusinessWeek’s 1979 description of "the death of equities as a near permanent condition,
    Michael Lewis, "The Evolution of an Investor," Blaine-Lourd Profile, December 2007 ---
    http://www.portfolio.com/executives/features/2007/11/19/Blaine-Lourd-Profile#page3
    As quoted by Jim Mahar in his Finance Professor Blog at http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    As a group, professional money managers control more than 90 percent of the U.S. stock market. By definition, the money they invest yields returns equal to those of the market as a whole, minus whatever fees investors pay them for their services. This simple math, you might think, would lead investors to pay professional money managers less and less. Instead, they pay them more and more...Nobody knows which stock is going to go up. Nobody knows what the market as a whole is going to do, not even Warren Buffett. A handful of people with amazing track records isn’t evidence that people can game the market. Nobody knows which company will prove a good long-term investment. Even Buffett’s genius lies more in running businesses than in picking stocks. But in the investing world, that is ignored. Wall Street, with its army of brokers, analysts, and advisers funneling trillions of dollars into mutual funds, hedge funds, and private equity funds, is an elaborate fraud.
    Michael Lewis, "The Evolution of an Investor," Blaine-Lourd Profile, December 2007 ---
    http://www.portfolio.com/executives/features/2007/11/19/Blaine-Lourd-Profile#page3
    As quoted by Jim Mahar in his Finance Professor Blog at http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/


    From Jim Mahar's blog on September 19, 2006 --- http://financeprofessorblog.blogspot.com/

    SSRN-102 Errors in Company Valuations (102 Errores en Valoraciones de Empresas) by Pablo Fernández

    Want to practice your Spanish while studying Finance as well? This paper provides you the opportunity! It examines common mistakes that we tend to make in valuation.

    I won't try to translate it for you (I actually surprised myself as I could read most of it!) but fortunately the abstract is in English.


    SSRN-102 Errors in Company Valuations (102 Errores en Valoraciones de Empresas) by Pablo Fernández:
    "This paper contains a collection and classification of 96 errors seen in company valuations performed by financial analysts, investment banks and financial consultants. The author had access to most of the valuations referred to in this paper in his capacity as a consultant in company acquisitions, sales, mergers, and arbitrage processes.

    We classify the errors in six main categories: 1) Errors in the discount rate calculation and concerning the riskiness of the company; 2) Errors when calculating or forecasting the expected cash flows; 3) Errors in the calculation of the residual value; 4) Inconsistencies and conceptual errors; 5) Errors when interpreting the valuation; and 6) Organizational errors"

    September 19, 2006 message from Bob Deily, MBAWare [bdeily@mbaware.com]

    Dear Dr. Jensen,

    First off, let me compliment you on an absolutely exhaustively researched web site. There is an incredible amount of information contained on the various pages, and I can’t imagine how long it has taken to compile and separate the “wheat from the chaff.”

    I am writing to request a review of my company's offering of software for Finance/Accounting ( http://www.mbaware.com/finandacsof.html  ) and for business valuations ( http://www.mbaware.com/busvalsof.html  ) for possible inclusion on various web pages on your site. We are a retailer of a variety of specialized, high-quality, off-the-shelf financial software including software for amortization, accounting, business plans, business strategy, business valuations, financial statement analysis, forecasting, payroll, Sarbanes-Oxley compliance, treasury management and much more. Our specialties are financial and business valuation software.

    From my review of the site, it looks like the best fit might be our valuation software and data page ( http://www.mbaware.com/busvalsof.html  ) which would be a good fit on your “Threads on Return on Business Valuation, Business Combinations, Investment (ROI), and Pro Forma Financial Reporting” page ( http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm  ) under the “BUSINESS VALUATION SITES” section.

    Thanks very much for your consideration, and please let me know if you have any questions.

    Best regards,

    Bob Deily, President
    MBAWare - The Business Software Source
    (703) 875-0660
    E-mail: bdeily@mbaware.com 
    www.MBAWare.com

     


    There is a link to Banister Financial where you can find some tips of valuation and valuation frauds.


    Controversial Issues in Pro Forma Financial Reporting

    A Forecast for the Future
    www.financialwonder.com
    CPAs will want to check out this Web site to find free tools for corporate budgeting and forecasting. Users can build forecasts using the formulas found here for free. They then can use the results on their individual balance sheets or income statements and copy the results directly to their spreadsheets or word processors.


    Preliminary statistical data show the difference between operating (pro forma) earnings and net income under generally accepted accounting principles reached an all-time high in 2001. These statistics cover the largest U.S. public companies, collectively known as the Standard & Poor's 500. A timely analysis by TheStreet.Com shows why investors should be concerned. http://www.accountingweb.com/item/70533 


    Sharpe Point: Risk Gauge Is Misused
    Past average experience may be a terrible predictor of future performance

    The so-called Sharpe Ratio has become a cornerstone of modern finance, as investors have used it to help select money managers and mutual funds. Now, many academics -- including Sharpe himself -- say the gauge is being misused . . . The ratio is commonly used -- "misused," Dr. Sharpe says -- for promotional purposes by hedge funds. Bayou Management LLC, the Connecticut hedge-fund firm under investigation for what authorities suspect may have been a massive fraud, touted its Sharpe Ratio in marketing material. Investment consultants and companies that compile hedge-fund data also use it, as does a new annual contest for the best hedge funds in Asia, by a newsletter called AsiaHedge. "That is very disturbing," says the 71-year-old Dr. Sharpe. Hedge funds, loosely regulated private investment pools, often use complex strategies that are vulnerable to surprise events and elude any simple formula for measuring risk. "Past average experience may be a terrible predictor of future performance," Dr. Sharpe says.
    Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, "Sharpe Point: Risk Gauge Is Misused," The Wall Street Journal, August 31, 2005; Page C1--- http://online.wsj.com/article/0,,SB112545496905527510,00.html?mod=todays_us_money_and_investing


    Message from Ron Huefner [rhuefner@ACSU.BUFFALO.EDU

    For those needing a break from Enron, the SEC today issued its first enforcement action in the area of pro-forma earnings. AAER 1499, regarding Trump Hotels and Casino Resorts, Inc., may be found at

    http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/trumphotels.htm 

    Ron Huefner

    "SEC Brings First Pro Forma Financial Reporting Case Trump Hotels Charged With Issuing Misleading Earnings Release,"  FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE 2002-6 --- http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/trumphotels.htm 

    Washington, D.C., January 16, 2002 — In its first pro forma financial reporting case, the Securities and Exchange Commission instituted cease-and-desist proceedings against Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts Inc. for making misleading statements in the company's third-quarter 1999 earnings release. The Commission found that the release cited pro forma figures to tout the Company's purportedly positive results of operations but failed to disclose that those results were primarily attributable to an unusual one-time gain rather than to operations.

    "This is the first Commission enforcement action addressing the abuse of pro forma earnings figures," said Stephen M. Cutler, Director of the Commission's Division of Enforcement. "In this case, the method of presenting the pro forma numbers and the positive spin the Company put on them were materially misleading. The case starkly illustrates how pro forma numbers can be used deceptively and the mischief that they can cause."

    Trump Hotels consented to the issuance of the Commission's order without admitting or denying the Commission's findings. The Commission also found that Trump Hotels, through the conduct of its chief executive officer, its chief financial officer and its treasurer, violated the antifraud provisions of the Securities Exchange Act by knowingly or recklessly issuing a materially misleading press release.

    "This case demonstrates the risks involved in mishandling pro forma reporting," said Wayne M. Carlin, Regional Director of the Commission's Northeast Regional Office. "Enforcement action can result if a company fails to disclose information necessary to assure that investors will not be misled by the pro forma numbers."

    Specifically, as set forth in the Order, which is available on the Commission's website, the Commission found that:

    The Commission found that Trump Hotels violated Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5 thereunder. The Company was ordered to cease and desist from violating those provisions.

    For information about the use and interpretation of pro forma financial information, see the cautionary advice for companies and their advisors at http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/proforma-fin.htm and the investor alert recently issued by the Commission at http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/proforma12-4.htm.

    Contact:   Wayne M. Carlin  tel.: (646) 428-1510

    Additional Materials

       * Order re: Trump Hotels & Casino Resorts, Inc.
       * SEC Caution Regarding "Pro Forma" Financials
       * Investor Alert Regarding "Pro Forma" Financials

    Note that the quote below is not talking about GAAP profitability.  Instead it is that vapor concept of pro forma profitability --- whatever that is as inconsistently defined by many firms trying to boost their image with investors.

    From Information Week Daily on October 24, 2001

    Amazon Inching Toward Profitability

    Amazon.com Inc. CEO Jeff Bezos, addressing the company's third-quarter loss of $170 million, insisted Tuesday that the online superstore was ready to meet its pledge for profitability in the final three months of the year.

    Of course, he's talking pro forma operating profitability. Measured in that sense, Amazon's results look almost rosy: The pro forma loss from operations for the quarter ended Sept. 30 shrunk 60% to $27 million, compared with $68 million a year earlier. The U.S. retail and services segments combined were profitable on a pro forma basis for the second straight quarter--to the tune of $1 million, compared with a loss of $29 million last year.

    But back to the non-pro forma loss of $170 million, as computed according to generally accepted accounting principles: It was a 29% improvement from the $241 million loss a year ago, but $2 million worse than the $168 million it lost during the previous quarter. Net sales were basically flat--$639 million, compared with $638 million a year ago. One bright spot for the quarter: Sales of used merchandise, launched just 11 months ago, totaled 17% of all U.S. orders.

    "To reach pro forma profitability requires not heroics, just execution," CFO Warren Jenson said during a conference call. Jensen said net sales for the fourth quarter are expected to be between $970 million and $1.07 billion, compared with $972 million for fourth quarter of 2000. He expects revenue from services--fueled by partnerships with Target, Circuit City, and Expedia formed in the past three months--to exceed $200 million this year. - Christopher T. Heun

    Bob Jensen's threads on eCommerce are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm 


    From The Wall Street Journal's Accounting Educator Reviews on January 24, 2002

    TITLE: Amazon Had First-Ever Profit In 4th Quarter 
    REPORTER: Nick Wingfield 
    DATE: Jan 23, 2002  
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1011391206164562000.djm  
    TOPICS: Earning Announcements, Managerial Accounting

    SUMMARY: The Wingfield article relates the surprise felt on Wall Street by the first-ever reported profit for the last quarter for Amazon.com. Factors that led to these results are discussed as well as the long-term outlook for the e-commerce retailer's future.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) Is the "new-economy" dead? Can you argue that there is no fundamental difference between the new- and old-economy? What was the universally recognized measure of performance in the old economy?

    2.) What is a lag indicator of performance? Differentiate it from a lead indicator of performance. How many lead indicators can you list? Can a lag indicator of performance be a lead indicator at the same time?

    3.) How long has Amazon.com Inc. been in business? Does it surprise you that this is the first quarter that it has ever posted a profit? What factors are cited explaining the profits for last year's 4th quarter? Is there anything "new" about those factors?

    4.) What has happened to Amazon's strategy since its inception? How do they measure success against that strategic vision today and does it differ from its view of their early success?

    5.) What outside factor contributed to its reported profit? What does this bode for Amazon's future? What enticements are they offering in the hopes of spurring sales growth?

    6.) What are "fulfillment" costs? What are "nonstandard" accounting measures? Why does the article maintain that Amazon's future is murky?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Reviewed By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Reviewed By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University


    The Future of Amazon.com:  Unlike Enron, Amazon.com seems to thrive without profits.  How long can it last?

    "Economy, the Web and E-Commerce: Amazon.com." An Interview With Jeff Bezos CEO, Amazon.com, The Washington Post,  December 6, 2001 --- http://discuss.washingtonpost.com/zforum/01/washtech_bezos120601.htm 


    Amazon.com is pinning its hopes on pro forma reporting to report the company's first profit in history.  But wait! Plans by U.S. regulators to crack down on "pro forma" abuses in accounting may take a toll on Internet firms, which like the financial reporting technique because it can make losses seem smaller than they really are.  

    "When Pro Forma Is Bad Form," by Joanna Glasner, Wired News, December 6, 2001 --- http://www.wired.com/news/business/0,1367,48877,00.html 

    As part of efforts to improve the clarity of information given to investors, the Securities and Exchange Commission warned this week that it will crack down on companies that use creative accounting methods to pump up poor earnings results.

    In particular, the commission said it will focus on abuse of a popular form of financial reporting known as "pro forma" accounting, which allows companies to exclude certain expenses and gains from their earnings results. The SEC said the method "may not convey a true and accurate picture of a company's financial well-being."

    Experts say the practice is especially common among Internet firms, which began issuing earnings press releases with pro forma numbers en masse during the stock market boom of the late 1990s. The list of new-economy companies using pro forma figures includes such prominent firms as Yahoo (YHOO), AOL Time Warner (AOL), CNET (CNET) and JDS Uniphase (JDSU).

    Unprofitable firms are particularly avid users of pro forma numbers, said Brett Trueman, professor of accounting at the University of California at Berkeley's Haas School of Business.

    "I can't say for sure why, but I can take a guess: They're losing big time, and they want to give investors the impression that the losses are not as great as they appear," he said.

    Trueman said savvy investors tend to know that companies may have self-serving interests in mind when they release pro forma numbers. Experienced traders often put greater credence in numbers compiled according to generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP), which firms are required to release alongside any pro forma numbers.

    A mounting concern, however, is the fact that many companies rely almost solely on pro forma numbers in projections for future performance.

    Perhaps the best-known proponent of pro forma is the perennially unprofitable Amazon.com, which has a history of guiding investor expectations using an accounting system that excludes charges for stock compensation, restructuring or the declining value of past acquisitions.

    Invariably, the pro forma numbers are better than the GAAP ones. In its most recent quarter, for example, Amazon (AMZN) reported a pro forma loss of $58 million. When measured according to GAAP, Amazon's net loss nearly tripled to $170 million.

    Things are apt to get even stranger in the last quarter of the year, when Amazon said it plans to deliver its first-ever pro forma operating profit. By regular accounting standards, the company will still be losing money.

    Those results might not sit too well with the folks at the SEC, however.

    In its statements this week, the SEC noted that although there's nothing inherently illegal about providing pro forma numbers, figures should not be presented in a deliberately misleading manner. Regulators may have been talking directly to Amazon in one paragraph of their warning, which said:

    "Investors are likely to be deceived if a company uses a pro forma presentation to recast a loss as if it were a profit."

    Neither Amazon nor AOL Time Warner returned phone calls inquiring if they planned to make changes to their pro forma accounting methods in light of the SEC's recent statements.

    According to Trueman, few members of the financial community would advocate getting rid of pro forma numbers altogether.

    Even the SEC said that pro forma numbers, when used appropriately, can provide investors with a great deal of useful information that might not be included with GAAP results. When presented correctly, pro forma numbers can offer insights into the performance of the core business, by excluding one-time events that can skew quarterly results.

    Rather than ditching pro forma, industry groups like Financial Executives International and the National Investor Relations Institute say a better plan is to set uniform guidelines for how to present the numbers. They have issued a set of recommendations, such as making sure companies don't arbitrarily change what's included in pro forma results from quarter to quarter.

    Certainly some consistency would make it easier for folks who try to track this stuff, said Joe Cooper, research analyst at First Call, which compiles analyst projections of earnings.

    The boom in pro forma reporting has created quite a bit of extra work for First Call, Cooper said, because it has to figure out which companies and analysts are using pro forma numbers and how they're using them.

    But the extra work of compiling pro forma numbers doesn't necessarily result in greater financial transparency for investors, Cooper said.

    "In days past, before it was abused, it was a way to give an honest apples-to-apples comparison," he said. "Now, it is being used as a way to continually put their company in a good light."

    See also:
    SEC Fires Warning Shot Over Tech Statements
    Earnings Downplay Stock Losses

    Change at the Top for AOL
    Where's the Money?, Huh?
    There's no biz like E-Biz


    I added the following to my December 4, 2001 message from Phil Livinston to my threads on pro forma accounting statements at  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm  
    Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/theory/00overview/beresford01.htm 

    To: FEI Members and Prospective Members From: Phil Livingston

    Special FEI Express - SEC Cautions Companies to Potential Dangers of "Pro Forma" Financials

    Today, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a cautionary advisory on the use of pro forma earnings per share measures used in earnings press releases. The SEC warned that companies issuing earnings press releases should always include net earnings per share determined according to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and recommended that any use of pro forma measures should be accompanied by a plain English reconciliation back to the GAAP results. The SEC stated that companies not following these practices could be subject to the anti-fraud provisions of laws governing corporate financial reporting. The SEC advisory went on to recommend the guidance provided by the "FEI/NIRI Earnings Press Release Guidelines."

    FEI strongly encourages companies to follow the "best practice" standard created by our Committee on Corporate Reporting and the National Institute of Investor Relations. These guidelines can be found on the FEI website at http://www.fei.org/news/FEI-NIRI-EPRGuidelines-4-26-2001.cfm . SEC officials have broadly endorsed these guidelines and repeatedly encouraged their use in public speeches. Current market and economic conditions make it important for all of us involved in financial reporting to take extra steps to make sure we are fully and fairly presenting our companies' financial results to investors. As financial officers, we have that extra duty to our shareholders, employees and creditors to provide highly transparent and meaningful information.

    The use of pro forma earnings has become increasingly widespread and is drawing more attention. Some say the increased use of pro forma measures results from the inadequacies and limitations of measures currently defined by GAAP. Meanwhile, critics cite cases of abuse where pro forma earnings have been used to distort reality and provide an opaque view of a company's results. Be in the camp that uses pro forma earnings in a constructive way to provide meaningful supplemental data to the GAAP results. Please share this SEC release and the FEI guidelines with the rest of your management team. Be a best practices company in financial reporting.

    Read the official release from the SEC here: http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/proforma-fin.htm 

    That's all for now,

    Phil

    Bob Jensen's threads on accounting theory can be found at

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/theory/00overview/theory01.htm 


    In spite of my highly negative views on pro forma statements, I will share a more positive case fro pro forma forwarded by Janet Flatley.

    "Money Managers Say Pro Forma Results Are Useful," by Stephen Taub

    Most money managers claim corporate financial reporting needs to be improved. But when it comes to the controversial issue of pro forma earnings, most professional investors say those figures are useful or extremely useful.

    Specifically, 9 out of 10 portfolio managers believe that corporate financial reporting needs to be upgraded, according to a survey of 223 fund managers taken in October by New York-based capital markets firm Broadgate Consultants Inc. The survey of portfolio managers was intended to gauge the reaction to recent proposals by the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB). Officials at FASB are contemplating drawing up new standards for financial reporting, and possibly requiring more information about intangible assets to be carried on balance sheets.

    Despite recent criticism of pro forma financial reporting, nearly 76 percent of portfolio managers in the survey said they found pro forma accounting at least somewhat useful, and many of these said that it is extremely useful.

    In fact, 67 percent of respondents opposed banning pro forma reporting from press releases. However, 91 percent of that two-thirds majority felt that corporations should provide more detail in their pro forma statements.

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board last week added a project on financial performance reporting to its agenda. See recent story.

    Portfolio managers are somewhat divided about whether FASB should broaden the scope of its project to require companies to include financial metrics such as ratios in their statements. 47 percent said yes to that, while 44 percent voted no.

    Even so, 95 percent of the money managers said they would like more consistency in how a common financial metric - earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) - is calculated. Sixty percent of managers want more information about intangible assets, and 60 percent want more detailed disclosures about internally generated intangibles, such as the value of brand names or customer lists, to name two.

    So, what are the most relevant measures of financial performance? In a tight financial market, cash flow after capital expenditures and interest expense received the highest marks from the portfolio managers. Balance sheet strength came in second. EBITDA and earnings tied for third. Interestingly, book value ranked last.

    As for FASB's decision not to categorize the effects of the World Trade Center attacks as an extraordinary item, nearly 55 percent of the managers agreed.

    "The results of the survey clearly reveal that professional investors want more detail, precision and clarity in financial statements," said Thomas C. Franco, chairman and chief executive officer of Broadgate, in a press release accompanying the survey's results. "However, it is noteworthy that investors also appear to recognize the obvious limitations with pro forma results, but consider such reporting valuable in assessing the ongoing performance factors driving the businesses they follow."

    Read On! For More of Today in Finance http://m.s.maildart.net/link_30322_6594702_1_120093342_73938558_0_7e 


    I added the following December 4, 2001 message from Phil Livinston to my threads on pro forma accounting statements at  http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm  
    Also see http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/theory/00overview/beresford01.htm 

    To: FEI Members and Prospective Members From: Phil Livingston

    Special FEI Express - SEC Cautions Companies to Potential Dangers of "Pro Forma" Financials

    Today, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) issued a cautionary advisory on the use of pro forma earnings per share measures used in earnings press releases. The SEC warned that companies issuing earnings press releases should always include net earnings per share determined according to U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), and recommended that any use of pro forma measures should be accompanied by a plain English reconciliation back to the GAAP results. The SEC stated that companies not following these practices could be subject to the anti-fraud provisions of laws governing corporate financial reporting. The SEC advisory went on to recommend the guidance provided by the "FEI/NIRI Earnings Press Release Guidelines."

    FEI strongly encourages companies to follow the "best practice" standard created by our Committee on Corporate Reporting and the National Institute of Investor Relations. These guidelines can be found on the FEI website at http://www.fei.org/news/FEI-NIRI-EPRGuidelines-4-26-2001.cfm . SEC officials have broadly endorsed these guidelines and repeatedly encouraged their use in public speeches. Current market and economic conditions make it important for all of us involved in financial reporting to take extra steps to make sure we are fully and fairly presenting our companies' financial results to investors. As financial officers, we have that extra duty to our shareholders, employees and creditors to provide highly transparent and meaningful information.

    The use of pro forma earnings has become increasingly widespread and is drawing more attention. Some say the increased use of pro forma measures results from the inadequacies and limitations of measures currently defined by GAAP. Meanwhile, critics cite cases of abuse where pro forma earnings have been used to distort reality and provide an opaque view of a company's results. Be in the camp that uses pro forma earnings in a constructive way to provide meaningful supplemental data to the GAAP results. Please share this SEC release and the FEI guidelines with the rest of your management team. Be a best practices company in financial reporting.

    Read the official release from the SEC here: http://www.sec.gov/news/headlines/proforma-fin.htm 

    That's all for now,

    Phil

     


    E-Business and E-Commerce  ROI Complications
    Putting ROI Through The Wringer

    Great Investment Return Calculators

    Forwarded from Jim Mahar's Blog on July 23, 2009 ---
    http://politicalcalculations.blogspot.com/2009/06/investing-through-time.html

    1. Historic Rates of return from any two points of time:

    From PoliticalCalculations:
    " Now however, everything has changed because we here at Political Calculations are putting the entire encapsulated history of the S&P 500 at your fingertips!

    We've taken the raw data from the sources linked above, and made it easily accessible by selecting a month and year in our tool below. The tool will provide the average index value of the S&P 500 for the given month and year, the associated dividends and earnings for that month and year, not to mention the dividend yield and the price to earnings ratio. For good measure, we threw in the value of the Consumer Price Index as well!"


    2. How much an investment would have grown from and to any point in time from 1871 (yeah, so the data may not be perfectly clean, still a good look!)

    Political Calculations: Investing Through Time:
    "All you need to do is to select the dates you want to run your hypothetical investment between and to enter the amount of money to invest either from the very beginning or to add each month (beginning with that first month you select) for the duration that your investment runs.

    We'll determine how much your investment would be worth assuming the amounts invested are adjusted for inflation for each month the investment is active and accounting for the effects of either not reinvesting dividends along the way or fully reinvesting dividends"

    What is PoliticalCalcuations? From the site: "Welcome to the blogosphere's toolchest! Here, unlike other blogs dedicated to analyzing current events, we create easy-to-use, simple tools to do the math

     

    Bob Jensen's threads about free online calculators of various types --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob3.htm#080512Calculators

     


    "Decoding Business Profitability," by Lyn Denend quoting Mark Soliman, Stefan Reichelstein, and Madhav Rajan, Stanford Business Magazine, November 2007 --- http://www.gsb.stanford.edu/news/bmag/sbsm0711/kn-decoding.html

    For years, return on investment (ROI) and related financial accounting ratios have been widely used as key measures of business profitability. Now three Business School accounting professors have written an award-winning paper that shows the economic interpretation of the ROI metric requires more careful analysis.

    For more than 40 years, business professionals and academics have relied on ROI to infer a company’s economic rate of return, which is usually conceptualized as the internal rate of return of a firm’s investment projects. Many recognized that financial accounting is subject to biases that could skew the magnitude of the ROI ratio, but they tended to believe these effects would average out over time, thereby enabling parity between ROI and real economic return. On the other hand, when companies such as those in the oil industry have been accused of abusing their market power, as evidenced by excessive accounting profitability, they tried to explain away high accounting returns by claiming that standard metrics do not adequately measure real economic returns.

    “There wasn’t a precise mathematical understanding of the issue,” said Madhav Rajan, a professor of managerial accounting who collaborated on the study with Stefan Reichelstein, who also specializes in managerial accounting, and Mark Soliman, a financial accountant.

    The threesome developed a model that enabled them to examine analytically and empirically how a firm’s ROI was affected by two central variables: accounting conservatism and growth in new investments. They considered accounting to be conservative if it resulted in book values that were understated because investments were written off faster than they should be, given the under-lying pattern of project cash flows. Direct expensing of intangible investments is a prime example of such conservatism.

    The researchers found that accounting conservatism and past growth in investments jointly determined how ROI compared to the underlying economic profitability of a business. Given conservative accounting, higher growth tended to depress ROI, a decline that was accentuated by more conservative accounting rules. On the other hand, more conservative accounting increased ROI only if the rate of past growth in new investments was below some critical value, with the opposite effect emerging for growth rates above that critical value. To test the theoretical predictions of the model, the researchers used a data sample of 43,680 firm-year observations from 1982 to 2002.

    The result is a tool for “decoding the economic profitability of a firm given the accounting profitability reported in the ROI number,” Reichelstein said. Contrary to earlier examples and numerical illustrations in textbooks and the relevant literature, “we now have a much more systematic grasp of the linkage between accounting and economic return.”

    Both investors and managers can use the tool, “From a management perspective, it’s perfectly possible that one of your divisions has an ROI of 15 percent while another one has an ROI of 10 percent,” Reichelstein said. “You shouldn’t jump to the conclusion that the one giving you 15 percent is the one that’s adding more value to the business.” By applying the model, taking into account how rapidly both divisions have been growing and which has assets that may be more subject to a conservatism, management can more accurately determine the real economic profitability of both business groups.

    The research, which earned best paper awards when presented at two international accounting conferences, is published as “Conser-vatism, Growth, and Return on Investment,” in the September 2006 issue of the Journal of Accounting, Auditing, and Finance.


    Alpha Return on Investment --- http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Alpha_(investment)

    What the professional investors don't tell you ---
    I downloaded this video --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/FinancialRounds.flv

    From the Financial Rounds Blog on September 4, 2009 ---
    http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    When I teach investments, there's always a section on market efficiency. A key point I try to make is that any test of market efficiency suffers from the "joint hypothesis" problem - that the test is not tests market efficiency, but also assumes that you have the correct model for measuring the benchmark risk-adjusted return.

    In other words, you can't say that you have "alpha" (an abnormal return) without correcting for risk.


    Falkenblog makes exactly this point:
     

    In my book Finding Alpha I describe these strategies, as they are built on the fact that alpha is a residual return, a risk-adjusted return, and as 'risk' is not definable, this gives people a lot of degrees of freedom. Further, it has long been the case that successful people are good at doing one thing while saying they are doing another.
     
    Even better, he's got a pretty good video on the topic (it also touches on other topics). Enjoy.

    You can watch the video under September 4, 2009 at http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/
    I downloaded this video --- http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/temp/FinancialRounds.flv

    Bob Jensen's threads on market efficiency (EMH) are at 
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH

    Bob Jensen's threads on market efficiency (EMH) are at 
    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory01.htm#EMH

     


    Today's smartest companies are measuring a complex mix of business objectives, costs, and risks--and holding managers accountable for results that maximize returns. http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK20021017S0013 

    Companies are taking a hard look at returns on IT investments, using complex valuation models linked to business goals. by Eileen Colkin, October 21, 2002

    Tough competition and even tighter budgets mean that IT projects must go through a rigorous ROI wringer. And that wringer is getting tougher all the time. Forget on time and on budget, and don't even think about using a vendor's ROI tool. The smartest companies are measuring a complex mix of business objectives, costs, and risks, and holding managers accountable for results that maximize returns. "It used to be the 'ta-da' strategy," says John Howell, VP and program director of Internet solutions for Citibank Global Securities Services. "We'd put the project together and throw it out there and say, 'Ta-da! It must be successful.' We didn't look to maximize ROI, we looked to measure it."

    Citibank Global Securities Services has moved beyond the easy approach to ROI with a methodology that looks to maximize returns, Howell says.

    The new frontier is "more acuity in computing ROI," says Howard Rubin, a principal at Meta Group. Companies categorize IT initiatives by specific goals, such as raising the stock price, increasing market share, or lowering operating costs, then use historical and other data to quantify what returns can be expected. "IT departments need to look at the big picture," says Calvin Braunstein, president and executive research director at advisory firm Robert Frances Group. They're also tightening the links between IT investment and its impact on a company's sales and profit. Spending should go up only when revenue is headed in the same direction or costs are going down. "It has to impact either the top or bottom line," Braunstein says.

    Still, only a few companies are using broader definitions of ROI. About 8% of all businesses examine IT investments through these more complex valuation filters, Rubin says. And those that are doing so use a variety of methodologies.

    Chris Lofgren, president and CEO of Schneider National Inc., a $2.4 billion-a-year trucking and logistics company, has embraced the move to a more complex approach to ROI. "The emergence of the ROI metrics came from a realization in the tech community that sometimes they built things that were neat and cool because they could, even though there wasn't much value," Lofgren says. "Now there's an evolution to the extent that if companies want to push capital into a technology, IT has got to compete for that capital with proven valuation."

    Project valuation has become more of an art than a science at Schneider National, president and CEO Lofgren says.

    Lofgren puts IT investments into strategic buckets. Those that will lower costs go in one bucket, revenue creators in another, and those expected to simplify business processes in a third. He then considers different factors for each category, consulting the executives and business units relevant to each set of projects. But these sorts of valuations are still more of an art than a science. "You can't take away judgment, business strategy, and insight," Lofgren says.

    Citibank Global Securities has made the transition away from the "ta-da" strategy to a more comprehensive approach to assessing the potential returns on IT projects. The company, which sells stocks and bonds to institutional investors, is building an executive portal that will let it act as a central information source and value-added service provider for C-level executives at the 350 largest financial institutions in the world. Having such a small target market leaves little room for error. One lost customer for the division is equivalent to a global retailer losing a million consumers. But the potential for gains is also huge: If the portal wins favor, Citibank's market share should increase, and it will be positioned to sell other products to this elite group, Howell says.

    Continued at http://www.informationweek.com/story/IWK20021017S0013 


    EIR Method Controversies

    This is a rather strong position taken by Deloitte (and Webmaster Paul Pacter) on IASPlus on June 17, 2008 --- http://www.iasplus.com/index.htm

    June 17, 2008: We disagree with IFRIC's draft decision on effective interest rate

      In a letter to IFRIC, Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu disagree with the IFRIC's tentative decision not to take onto the IFRIC's agenda a request for an interpretation on the application of the effective interest rate (EIR) method. Click for our Letter to IFRIC (PDF 136k). Here is an excerpt:
    In summary, we believe the tentative agenda decision wording does not provide sufficient clarity and that additional interpretive guidance is needed. We believe there are three important interpretative issues that need to be addressed:
    • (i) how to apply the effective interest rate to debt instruments with a market-based reset;
    • (ii) when should an entity apply AG7 compared to AG8; and
    • (iii) for inflation linked debt, is it possible to analogise with IAS 29 in the case when an entity is not applying that standard.
    The application of the EIR is critical in determining the balance sheet carrying amount and the impact on profit or loss for debt instruments held at amortised cost, as well as the income recognition for those debt instruments classified as available-for-sale. The EIR has widespread application for both vanilla and complex debt instruments, yet the standard is not clear as to how the EIR method applies for instruments with variable cash flows.
    Our past comment letters to IASB, IFRIC, IASC, and SIC are Here.

    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 27, 2006

    TITLE: Xerox Net Jumps on a Tax Refund, Color-Page Output
    REPORTER: William Bulkeley
    DATE: Oct 24, 2006
    PAGE: B3 LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116160233330000697.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Income Taxes, Taxation

    SUMMARY: Xerox's results are impacted both by factors affecting operating earnings and by one-time items, including a tax refund following completion of an audit of 1999 to 2003.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) What factors disclosed in this article will affect operating earnings? Which ones will impact net income but not operating income?

    2.) Why do companies separate items in earnings releases that arise in only one time period? Are these one time items the same as the items that are excluded from operating income? Support your answer.

    3.) Why does Xerox's tax refund have such a significant impact on this year's third-quarter net income if the refund relates to a tax audit for the years 1999 to 2003? Specifically cite accounting support for including the effect of the refund in the current period. How does this support differ from the reasoning you offer in answer to question 2?

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island


    From The Wall Street Journal Accounting Weekly Review on October 27, 2006

    TITLE: Embattled Airbus Lifts Sales Target for A380 to Profit
    REPORTER: Daniel Michaels
    DATE: Oct 20, 2006
    PAGE: A4
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116129654805798256.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac 
    TOPICS: Accounting, Cost-Volume-Profit Analysis, Earning Announcements, Earnings Forecasts, Managerial Accounting

    SUMMARY: "European plane maker Airbus said it needs to sell significantly more A380 superjumbos than originally planned to make a profit on the roughly 12 billion euro ($15 billion) project..." Questions relate to the use of Cost-Volume-Profit analysis to make this announcement. The article follows on one previously covered in a Weekly Review.

    QUESTIONS:
    1.) Describe the formula used to determine the number of units of a product that must be sold in order to break-even or to generate a profit.

    2.) What is the break-even point in units for sales of the Airbus A380? How is that break-even point translated into sales dollars? What questions do you think must be considered in forecasting sales of the A380 given its production delays?

    3.) Why is this break-even information of interest to financial analysts who follow Airbus? That is, how does the break even information add on to information previously announced regarding cost overruns and shipping delays for the A380?

    4.) How did Airbus calculate the 13% projected internal rate of return on the A380 project? Specifically describe steps needed to make that calculation.

    5.) In the article, the author states that the internal rate of return is "essentially the project's payback rate." Do you agree? Support your answer and include definitions of internal rate of return and payback period.

    Reviewed By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island

    --- RELATED ARTICLE ---
    TITLE: EADS Expects Further Delays in Airbus A380 Jetliner Program
    REPORTER: Daniel Michaels
    PAGE: B2 ISSUE: Sep 22, 2006
    LINK: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB115882214969669858.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

    "Embattled Airbus Lifts Sales Target For A380 to Profit," by Daniel Michaels, The Wall Street Journal, October 20, 2006; Page A6 --- http://online.wsj.com/article/SB116129654805798256.html?mod=djem_jiewr_ac

    European plane maker Airbus said it needs to sell significantly more A380 superjumbos than planned to make a profit on the roughly €12 billion ($15 billion) project, highlighting its uphill struggle in making the giant plane a commercial success.

    During a presentation to investors and equity analysts in Hamburg, Germany, that was posted on the company's Web site, Airbus Chief Financial Officer Andreas Sperl said Airbus would break even on the project to build the world's largest passenger jet when it delivers some 420 of the two-deck aircraft.

    The original target, set in 2000 when Airbus launched the A380, was 250 deliveries. That was raised to around 270 deliveries last year. Since it started marketing the plane in 2000, Airbus has garnered 159 firm orders for A380s from 16 customers and commitments to buy nine additional 555-seat jetliners -- though some may cancel orders because of the mounting delays.

    Airbus has previously said the delays would result in a financial hit, but Thursday's disclosure quantifies that impact in terms of orders -- underscoring its increased need to make the plane appealing to customers. Manufacturing problems, in particular with the wiring of the A380, have forced Airbus to delay deliveries by two years and have also pushed the project at least 30% over its original budget of €9 billion at current exchange rates. The A380 woes, which have angered many of Airbus's best customers, have prompted Airbus and parent company European Aeronautic Defence & Space Co. into drawing up a major restructuring plan to tackle problems.

    Mr. Sperl's presentation also said Airbus had cut the internal rate of return on the A380 project -- essentially, the project's payback rate -- to 13% from a previous prediction of 19%. The lower return rate also is because of the delays and cost overruns. Airbus in 2000 predicted a rate of return above 20%.

    Still, Airbus left unchanged its forecast of total A380 sales, which it maintains at 751 planes over the next 20 years. Airbus has said it expects orders to pick up once the plane enters service, now late 2007 for its first delivery. Airbus rival Boeing Co. is far less optimistic about sales prospects for very large jetliners. Boeing predicts a total market for both itself and Airbus of 990 jetliners with more than 400 seats. That includes aircraft smaller than the A380, such as the Airbus A340 and the Boeing 777, and a large number of big cargo jets.

     


    "Business: Strategic Investment:  For many companies, launching Internet initiatives that advance strategic goals is more important than getting a hard-dollar return," by Clinton Wilder, Information Week Online, May 24, 1999 --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/acct1302/wilder01.htm 

    The Internet has changed the way companies communicate, how they share information with business partners, and how they buy and sell. It's also changing the way they view their IT investments.

    As companies launch electronic-business projects, many are tossing out conventional thinking about the need for a return on investment and focusing on how the initiatives advance their overall business strategy--whether it's to improve customer satisfaction, increase brand awareness, or open new sales channels. A small but growing number of companies have recently begun searching for new ways to measure the ROI of their E-business projects. For less strategic projects, such as those that increase the efficiency of the supply chain, traditional ROI evaluations are still being used. But the bottom line is that E-business is seen increasingly as something that must be pursued at all costs.

    The Bank of Montreal, Canada's third-largest bank, didn't even consider ROI when it committed between $55 million and $69 million to online banking initiatives, much of it for the development of custom-built middleware linking the Web to its mainframe applications and databases. "We weren't sure if it would make money or not, but we didn't see how we could continue to be a leading-edge, full-service bank if we didn't do it," says Ron McKerlie, the Toronto bank's VP of smart cards and emerging businesses.

    The Bank of Montreal is hardly alone in pushing ahead with E-business projects without formally evaluating their potential ROI. In a recent survey of 375 IT and business executives conducted by InformationWeek Research in conjunction with Business Week, only 17% of IT managers and 12% of business executives said their companies formally required them to demonstrate the potential payback of their E-business applications. And 28% of IT managers and 39% of business executives said their companies required no ROI evaluation whatsoever (see chart, below).

    Consultants say many businesses are playing catch-up with E-business, and as a result, they're often jumping into it without carefully considering either the ROI or strategic implications of the move. "Of the E-business projects we're familiar with, I'd say two-thirds are done simply out of a sense of business urgency," says Bob Parker, an analyst at AMR Research. "CEOs are walking in and saying, `I don't know exactly what this is, but I know we have to do it.' There's an element of fear--the fear of getting left behind."

    That's the wrong approach, says Parker. Even if a company doesn't do a formal ROI evaluation, there needs to be coordination between the CEO, the CIO, employees, and business partners that will be affected. A business case needs to be made. "The probability of failure increases when you do a project just because the CEO read somewhere that he needs to be on the Net," says Parker.

    Critical Decisions Ironically, companies that weigh those factors carefully often come to the same conclusion: They must proceed--regardless of ROI. That's because the Internet has increased the speed of business, changed the nature of customer service, and given companies the ability to enter new markets, says Diana Brown, VP and general manager of financial services for Web integrator Scient Corp. Companies must respond. "You have to keep E-business out of the normal budgeting process," she says. "If these investments are held up to the same magnifying glass as other line items--to make money this year--it's very hard to make anything happen."

    More companies are justifying their E-business ventures not in terms of ROI but in terms of strategic goals. In the InformationWeek Research survey, creating or maintaining a competitive edge was cited most often as the reason for deploying an E-business application. That was followed closely by improving customer satisfaction, keeping pace with competitors, and establishing or expanding brand awareness (see chart, below).

    The business and IT executives surveyed largely agreed on the top three goals. Where they differed was on the issue of cost reduction: 78% of IT executives cited reducing operational costs as a motive for deploying E-businesses applications, compared--perhaps surprisingly--with just 66% of business executives. (Full results of the survey will be released June 8 at InformationWeek's E-Business Conference & Expo in San Jose, Calif. For information, see http://www.ebusinessexpo.com/.)

    Customer satisfaction was a key reason the Bank of Montreal launched Mbanx, an online banking service, and it has paid off. More than 150,000 customers use the bank's service, and their customer-satisfaction level is around 95%, compared with 60% to 70% for conventional customers, says McKerlie.

    The bank has other E-business initiatives under way, including a joint venture with Canada Post for electronic billing and mailings; an online stock brokerage; online loan, mortgage, and credit-card applications; online billing for company credit cards; an automated E-mail response system; and an expansion of the bank's U.S. business (through Harris Bank in Chicago) that doesn't require opening new branches.

    In assessing its investments in some of these projects, the bank was able to use conventional ROI metrics. For example, it could compare the estimated cost of sending an electronic bill vs. mailing a paper bill and calculate how long it will take to recoup the IT investment. But for other projects, the bank began using a new set of metrics for E-business developed by Scient. These ask: Does the initiative target a valuable customer segment?

    Does it improve the quality of customer service?

    Does it reuse existing IT infrastructure?

    Does it give the bank a commanding market-share lead from being first to market?

    Does it help the bank learn more about its customers?

    Is it a strategic fit with other existing ventures?

    "We mainly use the new metrics to compare each of these initiatives with each other," says McKerlie. If the company has only $100 million to spend but wants to go ahead with projects that would cost $200 million, it uses both traditional and new metrics to identify the most important projects to pursue, he says

    Related links: What's The Investment Worth?

    And from our sister publications: InternetWeek Measuring ROI For The Top Line Of The Business

    Why Bother? Some companies don't even look at their strategic E-business applications as IT projects, so there's little reason to evaluate ROI. In January, Milacron Inc., a $1.7 billion machine-tool manufacturer in Cincinnati, launched Milpro.com, an E-commerce site that uses Open Market's Transact commerce server and LiveCommerce catalog software. Alan Shaffer, Milacron's group VP of industrial products, jokes that he approved the seven-figure budget request of the company's director of E-commerce "in less than 10 seconds." He then doubled the budget in midproject last year. "Return on investment? We never even discussed it," Shaffer says. "This isn't an IT project, it's just another market channel. Very few people do ROI on expanding their market channels."

    Shaffer gave his IT people one non-negotiable imperative: Be the first to market in the industry. "I told them we could change what we did or what it cost, but not when it would launch," he says. He also accepted that Milacron wouldn't see significant online sales until 2001. In fact, the company projects that Milpro.com will achieve only $600,000 in online sales for the first six months ending June 30.

    Milacron's analysis of the Web initiative is about as far from traditional ROI calculations on IT spending as you can get. But like the Bank of Montreal, it sees its E-business efforts as a way to boost customer service. Milpro.com, which is upgraded every 90 to 120 days, is not only a vehicle for sell-ing more cutting tools and fluids to small machine shops, it also provides customers with technical advice about using the company's products.

    "A paper catalog gives you no clue about that kind of information," says Shaffer. "To deliver that knowledge to the point of sale around the clock--there's no other way besides the Web that could do that as cost-effectively."

    Milacron has included free services to encourage customers and potential customers to use the site. The Milpro Wizard offers advice on machine-tool and fluid problems, products, and other issues. The Job Shop Mall lets customers post a classified ad or search ads posted by other users, and users can list or search for new and used machinery and equipment at the site's Machinery Flea Market. In Milpro.com's first three months, 400 machine shops registered to market their services on the Job Shop Mall, and customers listed 200 pieces of equipment for sale in the Machinery Flea Market. Shaffer says the number of customers using the Wizard on Sundays and at midnight drops by only half from peak periods.

    Milacron's tracking of site usage relates directly to three of the top five ROI criteria for E-business cited by respondents to the InformationWeek Research survey: improving customer or client satisfaction (cited by 87% of IT and business executives), lowering the cost of promoting products and services (70%), and increasing direct access to customers (68%). (The other two measures were lowering operational costs and adding new customers, cited by 85% and 72%, respectively.) Milacron's Web site may not achieve a quantifiable ROI, but by doing well in these areas, it's advancing the company's strategic goals. "If you treat your E-commerce site like an IT project," says Shaffer, "it's the kiss of death."

    Selling and providing services for customers over the Internet are just two aspects of E-business. Many companies use the Web to make their supply chains more efficient, cut back-office processing costs, and achieve other efficiencies. IT executives and consultants say it's often easier to show a quantifiable return on investment in these areas than more strategic, customer-oriented projects.

    "Clearly, a big part of ROI is shortening cycle times with supply-chain partners, and that has a lot more to do with extranets than with your Web site," says J.G. Sandom, senior partner and director of interactive at marketing firm Ogilvy Interactive Worldwide, whose E-business clients include Ford Motor Co. and GTE's wireless division. "The less you have to deliver by print, phone, and fax, the more money you'll save. It's a great way to show ROI quickly."

    Cutting Calls That's why Philips Lighting Co., the $5 billion lighting products unit of Royal Philips Electronics, expects to see a quick return on its investment in TradeLink, an ordering system that works on the Web for smaller distributors that don't use electronic data interchange. Call-center inquiries regarding inventory or order status account for about half the expense of processing an order. In a pilot test of TradeLink, Philips Lighting found the system reduced customer-service phone calls by 80%. Philips expects big savings as it rolls out TradeLink to 400 distributors by year's end.

    Jim Worth, director of E-commerce at Philips Lighting, in Somerset, N.J., says the best way to guarantee ROI is to start small. "Metrics from small-scale pilots are the best way to go," he says. "Until you have it running right, don't tell anyone about it, because there will always be a lot of people who don't like what you're doing."

    Like Philips Lighting, McKessonHBOC Inc., a $24 billion pharmaceuticals wholesaler in San Francisco, took a traditional approach to ROI when it began developing an E-business system to reduce back-office processing costs in late 1997. The company expects to recoup its $1 million investment in AR Link, a Web bill presentment and payment system, nine to 12 months after rolling it out to most of its large customers later this year, says John Amos, director of financial systems at McKesson. The company expects AR Link to help increase operating margins over the following two years.

    How? In this case, the ROI calculation is straightforward. McKesson handles 4.5 million customer-service calls per year, at an estimated average cost of $2 per call, for a total of $9 million. And 25% of those calls are customers requesting a printed copy of a statement or invoice via mail or fax. McKesson spends $3 each to produce and distribute such documents. By contrast, McKesson's cost for customers to access its accounts-receivable database over the Web via AR Link and print their own statements is about 8 cents. As customer usage of AR Link increases, the system should pay for itself quickly.

    "It's easier to measure ROI from E-business, because the ability to get information is greater," says Amos. "When we measure customer-service calls, we can lose track of the call as it's transferred around. But online, we can track what customers are looking at--invoices, credit memos, billing status." AR Link went live in April and about 60 McKesson customers use it now, including Wal-Mart, which came online last week. Amos expects 9,000 customers to be on the system by year's end.

    McKesson expects to realize an even greater return down the road from the development infrastructure it put in place for AR Link. The company built the Windows NT system with just six people, including developers from Web integrator Proxicom Inc., using JavaScript on the client, Visual Basic Objects and Microsoft Transaction Server for the server, and proprietary security technology. McKesson will use those same tools to build at least two more planned Web systems: Contract/Pricing Link and an ordering system called E Link. That will help cut development time, which McKesson figures costs the company about $170 per hour.

    Like the Bank of Montreal, McKesson leveraged its existing IT infrastructure in developing AR Link by integrating it with the company's existing Oracle8 accounts-receivable database, which it says is the largest in the wholesale business with $2.5 billion in receivables at any given time. The company is also integrating AR Link with its SAP Business Information Warehouse. "We're learning that we can get a better return on our technology if we Web-ify it," says Amos.

    While McKesson's use of ROI metrics are conventional, it illustrates how E-business is becoming more ingrained in the business mainstream. Companies are less likely to jump into an E-business project without doing an ROI study than they were a few years ago, according to Mike Beck, VP at Proxicom, the Web integrator that worked with McKesson. "In the last 12 months, there has been a re-emergence of ROI estimates for these projects, even though the expectations are very low," he says. "But they're often blown away by the actual results."

    What's driving that change in some companies is the realization that customer interaction on the Web produces more hard data about the customer than any other "touch point". "Now that you can measure things so accurately because it's all trackable," says Amos, "you can put savings in terms that the CFO can really understand."

    Cross-Functionality Of course, it's easier to measure the ROI of an E-business application that cuts back-office processing costs than one that improves customer satisfaction. As companies struggle to come up with new metrics that measure the ROI of E-business projects, they must also take into account another key aspect of nearly all E-business initiatives: they're cross-functional. "The investments you need to make all come from different buckets--IT, marketing, customer service, and others," says Scient's Brown. "For each E-business project, it's not just a technology risk. But in many organizations, it's very hard to look at projects--and budgets--holistically."

    United Parcel Service of America Inc. is trying to do just that. It's developing new metrics for its customers to help measure the payoff from E-commerce initiatives that UPS is helping with. "E-commerce cuts across the entire organization, and if we just continue to focus on the person who runs the shipping dock, that's not going to cut it," says Alan Amling, director of E-commerce at UPS, in Atlanta. "We have to look at accounts receivable, order entry, customer service--the whole value proposition. We need new metrics because no company makes a huge investment without monitoring the return at some point."

    In the emerging era of E-business, ROI metrics must be flexible enough to adapt as a company's E-business strategy evolves. And even though the Internet has accelerated the pace of business like never before, E-business metrics need to reflect a long-term view of ROI. "The payoff of E-business could be a long time out," says Brown. "But if you don't do it, you'll never get the payoff at all."


    New Yahoo Service Looks To Improve ROI Of Online Ads
    Yahoo Inc. and Marketing Management Analytics Inc. on Friday launched a service that helps advertisers determine the effectiveness of online ads on sales. The move comes as marketers are under increasing pressure by companies to justify the high cost of advertising, both on and offline. The new service delivers returns on investment by assessing ads on Yahoo and measuring their effectiveness against ads on other media, whether it's on another web site or on television or print. Besides the comparison of marketing campaigns, the service provides recommendations to marketers on how to maximize the effectiveness of their overall spending on advertising. The service would be available at an additional cost. Greg Stuart, president and chief executive of the Interactive Advertising Bureau, said marketers are increasingly under pressure to show chief executives and financial officers that advertising dollars are having a positive affect on sales.
    Antone Gonsalves, "New Yahoo Service Looks To Improve ROI Of Online Ads," InformationWeek, December 16, 2005 --- http://www.internetweek.cmp.com/showArticle.jhtml?sssdmh=dm4.161133&articleId=175004707 


    Implementing a framework for value assessment is the first step in guaranteeing ROI from B2B e-commerce projects. Without one, you risk losing time as well as money. http://www.iemagazine.com/010810/412feat1_1.shtml 


    "Warehouse ROI:  Data warehouses are getting the same scrutiny as other projects, by Rick Whiting, Information Week Online, May 24, 1999 --- http://www.informationweek.com/735/dw.htm 


    "What We Sell Is Between Our Ears," by Michael Hayes, Journal of Accountancy, June 2001, 57-63 --- http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/jun2001/hayes.htm

    TOOLS THAT MAKE IT WORK

    Because the firm’s staff is not housed in the same building, it doesn’t have to worry about networks, but both staff and clients must have high-speed access. “That’s one of the things we’ve had to tell everybody to use. In some cases, we went to cable modem about four years ago,” says Sechler. “Its speed and access were unsurpassed at that time.” In areas where cable is not available, the firm now uses DSL as an alternative.

    Of the accounting packages available as ASPs, Sechler prefers NetLedger (www.netledger.com). Funded by Oracle, it’s “basically a QuickBooks living on the Web,” Sechler says. “My clients and I can look at the accounting at the same time anytime—in some cases while one of our firm’s bookkeepers with access at a different level prepares the monthly activity.”

    A user can set an astonishing number of levels of access. “I can have the treasurer look at everything, or everything except payroll, or write a check but not make deposits. There are many areas where we can make the rules,” Sechler says. “It costs just $10 per user per month to use NetLedger, and there is no charge for the subscribing CPA. I explain to my clients, ‘You can go out and buy a $5,000 software package—or pay $10 a month for this.’ For clients relying on grantor or contribution money, it’s a great opportunity.” An expensive package may have a few more bells and whistles to produce reports automatically, but by exporting data from NetLedger to Excel Sechler can customize reports so clients get what they want.

    “I’ve got clients with board members in many countries. NetLedger’s been a great solution for our clients in Belgium, Budapest, Dublin, Melbourne and London because they don’t have to wait for anything. I can have this moment’s activity sitting in NetLedger when they decide they want to take a look at what’s going on.”

    Sechler also uses Office 2000, SuperForms, QuickBooks and Intuit’s tax package called ProSeries, which QuickBooks talks to (see “Tools You Can Use”). “I can upload and download updates smoothly from the Web with it. The support’s very good, and I like using it. It’s been good to me. It’s one of the few that were really doing a good job in the 990 area, which is for the nonprofits’ tax return—a nonstandard area. Not a lot of packages really support that area well,” she says.

    Tools You Can Use
    NetMeeting
    www.microsoft.com/windows/netmeeting/download/
    Online conferences and collaboration. ASP. Free.
    PlaceWare
    www.placeware.com
    Excellent tool for larger groups, online seminars and conferences. Pricing varies based on size of audience and frequency of use.
    CoWorking
    www.coworking.com
    Updates on telework techniques and collaborative online tools.
    Gil Gordon
    www.gilgordon.com
    The guru of telework has tons of tips and techniques.
    NetLedger
    www.netledger.com
    Accounting ASP. $9.95 per user per month.
    QuickBooks Pro
    www.quickbooks.com
    Accounting software. $90 to $500, depending on user needs.
    Quicken Deluxe
    www.quicken.com
    Personal accounting software. $50.
    ICQ
    www.icq.com
    Instant messaging software for collaboration, communication and file transfer. Free.
    Yahoo groups
    www.yahoo.com
    Discussion groups, list servers, custom-moderated communities. Free.
    uReach
    www.ureach.com
    Unified messaging software, virtual fax and voice mail, file storage. ASP. $4 per month.
    Adobe Acrobat reader
    www.adobe.com
    Reads messages sent in PDF format. Free.

     


    KMPG's eValuation
    "Services Calculate Net ROI Consulting firms update traditional business metrics for Internet" By Chuck Moozakis ---  
    http://www.internetwk.com/lead/lead082400.htm
     

    Calculating Net ROI

    The fledgling oil and gas exchange PetroCosm knew it needed more than the backing of giants Chevron and Texaco to win over customers and suppliers. Even more important was the ability to demonstrate clear financial benefits for participants.

    In the months leading up to its July launch, PetroCosm worked with consulting firm KPMG to develop a return-on-investment (ROI) model that would help potential customers make the case for participating in the exchange.

    PetroCosm used a new KPMG service dubbed eValuation--announced last week--that takes into account traditional ROI variables, such as up-front development costs, as well as more Internet-centric variables, such as the additional sales that can be derived by participating in a wide range of online marketplaces. It also factors in the cross-company ramifications of Internet supply chains and how customers and suppliers can also benefit.

    "We were able to come up with a business case that said this is a profitable business" for both suppliers and PetroCosm's founding members, said PetroCosm controller Rod Starr. "It sounds straightforward enough, but one of the great challenges is that there are no existing models to gauge ROI."

    Armed with results from the ROI study that indicated the type of cost savings prospective members could realize by participating in a B2B exchange, PetroCosm has been able to sell prospective participants on the possibility of trimming anywhere from 5 percent to 20 percent of their procurement costs by joining the marketplace, Starr said. --Chuck Moozakis

    Read the rest: http://www.internetwk.com/lead/lead082400.htm 


     

    KPMG's Business Measurement Process (BMP)

    Auditing Organizations Through a Strategic-Systems Lens by Timothy Bell et al.,-- http://www.cba.uiuc.edu/kpmg-uiuc/monograph.html 
    The Adobe Acrobat version can be downloaded from http://www.cba.uiuc.edu/kpmg-uiuc/monograph.PDF 

    The KPMG Business Measurement Process

    Timothy B. Bell
    Frank O. Marrs
    KPMG LLP

    Ira Solomon
    Howard Thomas
    University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign

    Foreword by William R. Kinney, Jr.

    Copyright 1997
    by KPMG LLP, the U.S. member firm of
    KPMG International, a Swiss association

    Chapter 7 is entitled the Business Measurement Process --- 

    The eight components comprising the client business model are:

    External Forces — political, economic, social, and technological factors, pressures, and forces from outside the entity that threaten the attainment of the entity’s business objectives;

    Markets/Formats — the domains in which the entity may choose to operate, and the design and location of the facilities;

    Strategic Management Process — the process by which the:

    – entity’s mission is developed
    – entity’s business objectives are defined
    – business risks that threaten attainment of the business objecttives are identified
    – business risk management processes are established
    – progress toward meeting business objectives is monitored;

    Core Business Processes — the processes that develop, produce, market, and distribute an entity’s products and services. These processes do not necessarily follow traditional organizational or functional lines, but reflect the interlinkage of related business activities;

    Resource Management Processes — the processes by which resources are acquired, developed, and allocated to the core business activities;

    Alliances — the relationships established by an entity to:

    – attain business objectives
    – expand business opportunities
    – reduce or transfer business risk;

    Core Products and Services — the commodities that the entity brings to the market;

    Customers — the individuals and organizations that purchase the entity’s output.

    Book Review from The CPA Journal, July 1999

    BOOK REVIEW:
    AUDITING ORGANIZATIONS THROUGH A STRATEGIC-SYSTEMS LENS: THE KPMG BUSINESS MEASUREMENT PROCESS

    By Timothy B. Bell, Frank O. Marrs, Ira Solomon, and Howard Thomas

    Reviewed by Hema Rao, DBA, CPA, assistant professor, SUNY Utica/Rome

    This research monograph focuses on KPMG's new risk-based strategic-systems audit approach. The firm believes that its new holistic approach to evaluating client business risk is needed in today's more complex business environment. The new business measurement process (BMP) shifts the auditor's focus from an "accounting lens," or transaction-based approach, to a "strategic-systems lens" approach.

    The Lincoln Savings and Loan (LSL) audit is cited in the monograph as an example of the failure of a transaction-based approach to an audit. In contrast, a BMP audit would consider macro information relevant to the savings and loan industry in assessing audit risk. This would include the weak economic environment, regulatory changes, disputes with a regulator, changes in strategic business practices that allowed the bank to invest in high risk securities, auditor changes, and business risks peculiar to LSL. If she had used this new approach, the LSL auditor might have been more skeptical about the 400­500% overvalued reported land sales.

    The stated purposes of the monograph are to present--

    * "an overview of the theories and trends that create a need for a risk-based strategic-systems audit;

    * a discussion of the systems theory and strategy concepts that underlie the risk-based strategic-systems audit;

    * an overview of some of the business measurement principles, analytical procedures, and tools comprising KPMG's risk-based strategic-systems audit--BMP; and

    * examples that illustrate how BMP might be applied to a retail client."

    The Strategic-Systems Lens. KPMG applies concepts from systems theory and views the client's accounting transactions as an outcome of a complex web of economic and business interrelationships. The auditor's "lens" (mental orientation) to assess audit risk is influenced by the nature of these complex relationships. A broader and more comprehensive focus heightens skepticism in evaluating the economic reasonableness of reported management assertions.

    Knowledge Acquisition Framework

    To gain a comprehensive understanding of the client's business and industry, the auditor should understand the client's systems dynamics. Such a process includes the following:

    * Gaining an understanding of the client's strategic advantage. How does the client create value?

    * Assessing the threats that put the client's attainment of its business objectives at risk.

    * Developing a client business model that will serve as a lens to perceive and judge client assertions. This model is called the "comprehensive decision frame guide."

    * Developing expectations about key assertions embodied in the overall financial statements

    * Comparing reported financial results to expectations and designing additional audit work to address gaps between the two.

    The comprehensive decision frame guides the auditor to apply professional judgment to evaluate the appropriateness of--

    * recorded transactions and

    * assumptions made about the underlying accounting principles in executing nonroutine transactions, making accounting estimates, and valuing recorded assets.

    In the absence of this framework, the professional judgment developed by the auditor to predict the client's ability to continue as a going concern and detect management fraud may be misguided. The differences in the new BMP audit and the traditional audit are explained in the Exhibit.

    The KPMG Business Measurement Process (BMP)

    The audit risk model components--inherent, control, and detection risk--continue to be relevant to the BMP audit process. Under this approach, audit risk assessment is made from the broader perspective of the client rather than from the transaction level alone. The BMP framework analysis is done at five different levels.

    Strategic Analysis. This is intended to provide the auditor with a deep understanding of the industry and global environment in which the client organization operates. The analysis includes assessing business risks that affect financial statement assertions due to threats to the client from competition within its industry and the adequacy of the client's response to these risks.

    Business Process Analysis. At the second level, the auditor uses a "value chain" approach to study the client's core business processes and total quality management used for creating value in the eyes of customers and resulting in profitable sales. The auditor evaluates methods and systems used by the organization in conducting its business using eight dimensions: process objectives, inputs, activities, outputs, systems, classes of transactions, risks that threaten objectives, and other symptoms of poor performance. The auditor develops an understanding of the client's financial and nonfinancial performance measures and determines the gaps that exist between the client's processes and those of its direct competitors. Such measures may be used as corroborative evidence in assisting the auditor support expectations about financial statement assertions.

    Risk Assessment. At the third level, the auditor gains an understanding of the client's risk monitoring and management processes, both internal and external. With this understanding, the auditor can decide if the client has identified all aspects of business risk, prioritized them appropriately, established controls to reduce the risk to acceptable levels, and made accounting choices and disclosures in the financial statements that address any uncontrolled risks.

    Business Measurement. At the fourth level, the auditor measures business processes and variables that have the greatest impact on the client's business. The auditor analyzes the client's financial and nonfinancial performance and measures both over time and against the competition. Additional audit work is done on financial statement assertions inconsistent with the auditor's understanding of the client's strategic systems analysis.

    Continuous Improvement. The final phase allows the auditor to provide the client with valuable feedback for continuous improvement. The auditor reports on client gaps in process and financial performance measures based on standardized targets and competitor measures. Client reaction to these types of diagnostic business assurance is valuable information in assessing audit risk.

    Improved Analytical Procedures

    In external auditing, any significant deviations found in comparisons of auditor expectations of client business performance and financial position with financial statement assertions are evaluated in assessing audit risk. In traditional audits, these expectations are tested based on details of client accounting transaction samples. This reductionist process may lead to a potential bias in auditor judgment in favor of judging management assertions as being appropriate.

    KPMG's complex business process­oriented analytical procedures (which develop financial and nonfinancial expectations regarding every business activity of the audit client) may explain any uncontrolled business risks that resulted in these deviations by looking beyond the client's accounting system. This new comprehensive approach also allows the BMP auditor to comply more effectively with the requirements of SAS No. 82, Consideration of Fraud in a Financial Statement Audit, since diagnosing the problem improves under this holistic approach to the audit.

    Conventional Auditing Still in Use

    The BMP audit model retains much of existing conventional auditing. The strategic systems auditor will continue to use the audit risk model, allocate audit work on the basis of risk assessment, and for the most part use conventional audit procedures. However, the BMP auditor will use a higher level of knowledge base that combines traditional auditing with systems theory and business strategy to come up with audit expectations. The auditor understands the unexpected deviations from expectations from a more comprehensive analysis of the client's external and internal business environments and views the client's business and other processes as part of a larger system. Audit risk evaluation becomes more appropriate from this judgment plane.

    In the opinion of this reviewer, current and future audit practitioners will benefit from the BMP enhancements explained in this monograph. Classroom use of this technical, yet easy to understand and well illustrated, audit approach will provide good training for future generations of auditors. *

     

    http://www.kpmg.ie/audit/bmp.htm 


    e-Business and e-Commerce Managerial Accounting, Revenue Forecast

    Every now and then I call your attention to the wonderful (almost free) service called The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educator's Review.  I say "almost free" because users do have to subscribe to the electronic version of the WSJ, but any accounting, finance, or business educator who does not subscribe will miss boatloads of helpers for their students.  There are similar reviews for other business disciplines other than accounting.  Educators interested in subscribing should contact wsjeducatorsreviews@dowjones.com 

    The item that I am going to quote here appears in the Fall 2001 edition.

    TITLE: Heard on the Street: ComScore Aims For Better Data On Net Retailers 
    REPORTER: Nick Wingfield DATE: Aug 31, 2001 PAGE: C1, 2 LINK: 
    http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB999219884208643973.djm
      

    TOPICS: 
    Managerial Accounting, Revenue Forecast

    SUMMARY: 
    Wingfield relates the art of sales forecasting for e-commerce firms. In particular, the story tells of the efforts of ComScore Networks to provide early indications of sales trends for online retailers with greater detail than was previously available. ComScore, like other prognostication firms, monitors the habits of Internet users, in their case, 1.5 million of them. ComScore surveys a sample of the Internet users to divine a percentage of sales estimate. Other firms use similar technology to that used by ComScore, but ComScore follows many more users than does its competitors and its competitors merely estimate Web traffic rather than provide revenue forecasts.

    QUESTIONS: 
    1.) The article mentions "metrics that require multiple leaps of faith" in describing predicting revenues for Web-based firms. What are some of these metrics? Why do these measures seem to be such poor indicators of performance?

    2.) Re-read the Weber article about "stickiness" and relate it to the "tabulation of Web-page hits" mentioned in the Wingfield article. How good is the "correlation between increases in traffic and increases in sales?"

    3.) Why might some of the metrics previously used by these forecasting firms be more useful for advertising-supported sites compared to Web-based retailers?

    Reviewed By: 
    Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island 
    Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University 
    Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    This is just one of several "cases" in the Fall 2001 edition of The Wall Street Journal Accounting Educator's Review.


    Pro-Forma Earnings (Electronic Commerce, e-Commerce, eCommerce)

    From the Wall Street Journal's Accounting Educators' Reviews, October 4, 2001
    Educators interested in receiving these excellent reviews (on a variety of topics in addition to accounting) must firs subscribe to the electronic version of the WSJ and then go to http://209.25.240.94/educators_reviews/index.cfm 

    Sample from the October 4 Edition:

    TITLE: Sales Slump Could Derail Amazon's Profit Pledge 
    REPORTER: Nick Wingfield 
    DATE: Oct 01, 2001 
    PAGE: B1 
    LINK: http://interactive.wsj.com/archive/retrieve.cgi?id=SB1001881764244171560.djm  
    TOPICS: Accounting, Creative Accounting, Earnings Management, Financial Analysis, Net Income, Net Profit

    SUMMARY: Earlier this year Amazon promised analysts that it will report first-ever operating pro forma operating profit. However, Amazon is not commenting on whether it still expects to report a fourth-quarter profit this year. Questions focus on profit measures and accounting decisions that may enable Amazon to show a profit.

    QUESTIONS: 

    1.) What expenses are excluded from pro forma operating profits? Why are these expenses excluded? Are these expenses excluded from financial statements prepared in accordance with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles?

    2.) List three likely consequences of Amazon not reporting a pro forma operating profit in the fourth quarter. Do you think that Amazon feels pressure to report a pro forma operating profit? Why do analysts believe that reporting a fourth quarter profit is important for Amazon?

    3.) List three accounting choices that Amazon could make to increase the likelihood of reporting a pro forma operating profit. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making accounting choices that will allow Amazon to report a pro forma operating profit.

    SMALL GROUP ASSIGNMENT: Assume that you are the accounting department for Amazon and preliminary analysis suggest that Amazon will not report a pro forma operating profit for the fourth quarter. The CEO has asked you to make sure that the company meets its financial reporting objectives. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of making adjustments to the financial statements. What adjustments, if any, would you make? Why?

    Reviewed 

    By: Judy Beckman, University of Rhode Island Reviewed 
    By: Benson Wier, Virginia Commonwealth University Reviewed 
    By: Kimberly Dunn, Florida Atlantic University

    Bob Jensen's threads on electronic commerce are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/ecommerce.htm 



    "Enterprises Tailor ROI To E-Business:   Strategies for tracking success of e-biz investment vary by company, industry,"  By Chuck Moozakis and David Lewis, InformationWeek Online, December 18, 2000 ---
    http://www.internetweek.com/lead/lead121800.htm 

    For many companies, return on investment is a clear way to determine whether they're earning a profit on their technology investment. But when it comes to calculating online ROI, there are almost as many paths to take as there are companies doing business on the Internet. And in the coming year, the picture may get cloudier as more companies than ever struggle to get their arms around this critical business measurement.

    E-businesses that use ROI can be divided into three main categories: those that develop their own measurement practices; those that use off-the-shelf ROI products; and those that hire consultants to develop a custom ROI measurement. Several companies, ranging from Big Five consulting firms to Gartner Group and Hurwitz Group, as well as vendors, including Comdisco and Nortel Networks, offer ROI measurement products or services.

    Early adopters of ROI--regardless of their approach--are getting measurable results from their ROI initiatives today and charting a path that others can follow.

    Ryder System Inc., a trucking and transportation company, is actually using Web-oriented ROI to help establish business priorities. The company last month rolled out a product developed with consulting help from IBM E-Business Services. The tool, dubbed Return on Web Investment (ROWI), was fashioned "to quickly assess and prioritize e-business initiatives that may come up," explains John Wormwood, group director of e-commerce.

    "We knew that traditional cycles for planning--where a request for funding might take several months to get into place--wouldn't work, so we put together ROWI. This is a framework that lets us evaluate Web opportunities," Wormwood says.


    Some Retailers De-Emphasize Web Payback By David Lewis, InternetWeek, October 19, 2000 --- http://www.internetweek.com/lead/lead101900.htm 

    Although most e-retailers are tracking their return on online investment, a large minority of these e-businesses are taking a contrarian approach. They've rejected ROI, at least temporarily, in favor of a "path-to-profitability" approach that emphasizes planning and patience.

    About one-third of 50 e-retailers responding to a recent survey said they are pursuing online strategies that give them as long as two years before they'll shift focus to profit-oriented metrics such as ROI. The survey was conducted by Hackett Benchmarking & Research and IBM Global Services. Respondents included pure dotcoms as well as "bricks-and-clicks" companies with online retail operations; participants' total annual sales ranged from about $100 million to $8 billion.

    Return on investment, usually defined as the ratio of net income to invested capital, is a widely used operating efficiency measure.

    But will "planning and patience" pay the bills?


    "Rethinking ROI," InformationWeek Online, May 24, 1999 --- http://www.informationweek.com/735/roi.htm

    Evaluating the potential return on an IT investment can be fairly straightforward--at least in theory. If a CIO shows that a new system will cut costs and pay for itself after a couple of years, or that it will significantly improve efficiency at a reasonable price, business executives usually give the green light. This is especially true of tactical projects, such as applications that cut order-processing costs. But in other cases, IT initiatives have become so important that companies are either not evaluating ROI or they're looking to develop new ways to measure ROI to take into account a project's strategic value. In this issue, InformationWeek examines how companies are addressing ROI in four areas:

    Electronic business: A sense of urgency is forcing many companies to push ahead with projects without considering ROI. CEOs are less concerned about a dollar return than with enhancing the company's competitive edge, creating a marketing channel, or improving customer satisfaction. Less-strategic initiatives are still subject to stringent ROI calculations, and some companies are beginning to develop new metrics to help them assess the value of all of their E-business projects (see "E-Business: Strategic Investment").

    Enterprise resource planning: Many high-priced implementations have escaped the harsh scrutiny of company accountants because the software was needed to replace legacy systems that weren't year 2000 compliant. With Y2K issues nearly resolved, companies are looking at the ROI of their ERP projects and finding that the complexity of the systems and the need for employee training often leads to a negative return over the first five years (see "Making ERP Add Up").

    Intranets: Many applications are so inexpensive to develop and deploy that companies often assume they'll get a return on their investments--or they justify these relatively small investments by pointing to intangibles, such as improved employee morale from having easy access to their human resources and 401(k) records, better workforce collaboration, and quicker time to market (see "Intranet ROI: Leap Of Faith").

    Data warehouses: While they can provide information that leads to reduced costs and higher sales, it's hard to attach a dollar value to the gains data warehouses offer because other processes must be improved to get the benefits. Companies continue to introduce strategic data warehouses--such as those that can identify their most profitable customers--without calculating their potential ROI, but many are looking for a hard-dollar return on data warehouses that help improve operational efficiency (see "Warehouse ROI").

    Regardless of the type of IT project, it's clear that as technology becomes more central to a company's ability to compete, IT and business executives are being forced to rethink their traditional approach to ROI.


    Investing in E-Commerce and other technologies poses huge problems for business decision makers, because the popular investment criteria such as Return on Investment (ROI) are so difficult to compute and there are so many uncertainties about both investments and returns.  These topics make interesting case studies in both managerial accounting and accounting information systems courses.  Two articles of interest are as follows:

    "E-Commerce: New Sense of Urgency Companies Rush For Online Market Share Flurry of multimillion-dollar deals signals new effort to be competitive in E-commerce," by Clinton Wilder in Information Week, May 24, 1999, 48-56.

    "Rethinking ROI Some projects have become so important that companies are looking for new ways to measure their return on investment--or are dispensing wtih ROI studies completely," by Tom Stein in Information Week, May 24, 1999, 59-68.

    Both articles deal with problems of ROI as a criterion for investment decisions and performance evaluation.  The online versions of these articles can be found at http://www.informationweek.com/maindocs/index_735.htm

    One of our accounting educator experts on such matters is Amy Ray (formerly with the University of Tennessee).  Since joining UT, she has received a grant to participate as part of an external review team for Allen Bradley (1992) and is currently a member of a UT team awarded an NSF grant to conduct a joint study with Eastman Chemical.   See http://funnelweb.utcc.utk.edu/~scrusenb/ut_acct/faculty/gatian.html

    Companies under fire to get e-commerce systems up and running are finding it takes more than ROI to measure success --- http://www.pcweek.com/a/pcwt0001131/2416552 

    For a sample, you may want to look at e-Business Basics at http://www.darwinmagazine.com/learn/ebusiness/basics.html

    Have all companies jumped on the e-business bandwagon? Not yet. PricewaterhouseCoopers and The Conference Board found that 70 percent of the global companies they surveyed derive less than 5 percent of their revenues from e-business. Several factors have kept some companies surveyed from rolling out e-business initiatives, including the following: potentially high and uncertain implementation costs; lack of demonstrated ROI within their industry; concern about tax, legal, and privacy issues related to e-business; and scant use of the internet among their customers.

    Managing in economic hard times requires good communications, refocusing on short-term ROI and the ability to change direction quickly. http://cgi.zdnet.com/slink?141834:2700840 

    Enterprise information portals from Epicentric, iPlanet, Plumtree and Viador deliver more than just data--they also provide a good ROI for companies that can afford them. http://cgi.zdnet.com/slink?141406:2700840 

    Bob Jensen's threads on ROI are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm 


    InternetWeek is running a poll on how to measure electronic business success.

    Reader Poll What is the main way you currently measure the success of your e-business initiatives? 

    To participate in the poll, go to http://www.internetweek.com/question01/quest091401.htm 


    From Internet Week news on October 1, 2001

    ROI: Little More Than Lip Service

    Ever since the dotcom bust and economic slowdown, IT organizations have latched on to all manner of "ROI" metrics to justify their technology investments.

    But whether they're really calculating return on investment is suspect. New research and anecdotal evidence suggest that managers may be fudging the numbers--or at least evaluating their projects less than rigorously.

    A new InternetWeek survey indicates a striking disconnect between what businesses say about their ROI studies and their actual e-business results. Some 82 percent of 1,000 managers surveyed by InternetWeek said they expect their company's overall "e-business operations" to be profitable in 2001. Yet only 34 percent said their company had developed an ROI model to measure the success of those operations. --David Lewis and Mike Koller

    Read on: http://update.internetweek.com/cgi-bin4/flo?y=eEbG0Bdl6n0V30SpZ0Aj 


    E-COMMERCE AND AUDITING FAIR VALUES SUBJECTS OF NEW INTERNATIONAL GUIDANCE The International Federation of Accountants (IFAC) invites comments on two new exposure drafts (EDs): Auditing Fair Value Measurements and Disclosures and Electronic Commerce: Using the Internet or Other Public Networks - Effect on the Audit of Financial Statements. Comments on both EDs, developed by IFAC's International Auditing Practices Committee (IAPC), are due by January 15, 2002. See http://accountingeducation.com/news/news2213.html  

    The IFAC link is at http://www.ifac.org/Guidance/EXD-Download.tmpl?PubID=1003772692151 

    The purpose of this International Standard on Auditing (ISA) is to establish standards and provide guidance on auditing fair value measurements and disclosures contained in financial statements. In particular, this ISA addresses audit considerations relating to the valuation, measurement, presentation and disclosure for material assets, liabilities and specific components of equity presented or disclosed at fair value in financial statements. Fair value measurements of assets, liabilities and components of equity may arise from both the initial recording of transactions and later changes in value.

     
    Download
    "Auditing Fair Value Measurements And Disclosures"
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    From Information Week Between the LInes on February 5, 2002

    Business Technology: ROI Mania Is Upon Us

    Business as usual? What does that mean anymore? In this rigid, scrutinize-every-expense-till-it-screams climate, it would hardly be surprising to hear that a software entrepreneur is beta testing an application that measures the ROI of ROI analyses while playing Elvis Costello's "Watching The Detectives" in the background.

    Companies must need such a tool, because ROI mania has seized the business world in a headlock, and a smackdown and quick pin are, by all accounts, imminent.

    "This ROI analysis for the proposed CRM project should be interesting--I'm really excited about heading up the project."

    "Wait a minute--did you get it approved?"

    "No, the CRM project hasn't been approved. That's the point--our ROI analysis is going to help us make the decision on whether it should be."

    "You're not listening: Forget about the CRM project; have you gotten approval for starting your ROI analysis?"

    "You're scaring me. What the hell are you talking about?"

    "OK, lemme slow down a little. You're on the company E-mail system, right?"

    "Very funny."

    "Then you must have received the memo late last week from the CFO about ROI projects, right?"

    "It's in my in-box, but it's pretty massive, so I didn't read it. So what?"

    "Well, Einstein, her royal CFOness says that in the interest of increasing shareholder equity and focusing our resources on only those projects that improve our bottom line, no new ROI analyses can be started without first getting her approval on whether the time and resources spent on doing that analysis will provide an appropriate return."

    [Blank stare.]

    "I'm not kidding. See, what she said was, ever since the cafeteria found as a result of its mandatory ROI analysis of how it prepares food that boiled all-goat hot dogs are more profitable to the company than grilled all-beef hot dogs, and as a further result switched to the all-goat boiled variety, our emergency-room medical claims have skyrocketed and sick leave has doubled."

    "And I'm not so happy about the 'special composite protein deli sandwich' five days a week, either, even if it's only $4.95."

    "Yeah, whatever. The point, pinhead, is unintended consequences."

    [Silence.]

    "Un-in-tend-ed con-se-quen-ces."

    "You mean like when that NFL kicker made a field goal and jumped up and down to celebrate but tore a ligament in his knee while he was doing it?"

    "Yeah, well, something like that. See, let me speak your language: It's like that arcade game, Whack A Mole: When you hammer one problem down, it triggers another one to pop up, and by solving one you might really not have made any progress because you've just unleashed another."

    "So we're not allowed to play Whack A Mole at lunchtime anymore?"

    [Sigh.] "Earth to knucklehead: This is why the CFO says we can't do any ROI analyses unless we've completed and received her sign- off on the ROI of that ROI analysis."

    "But what about the CRM project?"

    "Listen, you gotta stop thinking small or you're not going to get anywhere around here. Focus, my dippy friend, focus: The CRM project is the tail, and the ROI analysis of the CRM project is the dog, but the ROI measure of the ROI analysis of the CRM project is the owner of the dog, and she holds the leash."

    "Well, why didn't you say so in the first place? So instead of just doing the approved $7 million, 12-month ROI analysis of the $5 million, eight-month CRM project, I should first get approval for, say, just a cool $1 million to do an eight-week ROI justification of the CRM-ROI analysis? Now, that makes sense--it only pushes the CRM project out 14 months, which the vendor says is average for our industry."

    "Rockefeller, I do believe you've got it." 

    Bob Evans is editor- in-chief of InformationWeek. E-mail him at mailto:bevans@cmp.com  Join in on the discussion at: http://update.informationweek.com/cgi-bin4/flo?y=eFuZ0BcUEY0V10NvU0Am 

     

     


    Fair Value and Fair Value Hedges

    Fair Value =

    the estimated best disposal (exit, liquidation) value in any sale other than a forced sale.  It is defined as follows in Paragraph 540 on Page 243 of FAS 133:

    The amount at which an asset (liability) could be bought (incurred) or sold (settled) in a current transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced or liquidation sale. Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement, if available. If a quoted market price is available, the fair value is the product of the number of trading units times that market price. If a quoted market price is not available, the estimate of fair value should be based on the best information available in the circumstances. The estimate of fair value should consider prices for similar assets or similar liabilities and the results of valuation techniques to the extent available in the circumstances. Examples of valuation techniques include the present value of estimated expected future cash flows using discount rates commensurate with the risks involved, option- pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted spread models, and fundamental analysis.  Valuation techniques for measuring assets and liabilities should be consistent with the objective of measuring fair value. Those techniques should incorporate assumptions that market participants would use in their estimates of values, future revenues, and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates, default, prepayment, and volatility. In measuring forward contracts, such as foreign currency forward contracts, at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows, an entity should base the estimate of future cash flows on the changes in the forward rate (rather than the spot rate). In measuring financial liabilities and nonfinancial derivatives that are liabilities at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows (or equivalent outflows of other assets), an objective is to use discount rates at which those liabilities could be settled in an arm's-length transaction.

    The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) requires estimation of fair value for many types of financial instruments, including derivative financial instruments. The main guidelines are spelled out in SFAS 107 and FAS 133 Appendix F Paragraph 540.  If a range is estimated for either the amount or the timing of possible cash flows, the likelihood of possible outcomes shall be considered in determining the best estimate of future cash flows according to FAS 133 Paragraph 17.  For related matters under international standards, see IAS 39 Paragraphs 1,5,6, 95-100, and 165.  According to the FASB, fair value is the amount at which an asset (liability) could be bought (incurred) or sold (settled) in a current transaction between willing parties, that is, other than in a forced or liquidation sale. Quoted market prices in active markets are the best evidence of fair value and should be used as the basis for the measurement, if available. If a quoted market price is available, the fair value is the product of the number of trading units times that market price. 

    One of the best documents the FASB generated for FAS 133 implementation is called "summary of Derivative Types."  This document also explains how to value certain types.  It can be downloaded free from at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivsum.exe 


    April 5, 2005 message from Dennis Beresford [dberesfo@TERRY.UGA.EDU]

    The SEC recently released an interesting memo from its Office of Economic Analysis to the Chief Accountant on economic valuation of stock options. It is available at: http://www.sec.gov/interps/account/secoeamemo032905.pdf 

    The memo concludes that valuing employee stock options under new FASB Statement 123R is "not unusual" and is quite similar to valuations done in other areas of accounting and finance. This seems to deflate the arguments of some within the business community who continue to assert that employee stock options are too hard to value. The memo footnotes several academic studies from both accounting and finance scholars in supporting its findings.

    Denny Beresford

    Bob Jensen's threads on employee stock options are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/theory/sfas123/jensen01.htm
    Bob Jensen's threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm


    Damodaran Online: A Great Sharing Site from a Finance Professor at New York University and Textbook Writer --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    This site has great sections on corporate finance, investments, valuation, spreadsheets, research, etc. For example, take a look at the helpers on valuation --- http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/%7Eadamodar/

    You can pick the valuation approach that you would like to go to, to see illustrations, solutions and other supporting material.

       
      Discounted Cashflow Valuation
      Relative Valuation
      Option Pricing Approaches to Valuation
      Acquisition Valuation
      EVA, CFROI and other Value Enhancement Strategies

     

    Or you can pick the material that you are interested in.

           
    Spreadsheets Overheads Datasets References
    Problems & Solutions Derivations and Discussion Valuation Examples PowerPoint presentations

    Jim Mahar's finance sharing site (especially note his great blog link) --- http://financeprofessor.com/

    Financial Rounds from an anonymous finance professor --- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    Bob Jensen's threads on valuation are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    Bob Jensen's finance and investment helpers are at http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/Bookbob1.htm


    There are some exceptions for hybrid instruments as discussed in  IAS 39  Paragraph 23c and FAS 133  Paragraph 12b.  There are also exceptions where value estimates are unreliable such as in the case of unlisted equity securities (see IAS 39 Paragraphs 69, 93, and 95).   

    If an item is viewed as a financial instrument rather than inventory, the accounting becomes more complicated under SFAS 115.  Traders in financial instruments adjust such instruments to fair value with all changes in value passing through current earnings.  Business firms who are not deemed to be traders must designate the instrument as either available-for-sale (AFS) or hold-to-maturity (HTM).  A HTM instrument is maintained at original cost.  An AFS financial instrument must be marked-to-market, but the changes in value pass through OCI rather than current earnings until the instrument is actually sold or otherwise expires.   

    Under international standards, the IASC requires fair value adjustments for most financial instruments. This has led to strong reaction from businesses around the world, especially banks. There are now two major working group documents taking sides for and against fair value accounting for all financial instruments. 
    Go to http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm 

    Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=100107225&sc={D41D74AC-7D6C-11D5-BE63-003048110251}&n=3288 

    IAS 39
    All debt securities, equity securities, and other financial assets that are not held for trading but nonetheless are available for sale – except those unquoted equity securities whose fair value cannot be measured reliably by another means are measured at cost subject to an impairment test.

    SFAF 133
    All debt securities, equity securities, and other financial assets that are not held for trading but nonetheless are available for sale – except all unquoted equity securities are measured at cost subject to an impairment test.

    FASB requires fair value measurement for all derivatives, including those linked to unquoted equity instruments if they are to be settled in cash but not those to be settled by delivery, which are outside the scope of 133

     

    Paragraph 28 beginning on Page 18 of FAS 133 requires that the hedge be formally documented from the start such that prior contracts such as options or futures contracts cannot later be declared hedges. Under international accounting rules, a hedged item can be a recognized asset or liability, an unrecognized firm commitment, or a forecasted transaction (IAS 39  Paragraph 127). 

    If quoted market prices are not available, the estimate of fair value should be based on the best information available in the circumstances. The estimate of fair value should consider prices for similar assets and liabilities and the results of valuation techniques to the extent available in the circumstances. Examples of valuation techniques include the present value of estimated expected future cash flows using a discount rate commensurate with the risks involved, option-pricing models, matrix pricing, option-adjusted spread models, and fundamental analysis. Valuation techniques for measuring assets and liabilities should be consistent with the objective of measuring fair value. Those techniques should incorporate assumptions that market participants would use in their estimates of values, future revenues, and future expenses, including assumptions about interest rates, default, prepayment, and volatility.

    Under IAS 39 Paragraph 100, under circumstances when a quoted market price is not available, estimation techniques may be used --- which include reference to the current market value of another instrument that is substantially the same, discounted cash flow analysis, and option pricing models.  When an enterprise has matching asset and liability positions, it may use mid-market prices according to IAS 39 Paragraph 99.

    In reality, the FASB in FAS 133 and the IASC in IAS 39 require continual adjustments of financial instruments derivatives to fair value without giving much guidance about such matters when the instruments are not traded on exchange markets or are traded in markets that are too thin to rely upon for value estimation.  Unfortunately, over half of the financial instruments derivative contracts around the world are customized contracts for which there are no markets for valuation estimation purposes.  The most difficult instruments to value are forward contracts and interest rate and foreign currency swaps.  In my Working Paper 231 I discuss various approaches for valuation of interest rate swaps. 

    The fair value of foreign currency forward contracts should be based on the change in the forward rate and should consider the time value of money. In measuring liabilities at fair value by discounting estimated future cash flows, an objective is to use discount rates at which those liabilities could be settled in an arm's-length transaction. Although the FASB  does not give very explicit guidance on estimation of a derivative’s fair market value, this topic appears at many points in FAS 133. See Paragraphs 312-319 and 432-457.See blockage factor and yield curve.

    Paragraphs 216 on Page 122 and 220-231 beginning on Page 123 of FAS 133 leave little doubt that the FASB feels "fair value is the most relevant measure for financial instrument and the only relevant measure for derivative instruments."  This can be disputed, especially when unrealized gains and value hide operating losses. The December 1998 issue of the Journal of Accountancy provides an interesting contrast on fair value accounting.  On Pages 12-13 you will find a speech by SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt bemoaning the increasingly common practice of auditors to allow earnings management.  On Page 20 you will find a review of an Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals case in which a firm prevented the reporting of net losses for 1988 and 1989 by persuading its auditor to allow reclassification of a large a large hotel as being "for sale" so that it could revalue historical cost book value to current exit value and record the gain as current income.  Back issues of the Journal of Accountancy are now online at http://www.aicpa.org/pubs/jofa/joaiss.htm .

    The FASB intends eventually to book all financial instruments at fair value. Jim Leisingring comments about " first shot in a religious war" in my tape31.htm. The IASC also is moving closer and closer to fair value accounting for all financial instruments for virtually all nations, although it too is taking that big step in stages.  Click here to view Paul Pacter's commentary on this matter.

    See DIG Issue B6 under embedded derivatives.

    At the moment, accounting standards dictate fair value accounting for derivative financial instruments but not all financial instruments.  However, the entire state of fair value accounting is in a state of change at the moment with respect to both U.S. and international accounting standards.

    If a purchased item is viewed as an inventory holding, the basis of accounting is the lower of cost or market for most firms unless they are classified as securities dealers.  In other words, the inventory balance on the balance sheet does not rise if expected net realization rises above cost, but this balance is written down if the expected net realization falls below cost.  The one exception, where inventory balances are marked-to-market for upside and well as downside price movements, arises when the item in inventory qualifies as a "precious" commodity (such as gold or platinum) having a readily-determinable market value.    Such commodities as pork bellies, corn, copper, and crude oil, are not "precious" commodities and must be maintained in inventory at lower-of-cost-or market. 

    If an item is viewed as a financial instrument rather than inventory, the accounting becomes more complicated under SFAS 115. Traders in financial instruments adjust such instruments to fair value with all changes in value passing through current earnings. Business firms who are not deemed to be traders must designate the instrument as either available-for-sale (AFS) or hold-to-maturity (HTM). A HTM instrument is maintained at original cost. An AFS financial instrument must be marked-to-market, but the changes in value pass through OCI rather than current earnings until the instrument is actually sold or otherwise expires. Under international standards, the IASC requires fair value adjustments for most financial instruments. This has led to strong reaction from businesses around the world, especially banks. There are now two major working group documents taking sides for and against fair value accounting for all financial instruments. 
    Go to http://www.iasc.org.uk/frame/cen3_112.htm 

    • Financial Instruments: Issues Relating to Banks (strongly argues for fair value adjustments of financial instruments). The issue date is August 31, 1999.
      Trinity University students may view this paper at J:\courses\acct5341\iasc\jwgbaaug.pdf.  

    • Accounting for financial Instruments for Banks (concludes that a modified form of historical cost is optimal for bank accounting). The issue date is October 4, 1999.
      Trinity University students may view this paper at J:\courses\acct5341\iasc\jwgfinal.pdf 

     

    On December 14, 1999 the FASB issued Exposure Draft 204-B entitled Reporting Financial Instruments and Certain Related Assets and Liabilities at Fair Value.  See http://accounting.rutgers.edu//raw/fasb/project/fairvalue.html 
    (Trinity University students can find the document at J:\courses\acct5341\fasb\pvfvalu1.doc ).

     

    Dear Jamshed XXXXX

    First, it would seem that KPMG is correct pursuant to Paragraph 74 of IAS 39.

    FAS 133 is silent on this matter, although the IAS 39 Paragraph 74 rules are, in my viewpoint, consistent with US GAAP in general. My former student, Paul Pacter, authored IAS 39 and helped author FAS 133. He does not mention that Paragraph 74 of IAS 39 as a point where FAS 133 differs. You can read his summary of where there are differences between Ias 39 versus FAS 133 at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=100107225&sc={D41D74AC-7D6C-11D5-BE63-003048110251}&n=3288 

    An implicit rate of interest is commonly used as a surrogate adjustment for fair value since face value of a non-interest bearing receivable includes implicit interest.  See http://lcb1.uoregon.edu/sneed/Ch7.pdf 
    In practice, US GAAP allows firms to ignore implicit interest adjustments to receivables due within one year unless such adjustments are deemed material in amount.  Your past-due receivables probably extend beyond one year and implicit interest is probably material in amount.

    One of my favorite documents showing implicit interest calculations in receivables is http://focusedmanagement.com/focus_magazine/back_issues/issue_02/pages/qhg.htm 

    Hope this helps.

    Bob Jensen

    -----Original Message----- 
    From: XXXXX
    Sent: Friday, July 20, 2001 11:59 PM 
    To: rjensen@trinity.edu 
    Subject: IAS 39 vs. FAS 133

    Dear Bob 
    I've been surfing your website and find it most useful and helpful.

    I wonder if you can help me with a relatively simple issue with these standards.

    I work for a public quoted company in YYYYY, Oman (Persian Gulf) and are required to follow IAS39 for local statutory reporting. Our parent company is American and naturally requires us to follow FAS 133, not IAS39. We do not have any hedges or derivatives and to that extent the above standards do not apply.

    However, we do have accounts receivable (A/R) which are significant, approx. 65% of the total capital employed. About 40% of these A/R are overdue. KPMG our auditors insist that these A/R must be shown at "fair value " on the balance sheet date as per IAS39. They require that... on the overdue debt we must calculate "imputed interest" and reduce the carrying value of the A/R by that extent by charging the difference to the income statement. This is done by estimating the date on which the debt is expected to be recovered and the taking the simple interest on the period from the BS date to the expected repayment date. Example: Overdue debt on Dec 31, 2000 is USD 1,000. Expected date of repayment : June 30, 2001 Overdue period : 180 days Simple interest rate : 10 pct

    Therefore imputed interest: USD 1000 x 180/360 x 10 % = $ 50.

    Question for you Bob : Is imputed interest allowed under FAS 133? I shall be most grateful if you would share with me your views

    If you have any queries please contact me

    Best regards

    Jamshed XXXXX

     

    Fair Value Hedge =

    a hedge that bases its periodic settlements on changes in value of an asset or liability. This type of hedge is most often used for forecasted purchases or sales. See FAS 133 Paragraphs 20-27,104-110, 111-120, 186, 191-193, 199, 362-370, 422-425, 431-457, and 489-491. The FASB intends to incrementally move towards fair value accounting for all financial instruments, but the FASB feels that it is too much of a shock for constituents to abruptly shift to fair value accounting for all such instruments.  See Paragraph 247 on Page 132, Paragraph 331 on Page 159, Paragraph 335 on Page 160, and Paragraph 321 on Page 156.  The IASC adopted the same definition of a fair value hedge except that the hedge has also to affect reported net income (See IAS 39 Paragraph 137a)

    Held-to-maturity securities may not be hedged for fair value risk according to Paragraphs 426-431 beginning on Page 190 of FAS 133.  See held-to-maturity.

    In FAS 133, derivative financial instruments come in three basic types that are listed in Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133.  One of these types is described in Section a and Footnote 2 below:

    Paragraph 4 on Page 2 of FAS 133.
    This Statement standardizes the accounting for derivative instruments, including certain derivative instruments embedded in other contracts, by requiring that an entity recognize those items as assets or liabilities in the statement of financial position and measure them at fair value. If certain conditions are met, an entity may elect to designate a derivative instrument as follows:

    a.
    A hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognized asset or liability, or of an unrecognized firm commitment, \2/ that are attributable to a particular risk (referred to as a fair value hedge)
    ==========================================================================
    Footnote 2
    \2/ An unrecognized firm commitment can be viewed as an executory contract that represents both a right and an obligation. When a previously unrecognized firm commitment that is designated as a hedged item is accounted for in accordance with this Statement, an asset or a liability is recognized and reported in the statement of financial position related to the recognition of the gain or loss on the firm commitment. Consequently, subsequent references to an asset or a liability in this Statement include a firm commitment.
    ==========================================================================

    With respect to Section a above, a firm commitment cannot have a cash flow risk exposure because the gain or loss is already booked.  For example, a contract of 10,000 units per month at $200 per unit is unrecognized and has a cash flow risk exposure if the payments have not been made. If the payments have been prepaid, that prepayment is "recognized" and has no further cash flow risk exposure. The booked firm commitment, however, can have a fair value risk exposure.

    Generally assets and liabilities must be carried on the books at cost (or not be carried at all as unrecognized firm commitments) in order to host fair value hedges.  The hedged item may not be revalued according to Paragraph 21c on Page 14 of SFAS 113.  However, since GAAP prescribes lower-of-cost-or market write downs (LCM) for certain types of assets such as inventories and receivables, it makes little sense if LCM assets cannot also host fair value hedges. Paragraph 336 on Page 160 does not discuss LCM.  It is worth noting, however, that Paragraph 336 on Page 160 does not support fair value adjustments of hedged items at the inception of a hedge.

    The hedging instrument (e.g., a forecasted transaction or firm commitment) must meet the stringent criteria for being defined as a derivative financial instrument under FAS 133.   This includes the tests for being clearly-and-closely related.  It also includes strict tests of Paragraphs 21 beginning on Page 13 , 29 beginning on Page 20, and Paragraph 56 on Page 33 of FAS 133 with respect to the host contracts that are being hedged.  Those tests state that if the forecasted "transaction" is in reality a group or portfolio of individual transactions, all transactions in the group must bear the same risk exposure within a 10% range discussed in Paragraph 21.   Also see Footnote 9 on Page 13 of FAS 133.  The grouping tests are elaborated upon in the following Paragraphs:

    For example, a group of variable rate notes indexed in the same way upon LIBOR might qualify, whereas having different indices such as LIBOR and U.S. Prime rate underlyings will not qualify.    Also, anticipated purchases cannot be combined with anticipated sales in the same grouping designated as a forecasted transaction even if they have the same underlying.   Paragraph 477 on Page 208 of FAS 133 makes an exception for a portfolio of differing risk exposures for financial instruments designated in foreign currencies so not to conflict with Paragraph 20 of SFAS 52.   For more detail see cash flow hedge and foreign currency hedge.

    Those tests also state that a compound grouping of multiple derivatives (e.g., a portfolio of options or futures or forward contracts or any combination thereof) is prohibited from "separating a derivative into either separate proportions or separate portions and designating any component as a hedging instrument or designating different components as hedges of different exposures."   See Paragraphs 360-362 beginning on Page 167 of FAS 133.  Paragraphs dealing with compound derivative issues include the following:

    Paragraph 18 on Page 10 does allow a single derivative to be divided into components provided but never with partitioning of   "different risks and designating each component as a hedging instrument."   An example using Dutch guilders versus French francs is given under cash flow hedge.

    One question that arises is whether a hedged item and its hedge may have different maturity dates.  Paragraph 18 beginning on Page 9 of FAS 133 rules out hedges such as interest rate swaps from having a longer maturity than the hedged item such as a variable rate loan or receivable.  On the other hand, having a shorter maturity is feasible according to KPMG's Example 13 beginning on Page 225 of the Derivatives and Hedging Handbook issued by KPMG Peat Marwick LLP in July 1998) states the following.  A portion of that example reads as follows:

    Although the criteria specified in paragraph 28(a) of the Standard do not address whether a portion of a single transaction may be identified as a hedged item, we believer that the proportion principles discussed in fair value hedging model also apply to forecasted transactions.

    The difference between a forward exchange rate and a spot rate is not excluded from a fair value hedging relationship for firm commitments measured in forward rates.  However Footnote 22 on Page 68 of FAS 133 reads as follows:

    If the hedged item were a foreign-currency-denominated available-for-sale security instead of a firm commitment, Statement 52 would have required its carrying value to be measured using the spot exchange rate. Therefore, the spot-forward difference would have been recognized immediately in earnings either because it represented ineffectiveness or because it was excluded from the assessment of effectiveness.

    Paragraph 399 on Page 180 of FAS 133 does not allow covered call strategies that permit an entity to write an option on an asset that it owns.  See written option.

    Fair value hedges are accounted for in a similar manner in both FAS 133 and IAS 39.  Paul Pacter states the following at http://www.iasc.org.uk/cmt/0001.asp?s=100107225&sc={D41D74AC-7D6C-11D5-BE63-003048110251}&n=3288 

    IAS 39 Fair Value Hedge Definition
    a hedge of the exposure to changes in the fair value of a recognised asset or liability (such as a hedge of exposure to changes in the fair value of fixed rate debt as a result of changes in interest rates).

    However, a hedge of an unrecognised firm commitment to buy or sell an asset at a fixed price in the enterprise’s reporting currency is accounted for as a cash flow hedge

    IAS 39 Fair Value Hedge Accounting:
    To the extent that the hedge is effective, the gain or loss from remeasuring the hedging instrument at fair value is recognised immediately in net profit or loss. At the same time, the corresponding gain or loss on the hedged item adjusts the carrying amount of the hedged item and is recognised immediately in net profit or loss.

     

    FAS 133 Fair Value Hedge Definition:
    Same as IAS 39

    ...except that a hedge of an unrecognised firm commitment to buy or sell an asset at a fixed price in the enterprise’s reporting currency is accounted for as a fair value hedge or a cash flow hedge.


    SFAS Fair Value Hedge Accounting:
    Same as IAS 39

     

    a. The gain or loss from remeasuring the hedging instrument at fair value should be recognized immediately in earnings; and

    b. The gain or loss on the hedged item attributable to the hedged risk should adjust the carrying amount of the hedged item and be recognized immediately in earnings.

    c. This applies even if a hedged item is otherwise measured at fair value with changes in fair value recognized directly  in equity under paragraph 103b.  It also applies if the hedged item is otherwise measured at cost. 
    (IAS 39 Paragraph 153)
    See IAS 39 Paragraph 154 for example
    .

    Also see hedge and hedge accounting.

     

    DIG issues on fair value at http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/issuindex.html 
    Section F: Fair Value Hedges

    *Issue F1—Stratification of Servicing Assets (Cleared 02/17/99)

    *Issue F2—Partial-Term Hedging (Cleared 07/28/99)
    See Partial-Term Hedgingn

    Yield Curve =

    the graphical relationship between yield and time of maturity of debt or investments in financial instruments.  In the case of interest rate swaps, yield curves are also called swaps curves.  Forward yield (or swaps) curves are used to value many types of derivative financial instruments.   If time is plotted on the abscissa, the yield is usually upward sloping due to term structure of interest rates.  Term structure is an empirically observed phenomenon that yields vary with dates to maturity. 

    FAS 133 refers to yield curves at various points such as in Paragraphs 112 and 319.   The Board also referred to by analogy at various points such as in Paragraphs 162 and 428.  Financial service firms obtain yield curves by plotting the yields of default-free coupon bonds in a given currency against maturity or duration. Yields on debt instruments of lower quality are expressed in terms of a spread relative to the default-free yield curve.   Paragraph 112 of SFAS 113 refers to the "zero-coupon method."   This method is based upon the term structure of spot default-free zero coupon rates.  The interest rate for a specific forward period calculated from the incremental period return in adjacent instruments. A very interesting web site on swaps curves is at http://www.clev.frb.org/research/JAN96ET/yiecur.htm#1b  

    In the introductory Paragraph 111 of FAS 133, the Example 2 begins with the assumption of a flat yield curve. A yield curve is the graphic or numeric presentation of bond equivalent yields to maturity on debt that is identical in every aspect except time to maturity. In developing a yield curve, default risk and liquidity, for example, are the same for every security whose yield is included in the yield curve. Thus yields on U. S. Treasury issues are normally used to plot yield curves. The relationship between yields and time to maturity is often referred to as the term structure of interest rates.

    As explained by the expectations hypothesis of the term structure of interest rates, the typical yield curve increases at a decreasing rate relative to maturity. That is, in normal economic conditions short-term rates are somewhat lower than longer-term rates. In a recession with deflation or disinflation, the entire yield curve shifts downward as interest rates generally fall and rotates indicating that short-term rates have fallen to much lower levels than long-term rates. In an economic expansion accompanied by inflation, interest rates tend to rise and yield curves shift upward and rotate indicating that short-term rates have increased more than long-term rates.

    The different shapes of the yield curve described above complicate the calculation of the present value of an interest rate swap and require the calculation and application of implied forward rates to discount future fixed rate obligations and principal to the present value. Fortunately Example 2 assumes that a flat yield curve prevails at all levels of interest rates. A flat yield curve means that as interest rates rise and fall, short-term and long-term rates move together in lock step, and future cash flows are all discounted at the same current discount rate.

    A yield curve is the graphic or numeric presentation of bond equivalent yields to maturity on debt that is identical in every aspect except time to maturity. In developing a yield curve, default risk and liquidity, for example, are the same for every security whose yield is included in the yield curve. Thus yields on U. S. Treasury issues are normally used to plot Treasury yield curves. The relationship between yields and time to maturity is often referred to as the term structure of interest rates. Similarly, an unknown set of estimated LIBOR yield curves underlie the FASB swap valuations calculated in all FAS 133/138 illustrations.  The FASB has never really explained how swaps are to be valued even though they must be adjusted to fair value at least every three months. Other than providing the assumption that the yields in the yield curves are zero-coupon rates, the FASB offers no information that would allow us to derive the yield curves or calculate the swap values in Examples 2 and 5 in Appendix B of FAS 133 and in other examples using FAS 138 rules.

    The typical yield curve gradually increases relative to years to maturity. That is, historically, short-term rates are somewhat lower than longer-term rates. In a recession with deflation or disinflation the entire yield curve shifts downward as interest rates generally fall and rotates counter-clockwise indicating that short-term rates have fallen to much lower levels than long-term rates. In rapid economic expansion accompanied by inflation, interest rates tend to rise and yield curves shift upward and rotate clockwise indicating that short-term rates have increased more than long-term rates.

    The different shapes of the yield curve described above complicate the calculation of the present value of an interest rate swap and require the calculation and application of implied forward rates to calculate future expected swap cash flows. Example 2 in Appendix B of FAS 133 assumed that a flat yield curve prevails at all levels of interest rates. A flat yield curve means that as interest rates rise and fall, short-term and long-term rates move together in lock step, and future cash flows are all discounted at the same current discount rate. The cash flows and values in the Appendix B Example 5, however, are developed from the prevailing upward sloping yield curve at each reset date.

    The accompanying Excel workbook used the tool Goal Seek in Excel to derive upward sloping yield curves and swap values at the reset dates that generated the $4,016,000 swap value used in the FASB's Example 1 of Section 1 of the FAS 138 examples at  http://www.rutgers.edu/Accounting/raw/fasb/derivatives/examplespg.html.

    Yield curves are typically computed on the basis of a forward calculated in the following manner using the y(t) yield curve values:

    ForwardRate(t) = [1 + y(t)]t/[1 + y(t-1)]t-1 – 1

    The ForwardRate(t) is the forward rate for time period t, y(t) is the multi-period yield that spans t periods, and y(t-1) is the yield for an investment of t-1 periods --- for example, if 6.5% is y(t) and 6.0% is y(t-1). Thus, ForwardRate(2), the forward LIBOR for year 2, is calculated as follows

    ForwardRate(2) = (1.065)2/1.06 – 1 = 0.07 or 7.0%

    In practice, investors and auditors often rely upon the Bloomberg swaps curve estimations.   The contact information for Bloomberg Financial Services is as follows: Bloomberg Financial Markets, 499 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10022; Telephone: 212-318-2000; Fax: 212-980-4585; E-Mail: feedback@bloomberg.com; WWW Link: <http://www.bloomberg.com/> and <http://www.wsdinc.com/pgs_www/w5594.shtml>. Various pricing services are available such as Anderson Investors Software at  http://www.wsdinc.com/products/p3430.shtml    Cutter & Co. provides some illustrations yield curves at http://www.stocktrader.com/summary.html    Discussion group messages about yield curves are archived at http://csf.colorado.edu/mail/longwaves/current-discussion/0086.html

    Links to various sites can be found at http://www.eight.com/websites.htm    You may also want to view my helpers at http://WWW.Trinity.edu/rjensen/acct5341/index.htm  

    Also see my interest rate accrual comments my "Missing Parts of FAS 133" document.

    Bob Jensen provides free online tutorials (in Excel workbooks) on derivation of yield curves, swap curves,  single-period forward rates, and multi-period forward rates. These derivations are done in the context of FAS 133, including the derivations of the missing parts of the infamous Examples 2 and 5 of FAS 133.  Since these tutorials contain answers that instructors may want to keep out of the hands of students in advance of assignments, educators and practitioners must contact Jensen for instructions on how to find the secret URL.  The key files on yield curve derivations are yield.xls, 133ex02a.xls, and 133ex05a.xls. Bob Jensen's email address is rjensen@trinity.edu

     

     


    Measuring Value of Products and Services

    May 7, 2007 message from Joe C Razum [jcrazum@baldor.com]

    Bob,

    Hello. I came across your extensive "knowledge garden" on the web. Very impressive and it looks like a lot of work...and a labor of passion for what you do.

    I am equally passionate about helping companies measure the business value of their offerings, whether its a product system or service.

    In many industries, I sincerely believe that the only way we can beat the "China Factor" is through better knowledge of value delivered and better resultant pricing.

    We've been building our own knowledge garden on value, TCO and value pricing, via the TCO Toolbox software. With over a thousand B2B case studies in our database, using a vendor neutral tool and approach to measuring Total Cost of Ownership (TCO) and now Value, we are attracting some good press:

    Plant Engineering Magazine Gold Product of the Year for Software. Harvard Business Review - Rockwell Automation TCO analysis mentioned in Anderson & Narus' March 2006 article on Value Propositions. HBS Press book ; Rare Commodity: Moving Business Markets Beyond Price to Value (Fall 2007, Anderson, Narus et al) - details 2-4 pages on TCO Toolbox etc.

    This program was born while our company was with Rockwell Automation.

    Since February our parent division is now part of Baldor. I've been the program manager throughout.

    We have a free 90 day demo (full enabled) of the TCO Toolbox software available for download at www.tcotoolbox.com .

    I hope the site makes it on one of your lists.... value measurement, value pricing, etc. is a growing topic based on the conferences I've been to recently.

    All the Best, Joe

    Joe Razum Baldor
    Dodge Reliance mobile 864.363.2781

    Please note my new email address: jcrazum@baldor.com 

    Measure Value... TCO Toolbox www.tcotoolbox.com

     


    Free Online Real Estate Valuations

    Question
    How can you find, in less than a minute, the purported value of a home in the United States?

    Answer
    None of the free major online appraisal sites ( Eppraisal.com, Realestateabc.com , Homegain.com and Zillow ) can find my current boondocks cottage in the White Mountains of New Hampshire. But these sites all tell me that I sold my home in San Antonio too cheap. What can I say? It was my only offer after having my San Antonio home on the market for nearly a year.

    After testing these free online appraisal sites out today, I'm impressed by the convenience of the online appraisal services. However, I think those appraisals run a bit too high, but that's only my opinion. I'm absolutely certain that the Bexar County Tax Appraisal District in San Antonio overvalues homes for tax purposes, but this may be the reason the online free appraisal services also provide, in my opinion, high appraisals. They probably get a lot of their inputs from public taxation appraisal databases.

    Several accounting professors have written to me that their home appraisals at the online sites are way too low. They suspect that the appraisals are based upon old transactions in nearby neighborhoods that are not comparable to their neighborhoods.

    In any case, these services are very fast and convenient if you are mildly considering moving to another community and want to compare home values. They're also convenient if you want to gossip, with wide margins of error, about what your friends' and relatives' homes are worth. That way you can prioritize your efforts to get cut into the better wills when they kick the bucket.

    Warning
    These online free services are no substitutes for more localized appraisals by supposed experts in the community in question. But these experts are sometimes dubious characters. When I purchased my current home my offering price was heavily influenced by the appraisal of John Doe, the local expert appraiser in the Sugar Hill area. The bank where I got my mortgage arranged for John Doe to conduct the appraisal, because I was living in Texas and had no idea who to hire for making an appraisal. The appraisal was $180 per square foot on the value of the house apart from the land value (which in New Hampshire is appraised separately for tax purposes). Keep in mind that high mortgage appraisals please both buyers and sellers of homes. Buyers feel like they got a great deal when they paid less than the appraised value. Sellers are relieved that the buyers could get enough financing to close the deal.

    Two years later, my property tax appraisal shot up to $164 per square foot on my 140-year old cottage apart from the land value. In New Hampshire, the appraisals of surrounding houses and land are mailed by the towns to all home owners. Hence your neighbor's property tax appraisals are not secret. My immediate neighbors' houses were being assessed for less than $100 per square foot apart from land value. So I had John Doe do a second appraisal of my house. Keep in mind that John Doe is the same John Doe who two years earlier appraised my house for $180 per square foot. Since I was having the second appraisal done for purposes of lowering my taxes, John Doe nicely appraised my house now for $115 per square foot apart from the land value. There have been very few home sales in Sugar Hill over the past two years, but realtors tell me that house values have not declined. Certainly construction costs have greatly increased. My  point here is that you can get burned by both the online appraisal services and the local John Doe expert appraisers. Sadly, the Town of Sugar Hill did not agree with John Doe's lowered appraisal.

    "What’s My House Worth? And Now?" by Michelle Slatalla, The New York Times, August 2, 2007 --- Click Here

    THE value of my house fluctuates more often — and for even more mysterious reasons — than my weight these days.
     
    But is it going up? Or down? Either my house lost $94,248 in value over the last two months, or else it gained $32,799 in the last 30 days.

    I can’t tell, because I get conflicting information from online sites — like  Eppraisal.com, Realestateabc.com and Homegain.com — where I find myself obsessively comparing numbers every day or so.

    O.K., every hour or so (or about as often as I used to get on the scale when I was in high school).

    But if I didn’t keep up with the real estate sites, then I wouldn’t know that earlier this summer a center-hall colonial a block away from me sold for $2,439,500 despite its outdated kitchen (thank you, Cyberhomes.com). Or that most of my neighbors are juggling payments on big adjustable-rate mortgages just like mine (thank you Propertyshark.com). Or that the bathroom I recently remodeled may have increased my property value by $33,490 (thank you, Zillow.com).

    With a growing number of Internet sites trolling public databases for financial facts, it has become increasingly easy in the last two years for information addicts like me to perform party tricks by announcing to our friends all kinds of delicious snippets that once were considered intimate, known mainly to brokers or people with enough time to drive to the courthouse to flip through musty files.

    But it’s no longer just cocktail chatter. With a nationwide real estate crisis in full bloom thanks to subprime mortgage woes, falling prices and rising loan rates, homeowners are increasingly turning to Internet sites to try to glean bits of information that may shed light on when to refinance, or whether to sell.

    And why not? I really, really need every tiny bit of information I can get about managing my biggest investment.

    Don’t I?

    “Oh, no! Oh, my goodness, I have to tell you to stop right now,” said Baba Shiv, an associate professor of marketing at Stanford University. “You are being completely irrational. This information can end up having a negative effect on your life.”

    This was not the response I had hoped to hear from someone who specializes in studying how everyday investors make decisions about how to manage their money.

    “But everybody is doing it,” I whined.

    And in my defense, I would like to point out that’s true. In June, for instance, more than 39 million people visited the 20 most popular real estate Web sites, a 22.4 percent increase in visitors over the same period in the previous year, according to Nielsen/NetRatings Inc. Not only that, but a lot of those people are becoming addicted. At Zillow.com, for instance, 44 percent of the site’s users visited five or more times in June, and 25 percent of them 10 or more times, according to a spokeswoman for the site.

    Beyond catering to the voyeuristic appeal of knowing what your neighbor paid per square foot, the sites say they offer a valuable service by making information more accessible to average folks.

    Continued in article

    Conclusion
    As the Financial Accounting Standards Board in the United States and the International Accounting Standards Board in London move closer and closer to fair value accounting for non-financial and well as financial assets and liabilities, the real estate appraisal industry does not give me much faith in "fair value" estimates. Also fair value accounting mixes the hypothetical with transpired transactions into an accounting stew that does mean much to anybody.

    Bob Jensen's threads on the science and art of valuation can be found in the following links:

    http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/FairValue/

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen//theory/00overview/theory01.htm#FairValue

    http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/roi.htm

    One of my PowerPoint slides (Slide 4) deals with real estate appraisals of all Days Inn assets in that company's controversial 1987 annual report. That annual report has traditional historical cost financial statements audited by Price Waterhouse, forecasted financial statements reviewed by Price Waterhouse, and exit (liquidation) value financial statements prepared by an appraisal firm called Landhauer Associates. The PowerPoint show is the 10FairValue.ppt file at http://www.cs.trinity.edu/~rjensen/Calgary/CD/JensenPowerPoint/


    Business Valuation References and Resources

    Whenever I get news about increased interest in business (especially economics and finance) professors on Wall Street, I think back to "The Trillion Dollar Bet" (Nova on PBS Video) a bond trader, two Nobel Laureates, and their doctoral students who very nearly brought down all of Wall Street and the U.S. banking system in the crash of a hedge fund known as Long Term Capital Management where the biggest and most prestigious firms lost an unimaginable amount of money --- http://www.trinity.edu/rjensen/FraudRotten.htm#LTCM


    Valuation for Financial Reporting : Fair Value Measurements and Reporting, Intangible Assets, Goodwill and Impairment , 2nd Edition, by Michael J. Mard, James R. Hitchner, Steven D. Hyden, Wiley, ISBN: 978-0-471-68041-3 Hardcover 240 pages September 2007. The last time I checked Amazon had eight used copies available --- Click Here


    From Jim Mahar's blog on April 26, 2008--- http://financialrounds.blogspot.com/

    Is Valuation Driven More By Cash Flows or Discount Rates?

    Here's one for my next semester's Security Analysis class: In "What Drives Stock Price Movement?" Long Chen and Xinlei Zhao use analyst forecast and stock market data to examine whether stock price changes are associated more with changes in cash flows or discount rates. Here's the abstract (note: the emphasis is mine): A central issue in asset pricing is whether stock prices move due to the revisions of expected future cash flows or/and of expected discount rates, and by how much of each. Using consensus cash flow forecasts, we show that there is a significant component of cash flow news in stock returns, whose importance increases with investment horizons. For horizons over three years, the importance of cash flow news far exceeds that of discount rate news. These conclusions hold at both firm and aggregate levels, and diversification only plays a secondary role in affecting the relative importance of cash flow/discount rate news. The conventional wisdom that cash flow news dominates at the firm level but discount rate news dominates at the aggregate level is largely a myth driven by the estimation methods. Finally, stock returns and cash flow news are positively correlated at both firm and aggregate levels.

    Link to the SSRN working paper --- http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1121893


    "Hedge funds lure business school profs," CNN Money,"September 10, 2007 --- http://money.cnn.com/news/newsfeeds/articles/newstex/AFX-0013-19470175.htm

    The growing and lightly regulated hedge fund industry is attracting new players -- business school professors eager to test their theories in a field known for big risks and occasionally bigger rewards.

    Hedge funds are becoming a tempting tool for faculty members looking to sharpen research and giving a Wall Street perspective to their students, all while making some extra money.

    'MBAs and, to a less extent, Ph.D.'s have taken over the financial world,' said Roger Ibbotson, a professor at the Yale University School of Management and co-founder of a hedge fund. 'What we study is what people in finance know and use.' Hedge funds are a $1.1 trillion industry, largely unregulated and traditionally used by institutions and wealthy investors. Hedge funds profit by using unconventional techniques, such as short-selling, or betting on falling markets to make a profit during market downturns. They typically are active traders and can use techniques off limits to mutual funds.

    While hedge funds frequently outperform more traditional investments, some have failed spectacularly. Last year, Connecticut-based Amaranth Advisors wrongly guessed that tropical storms in the Gulf of Mexico would cause natural gas prices to spike. The storms didn't develop and Amarath lost billions within a week, prompting lawsuits and congressional hearings.

    Economic consultant Peter Bernstein said the link between academic theory and Wall Street is not new, but the interest among professors to run a hedge fund is.

    'Wall Street does not know very much about theory,' Bernstein said. 'The whole notion of risk is something people didn't think about in a systematic sense. Academics come with a structure about how to compose a portfolio.' Ibbotson and Yale finance professor Zhiwu Chen founded Zebra Capital Management in 2001. Housed in an out-of-the-way office park in nearby Milford and staffed by analysts and computer technicians, Zebra has grown into a $265 million fund by using mathematical and economic models to develop investment strategy.

    Its 18.2 percent return for the year through July outpaced the Standard & Poor's (NYSE:MHP) 500 Index, which gained about 3.5 percent in the same period.

    Links between university research and hedge funds are good for both, said William Goetzmann, a Yale business professor who is Ibbotson's research partner.

    Hedge funds are part of a 'new frontier of finance,' boosting universities that draw students who are interested in the industry, he said.

    'It helps a school attract the best and the brightest of students,' Goetzmann said.

    Bernstein said many professors are drawn to hedge funds by the lure of money and little regulation.

    'A lot more in fees, and a lot less constrained,' he said.

    Continued in article

    Jensen Comment
    I'm also reminded of two instructors in a valuation workshop I attended (courtesy of Virginia Tech). These instructors were in the business of valuing firms. What they stressed is that the best advice they could give is to stay away from valuation researchers in academe. One problem in academe is that researchers generally limit themselves to the information content contained in databases that lack the subjective insights on the experts in the trenches. Academic models are limited to the generally insufficient relevant data in their databases. As Yogi Berra stated:  "It is difficult to make predictions, especially about the future"

    True valuation experts would rather study the Bill Belichick School for forecasting --- cheat if you can get away with it:

    A former assistant under Bill Belichick, Mangini arrived in New York last year with an insider's knowledge of the Patriots' sign-stealing surveillance tactics and he shared the dirty little secret with members of the Jets' organization, a person with knowledge of the matter informed the Daily News yesterday.

    It wasn't until the fifth Mangini-Belichick showdown - last Sunday - that the Jets were able to catch the Patriots. Tipped off by Jets security, an NFL security official confiscated a video camera and tape from a Patriots employee at the Meadowlands, and the evidence is believed to be damning
     Rich Cimini, "Eric Mangini exposes Bill Belichick's spy games," NY Daily News, September 12, 2007 --- Click Here 

     

    You can read a more about valuation in the following links:

    From the Journal of Accountancy Smart Stops on the Web, September 2007 ---

    BUSINESS VALUATION